Ian's "Staying Alive" link

[Rob Lister]

Ian the T posted a link to a quiz.

http://www.philosophers.co.uk/games/identity.htm

It was a pretty cool quiz.

The first question on the quiz went thus:

You have been chosen to go on a very important mission to Mars. You have no choice in this matter, you must go. But you can choose your means of transport.

One method is teletransportation. You will step into a scanner here on earth which will destroy your brain and body, while recording the exact states of all your cells. This information will then be transmitted to a replicator on Mars. Travelling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to reach its destination. The replicator will create, out of new matter, a brain and body exactly like yours. The person on Mars will look like you, think like you, in fact be indistinguishable from you. He or she will certainly feel as though they have merely fallen asleep on Earth and then woken up on Mars. This method is 100 per cent reliable.

The other choice is to go by spaceship. This is very risky and there is 50 per cent chance that the ship will not complete the journey and you will die in transit. But if you do successfully take the spaceship, then your body and brain won't at any stage have been destroyed.

You must make the choice which you think will give your self the biggest chance of surviving. Click one of the two options below:

I chose to be teleported because if the difference between the old-me on earth and the new-me on Mars is "indistinguishable", then the new me is the old me.

In effect, I chose a 100% chance of being dead for three minutes over a 50% chance of being dead forever.

Does my logic fail?

I think Einstein would back me up on this one if he hadn't gone and got himself dead.

[Benguin]

I concur, captain.

Is their some daft trick in the question about one's soul being unresurrected?

[Rolfe]

Originally posted by Rob Lister
I chose to be teleported because if the difference between the old-me on earth and the new-me on Mars is "indistinguishable", then the new me is the old me. I initially chose like you. But then when I got to the last question I contended that the earlier two hadn't given me sufficient information to make a choice.

Which is the gripe I started having on II's thread. Maybe more appropriate for further on this discussion. And especially 'cos I'm going to bed, and I can meditate of the consciousness of sleep as opposed to death....

Rolfe.

[Rolfe]

Originally posted by Benguin
Is their some daft trick in the question about one's soul being unresurrected? I think it's a fatal flaw in the quiz. At that point I decided that I would take the position that preserving this "soul" was the most important criterion for me. Therefore I chose not to be frozen. But it seems to me that I was therefore denied vital information in the earlier choices - no information was given about whether this "soul" would be preserved by teleportation or the bionicisation of the brain, so it was impossible to choose so as to indicate that this was the priority.

I think.

But I'm open to the suggestion that the quiz was more subtle than I realise and the bases were really all covered in a way my simple little brain hasn't yet sussed.

Rolfe.

[Rob Lister]

Originally posted by Rolfe
I think it's a fatal flaw in the quiz. At that point I decided that I would take the position that preserving this "soul" was the most important criterion for me.

The key element for me was that the way the question was worded, the soul was of no value to "me". If it has no value to me, I don't give it consideration.

[Rolfe]

Originally posted by Rob Lister
The key element for me was that the way the question was worded, the soul was of no value to "me". If it has no value to me, I don't give it consideration. Yes, but it might be of philosophical value to you. Given the discoveries that were detailed. And if it was, then what about the earlier questions?

Rolfe.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rolfe in other thread
Am I wrong in suspecting that the quiz was unfair? The concept of the soul wasn't introduced until the last question.
If I'd been told that the reconstituted me on the distant planet would have lost that soul, I'd have chosen differently.



Huh?? Think you've been watching too many horror films. :eek:

A substance dualist is likely to believe any reconstituted self would be a corpse. I, as a subjective idealist, also believe this.

However, neither the dualists nor I am obliged to believe this. What might happen is that the soul would start to operate through the reconstituted body. So if this reconstituted self would definitely be alive, then I would be happy to take the transporter. It's just that I think most probably just a corpse would be created.

What I would definitely reject is the idea that there could be 2 selves ie if we didn't kill off the original so there was 2 copies of me. Materialists have to accept there could be 2 selves and thereby have to face the logical conundrums thereby created. I don't.

[Rolfe]

Oh good! I was really worried Ian might agree with me! :D

Rolfe.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rolfe
Oh good! I was really worried Ian might agree with me! :D

Rolfe.

Relax . .relax . .that'll never happen :) I will never agree with anyone on here, otherwise my name ain't Interesting Ian!

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
...snip...What I would definitely reject is the idea that there could be 2 selves ie if we didn't kill off the original so there was 2 copies of me. Materialists have to accept there could be 2 selves and thereby have to face the logical conundrums thereby created. I don't.

