Ian's "Staying Alive" link

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
If it was in the shortest possible time, i.e a plank time, then no. You wouldn't. No-one could. If it was done fast enough that none of the synapses were interrupted, AT ALL, then no, you wouldn't know the difference, as it would be no different then the way your brain replaces itself. If, however, it wasn't that fast, then yes, you would know the difference. Or rather, you wouldn't know anything at all, because you'd be dead. Why does planck time make a difference. In any case, you say if it took planck time, you could not tell the difference. So, you do could not tell the difference, why would you not take the teleporter?

Originally posted by Taffer
No, you couldn't know the difference, but an objective, outside observer, would. Lets assume that God is actually an alien (to keep him material ;)). He would know which is the original, and which are the clones. Who cares what anyone else thinks or knows. If you can't tell the difference, why would you not take the teleporter?

BJ

[Taffer]

Because, oh Joe of Billies, the Teleporter is not instant. It's right there, in the question. Do you really have to change the question to prove your right-ness?

If it was less then a planck length, then sure, I'd take the Teleporter. You, nor noone else in the universe, would be able to tell the difference. However, that isn't possible, is it?

Billy. If you wish us (and in particular, me) to address a different question, then say so. However, do not use a different question to argue for the first.

For your penance you must make 10 posts to lifegazer.
I'd like to say "Oh! Dear lord! NO!!!" As I've heard a bit about the imfamous Lifegazer. However, I'm not sure why he has such a reputation. Care to enlighten?

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
In your {Huntsman's] scenario, which clone (or original) would offer to die? None of them. You have now created new life forms, each with a valid right to life. Each with a valid survival instinct. So not one single member of that group is going to offer himself for destruction, because every one has a self-preservation instinct, and a fully singular awareness of self to protect. We all agree with this. Why do you keep bringing it up time and time again as if it is something materialists disagree with, even when, time and time again, we keep agreeing with you on this point.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
The scenario masks the original sample from everyone, but induces the problem that every single one now has its own sense of self. In fact, your scenario demonstrates another problem with BJ's scenario - the fact that each and every one is experiencing a state of its own selfhood, and not the selfhood of any of the other duplicates. They are identical but the same.
They are identical but the same.
They are identical but the same.
They are identical but the same.
They are identical but the same.
(For the next four times you say this as if it is a differece between us)

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
As Ian pointed out, it wouldn't be one mind (or self) seeing out of dozens of bodies, but dozens of identical minds each seeing out of one body - its own body - and no other. Ian says it's one mind seeing through dozens of bodies. :D

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
So, while you could no longer differentiate between individuals, you still could clearly see that each and every self is separate, individual, and utterly connected to the physical being that is the self. They are identical but the same. rolleyes:

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Hiding the details behind smoke and mirrors, yet still providing us the means to observe where BJ is wrong. Thank you. Perhaps you had better spell it out because I think everyone missed it. ;)


SCENARIO:

Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you?

Suppose the machine flipped heads and you were scanned, vapourized and recreated. You would say wouldn't you that YOU are dead and that the clone lives. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that...
HE would not know HE was the clone.

Suppose the machine flipped tails and you were left alone. You would say wouldn't you that YOU continue to live. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that......
I would not know I was ME.


Perhaps I'll leave it here for the moment

BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
In your {Huntsman's] scenario, which clone (or original) would offer to die? None of them. You have now created new life forms, each with a valid right to life. Each with a valid survival instinct. So not one single member of that group is going to offer himself for destruction, because every one has a self-preservation instinct, and a fully singular awareness of self to protect. We all agree with this. Why do you keep bringing it up time and time again as if it is something materialists disagree with, even when, time and time again, we keep agreeing with you on this point.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
The scenario masks the original sample from everyone, but induces the problem that every single one now has its own sense of self. In fact, your scenario demonstrates another problem with BJ's scenario - the fact that each and every one is experiencing a state of its own selfhood, and not the selfhood of any of the other duplicates. They are identical but not the same.
They are identical but the not same.
They are identical but the not same.
They are identical but the not same.
They are identical but the not same.
(For the next four times you say this as if it is a differece between us)

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
As Ian pointed out, it wouldn't be one mind (or self) seeing out of dozens of bodies, but dozens of identical minds each seeing out of one body - its own body - and no other. Ian says it's one mind seeing through dozens of bodies. :D

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
So, while you could no longer differentiate between individuals, you still could clearly see that each and every self is separate, individual, and utterly connected to the physical being that is the self. They are identical but not the same. :rolleyes:

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Hiding the details behind smoke and mirrors, yet still providing us the means to observe where BJ is wrong. Thank you. Perhaps you had better spell it out because I think everyone missed it. ;)


SCENARIO:

Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you?

Suppose the machine flipped heads and you were scanned, vapourized and recreated. You would say, wouldn't you, that you are dead and that the clone lives. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that...
HE would not know that HE is the clone.

Suppose the machine flipped tails and you were left alone. You would say wouldn't you that you continue to live. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that......
I would not know that I am ME.


Perhaps I'll leave it here for the moment

BillyJoe

[Atlas]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
But, if you accept that it's the self that is important, then the only thing that matters is that the self lives on. And it does.
The self, that secretion of the brain that is *I*, is not only important, it's all important. Even to religionists, they call that *I* personality soul.

Although we don't wish to use that phrase for the additional baggage it carries, both materialists and religionists revere the *I* above the husk it is housed in.

I am materialist enough to admit hypothetically that identical copies of material bodies would produce identical, separate and unique "selves". *I* would glow from distinct perspectives much like triplets just out of the womb. Identical and in immediate divergence.

But facts, as you say, are facts. We do not throttle two of the triplets because it is only important to have one *I* and POV. We recognize that each material source of *I* is a POV.

I think that now is the key. I have been saying that *I* is the most important. I've been having trouble with that "first-in body "bias" thing and here it is in stark relief.

*I* is a reproducible phenomonon from atomically identical brains. But POV is that *I* bonded to it's material source. In fact POV is the real thing we reverence. POV is the experience of *I*. We call them both *I* because in our world they are always identical but in the world of the teletransport duplicator we need to to speak of them distinctly.

Hoo boy.... Atlas stumbles in the dark and finds the light switch. I see the source of the discomfort I've felt all along. I needed a definition of the *I* within it's body and had to consider the *I* phenomonon in contrast with it.

To the extent that materialism needed to explain *I* separate from soul the duplication scenarios are instructive. To the extent that materialism assigns equivalence to duplicates it is false because in the material world POV ( *I* within it's body ) trumps *I* alone. POV has material substance in addition to it's immaterial *I*.

BJ, I think Z and Taffer and you and I have been talking round and round about this without it finding clarity in the Atlas home. I have found the language construct that has made it so.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Taffer
I'd like to say "Oh! Dear lord! NO!!!" As I've heard a bit about the imfamous Lifegazer. However, I'm not sure why he has such a reputation. Care to enlighten? Oh you really must participate to appreciate how the obvious can escape someone.

Of course, the reason is that lifegazer has a philosophy that only he knows and he is trying to sell it. My favorite line that he often uses is "I assume nothing."

Lifegazer is a Solipist but a superior one. It's not just that the universe and you don't exist (only God exists) he's willing to talk to you about it. Your experience of Taffer is like a dreamthread of God and when he's done with you poof - no afterlife. But there is this added absurdity. If all of us dreamthreads don't start living in harmony God will visit on us Armageddon and that would make him sad.

If you ever do manuever him to a corner and paint him in with some obviousness, he will call you a plonker because you are too stupid or obstinate to understand. One thing about him, he's consistent. He won't cut you any slack at all. You are wrong. Trust that going in.

[BillyJoe]

Atlas,

The self, that secretion of the brain that is *I*, is not only important, it's all important.

I'm not sure that "secretion of the brain" is any more informative than "pattern of neural activity in the brain".

Even to religionists, they call that *I* personality soul.

And to materialists it is the self, "a pattern of neural activity in the brain"

Although we don't wish to use that phrase for the additional baggage it carries, both materialists and religionists revere the *I* above the husk it is housed in.

Fine.

I am materialist enough to admit hypothetically that identical copies of material bodies would produce identical, separate and unique "selves". *I* would glow from distinct perspectives much like triplets just out of the womb. Identical and in immediate divergence.

Fine (except I don't think "unique" fits because more than a single version is not "unique")

But facts, as you say, are facts. We do not throttle two of the triplets because it is only important to have one *I* and POV. We recognize that each material source of *I* is a POV.

I am not disagreeing. Identical but not the same selves, yes. If the machine did not destroy the original there would be two identical but not the same self and killing one is murder.

I think that now is the key. I have been saying that *I* is the most important. I've been having trouble with that "first-in body "bias" thing and here it is in stark relief.

Yes, it's an unjustifiable bias.

*I* is a reproducible phenomonon from atomically identical brains. But POV is that *I* bonded to it's material source. In fact POV is the real thing we reverence. POV is the experience of *I*. We call them both *I* because in our world they are always identical but in the world of the teletransport duplicator we need to to speak of them distinctly.

How can *I* not be bonded to a material source. This necessity of *I* to be bonded to a material source makes it a material *I*.
POV = (material)*I* = self.

Hoo boy.... Atlas stumbles in the dark and finds the light switch. I see the source of the discomfort I've felt all along. I needed a definition of the *I* within it's body and had to consider the *I* phenomonon in contrast with it.

That *I* phenomenon sounds suspiciously like the soul.

To the extent that materialism needed to explain *I* separate from soul the duplication scenarios are instructive.

Well, it has to explain *I* without reference to a soul.

To the extent that materialism assigns equivalence to duplicates it is false because in the material world POV ( *I* within it's body ) trumps *I* alone. POV has material substance in addition to it's immaterial *I*.

Not sure if I understand. For materialism, POV = material *I* = self = pattern of neural activity in the brain. The immaterial *I* = the soul.

BJ, I think Z and Taffer and you and I have been talking round and round about this without it finding clarity in the Atlas home. I have found the language construct that has made it so.

Could you to explain it to me then. :(

BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Atlas
Of course, the reason is that lifegazer has a philosophy that only he knows and he is trying to sell it. Hmmm, that was an insult then? A while back someone compared me to lifegazer. :confused:

Anyone remember who that was?
I have a little friend called Maxwell. :cool:

BJ

[Atlas]

Lifegazer?? You?? Naw. Well maybe in your steadfast assuredness. You are like a white lifegazer on the chessboard of debate.

Originally posted by BillyJoe
For materialism, POV = material *I* = self = pattern of neural activity in the brain. The immaterial *I* = the soul. [b]
(edit:Perhaps I still have to make clear how nueral activity, what I call secretion, is immaterial consciousness. I'll just say now it is the essence of IDEA. )

(edit2: I guess furthermore I'm saying that my POV is different from your POV. I'm saying it is a whole body phenomonon. The brain part of the whole body construct's an *I* or idea of self.

I think there was a frustrating exchange with Z a while back having to do with language and terms and I think it is coming down to that. I hope to explore this in a bit of depth but right now I'll say this.

You seem at times to have been arguing for equivalence between a duplicate's "sense of self" or immaterial *I* and his material*I*. That it is ok for an original to discontinue because of a continuing of consciousness elsewhere. I submit that consciousness is immaterial (though it's source is the brain.) Because of that this "soul" or "ghost in the machine" has creeped in from your side.

If POV is truly material as now we both define it, it is unique and not equivalent. The fact that it produces an equivalent *I* or soul or whatever is immaterial (pun intended) to this argument.

POVs being distinct physical structures are never equivalent. You equate it above to "SELF". There is then no continuation of "SELF" as we have talked about it. Only a continuation of the idea of self.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
How can *I* not be bonded to a material source. This necessity of *I* to be bonded to a material source makes it a material *I*. You're right it is bonded. It is Idea. It is bonded like the air is to the earth.

POV = (material)*I* = self. I have been agreeing to this with a different underlying understanding of it than you.

That *I* phenomenon sounds suspiciously like the soul. I think I could make the immaterial*I* fit a definition of soul. Sense of self. I think of the immaterial*I* as the idea of self and not quite the personality or behavior of self in the world. Perhaps this is a topic of discussion.

Atlas' comment: To the extent that materialism needed to explain *I* separate from soul the duplication scenarios are instructive.
Well, it has to explain *I* without reference to a soul. I agree. 'Separate' was the wrong word.

Atlas' comment:To the extent that materialism assigns equivalence to duplicates it is false because in the material world POV ( *I* within it's body ) trumps *I* alone. POV has material substance in addition to it's immaterial *I*.
Not sure if I understand. For materialism, POV = material *I* = self = pattern of neural activity in the brain. The immaterial *I* = the soul. I finally caught this and added edit2 at the top of my previous post. I have usurped the meaning of POV. But I have done so because it is at the core of our disagreement. Taff and Z have both talked about the time and space coordinates as attributes of POV. Your defininition hides these attributes. I was thinking more simply of the difference between a tall man's and a short man's POV. Suddenly it seemed like POV was at least dependent on the physical attributes of the body. This is also hidden but logically obvious in your equating it with the neural pattern of the brain. The brain accepts the sensory inputs and the produces the predicate "sense of self".

Neural firings of energetic impulse can cause motor function. Likewise they can cause IDEA. Self and sense of self are likewise different to me. My material self is my whole body. I wish to have a term that we can use in this discussion that addresses both my material Self and Sense of Self and I chose POV. But it does not fit the materialist definition that you describe. Does materialism have terms that we can use or do YOU have to change. :D

I think we continue to get closer and closer to the description of the fundamental disagreement that we psuedoMaterialists have with you UberMaterialists. :p

[Hellbound]

Billy:

I said I wasn't sure because I was not positive I had your point of view down. It seems we are both on the same sheet of music, though.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

My previous post requires clarification (sorry, I can no longer change it).......

SCENARIO:

Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you?

Suppose the machine flipped heads and you were scanned, vapourized and recreated. You would say, wouldn't you, that you are dead and that the clone lives. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that...
He would not know that he is HIM(the clone).

Suppose the machine flipped tails and you were left alone. You would say wouldn't you that you continue to live. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that......
I would not know that I am ME (the original).


Perhaps I'll leave it here for the moment

BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Atlas,

Lifegazer?? You?? Naw. Well maybe in your steadfast assuredness. You are like a white lifegazer on the chessboard of debate.

How do you know I'm not a black man. :D

(edit:Perhaps I still have to make clear how nueral activity, what I call secretion, is immaterial consciousness. I'll just say now it is the essence of IDEA. )

"how neural activity is immaterial consciousness"? "essence"? Sounds like that "ghost in the machine" to me. :(

(edit2: I guess furthermore I'm saying that my POV is different from your POV.

I would say one POV is different from another POV. The POVs are attributes of brains, not souls.

I'm saying it is a whole body phenomonon. The brain part of the whole body construct's an *I* or idea of self.

I would say the brain constructs a self. Period. The *I* or "idea of self" sounds to me like a ghost in the machine.

You seem at times to have been arguing for equivalence between a duplicate's "sense of self" or immaterial *I* and his material*I*.

Sorry if I seem to have been doing this because, on the contrary, I deny the existence of a "sense of self" or "immaterial *I*". I'm a materialist remember. Sense of self implies an entity to do the sensing. The self is an attribute of the brain. If you like, the brain has the self. There is no immaterial entity (immaterial *I*) that has that self. It belongs tothe brain.

That it is ok for an original to discontinue because of a continuing of consciousness elsewhere.

If, by the original, you mean the self in the brain of the original, then yes. All that constitutes the self is a pattern. As long as that pattern continues, that self continues. This is demonstrated by that scenario I posed for zaayrdragon.

I submit that consciousness is immaterial (though it's source is the brain.) Because of that this "soul" or "ghost in the machine" has creeped in from your side.

I submit that a material brain cannot produce an immaterial anything. There is no way for the material to interact with the immaterial. A ghost, if one existed, would necessarily pass straight through solid brick walls, for example.

If POV is truly material as now we both define it, it is unique and not equivalent.

Perhaps our definitions of "unique" are different (perhaps "unique" doesn't have a unique definition. :D ). For me, unique means one of a kind. When the non-destructive duplicator produces a duplicate, the original is no longer unique, by definition (well, by my definition)

The fact that it produces an equivalent *I* or soul or whatever is immaterial (pun intended) to this argument.

No immaterial *I* or soul. Materialism does not see a need for this entity. Everything is explained satisfactorily with the self alone.

POVs being distinct physical structures are never equivalent.

I would say that two identical POVs are not the same POV, but they are equivalent. Think again of that scenario I posed for zaayrdragon.

You equate it above to "SELF". There is then no continuation of "SELF" as we have talked about it. Only a continuation of the idea of self.

Yes, POV = self and "idea of self" (if I have understood your meaning) = soul. And, no, there is, in a sense (easy now), no continuation of self. I have described it as a series of instantaneous selves connected by memories. This description, I think, fits the solution for the scenario I posed for zaayrdragon

regards,
BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Atlas,

You're right it is bonded. It is Idea. It is bonded like the air is to the earth.

Not like the air to the Earth, because the brain actually produces the self. And that is what I meant when I agreed with "bonded". Doesn't preclude another instance of that self from being bonded to another instance of that brain.

POV = (material)*I* = self. I have been agreeing to this with a different underlying understanding of it than you.

Hmmm...

I think I could make the immaterial*I* fit a definition of soul. Sense of self. I think of the immaterial*I* as the idea of self and not quite the personality or behavior of self in the world.

Fine. Don't believe it exists though.

To the extent that materialism assigns equivalence to duplicates it is false because in the material world POV ( *I* within it's body ) trumps *I* alone.

Where is the *I* alone? Two identical brains with two identical patterns produce two identical selves. Where is *I* alone?

I have usurped the meaning of POV. But I have done so because it is at the core of our disagreement. Taff and Z have both talked about the time and space coordinates as attributes of POV. Your defininition hides these attributes.

Taff and Z have both said that temporal and spacial continuity are essential for continuity of self. I have said that they are not essential. I haven't hidden these attributes (is that the right word?), I have said (and demonstrated) that they are not essential. In fact, I have denied continuity altogether with the idea of series of instantaneous selves connected by memories.

I was thinking more simply of the difference between a tall man's and a short man's POV.

Over my head. :( :D

Suddenly it seemed like POV was at least dependent on the physical attributes of the body. This is also hidden but logically obvious in your equating it with the neural pattern of the brain.

It is. But identical brains means identical selves. As long as there is a self with the memories to connect it to the temporally preceding self, that is all that matters.

The brain accepts the sensory inputs and the produces the predicate "sense of self".

You seem to have two subjects for the predicate self. The brain. And that entity (soul) that has the sense of self. The soul really seems superfluous to me. Occam's razor says that plurality should not be posited without necessity and I see no necessity.

