Logic vs emotion

[IndigoRose]

Under what circumstances is logic the correct tool to use to make a decision? When is emotion more correct to use to make a decision? Under what circumstances are "appeals to emotion" the correct argument?
IndigoRose

[Rob Lister]

Originally posted by IndigoRose
Under what circumstances is logic the correct tool to use to make a decision?

always.

When is emotion more correct to use to make a decision?

never.

Under what circumstances are "appeals to emotion" the correct argument?

When logic dictates that doing so is in your interests. Politicians do it all the time --- mostly even.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by IndigoRose
Under what circumstances is logic the correct tool to use to make a decision? When is emotion more correct to use to make a decision? Under what circumstances are "appeals to emotion" the correct argument?
IndigoRose

There is a quote attributed to Jonathan Swift : "you do no reason a man out of something he was not reasoned into." There's a good article in Skeptical Inquirer about the difficulty of using logic on people with regard to their (specifically) religious beliefs, but the difficulty generalizes. A lot of people I know object to gay marriage, for example, on the basis of an "ewwww"-style emotional response, against the gates of which the battering ram of reason can beat forever, without effect.

Logic is also a terrible tool for making decisions with when you either don't have enough information (and thus can't reach a decision), when some of your underlying assumptions are of questionable quality, or when you have too much information and can't sort through it all "logically." In cases like this, emotion, intuition, and reflexive judgement can be both more likely to reach a correct and timely judgement than "reason." None of the good poker players I know -- even the ones with Ph.D.'s in statistics -- use stats at the table. They just read the cards in my hands by staring into my soul. The hunch of an expert can be worth more than a thousand pages of close reasoning.

Logic, then, is only appropriate when you have the kind of information upon which it works, otherwise it's just a method of screwing up by the numbers. Emotion, of course, is also only appropriate when you have the kind of information -- usually, experience -- upon which it works. The trick is to know yourself well enough to judge between them.

I guess this means I disagree with Mr. Lister.

[Rob Lister]

Originally posted by drkitten
Logic, then, is only appropriate when you have the kind of information upon which it works, otherwise it's just a method of screwing up by the numbers. Emotion, of course, is also only appropriate when you have the kind of information -- usually, experience -- upon which it works. The trick is to know yourself well enough to judge between them.

I guess this means I disagree with Mr. Lister.

I'm not so sure you do. Logically, using the logical tool requires that tool is available for use. It isn't always available.

For example: you are enjoying a nice frosty imported brew at your local pub. A drunk walks up and out of the blue takes a swing at you. Do you act instinctively or logically?

Turned out that the drunk was really trying to punch the guy behind you that was about to do you in with a broken beer bottle (you have many unseen fans and enemies, I see).

The drunk could have told you to duck but he logically concluded that verbal communication would have only enlisted a logical response --- you'd have asked, "why?"

[BPSCG]

Originally posted by drkitten
A lot of people I know object to gay marriage, for example, on the basis of an "ewwww"-style emotional response, against the gates of which the battering ram of reason can beat forever, without effect. Not always the case. I had the "ewww" reaction for the longest time, then thought about it, and couldn't come up with any compelling reason to be against gay marriage. I see a host of legal issues that would have to be resolved (can't see it working without a nationwide standard), and it won't happen until the general public gets past its collective "ewww", but I don't see how it makes a difference to me if the two guys next door become legally obligated to each other.

So, yeah, it IS possible for reason to get past the emotions. But you have to be someone who tends to give substantially heavier weight to reason in the first place, I think, because emotions tend to short-circuit the reasoning process.

Edited to add: Spinoza wrote that only an emotion can overcome another emotion. Therefore, reason must itself become an emotion -- a powerful one -- in order that it may outweigh others. He calls this powerful emotion “the intellectual love of God,” which (since Spinoza conceived of God as being the underlying "substance" of the universe, entailing everything that exists and the laws that control it) means love of nature as well and the acceptance of or natural law. Knowledge/understanding of God/Nature is the ultimate virtue.

[T'ai Chi]

Interesting question of when to use logic and when to use emotion!

Both are appropriate, but it all depends on the situation I believe.

If a kid falls down and skins their knee, I'm not going to use logic and, knowing that it is a very minor scratch, just say it is nothing. I'm going to un-logically acknowledge the kid like the scratch is the biggest thing in the universe.

[Batman Jr.]

I've said this one time before on this message board, but I'll say it again. Every logical decision must be born of an emotional urge to be logical. Nietzsche seemed to have picked up on this when in "The Birth of Tragedy," he describes the Dyonisian foundation of the Apollinian.

[BPSCG]

Originally posted by Batman Jr.
I've said this one time before on this message board, but I'll say it again. Every logical decision must be born of an emotional urge to be logical.Why? And why isn't the reverse true - that every emotional decision must be born of a logical urge to be emotional?

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BPSCG
Why? And why isn't the reverse true - that every emotional decision must be born of a logical urge to be emotional?

Oh, I like that one! I think maybe it is. I can logically decide that an emotional response is appropriate, and emotionally decide that a logical response is appropriate. The decisions are usually good. I would hate have a love interest try to use logic to convince me to have a sexual relationship--that would kill it right there. On the other hand, there are aspects of it that need to be dealt with dispassionately ..."I don't care what I am feeling...if you are married, then the relationship will be friends only."
IndigoRose

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by Rob Lister


always .... never.

.

Are all of your decisions based on logic, or are some of them based on emotion? Chocolate vs vanilla? cat vs dog? the blonde or the brunette?
IndigoRose

[jj]

Originally posted by T'ai Chi
If a kid falls down and skins their knee, I'm not going to use logic and, knowing that it is a very minor scratch, just say it is nothing. I'm going to un-logically acknowledge the kid like the scratch is the biggest thing in the universe.

Well, yes, but you'll also teach them where to find the neosporin and the bandaids, yes?

[Rob Lister]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


Are all of your decisions based on logic, or are some of them based on emotion? Chocolate vs vanilla? cat vs dog? the blonde or the brunette?
IndigoRose

Not all of my decisions are based on logic. That wasn't what you asked. Logic is always the correct tool. Even when deciding on chocolate v vanilla.

[jj]

Originally posted by Rob Lister


Not all of my decisions are based on logic. That wasn't what you asked. Logic is always the correct tool. Even when deciding on chocolate v vanilla.

Logic determines personal preference?

[Rob Lister]

Originally posted by jj


Logic determines personal preference?

No, but it should. Of course, that's just my personal preference.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by Rob Lister


No, but it should. Of course, that's just my personal preference.

Why?

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by T'ai Chi
Interesting question of when to use logic and when to use emotion!

Both are appropriate, but it all depends on the situation I believe.

If a kid falls down and skins their knee, I'm not going to use logic and, knowing that it is a very minor scratch, just say it is nothing. I'm going to un-logically acknowledge the kid like the scratch is the biggest thing in the universe.

Actually, the logical thing to do is to direct his attention elsewhere. In other words, distract the kid with a toy or interesting idea. Even "Mommy will kiss it and make it all better." is an appropriate distraction technique. er.. or "daddy". A person can only pay attention to so many things at once; distracting someone in pain often leads to less pain experienced. But if allowed to focus on the area that is painful, it will only get moreso.

Emotions are proprioceptive (body feelings). But then if you think about how it feels to be logical, you realize that logic also changes proprioception, and could be classified as an emotion - if someone really wanted to.

But do notice that the feeling that you're being logical is not the same thing as actually being er.. correctly logical, Veridically Logical.

[Batman Jr.]

Originally posted by BPSCG
Why? And why isn't the reverse true - that every emotional decision must be born of a logical urge to be emotional?
I've never heard of a "logical urge." Isn't that kind of an oxymoron? Compulsion by definition is emotional. Logic systemizes facts. The decision to use logic in your endeavors is a compulsion and therefore emotionally based. People use reason in an effort to get to the truth, though it must be asked why people want to get to the truth. The answer is simple: because of the natural affection the human mind has for that truth. Emotion is simply inseparable from any kind of decision we make.

A decision can be broken up into two parts: the desired consequence and the way to that consequence. The consequence desired is always contingent upon emotion; it is the path to realizing that consequence where either logic is applied or thrown by the wayside.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by Batman Jr.

I've never heard of a "logical urge." Isn't that kind of an oxymoron? Compulsion by definition is emotional. Logic systemizes facts. The decision to use logic in your endeavors is a compulsion and therefore emotionally based. People use reason in an effort to get to the truth, though it must be asked why people want to get to the truth. The answer is simple: because of the natural affection the human mind has for that truth. Emotion is simply inseparable from any kind of decision we make.


No, it is not an oxymoron. I have come across a lot of brain damaged children who can apply deductive logic without error yet are unable to understand emotion, facial expression, humor, inuendo, etc. They have an "urge" to try to apply logic to situations where it is not appropriate. For instance, thinking that walking up to an unknown woman and proposing sex will succeed if he list the logical reasons why she should have sex with him. As most women do not like being treated like prostitutes, it does not work well.

I also disagree that logic is always used to get to the truth. All that is necessary is to use an invalid premise and logic will lead you to whatever conclusion you desire, and as far away from the truth as you wish to get.
IndigoRose

[Batman Jr.]

Originally posted by IndigoRose
No, it is not an oxymoron. I have come across a lot of brain damaged children who can apply deductive logic without error yet are unable to understand emotion, facial expression, humor, inuendo, etc. They have an "urge" to try to apply logic to situations where it is not appropriate. For instance, thinking that walking up to an unknown woman and proposing sex will succeed if he list the logical reasons why she should have sex with him. As most women do not like being treated like prostitutes, it does not work well.
My arguments have nothing to do with understanding others' emotions, but instead only to do with experiencing emotion for oneself. An "urge" to apply logic is still fundamentally emotional even in the case you describe.
Originally posted by IndigoRose
I also disagree that logic is always used to get to the truth. All that is necessary is to use an invalid premise and logic will lead you to whatever conclusion you desire, and as far away from the truth as you wish to get.
I said "in an effort to get to the truth." I never made the claim that logic "always" gives you the truth. Whether or not you get to the truth using logic, your attempt to get the truth is based upon a desire to obtain that truth for yourself.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by Batman Jr.


I said "in an effort to get to the truth."

ok, then I will be more specific. Not everyone who uses deductive logic is making an effort to get to the truth. Sometimes they are deliberately using false premises along with logic to "prove" their own version of what they want to be true.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


ok, then I will be more specific. Not everyone who uses deductive logic is making an effort to get to the truth. Sometimes they are deliberately using false premises along with logic to "prove" their own version of what they want to be true.
IndigoRose
The "tool problem" you cite is well known. Deductive logic only promises a true conclusion if given true premises and produced through a sound syllogism.

How does such behavior reflect on the tool? How does the behavior of some reflect on the motives of the rest? This is specious.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

The "tool problem" you cite is well known. Deductive logic only promises a true conclusion if given true premises and produced through a sound syllogism.

How does such behavior reflect on the tool? How does the behavior of some reflect on the motives of the rest? This is specious.

It doesn't ... no more than someone using a screwdriver for a hammer would. I said that logic is not always used to get to the truth. I did not say that this was because there is some flaw in logic.

Back to my original question however... When is it the correct decision to use emotion to make a decision instead of logic? This question does not mean that logic is somehow flawed, only that it may not always be the right tool.
IndigoRose

[Dymanic]

Under what circumstances is logic the correct tool to use to make a decision?I would say, "Whenever time allows".

Emotions are not something to be consulted prior to making a decision -- they are the end result of a decision-making process which has already taken place. In a real-world environment, decisions must often be made based on incomplete information, and in the hostile envoronments of our ancestors, survival usually favored speed over precision. Running from a hundred lions which turn out to be imaginary is preferable to hesitating in the face of a single one which turns out to be real.

For this reason, evolution has streamlined some decision-making processes by trimming their rule sets to a minimum -- but they still operate by rules. These rules are logical, but since they are optimized for probabilistically favorable results rather than exactness, it may not always appear so. These processes also have direct access to the endocrine system, and thus are not always easily overruled; as has been pointed out, the high priority which they tend to command may render more sophisticated logic routines unavailable.

[Batman Jr.]

Originally posted by Dymanic
I would say, "Whenever time allows".

Emotions are not something to be consulted prior to making a decision -- they are the end result of a decision-making process which has already taken place. In a real-world environment, decisions must often be made based on incomplete information, and in the hostile envoronments of our ancestors, survival usually favored speed over precision. Running from a hundred lions which turn out to be imaginary is preferable to hesitating in the face of a single one which turns out to be real.

For this reason, evolution has streamlined some decision-making processes by trimming their rule sets to a minimum -- but they still operate by rules. These rules are logical, but since they are optimized for probabilistically favorable results rather than exactness, it may not always appear so. These processes also have direct access to the endocrine system, and thus are not always easily overruled; as has been pointed out, the high priority which they tend to command may render more sophisticated logic routines unavailable.
I agree.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by Dymanic
I would say, "Whenever time allows".

For this reason, evolution has streamlined some decision-making processes by trimming their rule sets to a minimum -- but they still operate by rules. These rules are logical, but since they are optimized for probabilistically favorable results rather than exactness, it may not always appear so. These processes also have direct access to the endocrine system, and thus are not always easily overruled; as has been pointed out, the high priority which they tend to command may render more sophisticated logic routines unavailable.

hmmm....maybe I should reword the question....ok.... Do *you* ever make a decsion where you say, "I *feel* like doing ...whatever? Or is every decision based on some kind of logical analysis? If so, what is the logical analysis going on when you are making decisions such as vanilla vs chocolate?
IndigoRose

[Batman Jr.]

So then we're now talking about parsimonious logic as opposed to more extensive logic?