Would someone be kind enough to explain to the ignorant person I am what logical conundrums this would create?

[Eleatic Stranger]

The main problem is that if there were two of you then you would no longer be identical with yourself, which is a logical contradiction. (Identity is logically defined, most commonly, as a two place predicate consisting of the same object in both places.)

However, materialism doesn't necessarily cause this problem, though the issue of personal identity is an interesting one philosophically (I took a course on this just last term, in fact). The test they give is a little simplistic, but it doesn't do too bad of a job of mapping out where one stands on the variety of accounts out there.

[Rob Lister]

Originally posted by Rolfe
Yes, but it might be of philosophical value to you. Given the discoveries that were detailed. And if it was, then what about the earlier questions?

Rolfe.

It had no goal-related value. The goal, survival, was the basis of the test. If I can't measure the survival-factor of the soul -- such as the question implied -- then even if it exists in principle, it does not exist in practice.

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Eleatic Stranger
The main problem is that if there were two of you then you would no longer be identical with yourself, which is a logical contradiction. (Identity is logically defined, most commonly, as a two place predicate consisting of the same object in both places.)

However, materialism doesn't necessarily cause this problem, though the issue of personal identity is an interesting one philosophically (I took a course on this just last term, in fact). The test they give is a little simplistic, but it doesn't do too bad of a job of mapping out where one stands on the variety of accounts out there.

I would still be identical to myself as long as both versions of me somehow are made to have exactly the same experiences.

And when one of the "mes" starts to experience different things, then it will start to be different, like these two fellows->:alc:

I still don't see the problem.:confused:

[Eleatic Stranger]

The problem is that something can only be identical to itself (usually under a different description, that being the point of the identity predicate). If there are two of you, they can't be identical to each other because they are two different objects. If you treat the splits of person-whoever as one object there are all sorts of problems - for instance, if one is at space S1 and the other is at space S2, then the statement "Person-whoever is at space S1" is both true and false simultaneously.

[Z]

What I would definitely reject is the idea that there could be 2 selves ie if we didn't kill off the original so there was 2 copies of me. Materialists have to accept there could be 2 selves and thereby have to face the logical conundrums thereby created. I don't.

Then the whole system wouldn't work, II, because there is nothing in the question that indicates any transfer of material or energy from the first You (the one that was killed) to the second You - in fact, I assume from the precise way the question was worded, that you would be destroyed at Earth by the pattern-read system, probably as a part of determining your exact pattern.

But if that were not necessary, if your pattern could be read without destroying the body, then two yous could suddenly exist, and your entire metaphysic would immediately vanish into smoke, joining God in his unreal realm of fantasies.

There are no logical conundrums for the materialist any more than there are if you were to clone yourself exactly. THe only reason you have no logical conundrums is because you reject the idea that two selves could exist. This means you also reject that the machine can do what they described.

From the test:

One method is teletransportation. You will step into a scanner here on earth which will destroy your brain and body, while recording the exact states of all your cells. This information will then be transmitted to a replicator on Mars. Travelling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to reach its destination. The replicator will create, out of new matter, a brain and body exactly like yours. The person on Mars will look like you, think like you, in fact be indistinguishable from you. He or she will certainly feel as though they have merely fallen asleep on Earth and then woken up on Mars. This method is 100 per cent reliable.

In other words: you will be killed on Earth in order to record the state of all your cells. Then, on Mars, new matter will be reorganized to perfectly resemble you, and to the new being you will be indistinguishable from the original.

Why do you seem to miss this key fact? There is no material being transmitted between the two bodies, therefore, Materialistically speaking, the creature on Mars is not YOU, only a nearly-identical version of you. (Its very awareness of the process marks a significant difference already, but I already discussed this)

Materialists MUST choose the spaceship option - it's only logical.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Relax . .relax . .that'll never happen :) I will never agree with anyone on here, otherwise my name ain't Interesting Ian!
Absolutely right, Neo.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Materialists MUST choose the spaceship option - it's only logical.
I chose the spaceship option, but for other reasons.

Question: If the material beamed over to Mars was the material from Earth, would you still be the same person, or would a new person be created out of the same material? How would it be any different than using new matter to create an identical replica?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Correa Neto
I would still be identical to myself as long as both versions of me somehow are made to have exactly the same experiences.

And when one of the "mes" starts to experience different things, then it will start to be different, like these two fellows->:alc:

I still don't see the problem.:confused:

I discussed this almost a year ago on a thread on here. Here is one thought experiment which I mentioned which illustrates the difficulty for materialism. Unfortunately I take for granted that people agree that both duplicate and original have equal right to claim that they are the originally you. Perplexingly people on here are now disagreeing with this. But for those who concede this . . .