Likewise they [neural activity] can cause IDEA. Self and sense of self are likewise different to me.

To me as well, particularly as I deny one and affirm the other

My material self is my whole body.

It is the body/brain's material self rather than the material self's brain/body

I wish to have a term that we can use in this discussion that addresses both my material Self and Sense of Self and I chose POV.

As long as you realize that when I have referred to POV, I have equated it to the (material) self

But it does not fit the materialist definition that you describe.

No.

Does materialism have terms that we can use or do YOU have to change.

:D
Let's just leave the immaterial self/ *I* separate. It is materialism's target after all.

I think we continue to get closer and closer to the description of the fundamental disagreement that we psuedoMaterialists have with you UberMaterialists.

I damn well hope so after eleven pages. :D

regards,
BillyJoe

[Atlas]

Well BJ, I feel like the rug has been pulled out from under me. Let's discuss the areas of agreement first.

There is no immaterial entity (immaterial *I*) that has that self. The self is the material body and all of it's actions, likes, dislikes, words, and thoughts. No immaterial*I* has it. But it is self-referential under the term "I". So it might be proper to say that the self has it's image of *I* that is referred to as "I".

No immaterial *I* or soul. Materialism does not see a need for this entity. Everything is explained satisfactorily with the self alone. Everything can be perhaps, but hasn't been.

The *I* or "idea of self" sounds to me like a ghost in the machine. I admit it can be structured to sound that way. But now we reach our point of departure. You say other things like this... I submit that a material brain cannot produce an immaterial anything. There is no way for the material to interact with the immaterial... and this... I deny the existence of a "sense of self" or "immaterial *I*". Somehow we've got to agree on the language to discuss this further.

I thought we had established a concept of "Illusion of Self" that was produced by the brain. This seemed like something beyond nueral firings. Those are inside the brain. The ilusion of self involves it's exterior, ie the skin, and the body's emotions and movements in space. The brain not only produces this *I* but it motivates it and monitors it and corrects through it's own feedback mechanisms.

As a metaphor I suggest a movie projector. The brain has all the attributes, inputs, and activities. The result is a projection on the screen. It is a function of the brain to produce a projection seen best in dreams where whole landscapes surround the self. Unlike the projector the brain uptakes the projection with all real world sense data and manuvers the material self through the material world.

I don't see how we cannot admit this Projection or Idea of self exists. It is the pragmatic and common sense viewpoint, which doesn't make it right, but we have to agree on what it is. The Idea is not the same as neural firings, just as the Projection is not the filmstrip, just as magnetic force is not electric impulse. They are derivations, productions. They lack their own physical reality but are dependent on real thing producing them. They are real but in a sense immaterial. Thought and illusion especially so. So while you say they are neural firings they are as different from them as magnetism is from electricity as the weight or force of a block of granite is from the block of granite. That is, there is more to it than is admitted by the simplistic "pattern of neural firings". These patterns hologram the world.

Now I don't exactly know the best way to talk about these things or whether my metaphors are good ones or not. I'm trying to get at something else. Just as the weight of the granite block is a product of the mass of the granite and the gravitational field it's in, and just as a hologram is just a piece of glass until a laser shines through it, a brain is just dead meat until a life presses it into action.

So when you say: I deny the existence of a "sense of self" or "immaterial *I*". I can agree that the brain does not produce one except within the field of life and then it always produces one. Denying the existence of an immaterial*I* doesn't make it go away. ;) And while it is of the same substance perhaps as a chimera or an angel, (ie mistaken idea) it is very much a pragmatic, common sense and apparently real mistaken idea. It has a real world referent like the image of a tree in our minds. Perhaps immaterial has too much friction. Is insubstantial better? I'm talking about Idea, which is that holographic projection of thought and image from real world matter and energy.

The point of this is that to us, it is not the brain or the matter that is important. Cut as much as you like out of it. Just don't destroy the projection. People do get brain tumors that are successfully removed without damage to the "illusion of self" and the self is unchanged but for a scar. I also agree that a lobotomy destroys the "illusion of self". Further, it is that loss of the "illusion" that we lament. We couldn't care less about the brain matter - that goes into the trash.

All this convinces me that while science must adopt a soulless view of the human entity, it also must admit and seek to enhace the vitality of the consciousness of the human. That means all the thoughts, memories and ideas of each unique entity. I think it has to admit the uniqueness within the individual human being. You admit this in you last statement: And, no, there is, in a sense (easy now), no continuation of self. I have described it as a series of instantaneous selves connected by memories. But then scoff at Z, Taff and me when we shout "Don't do it, BJ" as you blithely step into the disintegrator. You are important as your own original self. Nobody likes being an Australian, and yah it seems that one is as good as the next. But hey BJ, it just ain't true. ;)

[BillyJoe]

Atlas,

The self is the material body and all of it's actions, likes, dislikes, words, and thoughts.

Yes, but the self is an illusion. It doesn't actually exist.

No immaterial*I* has it. But it is self-referential under the term "I".

Meaning that selves refer to themselves as "I"? Yes, they really do believe they exist. The illusion is so extraordinarly good that it is hard to believe it is not real. The self that is. The illusion of self is very real. It has material representation in the brain after all.

So it might be proper to say that the self has it's image of *I* that is referred to as "I".

Fine. Just as long as you realize it is an illusion.

Everything can be [explained satisfactorily without the immaterial *I*] perhaps, but hasn't been.

For example? In any case, what evidence is there for the immaterial. By implication, I don't think there ever could be.

I admit it can be structured to sound that way. But now we reach our point of departure. You say other things like this..."I submit that a material brain cannot produce an immaterial anything. There is no way for the material to interact with the immaterial..." and this... "I deny the existence of a "sense of self" or "immaterial *I*"" Somehow we've got to agree on the language to discuss this further.

I think the language is clear enough. I think it is the implications that are being missed.

I thought we had established a concept of "Illusion of Self" that was produced by the brain. This seemed like something beyond nueral firings.

How so? Whay could the illusion of self not be represented by a pattern of neural activity in the brain?

Those [neural activity] are inside the brain. The ilusion of self involves it's exterior, ie the skin, and the body's emotions and movements in space. The brain not only produces this *I* but it motivates it and monitors it and corrects through it's own feedback mechanisms.

No, that's part of the illusion, that it is exterior to the brain. Everything happens inside the brain. Why do you think it could not be all just inside the brain?

As a metaphor I suggest a movie projector. The brain has all the attributes, inputs, and activities. The result is a projection on the screen. It is a function of the brain to produce a projection seen best in dreams where whole landscapes surround the self. Unlike the projector the brain uptakes the projection with all real world sense data and manuvers the material self through the material world.

Again, this is just part of the illusion. There is no projector. As far as vision is concerned, all the traffic is inwards. Nothing projects outwards. Neither is there a projector inside the brain, nor screen, nor light, nor eyes in there to see with. It's all represented in the pattern of neural activity in the brain. The rest is illusion.

I don't see how we cannot admit this Projection or Idea of self exists. It is the pragmatic and common sense viewpoint, which doesn't make it right, but we have to agree on what it is.

It seems we don't though. I agree with you that it "is the pragmatic and common sense viewpoint". I aslo agree that that "doesn't make it right". Consider the checkerboard illusion. The "pragmatic and common sense viewpoint" is that the square are different shades of grey. The fact is that they can be measured to be identical. It's an illusion, just like the self. This is not to say that the illusion is not real. I mean look at those squares. They definitely do seem to be different shades of grey don't they? Similarly the illusion of self is real. It's the self that is not real, not the ilusion of self.

The Idea is not the same as neural firings, just as the Projection is not the filmstrip....

As I say, nothing is projected. The illusion of projection is real, but not the projection itself, That is not happening.

....just as magnetic force is not electric impulse.

Well, of course we know now (or should I say our present theory is) that there are no isolated magnetic or electric waves, because an electric waves induces a magnetic wave which induces an electric wave etc etc thereby propagating an electromagnetic wave through (empty) space. Anyway, that is by the by. But, still, things are not always what they seem.

They are derivations, productions. They lack their own physical reality but are dependent on real thing producing them. They are real but in a sense immaterial.

In what sense "immaterial". They are all measurable quantities. They can be described and predicted. Therefore thay must be material.

Thought and illusion especially so.

The illusion of some thing IS real. It's the thing, itself, that is NOT real. And surely it is at least possible, isn't it, that thought could have representation in the brain as a pattern of neural activity. Which would make it material. Why do you say it is necessarily "immaterial"

So while you say they are neural firings they are as different from them as magnetism is from electricity.....

unless you subscribe to electromagnetism, in which cae they are, sort of, one and the same thing

....as the weight or force of a block of granite is from the block of granite.

Except that the concept of curved space shows a much deeper inseparable interconnection between a mass and weight.

That is, there is more to it than is admitted by the simplistic "pattern of neural firings". These patterns hologram the world.

And a hologram is also a projection, but there is no sense in which vision is a projection. I don't think this analogy works at all.

Now I don't exactly know the best way to talk about these things or whether my metaphors are good ones or not. I'm trying to get at something else. Just as the weight of the granite block is a product of the mass of the granite and the gravitational field it's in, and just as a hologram is just a piece of glass until a laser shines through it, a brain is just dead meat until a life presses it into action.

Sorry, the metaphors don't work for me. :(
And I don't rally understand the relevance of "a brain is just dead meat until a life presses it into action." unless you mean something other than, breathing, circulation, hormones, and biochemical reactions

So when you say: "I deny the existence of a "sense of self" or "immaterial *I*". I can agree that the brain does not produce one except within the field of life and then it always produces one.

Not sure what your point is here. (A dead brain doesn't produce anything

Denying the existence of an immaterial*I* doesn't make it go away. ;)

Well, what I meant is that I don't see any need for an immaterial *I* and there can be no evidence for anything immaterial almost by definition.

And while it is of the same substance perhaps as a chimera or an angel, (ie mistaken idea) it is very much a pragmatic, common sense and apparently real mistaken idea.

Well, an illusion. And an illusion IS real, yes. But, being real, it is, of course material. It has pattern representation on the brain.

It has a real world referent like the image of a tree in our minds.

Sensory input into the brain is descriminated within the brain producing a pattern of neural activity within the brain. There is actually no image in the brain (no projector, screen, light, eyes etc and no image projected into the outside world.

Perhaps immaterial has too much friction. Is insubstantial better?

I don't see a difference in this context.

I'm talking about Idea, which is that holographic projection of thought and image from real world matter and energy.

I understand (but don't accept) the holographic projection but I still don't understand your word "Idea"

The point of this is that to us, it is not the brain or the matter that is important. Cut as much as you like out of it. Just don't destroy the projection.

I would say that a particular brain is not important, but that an instance of a brain (or, perhaps, an artificial analog) is essential, for the exsitence of an illusion of self.

People do get brain tumors that are successfully removed without damage to the "illusion of self" and the self is unchanged but for a scar.

Obviously these particular brain tumours are not substantially affecting the pattern producing the illusion of self

I also agree that a lobotomy destroys the "illusion of self".

Even then there is something that it is like to be a lobotomized illusion of self. Removing the whole brain would definitely do it though :D

Further, it is that loss of the "illusion" that we lament. We couldn't care less about the brain matter - that goes into the trash.

Except that, without that matter, there is no illusion. And, of course, that "we" in your sentence, is the illusion of which we speak.

All this convinces me that while science must adopt a soulless view of the human entity, it also must admit and seek to enhace the vitality of the consciousness of the human. That means all the thoughts, memories and ideas of each unique entity. I think it has to admit the uniqueness within the individual human being.

I empathize with you, Atlas, but we are unique (and I am using non-materialist language here), only as long as we do not have a duplicate. Anyway, I wouldn't worry too much. It seems quantum affects may make duplication impossible (Science to the rescue :) )

You admit this in you last statement: [b]And, no, there is, in a sense (easy now), no continuation of self. I have described it as a series of instantaneous selves connected by memories. But then scoff at Z, Taff and me when we shout "Don't do it, BJ" as you blithely step into the disintegrator.

But don't you see.....the instantaneous self in the duplicate immediately after the duplication is connected to the instantaneous self in the original immediately before the duplication. The series of instantaneous selves connected by memory continues in the duplicate. The illusion of self continues.

You are important as your own original self. Nobody likes being an Australian, and yah it seems that one is as good as the next. But hey BJ, it just ain't true. ;) :)

regards,
BillyJoe.

[Z]

But don't you see.....the instantaneous self in the duplicate immediately after the duplication is connected to the instantaneous self in the original immediately before the duplication. The series of instantaneous selves connected by memory continues in the duplicate. The illusion of self continues.

But only in the wrong direction.

Consider it this way: For a moment, let's dispense with unnecessary baggage such as souls, illusions, etc. FACTS: Any given thing that has senses and a means to process those senses intelligently has a sense of self. The sense of self is the combined and composite of all its sensory data, its memory, instincts, and behaviour algorithms, plus an awareness of individuality.

If we clone a thing with a sense of self, we create a new self with a new sense of self, a new awareness of individuality. It is connected by memories to the original sense of self, yes - but the original is not connected to the new sense of self, and THIS IS WHERE THE PROBLEM LIES. This is the crux of the problem, and why it is so important to analyze both the non-destructive AND the destructive cases.

In a non-destructive case, we can clearly see that the original sense of self is not connected to the new sense of self from the original POV, but the new sense of self IS connected to the original sense of self from the new POV. However, if both POVs persist, not only do we demonstrate that the connection of selves is one-sided, but we can also observe an immediate divergence of that connection, as one POV takes in new experiences that the other does not, and vice-versa.

IN a destructive case, by extrapolation, logic, and reason, we have a new self with a new sense of self, and this sense of self is connected to the original sense of self from the new POV. But as we have already established, no such connection occurs from the original POV regarding the original sense of self; the original in this case, having been destroyed, has no say per se in the situation, but also has no continued awareness. The original POV is gone, dead, destroyed, never coming back again, etc.

Thus, understanding this situation, the survival instinct asserts that any scenario which leads to the destruction of the sense of self from your current POV is a bad scenario, and undesirable. You will not continue in your clone; you will be dead. The second choice is less desirable than the first, because in the first you will continue in yourself, though you may now be competing for social identity with your clone. But competition may be won; death is a certain loss.

Even if you make a million clones and convince them all that they are all the original, and likewise convince the original that it may or may not be a clone, this is irrelevant in that the original is still sensing from within its own POV, and not the POV of a million clones. In fact, you agree with this point, BJ - but still assert that it would be OK to kill the original, as long as a duplicate lived on?

Alas, BJ, you are relying on the idea that the POV is somehow linked - but it does so retroactively, which does not carry the original POV forward, but rather installs a POV backward. This serves the duplicate self fine, but does absolutely nothing for the original.

In other words:
Factual Existence:
Past-----------------Present------------------Future
Orig------------------>TT/Destruct|
Dupl TT/Create|-------------------->
POV Existence:
Orig------------------>TT/Destruct|
Dupl<------------------TT/Create--------------------->

But notice how the Orig POV ceases. End of story.

The duplicate POV does not exist in the past either, except as projected from the present.

Apologies, my illustration is poor. But what I am attempting to introduce to you is the idea that the duplicate has a sense of self like the original's but that the original, which is the only you that you will ever or can ever sense, simply stops.

How, after all, can you continue in the duplicate if you still exist as the original? You can't. And if you can't exist in this case, how spontaneously can you continue to exist if you kill the original?

It's really as simple as that.

[BillyJoe]

Hmmm....seems this thread is dying. Perhaps we need to spice it up a bit....


zaayrdragon,

Now listen up you ignorant git. :D

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But only in the wrong direction. Did I hear misdirection?

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Consider it this way: For a moment, let's dispense with unnecessary baggage such as souls, illusions, :D
(I mean, that is EXACTLY what we are discussing. :rolleyes: )

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
FACTS: Any given thing that has senses and a means to process those senses intelligently has a sense of self. Ever heard of the saying "You are entitled to your OPINIONS but not your FACTS"!

WARNING: SERIOUS BIT:
"Any given thing that has senses and a means to process those senses intelligently has a sense of self"
So what is this "thing"? What "thing" processes the sensory input? Well, what else but the brain. The brain does the processing so it must be the brain that has a "sense of self". So what sort of sense of self should the brain have. Well, the brain is all grey and white, wrinkly and soft and sends long thin arms into its immediate environment - the body that surrounds it. But is this what you are referring to when you say "sense of self". No, not a bit of it. The "sense of self" is that body with its eyes, nose, ears, arms, legs, trunk and genitalia. In other words, this "sense of self" of which you speak is an illusion.

So, in one sentence you dispense with illusions and in the very next sentence you welcome them back in again. You tricky dicky. :D

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
If we clone a thing with a sense of self, we create a new self with a new sense of self, a new awareness of individuality. INDIVIDUALITY hey? Well, who ever heard of a brain with INDIVIDUALITY? Next thing you'll be giving the quivering lump of grey wrinkles a PERSONALITY. :nope:

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
It [the duplicate] is connected by memories to the original sense of self, yes - but the original is not connected to the new sense of self, and THIS IS WHERE THE PROBLEM LIES. Well, I 'll tell you WHERE THE PROBLEM LIES! You have no sense of symmetry at all. Here, I'll spell it out for you...
In the case of the non-destructive case:
The original after the duplication is connected to the original before the duplication by memories.
The duplicate after the duplication is connected to the original before the duplication by memories.
Okay???

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This is the crux of the problem, and why it is so important to analyze both the non-destructive AND the destructive cases. So why do you steadfastly REFUSE to dissect the destructive case. Here it is again...

SCENARIO:
Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you?

Suppose the machine flipped heads and you were scanned, vapourized and recreated. You would say, wouldn't you, that you are dead and that the clone lives You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that...
HE would not know that HE is HIM (the clone).

Suppose the machine flipped tails and you were left alone. You would say wouldn't you that you continue to live. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that......
I would not know that I am ME (the original).

Could we just a tiny little response. Pretty please. :cool:


Originally posted by zaayrdragon
In a non-destructive case, we can clearly see that the original sense of self is not connected to the new sense of self from the original POV, but the new sense of self IS connected to the original sense of self from the new POV.
Well listen, after the duplication, the original and the duplicate are both connected to the original before the duplication. Symmetry.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
However, if both POVs persist, not only do we demonstrate that the connection of selves is one-sided (interjection: :D ) but we can also observe an immediate divergence of that connection, as one POV takes in new experiences that the other does not, and vice-versa. Agreed. You really must acknowledge that we have been in agreement on this point since page one. Yes, they are identical but not the same and then they immediately diverge because of different experiences. :rolleyes:

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
IN a destructive case, by extrapolation, logic, and reason... Oh, really, is that what it is?