Vanilla vs. Chocolate:

I'll use my two-part-decision-making archetype:
I desire chocolate
a) If I eat chocolate, my desires will be satiated
b) If I eat vanilla, I will not have satiated my desire
c) Therefore, I choose the chocolate.
I guess this would be classified as parsimonious as the logical processes involved in coming to the conclusion in item 2c in the list are performed instantaneously and discreetly.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by IndigoRose

hmmm....maybe I should reword the question....ok.... Do *you* ever make a decsion where you say, "I *feel* like doing ...whatever?Of course. (Doesn't always work out all that great either, btw).
Or is every decision based on some kind of logical analysis?As I said above, I think even an emotional decision is based on some kind of logic, at some level. Plus, since the type of logical analysis for the type of decision you are referring to is really a cost/benefit analysis, to produce realistically viable results it must take into account possible emotional costs and benefits.
If so, what is the logical analysis going on when you are making decisions such as vanilla vs chocolate?I think it can get complicated. Decisions often involve competition between various sub-processes, some concerned with short-term goals, others with long-term goals, and with a lot of feedback in both directions. Vanilla vs chocolate is trivial enough to be settled by some sort of mental coin toss; ice cream vs sit-ups might be a more interesting struggle.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose
When is it the correct decision to use emotion to make a decision instead of logic? This question does not mean that logic is somehow flawed, only that it may not always be the right tool.
IndigoRose
In some ways, the question begins with a false premise. Viewed one way, it assumes one can make a wholly emotional decision, wholly devoid of logic. Viewed the other way, it assumes one can make a wholly logical decision, devoid of emotion.

To resolve this, you need to trace back to fundamentals. In deductive logic, what informs the premises?

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by Batman Jr.
So then we're now talking about parsimonious logic as opposed to more extensive logic?

Vanilla vs. Chocolate:

I'll use my two-part-decision-making archetype:[list=1]
I desire chocolate.....

What I am talking about is making decisions based on emotion, as in "I desire chocolate."
IndigoRose

[BPSCG]

Originally posted by IndigoRose
When is it the correct decision to use emotion to make a decision instead of logic? This question does not mean that logic is somehow flawed, only that it may not always be the right tool.
If the logic isn't flawed, then why would you NOT want to use it?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


What I am talking about is making decisions based on emotion, as in "I desire chocolate."
IndigoRose

I desire chocolate, therefore...?

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BPSCG
If the logic isn't flawed, then why would you NOT want to use it?

This is turning into a very interesting discussion, at least for me. I am not meaning "emotion" as some kind of "anti-logic". What I am talking about is "I desire chocolate" being used to make decisions ... maybe as opposed to "I desire chocolate and hate vanilla, but I eat vanilla because ... (let's say it has less calories)".
IndigoRose

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


I desire chocolate, therefore...?

Yes, I am talking about the "I desire chocolate" part of that, "desire" being an emotion. I am not saying that emotion prevents one from applying logic, but that the decision is based on the emotion.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


This is turning into a very interesting discussion, at least for me. I am not meaning "emotion" as some kind of "anti-logic". What I am talking about is "I desire chocolate" being used to make decisions ... maybe as opposed to "I desire chocolate and hate vanilla, but I eat vanilla because ... (let's say it has less calories)".
IndigoRose

So what you are really talking about is using emotion to feed the premises, which is the point I've been driving at.

Deduction yields no new information, it merely uncovers the truth hidden inside things already known or assumed. We must always use something else to feed it new premises.

What you're grappling with here Antonio Damasso has dubbed Descartes' Error: Cartesian dualism. It is a false premise.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Of course. (Doesn't always work out all that great either, btw).
As I said above, I think even an emotional decision is based on some kind of logic, at some level. Plus, since the type of logical analysis for the type of decision you are referring to is really a cost/benefit analysis, to produce realistically viable results it must take into account possible emotional costs and benefits.
I think it can get complicated. Decisions often involve competition between various sub-processes, some concerned with short-term goals, others with long-term goals, and with a lot of feedback in both directions. Vanilla vs chocolate is trivial enough to be settled by some sort of mental coin toss; ice cream vs sit-ups might be a more interesting struggle.

This is an excelent answer. Yes, an emotional decision is not illogical. The original question was worded poorly. I am still trying to figure out a better way to word it. Maybe, how often does your logical decision making start with "I desire, therefore..", making it an emotional decision but not an illogical one.
IndigoRose

[Rob Lister]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


So what you are really talking about is using emotion to feed the premises, which is the point I've been driving at.

Deduction yields no new information, it merely uncovers the truth hidden inside things already known or assumed. We must always use something else to feed it new premises.

What you're grappling with here Antonio Damasso has dubbed Descartes' Error: Cartesian dualism. It is a false premise.

Wow! The only reason I answered "always" and "never" in my original answer was to promote the debate. It never occured to me they may have been the correct answers - in a circular sort of way.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Rob Lister


Wow! The only reason I answered "always" and "never" in my original answer was to promote the debate. It never occured to me they may have been the correct answers - in a circular sort of way.

When confronted by a false dichotomy, "yes" is often the correct answer.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


When confronted by a false dichotomy, "yes" is often the correct answer.

"Both .. and" rather than "either.. or". A generic way to break out of a paradox.

[Batman Jr.]

Originally posted by IndigoRose
This is turning into a very interesting discussion, at least for me. I am not meaning "emotion" as some kind of "anti-logic". What I am talking about is "I desire chocolate" being used to make decisions ... maybe as opposed to "I desire chocolate and hate vanilla, but I eat vanilla because ... (let's say it has less calories)".
This is still a decision driven by emotion. You just have a stronger desire to lose weight than you do to eat chocolate.

[rppa]

Originally posted by BPSCG
If the logic isn't flawed, then why would you NOT want to use it?

That's a very important but possibly subtle point. I can think of management examples where somebody thought they were making a quantifiable decision because they assigned numbers to things and added them up. This is a way that people fool themselves into thinking they are being "objective" and "logical" and "quantitative".

The problem is that the numerical model, the scoring algorithm, and thus the logic may be deeply flawed and in fact highly subjective, or even representing the opposite of either an emotional or logical decision would be.

My preference for a dichotomy would be between "logical" and "intuitive", because intuition really stands for a decision basis that you might at first have a great deal of trouble quantifying, but if you do, it's the better and more logical basis.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by rppa


My preference for a dichotomy would be between "logical" and "intuitive", because intuition really stands for a decision basis that you might at first have a great deal of trouble quantifying, but if you do, it's the better and more logical basis.

Intuitive is such an emotionally loaded word for some people. The dichotomy for me is situations where I use deduction, and situations where I use induction ... but one does not become the other. They are serving two different purposes.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose
The dichotomy for me is situations where I use deduction, and situations where I use induction ... but one does not become the other. They are serving two different purposes.
IndigoRose
You are drawing too strong a dichotomy here and you err when you say "one does not become the other." Induction is the engine that delivers new premises to deduction. Deduction is incapable of creating new truths; it can only uncover truths latent within the premises.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

You are drawing too strong a dichotomy here and you err when you say "one does not become the other." Induction is the engine that delivers new premises to deduction. Deduction is incapable of creating new truths; it can only uncover truths latent within the premises.

Induction can supply you with a new theory. Deduction can assist you in analysing it. One does not become the other. I am not sure where you see an error.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose

Induction can supply you with a new theory. Deduction can assist you in analysing it. One does not become the other. I am not sure where you see an error.
IndigoRose
"Theory" is a scientific construct. "Induction" is a logical construct. Deduction does not assist in analyzing induction.

I go to a field in New England and see hundreds of orange day lillies. I drive further west and stop at another New England field and see dozens of orange day lillies. Onto New York, where I stop at a huge field and see thousands of orange day lillies. It is the same in Ohio. And Indiana. Everywhere I go I see orange day lillies and only orange day lillies. I induce: "All day lilllies are orange."

That is a conclusion of the induction, and a premise to any deduction. Now I dig up a dozen day lilly tubers, from many different fields, and plant them in my yard. They are about to bloom. I deduce:

All day lillies are orange
These plants about to bloom are day lillies
Therefore these plants about to bloom are orange.

Induction is the logic engine that supplies new premises to deduction.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


Induction is the logic engine that supplies new premises to deduction.

We are saying the same thing, so I don't understand why you see an error. The process of producing the premise is different than the process that proves the premise.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


We are saying the same thing, so I don't understand why you see an error. The process of producing the premise is different than the process that proves the premise.
IndigoRose

I'm hoping that this post makes it clear we're not saying the same thing. I think you have the misconception that deduction proves the initial premises. It doesn't. Go back over the example I posted. Induction created the universal premise about day lillies. Deduction predicted instances of day lillies based on the premise. It said that these day lilllies, as yet unblooming, will be orange. That is simply a prediction about specific cases.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


I think you have the misconception that deduction proves the initial premises.

No, I don't, and I don't know where you got that idea.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


No, I don't, and I don't know where you got that idea.
IndigoRose
Perhaps it might serve the discussion better for you to address the substance of my post?

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

Perhaps it might serve the discussion better for you to address the substance of my post?

You said, "I think you have the misconception that deduction proves the initial premises." and I disagreed with your assumption.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose
You said, "I think you have the misconception that deduction proves the initial premises." and I disagreed with your assumption.
IndigoRose

Well, then I must misunderstand this statement of yours: "The process of producing the premise is different than the process that proves the premise." You wrote it in response to my statement: "Induction is the logic engine that supplies new premises to deduction. " Please explain what you meant, then.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


Well, then I must misunderstand this statement of yours: "The process of producing the premise is different than the process that proves the premise." You wrote it in response to my statement: "Induction is the logic engine that supplies new premises to deduction. " Please explain what you meant, then.

Induction, going from the specific to the general, supplies a hypothesis, or a premise. That process of producing hypotheses is different than the deduction used to prove a hypothesis.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


Induction, going from the specific to the general, supplies a hypothesis, or a premise. That process of producing hypotheses is different than the deduction used to prove a hypothesis.
IndigoRose

Induction proves induction. Period. End of story. Deduction does not prove induction. How many times must I repeat myself? I provided an example of both previously. Induction produces new premises. Deduction is NOT used to then prove those premises. Induction did that already.

If you still don't get this, then please provide examples.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

Induction proves induction.


No, induction does not prove the hypothesis it creates.

Deduction does not prove induction.


I did not say that deduction proves induction

Induction produces new premises.


Yes, I said that already, several times.

Deduction is NOT used to then prove those premises.


I *am* saying that induction is used to create a hypothesis. I am *not* saying that deduction proves a premise.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


No, induction does not prove the hypothesis it creates.



I did not say that deduction proves induction



Yes, I said that already, several times.



I *am* saying that induction is used to create a hypothesis. I am *not* saying that deduction proves a premise.
IndigoRose
You obviously have no idea what you are talking about. Provide examples or citations or stop wasting our time and go away.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

You obviously have no idea what you are talking about. Provide examples or citations or stop wasting our time and go away.


You said, "I think you have the misconception that deduction proves the initial premises." and I disagreed with your assumption.

IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

"Induction can supply you with a new theory. Deduction can assist you in analysing it."

Wrong.

"Induction, going from the specific to the general, supplies a hypothesis, or a premise. That process of producing hypotheses is different than the deduction used to prove a hypothesis. "

Wrong.

I have asked you to provide examples or citations. Please do so. If you fail to do so with your next post, then this is my last post to you on this topic.

[IndigoRose]

BillHoyt's premise: "I think you have the misconception that deduction proves the initial premises"

Your premise is incorrect. I do not think that. Since your premise is incorrect, that is as far as it needs to go.
IndigoRose

[IndigoRose]

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
"Induction can supply you with a new theory. Deduction can assist you in analysing it."

Wrong.

"Induction, going from the specific to the general, supplies a hypothesis, or a premise. That process of producing hypotheses is different than the deduction used to prove a hypothesis. "

Wrong.

I have asked you to provide examples or citations. Please do so. If you fail to do so with your next post, then this is my last post to you on this topic.

This is verging on the silly, but it's also typical of your rather short-sighted view of the practical aspects of mathematical thought.

Have you ever noticed that lots of even numbers (greater than four) appear to be the sum of two odd primes?

6 = 3 + 3
8 = 5 + 3
10 = 3 + 7 = 5 + 5
12 = 7 + 5
100 = 97 + 3 = 93 + 7 = 89 + 11 = ...

Induction suggests a hypothesis : Every even number (greater than 4) is the sum of two odd primes. (This, of course, is the famous Goldbach conjecture.)

Induction, as shown, will generate the hypothesis, but to prove the hypothesis will require deductive reasoning. If you figure out a suitable deductive argument "proving the hypothesis," let me know. I -- and most of the number theory community -- would be interested.

q.e.d.?

(Edited to fix rather embarassing typo.)

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by drkitten

Have you ever noticed that lots of even numbers (greater than four) appear to be the sum of two odd primes?

6 = 3 + 3
8 = 5 + 3
10 = 3 + 7 = 5 + 5
12 = 7 + 5
100 = 97 + 3 = 93 + 7 = 89 + 11 = ...

Induction suggests a hypothesis : Every even number (greater than 4) is the sum of two odd primes. (This, of course, is the famous Goldbach conjecture.)

Induction, as shown, will generate the hypothesis, but to prove the hypothesis will require deductive reasoning. If you figure out a suitable deductive argument "proving the hypothesis," let me know. I -- and most of the number theory community -- would be interested.

q.e.d.?


I like your example. Thanks.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten


This is verging on the silly, but it's also typical of your rather short-sighted view of the practical aspects of mathematical thought.

Have you ever noticed that lots of even numbers (greater than four) appear to be the sum of two odd primes?

6 = 3 + 3
8 = 5 + 3
10 = 3 + 7 = 5 + 5
12 = 7 + 5
100 = 97 + 3 = 93 + 7 = 89 + 11 = ...