{quote}

I think it has been broadly agreed that with a star trek teletransporter device, where the original person gets destroyed and a perfect duplicate gets created somewhere else, that the duplicate would be you in the absolute fullest sense of the word. Anyway I'm going to take for granted that this is agreed upon.

Now if we imagine a case where the original person is not destroyed and simply get duplicated, we will then have 2 streams of consciousnesses. Let's imagine that someone offers me £10,000,000 if I agree to be duplicated with the duplicate being killed after about an hour after duplication. And let's for the sake of argumentation ignore the ethical implications. Now this might seem like a good deal to me. After all, how could I lose out? A duplicate is created, lives for an hour, and then is destroyed. So after the duplicate is destroyed is exactly the same as before the duplicate was created, except I'm £10,000,000 richer! :D

So ok, I agree to it. Now let's suppose that the copying will take place in a room with a TV set. The copying will take place sometime whilst I am watching my favorite film of all time Groundhog Day, although precisely when duplication will take place is not specified. It could take place anytime during the duration of the film. Imagine also that the duplicate will suddenly appear in an absolute identical room with the same film playing which is also precisely synchronized to the other film.

It should be obvious that nothing untoward will happen at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the original obviously nothing will happen. I will be watching the film and will notice absolutely nothing at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the duplicate, again I will note nothing untoward. At the precise moment of duplication I will suddenly appear in the duplicate room, sitting exactly in the same relative position and posture, the film will be continuous with the film being shown in the other room, and my memories will be continuous with the original Ian just prior to duplication.

So ok, I'm sitting there watching the film, and I most probably will be thinking to myself "hmmmm, I wonder if I have been duplicated yet or not?". Because I have no way of knowing. Moreover, even if I have been duplicated, I have absolutely no way of telling whether I am the original or the duplicate. But now the end of the film arrives. I know that duplication must have taken place, but there is absolutely nothing about the character of my experiences which could enable me to determine whether I am the original or the duplicate. My consciousness has been continous. I might feel therefore that I must be the original Ian. But of course the duplicate will be thinking exactly the same thoughts. Bearing this in mind I cannot ascribe anymore probability than I am the original than the duplicate, and the same reasoning will be gone through by the other Ian. So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.

Then the door to the room opens, and the person standing there says "I regret to inform you that you are the duplicate Ian, and therefore must be immediately executed".

So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd! After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place? Then, since no duplicate is created, there is absolute 100% certainty that I am the original Ian.

It might be popinted out that at least the other Ian gets the £10,000,000. But this doesn't interest me anymore than anyone else I like who receives £10,000,000.

I honestly don't think there is anyway around this paradox apart from suggesting my own solution, namely that after duplication and before an Ian gets destroyed, in other words whilst there exist 2 Ians', I will simultaneously experience out of both of Ian's bodies. Otherwise materialism just generates an incoherency. [/QUOTE]

[Z]

Ian, your little story illustrates several of your fundamental character flaws.

Unfortunately I take for granted that people agree that both duplicate and original have equal right to claim that they are the originally you.

This is true for your example, but false for the teletransporter example, because you have two huge experiential differences. The first is, awareness of the process. The second is, by knowing whether you are on Earth or Mars, you know whether or not you are the original or the duplicate.

I think it has been broadly agreed that with a star trek teletransporter device, where the original person gets destroyed and a perfect duplicate gets created somewhere else, that the duplicate would be you in the absolute fullest sense of the word. Anyway I'm going to take for granted that this is agreed upon.

As I pointed out elsewhere, technically you aren't 'destroyed' on the Trek transporter; merely converted to energy and beamed to another location, where you are hollywood technomagically reassembled. This concept brings up its own errors, ideologies, and philosophies, but let's avoid those for now.

Even avoiding the error in your Trek knowledge, I would have to disagree that the duplicate is you in the fullest sense of the word. In fact, if you are destroyed, then you cease to exist; the creation of a duplicate is irrelevant.
--snip--
So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd!

Actually, there's no paradox at all. One Ian occupies position X1, Y1, Z1, T1 and the other occupies position X2, Y2, Z2, T1. The Ian in position 1 and the Ian in position 2 both may BELIEVE that they are the same Ian, but in fact, one has only just now spontaneously appeared (let's say in position 2). There is no subjective way either one would know which they were, but to any objective observer in possession of the facts, the duplicate would be clearly known. Plus, minute variables may have already made a difference between the time Ian(1) and Ian(2) finish watching the movie. Perhaps Ian(1) scratched his ear, while Ian(2) didn't - and one has a tiny scratch, while the other doesn't. This would demonstrate immediately the fact that these are two separate entities rather than one entity with two bodies.