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
.....we have a new self with a new sense of self, and this sense of self is connected to the original sense of self from the new POV. But as we have already established, no such connection occurs from the original POV regarding the original sense of self; the original in this case, having been destroyed, has no say per se in the situation, but also has no continued awareness. The original POV is gone, dead, destroyed, never coming back again, etc. :D
Oh my God, this really is hopeless isn't it? If no sense of symmetry wasn't bad enough, now we have to put up with ***** like "self with a sense of self". A self with a sense of self :D

And still silent on....


SCENARIO:
Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you?

Suppose the machine flipped heads and you were scanned, vapourized and recreated. You would say, wouldn't you, that you are dead and that the clone lives You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that...
HE would not know that HE is the HIM (the clone).

Suppose the machine flipped tails and you were left alone. You would say wouldn't you that you continue to live. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that......
I would not know that I am ME (the original).


Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Thus, understanding this situation, the survival instinct asserts that any scenario which leads to the destruction of the sense of self from your current POV is a bad scenario, and undesirable. You will not continue in your clone; you will be dead. The second choice is less desirable than the first, because in the first you will continue in yourself, though you may now be competing for social identity with your clone. But competition may be won; death is a certain loss. Yeah, yeah, yeah.


SCENARIO:
Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you?

Suppose the machine flipped heads and you were scanned, vapourized and recreated. You would say, wouldn't you, that you are dead and that the clone lives You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that...
HE would not know that HE is HIM (the clone).

Suppose the machine flipped tails and you were left alone. You would say wouldn't you that you continue to live. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that......
I would not know that I am ME (the original)


Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Even if you make a million clones and convince them all that they are all the original, and likewise convince the original that it may or may not be a clone, this is irrelevant in that the original is still sensing from within its own POV, and not the POV of a million clones. In fact, you agree with this point, BJ - but still assert that it would be OK to kill the original, as long as a duplicate lived on? zaayrdragon, listen...

SCENARIO:
Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you?

Suppose the machine flipped heads and you were scanned, vapourized and recreated. You would say, wouldn't you, that you are dead and that the clone lives You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that...
HE would not know that HE is the HIM (the clone).

Suppose the machine flipped tails and you were left alone. You would say wouldn't you that you continue to live. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that......
I would not know that I am ME (the original).


Each of them feels EXACTLY like the other. EXACTLY like the other. So how can it possibly matter which one lives. There is absolutely nothing to distinguish them. How can it possibly matter which one lives.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Alas, BJ, you are relying on the idea that the POV is somehow linked - but it does so retroactively, which does not carry the original POV forward, but rather installs a POV backward. This serves the duplicate self fine, but does absolutely nothing for the original. Oh my God! :(

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
In other words:
Factual Existence:
Past-----------------Present------------------Future
Orig------------------>TT/Destruct|
Dupl TT/Create|-------------------->
POV Existence:
Orig------------------>TT/Destruct|
Dupl<------------------TT/Create--------------------->

But notice how the Orig POV ceases. End of story.

The duplicate POV does not exist in the past either, except as projected from the present.

Apologies, my illustration is poor. Poor? It is friggin' hopeless. Try this....


/ pattern L -> pattern M -> ->
-> -> pattern J -> pattern K -
\ DEAD


Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But what I am attempting to introduce to you is the idea that the duplicate has a sense of self like the original's but that the original, which is the only you that you will ever or can ever sense, simply stops. INTRODUCE me to the idea? :D
zaayrdragon, you are about two decades too late. :D

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
How, after all, can you continue in the duplicate if you still exist as the original? You can't. And if you can't exist in this case, how spontaneously can you continue to exist if you kill the original?No, you can't zaayrdragon. But the self produced by those brains certainly can.

WARNING:SERIOUS BIT:
Originally it was just genes. To promote their survival, these genes collected together and surrounded themselves with an envelope (a sort of primitive body). This envelope evolved into a body, eventually with head, eyes, ears, nose, trunk, arms, legs, fingers and toes to more effectively promote the survival of those genes. Along with this, there evolved neural tissue which became centalized as a brain which in turn evolved consciousness and a self.
genes -> body -> brain -> self
The genes own that body and through the body, the brain, and through the brain, the self.
You are the illusion produced by the brain and hence ultimately the genes to promote their survival. The illusion is extraordinarily good, so much so that zaayrdragon actually think he exists. But he only exists as an illusion. And he is not alone. We all exist as illusions. Extraordinarliy good illusions

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
It's really as simple as that. No, it's not that simple. ;)

But have a go anyway...

SCENARIO:
Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you?

Suppose the machine flipped heads and you were scanned, vapourized and recreated. You would say, wouldn't you, that you are dead and that the clone lives You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that...
HE would not know that HE is the HIM (the clone).

Suppose the machine flipped tails and you were left alone. You would say wouldn't you that you continue to live. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that......
I would not know that I am ME (the original).


disregards,
BillyJoe, :D

[Z]

SCENARIO: Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you? Suppose the machine flipped heads and you were scanned, vapourized and recreated. You would say, wouldn't you, that you are dead and that the clone lives You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that... HE would not know that HE is the HIM (the clone). Suppose the machine flipped tails and you were left alone. You would say wouldn't you that you continue to live. You would also have to say, wouldn't you, that...... I would not know that I am ME (the original).

The scenario is meaningless, though, in discussing the original self. If you were vapourized, you'd be dead - end of story.

If you survived, you would know because you survived that either a) nothing happened or b) you were the clone created, and imbued with such memory as to believe you've been alive all along. Of course, this cannot matter to you at this point, because you cannot know which is true. However, if you were in fact vapourized, then you wouldn't know anything at all.

Again, though, this scenario merely obfuscates the fact that, without resorting to conditions to mask the truth, you WOULD know. Well, you'd either know you were a clone, or you'd be dead. Or, in a non-destructive scenario, you would know quite clearly that there is still only one you.

You still can't address the fact that if you are cloned and survive the process, the original you is still the one and only you. You may not be unique, except of course in temporal and spatial location, but you are still the only person experiencing things from your own point of view. You still HAVE to rely on a destructive scenario in order to feel justified - you HAVE to rely on it to argue that there is no difference between cloneYou and originalYou. Remove the destructive aspect, and you lose automatically.

This suggests that YOU are not transferred at all - and that therefore, you would be insane to accept a destructive cloning process.

Or consider even a semi-destructive process. Let's say that the process of cloning isn't going to kill you, but it will render you in such a state, total paralysis, that you can only survive via life support and can say or do nothing, only experience through your senses for the rest of your life. And further, let's say that the scientists know the process causes further damage to the nerves, so that you are in excruciating pain for whatever life is left. Now does it matter? Your clone is fine, alive and well, wandering around Mars. But does that justify putting yourself into this horrible scenario? Of course not. So how can you justify total annihilation, then?

Your much-loved scenario is only another smokescreen. Fact is, if that coin came up 'kill the bastage' then you'd stop experiencing anything at all, full stop, end of story. That's not survival, that's suicide (or murder, depending on how you look at it).

[DanishDynamite]

Man, this thread just keeps on keeping on.

If a brain exactly like the brain currently in your skull exists somewhere and is set into motion, you will be looking out of its eyes. What is so hard to understand about that?

The only possible reason you could have to not believe this, is if you think there is something extra-physical about the particular mass of elementary particles currently located in your skull. Something which isn't physical and thus cannot be copied physically. What exactly is the nature of this "ghost in the machine"? What is it made of? Or is it even made of anything? If it isn't made of anything which can even in principle be detected physically, then how can you even claim it is there?

[Z]

If a brain exactly like the brain currently in your skull exists somewhere and is set into motion, you will be looking out of its eyes. What is so hard to understand about that? ''

And how, exactly, will you do that if the brain currently in your skull is still functioning? You won't spontaneously experience out of both sets of eyes, so you can't experience out of the eyes of another brain somewhere else. What is so hard to understand about that?

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
''

And how, exactly, will you do that if the brain currently in your skull is still functioning? You won't spontaneously experience out of both sets of eyes, so you can't experience out of the eyes of another brain somewhere else. What is so hard to understand about that?

What is hard to understand is how you cannot get beyond semantics and into addressing the question at hand. Let me repeat the question:
The only possible reason you could have to not believe this, is if you think there is something extra-physical about the particular mass of elementary particles currently located in your skull. Something which isn't physical and thus cannot be copied physically. What exactly is the nature of this "ghost in the machine"? What is it made of? Or is it even made of anything? If it isn't made of anything which can even in principle be detected physically, then how can you even claim it is there?

[Z]

The only possible reason you could have to not believe this, is if you think there is something extra-physical about the particular mass of elementary particles currently located in your skull. Something which isn't physical and thus cannot be copied physically. What exactly is the nature of this "ghost in the machine"? What is it made of? Or is it even made of anything? If it isn't made of anything which can even in principle be detected physically, then how can you even claim it is there?

Why do I have to assume something extra-physical about being unable to see from someone else's eyes? Can you see out of anyone's eyes but your own? Of course not.

I'm not at all interested in a 'ghost in the machine' - like BJ, you're asserting what I am not, that there must be a 'soul' for my position to be valid. But I deny this utterly - I'm simply pointing out the simple logic, that if you cannot while alive see out of the eyes of any other being, then you cannot 'jump' from the body which dies into an identical body which lives.

So, to repeat myself:

And how, exactly, will you do that if the brain currently in your skull is still functioning? You won't spontaneously experience out of both sets of eyes, so you can't experience out of the eyes of another brain somewhere else. What is so hard to understand about that?

Can you address this concept? How do you deal with the simple fact that you are locked within your own perceptions - that you ARE your own perceptions - and cannot under any circumstances transfer the experience of your perceptions in any way?

I don't care if there are 10,000 identical brains - you will not see out of 10,000 sets of eyes, nor process inputs from 10,000 bodies, but only your own eyes, your own body. And if you can't transfer your POV into another body while living, how can you do it while dead?

You can't address this point, because it is the logical flaw of your argument - if a brain is duplicated and activated somewhere else, yet the brain is still functioning and active, then it can only experience what its own senses are telling it; it will never and can never know, in any way, what the other brain (the duplicate) is going through. So why does that change if the original brain is killed? Address that point AND NO OTHER, or I simply won't be bothered with you, D.D. It's not that I intend to be rude, but you come across more forcefully than BJ - and he seems to at least have a sense of humour.

But if you CANNOT address the issue I raise, then I suggest your thinking is fundamentally flawed.

I don't propose any ghost in the machine, I simply propose that the idea of a clone being a valid extension of self is fundamentally flawed. The only means of making the cloning process work, with regards to transferral of self, is destruction of the original or complete obfuscation of the set of awareness - yet self is not in any way transferred, but rather the fact of this is simply masked, hidden either in destruction or in a set of illusions meant to confuse both original and duplicate(s).

Remove these masks, and you see the logical flaw immediately.

Honestly, BJ, DD - can you address this very simple concept, that without destruction or deliberate obfuscation, the fact that YOU do not experience out of each clone made? I mean that - don't use any form of destruction of the original, or any obfuscation of the status of clone. Put the original in a room with a big sign that reads 'Original' and have each clone form in a room with a big sign reading 'Clone'... Then randomly kill one off. I guarantee whoever survives will know what they are. And I guarantee that the one that got killed will not live on through the others. Or don't kill anyone - just ask each one what they see. If they only see one sign, then they are only experiencing out of their own eyes, and not out of each other's eyes.

It's mind-numbingly simple, yet perhaps your minds are already too numb to accept this simple physical truth?

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Unfortunately we do have to resolve the destructive duplication before we can move on to the non-destructive version. Please bear with me.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
The scenario is meaningless.....in discussing the original self. It is just my attempt to help make the penny drop for you. Despite what you may think there IS an alternative view to the one you espouse. I hope, and I don't mean to sound presumptious when I say this, that someday you will see it..

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
If you were vapourized, you'd be dead - end of story. True, if YOU were vapourized, YOU would be dead. But, if there were two YOUs, and only one YOU was dead, there would be one YOU still alive.
Two YOUs, one YOU is dead and one YOU is alive. YOU live on.
Two YOUs, equally and legitimately YOU, with no way to tell them apart, one YOU is dead and one YOU is alive. YOU live on.

And, when I read that, putting myself in your shoes, I can see it won't work for you. I'm wondering how I can ever flick that switch that turns on the light for you. :(

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
If you survived, you would know because you survived that either a) nothing happened or b) you were the clone created, and imbued with such memory as to believe you've been alive all along. You are really SO CLOSE here, zaayrdragon, that I don't know why the penny is not dropping for you. Let us dissect (in a constructive way ;) ) your sentence....
If you survived, you would know that either:
(a) Nothing happened.
(b) You are the duplicate.
In other words, situation (a) and (b) feel exactly the same, with absolutely nothing to tell them apart. You would not know the difference. In both cases you would feel like you.

Am I getting anywhere?.....NO?......well, let's move on.....

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Of course, this cannot matter to you at this point, because you cannot know which is true. Doesn't this do it for you?
"It cannot matter to you" you said.
Meaning "It cannot matter to you if "nothing happened" or "you are the duplicate". In other words, the result is the same, YOU ARE ALIVE. That's why "it cannot matter", as you said

NO?.....Well, I'm trying.....

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
However, if you were in fact vapourized, then you wouldn't know anything at all.Yes, if you are vapourized, you wouldn't know anything at all. I agree. That instance of YOU wouldn't know anthing at all. But the duplicate is YOU also, and therefore YOU survive. Remember I am not saying that YOU are transferred from the original to the duplicate. I am saying that YOU are reproduced in the duplicate. And I am not saying that YOU would look through both sets of eyes if the original is not vapourized. It sound like a paradox to you doesn't it. YOU in the original. YOU in the duplicate. But not the same YOU looking through both eyes. Two identical but not the same YOU. But each equally legitmately YOU, so that if one survives, YOU survive. And, if both survive, two YOUs survive, identical but not the same YOU.
How can this paradox be resolved?

Well, it can be resolved, because it is resolved for me. But I don't know what to say to make it resolve for you. Goddammit!.....

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Again, though, this scenario merely obfuscates the fact that, without resorting to conditions to mask the truth, you WOULD know. Well, you'd either know you were a clone, or you'd be dead. But think a moment. How could knowing make any difference to the fact that YOU survive?

Suppose someone, call him Spoiler, saw the coin toss and came up to you and said: "You don't know if it was heads or tails so you don't know if you are the original or the duplicate, because, as you admit, it feels exactly the same with absolutely no way to tell the difference. So I hope it won't make a difference to you if I tell you that the coin came up heads and that, therefore, you are the duplicate."
"Goddammit!" you reply, "That means I'm dead! No, hold on, what am I saying? I'm obviously not dead. Here I am talking to you after all. The original is dead. I am the duplicate :(. Goddammit, I thought I was the one and only true original. Hmmm....oh well, at least I'm alive.....but still, I wish I were the original. Except that, if I was, I would, of course, be dead....hmmm....Goddamn!"
"Only kidding" says Spoiler. "That stupid duplicator doesn't even work. There was never any chance of you being scanned, vapourized and duplicated. Nothing happened. You are the original. You were, are, and always will be the original."
:)

TEN YEARS LATER:
News item. Ten years ago, a mad scientist produced a Duplicator which scanned, vapourised and duplicated people. The process worked extraordinarily well. The duplicates had absolutely no idea that anything had changed. However, when they were told what had happened, the duplicates that showed a negative response to this news, were told that, in fact, the machine was a complete hoax. They were told that nothing had happened and that they were the original.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Or, in a non-destructive scenario, you would know quite clearly that there is still only one you.The materialist's solution to the paradox of the destructive duplicator, extends to the non-destructive duplicator. However, it is impossible to see it without first seeing for yourself how it resolves the destructive scenario. So I'll hold off at this point and wait for your response to the above.

regards,
BillyJoe

[Z]

nfortunately we do have to resolve the destructive duplication before we can move on to the non-destructive version. Please bear with me.

And I would say the same in reverse, we have to resolve the non-destructive duplication before we can move on to the destructive version.

But, if there were two YOUs, and only one YOU was dead, there would be one YOU still alive.

But the point is, there aren't ever two YOUs. This is what the non-destructive scenario demonstrates - that if a duplicate is made, it is YOU and HIM to you. You absolutely CANNOT have an identical POV - you have YOUR POV, and he has HIS POV. Each believes themselves to be the same person (unless conditions clue them in otherwise) but each is still a distinct and separate individual with their own POV. So YOU will not survive, as there is only and ever only one YOU. The non-destructive scenario shows this clearly, and every attempt to make it appears otherwise involves one form or another of hiding the facts.

Think about it, BJ - if we claim that electricity always travels along material paths, we have to either make an exception for non-conductive materials, or we have to deny the existance of any such materials to make such a claim. This is much the same situation: in order to postulate that YOU survive, you have to either make the qualification that it is not the same YOU, which means YOU do not survive at all, or you have to deny the existance of the original YOU or the surrounding conditions involved. In other words, if we take ALL the facts, then it becomes clear that you do not survive at all, only your pattern/genes/etc. in another person.

"It cannot matter to you" you said. Meaning "It cannot matter to you if "nothing happened" or "you are the duplicate". In other words, the result is the same, YOU ARE ALIVE.

The 'YOU' being the you after the process - not NECESSARILY the you prior to the process, but due to hiding the facts, you have no way of knowing.

But if you are told with certainty that you will be destroyed, nothing else matters - you would not want to be destroyed, no matter what. (Well YOU would, but I doubt you have the same self-preservation instinct that I must have...)

Two identical but not the same YOU. But each equally legitmately YOU, so that if one survives, YOU survive. And, if both survive, two YOUs survive, identical but not the same YOU. How can this paradox be resolved?

Two identical but not the same individuals - one you, one him. This is where the paradox is resolved, because two YOUS cannot exist - only one YOU and only one HIM. Your POV - the unique viewpoint by which you are YOU and not HIM - doesn't magically transfer at the moment of your death to the other 'you' - IT-JUST-STOPS.

I don't know why you fail to understand this - it's perfectly clear to me. You've resolved a false assumption, and it could kill YOU.

Suppose, for an instant, that the system didn't work at all - they just wanted to be rid of you. So they show you lots of convincing images of people on Mars that used to live on Earth claiming 100% success on the teletrans, then tell you to step into the chamber to be destroyed. What lives on after that? Absolutely nothing - they fooled you, and you died. End of story.

Suppose the teletrans malfunctioned, and nothing came out the other end at all. You're dead, end of story.

Suppose all that appeared on the other end was raw DNA with no other matter around it - no flesh, etc. You're dead, end of story.

But really, it wouldn't matter WHAT appeared or didn't appear at the other end. You're dead, end of story.

The materialist's solution to the paradox of the destructive duplicator, extends to the non-destructive duplicator.