Induction suggests a hypothesis : Every even number (greater than 4) is the sum of two odd primes. (This, of course, is the famous Goldbach conjecture.)

Induction, as shown, will generate the hypothesis, but to prove the hypothesis will require deductive reasoning. If you figure out a suitable deductive argument "proving the hypothesis," let me know. I -- and most of the number theory community -- would be interested.

q.e.d.?

(Edited to fix rather embarassing typo.)
The conjecture has been proved by induction. There is, as yet, no deductive argument that also proves it. Mathematics recognizes proof by induction, drkitten.

But we are not talking here of mathematics; we are talking about logic more generally, aren't we. Who is being short-sighted?

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

The conjecture has been proved by induction. There is, as yet, no deductive argument that also proves it. Mathematics recognizes proof by induction, drkitten.



The Goldbach conjecture has NOT been proven true by induction; it hasn't been proven true at all, and there's possibly a Fields medal in it for you if you can show it to be true. Experimental evidence has proven it to be true up to about 10^14, but of course, it's a long way from there to infinity.

More directly, "induction" and "proof by induction" are two different things. Proof by induction is actually an example of deductive reasoning, where you use the two premises that F(0) is true and that if F(i) is true, and so infer deductively that it must be true for all i (>= 0). Mathematics recognizes proof by induction only because it's deductively valid.

Which is the point. We have strong inductive evidence that the Goldbach conjecture is true, but no amount of inductive evidence will demonstrate its truth. To do that will require deductive reasoning. Induction will generate the conjecture, but few conjectures can be proven by mere enumeration of cases (which is all induction really is).

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten


The Goldbach conjecture has NOT been proven true by induction; it hasn't been proven true at all, and there's possibly a Fields medal in it for you if you can show it to be true. Experimental evidence has proven it to be true up to about 10^14, but of course, it's a long way from there to infinity.

More directly, "induction" and "proof by induction" are two different things. Proof by induction is actually an example of deductive reasoning, where you use the two premises that F(0) is true and that if F(i) is true, and so infer deductively that it must be true for all i (>= 0). Mathematics recognizes proof by induction only because it's deductively valid.

Which is the point. We have strong inductive evidence that the Goldbach conjecture is true, but no amount of inductive evidence will demonstrate its truth. To do that will require deductive reasoning. Induction will generate the conjecture, but few conjectures can be proven by mere enumeration of cases (which is all induction really is).

No, that is MY point, drkitten. In Logic, deduction does not prove induction. Induction stands on its own. We are, then, left with the dilemma: induction creates new knowledge, but doesn't guarantee the knowledge, and deduction guarantees the knowledge, but can't create new knowledge.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


No, that is MY point, drkitten. In Logic, deduction does not prove induction. Induction stands on its own. We are, then, left with the dilemma: induction creates new knowledge, but doesn't guarantee the knowledge, and deduction guarantees the knowledge, but can't create new knowledge.

That's a dilemma?

"We're left with this dilemma: hammers pound nails, but can't turn screws, and screwdrivers turn screws, but can't pound nails." You use the tool to the purpose at hand.

Returning to IndigoRose's statement


Induction, going from the specific to the general, supplies a hypothesis, or a premise. That process of producing hypotheses is different than the deduction used to prove a hypothesis.

... I think it's quite clear that she's absolutely correct. The Goldbach conjecture example demonstrates it. Induction will produce the hypothesis, but the deduction used to prove is [will have to be] different.

As she said elsewhere:


The process of producing the premise is different than the process that proves the premise.

and

Induction can supply you with a new theory. Deduction can assist you in analysing it. One does not become the other.

Perhaps you can explain your objections to those three statements of hers in light of the Goldbach conjecture example?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten


That's a dilemma?

"We're left with this dilemma: hammers pound nails, but can't turn screws, and screwdrivers turn screws, but can't pound nails." You use the tool to the purpose at hand.
Keep in mind the objective is to get to new knowlege. Induction gets new knowledge, but can't guarantee it. Deduction guarantees knowledge, but can't produce new knowledge. Yeah, I'd call that a dilemma.

Returning to IndigoRose's statement



... I think it's quite clear that she's absolutely correct. The Goldbach conjecture example demonstrates it. Induction will produce the hypothesis, but the deduction used to prove is [will have to be] different.

As she said elsewhere:



and


Perhaps you can explain your objections to those three statements of hers in light of the Goldbach conjecture example? [/B]
Stop restricting us to mathematics. Stop restricting us to the Goldbach conjecture. The topic is logic's ability to aid us in making decisions. Please go back to the beginning of this thread to see that is so.

And yes, my objections stand and are quite clear. Induction is its own argument form. Logically, induction provides new knowledge. It is not then proven by deduction. The dilemma that I am pointing to is the reason for the epistemology of science.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

Keep in mind the objective is to get to new knowlege. Induction gets new knowledge, but can't guarantee it. Deduction guarantees knowledge, but can't produce new knowledge. Yeah, I'd call that a dilemma.


So you use induction to get to new knowledge, and then you use deduction to confirm the truth of what you suspected from induction.

This is elementary, and hardly a dilemma.




Stop restricting us to mathematics. Stop restricting us to the Goldbach conjecture. The topic is logic's ability to aid us in making decisions....
And yes, my objections stand and are quite clear.

Then perhaps you could actually restate your objections in a way that applies to a specific problem. I'm hardly "restricting" you to mathematics, but if your epistemological framework won't even let you make logical decisions in as ritualized and restricted a framework as mathematics, then there's something deeply wrong with your framework.

If you prefer your own (nonmathematical) example, you drew the conjecture that "all day lillies are orange" from your observations of fields of day lillies. As you yourself acknowledge, that statement has not been "proven" true. If you want to prove it true, however, it's (relatively) easy to set up a deductive argument that produces that proposition as a conclusion. For example,

All plants with this particular gene produce this protein to color their flowers.
This protein colors flowers orange.
All day lillies have this particular gene.
Therefore, all day lillies are orange.

Without the impetus provided by the induction, you likely would never have thought to look at the genetics of flower coloration. Thus, induction provided you with the conjecture, and deduction (albeit from a different set of premises) guarantees the truth of that conclusion. Induction and deduction together provide you with a method of getting new knowledge and making decisions.

Or, as IndigoRose put it (and you have not yet substantially objected to) :


Induction, going from the specific to the general, supplies a hypothesis, or a premise. That process of producing hypotheses is different than the deduction used to prove a hypothesis.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten


So you use induction to get to new knowledge, and then you use deduction to confirm the truth of what you suspected from induction.

This is elementary, and hardly a dilemma.
Really? One wonders why science was invented.

Then perhaps you could actually restate your objections in a way that applies to a specific problem. I'm hardly "restricting" you to mathematics, but if your epistemological framework won't even let you make logical decisions in as ritualized and restricted a framework as mathematics, then there's something deeply wrong with your framework.

If you prefer your own (nonmathematical) example, you drew the conjecture that "all day lillies are orange" from your observations of fields of day lillies. As you yourself acknowledge, that statement has not been "proven" true. If you want to prove it true, however, it's (relatively) easy to set up a deductive argument that produces that proposition as a conclusion. For example,

All plants with this particular gene produce this protein to color their flowers.
This protein colors flowers orange.
All day lillies have this particular gene.
Therefore, all day lillies are orange.

Without the impetus provided by the induction, you likely would never have thought to look at the genetics of flower coloration. Thus, induction provided you with the conjecture, and deduction (albeit from a different set of premises) guarantees the truth of that conclusion. Induction and deduction together provide you with a method of getting new knowledge and making decisions.

Or, as IndigoRose put it (and you have not yet substantially objected to) :


So one can deduce that all organisms on earth use DNA or RNA? Please explain how that is so.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

Really? One wonders why science was invented.



Because previous methods of doing "natural philosophy" had relied almost solely on deductive reasoning. "Science" is simply the most reliable way we've found for merging inductive and deductive reasoning.

For a longer answer, I refer you to Sir Karl Popper.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten


Because previous methods of doing "natural philosophy" had relied almost solely on deductive reasoning. "Science" is simply the most reliable way we've found for merging inductive and deductive reasoning.

For a longer answer, I refer you to Sir Karl Popper.
But you just wrote: "So you use induction to get to new knowledge, and then you use deduction to confirm the truth of what you suspected from induction." There seems to be no need for science's methods here. Induction and deduction would seem to be enough.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

But you just wrote: "So you use induction to get to new knowledge, and then you use deduction to confirm the truth of what you suspected from induction." There seems to be no need for science's methods here. Induction and deduction would seem to be enough.

I again refer you to Sir Karl Popper.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten


I again refer you to Sir Karl Popper.
I again pose to you the question: why science? You claim deduction is used to prove induction. This is logically incorrect. You claim natural philosophy relied solely on deduction. This is not so. I have asked you to explain why science was necessary and you claim it merges induction and deduction But this flies in the face of your claim that deduction proves induction. I await a direct answer.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by drkitten


Have you ever noticed that lots of even numbers (greater than four) appear to be the sum of two odd primes?

6 = 3 + 3
8 = 5 + 3
10 = 3 + 7 = 5 + 5
12 = 7 + 5
100 = 97 + 3 = 93 + 7 = 89 + 11 = ...

Induction suggests a hypothesis : Every even number (greater than 4) is the sum of two odd primes. (This, of course, is the famous Goldbach conjecture.)

Induction, as shown, will generate the hypothesis, but to prove the hypothesis will require deductive reasoning.

I liked your examples. Sorry it took so long to get back to it, but I was working on something else. Where the conversation kept getting thwarted from what both of us were saying is in the misreading of when I said this:


Induction, going from the specific to the general, supplies a hypothesis, or a premise....


BillHoyt's premise: "I think you have the misconception that deduction proves the initial premises"

To state it more clearly:
Induction is used to supply a hypothesis.
Induction is used to supply a premise.
This does not mean a hypothesis and a premise are the same thing. It only means that induction can be used to supply each of these things.

If I am doing a problem in plane geometry, I might state a premise that parallel lines do not meet, and then use that premise to prove some else. The deductive process I used *is not* aimed at proving or disproving the original premise about parallel lines that I stated.

If I state a hypothesis, it *is* my intention to try see if I can disprove my stated hypothesis. My goal is different. I go about reaching that goal by using deductive reasoning.
IndigoRose

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

I again pose to you the question: why science? You claim deduction is used to prove induction.

Objected to as already asked and answered.

Again, I refer you to Sir Karl.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten


Objected to as already asked and answered.

Again, I refer you to Sir Karl.
Sorry to hear you are unable or unwilling to answer.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

Sorry to hear you are unable or unwilling to answer.

I'm unwilling to repeat the answer I've already given. Please try again. After you've read Sir Karl Popper, who has addressed these issues in depth.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten


I'm unwilling to repeat the answer I've already given. Please try again. After you've read Sir Karl Popper, who has addressed these issues in depth.
I don't think you should presume I haven't already. A reference to an author hardly answers a specific question. That author may have in his many works, provided an answer, but it is incumbent upon you to specifically quote that author or to paraphrase his answer.

Anything less is not only a dodge, but a personal insult.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

I don't think you should presume I haven't already. A reference to an author hardly answers a specific question. That author may have in his many works, provided an answer, but it is incumbent upon you to specifically quote that author or to paraphrase his answer.

Anything less is not only a dodge, but a personal insult.

I've already paraphrased his answer above, and you misread it. Therefore, I refer you to the master : Sir Karl Popper.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten


I've already paraphrased his answer above, and you misread it. Therefore, I refer you to the master : Sir Karl Popper.
Here is what you said:
Because previous methods of doing "natural philosophy" had relied almost solely on deductive reasoning.
Not true in the least. Newton's Principia, for example, offered this rule: "In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phænomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions"

Clearly, Newton here is recognizing general induction as the basis for "experimental philosophy's" (another name for natural philosophy) propositions.
"Science" is simply the most reliable way we've found for merging inductive and deductive reasoning.
This doesn't address the question of your claim about induction and deduction's sufficiency.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt



Not true in the least. Newton's Principia, for example, offered this rule: "In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phænomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions"

Clearly, Newton here is recognizing general induction as the basis for "experimental philosophy's" (another name for natural philosophy) propositions.



Right. That's because Newton is one of the early founders (and inventors) of the scientific method, along with his close contemporaries such as Gallileo, Copernicus, and the other leading lights of that era. If you compare that method of inductive inquiry with the earlier work, for example, of the Scholastics or of the Greek philosophers, there was a general opinion that (deductive) reason alone would explain the natural world, without recourse to experimentation. Newton, in this excerpt, is basically defending the as-yet unnamed concept of "the scientific method" against the previous philosophical concepts.

You can see further evidence for this shift in the mere fact that he felt compelled to write these paragraphs. In the same way that historians infer the existence of a practice from written documents decrying or prohibiting the practice, Newton's spirited defense of the specialized field he terms "experimental philosophy" illustrates the dominance at the time of what might be called "unexperimental philosophy," the rationalist/Scholastic doctrine of the sufficiency of reason, the doctrine of belief in "contrary hypothesis that may be imagined," but not supported via empirical evidence.

The essentials of the scientific method are here in Newton's exposition : assume the provisional truth of propositions inferred inductively, but confirm their truth via other methods. Newton does not state that deductive logic is to be one of those other methods, but it's implicit in the rest of his writings, including the Principia itself.

Since Newton, of course, "the scientific method" has not only become the dominant paradigm of reasoning, but has also been refined and improved. One of the weaknesses of the scientific method, for example, is that general induction, combined with the providional assumption of truth for propositions so obtained, is too weak a gatekeeper. A big role of deduction is thus to refute these presumed truths via what amounts to modus tollens. It would be more efficient if we had a way to reduce the number of incorrect hypotheses accepted. Thus, there are a number of technical improvements that have happened since then. The peer-review system allows scientists to confirm that the inductive reasoning used by the original science is in fact valid. The idea of a "control group" provides some degree of protection against false induction. A further protection was provided by the idea of blinding, and then double-blinding, experiments to avoid known effects that would be likely to result in the false acceptance of a bad hypothesis. Of course, deduction could eliminate these hypotheses (when the presumed-true theory was shown incompatible with other data), but why not just elliminate the extra step and apply a higher standard to inductive reasoning?