This is the same sort of premise demonstrated in Total Recall. Here, we have someone who is being told he will have memories of a pleasant, adventurous vacation implanted, when in fact (it appears) instead, it turns out memories of his mundane life were implanted instead. So who is this person? The secret agent under a mind wipe, or the mundane fellow under a vacation delusion? Is he even experiencing reality, or just 'remembering' the experiences he was implanted with?

Ian, here's the real kicker - Let's say room 1 is 19 feet down the hall from room 2 and 12 feet from the hall closet, and that Ian(orig), for some reason, opted to count the distance between the hall closet where he hung his hat, and the room he was led to. Now, if, for some reason, either Ian were to return to that closet, he would instantly have the means for knowing if he were a clone or not.

Likewise, let's say that Ian had Sherlock Holmes-style powers of observation of minutae, and noticed that there was a slight dent in the TV monitor casing - which suddenly wasn't there. This would give Ian the awareness that he may, in fact, be the fake Ian.

In fact, any of a number of variations would give the duplicate the instant (depending on his mental swiftness) awareness that he was not the original. So it's hardly a paradox, nor is it absurd. It is simply reasonable.

I honestly don't think there is anyway around this paradox apart from suggesting my own solution, namely that after duplication and before an Ian gets destroyed, in other words whilst there exist 2 Ians', I will simultaneously experience out of both of Ian's bodies. Otherwise materialism just generates an incoherency.

First, it's not a paradox. Linguistics, Ian - give it a read some time.

Second, the only way you would be able to simultaneously experience out of both Ian's bodies would be if some form of communication existed between the two - an impossibility. Your 'solution' is what generates an incoherency, not materialism.

In other words, you fail to understand even the most simple concepts that you are espousing. You cannot even use the terminology correctly, and your 'ideal' identical rooms would be next-to-impossible to implement without a great deal of effort.

Why, they would even have to assure that you didn't touch anything, since any fingerprint that somehow became visible then vanished suddenly could lead you to an awareness of your duplicated state!

Anyway, this rebuttal was not aimed at you, Ian, since you are never wrong :rolleyes: but for the passing reader, who hopefully has more sense than you do.

[Taffer]

I attempted this explanation in II's thread, so I'll post it here for judgement.

Taffer wrote:
The variables are (Hah!):
X = My physical body, brain, etc.
X2 = My cloned body, exact in every detail.
Y = My personality, emotions, memories, wishes/dreams etc.
Z = My sense of self, as experienced by me (my conciousness, self awareness etc).
Z2 = My clones sense of self, as experienced by him (his conciousness, self awareness etc). Note that this is not mine. It is the same as mine (as in, he experiences his sense of self in the way that I would, but it is not mine).

Ok, so I step onto the transporter plate, and yell "beam me up Scotty", or "Energize" or whatever (depending on what era of Star Trek you are using ). My body is 'copied', that information is sent to mars, and then it is 'pasted' into the clone machine that spits out another me. So far we have X, which is now destroyed, and X2, which has just been made on mars.

X would have a Y personality, and would have a Z sense of self. However, X is now dead, so we have to look at X2. X2 would have a Y personality (becase this is created by the physical properties of the brain in question), but would have a Z2 sense of self. Why? Because Z, my sense of self, was destroyed when my brain was destroyed. Z2 would appear the same to Z, because again it is a product of the functions of the brain, which are the same in X and X2, but it is not the same. This is the crux of it. We are told to judge each question based on survival, and although X2 would survive, with Y personality, it would Z2 sense of self, which is not mine. Therefore I would take the shuttle, because there is a chance that Z will survive, and thus *I* would survive.

Maybe I should use different terms. Assume, for the moment, that your 'sense of self' is found to be an actual thing. The moment your brain starts up, an 'energy spot' is created in your brain. This 'energy spot' is your self awareness, your sense of self. It is your self. However, it is created, as a byproduct, by the processes that make up your brain. Maybe your brain cells excrete a chemical which forms this 'energy spot'. If, for any reason, your brain stops running, this 'energy spot' will die. If you stop you copy yourself on the transporter, then destroy X (while you are creating X2 on mars), this 'energy spot' in X will die. Thus you will die.
However, when you 'start up' the brain in X2, this 'energy spot' will be created again, and it will, for all the world, look like the 'energy spot' in X. BUT. As there was a break in the continuity of your brain, this 'energy spot' is a duplicate that is not the same as the 'energy spot' in X. Thus your sense of self, or your energy spot, or whatever, will have died, and all Z2 is is a duplicate of Z. To everyone but you, and possible X2, they will not be able to tell the difference. Even if you were to examine the 'energy spot', it would seem the same. But from your point of view, you will have died. You will no longer be. You will be an ex parrot!