How so? In a non-destructive scenario, assuming you are right after all, then you have two bodies experiencing the SAME POINT OF VIEW. YOU exist in both - meaning YOU are now sensing out of both bodies simultaneously. This further implies that YOU will CONTINUE to do so - but this is impossible and meaningless. Now, you can claim that AT THE INSTANT OF DUPLICATION, you are experiencing out of both bodies simultaneously, but this is still clearly wrong. If one room was green, and the other red, and you ask each person what color they see, you won't get them saying both colors at once - each sees their own room, their own color. They are not the same person, and therefore both CANNOT be you.

The non-destructive scenario clearly and concisely demonstrates the flaw to your thinking, but you insist on clinging either to a destructive scenario, or a scenario that masks the truth. In fact, it says a lot that you go to such lengths to construct a scenario that hides the facts in order for your view to be upheld.

Tell me, can you REALLY uphold this view WITHOUT doing so? Can you really claim that YOU live in both bodies simultaneously?

I have more to say, but I'll wait until I see you resolve THAT part of the discussion.

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Why do I have to assume something extra-physical about being unable to see from someone else's eyes? Can you see out of anyone's eyes but your own? Of course not. A given instance of you can only look out of that instance's eyes.

The problem I think is that you cannot get beyond the idea that you must be unique. This is understandable but you must try to get beyond it.

What makes you you? The only thing that makes you you is that a brain and body of your exact type exists somewhere. If such a brain and body didn't exist, you wouldn't exist. Does it make a difference to whether or not you exist that this brain and body is located in Los Angeles or in New York? No it doesn't. It doesn't matter where this brain and body is located; as long as it is located somewhere you will exist and you will be looking out of its eyes.

A brain of your type generates you. If such a brain is switched off, it will not generate you. If such a brain is switched on, it will. You are nothing more and nothing less than a projection of a brain of your type. There is no you unless such a brain is active somewhere.

Does that mean that if two such brains are active, a single personality will be able to look out of both pairs of eyes? No. Each personality only looks out of the eyes attached the brain generating it, but each personality will still be the you generated by such a brain.
I'm not at all interested in a 'ghost in the machine' - like BJ, you're asserting what I am not, that there must be a 'soul' for my position to be valid. But I deny this utterly - I'm simply pointing out the simple logic, that if you cannot while alive see out of the eyes of any other being, then you cannot 'jump' from the body which dies into an identical body which lives.
The problem is that you consistenly have the underlying assumption that "you" are unique in the Universe. You are simply being generated by the mass of elementary particles in your skull. These particles are in a given state at any given moment. If these particles were in New York or on the Moon it would make no difference. Such particles in such states would generate you. If such particles in such states were in both New York and on the Moon, they would both generate you.

You are a projection of a brain such as yours.
Can you address this concept? How do you deal with the simple fact that you are locked within your own perceptions - that you ARE your own perceptions - and cannot under any circumstances transfer the experience of your perceptions in any way?
Exactly. You are your perceptions. And your perceptions are generated by a brain of your type. Therefore, if such a brain is active somewhere, there you are.

I don't care if there are 10,000 identical brains - you will not see out of 10,000 sets of eyes, nor process inputs from 10,000 bodies, but only your own eyes, your own body. And if you can't transfer your POV into another body while living, how can you do it while dead?
Every instance of you will only process its own inputs.

I expect its been mentioned before, but an instance of you will only be exactly you at the moment of creation.
You can't address this point, because it is the logical flaw of your argument - if a brain is duplicated and activated somewhere else, yet the brain is still functioning and active, then it can only experience what its own senses are telling it; it will never and can never know, in any way, what the other brain (the duplicate) is going through. So why does that change if the original brain is killed? Address that point AND NO OTHER, or I simply won't be bothered with you, D.D. It's not that I intend to be rude, but you come across more forcefully than BJ - and he seems to at least have a sense of humour.
Yes, a given brain can only experince what it senses. Hence, a you created at any given time will begin to diverge from any other yous being projected at that time.

But if you CANNOT address the issue I raise, then I suggest your thinking is fundamentally flawed.

I don't propose any ghost in the machine, I simply propose that the idea of a clone being a valid extension of self is fundamentally flawed. The only means of making the cloning process work, with regards to transferral of self, is destruction of the original or complete obfuscation of the set of awareness - yet self is not in any way transferred, but rather the fact of this is simply masked, hidden either in destruction or in a set of illusions meant to confuse both original and duplicate(s).We are not talking about clones. We are talking about exact duplicates down to the state of each elementary particle.
Remove these masks, and you see the logical flaw immediately.

Honestly, BJ, DD - can you address this very simple concept, that without destruction or deliberate obfuscation, the fact that YOU do not experience out of each clone made? I mean that - don't use any form of destruction of the original, or any obfuscation of the status of clone. Put the original in a room with a big sign that reads 'Original' and have each clone form in a room with a big sign reading 'Clone'... Then randomly kill one off. I guarantee whoever survives will know what they are. And I guarantee that the one that got killed will not live on through the others. Or don't kill anyone - just ask each one what they see. If they only see one sign, then they are only experiencing out of their own eyes, and not out of each other's eyes.

It's mind-numbingly simple, yet perhaps your minds are already too numb to accept this simple physical truth?
The truth, once you see it, is indeed mind-numbingly simple.

[Z]

DD, your 'flashlight analogy' makes no sense whatsoever. ONCE AGAIN, for the thinking impaired:

But the point is, there aren't ever two YOUs. This is what the non-destructive scenario demonstrates - that if a duplicate is made, it is YOU and HIM to you. You absolutely CANNOT have an identical POV - you have YOUR POV, and he has HIS POV. Each believes themselves to be the same person (unless conditions clue them in otherwise) but each is still a distinct and separate individual with their own POV. So YOU will not survive, as there is only and ever only one YOU. The non-destructive scenario shows this clearly, and every attempt to make it appears otherwise involves one form or another of hiding the facts.

So I'm claiming that I'm unique in the universe? Absolutely. Everything is unique in the universe, inasmuch as it occupies one material position in space-time and undergoes a unique set of circumstances.

Self is not a product of brain; self is intrinsic TO the brain. It is a property of the brain, as much as a production of the brain. The 'self' is not transmitted anywhere; it IS the brain in activity. Your insistance that a 'you' is a transmitted product is as much the 'ghost in the machine' - or perhaps, the ghost excreted by the machine - as any commentary on soul. I insist the 'self' is inherent and intrinsic to the brain - a brain in activity, that is - and unique to that brain. There is only ever one instance of 'you' - and even if there are a million perfect duplicates, down to the elementary particles - this does not change. So in other words, your way of dealing with my non-destructive scenario is simply not dealing with it.

Well, DD, frankly, I'd rather debate with BJ - at least he TRIES to make sense. I'd suggest you seriously rethink your flashlight analogy - it's as bad in its own way as Ian's radio analogy.

But just to revisit your broken analogy - if 100 flashlights are shining with 100 identical lights, if they were the same light (the same 'you') they would all be focused on the exact same spot at the exact same angle, and would affect the illuminated object equally - that is, if the light projected is 100 lumins per flashlight (I have no idea if that's the correct unit) then 100 lumins should strike the object. But 100 flashlights together produce 10,000 lumins - and the object would be very brightly illuminated indeed. Plus, for each beam of light to be the same, each flashlight would necessarily have to co-occupy the exact same space-time - which is impossible. So even your precious flashlights are not producing the SAME light, only 100 identical beams of light.

If flashlight 39 is turned off, its light doesn't now become the light of flashlight 93 or 21 or 19 - it's off, and no longer exists. Period.

Simple!

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
DD, your 'flashlight analogy' makes no sense whatsoever. ONCE AGAIN, for the thinking impaired:

So I'm claiming that I'm unique in the universe? Absolutely. Everything is unique in the universe, inasmuch as it occupies one material position in space-time and undergoes a unique set of circumstances.
But the material position of you makes no difference to whether you are you or not. Don't you agree? Or are you saying that if you are visiting some other town, the you in that town is no longer the same you?
Self is not a product of brain; self is intrinsic TO the brain.What is the difference?
It is a property of the brain, as much as a production of the brain. Yes, it is a product of the brain.
The 'self' is not transmitted anywhere; it IS the brain in activity.
Of course it isn't transmitted anywhere. It is, as you say, the brain in action.
Your insistance that a 'you' is a transmitted product is as much the 'ghost in the machine' - or perhaps, the ghost excreted by the machine - as any commentary on soul.
What? I have never insisted that the "you" is transmitted anywhere. It is generated by the brain, as you agree.
I insist the 'self' is inherent and intrinsic to the brain - a brain in activity, that is - and unique to that brain. There is only ever one instance of 'you' - and even if there are a million perfect duplicates, down to the elementary particles - this does not change. So in other words, your way of dealing with my non-destructive scenario is simply not dealing with it.
The above is not rational. Please tell me in what sense a you being generated from one brain differs from a you being generated from another.
Well, DD, frankly, I'd rather debate with BJ - at least he TRIES to make sense. I'd suggest you seriously rethink your flashlight analogy - it's as bad in its own way as Ian's radio analogy.
Thanks for your condesention. It is very helpful.
But just to revisit your broken analogy - if 100 flashlights are shining with 100 identical lights, if they were the same light (the same 'you') they would all be focused on the exact same spot at the exact same angle, and would affect the illuminated object equally - that is, if the light projected is 100 lumins per flashlight (I have no idea if that's the correct unit) then 100 lumins should strike the object. But 100 flashlights together produce 10,000 lumins - and the object would be very brightly illuminated indeed. Plus, for each beam of light to be the same, each flashlight would necessarily have to co-occupy the exact same space-time - which is impossible. So even your precious flashlights are not producing the SAME light, only 100 identical beams of light.
I'm afraid you haven't understood the analogy. It doesn't matter where the beam hits, the point is that each beam is exactly the same. There is nothing which differenciates one beam from another, except which flaslight it came from. And the location in space of "you" makes no difference to whether you are you or not.
If flashlight 39 is turned off, its light doesn't now become the light of flashlight 93 or 21 or 19 - it's off, and no longer exists. Period.Of course it doesn't become some other flashlight.

*Sigh*

[Z]

You can grasp all that and still not understand that there cannot be 'two yous'?

Stunning.

You're also confusing a dynamic space-time location with internally consistant continuity with multiple space-time location. Of course the you here is the same as the you who moves FROM BEING THE YOU HERE, through space and time CONTINUOUSLY, to the new location in space-time that you occupy somewhere else and somewhen else. But just duplicating someone somewhere else will NOT teleport 'you' to some other place. It's NOT the same 'you', no matter what you'd like to claim. And if it's not the same 'you', then 'you' cannot survive if destroyed and duplicated elsewhere.

BJ, are you grasping ANY of this? Your teacher seems to be dense as a stump.

DD, claiming that 'self' is like the beam of a flashlight is claiming that 'self' is transmitted from the brain. The flashlight emits/transmits light. Each beam of each flashlight is identical but differs in location, time, orientation, interference, etc. Each beam is different, actually - unless they all co-occupy identical space-time.

Otherwise, you have a hundred different beams of light, no two truly the same beam of light.

I really don't know 'how to make the coin drop for you,' DD. Hopefully, you'll grasp this very basic concept one day.

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
[B]You can grasp all that and still not understand that there cannot be 'two yous'?

Stunning.

You're also confusing a dynamic space-time location with internally consistant continuity with multiple space-time location. Of course the you here is the same as the you who moves FROM BEING THE YOU HERE, through space and time CONTINUOUSLY, to the new location in space-time that you occupy somewhere else and somewhen else.
I realize this will confuse the topic but in fact there is no you moving through space and time. You are not the same you as you were when you were 3 years old. Or the same you as you were 1 second ago. But, as I said, I realize this will only confuse you even more.

But just duplicating someone somewhere else will NOT teleport 'you' to some other place. It's NOT the same 'you', no matter what you'd like to claim. And if it's not the same 'you', then 'you' cannot survive if destroyed and duplicated elsewhere. So you assert. You have yet to show why this would the case.
BJ, are you grasping ANY of this? Your teacher seems to be dense as a stump.
Sad.
DD, claiming that 'self' is like the beam of a flashlight is claiming that 'self' is transmitted from the brain.
Precisely. And you agreed to this earlier when you said it was a product of the brain.
The flashlight emits/transmits light. Each beam of each flashlight is identical but differs in location, time, orientation, interference, etc. Each beam is different, actually - unless they all co-occupy identical space-time.
Each beam is exactly the same except for its point of origin.
Otherwise, you have a hundred different beams of light, no two truly the same beam of light.
You could have a million or a billion, each exactly the same except for it's origin. Once again, if a flashlight with your name on it is on, you exist. If not, you don't.
I really don't know 'how to make the coin drop for you,' DD. Hopefully, you'll grasp this very basic concept one day. Likewise I'm afraid. Like BJ, I've tried my best, but making the penny drop for you is infuriatingly slow work.

[Z]

I realize this will confuse the topic but in fact there is no you moving through space and time. You are not the same you as you were when you were 3 years old. Or the same you as you were 1 second ago. But, as I said, I realize this will only confuse you even more

So you assert. But why do you think this? I assert that I am the same dynamic (ever-changing) me that I was at three years ago. In fact, many of the same neurons I had at three are still with me now - quite possibly, ALL of them, according to prevailing scientific theory.

As to why there cannot be two 'yous', the non-destructive scenario illustrates it perfectly. If both survive, 'you' are not in both bodies - 'you' are still in the same body that you always were. 'You' ARE the same body that you always were. But now there's another person identical to you. Is it 'you', or is it 'him'? If I'm talking to you here on earth, and a duplicate of you forms on Mars, am I talking to the original, or the duplicate? And if I'm addressing the original, and saying 'you', do I then refer to the duplicate on Mars as 'you'? No, of course not.

Please, why do you really think you would be magically transferred to the new body? Assuming a non-destructive scenario, if you are duplicated on Mars, does your original body fall lifeless and limp? No, you are still alive and well, on Earth, and on Mars there is another person just like you BUT NOT YOU. Why, then, if they destroy your body on Earth, do you think you will suddenly stop being dead and start being someone else?

It's the most ridiculous metaphysic because it claims to be materialism, but it's really nonsense. You're not going to live on in your duplicate; a beam of light isn't the same beam of light if two flashlights are turned on. I could name every person on earth John Doe, that doesn't mean they are all the same person.

TRY for just a moment to see it from my point of view. I've tried to see it from yours, and it just doesn't mesh. There's no way for your POV to move between two separate bodies if both are alive, so how can it do so after one dies? The situation just doesn't work the way you and BJ would like it to. You have to understand the philosophical implications of duplication in general before moving on to destructive cases specifically. What is the most general case? That a duplicate can be made. All other specifics aside, that means both original and duplicate are alive, and thus clearly are two separate beings, two separate selves. Neither one is the other; neither one, if killed, will live on in the other.

Simple logic, really.

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
So you assert. But why do you think this?
Because I'm a materialist and there is so far no reason or evidence to suggest that Materialism is wrong.
I assert that I am the same dynamic (ever-changing) me that I was at three years ago. In fact, many of the same neurons I had at three are still with me now - quite possibly, ALL of them, according to prevailing scientific theory.
No, none of your neurons are the same as they were when you were three. They have all had old molecules replaced by new ones. Furthermore, each and every neuron has its state changed constantly.

Aside from the above, I find it incredible how you can claim to still be the same at your current age as you were when you were 3. Are you saying that your mindset is still that of a 3-year old?
As to why there cannot be two 'yous', the non-destructive scenario illustrates it perfectly. If both survive, 'you' are not in both bodies - 'you' are still in the same body that you always were. 'You' ARE the same body that you always were. But now there's another person identical to you. Is it 'you', or is it 'him'? If I'm talking to you here on earth, and a duplicate of you forms on Mars, am I talking to the original, or the duplicate? And if I'm addressing the original, and saying 'you', do I then refer to the duplicate on Mars as 'you'? No, of course not.
It makes no difference what kind of scenarios you envision after the new you has been created. As I said before, and as I'm sure BJ has said, the newly created you is only exactly you at the moment of creation. As soon as each you starts to receive different data, you will diverge.
Please, why do you really think you would be magically transferred to the new body? Assuming a non-destructive scenario, if you are duplicated on Mars, does your original body fall lifeless and limp? No, you are still alive and well, on Earth, and on Mars there is another person just like you BUT NOT YOU. Why, then, if they destroy your body on Earth, do you think you will suddenly stop being dead and start being someone else?
I don't understand your obsession with the various possible scenarios occuring after a new you has been made. Such scenarios are irrelevant.

Yes, each you will begin to diverge the moment after the you has been created. So what? That is perfectly in line and in fact mandated by the Materialistic viewpoint.
It's the most ridiculous metaphysic because it claims to be materialism, but it's really nonsense. You're not going to live on in your duplicate; a beam of light isn't the same beam of light if two flashlights are turned on. I could name every person on earth John Doe, that doesn't mean they are all the same person.*Sigh*

Once again, there is no You except if there is a You brain active somewhere. If you think otherwise, please explain what the difference is between one You brain and another You brain. Where is this Magical Difference?
TRY for just a moment to see it from my point of view. I've tried to see it from yours, and it just doesn't mesh. There's no way for your POV to move between two separate bodies if both are alive, so how can it do so after one dies? The situation just doesn't work the way you and BJ would like it to. You have to understand the philosophical implications of duplication in general before moving on to destructive cases specifically. What is the most general case? That a duplicate can be made. All other specifics aside, that means both original and duplicate are alive, and thus clearly are two separate beings, two separate selves. Neither one is the other; neither one, if killed, will live on in the other.
Once again, You don't exist except if a You-brain exists. If a billion You-brains are switched on, a billion Yous will exist. Whatever happens after that is totally irrelevant.
Simple logic, really. Yes, I agree.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
And I would say the same in reverse, we have to resolve the non-destructive duplication before we can move on to the destructive version. But I am the teacher and you are the pupil and, if you don't answer the correct question, you will be given an F grade. :D

But seriously.....

What I have been trying to do in this thread, zaayrdragon, is to try to give you an understanding of my view of the problem of identity. I believe it to be also the materialist view. Are you interested in knowing how I can hold the view that I do? If you do, you must allow me to try to explain it in my own way. The essential starting point for me is the destructive duplicator scenario because everything is simplified. The non-destructive duplicator scenario introdcues too many variables for you to see my view clearly. In other words, it is easier for me to explain my view, to introduce you to my world view, if I use the destructive scenario. Only if you have understood my view (which doesn't necessarily mean to agree with it) in this scenario will I have any chance at all of explaining to you my view of the non-destructive scanario.