"Science," thus, is just the current best way we've found to merge inductive and deductive reasoning. The basic framework was laid by Popper; theories are generated by whatever means, usually inductively, through the inspection of data. A theory is really only "scientific" if it makes a testable prediction, that is, if deductive reasoning applied to the theory results in a statement that can be shown to be true or false. A subsequent finding that the prediction is false implies (deductively, via modus tollens) that the original theory itself is false.

Add in a few PDF files for grant proposals, and you've re-invented the National Science Foundation.

What aspect of science do you feel is NOT captured by applications of inductive and deductive reasoning?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten
Right. That's because Newton is one of the early founders (and inventors) of the scientific method, along with his close contemporaries such as Gallileo, Copernicus, and the other leading lights of that era. If you compare that method of inductive inquiry with the earlier work, for example, of the Scholastics or of the Greek philosophers, there was a general opinion that (deductive) reason alone would explain the natural world, without recourse to experimentation. Newton, in this excerpt, is basically defending the as-yet unnamed concept of "the scientific method" against the previous philosophical concepts.
I agree that this was part of the breakaway of Natural Philosophy from philosophy. This began a great war that ultimately resulted in Science divorcing itself from Philosophy in many respects. Newton called it induction to be sure, as have many others since, but it is not quite so.

You can see further evidence for this shift in the mere fact that he felt compelled to write these paragraphs. In the same way that historians infer the existence of a practice from written documents decrying or prohibiting the practice, Newton's spirited defense of the specialized field he terms "experimental philosophy" illustrates the dominance at the time of what might be called "unexperimental philosophy," the rationalist/Scholastic doctrine of the sufficiency of reason, the doctrine of belief in "contrary hypothesis that may be imagined," but not supported via empirical evidence.
True enough. There was more going on there, though. At the time, the nascent scientists were fighting a battle on at least two fronts. One was with Religion, whose tenets were already being challenged, even though Science and scientists both strove to serve God. They saw themselves as trying to reveal His creation. But they served another master as well: probity. They trusted their processes of tearing apart the watches to see what made them tick. This didn't sit well with the religious establishment.

Equally, they were challenging Aristotle, whose reign from the grave had lasted centuries. His idealized notions continued to outweigh the evidence in front of philosophers. They didn't trust scientists either. Why? Because they already knew that induction creates, but doesn't guarantee new knowledge and that deductions guarantees but cannot create new knowledge. They allowed themselves to wallow in an epistemological Zeno's paradox.

Newton called the developing scientific methods induction, but it is not really induction. This, of course, was one of the fundamental problems. Scientists could not satisfactorily explain what the hello they were doing, nor why the hello it kept working. It was neither hot nor cold, and philosophy wanted to spit it out from its mouth.

The essentials of the scientific method are here in Newton's exposition : assume the provisional truth of propositions inferred inductively, but confirm their truth via other methods. Newton does not state that deductive logic is to be one of those other methods, but it's implicit in the rest of his writings, including the Principia itself.
But this cannot and does not work, as will become clearer later. Let us say, for example, that we actually did induce the hypothesis that all swans are white. Then we devise a test wherein we raid a local pond, and grab a few swans. We test swan 1. White. Swan 2. White. Swan 3. White. There is no serialization here, unlike mathematical induction, whereby we can declare all swans to be white from this. Each deduction has simply said this is another instance of a white swan. When we finally encounter Swan 5,431 and find it is black, our only recourse is to modify the proposition to some swans are white, or, more boldy, most swans are white.

Since Newton, of course, "the scientific method" has not only become the dominant paradigm of reasoning, but has also been refined and improved. One of the weaknesses of the scientific method, for example, is that general induction, combined with the providional assumption of truth for propositions so obtained, is too weak a gatekeeper. A big role of deduction is thus to refute these presumed truths via what amounts to modus tollens.
Now we're at Popper, who first stated this proposition. Now he, too, called it induction, but we'll get to that error later. What you miss here in this description is that the deduction is NOT being used on the real hypothesis, but on a straw man hypothesis. The straw man was designed to be refuted, in order to drop one more possibility from the infinite set of possibilities. We never actually apply deduction to the hypothesis we are after. This is not a case of a deduction proving an induction.

It would be more efficient if we had a way to reduce the number of incorrect hypotheses accepted. Thus, there are a number of technical improvements that have happened since then. The peer-review system allows scientists to confirm that the inductive reasoning used by the original science is in fact valid.
Actually, no. Peer review simply weeds out obvious errors in method or obvious disconnects between hypothesis tested and conclusions claimed. The idea of a "control group" provides some degree of protection against false induction. A further protection was provided by the idea of blinding, and then double-blinding, experiments to avoid known effects that would be likely to result in the false acceptance of a bad hypothesis.
No, these methods are only used in the softer sciences, where self-reporting, interpretation and possible unconscious bias are large effects. They are not part of the overall scientific framework.
Of course, deduction could eliminate these hypotheses (when the presumed-true theory was shown incompatible with other data), but why not just elliminate the extra step and apply a higher standard to inductive reasoning?
I think you forget that the number of possible hypotheses is infinite. This is true for every proposition you wish to test.
"Science," thus, is just the current best way we've found to merge inductive and deductive reasoning. The basic framework was laid by Popper; theories are generated by whatever means, usually inductively, through the inspection of data. A theory is really only "scientific" if it makes a testable prediction, that is, if deductive reasoning applied to the theory results in a statement that can be shown to be true or false. A subsequent finding that the prediction is false implies (deductively, via modus tollens) that the original theory itself is false.

Add in a few PDF files for grant proposals, and you've re-invented the National Science Foundation.

What aspect of science do you feel is NOT captured by applications of inductive and deductive reasoning?
What we are talking about here, as I've stated previously, is not deduction about the target proposition, but deduction about a tangential straw man. And what we are talking about here is not induction in the first place, but something else. Review the science literature in any specialized area. You will not find a succession of papers that each simply report an instance of X, followed by a paper testing the now established induction of X as a general proposition. X is actually created by retroduction, also known as abduction, a third leg of the logic ladders.

If we pick a ball from an urn and find it is white, and another, and another, and another, we have cause to induce that all the balls from the urn are white.

If we know we've just blindfoldedly picked a ball from said urn, we have deductive cause to believe that, when we take off the blindfold, we'll see we have a white ball.

If however, we find a white ball, we can abduce that it came from that self-same urn. We have to have established a scaffold of facts and evidence for that abduction to work, but that is how science actually works. We have to know, with some confidence, that all other urns in the area have non-white balls. We have also to know there are no other balls just hanging around the area. We have to rule out other possibilities until, in a Holmes-like fashion, we converge on the most probable answer. (Yes, I know; Doyle also incorrectly called it deduction.)

Yes, this is a kind merging of induction and deduction, but in a very limited sense. And it is much more. It introduces this new (in relative terms) retroductive reasoning process.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


Yes, this is a kind merging of induction and deduction,



This statement is true.




but in a very limited sense. And it is much more.

And this is untrue.

And if you want to find out more, I refer you, again, to Sir Karl, who dealt with this issue much more explicity and logically than the straw man version you've presented above.

And this is my last word on the subject.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by drkitten
And this is my last word on the subject.
Pardon me for having gone over your head. B'uh B'ai.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Let us say, for example, that we actually did induce the hypothesis that all swans are white. Then we devise a test wherein we raid a local pond, and grab a few swans. We test swan 1. White. Swan 2. White. Swan 3. White. There is no serialization here, unlike mathematical induction, whereby we can declare all swans to be white from this. Each deduction has simply said this is another instance of a white swan. When we finally encounter Swan 5,431 and find it is black, our only recourse is to modify the proposition to some swans are white, or, more boldy, most swans are white.

In theory, we could collect all the swans on earth and find out if they're all white. But it's highly problematic in practice.

We could also look at it from a different perspective which would make the question irrelevant. For example, we could find the portion(s) of DNA that make them white; and define having that DNA (plus the prototypical swanniness parts of the DNA) as being a white swan. Then we could only speak tautologically: All animals with white swan DNA are white swans.

Oops, did that white swan just get coated in black oil? :) Creating a counter-example is too easy to even contemplate universality.

We have to rule out other possibilities until, in a Holmes-like fashion, we converge on the most probable answer. (Yes, I know; Doyle also incorrectly called it deduction.)

Yes, this is a kind merging of induction and deduction, but in a very limited sense. And it is much more. It introduces this new (in relative terms) retroductive reasoning process.

But we have to remember that the convergence is still subject to error; there may be areas of the unlimited alternative possibilities that we don't know about and so haven't considered.

Isn't abduction what we do when we do experiments on mice; and speculate proportional effects on people?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist


In theory, we could collect all the swans on earth and find out if they're all white. But it's highly problematic in practice.

We could also look at it from a different perspective which would make the question irrelevant. For example, we could find the portion(s) of DNA that make them white; and define having that DNA (plus the prototypical swanniness parts of the DNA) as being a white swan. Then we could only speak tautologically: All animals with white swan DNA are white swans.

Oops, did that white swan just get coated in black oil? :) Creating a counter-example is too easy to even contemplate universality.



But we have to remember that the convergence is still subject to error; there may be areas of the unlimited alternative possibilities that we don't know about and so haven't considered.

Isn't abduction what we do when we do experiments on mice; and speculate proportional effects on people?
Thank you for that enormous contribution to the discussion. I always like my trash compactor full before I bring its contents to the dump.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

Thank you for that enormous contribution to the discussion. I always like my trash compactor full before I bring its contents to the dump.

Look who's talking. What does anything you've posted here have anything to do with when Emotional analysis is more appropriate than logical analysis?

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by Suggestologist


Look who's talking. What does anything you've posted here have anything to do with when Emotional analysis is more appropriate than logical analysis?

Yes. Maybe we can get this back onto the topic. What is your take on the original question I posted?
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


Yes. Maybe we can get this back onto the topic. What is your take on the original question I posted?
IndigoRose
I provided you my take on the question, but you failed to take me up on that angle. I will repeat it here: the question rests on a false premise. It presumes Descarte's error. Logic needs to be fed by premises. One class of such premises is one's emotions. Without the two working together one cannot get what one wants. The dichotomy is false.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

I provided you my take on the question, but you failed to take me up on that angle. I will repeat it here: the question rests on a false premise. It presumes Descarte's error. Logic needs to be fed by premises. One class of such premises is one's emotions. Without the two working together one cannot get what one wants. The dichotomy is false.

The question was not directed at you. If you want to talk about that, why don't you start a new topic?
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


The question was not directed at you. If you want to talk about that, why don't you start a new topic?
IndigoRose
This is a public forum, run by a skeptic's organization. If you cannot deal with skeptical inquiry, you really ought to question why you are here. If you wish to try to deal with skeptical inquiry, you cannot post publicly and restrict the responses.

I am talking about the premise of your question. That is the topic of this thread. The premise, as I have pointed out, is wrong. It presumes a dichotomy that doesn't really exist.

Now, please address those points.

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

This is a public forum, run by a skeptic's organization. If you cannot deal with skeptical inquiry, you really ought to question why you are here. If you wish to try to deal with skeptical inquiry, you cannot post publicly and restrict the responses.

I am talking about the premise of your question. That is the topic of this thread. The premise, as I have pointed out, is wrong. It presumes a dichotomy that doesn't really exist.

Now, please address those points.

Why don't you start yourself a new thread, and then you can talk all you want about your topic.
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by IndigoRose


Why don't you start yourself a new thread, and then you can talk all you want about your topic.
IndigoRose
Your topic is "Logic vs emotion," is it not?

This was your opening post, was it not?
"Under what circumstances is logic the correct tool to use to make a decision? When is emotion more correct to use to make a decision? Under what circumstances are "appeals to emotion" the correct argument?"

The first two questions set up the false dichotomy of logic vs emotion, do they not?

The answer that the question is wrong directly addresses the topic, does it not?

If not, please explain to us all, bit by bit, how this question is off topic.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

I provided you my take on the question, but you failed to take me up on that angle. I will repeat it here: the question rests on a false premise. It presumes Descarte's error. Logic needs to be fed by premises. One class of such premises is one's emotions. Without the two working together one cannot get what one wants. The dichotomy is false.

While they work together, people generally understand the difference between thinking logically/rationally and thinking emotionally/intuitively. The focus of the question contains no false dichotomy. Decarte's error is a nonsequitor.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist


While they work together, people generally understand the difference between thinking logically/rationally and thinking emotionally/intuitively. The focus of the question contains no false dichotomy. Decarte's error is a nonsequitor.
And they understand that incorrectly. The false dichotomy comes from Descarte's error. Neurobiologically, the body's emotions and its reasoning center are connected. Logically, our needs, wants, desires and values provide the premises for deductive reasoning.

If I buy her a drink and talk with a woman, I may be able to hook up with her.
I want to hook up with that lady.
If I buy that lady a drink and talk with her, I may be able to hook up with her.

The syllogism is the logic used to prove the conclusion, but the pivotal minor premise was totally supplied by my emotion.

If you want to read more about Descarte's error and the close connection between emotion and reason, I suggest Antonio Damasio's Descarte's Error.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

And they understand that incorrectly. The false dichotomy comes from Descarte's error. Neurobiologically, the body's emotions and its reasoning center are connected. Logically, our needs, wants, desires and values provide the premises for deductive reasoning.