[Z]

Some have mentioned how the two beings would be 'indistinguishable' but this isn't true - it would only be 'indistinguishable' to the second entity; the first would definitely experience a difference, being dead!

[Taffer]

Hah! Exactly! And although we seem to disagree on the second question, it doesn't really change anything. If for nothing else, but that (like you said) the second question is based upon survival and (like I said) interpretation, rather then philisophical stand points.

[Z]

Well, I don't know if you caught it in the other thread, but since my view is that bodily and psychological continuity are necessary for self, then the disruption of the psychological continuity of zaayrdragon in favor of the spontaneous generation of the psychological continuity of Harry Spudnik (or whatever) becomes a problem for the self. zaayrdragon would still 'die', this time in the death of his memories, thought processes, etc... This is easily observed in those who suffer brain damage of this fashion. The old person ceases to exist, and a new person emerges, sometimes SIGNIFICANTLY different from the original. This usually leads to slews of problems for the patient and his loved ones... especially since this new person is constantly facing evidence that he SHOULD be someone that he isn't.

[Taffer]

And I agree with you (I just posted a reply to said post) with that. But I only think that physical continuity is require, if we are talking simply about survival of conciusness. If we are talking about survival of the person zaayrdragon, to itself and others, however then I agree with you. The implants will, if performed in such a way as to allow unbroken continuity of brain functions, allow the survival of both *you* and your personality.

[Z]

Agreed.

Of course, I also operate under the assumption that psychological continuity and physical continuity are interdependant - that psychological continuity is a product of physical continuity. So any change to the physical would result in a change to the psychological.

If, for example, in question 1, they somehow removed my brain, then did the blast-and-clone, while shipping my brain via spaceship (why they would do that, I have no idea), and plugged me into the new body on the other end, I would be fine with that.

Question 2 is just a doozy from my standpoint, because in both cases, the physical is altered badly, thus altering the psychological; but at least, in the silicon choice, the psychological continuity is partially preserved and later restored, while in the other choice, the physical changes result in a total psychological continuity re-write (which entails a destruction ! and a creation).

I'd say the third question was the easiest of all, even though it should have included a third possible choice.

[Taffer]

I agree. My only problem, I guess, is that I'm working under the assumption that a psychological state is caused by the physical state. In that any change to the physical state would change the psychological state. And also that the state of 'self awareness' is also caused by the physical state. Thus we are told that the virus changes memories, personality etc, so we can assume that it changes the physical areas which those psychological states are created from, but it doesn't say if it changes anything else. Thus we can assume that the physical states that create the state of 'self awareness' are left untouched by the virus.

However, with the replacements, we are told that large parts of the brain are replaced. I guess I am just assuming that by "large parts" it means almost all, and that it would be enough to disrupt the state of 'self awareness'.

[Taffer]

(In reply to the post on II's thread)

I wouldn't choose the Teletrans as it disrupts the continuity of the physical state of the brain...I.E. you are killed.

Thus, I wouldn't choose the replacements because it disrupts the continuity of the physical state of the brain...I.E. you are killed.

[Z]

Yes, I agree - how much of the brain can be replaced before self is destroyed?

Yet I read into this an assumption that a sufficient amount of your brain would remain to be 'you'.

Really, the question is, once again, poorly written - it leaves too much open to interpretation again. If they said the 'whole brain', well, I'd probably opt for the virus instead. (Lose-lose scenario)

Then again, I might not - either way, I'd be 'dead'. But my stubborn opinions might live on! :D

Ever read the Heechee Saga by Pohl? If you can slog through the thoroughly depressing first book (Gateway), the other books covered transferred intelligence quite thoughtfully. The main character's 'mind' is transferred into computers, where 'he' continues a pseudo-existence in the computer world with his friends and family. The original Him is truly dead, but 'he' lives on.

Made me think about the link between brain and mind a LONG time ago!

[Z]

Thus, I wouldn't choose the replacements because it disrupts the continuity of the physical state of the brain...I.E. you are killed.

Ya gotta admit, question 2 is a doozy. Depending on interpretation, you could very well be facing a lose-lose situation. Since the virus ALSO disrupts the continuity of the physical state of the brain... you are also killed.