So, I have to ask you. Are you interested in how or why I can hold the view that I do? Or would you rather just show how my POV is wrong from your POV.

I should add that I do understand completely your POV. It is totally and completely clear to me. I understand everyone of your arguments, and I understand why you believe those arguments to be true. It is an intuitive and compelling POV. In my opinion that view is wrong, but that doesn't matter. The point is that I understand your view. If you don't belive me, give me any scenario and will give you your interpretation of it and you will se that I do understand your POV. It is also clear that you do not understand my view. I know because you keep repeating the same misrepresentations of my view over and over again. And I have spent a great deal of this thread repeatedly correcting your misrepresentations

Anyway, if I am not permitted to start with the destructive scenario (and remember that I have said that my view easily extends to the non-destructive scenario), I don't think I have any chance at all of revealing to you how I can hold the view that I do on the problem of identity.



The following are examples of your misrepresentations of my view, all of them from your most recent reply to my last post'

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Your POV....doesn't magically transfer at the moment of your death to the other 'you' Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Suppose the teletrans malfunctioned, and nothing came out the other end at all. You're dead, end of story.
Originally posted by zaayrdragon
In a non-destructive scenario, assuming you are right after all, then you have two bodies experiencing the SAME POINT OF VIEW.Originally posted by zaayrdragon
YOU exist in both - meaning YOU are now sensing out of both bodies simultaneously.
Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Now, you can claim that AT THE INSTANT OF DUPLICATION, you are experiencing out of both bodies simultaneously
Originally posted by zaayrdragon
you insist on clinging either to a destructive scenario, or a scenario that masks the truth. In fact, it says a lot that you go to such lengths to construct a scenario that hides the facts in order for your view to be upheld. Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Can you really claim that YOU live in both bodies simultaneously?

I have repeatedly corrected you about these misrepresentations, but you continue to state them. It really seems to me you are not interested in understanding my POV at all. Is that the case? :(

regards,
BillyJoe

[Z]

BJ, I applaud your efforts, and I admire your perversedly dogged faith. But the reasoning you employ will result in your death at the teletrans. Now, it seems perfectly fine to you, to end your continual existence ultimately and finally, because you prefer an abstract view of your self - that the pattern itself, regardless of carrier, matters more than carrier. For the very same reason, if offered a chance at 'immortality' by transferring your brain-pattern into a perfect virtual world, where your 'self' would continue for as long as the computers running the world continued, you'd snap it up in a heartbeat.

I used to think the very same way. I read the Heechee Saga by Pohl Anderson (sp?) and found the entire Virtual Lifestyle enchanting. But I also noticed that the lead character was occasionally forced to address some small regret that the person whos brain pattern he was is dead and gone, and he's not REALLY a continuation of that LIFE - only of that MIND.

When we were kids, we played a game called Star Frontiers, which offered a unique way out for careless characters: for an exorbinant fee, you could have a bank of clones standing by. Each clone carried a complex receiver that would continually program the brain with your memories and mind-states, as received from an implant in your brain. At the instant of death, the next clone in line would be activated, and you would carry on.

Now, from your POV (and the one I used to have) that would be great - you'd potentially out-live your enemies, if you were rich enough. But when the inevitable scenario arose that a clone was activated while the current individual was still alive, we had to address the very issue that changed my viewpoint - If two 'yous' exist, which 'you' is you? Yes, I agree, BJ, that from every outside viewpoint, it doesn't matter. But from the view of the original being (or in the game case, the earlier of the two clones) it does matter, greatly. Because the one facing destruction is facing oblivion. Sure, that shouldn't matter, since you will no longer be there to be aware of oblivion (the very concept is contradictory) but I think most reasonable people would prefer being to not being.

YOU claim that the non-destructive scenario adds too many variables and makes it too complex. Yet all I can see is that it clearly demonstrates that your continual awareness is locked forever within your dymanic brain-body. And, for DD's understanding, note I say 'dynamic'. You are the same self as when you were 3, the same dynamic self. Ever-changing yet the same. And what proof, DD, that the molecules of the brain are always being replaced? We KNOW cells are continuously replaced, but the neurons of the brain are NOT. And what causes you to believe that molecules are replaced? Surely neurons are 'fed', but is the entire neuron replaced by its feeding and excreting process? (Honestly, I don't know the biology of a neuron, so if someone DOES know let me know).

In fact, isn't the whole point of replacing entire cells the fact that old cells get worn out? And if their component molecules are always being replaced, why would they wear out? Is a diamond found in 1994 the same diamond today? Or are all those diamond molecules replaced? But, then, diamonds don't have a biology to them, do they?

A short Google didn't turn up much - other than the fact that all cells undergo respiration and that the longish bits (axom?) of the nerve cell is periodically replaced - but it also looks like the primary structure of the cell doesn't change. Materials are taken in for the purpose of creating ATP to use for energy, and waste products are excreted, but the cell walls, etc. are not replaced. So how much of the cell actually changes at the molecular level? It seems, then, that these are the same neurons for your lifetime - give or take a rare few.

So if the neurons are the same for your lifetime, that leads a lot of credence to a need for a continual physical continuity of self, I think. Your mileage may vary.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But when the inevitable scenario arose that a clone was activated while the current individual was still alive, we had to address the very issue that changed my viewpoint - If two 'yous' exist, which 'you' is you? Which 'you' is you??

When you say "Which 'you' is you?", you, of course, imply that there are two of 'you'. So there are two of 'you' and you want to know which one is you. They are both 'you'. Period. There is no you that is one of 'you'.

When you say that you are 'you' (one of them), the you that you speak of is necessarily a soul. Without the soul there is just 'you' and 'you'.

I was going to go back to the destructive duplicator scenario, but that is not allowed, so I will continue to argue with my hands firmly tied behind my back.
I'm good but I'm not that good. :cool:

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But when the inevitable scenario arose that a clone was activated while the current individual was still alive....from the view of the original being.....it does matter, greatly. Because the one facing destruction is facing oblivion. Sure, that shouldn't matter, since you will no longer be there to be aware of oblivion (the very concept is contradictory) but I think most reasonable people would prefer being to not being.And you, after all this time of me repeatedly correcting your repeated misunderstanding of my view, still won't acknowledge that my (the materialist) view of this scenario is the same as yours. Why is that, zaayrdragon, do you think? :(

BillyJoe

[Z]

Which 'you' is you?? When you say "Which 'you' is you?", you, of course, imply that there are two of 'you'. So there are two of 'you' and you want to know which one is you. They are both 'you'. Period. There is no you that is one of 'you'. When you say that you are 'you' (one of them), the you that you speak of is necessarily a soul. Without the soul there is just 'you' and 'you'.

As I said, this was a discussion in childhood. Frankly, having matured intellectually, I now know that there is only one "I" - and only one "you". A person can only ever use "I" to refer to him or her self and no other. So in other words, there are not two 'yous' - this was a semantical mistake I used to confuse myself with. Rather, there was 'you' and there was someone else.

Of course there is a 'you'. This seems to be where your normally sharp intellect turns to mush. If you have a POV, or should I more appropriately state, if the brain-body construct (that is 'you', as I am referring to you) takes in sensory input and processes that input, then that brain-body construct properly calls itself "I" and no other brain-body construct. To simplify, if I am addressing you (in this case, BJ) and a clone exists, I wouldn't be able logically to refer to the clone as 'you' but as 'him', and you wouldn't logically be able to refer to the clone as 'I' but as 'him'. 'I' infers a number of things - that the speaker is referring to the person speaking directly, that the person being addressed possesses some form of sensory input and thought processing, and that those inputs and processes are unique to that individual being, and that they exist in one temporal/physical location dynamically. Now, do you receive sensory input from this body AND the body of the clone? No, of course not. Do you process thoughts for both bodies? Of course not. Do you share the same dynamic temporal/physical location as the clone? Of course not. Therefore, at no time ever does the clone share your self - he has his self, and you have your self. Not that a 'self' is a thing to have, a self merely is.

If a thing has senses and the means to process those senses, as well as the ability to be self-aware (i.e. understands that its various parts are a part of it), it has a self. That self is totally unique to that thing. Duplicate the thing and the new thing becomes a new self. It may in every way appear to be the same self, but it is no more the same than two cars off the assembly line.

Frankly, though, this appears to be a barrier you cannot cross - without destroying the original, you are unable to assert that the duplicate is you as well as the original. You are unable to assert that your continual awareness will survive through the new being, because there is no means to transfer your sense of awareness to the new being. Why? Because your sense of awareness is a part of your brain/body - it is the function, process, product, etc. of that particular brain body. Yes, the brain/body is always changing - but the sense of awareness remains as a dynamic part of that brain/body system.

Let's say that, after duplication, the duplicate is blinded. Do you still see? Of course you do - what affects the duplicate does not necessarily affect you. Vice versa also true. Thus, two separate, distinct individuals. Let's say that your arm is amputated. Does the duplicate lose an arm as well? Of course not.

Now let's say the duplicate's heart stops. Yours still keeps beating. And if your brain dies? The duplicate's keeps functioning.

But we agree on all these points, I see. Then where do we disagree?

When your brain dies. This is where we cross wires. I assert that, since your brain is dead, that's it for you - you will never experience anything ever again. You instead assert that, when your brain stops, the duplicate will be you and will continue to live. HERE is the point that I see as fallacious - HOW can the duplicate BECOME you? It can't - it was never YOU in the first place - only a duplicate of you. All semantical games aside, the scenario simply states that you will be destroyed. Any further talk of a duplicate on Mars is irrelevant at this point - because the individual desires his or her own personal, individual survival. Or at least would, if the individual had a lick of common sense and logic.

For your concept to work, the more I think about it, you would have to deny any personal points of view at all. You would have to deny that you sense things ever only from your own senses and environment. You would have to deny the self, entirely, to propose this concept of yours - yet that is clearly a contradiction, since you are insisting the self - YOUR self, specifically - lives on through the duplicate. It just doesn't make any sense - and your concept falls apart if the original survives. In fact, it would fall apart anyway, as constructed in the question, by the simple awareness of process that the duplicate possesses, as well as the similar awareness of process of other people. Unless you can guarantee that every other person will view the process as you do, the duplicate will always be treated as different from the original by those who see things the way I do. Or even by those who have their doubts.

So for your concept to really work, you have to obfuscate the entire procedure, and conceal what REALLY happens from everyone. Which seems, to me, the more complex and difficult scenario. The simplest scenario demonstrates the key flaw - that you cannot have two 'selves'.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This seems to be where your normally sharp intellect turns to mush.Well, it only seems so to you because you still do not understand my point of view. I think you have to decide whether you want to keep knocking it or whether you are interested in understanding it. I would never suggest that your intellect is turning to mush, because I can see exactly where you are coming from and exactly where you are going. And that you are absolutely consistent. :) And wrong. :D

In the following quote I will translate into materialist language [with some explanations in brackets], to illustrate my point of view. I wonder if you will be able to understand why I write it the way I do? I'm not asking you to agree, just to understand.....

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
If a thing has senses and the means to process those senses, as well as the ability to be self-aware (i.e. understands that its various parts are a part of it, it has a self. That self is totally unique to that thing. Duplicate the thing and the new thing becomes a new self. It may in every way appear to be the same self, but it is no more the same than two cars off the assembly line. If a brain [the thing that we are talking about is surely the brain isn't it?] has sensory input [the brain doesn't have senses, it has sensory input] and the means to process those senses [yes, I was right, we ARE talking about the brain], as well as the ability to create an illusion of self [true self awareness would be the image of a grey wrinkly glob sitting inside a skull taking in sensory input from the body's senses, processing it and creating an illusion of a self as a body with eyes, tongue, nose, ears and skin sensing the external world passing the infromation to its brain which then processing it and creating outputs to the body's muscles.] That is, the brain creates the illusion that the body's various parts are a part of the brain. It creates an illusion of self. That self is totally unique until there is a duplicate of that brain. Duplicate the original brain and the duplicate brain produces a duplicate self. It [the duplicate self] feels in every way the same as the original self, and in every way feels the same as two cars off the assembly line are both green.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But we agree on all these points, I see. It seems I have finally gotten through to you. :)

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Then where do we disagree?

When your brain dies. This is where we cross wires. I assert that, since your brain is dead, that's it for you - you will never experience anything ever again. You instead assert that, when your brain stops, the duplicate will be you and will continue to live. HERE is the point that I see as fallacious - HOW can the duplicate BECOME you? Oops, no I haven't

This is a TOTAL misrepresentation of the materialist view. The duplicate does not BECOME you, it IS you. You are not TRANSFERRED to the duplicate, you are REPRODUCED in the duplicate. Remember, when I use the word 'you', I mean "the feeling of what it is like to be", in this case, you. This feeling is present in both the original and duplicate brain. Therefore, that "feeling of what it is like to be" in the original brain dies when the original brain dies, but there is still the "feeling of what it is like to be" in the duplicate brain. You don't HAVE this "feeling of what it is like to be". You ARE this feeling of what it is like to be". That same "feeling of what it is like to be" is in the original brain and in the duplicate brain.

In that Coin Tossing Destructive Duplicator scenario, the "feeling of what it is like to be" is clearly shown to be exactly the same in the original brain and the duplicate brain. You do not know whether you are the self in the original brain or the self in the duplicate brain. In one version of this scenario, you are told you are the self in the duplicate brain. You are not too happy to hear this because it means that you must, unfortunately, be dead (because you think that you are the self in the original brain). But then you immediately realize that you are, in fact, alive. You suddenly realize that you are not the self in the original brain but the self in the duplicate brain. But then there is a double take and you are told it was just a joke. The stupid duplicator is a fake. You ARE the self in the original brain after all, just as you thought. Well, you are not really surprised because, after all, you noticed absolutely no difference when that duplicator was supposed to have vapourized you. Ten years later, you discover the duplicator actually did work but that there was no coin flip. You realize that you have been the self in the duplicate brain after all.

So what difference does it make anyway?
(In other words, take the teleporter.)

regards,
BillyJoe
(sorry, some sloppy language in that last paragraph to simplify things for zaayrdragon. :cool: )

[Z]

See, BJ, I just don't think you and I can ever truly agree. You decide instead to 'translate' my words into language that you feels supports your view - you add complexity to a simple matter, rather than simplifying the matter to see its overall consequences.

There is no 'illusion of self' - and sense of self doesn't mean just the brain, but the brain/body totality, unless you remove ALL sensory input from the brain, at which point the brain only has awareness of self from memory, no sense of self at all. And if the brain has no memory, nor sensory input, it cannot be said to have a sense of self at all. At this point, it becomes rather fuzzy - does the brain, with no memory and no senses, still 'imagine' and 'think', or do the pulses of biochemical energy form meaningless images, patterns, etc.? Is this poor unfortunate self-aware, or simply in a state of delirium? Of course, it would be difficult to know WHAT goes on in such a brain, but re-attaching senses might then provide us with a glimpse, for surely the disembodied brain carries a memory of its delirium - but would it recall this delirium, as it relearned its knowledge? Probably no more than we can recall our earliest childhood memories.

So perhaps the self starts at the point where memory is sufficient enough to provide an awareness of its past states...

Sorry, sidetracked by my own thinking.

Notice, also, that you didn't just translate the paragraph, you inserted your own concepts. You added the 'illusion of self' (odd, how does illusion fit into a materialist concept?) and then inserted a new qualifier - that the self is unique until a duplicate is formed. I still deny that the self would lose its uniqueness when a duplicate is formed - unless that duplicate co-occupies identical space-time. Otherwise, this becomes a factor in its identity, and therefore the duplicate is also a unique self.

Further, you insert how the duplicate feels - which is immaterial to the problem. I've not claimed that the duplicate wouldn't feel like the original in every way - but that feeling is still locked within that duplicate, just as the original feeling is locked in that original brain.

Then you go off, once again, and posit two 'yous', which is clearly a fallacy. The duplicate brain is NOT you - it is now HIM. Simple language, really - there cannot be two or three or a million singular second persons. At best, you might linguistically argue for 'you' in the plural sense of address (or what Southerners call y'all), but this addresses a group, not an individual. The individual that is you does in no way become the group 'you'. (Would much prefer the Spanish pronouns here - Usted y Ustedes. Provides a far clearer plurality than 'you')

You are a singular being. You can never be more than a singular being. If you are reproduced, then you have a copy, but not a multiple you.

As far as the Coin Tossing Destructive Scenario, you are wrong again. Both may indeed share similar feelings of self (even identical) but if either one becomes aware of the other, the shared feeling is immediately divided by the awareness of who is who - not whether one is a duplicate or an original, but the fact that one is not the other. Facing your duplicate, you don't think, "This is Me, and that is Me" - you think, "This is Me, and that person looks just like Me. But that person is He." Sure, you can fool either person any which way, but that individual's awareness, sense of self, etc. doesn't change because of having a duplicate.

Honestly, I don't think you CAN understand, really, or you wouldn't keep pushing your dualist concepts off as materialism.

Let me put it another way: how can you be the duplicate if you were never the duplicate before? Forget sense or memory - I'm saying, how can you be something in 2001 that dies in 2002 and then still be something after your death in 2002? You can't. All memory nonsense aside, the person who forms in 2002 didn't exist in 2001 - his memories are false. It doesn't matter to him, unless he knows the memories are false. But this is irrelevant - as the duplicate doesn't have a say in whether to take the teletrans or not. But the original should care - a lot - because when he steps up to that teletrans, he's going to be killed, end of statement.

OK, BJ - try this one on for size: let's say that the teletrans doesn't vaporize you, it just is so shocking to the system that your body stops all functioning. Now, the agency, thinking ahead, throws your body in the freezer, and the duplicate forms on Mars. Now, so far, you've asserted that the person on Mars is YOU.

But a month later, they discover how to re-start the human body, thaw you out, and restore you to full function, complete with all of your memories in-tact. NOW which one are you?

You can't declare them both to be you - this would be absurd. YOU can only experience from one brain-body construct at a time, and as far as we know from experience, only from the one you were born with and had all your life. So who is you NOW? Are you still the one on Mars, and the person on Earth is a different person, or are you the one on Earth, and the one on Mars is the different person? It's very similar to the non-destructive scenario, but it gives you some time within the destructive paradigm, so that you can continue to claim to be the duplicate, before re-introducing the original you. So does your claim stand under this scenario? It certainly doesn't seem so. Nor does it stand under the non-destructive scenario, and if it can't stand under either of those cases, then why infer that it would stand elsewise?