Well, of course, if you didn't have desire (an emotion) to think logically, you probably wouldn't. But that's not the question. The question is more about when to listen to your head, versus when to listen to your heart.

If I buy her a drink and talk with a woman, I may be able to hook up with her.
I want to hook up with that lady.
If I buy that lady a drink and talk with her, I may be able to hook up with her.

The syllogism is the logic used to prove the conclusion, but the pivotal minor premise was totally supplied by my emotion.

Ok, here's what the question is asking: Should you listen to your emotions which may be telling you things like: "She's going to reject you and that's gonna hurt." or should you listen to your head (logic) which may be saying things like: "If you don't talk to her, then you'll never know if you can hook up with her."

Which do you choose to go with?

If you want to read more about Descarte's error and the close connection between emotion and reason, I suggest Antonio Damasio's Descarte's Error.

Bill, if the question had been: When is it appropriate to feel angry versus feeling sad; would you still be going on about Decarte's error? Because, within anger there is often some sadness and vice-versa; but that doesn't change the fact that they aren't the same thing; and it has little to do with the question.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist


Well, of course, if you didn't have desire (an emotion) to think logically, you probably wouldn't. But that's not the question. The question is more about when to listen to your head, versus when to listen to your heart.
You need to re-read the last sentence of the original post.
Ok, here's what the question is asking: Should you listen to your emotions which may be telling you things like: "She's going to reject you and that's gonna hurt." or should you listen to your head (logic) which may be saying things like: "If you don't talk to her, then you'll never know if you can hook up with her."

Which do you choose to go with?
I already told you, but you insist on this false dichotomy.

Bill, if the question had been: When is it appropriate to feel angry versus feeling sad; would you still be going on about Decarte's error? Because, within anger there is often some sadness and vice-versa; but that doesn't change the fact that they aren't the same thing; and it has little to do with the question.
Re-read the last sentence of the original post.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

You need to re-read the last sentence of the original post.

I already told you, but you insist on this false dichotomy.

You didn't already answer the question. And there's nothing false about it. Normal people know how to separate the two ideas. And that is what you continue to avoid honestly discussing.

Re-read the last sentence of the original post.

Done. And your point was?

I mean, do you honestly not know the difference between an appeal to emotion and an appeal to logic?

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

people generally understand the difference between thinking logically/rationally and thinking emotionally/intuitively.
I agree that that is a false dichotomy.

Close examination of the low-level details of a complex system might be expected lead to clear understanding. It is interesting that what actually tends to happen is exactly the opposite; one starts out with what appears to be a clear understanding, and watches that vanish in the face of more information.

Human decision-making depends (in simplest terms) on a complex and dynamic interplay between the limbic system and the frontal lobes. The original question is not meaningful; it is like asking whether the valves or the pistons are more critical to the operation of a gasoline engine.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
You didn't already answer the question. And there's nothing false about it. Normal people know how to separate the two ideas. And that is what you continue to avoid honestly discussing.
Appealing to the popularity of an idea is simply the fallacy of appeal to popularity. That people think emotional reasoning and logical reasoning are disconnected is no more relevant to the truth than the fact most people think mind is something very disconnected from brain, or that we have souls. I will answer the question once again: the two are not disconnected. Each of us always uses both. We cannot help it. We may fail to get truthful premises to work with. We may fail to apply premises correctly, but we have no choice but to feed our reasoning engine with premises, including the emotional and we have no choice by to try to reason out with the best logic tools we have.
I mean, do you honestly not know the difference between an appeal to emotion and an appeal to logic?
Yes I do know the difference. Appeal to emotion is an informal fallacy. Appeal to logic is not.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Dymanic

I agree that that is a false dichotomy.

Close examination of the low-level details of a complex system might be expected lead to clear understanding. It is interesting that what actually tends to happen is exactly the opposite; one starts out with what appears to be a clear understanding, and watches that vanish in the face of more information.

Human decision-making depends (in simplest terms) on a complex and dynamic interplay between the limbic system and the frontal lobes. The original question is not meaningful; it is like asking whether the valves or the pistons are more critical to the operation of a gasoline engine.

Any dichotomy is then false, because we can always look at things from a different level of detail and find that both sides of the dichotomy are composed of the same fundamental pieces. This then becomes an exercise in postmodernistic Deconstruction. Or enantiodrama.

The question is not about criticality, it's about utility.

There is utility in making the distinction which the thread topic question presupposes: this utility implies potential meaningfullness. What is the utlility in deconstructing it?

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

Any dichotomy is then false, because we can always look at things from a different level of detail and find that both sides of the dichotomy are composed of the same fundamental pieces. This then becomes an exercise in postmodernistic Deconstruction. Or enantiodrama.
I can't argue with that, I must admit.
The question is not about criticality, it's about utility.Fair enough. The original question asks when logic is "the correct tool to use to make a decision", implying that one is free to select various tools individually from a toolbox. That doesn't seem quite right to me, even when viewed at a level which involves something like suspension of disbelief as far as details are concerned. One of the distinguishing features of what we call emotions is that they arise involuntarily. What is the utility in even asking whether it is more correct to use emotion to make a decision if one doesn't have any choice in the matter?

[IndigoRose]

Originally posted by Dymanic
I can't argue with that, I must admit.
Fair enough. The original question asks when logic is "the correct tool to use to make a decision", implying that one is free to select various tools individually from a toolbox. That doesn't seem quite right to me, even when viewed at a level which involves something like suspension of disbelief as far as details are concerned. One of the distinguishing features of what we call emotions is that they arise involuntarily. What is the utility in even asking whether it is more correct to use emotion to make a decision if one doesn't have any choice in the matter?

While emotions may arise involutarily, that does not mean that we are forced to use them to make decisions. You have a variety of ways available to you to view a situation. Which view do you use to make decisions, and under what circumstances? Would you use "feelings" to make a decision on a life partner? Would you choose the person who looked best on paper?
IndigoRose

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Any dichotomy is then false, because we can always look at things from a different level of detail and find that both sides of the dichotomy are composed of the same fundamental pieces. This then becomes an exercise in postmodernistic Deconstruction. Or enantiodrama.
Postmodernism. Right. Get your hands off that table, you'll just give yourself a sliver trying to make it turn.

No, any dichotomy is not false. Didn't say that. Didn't get close to saying that. Dynamic didn't say that either. He was merely pointing out the underlying biology.

"I want that." Whoopee, I need to turn that into a decision. Perhaps that means action, perhaps not. "I want that. Therefore, I will try to grab it." Now we've made a decision. We had no choice but to use logic The quality of the logic is the only issue now. Emotions must translate to decisons to act or not to act. The translation always involves logic. There is no getting around it. If our premises were bad, we've made a bad decision. If our reasoning was bad, we've also made a bad decision. But we inevitably use logic to make the decision.


The question is not about criticality, it's about utility.

There is utility in making the distinction which the thread topic question presupposes: this utility implies potential meaningfullness. What is the utlility in deconstructing it?
Pick the slivers out and get some band-aids for those palms.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Dymanic
I can't argue with that, I must admit.
Fair enough. The original question asks when logic is "the correct tool to use to make a decision", implying that one is free to select various tools individually from a toolbox. That doesn't seem quite right to me, even when viewed at a level which involves something like suspension of disbelief as far as details are concerned. One of the distinguishing features of what we call emotions is that they arise involuntarily.

Our culture teaches us that we cannot control emotions. Our culture is wrong; we can (learn to) control our emotions. EQ (Goleman, etc.) is one area that deals with how.

What is the utility in even asking whether it is more correct to use emotion to make a decision if one doesn't have any choice in the matter?

Well, what does it mean when someone says, "I'll sleep on it"? It generally means; they'll see how they FEEL about it tomorrow, or in the morning. It doesn't generally mean they'll do some logical thinking about it; they would say "I'll think it over" -- for THINKing.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
[B]
Postmodernism. Right. Get your hands off that table, you'll just give yourself a sliver trying to make it turn.

No, any dichotomy is not false. Didn't say that. Didn't get close to saying that. Dynamic didn't say that either. He was merely pointing out the underlying biology.

You do realize that at the heart of deconstruction is the dissolution of opposing pairs? Life/Death; Cold/Hot; Up/Down; good/bad; Logic/Emotion. You're engaging in a postmodernistic exercise.

"I want that." Whoopee, I need to turn that into a decision. Perhaps that means action, perhaps not. "I want that. Therefore, I will try to grab it." Now we've made a decision. We had no choice but to use logic The quality of the logic is the only issue now. Emotions must translate to decisons to act or not to act. The translation always involves logic.

Are you familiar with the term "motor set"? Are motor sets engaged by logic or are they automatisms?

There is no getting around it. If our premises were bad, we've made a bad decision. If our reasoning was bad, we've also made a bad decision. But we inevitably use logic to make the decision.

And how much of a role should allowing oneself to get in touch with one's feelings on a subject be utilized? If you want to put it in terms of "quality of reasoning"; then I have to translate the question posed by this thread to:

"What is the quantity of emotion that should be explored in order to optimize the quality of reasoning?" (and what quantity of abstract logic?)

Of course, this is liable to vary by context. Pick a few contexts and share your point of view on the question.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

...we can (learn to) control our emotions. Sure, I guess we can do that. If we feel like it. (Or maybe it's: if it appears to be the logical thing to do.)

Seriously though, maybe it would be helpful to try for a little more clarification as to precisely what is meant by 'emotions'.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Sure, I guess we can do that. If we feel like it. (Or maybe it's: if it appears to be the logical thing to do.)

Seriously though, maybe it would be helpful to try for a little more clarification as to precisely what is meant by 'emotions'.

They're body feelings which are associated with certain modes of thought processes. Emotional "Flooding": which is what happens when people are so emotionally riled up they can't THINK straight (logically), is an important aspect dealt with by Goleman. When you're depressed, you look for the dim sides of life. When you're happy, you tend look for the bright sides. And as I wrote earlier in this thread, the feeling of being logical could be classified as an emotion; though it obviously does not guarantee veridicality of logic.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
You do realize that at the heart of deconstruction is the dissolution of opposing pairs? Life/Death; Cold/Hot; Up/Down; good/bad; Logic/Emotion. You're engaging in a postmodernistic exercise.
Stellar logic, that. A stellar example of the affirming the consequent fallacy.
Are you familiar with the term "motor set"? Are motor sets engaged by logic or are they automatisms?
They are engaged by logic. They are also automatisms. By posing this question, however, you just displayed your hidden presumptions.
And how much of a role should allowing oneself to get in touch with one's feelings on a subject be utilized? If you want to put it in terms of "quality of reasoning"; then I have to translate the question posed by this thread to:

"What is the quantity of emotion that should be explored in order to optimize the quality of reasoning?" (and what quantity of abstract logic?)

Of course, this is liable to vary by context. Pick a few contexts and share your point of view on the question.
What do those feelings result in? Wants, desires, needs. Effecting those wants, desires and needs requires logic.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Stellar logic, that. A stellar example of the affirming the consequent fallacy.

Delineate the fallacy claim; or don't make claims to have identified one.

They are engaged by logic. They are also automatisms. By posing this question, however, you just displayed your hidden presumptions.

So, you're now claiming that processes that are engaged entirely without conscious thought; are engaged by logic?

What do those feelings result in? Wants, desires, needs. Effecting those wants, desires and needs requires logic.

Once again, you avoid the question at hand. What is the optimal mix of logical and emotional exploration? Pick a context, any context.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Delineate the fallacy claim; or don't make claims to have identified one.
I'll take you through it...

You do realize that at the heart of deconstruction is the dissolution of opposing pairs? Life/Death; Cold/Hot; Up/Down; good/bad; Logic/Emotion. You're engaging in a postmodernistic exercise.
This is a basic, formal logical fallacy. I will rearrange it into a syllogism to make it plain:

If Postmodernism, then deconstruction.
Your argument deconstructs.
Therefore your argument is postmoderinst.

Even more plain:
If P then Q
Q
Therefore P

An example:
If you have a dog, you have an animal
You have an animal
Therefore you have a dog.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

I'll take you through it...


This is a basic, formal logical fallacy. I will rearrange it into a syllogism to make it plain:

If Postmodernism, then deconstruction.
Your argument deconstructs.
Therefore your argument is postmoderinst.

Even more plain:
If P then Q
Q
Therefore P

An example:
If you have a dog, you have an animal
You have an animal
Therefore you have a dog.

I think you're confusing class with member. Deconstruction is a member of the class: things-which-are-postmodernistic.

If deconstruction, then postmodernistic (deduction rule from class membership)
Your argument deconstructs (observation)
Therefore your argument is postmodernistic; something a postmodernist might do (level of behavior); note that I'm not claiming you are a postmodernist (level of identity).

----------------------

Using your example:

Dog is a member of the class: animal.

If you have a dog, you have an animal (deduction rule from class membership)
You have a dog (observation)
Therefore you have an animal.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist


I think you're confusing class with member. Deconstruction is a member of the class: things-which-are-postmodernistic.

If deconstruction, then postmodernistic (deduction rule from class membership)
Your argument deconstructs (observation)
Therefore your argument is postmodernistic; something a postmodernist might do (level of behavior); note that I'm not claiming you are a postmodernist (level of identity).

----------------------

Using your example:

Dog is a member of the class: animal.

If you have a dog, you have an animal (deduction rule from class membership)
You have a dog (observation)
Therefore you have an animal.

You need to look up "deconstruct" or stop equivocating or both. Deconstruct means simply to dismantle. As you put it earlier, "dissolution." Am I a postmodernist when I strike a set? Or tear down a building?

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


You need to look up "deconstruct" or stop equivocating or both. Deconstruct means simply to dismantle. As you put it earlier, "dissolution." Am I a postmodernist when I strike a set? Or tear down a building?

I take that as an admission that your claim of fallacy is unwarranted.