This test is great for one reason - it made us think. But otherwise, it's very poorly done.

[Taffer]

:D

I havn't read that, but I might have a look at it. It'd probably go well with my philosophy paper too.

But I agree that the question is badly written.

I dunno...if only small parts of the brain are replaced, then I guess it'd be better then living with a whole brain but without your same personality. But I also believe that you could replace your entire brain with a computer if every function of your brain was replicated, and your brain was replaced slowly and carefully enough. For example, the first computer 'synapse' was put in place of an actual one, and it would need to function the same, be able to interact with the other biological synapses etc. It's an interesting thought. I think that, given enough technology, it could be done.

The problem that arrises, thought, is that there would be no way to test if it worked or not. If you created a computer program as complicated as the working of a brain, and it replicated all the brains functions exactly, it would seem for all the world to be just like the original. So even if the original was destroyed, the computer copy would swear that it was the original inside a computer. But from the point of view of the original, they would have died. Problematic. I think that a problem like this could not be tested, but would rather have to be worked out through logic and the known workings of the brain.

[Taffer]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Ya gotta admit, question 2 is a doozy. Depending on interpretation, you could very well be facing a lose-lose situation. Since the virus ALSO disrupts the continuity of the physical state of the brain... you are also killed.

This test is great for one reason - it made us think. But otherwise, it's very poorly done.

Agreed. I do think I face a lose-lose situation, and I simply choose the virus because I feel there is a greater change of keeping the required physical continuity to keep psychological continuity which keeps self aware continuity.

[Badly Shaved Monkey]

Here's a thought to stick a broom handle through the bicycle spokes of this discussion.

Forget about teleporters, think about the real world. There is no continuous existence from moment to moment. If time and everything else is quantised we jump from instant to instant, each correlated with the past with each 'now' a creation based on probabilities set up in the previous instant. The teleporter would be no different from this if, by the power of science fiction, things are so organised that the next successive 'now' for all your body bits is for them to be on Mars not Earth. This makes the teleporter non-scary, but real life really scary.

I think I'm right in saying that although the subjective experience of going forwards in time behaves as above, if time is sliced according to all the different angles available to different observers then to a hypothetical view 'outside' the Universe all the 'nows' co-exist and the subjective experience of time passing is just a trajectory through that array of 'nows'.

Subsidiary discussion: why pop physics books are dangerous to those who lack the mathematical background to deal in anything other than the metaphors they use.

Time for a lie down.

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Rob Lister
I chose to be teleported because if the difference between the old-me on earth and the new-me on Mars is "indistinguishable", then the new me is the old me.

In effect, I chose a 100% chance of being dead for three minutes over a 50% chance of being dead forever.

Does my logic fail?

I think Einstein would back me up on this one if he hadn't gone and got himself dead. Don't worry about Einstein, I agree with you. :)

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Benguin
Is their some daft trick in the question about one's soul being unresurrected? If you don't believe in a soul (and you don't do you?), then don't worry about the soul.

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Rolfe
At that point I decided that I would take the position that preserving this "soul" was the most important criterion for me. You DO believe in a soul?

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Rob Lister
The key element for me was that the way the question was worded, the soul was of no value to "me". If it has no value to me, I don't give it consideration. We agree again. :)

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Rolfe
Yes, but it might be of philosophical value to you. What does this mean. If you don't believe in a soul, how can it have any sort of value to you?

Just asking,
BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Eleatic Stranger
The problem is that something can only be identical to itself (usually under a different description, that being the point of the identity predicate). If there are two of you, they can't be identical to each other because they are two different objects. If you treat the splits of person-whoever as one object there are all sorts of problems - for instance, if one is at space S1 and the other is at space S2, then the statement "Person-whoever is at space S1" is both true and false simultaneously. I think everyone here is using the word "identical" somewhat differently. We talk about the duplicate being identical but not the same as the original.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
....you will be killed on Earth in order to record the state of all your cells. Then, on Mars, new matter will be reorganized to perfectly resemble you, and to the new being you will be indistinguishable from the original.

Why do you seem to miss this key fact? There is no material being transmitted between the two bodies, therefore, Materialistically speaking, the creature on Mars is not YOU, only a nearly-identical version of you. (Its very awareness of the process marks a significant difference already, but I already discussed this)

Materialists MUST choose the spaceship option - it's only logical. Imagine a duplicator that destroys the original and creates a duplicate in the exact position of the original from a external supply of atoms and assume that this can be done 100% accurately so that the structure and function of the duplicate is identical to the original. Imagine further that no one can tell whether a duplication takes place (says its a 50% chance that it happens).
How would you interpret this scenario.

BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Question: If the material beamed over to Mars was the material from Earth, would you still be the same person, or would a new person be created out of the same material? How would it be any different than using new matter to create an identical replica? It makes absolutely no difference.

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

In reference to your scenario....

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Now if we imagine a case where the original person is not destroyed and simply get duplicated, we will then have 2 streams of consciousnesses. Let's imagine that someone offers me £10,000,000 if I agree to be duplicated with the duplicate being killed after about an hour after duplication. And let's for the sake of argumentation ignore the ethical implications. Now this might seem like a good deal to me. After all, how could I lose out? A duplicate is created, lives for an hour, and then is destroyed. So after the duplicate is destroyed is exactly the same as before the duplicate was created, except I'm £10,000,000 richer! :D
The following statement doesn't ring true for me.....

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original. You are looking at this from the Materialist perspective, right?
Okay. So who is the "I" in the above sentence? From the materialist perspective there are two *I*s. The *I* in the original and the *I* in the duplicate. The *I* in the original will get the money 100%. The *I* in the duplicate will be killed in one hour 100%. There is no 50%. One gets the money and the other dies.

But I may be misunderstanding your use of "I" in the quote.

BillyJoe.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This is true for your example, but false for the teletransporter example, because you have two huge experiential differences. The first is, awareness of the process. The second is, by knowing whether you are on Earth or Mars, you know whether or not you are the original or the duplicate. But the Materialist's interpretation should be able to account for both shouldn't it.
But, in any case, if the original dies, aren't *you* happy to continue as the duplicate (forget teh fact that you would rather be dead than stranded on Mars for the rest of yoru life)

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
I would have to disagree that the duplicate is you in the fullest sense of the word. In fact, if you are destroyed, then you cease to exist; the creation of a duplicate is irrelevant.
Well, it seems you aren't. So, are you a Materialist or are you a substance Dualist.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Actually, there's no paradox at all. One Ian occupies position X1, Y1, Z1, T1 and the other occupies position X2, Y2, Z2, T1. The Ian in position 1 and the Ian in position 2 both may BELIEVE that they are the same Ian, but in fact, one has only just now spontaneously appeared (let's say in position 2). There is no subjective way either one would know which they were, but to any objective observer in possession of the facts, the duplicate would be clearly known. Plus, minute variables may have already made a difference between the time Ian(1) and Ian(2) finish watching the movie. Perhaps Ian(1) scratched his ear, while Ian(2) didn't - and one has a tiny scratch, while the other doesn't. This would demonstrate immediately the fact that these are two separate entities rather than one entity with two bodies. But just imagine that there is absolutely no way to tell the difference. Come on, it's not that hard. :(

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Second, the only way you would be able to simultaneously experience out of both Ian's bodies would be if some form of communication existed between the two - an impossibility. Agreed. :)

regards,
BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
[B]Ian, your little story illustrates several of your fundamental character flaws.



This is true for your example, but false for the teletransporter example, because you have two huge experiential differences. The first is, awareness of the process. The second is, by knowing whether you are on Earth or Mars, you know whether or not you are the original or the duplicate.



As I pointed out elsewhere, technically you aren't 'destroyed' on the Trek transporter; merely converted to energy and beamed to another location, where you are hollywood technomagically reassembled. This concept brings up its own errors, ideologies, and philosophies, but let's avoid those for now.

Even avoiding the error in your Trek knowledge, I would have to disagree that the duplicate is you in the fullest sense of the word. In fact, if you are destroyed, then you cease to exist; the creation of a duplicate is irrelevant.
--snip--


Actually, there's no paradox at all. One Ian occupies position X1, Y1, Z1, T1 and the other occupies position X2, Y2, Z2, T1. The Ian in position 1 and the Ian in position 2 both may BELIEVE that they are the same Ian, but in fact, one has only just now spontaneously appeared (let's say in position 2). There is no subjective way either one would know which they were, but to any objective observer in possession of the facts, the duplicate would be clearly known. Plus, minute variables may have already made a difference between the time Ian(1) and Ian(2) finish watching the movie. Perhaps Ian(1) scratched his ear, while Ian(2) didn't - and one has a tiny scratch, while the other doesn't. This would demonstrate immediately the fact that these are two separate entities rather than one entity with two bodies.