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
And, for DD's understanding, note I say 'dynamic'. You are the same self as when you were 3, the same dynamic self. Ever-changing yet the same.
You will need to clarify this for me. If "you" are ever-changing then "you" are not the same. Unless you are thinking of a soul?
And what proof, DD, that the molecules of the brain are always being replaced?
By the simple fact that they are live cells. Unless cells respirate, they die. And what is respiration? It is the absorbtion of new oxygen molecules and the release of old carbon dioxide molecules.
We KNOW cells are continuously replaced, but the neurons of the brain are NOT. And what causes you to believe that molecules are replaced? Surely neurons are 'fed', but is the entire neuron replaced by its feeding and excreting process? (Honestly, I don't know the biology of a neuron, so if someone DOES know let me know).
I'll see if I can find some info on whether every molecule in a brain cell is replaced. I don't see how it matters, though. The bottom line is that each cell changes its makeup from moment to moment.

Just googled a bit and found this interesting quote: (http://members.optusnet.com.au/exponentialist/Cells.htm)
Lynn Margulis and Dorian Sagan (1995) make the following observations about the human body:

"It continuously self-repairs. Every five days you get a new stomach lining. You get a new liver every two months. Your skin replaces itself every six weeks. Every year, ninety-eight percent of the atoms in your body are replaced."
The quote is from the book "What Is Life?" by Lynn Margulis and Dorian Sagan (1995).
In fact, isn't the whole point of replacing entire cells the fact that old cells get worn out? And if their component molecules are always being replaced, why would they wear out? Is a diamond found in 1994 the same diamond today? Or are all those diamond molecules replaced? But, then, diamonds don't have a biology to them, do they?My understanding is there are many reasons for new cells. Growth, tissue damage, malfunction, etc.
A short Google didn't turn up much - other than the fact that all cells undergo respiration and that the longish bits (axom?) of the nerve cell is periodically replaced - but it also looks like the primary structure of the cell doesn't change. Materials are taken in for the purpose of creating ATP to use for energy, and waste products are excreted, but the cell walls, etc. are not replaced. So how much of the cell actually changes at the molecular level? It seems, then, that these are the same neurons for your lifetime - give or take a rare few.What? New dendrites grow, others wither, neurons continously exchange old atoms for new ones....in fact new brain cells (http://www.dsrf.co.uk/Reading_material/New_braincells/newbrain1.htm) are being produced all the time. So what exactly about your brain is the same, from moment to moment?
So if the neurons are the same for your lifetime, that leads a lot of credence to a need for a continual physical continuity of self, I think. Your mileage may vary. As you have said yourself, the neurons are not the same. Neither are the dendrites or the number of cells in your brain.

[Z]

So you have difficulty with the difference between continuity and change, I see. Well, that does explain a lot.

See, something is the same, even if it changes. Not the same as it was moments ago, but still the same thing. A car is still the same car if you replace the oil, change the tires, etc. It continues to be the same car no matter how much of it you replace over time. Of course, you can argue that, eventually, you have a different car than when you started out - but due to the continual and gradual replacement, it is still the same car. Plus, chances are, you'll never replace the frame of the car - replacing the frame would, in essence, amount to throwing out the old car and getting a new one. (Only because to do this would require taking the entire car apart anyway)

So it is with a person. They grow, they change, but they are still the same person. The change happens gradually over time. Eventually (every seven years, as I understand it) you are physically comprised of almost all new parts, but you are still the same person. This seems to be your problem - you don't see how something can change and still be the same. (Do you get stuck in your ways a lot?)

But note the very piece you quoted did not mentioned neurons, and specifically said about 98% of the body is replaced. What do you suppose the other 2% is? Or does it take slightly longer than a year to replace 100%?

Also note: unless you are proposing that a neuron is comprised only of hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon, then respiration does not replace the molecules of the cell. Think of the cell like a generator: it takes in materials, processes them, and produces energy and waste materials. The generator itself (other than standard wear and tear) is unchanged, but it's 'respirating' in much the same way. And suppose the generator, for whatever reason, is damaged and needs new belts, a new filter, whatever. Do swapping these components out make a new generator? Of course not. So it is with neurons: they take in oxygen (and, I assume, other molecules) and create energy, then output carbon dioxide. The cell itself is largely unchanged (other than wear and tear). If the dendrite becomes damaged, the surrounding neurons repair the dendrite. This doesn't change the nucleus of the cell, only its filament.

As for new brain cells: from the article you posted a link to:

The absolute number of new cells is low relative to the total number in the brain.

So, yes, a few cells are generated every so often, in the hippocampus. But not enough to replace all the neurons of the brain, certainly not in any significant time frame. So the neurons you have today are the same ones, largely, that you were born with.

Of all the cells in the body, the neurons are the only ones not replaced systematically by the body. The hippocampus generates new ones, but the rest of the brain only generates new neurons after trauma and injury, and then only under the right conditions.

So this gives one, tiny part of the human being that is not replaced - one continuous component that exists throughout lifetime.

Really, DD, what is it you have against dynamic systems? If you see a diamond in the rough, take it to a jeweler, and have him cut it, does it become a new diamond? It could well become several smaller diamonds, of course. If you watch a stream, is it not the same stream from one moment to the next, changing each moment as different things flow along its path? Is the sun that we see each day a different star from the sun we saw yesterday?

So when does something become a new thing? Well, when we reproduce, we blend our DNA with the DNA of another person, and that blended DNA is neither one nor the other, but a new being altogether. It is separate from either parent (at birth). But suppose something goes wrong, and twins form but do not separate. Are they one being or two? Does sharing a few organs make them one being? What if they shared a brain? Is the two-headed girl one person or two?

I would generally say, with regards to people, that a unique brain makes that person a unique individual. Or, instead of unique, let's say separate. A separate brain signifies a separate person. Even if that brain is identical to another brain, it is still separate and therefore a separate person. Doesn't matter how two identical brains formed - whether by some slip of probability, deliberate genetic engineering, or hypercloning (or teletransfer); the end product, a new brain, is a separate person, distinct from the other brain. And since brain IS self, then the self is separate and distinct.

So the teletrans makes a separate, distinct self on Mars while killing a separate, distinct self on Earth - which means the self on Earth is NOT, can NEVER be, the self on Mars. Unless the self on Earth chooses the spaceship option, and through good fortune, arrives on Mars. He has changed, surely, but he is not separate from the self on Earth - he is one and the same, dynamic creature, who (depending on the length of the journey) has most of his original (from launch on Earth) parts still with him - and definitely most of his same neurons with him.

Tell me, what, other than pattern, does the teletrans duplicate share with the self on Earth? What physical objects do the two share? Nothing, save only the relationships of the molecules to each other within the pattern of the being. But this pattern doesn't make the two selves the SAME self any more than two cars built to the same blueprints are the SAME car.

I admit - maybe I just am not smart enough to grasp this concept of yours (DD and BJ). But no matter what angle I look at it from, except for one, it makes no sense to take the teletrans as the question is stated.

(The exception: IF there is a soul, and the soul somehow uses the body like a ghost in the machine, and if the soul can somehow transcend space at speeds faster than light - and if the soul is, by its nature, attracted automatically, to a particular pattern of physical material - well, honestly, there seem to be a lot of ifs in this exception. But it's the only exception by which I could agree that you could step into the teletrans, be killed, and wake up on Mars. But without a soul, there is no way anything could transfer to Mars to make you become that person on Mars. Any other scenario and you would simply step onto the teletrans and cease to be. Period.)

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
See, BJ, I just don't think you and I can ever truly agree. You decide instead to 'translate' my words into language that you feels supports your view - you add complexity to a simple matter, rather than simplifying the matter to see its overall consequences. We don't need to agree, we just need to understand each other's view.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
There is no 'illusion of self' I know you don't agree, but I wonder if you know what I mean by an "illusion of self"?

I am not saying that nothing at all exists with regard to the self. I AM saying that a "self" does not exist. But, I am also saying that an "illusion of self" does exist. This is not nothing....
A good analogy was the checkerboard illusion bought up earlier. The illusion is that the two squares are different shades of grey. This illusion exists. In other words, somewhere in the brain, there is a pattern of neural activity that corresponds to "The two squares are different shades of grey". However, the fact is, the squares are actually the same shade of grey (as various methods of investigation will reveal). In other words, "The differently shaded squares" do not exist.
In summary then, "The illusion of differently shaded squares" exists but "The differently shaded squares" does not exist.

Similarly, the "illusion of self" exists. Meaning that somewhere in the brain there is a pattern of neural activity that corresponds to there being a self. However, the fact is that there is there is no actual "self". The "self" does not exist.
In summary, the "illusion of self" exists but the "self" does not exist.

Another analogy is an "hallucination of a voice". The "hallucination of a voice" exists (as a pattern of neural activity in the brain), but the actual voice is not. The person experiencing the hallucination swears there is a voice speaking to him, but it is literally all in his head.

Now, what do I mean by an "illusion of self" and what do I mean by the "self". The "self" implies that there is someone in there who is in control. It is a sort of straight forward and intuitive view but, for it to be true, the following chain of command would have to be true:

self -> brain -> body -> genes.

Well, the first three bits seem intuitive enough. But the fourth bit does not. In what sense could the self have control of the genes. In fact, as evolution tells us, the chain of command is as follows:

genes -> body -> brain -> self.

This is less intutively true but evolution teaches us that this is the way it is. Genes came first. The genes later commandeered a body (a simple spherical membrane initially and later a more evolved body with head, trunk, arms, and legs) to promote the genes survival. Later still, the brain evolved within the evolving body to further promote survival of the genes. And later still, a self evolved within the evolving brain, again for the prupose of promoting survival of the genes.

So the idea of a "self" as the leader in a chain of command does not exist, except as an illusion

Does any of this make sense to you. I am not asking you if you agree, just whether you understand my point of view that there is an "illusion of self" but no actual "self". I think it is the basis of my point of view regarding the teleporter.

[Z]

No, it doesn't make sense, not at all.

Typically, an 'illusion' within the mind is caused by neurons firing without sensory input - or with falsified sensory input. For example, when confronted with the checkerboard image, the optic control and processing neurons interpolate a 'grey area' where none exists, but this is due to the heavy contrast and locations of the visual stimulus. There is a cause for these neurons to react as they do, but it is not a direct cause, as in, there are not actually wavelengths of 'grey' light striking the photoreceptors.

But the 'self' sense is provided by the entirety of neural activity, senses, etc. 'Self' is detected at every level - it is a blanket concept. 'Self' is not an illusion, but the combined totality of sensory processing and non-sensory processing. Self IS brain activity and storage. Even a dormant brain is self, to some degree, as there is neural activity and information storage taking place.

Further, your 'chain of command' scenario compares two different things: The first displays a chain of control - i.e. the self-brain-body concept. No, you can't control your genes - genes play no part in the control of the body's major systems.

The second is the chain of development - of evolution, if you like - and is consistant as well.

These are two different systems, two different chains, and bear no comparison to each other, except in their apparent relationship to each other, that is, an inverse relationship, with genes playing no part in the major system command chain.

However, in both cases, separating the self and the brain seems to me a dualist concept. More properly, the developmental chain ought to read genes-body-brain-advanced brain.

Anyway, chew on that for a few minutes.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
No, it doesn't make sense, not at all. :(

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Typically, an 'illusion' within the mind is caused by neurons firing without sensory input - or with falsified sensory input. For example, when confronted with the checkerboard image, the optic control and processing neurons interpolate a 'grey area' where none exists, but this is due to the heavy contrast and locations of the visual stimulus. There is a cause for these neurons to react as they do, but it is not a direct cause, as in, there are not actually wavelengths of 'grey' light striking the photoreceptors."Typically an illusion is caused "without sensory input"???
I'd like to see you experience the checkerboard illusion "without sensory input" :D

The illusion is caused "with falsified sensory input"???
How, pray tell, is the sensory input falsified? The intensities and wavelengths of light hitting the retina is, surely, an accurate representation of the intensity and wavelengths of light emmited by the respective squares. The input is therefore true.

"The neurons interpolate a 'grey area' where none exists"???
I guess you mean "interpret" but what do mean "where none exists"? There are two squares with the same shade of grey which the brain interprets as different shades of grey.

"this is due to the heavy contrast and locations of the visual stimulus"
Yes. :) The brain is more interested in contrasting the shade of grey from its immediate surrounds and less interested in recognising absolute shades of grey. From an evolutionary point of view, contrast was more of a suvival advantage than depicting shades accurately (eg picking out the predator from the foliage)

"There is a cause for these neurons to react as they do, but it is not a direct cause, as in, there are not actually wavelengths of 'grey' light striking the photoreceptors"???
It's probably a combination of wavelengths and intensity. But if there are not actually wavelengths of grey light striking the photoreceptors", what on Earth IS it that strikes the photoreceptors? :confused:

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But the 'self' sense is provided by the entirety of neural activity, senses, etc. 'Self' is detected at every level - it is a blanket concept. 'Self' is not an illusion, but the combined totality of sensory processing and non-sensory processing. Self IS brain activity and storage. You must understand, zaayrdragon, that an analogy is used, not for the purpose of proving a point of view, but for illustrating a point of view so as to make it easier to understand. For example, if I say that "Love is like a red rose", it would be silly to say "But love is not red, love does not have a smell (careful :D), love cannot be grown". That is against the purpose and spirit of an analogy.
I am merely trying to convey my point of view of "the illusion of self" by means of analogy to the checkerboard illusion. It is inappropriate to point out how the analogy is not exact, because all analogies, by their very nature are inexact.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Further, your 'chain of command' scenario compares two different things: The first displays a chain of control - i.e. the self-brain-body concept. No, you can't control your genes - genes play no part in the control of the body's major systems."genes play no part in the control of the body's major body systems"???
:D
Zaayrdragon, the genes are absolutely essential for the existence iof these systems and for their control. These genes are present in every cell of the body regulating and controlling every structure and function.
So, show me...
self->brain->body->genes
Also, what is the difference between "chain iof command" and "chain of control". A commander controls his troops. Command or control, take your pick. I am happy to go with either.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
The second is the chain of development - of evolution, if you like - and is consistant as well. Are you saying "chain of development" but not "chain of command"??? Your genes, interacting with the environment, control the development of your body, brain and self.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
However, in both cases, separating the self and the brain seems to me a dualist concept. Well I really am trying to explain my point iof view, but I 'm not sure you are interested in understanding it. However, until you understand a point of view, any arguments you may have against it will make no sense at all to the person that holds that view. This is the situation we are in and I am trying to correct it. But I can't do it on my own. :(

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
More properly, the developmental chain ought to read genes-body-brain-advanced brain. :con2:


Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Even a dormant brain is self, to some degree, as there is neural activity and information storage taking place. Well, this is our second area of disagreement.
It seems to me you are clutching at straws here with your "to some degree". But, tell me, if a self is a "feeling of what it is like to be", how can self continue to exist when your brain is unconscious (dreamless sleep, coma, anaesthesia). Tell me how you can have a "sense of self", when you are not able to sense anthing at all?


BillyJoe.

[Z]

BJ,

My apologies on the entire checkerboard thing - I was engaged with a different illusion recently, one in which a certain black and white pattern causes the illusion of grey patterns that don't exist at all. My most certain apologies.

The illusion you referenced, of course, involves the brain's attempt to demonstrate contrasts to such a degree that the two grey areas look different. Oddly enough, to my eyes, they still look the same. (I'm shade-blind. I can tell colors easily enough but different shades all look identical to me - makes it hard for me to appreciate the play of light and shadow on a surface, I can tell you that!)

So apologies for any confusion on that point.

As to the gene-control confusion: I can see you are conflagrating conscious control with autonomous control. Genes certainly control the development of the cell and the replication of RNA/DNA - but the gene itself is not in control of the overall major system, certainly. Genes DO control the development of the body, but after the body has completed its construction phase, the gene is relegated to a systemic controller - essentially not even a controller, but a blueprint by which RNA molecules and proteins are manufactured. So the 'chain of command' scenario only applies during the developmental phase, and only from a construction point of view. The 'self' is still the chief commander from the major systems point of view. The genes may guide the construction of the heart and lungs, but the brain gives them their commands to function.

As to the Advanced Brain confusion: researchers are coming close to pinpointing the physical location of the 'self'. The brain essentially consists of two (or is it three?) 'brains'. There is a lower-organized brain largely responsible for autonomous control of bodily systems, and a higher brain, which seems to focus on memory, sensory input processing, thought, and possibly consciousness. (Plus, I think, another section with other responsibilities; I'd have to re-read the material, and I feel lazy today :D). This higher brain, or advanced brain, is a development that seems to coincide with more complex behaviour in animals, more interest in abstract concepts, and more 'human' traits. It also appears to coincide with lifetime neurons and non-regenerating brain tissues - meaning, consciousness itself may require survival of certain key neurons. Of course, this is all still fairly new research, so we'll have to see what comes of it.

If your 'illusion of self' concept is an analogy, then say so... otherwise, you have appeared to be insisting that self IS an illusion, not that self is LIKE an illusion. So when I demonstrate that self is, in fact, not an illusion at all, it was in response to your apparently direct claim that it was so. If I tell you that a lake and some trees in the desert is a mirage, and you bring back leaves and water, showing me that it was, in fact, an oasis, I wouldn't be justified in then claiming that I was using a mirage analogy, would I? Self is not an illusion. As to the checkerboard analogy, well, analogies generally stink, do they not? Take Ian's radio-brain analogy!

A commander controls his troops. Command or control, take your pick. I am happy to go with either.

Actually, a commander commands his troops; his subordinates control the troops. My colonel might have ordered us to dig foxholes, but it's the sergeant directly over us who directs and guides us in where, how, etc. Similarly, the brain might issue orders to produce adrenaline, but it's the genes that direct how the proteins will be ordered and arranged and how the cells will follow orders in the future. Genes are like a guidebook, an SOP, if you will, for the cells after growth. They don't issue orders, make commands, cause muscles to twitch and glands to excrete. You could stand a refresher in biology if you think genes 'Command' anything at all, beyond the construction of proteins.

Well, this is our second area of disagreement. It seems to me you are clutching at straws here with your "to some degree". But, tell me, if a self is a "feeling of what it is like to be", how can self continue to exist when your brain is unconscious (dreamless sleep, coma, anaesthesia). Tell me how you can have a "sense of self", when you are not able to sense anthing at all?

And it seems to me you have a warped definition of 'self'. If self is a conscious feeling of being, then by your definition, there is no self unless you are conscious and aware of your self at any given time. But even in dreamless sleep (which I am still not sure exists) you can be awakened by noise, shaking, etc. Your senses are still active in sleep, just not turned up to full volume. Apparently, you have never really read much about what happens during sleep, have you? Nor do you awake to an alarm clock or noises, or someone waking you up??? Curious.