Behave like a postmodernist enough; and you can be legitimately labelled as being one. Dissolution of opposing pairs is important to postmodernistic deconstruction. However, deconstruction without a purpose, is without utility.

I've rephrased the intended question posed by this thread at least twice to accomodate your dissolution. Answering it within your mindset could shed light on any latent utility there may be in looking at it that way. But at this point, I don't see any.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

[emotions are] body feelings which are associated with certain modes of thought processes
Would you say that it is the body feelings themselves which constitute emotions, or the associated thought processes?

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Dymanic

Would you say that it is the body feelings themselves which constitute emotions, or the associated thought processes?

The body feelings can drive the thought process. And the thought process can result in change in body feelings.

The way our culture understands it; body feelings drive thoughts. Emotional "Flooding" is a prime example.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

The body feelings can drive the thought process. And the thought process can result in change in body feelingsI agree, but that doesn't answer my question.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist


I take that as an admission that your claim of fallacy is unwarranted.

Behave like a postmodernist enough; and you can be legitimately labelled as being one. Dissolution of opposing pairs is important to postmodernistic deconstruction. However, deconstruction without a purpose, is without utility.

I've rephrased the intended question posed by this thread at least twice to accomodate your dissolution. Answering it within your mindset could shed light on any latent utility there may be in looking at it that way. But at this point, I don't see any.
I was quite clear. You are now committing at least two fallacies.

1. You equivocate on "deconstruct," refusing to recognize its meaning outside postmodernist irratiionality.
2. You then commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

Dogs are subsumed under animals. All dogs are animals, but not all animals are dogs. Not all categorizing into opposite pairs is deconstruction. Deconstruction is not subsumed under postmodernism.

Here are some of the more bizarre conclusions of your foolishness:

Electricians are postmodernists because they "deconstruct" all charges into "posiitive" and "negative"

Politicians are postmodernists because they "deconstruct" political positions into "left wing" and "right wing."

All members of the legal system are postmodernists because they "deconstruct" all legal advocacy into "defendant" and "plaintiff."

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

I was quite clear. You are now committing at least two fallacies.

1. You equivocate on "deconstruct," refusing to recognize its meaning outside postmodernist irratiionality.

Your specific use in this case is clearly postmodernistic.

2. You then commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

Dogs are subsumed under animals. All dogs are animals, but not all animals are dogs. Not all categorizing into opposite pairs is deconstruction. Deconstruction is not subsumed under postmodernism.

Um, categorizing into pairs of opposite is not deconstruction. Mixing the categories around such that categorizing in terms of the opposites cannot be done meaningfully is deconstructive.

Dogs are not "subsumed" under animals by nature (nor by gods). They are categorized as animals, by people. Dogs can be categorized differently; things-with-four-legs, for example. In the same way, deconstruction is categorized as postmodernistic; that doesn't preclude it being categorized under other categories as well. But to ignore it's salient inclusion in the postmodernistic category, does not allow you to claim a logical fallacy when someone else does.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Dymanic
I agree, but that doesn't answer my question.

Oh, I see what you mean.

Would you say that it is the body feelings themselves which constitute emotions, or the associated thought processes?

It's the thought processes; which the feelings seem to lock in place.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

-----------------------------------------------------
Would you say that it is the body feelings themselves which constitute emotions, or the associated thought processes?
-----------------------------------------------------

It's the thought processes; which the feelings seem to lock in place.
You begin to feel apprehensive; your spidey sense is tingling, and you're not sure why. You are not aware of any immediate danger, but still there is this vague feeling of unease. You look and listen. You become aware that the birds in the nearby trees have suddenly fallen silent; barely audible are what could be footsteps as someone -- or something -- approaches from behind. You stand up and turn around, heart pounding. You scan the surrounding bushes, but see nothing. A number of thoughts race quickly through your mind: the scenic spot you chose to stop for your little walk is secluded, miles from the nearest town. You have left your cell phone in the car. The path back to the car leads past where you thought you heard the noise. The large branch lying near the log you were sitting on might make a good club.

Freeze it.

Keeping in mind that at this point in the story it is unknown whether what you thought you heard was actually a deer, a bear, an axe murderer, or simply another nature lover, which parts of the suggested description of your inner processes would you say are emotional, and which are logical? Are the emotional parts logically defensible? If not, why not?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
In the same way, deconstruction is categorized as postmodernistic; that doesn't preclude it being categorized under other categories as well. But to ignore it's salient inclusion in the postmodernistic category, does not allow you to claim a logical fallacy when someone else does.
Nonsense. The key here is the one you keep PoMo dancing around. Postmodernism might imply deconstruction, but deconstruction does not imply postmodernism. You committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

How many more fallacies are you going to treat us to?

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Nonsense. The key here is the one you keep PoMo dancing around. Postmodernism might imply deconstruction, but deconstruction does not imply postmodernism. You committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

How many more fallacies are you going to treat us to?

Bill, How many nominal fallacies of crying fallacy where there are none, are you going to continue to commit? Your claim of fallacy has been soundly defeated. Your further whining only goes to show you don't know a fallacy from a hole in the floor.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Bill, How many nominal fallacies of crying fallacy where there are none, are you going to continue to commit? Your claim of fallacy has been soundly defeated. Your further whining only goes to show you don't know a fallacy from a hole in the floor.
I specified the fallacy. It is up to you to demonstrate how the argument was not fallacious.

deconstruction is categorized as postmodernistic; that doesn't preclude it being categorized under other categories as well.
If I write something that strikes you as "deconstructionist," that does not mean it is. Furthermore, you cannot jump from thinking you see something "deconstructionist" to concluding it is postmodern. Work out the syllogism on your own to see it is the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
I specified the fallacy. It is up to you to demonstrate how the argument was not fallacious.


If I write something that strikes you as "deconstructionist," that does not mean it is. Furthermore, you cannot jump from thinking you see something "deconstructionist" to concluding it is postmodern. Work out the syllogism on your own to see it is the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

I've already delineated why you're mistaken.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
I've already delineated why you're mistaken.

All acorns are nuts
This is a nut
Therefore, this is an acorn.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
All acorns are nuts
This is a nut
Therefore, this is an acorn.

I've already demonstrated that you've misinterpreted the category/member relation.

[epepke]

Originally posted by drkitten
No, the situation is described by the logical syllogism that you have presented, but there's no evidence at all to support the idea that that's how the child actually reasons.

Nor does claiming that logic is important imply being good at it.

[epepke]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
"The most logical" was your insertion, not mine. I made no such claim.

These were your words: "No, you did the most logical thing: you went to your fridge." It's too late for you to edit them.

I cannot think of a way of responding meaningfully to this assertion, but it seems to me that the thing I would describe if I could makes further discussion impossible. In any event, I am impressed with your certitude. Have a nice day.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by epepke
These were your words: "No, you did the most logical thing: you went to your fridge." It's too late for you to edit them.

I cannot think of a way of responding meaningfully to this assertion, but it seems to me that the thing I would describe if I could makes further discussion impossible. In any event, I am impressed with your certitude. Have a nice day.

I have neither reason or intent to edit my words. I wrote them in the context of that particular decision. You elevated that to the universal with regards to truth tables.

I have used that phrase twice so far. The one you just alluded to, in full context:
You wanted milk. So, you did what? Take a flight to a Wisconsin dairy? Ran out to the car dealership to buy a car? Go to a dairy cattle auction and buy a heffer? No, you did the most logical thing: you went to your fridge
In the context ot this example, the fridge is the most logical thing.

I also used it here:

No, you learned, over time, what seemed the most logical way to get your needs met.
I would have thought the qualification makes it clear that I am not asserting that we always arrive at the most logical conclusions.

[Wrath of the Swarm]

People are inherently logical in the same sense that our brains are inherently arithmatical.

Each and every neuron is a tiny computer dedicated to arithmatic operations, and combined they form an immensely powerful computational system capable of performing intricate and subtle operations.

But if you provide a person with a list of two-digit numbers, he'll probably have great difficulty adding them up in his head.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm

Each and every neuron is a tiny computer dedicated to arithmatic operations, and combined they form an immensely powerful computational system capable of performing intricate and subtle operations.


Um,... no.

I suggest presenting this statement in the neurology department of your local hospital. Preferably right after the chief of neurology has just taken a large swallow of very hot coffee. The results should be amusing.

We've certainly got models of neurons (the McCulloch-Pitts 1943 model is one of the best-known and most influential) that use numbers to represent the behavior of real neurons. But these are models, and oversimplified ones at that. In one of the best books on artificial neural networks, Hertz et al. (1991) identified many, many problems with real neurons that are not incorporated into this "tiny computer" metaphor. From p. 4 (so it's not exactly a subtle issue hidden in a footnote):


Real neurons are often not even approximately threshhold devices as described by McCulloch-Pitts
Real neurons perform non-linear and non-arithmetic functions on their inputs
A real neuron produces a sequence of pulses, not a numeric output value; interpreting the firing sequence as an arithmetic quantity is problematic
Neurons do not have the synchrony usually associated with "tiny computers"
The performance of a neuron can vary wildly and stochastically based on the chemical environment in which it finds itself


I could add to this list that not only are the outputs from neurons non-numeric (the firing pulses often cannot be interpreted as real numbers), but simpilarly the inputs are non-numeric for the exact same reason. The description of a neuron as a tiny little arithmetic computer is useful but untrue -- rather like the "atom as a tiny little solar system with planets" metaphor, or the "electricity like water flowing through a wire" metaphor. You can get useful results, but they don't really describe the reality with accuracy worth a half cup of warm spit.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by drkitten

Real neurons are often not even approximately threshhold devices as described by McCulloch-Pitts
I find that disturbing, because it completely undermines what little understanding I thought I might have about what neurons do, leaving me without any conceptual handle whatsoever. Is there an offer in there somewhere to replace it with something?
Real neurons perform non-linear and non-arithmetic functions on their inputs.
I've seen that suggested various places, but it is usually delivered with some disclaimers regarding its speculative nature, at least with regard to individual neurons versus groups of neurons.
A real neuron produces a sequence of pulses, not a numeric output value; interpreting the firing sequence as an arithmetic quantity is problematicI don't see any fundamental reason to consider such an approach invalid. Counting raindrops might be considered problematic too, but it still seems reasonable to assume that a precise number of them must be landing within a given area at any one time, and that, independent of our ability to precisely count them, this number must vary from one moment to another by an certain amount. It might be said that this amount becomes numeric the instant we use numbers to describe it, but that seems like a bit of a philosophical indulgence to me.
I could add to this list that not only are the outputs from neurons non-numeric (the firing pulses often cannot be interpreted as real numbers), but simpilarly the inputs are non-numeric for the exact same reason
Could not the same complaint also be brought against just about any attempt to model a real-world phenomenon mathematically? I mean, where are the real numbers, really? It's very hard for me to view what happens at the lowest levels of a modern digital computer as the manipulation of actual numbers either.
The performance of a neuron can vary wildly and stochastically based on the chemical environment in which it finds itselfThe performance of a transistor varies with its environment too, though not over as wide a range. As for stochiastically, again, I think that remains to be established with confidence.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by Dymanic
I find that disturbing, because it completely undermines what little understanding I thought I might have about what neurons do, leaving me without any conceptual handle whatsoever. Is there an offer in there somewhere to replace it with something?


The Hertz, et al. book I cited is a reasonable place to start, if you can find it in the library (it's probably not worth buying just for this purpose). Some of the original PDP literature (for example, "Certain Aspects of the Anatomy and Physiology of the Cerebral Cortex," by Crick and Asanuma, in the standard McClelland/Rumelhart Parallel Distributed Processing) discusses this issue as well.

It shouldn't completely undermine your understanding; the McCulloch-Pitts model is used for a reason, because it's an understandable and computationally tractable model of how many neurons do function. Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. But by the same token, don't assume that what is true for the bathwater is also true for the baby.


I don't see any fundamental reason to consider such an approach invalid. Counting raindrops might be considered problematic too, but it still seems reasonable to assume that a precise number of them must be landing within a given area at any one time, and that, independent of our ability to precisely count them, this number must vary from one moment to another by an certain amount. It might be said that this amount becomes numeric the instant we use numbers to describe it, but that seems like a bit of a philosophical indulgence to me.



This is a reasonable assumption only if you are willing to make the supporting assumption that one raindrop is pretty much the same as another, and that the distribution of raindrops in space and time is irrelevant below a certain level, and that the only information that the user is interested in is the total amount of rainfall. With raindrops, these are probably pretty good assumptions.

On the other hand, I could make similar statements about the distribution of ink on a page, that independent of our ability to precisely count (or measure them), the amount of ink on the page must vary from one page to the next. This statement, while true, misses a very important factor in printing. Our assessment of the page as readers is not based on the amount of ink on the page (in fact, we might consider that to be largely irrelevant), but on the distribution of ink. Ink distributed in a certain way becomes one letter, while the same amount of ink distributed in another way becomes a different letter. The total amount of ink on a page is at best a red herring, and at worst is totally misleading as a guide to the page.

Using this analogy as an illustration, you can see that there is a lot of information in the distribution of neural pulses -- in the signal itself -- that is essentially abstracted away when you apply a single numeric "firing rate" or "activation state" to a McC-P "neuron." We have substantial evidence that this kind of information can substantially affect neural behavior. But to the best of my knowledge, no one's been able to apply this evidence and these observations to building computational models of human-scale cognition [yet]. It's an active and ongoing research area.


Could not the same complaint also be brought against just about any attempt to model a real-world phenomenon mathematically? I mean, where are the real numbers, really? It's very hard for me to view what happens at the lowest levels of a modern digital computer as the manipulation of actual numbers either.