Nonetheless, to me the self is not 'the feeling of what it is like to be', but the being itself. Your 'self' is a ghost in the machine - it is an immaterial concept (a feeling) which vanishes and reappears. It's no wonder you accept the teletrans, because the ghost can appear anywhere to your thinking, and be caused by anything. But to me, the self is the entirety of being, the physical you, the brain/body/mental states all tied together and all dynamic and continuously changing. Your very definition of self identifies you as a dualist - your 'self' is separated from your physical being, because it only appears when the physical being is conscious, and disappears when it is unconscious. My self is tied to that active physical being, and is represented by actual brain activity, memory storage, and autonomous controls as well. The self is present so long as life and memory are present and continuous, dynamic and connected physically to its own past. Your self is immaterial, spiritual (for lack of a better word), or worse, non-existant entirely. I would say, without a doubt, you are a dualist, albeit a sly one, or perhaps self-deluded, who sees 'self' as a separate entity from 'brain'. How can the self vanish? Nothing can be created or destroyed, only changed - conservation laws, you know.

I understand your point of view, but it is wrong, BJ (from a purely materialist point of view). It is not even internally consistant. It certainly can be demonstrated as inconstant in its responses to different situations. It thrives only under particular sets of circumstances, not under all circumstances. I wish I could make you see the logical fallacies and flaws, but I'm no debater. I never took classes in formal logic or debate, and I've no psychology knowledge to fall back on to make you see where your error lies, other than to tell you directly and hope you grasp it finally.

So either our debate continues, with each of us trying desperately to make the other understand what, apparently, is beyond our grasps, or our debate ends in stalemate; for surely neither of us can really embrace the other's point of view! Still, you can keep trying if you wish, and I'll keep trying if you seem to still be interested.

Let me ask you, BJ, out of pure interest: if a company found a way to create perfect computer replicas of brains, capable of 'free will', 'emotions', and 'sense of self', and offered to transfer your pattern of brain activity into one of these computers (which would kill the organic 'you' because of the electrical shock involved, but allow you a new cyber-life), would you take that offer? And would you still take the offer if the process didn't actually kill 'you' at all, but, due to crazy democratic law-making, required 'meat you' to be exiled as a non-person, since the legal you becomes the cyber you? (this is using your use of you, not mine, obviously) What would your take be on this situation?

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

If your 'illusion of self' concept is an analogy, then say so..

Where did you get that idea???
The checkerboard illusion is the analogy - I was using the checkerboard illusion to try to explain the idea of "illusion of self". Not only that, I specifically said that this is what I was doing. At least twice. :(

.....otherwise, you have appeared to be insisting that self IS an illusion,

Yes. I have specifically said that the "self" doesn't exist. And that the "illusion of self" does exists. The self is an illusion like the checkerboard illusion.

As to the checkerboard analogy, well, analogies generally stink, do they not?

My only purpose was to demonstrate that, when I say "Illusion of self" I am not saying that there is not anything. An "illusion of self" is still something, even if not a "self". Those squares as different shades of grey exist, at least as a pattern of neural activity in the brain.

Actually, a commander commands his troops etc etc;

Well, we seem to get caught up in details, missing the wood for the trees. I not disagree with the above. And it is not in conflict with what I said, just out of context.
Evolution is all about the survival of genes. The genes achieve this by forming bodies, brains and selves. Sure the brain becomes autonomous. But altimately it comes to the genes forming bodies, brains and selves to promote their own survival.

And it seems to me you have a warped definition of 'self'. If self is a conscious feeling of being, then by your definition, there is no self unless you are conscious and aware of your self at any given time.

Only because you are trying to see my point of view through your own point of view. If you understood my ppint of view, it would not appear warped, but merely different to your point of view.

But even in dreamless sleep (which I am still not sure exists) you can be awakened by noise, shaking, etc. Your senses are still active in sleep, just not turned up to full volume.

But there is no awareness, that is the point

Nonetheless, to me the self is not 'the feeling of what it is like to be', but the being itself. Your 'self' is a ghost in the machine - it is an immaterial concept (a feeling) which vanishes and reappears.

This really is nonsense I have to say. You are saying "feelings" are immaterial. Nuts. There is a pattern of neurological activity in the brain that IS the "feeling", hence "feelings" are material. You say the self is the being itself. What on earth could you mean by that? Presumably there is a feeling of what it is like to be you that only you know about and no-one else knows about. What is this then? If the "being itself" is not this feeling then what is it. I'd say a ghost in the machine ;).

Your very definition of self identifies you as a dualist - your 'self' is separated from your physical being, because it only appears when the physical being is conscious, and disappears when it is unconscious.

Perhaps you'd better give me your definition of Dualism.

Your self is immaterial, spiritual (for lack of a better word), or worse, non-existant entirely. I would say, without a doubt, you are a dualist, albeit a sly one, or perhaps self-deluded, who sees 'self' as a separate entity from 'brain'. How can the self vanish? Nothing can be created or destroyed, only changed - conservation laws, you know.

Oh well, I have obviously failed in my attempt to expalin to you my point of view. I think, though, that it is not entirely my fault.

I understand your point of view, but it is wrong, BJ (from a purely materialist point of view).

No, you clearly do not as is illustrated by your responses in this thread

It certainly can be demonstrated as inconstant in its responses to different situations. It thrives only under particular sets of circumstances, not under all circumstances.

No. It works in all situations. The fact that you can say it doesn't illustrates that you do not understand my point of view.
Also, as I have said repeatedly, I only use that particular situation because it is capable of revealing to you exactly what my point of view is - if you could only set aside for even a fleeting moment your own point of view of the situation. However, you seem incapable of doing this. I do understand this though. It is not a criticsim. We are all quilty of this at times.

I wish I could make you see the logical fallacies and flaws, but I'm no debater. I never took classes in formal logic or debate, and I've no psychology knowledge to fall back on to make you see where your error lies, other than to tell you directly and hope you grasp it finally.

:D
As I said, you can only say that because you do not understand my point of view. Sorry, that is the case. If you did understand, I would recognise it from your responses to my posts.

So either our debate continues, with each of us trying desperately to make the other understand what, apparently, is beyond our grasps

I completely understand your point of view. Really I do. Put forth any situation you like and I will be able to clearly state what your view is and why. It used to be my view (which is not to say that it is necessarily not the correct view just because I no longer hold it). I know exactly where you are coming from.

for surely neither of us can really embrace the other's point of view!

As I have said a few times already, I am not interested in converting anyone to my point of view. I am interested in having others understand my view and I am interested in understanding the views of others. That's all.

Let me ask you, BJ, out of pure interest: if a company found a way to create perfect computer replicas of brains, capable of 'free will', 'emotions', and 'sense of self', and offered to transfer your pattern of brain activity into one of these computers (which would kill the organic 'you' because of the electrical shock involved, but allow you a new cyber-life), would you take that offer?

How many times have I answered these questions or questions like them. What's the chance you'll understand anu more this time than all those other times?
You keep using that word "transfer", even though I have clearly stated on many occasions that there is no transfer. If there is a duplicate brain, the self is necessarily there as well. It is not transferred. Nor can it jsut be transferred into a sort of blank sheet duplicater brain.
As to your question. There would need to be a good reason to do so, otherwise why would I bother. For example, if I had a terminal cancer, and the offer was of a duplicate with the cancer cells excluded, I would not hesitate. And, as the destructive duplicator scenario demionstrates, I would live on. But you will not understand this last sentence because you do not understand my point of view. You will interpret in from your own point of view of the situation. :(

And would you still take the offer if the process didn't actually kill 'you' at all, but, due to crazy democratic law-making, required 'meat you' to be exiled as a non-person, since the legal you becomes the cyber you? (this is using your use of you, not mine, obviously) What would your take be on this situation?

Am I to answer this question yet again? My answer is still the same. And you will again misinterpret it because you do not understand my point of view. The original is me and I would not want that instance of me ( the original instance of me, yes) to suffer. The duplicate is me and I would be happy that this instance of me would be the happy carefree self that I am. See, you don't get it do you? You are thinking one me looking through two pairs of eyes. Or that only the original is me. Seems you'll never understand. You object to the destructive scenario, but it is just such a scenario that eventaully caused me to suddenly see this alternative view of the problem of identity.

But you never know, one day it might hit you and I might get some slight credit. :)

regards,
BillyJoe.

[Z]

Nope, I really understand your point of view - just not why you would hold such a point of view, because it is illogical. It isn't even internally consistant.

You claim the 'self' is an illusion. But is, nonetheless, real. That is, the illusion is real - in which case, what is the illusion's actuality? Sensory input, and the processing thereof. But an 'illusion' requires one to be fooled by the illusion - which implies that, to your viewpoint (where the 'self' is an illusion), there must be someone to experience that illusion. Your own use of language then demonstrates a ghost in the machine - to use the very term 'illusion of self' presupposes something to experience that illusion. And what can possibly experience an 'illusion of self'? The brain, I would say, can experience self, inasmuch as the brain is wrapped in a body whose senses provide it with information about its body - The brain 'possesses' a body (though, given the integral nature of brain and body, it would be better to say the brain and the body are one self) which it experiences through its senses and thought processes, thereby providing it information about itself - i.e. not the brain, which is merely a part of the self, but the total self, the brain/body together. How can 'self' be an illusion?

Define Illusion: A false interpretation of an external sensory stimulus, usually seen or heard, such as a mirage in the desert or voices on the wind. So where is the 'illusion' of self? Does the body not have senses? Does it not see, feel, hear, etc? Can it not see itself, its limbs, its torso? Can it not hear the rush of its own blood, taste itself, the salt of its skin, feel the pulse, the heartbeat? How is all this an 'illusion of self'? If it is an illusion, what would constitute the reality? If there is no 'self' then what can the illusion truly be?

No, the self cannot be an illusion - that would be to deny the physical reality of being. The self IS being - the totality of brain/body/mind states/memory. It is dynamic yet continuous. This is consistant with the concept that all things are material in nature. To claim the self is an illusion adds immaterial concepts, thus proposing two natures to things - material, and immaterial; the dualist position.

But altimately it comes to the genes forming bodies, brains and selves to promote their own survival.

Actually, the genes didn't get together, confer with each other, and decide that bodies would survive better - the process happened naturally and accidentally. So the genes aren't controlling anything consciously - it's a matter of the process of evolution, of less likely combinations of proteins dying off sooner, etc. Surely you aren't attributing a level of consciousness to DNA, are you?

But there is no awareness, that is the point

What is awareness? One definition points to definite observation of one's own thinking and senses - yet surely this cannot serve us, for most people, by this definition, are unaware moment to moment, waking or asleep. Another simply states, "Consciousness of stimulation, arising from within or from outside the person." Surely, then, this definition covers both sleep and wakefulness, for one can be made 'aware' of stimulation even in deepest sleep. So if 'self' equals 'awareness' then either self vanishes on a regular basis, whether awake or not, or self is continual as long as the senses are functioning. But I again assert that self and awareness are not the same thing - self is not a feeling, not awareness, certainly not consciousness. Self is being. Self is present awake or asleep, coma or conscious. If the brain functions, if it has memories, manages autonomous functions, etc., if it is not dead, the brain has a 'self'. The brain IS a self.

So, again, your belief that self disappears under those conditions is a dualist thought - if self is physical, it cannot disappear under any conditions (except, of course, death of self, in which case self becomes new substances instead); sense of self, of course, can be 'blinded' by these conditions, just as sight can be blinded or sense of balance can be 'blinded'. For self to not exist during unconscious moments leads us to believe that self must be immaterial in nature, thereby requiring dualism to embrace such a concept.

This really is nonsense I have to say. You are saying "feelings" are immaterial. Nuts. There is a pattern of neurological activity in the brain that IS the "feeling", hence "feelings" are material. You say the self is the being itself. What on earth could you mean by that? Presumably there is a feeling of what it is like to be you that only you know about and no-one else knows about. What is this then? If the "being itself" is not this feeling then what is it. I'd say a ghost in the machine .

No, I am saying nothing is immaterial that exists. My apologies for expressing 'feeling' as an immaterial concept - what I was trying to get across was that your use of 'feeling' was as an immaterial sense. You say that 'self' is a feeling of what it is like to be, then claim 'self' is an illusion - so by your own logic, this 'feeling' is an immaterial one, or at best, a false one. I said that self is not the 'feeling' - that is just the sense of self, the combined sensory input and cognizance of the existance of self. 'Feeling of self' translates as sense of self - the self is real, and we have a sense of it. How hard is that? And the being is not the 'ghost in the machine', but the machine itself. Again, how hard is that to understand? The self is all of it, together, continuous and dynamic. Now, we can argue how much of the self can one lose before losing one's self - but I suggest that would require some very inethical medical experimentation. Probably all but the major sections of the advanced brain could be lost without a loss of self. Hard to say for now.

Since you asked:

Dualism, as defined here (http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/D.html) :

Most generally, the view that reality consists of two disparate parts. In philosophy of mind, the belief that the mental and physical are deeply different in kind: thus the mental is at least not identical with the physical.

So your insistance that self, the feeling of being, is an illusion suggests that self is not real, that self is not the physical fact of being. Thus, a dualist concept, to you. Where as I assert that, as we have a sense of self, that self must exist, and since nothing immaterial can exist, the self must be material; what, then, can the self be, except that which we sense - i.e. the totality of the physical being, dynamic and continuous?

Have you ever heard someone say they 'got something spilled on them'? Do you ever feel tempted to correct them and say, on their shirt / clothes, whatever? Why or why not? The 'self' includes the clothes, when the body is wearing them. But this is a disposable feature of self, like hair and fingernails. Nonetheless, put on a smock, and the smock is now a part of you. Not an integral part, but a part, nonetheless. You are likely to mention getting mustard splattered on you (your shirt), or how you're soaked (your clothes, which probably also wets your skin, but hardly 'soaks' you). This is all a minor point, but it demonstrates that, at least to some common thought, 'self' is the totality - including the ever-changing non-essentials. But if you insist on 'essential self', we'd have to wait for science to finish studying the brain to get to the core of that. Nevertheless, it is there, somewhere - some part of the brain that causes our sense of self, or rather interprets that sense.

But the clothing thing was purely a digression - forgive me.

No. It works in all situations. The fact that you can say it doesn't illustrates that you do not understand my point of view.

OK, you say that, if you are cloned and the original destroyed, you will live on. Then, in the non-destructive, you say that two yous will exist. Yet you agree both are separate, distinct, and cannot share senses or experiences in any way. And you have agreed that you will not live on through your clone, since the second the two of you have different experiences, they are no longer the same 'you'. Which is you? Obviously, the original is you, if we are asking 'which you is the original you'. And since you are, right now, the original you, then the question is implied. So if the original you doesn't start sensing life from its clones, then how can it do so if destroyed? It can't - and this is the key issue: if two beings differentiate one from the other immediately after their first non-shared sensory experience, then the Mars clone of you cannot be you - they immediately differentiate when the Mars clone experiences anything at all. You have been killed.

Clearly, your thinking doesn't work in all situations - if you find it acceptable to be destroyed and duplicated on Mars, thinking that you (the original you, right here, right now) will live on in the duplicate, then you must also find it acceptable that in the non-destructive, two bodies would exist living the same life with two sets of experiences, two sets of sensory input, etc. going on within the same 'you'. Since this clearly cannot happen, you must reject the concept in the first place - which you will not do. So you instead offer one mode of thinking for the destructive, and a different mode of thinking for the non-destructive. You are inconstant, and irrational.

I understand your thinking - but not your reasoning, not your logic. Certainly, it's not perfectly logical or rational - and certainly not purely material, either. I'm not sure where the glitch in your thinking lies - but that's immaterial now. :D

Well, BJ, it's been a nice conversation, and it's helped me clarify what I think about the materialist point of view. (Of course, in my own opinion, there is a soul, but that gets into a tremendous metaphysic which I am simply not willing to debate anywhere)

It's also probably ruined my appreciation of Star Trek... man, what deluded fools they are, committing suicide any time they need to get around quickly.

I guess they're just lucky souls don't exist! :D

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Nope, I really understand your point of view, just not why you would hold such a point of view, because it is illogical. It isn't even internally consistant

No, you definitely do not. If you did, you would know why I hold that view, and you would see that it is logical, and you would see that it is internally consistent (even while not agreeing with it).

Then for the rest of your post, you again look at MY point of view from YOUR point of view. Hey, guess what, you need to prove my POV is illogical and internally inconsistent from within MY point of view not from within YOUR point of view. You are unable do this because you don't understand my POV.

....it would be better to say the brain and the body are one self

:D
If the duplicator were capable of replacing all the cells except the brain cells and you had acute leukaemia (fatal within three weeks), would you use it? If so don't give me this ***** about the body being part of the self. We are truely headed for cloud cuckoo land here! :D

To claim the self is an illusion adds immaterial concepts, thus proposing two natures to things - material, and immaterial; the dualist position.

I suppose you think those differently shaded squares are immaterial as well! :D
"Ah, you say that you can see two differently shaded squares on that checkerboard? Well then, you must be a dualist." :D

Actually, the genes didn't get together, confer with each other, and decide that bodies would survive better - the process happened naturally and accidentally. So the genes aren't controlling anything consciously - it's a matter of the process of evolution, of less likely combinations of proteins dying off sooner, etc. Surely you aren't attributing a level of consciousness to DNA, are you?

Ever heard of figurative language. :rolleyes:

What is awareness? One definition points to definite observation of one's own thinking and senses - yet surely this cannot serve us, for most people, by this definition, are unaware moment to moment, waking or asleep.

Really, zaayrdragon, try being awake and not think or experience. It is not possible.

..one can be made 'aware' of stimulation even in deepest sleep.

Well then you have become aware when previously you were not.

So, again, your belief that self disappears under those conditions is a dualist thought - if self is physical, it cannot disappear under any conditions

Then I suppose you would have to say that everything you see is immaterial because it all disappears as soon as you close your eyes. :nope:

So your insistance that self, the feeling of being, is an illusion suggests that self is not real, that self is not the physical fact of being. Thus, a dualist concept, to you.

Yeah, like those differently shaded squares are not real, not material, and I that I am therefore a dualist if I can see them. :rolleyes:

The 'self' includes the clothes, when the body is wearing them. But this is a disposable feature of self, like hair and fingernails. Nonetheless, put on a smock, and the smock is now a part of you.

:D.
Hey, let's just include the whole world shall we? The clothes impact on the skin, but the whole world impacts on your eyes. At the very least, that woman I slept with last night it part of me. :)

But if you insist on 'essential self', we'd have to wait for science to finish studying the brain to get to the core of that.

Well, I say there is not an "essential self" just an "illusion of self". I really have failed with you haven't I?

OK, you say that, if you are [duplicated] and the original destroyed, you will live on. Yes. Then, in the non-destructive, you say that two yous will exist. Yes. Yet you agree both are separate, distinct, and cannot share senses or experiences in any way. Yes. And you have agreed that you will not live on through your clone.....