The complaint isn't about an attempt to model. The complaint is about the attempt to read the properties of the model as properties of the real world. The map is not the territory -- the menu is not the meal. More precisely, the neuron is not "a tiny computer dedicated to arithmatic [sic] operations," although modelling it as one can produce interesting results. The problem is that the model deliberately oversimplifies (as all models do), and in doing so may lose or distort information to the point of becoming misleading.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by drkitten

The Hertz, et al. book I cited is a reasonable place to start, if you can find it in the library (it's probably not worth buying just for this purpose). Sounds like something I'd get a lot out of. I'll see about ordering it (from the library, that is).

This is a reasonable assumption only if you are willing to make the supporting assumption that one raindrop is pretty much the same as another, and that the distribution of raindrops in space and time is irrelevant below a certain level, and that the only information that the user is interested in is the total amount of rainfall. With raindrops, these are probably pretty good assumptions.
Let's say (without torturing the raindrop metaphor any further) that what we are assuming is that neural outputs are trains of all-or-nothing spikes, one of which (the spikes, not the trains) may be assumed to be pretty much like another (i.e., that differences in voltage or waveshape do not play a significant role, the coding system instead involving temporal differences in the arrival times of the signals at their destinations), and that this distribution in space and time (without dismissing anything above level of Plank time) is exactly what we are interested in. Do you see the problematic nature of quantifying those distributions as practical, or fundamental?

Our assessment of the page as readers is not based on the amount of ink on the page (in fact, we might consider that to be largely irrelevant), but on the distribution of ink.
We might think of measuring the total amount of ink on the page as analagous to the type of information produced by (say) fMRI scanning. Limited, certainly, but not entirely useless; it can tell us something about the amount of information transfer taking place in a specific region.
you can see that there is a lot of information in the distribution of neural pulses -- in the signal itself -- that is essentially abstracted away when you apply a single numeric "firing rate" or "activation state" to a McC-P "neuron."
I can't, I'm afraid. Unless all you are saying is that we can catch the signal, but not the message (that goes in the 'painfully obvious' bin). Without a doubt, the substantive informational content resides above the signal level, (or below that level, at the level of physical structure) and access to that coding scheme (or, more likely, multiple superimposed coding schemes, unfortunately) would be more revealing. But it is not clear to me how it is that this understanding has been abstracted away by focusing on firing rate and activation state. We had nothing to abstract away in the first place if we never had the first clue about the coding scheme(s) in use above the signal level anyway.

The complaint isn't about an attempt to model. The complaint is about the attempt to read the properties of the model as properties of the real world. The map is not the territory -- the menu is not the meal.
Yes, yes, yes. But that's always a problem, isn't it? The only place I can think of where it is not a problem is when symbols are being manipulated according to the rules of a formal system of mathematics, with no hint of suggestion that the results will be mappable to any real world phenomenon whatsoever, and no guarantees regarding the consequences of attempting to do that. You presented it so as to suggest that this is somehow more of a problem in modelling neural activity than in anything else.
More precisely, the neuron is not "a tiny computer dedicated to arithmatic [sic] operations" Now that I agree with, with only the small reservation that a single transistor or logic gate hardly deserves the distinction either.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by Dymanic


Let's say (without torturing the raindrop metaphor any further) that what we are assuming is that neural outputs are trains of all-or-nothing spikes, one of which (the spikes, not the trains) may be assumed to be pretty much like another (i.e., that differences in voltage or waveshape do not play a significant role, the coding system instead involving temporal differences in the arrival times of the signals at their destinations), and that this distribution in space and time (without dismissing anything above level of Plank time) is exactly what we are interested in. Do you see the problematic nature of quantifying those distributions as practical, or fundamental?



Fundamental, as it relates not to the physics of the neuron, but of the topology of the representation as real numbers

Perhaps this example might make it clearer. Really, it's straight from the pages of Minsky and Pappert (Perceptrons, 1969 ) and their proof of the limitations of perceptron learning, but it applies to Mc-P neurons in general. Assume that a neuron produces a sequence (you can even assume a length of two) of wide and narrow pulses, in any order. I will further assume, without substantial loss of generality, that the "activation" function you impose upon this neuron treats a "wide" pulse as being more active (having a higher numeric value) than a narrow pulse.

I will also assume a very simple network of two neurons, with the output of one attached to the input of the second.

I challenge you to explain how the threshhold of the second Mc-P neuron could be set to fire if and only if there were both narrow [i]and wide pulses in the output of the first. More specifically, I claim that this is impossible, by the Minsky/Pappert XOR proof.

Let's start out by assuming that a sequence of two short pulses (dit-dit) corresponds to an activation function of X, which is less than the threshhold T of the second neuron (X < T). However, both dit-dah (Y), and dah-dit (Z) trigger the second neuron, so Y>T and Z>T. Now, consider the activitation level W corresponding to a pattern of dah-dah. Since this contains more wide pulses than either dah-dit or dit-dah, it must be even greater than Y or Z. But if W > Y, and Y > T, then W > T, and the second neuron will fire (incorrectly).

More generally, I claim that for the four firing patterns dit-dit, dit-dah, dah-dit, and dah-dah, ANY mapping you produce onto the real number line will of necessity have a highest and a lowest element. It is impossible for an Mc-P neuron to respond only to the middle two elements, because the threshhold function of an Mc-P neuron can only respond to linearly separable areas of input space. In other words, there is a particular response that can be learned by a real neuron, but not by an Mc-P neuron; the Mc-P model has limitations imposed directly by the assumption that the output of the prior neuron can be treated as a real number instead of as a genuine time-varying pulse sequence of varying widths.

This has some other implications. It's impossible to build an Mc-P neuron that acts as a voltage follower or delay line, because the mathematics of the Mc-P model don't permit it. It also can't be built as a rectifier, either half- or full-, nor can it be used as a voltage regulator (either band-stop or band-pass). On the other hand, we've got physical evidence of neurons that act as delay lines and/or voltage followers in the brain.

What we need instead is a more detailed (while still computationally tractable) model that can handle input and output signals that are neither numeric, nor necessarily even well-ordered. (At which point, we're almost talking about a Turing machine here, but, like, whatever.....) Unfortunately, no one's been able to satisfy all those constraints at the same time [yet], nor do I expect success in the immediate future.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by drkitten

What we need instead is a more detailed (while still computationally tractable) model that can handle input and output signals that are neither numeric, nor necessarily even well-ordered.
So XOR cannot be achieved in a single-layered system. AND, OR, and NOT aren't so tough, though. The possibility that we may be missing something mysterious, disorderly, and non-numerically-mappable is intriguing. But before we go off in search of that, why can we not simply assume a multi-layered system?

[drkitten]

Originally posted by Dymanic
So XOR cannot be achieved in a single-layered system. AND, OR, and NOT aren't so tough, though. The possibility that we may be missing something mysterious, disorderly, and non-numerically-mappable is intriguing. But before we go off in search of that, why can we not simply assume a multi-layered system?

Because if we're talking about physical neurons, we can count the number of layers involved in the given experimental setup. In particular, we can show a single neuron (and therefore a single layer) doing things that would require an assumption of multiple layers.

The basic problem is that we've got physical neurons in Petri dishes that are doing things that Mc-P neurons can't do. Ergo, physical neurons aren't Mc-P neurons.

[Dymanic]

Fascinating.



(Celebrity voice impersonated).

[Dymanic]

I've just found a *fascinating* discussion related to this here. (http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/stappfiles.html)

(I'm thinking of the section titled "Nerve Terminals" -- it's on page 32 of the MSWord Doc version of The Mindful Universe).

Not everyone seems to agree with everything Henry Stapp has to say (snark!) but he is at least a lot easier to follow than some writers on these subjects. (Which reminds me, it's about time I read Penrose's ENM again).

[JAK]

I believe we have gotten far a-field from the original discussion about "logic vs emotion." Nevertheless, let me comment on DrKitten's remarks and return to a personal observation about the matter of logic/emotion.
___________________________________________
[QUOTE]Originally posted by drkitten
I will also assume a very simple network of two neurons, with the output of one attached to the input of the second.
...
More generally, I claim that for the four firing patterns dit-dit, dit-dah, dah-dit, and dah-dah, ANY mapping you produce onto the real number line will of necessity have a highest and a lowest element. It is impossible for an Mc-P neuron to respond only to the middle two elements, because the threshhold function of an Mc-P neuron can only respond to linearly separable areas of input space. In other words, there is a particular response that can be learned by a real neuron, but not by an Mc-P neuron ...
____________________________________________

As I recall, neurons, in general, abide by the "all-or-none" law. Either they fire or they don't. However, "frequency of axonic transmission" is a variable.

I contend that this design is sufficient for a basis of all brain processes - including "logic and emotion."

In physics, energy is described in terms of vectors (having direction and magnitude). If physics can reduce all interactions of the universe to this level, having a similar technique would allow the brain to equally represent all things of the universe. The "direction" within the brain is flow within neural circuits. Frequency of axonic transmission represents the magnitude.

Hold that thought for a moment ...

If the brain can mimic the 1st law of thermodynamics, perhaps it can mimic "survival of the fittest." In such a scenario, the brain would, first, receive and interpret input about the enviroment (a al Dominic Masaro's Fuzzy Logical Model of Perception or O. G. Selfridge's Pandemonium model). Within the perceptions, multiple behaviors will be recognized as being appropriate for a perceived environment. Basically, you have recognized what "fits" the environment or "what you can do" within the constraints of reality.

For instance, if you are in a grocery store looking at a can of tomato sauce, you have the option of picking it off the shelf, looking elsewhere, sitting down, doing jumping-jacks, running for the exit, hollering for help, or a myriad of other behaviors. Any of these behaviors "fit" the environment, and you have any of them to choose from.

Now, if you "want" a can of tomato sauce, logic says you should pick it off the shelf. However, "want" belies an energy empowerment to the decision. This underlying empowerment can be deemed "emotional," though decidedly of low emotion. Even so, if no other opportunities of higher "empowerment" exist, the strength of your desire for tomato sauce will likely "win" against its weak competitors (sitting down, running for an exit, etc.). Thus, "logic" would have an emotional underpinning.

Given the environment, of all of the behaviors you can ennact, the behavior which has the greatest internal empowerment (want, desire, etc.) will control behavior. In other words, of all the behaviors which "fit" the environment, the one of highest empowerment takes control. (This competition likely happens in the nucleus Reticularis Thalami of the brain - see James Newman and Bernard Baars.)

"Logic" is a behavior. If someone chooses "logic," it comes with all of the connotations, beliefs, and biases of the person. It appears "non-emotional" because it exhibits low energy usage. Why should it be naturally selected? By being a low energy user, it conserves energy - the most precious of all commodities to any organism. Thus, natural selection prefers "logic" and low emotion (energy conservation) over emotional excess.

Given the above scenario, to represent anything, the brain need only create an energy pattern to represent something (a neural circuit) and a magnitude with which to empower the circuit. The empowerment prepares for any competition presented by any future environment. In other words, the brain only needs "no dits," "dits," and a variable frequency of "dits." Neural circuits are either "on" or "off," and when they are "on," they are "on" at variable strengths.

Just a view from the peanut gallery ...

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by JAK

I believe we have gotten far a-field from the original discussion about "logic vs emotion."That happens around here a lot, especially when the topic has anything to do with 'what makes humans tick'. I agree with Bill Hoyt's observation on page 1 that the OP's question was based on a false premise anyway.
As I recall, neurons, in general, abide by the "all-or-none" law. Either they fire or they don't. However, "frequency of axonic transmission" is a variable.That's what I thought too. I was hoping Drkitten would elaborate a little more on his claim that: we've got physical neurons in Petri dishes that are doing things that Mc-P neurons can't do.
JAK:

If the brain can mimic the 1st law of thermodynamics, perhaps it can mimic "survival of the fittest."The 'pruning' stage of early brain development certainly seems to qualify.
Thus, "logic" would have an emotional underpinning.I think it was also suggested somewhere up in the thread that emotion has a logical underpinning.

Since the Stapp article I linked to seems relevant not only to this discussion but another currently active one, I've decided to follow a suggestion I just recieved to start a new thread on that.

[drkitten]

Sorry, I hadn't realized this discussion had re-opened.

Originally posted by JAK

As I recall, neurons, in general, abide by the "all-or-none" law. Either they fire or they don't. However, "frequency of axonic transmission" is a variable.


I contend that this design is sufficient for a basis of all brain processes - including "logic and emotion."



Well, the first statement, in general, is a tautology. It's certainly the case that a neuron is either firing or it isn't, and it's similarly true that a car is either running or it isn't, that a bag is either empty or it isn't, et cetera. The key question is whether or not two states that can be broadly categorized as "firing" can be further subdistinguished.

And, of course, they can, as you yourself point out; two neurons can both be "firing" but of different pulse frequencies. The Mc-P neural model explicitly ignores this factor and treats alll "firing" neurons as mathematically and computationally identical. If you assume that neurons can fire at different rates and that these different rates can be distinguished, you've more or less re-invented the McClelland/Rumelhart PDP neuron. But the McClelland/Rumelhart neuron, in turn, assumes that the only subcategorization that exists is frequency.

This is an oversimplification. In general, neural pulses are all of the same amplitude, but they can vary not only in frequency, but also in phase and pulse shape. Ask any signal engineer about the amount of information that can be carried in the "phase" of a signal, and you'll see how crucial this oversimplification may be.

So the problem is that the "activation" of a real neuron cannot be described only as a single real-valued number (such as the firing rate); using a real-valued activation function is a computational simplification. I could get a more accurate model by assuming a complex-valued (frequency and phase) activation function, but this would be computationally more complex, and still leave out all the information carried in pulse shape. If I were much smarter than I am, I might be able to come up with a numeric encoding of pulse shape (perhaps in terms of Fourier coefficients), but the resulting neural model would be a nightmare to evaluate. Even when I do this, I'm focusing only on the electrical aspects of signal transmission and not on the chemical.... you see how the creation of a perfect model quickly turns into a hole with no bottom.

However, only by using this more detailed model would we be able to construct artificial neural models that are able to mimic the full behavior of real neurons.

But what does this have to do with logic vs. emotion? If a human modeller develops a mathematical abstraction, and then shows that this abstraction is in theory capable of performing a particular behavior, this says little or nothing about how such behavior is actually realized in the human brain. I can, in theory, build a computer running Windows XP out of water pipes and valves, or out of the abstract "cells" that form Roger Conway's "Game of Life." The real computer on someone's desk, however, is made out of doped silicon. The fundamental reasoning is flawed :

1) The human brain does X
2) A model based on Y does X
3) A model based on Y does Z
Therefore,
4) The human brain is based on Y
5) The human brain does Z

Neither conclusion can be supported within this argument. Frankly, I don't think it matters if your framework "is sufficient for a basis of all brain processes." What matters is if your framework is an accurate description of the basis that the brain uses, something that only the neurologists can tell us.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by new drkitten
Frankly, I don't think it matters if your framework "is sufficient for a basis of all brain processes." What matters is if your framework is an accurate description of the basis that the brain uses, something that only the neurologists can tell us.

It most assuredly does matter if you can demonstrate a framework that is a sufficient basis. The demonstration would put another nail in the coffin of the various guises of vitalism. Likewise, the model can inform research directions for neuroscience.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by new drkitten


This is an oversimplification. In general, neural pulses are all of the same amplitude, but they can vary not only in frequency, but also in phase and pulse shapeMy previous understanding (which you have challenged...thank you) was that those have not been found to be significant factors. (Or was it that they have been found not to be? Big difference...not sure).

Anyway, I'm going to stick my neck out a little, and post a somewhat longer passage than I ordinarily would in view of the forum rules on copyrighted material. The article I linked is pretty long, and I wonder how many here will find time to slog through it all, but what Stapp is saying seems quite pertinent to these discussions. (Mods, if I'm over the line, let me know, and apologies in advance).

One section that caught my interest was the section titled: "Nerve Terminals":
Nerve terminals lie at the junctions between two nerves, and mediate the functional connection between them. The way they work is this. Each "firing" of a nerve sends an electrical signal along that fiber. When this signal reaches the nerve terminal it opens up tiny channels in the terminal membrane, through which calcium ions flow into the interior of the terminal. Within the terminal are "vesicles", which are small storage areas containing chemicals called neurotransmitters. The calcium ions migrate from their entry channels to special sites, where they trigger the release of the contents of a vesicle into a gap between the terminal and a neighboring nerve. The released chemicals influence the tendency of the neighboring nerve to fire. Thus the nerve terminals, as connecting links between nerves, are basic elements in brain dynamics.

The channels through which the calcium ions enter the nerve terminal are called "ion channels." At their narrowest points they are not much larger than the calcium ions themselves. This extreme smallness of the opening in the ion channels has profound quantum mechanical import. The consequence is essentially the same as the consequence of the squeezing of the state of the simple harmonic oscillator, or of the narrowness of the slits in the double-slit experiments. The narrowness of the channel restricts the lateral spatial dimension. Consequently, the lateral velocity is forced by the quantum uncertainty principle to become large. This causes the cloud associated with the calcium ion to fan out over an increasing area as it moves away from the tiny channel to the target region where the ion will be absorbed as a whole on some small triggering site, or will not be absorbed at all on that site.

This spreading of the ion wave packet means that the ion may or may not be absorbed on the small triggering site. Accordingly, the vesicle may or may not release its contents. Consequently, the quantum state of the vesicle becomes a mixture consisting of a state where the neurotransmitter is released and a state where the neurotransmitter is not released. This quantum splitting occurs at every one of the trillions of nerve terminals. This quantum uncertainty in what is happening at the level of the nerve terminals propagates via the essentially mechanical Process 2 first to neuronal behavior, and then to the behavior of the whole brain, so that, according to quantum theory, the state of the brain becomes a cloudlike collection of an infinitude of classically describable possible brains, each representing a tendency for some corresponding experience to occur.

What is the effect of this replacement of the single, unique, classically described brain of classical physics by a cloud-like quantum brain state composed, essentially, of myriads of alternative possible classically describable brain states?

A principal function of the brain is to receive clues from the environment, form an appropriate plan of action, and direct the activities of the brain and body specified by the selected plan of action. The exact details of the chosen plan will, for a classical model, obviously depend upon the exact values of many noisy and uncontrolled variables. In cases close to a bifurcation point the dynamical effects of noise might even tip the balance between two very different responses to the given clues: e.g., tip the balance between the 'fight' or 'flight' response to some shadowy form.

I definitely agree with what you say about mistaking the map for the territory, btw.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by Dymanic
My previous understanding (which you have challenged...thank you) was that those have not been found to be significant factors. (Or was it that they have been found not to be? Big difference...not sure).



"Have not been found to be significant" is more accurate; opinion is actually divided in the relevant scholastic community. However, this is also a somewhat misleading statement. Since we don't have an artificial neural model that can be used to produce anything close to human-scale performance, we really don't have enough evidence to determine what is and is not significant. In this regard, the neural modelling community is decades behind the actual neuroscientists, since the Mc-P (and even Mc-R) neurons have been shown, repeatedly, to not be capable of mimicking behavior that can be routinely observed in vivo. However, no one has yet been able to produce a behavioral "significance" to any of these problesm with the models.

So, basically, the argument runs "our neural models are good enough, so why worry?" I can see the appeal of that argument. I haven't seen any currently unsolvable problems that would be more easily solvable by making the underlying formal model computationally intractable. The interesting philosophical questions (for example, vitalism, the nature of neural "representation," or the symbolic vs. connectionist nature of language processing) are largely irrelevant to the exact details of the models. So from a philosophical point of view, either vitalism is correct and there is a fundamental reason why artificial neural networks will never work irrespective of the model details, or there is a particular framework from which qualia, perception, awareness, and consciousness will arise from an abstract collection of cooperating units -- irrespective of whether these units are Mc-P neurons or real nerve cells.

And if you can tell me which, please let me know. Unless your name is Ian, of course....

[JAK]

__________________________________________________

Originally posted by new drkitten
Sorry, I hadn't realized this discussion had re-opened.
...
But what does this have to do with logic vs. emotion? If a human modeller develops a mathematical abstraction, and then shows that this abstraction is in theory capable of performing a particular behavior, this says little or nothing about how such behavior is actually realized in the human brain.
...
I don't think it matters if your framework "is sufficient for a basis of all brain processes." What matters is if your framework is an accurate description of the basis that the brain uses, something that only the neurologists can tell us.
__________________________________________________

Well ... actually much of this is coming from a neuropsychologist, Dr. James Newman (http://www.bvinst.edu/faculty/~newman.htm) of the Colorado Neurological Institute (Denver). The theory is consistent with the works of Dr. Antonio Damasio, Professor and Head of the Dept. of Neurology at the U. of Iowa, as well as Paul D. MacLean, Richard M. Restak, and other neurobiologists. It is also consistent with a variety of other recent theories (Global Workspace Theory by Bernard Baars, Perceptual Control Theory by William T. Powers, Behavioral Investment Theory by Gregg Henriques, and numerous others). Brain processes mimicking natural selection (survival of the fittest) has much clinical and research support.

Even so, you are opening intriguing and exciting possibilities regarding "phase and pulse" of neural transmission. Do you have references of who is working in this area? Are you working in this area? I would be most grateful for the info.

[JAK]

Originally posted by JAK

Well ... actually much of this is coming from a neuropsychologist, Dr. James Newman ... Global workspace Theory by Bernard Baars ...

Here are a couple of quotes from Newman and Baars:



My own work has emphasized combining such evidence into a single, integrative type of organization called "contrastive analysis," which compares conscious vs. unconscious processes across numerous experimental domains. A vast amount of data along these lines is already available. Building on a contrastive analysis of the functional capabilities of conscious and unconscious processes, I have presented an integrative theory called Global Workspace (GW) Theory, a broad architectural notion of the nervous system in which conscious events are viewed as mental representations that have at least three necessary properties (a) they are global, so that their contents are disseminated throughout the nervous system; (b) they are internally consistent, because conflicting processes will compete each other out of consciousness; and (c) they are informative, in that they trigger widespread adaptation among specialized processors in the nervous system. - Baars http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v1/psyche-1-06-baars.html




... neurologically this something is activation via a global attentional matrix which both: 1) controls access to consciousness by competing unconscious processors; and 2) integrates the multimodal representations of those processors which gain momentary access into unified, conscious percepts.
...
Various coalitions of unconscious processors compete for access to this global workspace (Newman & Baars, 1993).
...
(The) primary adaptive advantage is that it allows the organism to focus the processing resources of the central nervous system upon the particular stimulus most relevant to it in the moment.
...
the existence of myriad unconscious processes -- working outside of, and competing for access to consciousness
...
a single "stream of consciousness" is nature's solution to the problem of prioritizing experience, so that what is most dangerous or attractive or advantageous or interesting at that moment gains our undivided attention. -Newman http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v1/psyche-1-13-newman.html


Clearly, an approach founded in competitions within the neural structures of the brain.

Nevertheless, "phase and pulse" may play a significant role in this competition.

[synaesthesia]

This dichotomy is very problematic and misleading.

One thinker on cogntive domain who I respect as being amongst the closest to the right scientific track is Howard Gardner. His theory of multiple intelligences (an unevolved though highly evolvable theory) integrates a working knowledge of statistics. When we divde up cogntive areas, several criterion must be considered. I believe Gardner uses eight such as

Distinctiveness of neural pathways involved; selective damagability with respect to other domains of cognition.

Plausible evolutionary history.

Distinctiveness of basic conceptual operations involved in the domain.

Now the point is not that his criterion (of which I provided only a partial sample) are immutable. Intelligences can be divided into twos (which I regard as a bad move) or into hundreds of domains, or myriad. The point is the precise heuristic value we expect of our divisions.

Howard Gardner's eight-or-so (for they are not eight in number by design or necessity) categories of intelligence are based in experimentally validated statistical models. They are very open to use in multidisciplinary thinking because we are explicitly recognizing the limitations of the heuristic.

To divide intelligence into emotional and logical (as if visual, kinethetic, intrapersonal and spatial reasoning can be easily reduced to these two, or they be reduced without the others) is a failure of imaining the sort of relationships that are held between reasoning and motivation and(?) (emotivation?).

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by synaesthesia
To divide intelligence into emotional and logical (as if visual, kinethetic, intrapersonal and spatial reasoning can be easily reduced to these two, or they be reduced without the others) is a failure of imaining the sort of relationships that are held between reasoning and motivation and(?) (emotivation?).

It's interesting you mention sensory modalities. Kinesthetics (external) are associated with emotion and dissociated with logic. Visuals are more detailed with logic and more fuzzy with emotion. I think they are highly correlateable.

[JAK]

Originally posted by synaesthesia
This dichotomy is very problematic and misleading.
One thinker on cogntive domain who I respect as being amongst the closest to the right scientific track is Howard Gardner. His theory of multiple intelligences (an unevolved though highly evolvable theory) integrates a working knowledge of statistics. When we divde up cogntive areas, several criterion must be considered. I believe Gardner uses eight such as

Yes, Howard Earl Gardner’s 8 intelligences (http://www.infed.org/thinkers/gardner.htm) - linguistic intelligence, logical-mathematical intelligence, musical intelligence, bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, spatial intelligence, interpersonal intelligence, and intrapersonal intelligence.

Originally posted by synaesthesia
Distinctiveness of neural pathways involved; selective damagability with respect to other domains of cognition.

Logical-mathematical intelligence and musical intelligence have been seen to be inter-related – using common areas of the brain; distinctiveness need elaboration.

I would expect damage to Wernicke’s Area and Broca’s Area to affect at least linguistic intelligence, logical-mathematical intelligence, musical intelligence, interpersonal intelligence, and intrapersonal intelligence. Again, distinctiveness needs clarification.

Originally posted by synaesthesia
Plausible evolutionary history.

Plausible evolutionary history for the Baars/Newman approach can be shown from thermodynamics via Erwin Schrodinger and Stuart Kauffman.

Originally posted by synaesthesia
Distinctiveness of basic conceptual operations involved in the domain.

Please explain.

Originally posted by synaesthesia
... The point is the precise heuristic value we expect of our divisions.
Howard Gardner's eight-or-so (for they are not eight in number by design or necessity) categories of intelligence are based in experimentally validated statistical models. They are very open to use in multidisciplinary thinking because we are explicitly recognizing the limitations of the heuristic.

When giving creativity seminars, I, too, note differences in styles of thinking – kinesthetic, linguistic, interpersonal, spatial, etc. These can all be accommodated within Baars/Newman constructs.

Originally posted by synaesthesia
To divide intelligence into emotional and logical (as if visual, kinethetic, intrapersonal and spatial reasoning can be easily reduced to these two, or they be reduced without the others) is a failure of imaining the sort of relationships that are held between reasoning and motivation and(?) (emotivation?).
Let me provide an analogy to “cellular theory.� In cell theory, bones are made up of cells, eyes are made up of cells, and blood is made up of cells. Even so, these types of cells vary in support of their tissue. Similarly, a simple neural model will allow for elegance at higher levels of structure. Instead of differing tissues, the brain has differing behaviors. Baars/Newman constructs deal with low-level brain activities which support higher ordered behaviors such as Gardner’s 8 intelligences.

Nevertheless, any of Gardner’s 8 intelligences do have success/fail attributes. Either you translate German fluently or not. Either you play a B-flat note on the violin or not. Either you add up numbers correctly and balance your checkbook or not. Regardless of the “intelligence,� there is still flow (input, process, output) as well as the success/failure of what is attempted (kick a field goal, convince a jury, perform a concert, etc.).