Well, this is where you demonstrate that you do not understand my POV. I have never made any statement such as this. I do not agree with it. I would say that: "One instance of me would live on in the original and one instance of me would live on in the duplicate (where 'me' is "the illusion of self which corresponds to a pattern of neural activity produced by the brain").
When you understand that statement, you will understand my POV.

.....since the second the two of you have different experiences, they are no longer the same 'you'.

Yes, neither of them are any longer the same you. They have both changed. (Similarly, you a moment ago are not the same you now).

Which is you?

Both are me, equally and legitimately, me.
(If 'me' is "the illusion of self which corresponds to a pattern of neural activity produced by the brain".)
When you understand that statement, you will understand my POV.

Clearly, your thinking doesn't work in all situations - if you find it acceptable to be destroyed and duplicated on Mars, thinking that you (the original you, right here, right now) will live on in the duplicate,....

See? You insist that you understand my point of view but everytime you suggest to me what my view will be in a particular situation, you get it wrong. Your above sentence is correct if you scratch out that bit in brackets.....
"the original you, right here, right now"
The original me, right here, right now, on Earth, is dead. The duplicate me, right here, right now, on Mars, is alive. I live on.
Yes, nonsense you say. And I can hear you from all the way over here. You are SHOUTING at me that you do not understand my point of view. :(

....then you must also find it acceptable that in the non-destructive, two bodies would exist living the same life with two sets of experiences, two sets of sensory input, etc. going on within the same 'you'.

Sadly, no, that is not my view. :(
But I am deaf already, don't shout any louder. I have failed you, sorry. :(

Since this clearly cannot happen, you must reject the concept in the first place - which you will not do. So you instead offer one mode of thinking for the destructive, and a different mode of thinking for the non-destructive. You are inconstant, and irrational.

It is the same explanation. :(

I understand your thinking - but not your reasoning, not your logic. Certainly, it's not perfectly logical or rational - and certainly not purely material, either. I'm not sure where the glitch in your thinking lies - but that's immaterial now. :D

Sorry, that was probably a good joke, but I am almost completely deaf now. :( [b]

sad regards,
BillyJoe

[Z]

Well, be sad all you want - we simply don't agree. Statements like 'the instance of me' make no sense. If you insist that there are multiple instances of 'me' in this case, you have assumed a logical failure. Similarly, your definition of 'self' is flawed, in that it excludes the very thing that defines 'self' - a first-person point of view, unique unto the being experiencing self. And attempting to claim 'two selves' is a failing - two beings cannot be included in a first-person point of view unless both share the same first-person point of view - in other words, a logical impossibility. So your definition of 'self' ought, perhaps, to be applied to some other term - 'consciousness', for instance, or something of the like - that removes, utterly, the first-person perspective from the term. For as long as that perspective persists, it can and must be a unique perspective. YOUR perspective - the perspective of YOUR self - would suddenly and absolutely end when you die/are killed/are destroyed. YOUR perspective cannot and will not ever be 'transferred' to some duplicate - YOUR perspective will continue to be yours if a duplicate is created. Unless both original and duplicate are linked mentally in some fashion, YOUR perspective cannot be experienced by the duplicate, nor can HIS be experienced by YOU.

Basically, to 'understand' your point of view, I would have to throw out all logic, and embrace terminology acrobatics that I do not care to do. 'Self' is not 'the feeling of being'; and 'me' is not 'the illusion of self et. al.' Since I will not embrace the shaky foundation of your misunderstanding, I cannot fully comprehend your point of view. You offer nothing but smoke and mirrors, and when faced with certain terms, you attempt to redefine them, to add more smoke, more mirrors, so that your view is, to your opinion, supported.

FYI - the two grey squares exist, and are the same shade. The function of contrast within the brain creates the illusion (to those whose brains work properly) that they are two different shades - but this is well-understood and predictable illusion. But the squares are quite real, as are the photons you are receiving. Just as real as the neural signals being processed in such a way as to provide false contrast to your self. Once you understand the nature of the illusion, the illusion actually weakens for many people. Plus, you then possess the language to describe, not an illusion, but the fact of what is happening. But this is an aside... sorry.

Well, BJ - at least we can both agree that the stupid teletrans isn't going to be built for a MIGHTY long time - if two common men cannot agree on the moral implications of such a device, how can the better educated and morally superior folk (yeah right) who will have to face this dilemma deal with it?

Joyous regards,

ZD

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Well, be sad all you want - we simply don't agree. Statements like 'the instance of me' make no sense.

What about "an instance of the pattern of neural activity in the brain that is the illusion of me".

If you insist that there are multiple instances of 'me' in this case, you have assumed a logical failure.

The destructive duplicator demonstrates it unequivocally. You refuse to accept this result because you cannot get your head around that view that there can be two instances of you. You can't accept that result because you cannot get your head around the view that you are just a pattern of neural activity in the brain. Nevertheless this is the only way to make sense of the destructive duplicator without resorting to the concept of an "essential self" and all that implies.

FYI - the two grey squares exist, and are the same shade.

Yep, "the identically shaded squares" exist out there

The function of contrast within the brain creates the illusion.....that they are two different shades - but this is well-understood and predictable illusion.

And "the illusion of differently shaded squares" also exists - as patterns of neural activity in the brain. That's what I mean when I say that the illusion is real and is material. Similarly the "illusion of self" exists as a pattern of neural activity in the brain". That's what I mean when I say that the "illusion of self" is real and is material.

Once you understand the nature of the illusion, the illusion actually weakens for many people. Plus, you then possess the language to describe, not an illusion, but the fact of what is happening.

What ever turns you on, but the explanation of what causes the illusion is more satisfying for me than the illusion itself. But there we go. It is a lesson in evolution and a lesson in how the brain works. The evolutionary lesson is that the brain evolved to discriminate contrasts in preference to absolutes because discriminating contrasts provided an survival advantage. The lesson in how the brain works is that the brain does not project an image of what is out there, but rather it processes the input piecemeal in different parts of the brain and there is no bringing together of all these various parts to form an image to present to the (in any case, non-existent) self.

Well, BJ - at least we can both agree that the stupid teletrans isn't going to be built for a MIGHTY long time - if two common men cannot agree on the moral implications of such a device, how can the better educated and morally superior folk (yeah right) who will have to face this dilemma deal with it?

My guess is that they will deal with it, just like we're dealing with the many moral dilemmas thrown up by the results of scientifc research. Unless qauntum effects preclude it, the teleporter may become reality one day and, if I am right, people will take their holidays on it as a matter of course.

cya,
BillyJoe

[Z]

Nevertheless this is the only way to make sense of the destructive duplicator without resorting to the concept of an "essential self" and all that implies.

Bingo. I can see, here, the problem implicitly. Can you?

Are you even considering the fact that the destructive duplicator just doesn't make sense at all? Don't you see, you HAVE to resort to re-defininf self as a 'pattern', since 'pattern' is all that survives of you. It never seems to occur to you that there is no survival because the self is not a pattern of neural activity in the brain - you INSIST it must be this pattern, because it is 'the only way to make sense of the destructive duplicator without resorting to the concept of 'essential self' and all that implies'. Or, in other words, if you don't try re-defining Self as a 'pattern', the destructive duplicator makes no sense. Why? Because you share nothing in common with the duplicate except a pattern. And the only way 'you' can survive is if 'you' are that pattern. Well, there's your ghost - and your problem. Instead of twisting facts (and terms) to fit the teletrans, why don't you try looking at the teletrans as it really is? YOU are destroyed. A DUPLICATE is created with your pattern. BUT THAT PATTERN DOES NOT MAKE THAT DUPLICATE "YOU". From your first-person perspective, YOU are destroyed, end of story. In fact, it is senseless, now that I think about it, to define 'you' as 'a pattern of neural activity in the brain' because that pattern is never the same at any given moment - which explains your logical lunacy of a different 'self' from moment to moment. But you do NOT vanish from moment to moment; you are NOT a series of selves linked by memory. You are the continual, dynamic living being that experiences from your point of view through your senses and by your brain. The 'pattern of neural activity' in that brain is ethereal, changing from millisecond to millisecond, just as the molecular structure of your body is changing. Every part of you changes (except, possibly, bits of the neuron) as you progress through time and space continuously and fluidly. But through this, you remain. You are not some 'ghost', soul, or pattern; you are the whole, brain/body/awareness, continuous from the moment you first formed, and dynamic in almost every way.

So, no, I will not replace 'self', 'me', or 'you' with 'a pattern of neural activity in the brain' or 'an instance of a pattern of neural activity in the brain' - for if I were to do so, I would be accepting millions of 'selves' for every person, existing but a moment, and vanishing forever. This is without reason; counter-intuitive, as Ian might say, and utterly senseless.

So, BJ - since there remains a question of murder in the teletrans, I think we will never see such a destructive device used regularly by sensible people... if indeed at all. You try to remove the 'murder' aspect by re-writing 'self' as merely a 'pattern' - but I doubt lawmakers will ever agree with that. Otherwise, why can't we just destructively scan anyone we want to, and store their patterns indefinitely? The pattern still exists, right? Or, indeed, since such pattern exists but for a moment anyway, I guess murder doesn't exist, since the 'self' was doomed anyway when the second hand ticked again?

Nope, that just won't work, BJ. The self is more than a mere pattern, and so, the duplicator is a murder device. Sorry, Congress ain't gonna let that one go by. I don't think EITHER party will like that one. :D

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon, I said cya. BillyJoe :mad:

[Z]

:w2: Leaving? Ok, bye bye Billy. I'll send yer widow some flowers.

:big:

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
So you have difficulty with the difference between continuity and change, I see. Well, that does explain a lot.I have no such problem. Perhaps you are projecting?

See, something is the same, even if it changes. Not the same as it was moments ago, but still the same thing.
Depends what you mean by change.
A car is still the same car if you replace the oil, change the tires, etc.
I agree. When you replace like with like, you end up with exactly the same thing.
It continues to be the same car no matter how much of it you replace over time.
Ahh, but this is where we differ. If you just replace stuff in a macroscopic sense "over time", you will obviously not have the same car.
Of course, you can argue that, eventually, you have a different car than when you started out - but due to the continual and gradual replacement, it is still the same car. Plus, chances are, you'll never replace the frame of the car - replacing the frame would, in essence, amount to throwing out the old car and getting a new one. (Only because to do this would require taking the entire car apart anyway) I don't see why replacing the frame would be of special relevance. In fact, I don't see how your metaphor above is really relevant at all, given its concerned with macroscopic replacement.
So it is with a person. They grow, they change, but they are still the same person.
Why do you think so? As I said before, are you still the same person you were at age 3? If so, why don't you make the same decisions or think the same way? In what sense are you the same? And don't tell me you inhabit the same body. You don't. And don't tell me you have a contiuity of experince. You don't.
The change happens gradually over time. Eventually (every seven years, as I understand it) you are physically comprised of almost all new parts, but you are still the same person. This seems to be your problem - you don't see how something can change and still be the same. (Do you get stuck in your ways a lot?)It is not my problem as it is not a problem. The "you" of today is not the same "you" of yesterday.
But note the very piece you quoted did not mentioned neurons, and specifically said about 98% of the body is replaced. What do you suppose the other 2% is? Or does it take slightly longer than a year to replace 100%? I don't understand why it matters. Let us suppose for a moment that some parts of the neurons you were born with (nevermind the new ones created during your lifetime or the ever changing nature of makeup and existence of the dendrites of each neuron), remained the same during your lifetime. So what? Are you saying that these particular congregations of elementary particles have some special property in addition to their known properties which means they must be part of a mechanism for generating "you"? This is so absurd I don't even know where to begin.
Also note: unless you are proposing that a neuron is comprised only of hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon, then respiration does not replace the molecules of the cell. Think of the cell like a generator: it takes in materials, processes them, and produces energy and waste materials. The generator itself (other than standard wear and tear) is unchanged, but it's 'respirating' in much the same way. And suppose the generator, for whatever reason, is damaged and needs new belts, a new filter, whatever. Do swapping these components out make a new generator? Of course not. So it is with neurons: they take in oxygen (and, I assume, other molecules) and create energy, then output carbon dioxide. The cell itself is largely unchanged (other than wear and tear). If the dendrite becomes damaged, the surrounding neurons repair the dendrite. This doesn't change the nucleus of the cell, only its filament.You make no sense. Firstly, a dendrite is part of a neuron. Any change to a dendrite or the creation of a new dendrite is a change to the makeup of that neuron.

Secondly, the cell is never unchanged. It constantly synthesises new neurotransmitters, all of which consist of more than oxygen, hydrogen and carbon. It takes in vitamins, fatty acids, etc. for this purpose.

Thirdly, if wear and tear means those precious special atoms which exist to generate you, are replaced, then what exactly is your point?

Fourthly, brain cells die. A great increase in this rate is often associated with the disease called Parkinson's disease. Tell me, are you still the one and only you when one or more of your brain cells are dead?
So, yes, a few cells are generated every so often, in the hippocampus. But not enough to replace all the neurons of the brain, certainly not in any significant time frame. So the neurons you have today are the same ones, largely, that you were born with.They are not the same. Where is the integral you located?
Of all the cells in the body, the neurons are the only ones not replaced systematically by the body. The hippocampus generates new ones, but the rest of the brain only generates new neurons after trauma and injury, and then only under the right conditions.Even the generation of one new cell or even the generation of one new dendrite or the death of even one new dendrite is more than enough to show that what makes you "you" is not the particular particles currently in your body. How can you not see this?
So this gives one, tiny part of the human being that is not replaced - one continuous component that exists throughout lifetime. Complete crap, as I have already shown.

I'm curious though why you think this is even important. You must be allocating special properties to any atoms which might remain in your body throughout your lifetime. What special non-physical properties do these atoms have?
Really, DD, what is it you have against dynamic systems? If you see a diamond in the rough, take it to a jeweler, and have him cut it, does it become a new diamond? It could well become several smaller diamonds, of course.
How is this even relevant?
If you watch a stream, is it not the same stream from one moment to the next, changing each moment as different things flow along its path?
Exactly. The atoms change from moment to moment, but it is still the same pattern.
Is the sun that we see each day a different star from the sun we saw yesterday?Obviously.
So when does something become a new thing? Well, when we reproduce, we blend our DNA with the DNA of another person, and that blended DNA is neither one nor the other, but a new being altogether. It is separate from either parent (at birth). But suppose something goes wrong, and twins form but do not separate. Are they one being or two? Does sharing a few organs make them one being? What if they shared a brain? Is the two-headed girl one person or two?
*Sigh*

As I've said many time before, clones (and twins) have absolutely no relevance. Are you being deliberately dense?
I would generally say, with regards to people, that a unique brain makes that person a unique individual. Or, instead of unique, let's say separate. A separate brain signifies a separate person. Even if that brain is identical to another brain, it is still separate and therefore a separate person. Doesn't matter how two identical brains formed - whether by some slip of probability, deliberate genetic engineering, or hypercloning (or teletransfer); the end product, a new brain, is a separate person, distinct from the other brain. And since brain IS self, then the self is separate and distinct.
I quite agree, but the difference is only relevant once different data is processed by each.
So the teletrans makes a separate, distinct self on Mars while killing a separate, distinct self on Earth - which means the self on Earth is NOT, can NEVER be, the self on Mars. Unless the self on Earth chooses the spaceship option, and through good fortune, arrives on Mars. He has changed, surely, but he is not separate from the self on Earth - he is one and the same, dynamic creature, who (depending on the length of the journey) has most of his original (from launch on Earth) parts still with him - and definitely most of his same neurons with him.*Sigh*

Your "you" only exists at this moment. In the next moment you will be a different "you". Your brain makeup changes from moment to moment. Sometimes no significant change takes place, other times you change your mind or experience something mind-altering.

I'm repeating myself, but it is hard to find a new way to explain.
Tell me, what, other than pattern, does the teletrans duplicate share with the self on Earth?
Nothing. And that's because that is all it needs to share.
What physical objects do the two share? Nothing, save only the relationships of the molecules to each other within the pattern of the being. But this pattern doesn't make the two selves the SAME self any more than two cars built to the same blueprints are the SAME car.
Two cars built to the same specification do not share the same quantum state. Any phycisist could tell them apart immediately.
I admit - maybe I just am not smart enough to grasp this concept of yours (DD and BJ). But no matter what angle I look at it from, except for one, it makes no sense to take the teletrans as the question is stated.Perhaps you are right.
(The exception: IF there is a soul, and the soul somehow uses the body like a ghost in the machine, and if the soul can somehow transcend space at speeds faster than light - and if the soul is, by its nature, attracted automatically, to a particular pattern of physical material - well, honestly, there seem to be a lot of ifs in this exception. But it's the only exception by which I could agree that you could step into the teletrans, be killed, and wake up on Mars. But without a soul, there is no way anything could transfer to Mars to make you become that person on Mars. Any other scenario and you would simply step onto the teletrans and cease to be. Period.) [/B]
BillyJoe, do you think this guy is II in disguise?

[Z]

BillyJoe, do you think this guy is II in disguise?

:dl:

Good one, DD. And the only comment in your post worth commenting on, being as usual, most of your post made no sense whatsoever. :D

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
:dl:

Good one, DD. And the only comment in your post worth commenting on, being as usual, most of your post made no sense whatsoever. :D
I'm glad you had some amusement. I'm saddened that you can't answer my simple questions.

[Z]

Well, it is hard to respond to nonsense. :D

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by DanishDynamite
BillyJoe, do you think this guy is II in disguise? Sorry, I'm no longer reading this thread.

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Sorry, I'm no longer reading this thread.
Understandably so. Seems z has flipped. Oh well, it was fun to rehash.

[Kopji]

The movie 'The Sixth Day' was fun.
Not as good as 'Total Recall'

I remain unconvinced this line of thinking proves or disproves anything about materialism.

The whole idea of "straw man" being a fallacy is that it is a WEAKER and LESS TRUE version of the actual argument.

The fact that straw men are easily burned and people are dancing in circles around them claiming victory, does not make it a more convincing spectacle.

The original teleporter is destroyed in the process of cloning and is now two new things with unique memory at the point of the originals destruction.

This disproves materialism how? (This actually seems to affirm materialism.)

Or... the transportation process fails somehow, and one duplicate is left on mars, and the other on earth. Each has a common memory to the point of "cloning", and completely unique experiences from that point on.

So yes, in this instance it would be unethical to kill either copy. "Oops". So clone the wife and kids.

[BillyJoe]

Kopji

Originally posted by Kopji
I remain unconvinced this line of thinking proves or disproves anything about materialism. For the most part we have been arguing about what a materialist's position would be in the hypothetical teleporter situation.

Incredibly, zaayrdragon says that choosing the teleporter assumes a soul (that transfers from original to duplicate)

:D

BillyJoe.