This is the same sort of premise demonstrated in Total Recall. Here, we have someone who is being told he will have memories of a pleasant, adventurous vacation implanted, when in fact (it appears) instead, it turns out memories of his mundane life were implanted instead. So who is this person? The secret agent under a mind wipe, or the mundane fellow under a vacation delusion? Is he even experiencing reality, or just 'remembering' the experiences he was implanted with?

Ian, here's the real kicker - Let's say room 1 is 19 feet down the hall from room 2 and 12 feet from the hall closet, and that Ian(orig), for some reason, opted to count the distance between the hall closet where he hung his hat, and the room he was led to. Now, if, for some reason, either Ian were to return to that closet, he would instantly have the means for knowing if he were a clone or not.

Likewise, let's say that Ian had Sherlock Holmes-style powers of observation of minutae, and noticed that there was a slight dent in the TV monitor casing - which suddenly wasn't there. This would give Ian the awareness that he may, in fact, be the fake Ian.

In fact, any of a number of variations would give the duplicate the instant (depending on his mental swiftness) awareness that he was not the original. So it's hardly a paradox, nor is it absurd. It is simply reasonable.



I truly despair :cry:

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
X would have a Y personality, and would have a Z sense of self. However, X is now dead, so we have to look at X2. X2 would have a Y personality (becase this is created by the physical properties of the brain in question), but would have a Z2 sense of self. Why? Because Z, my sense of self, was destroyed when my brain was destroyed. So, the personality remains the same but the sense of self doesn't. Why? Why the personality but not the sense of self. They are both products of the brains function. Then you say "my sense of self". Who is the "my". The Materialist's version is: "X's sense of self". There is X's sense of self, Z. And there is X2's sense of self. X2's sense of self is identical to X1's sense of self. This means that X2's sense of self is Z.

Originally posted by Taffer
Z2 would appear the same to Z, because again it is a product of the functions of the brain, which are the same in X and X2, but it is not the same.No, not the same but identical in every way with absolutely no way to distinguish between them if it is set up as in II's scenario.

Originally posted by Taffer
Therefore I would take the shuttle, because there is a chance that Z will survive, and thus *I* would survive. Then *you* have swapped a 100% chance of survival for a 50% chance of survival.

regards,
BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
zaayrdragon,

Imagine a duplicator that destroys the original and creates a duplicate in the exact position of the original from a external supply of atoms and assume that this can be done 100% accurately so that the structure and function of the duplicate is identical to the original. Imagine further that no one can tell whether a duplication takes place (says its a 50% chance that it happens).
How would you interpret this scenario.

BillyJoe

Yea. And this happens anyway doesn't it? I mean all the stuff comprising our bodies gets completely replaced every 7 years or so. It's not material stuff which ensures you're the same person, but the patterns and functions.

[BillyJoe]

Hey, Taffer and zaayrdragon, will the two of you stop agreeing with each other. It's bad enough both of you being individually wrong, without the two of you teaming up to be wrong. :D

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yea. And this happens anyway doesn't it? I mean all the stuff comprising our bodies gets completely replaced every 7 years or so. It's not material stuff which ensures you're the same person, but the patterns and functions. Okay, I'll agree with you just this once. :)

[Z]

Imagine a duplicator that destroys the original and creates a duplicate in the exact position of the original from a external supply of atoms and assume that this can be done 100% accurately so that the structure and function of the duplicate is identical to the original. Imagine further that no one can tell whether a duplication takes place (says its a 50% chance that it happens). How would you interpret this scenario.

Identically - the original self is gone. However, no one would know it, except the original self.

It doesn't matter to anyone else, anywhere else, but to the original, it certainly would matter (if there was anything left to be concerned, that is). If it happened to you, you'd be dead and replaced with a perfect replica, and no one would ever know the difference. But you'd know - well, you'd know nothing, because you'd be dead. End of story.

[Z]

But, in any case, if the original dies, aren't *you* happy to continue as the duplicate (forget teh fact that you would rather be dead than stranded on Mars for the rest of yoru life)

No, because I am not my duplicate. My duplicate is a separate and distinct entity existant on Mars.

If two identical programs operate on two identical machines, are they the same program? Of course not - because at any moment, new inputs could differ, immediately changing the two programs. Likewise, self (earth) and self (mars) are two identical but separate entities, which at any moment, could receive new stimuli differentiating them.

If you turn off one machine, is it happy to continue in machine two? Or is it simply off?

This is so glaringly obvious, even Ian ought to appreciate it.

I truly despair

Nope, seems he's too dense even for that.

Ian, it's OK - you've been wrong before, We expect it from you by now. No need to despair, son.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
No, because I am not my duplicate. My duplicate is a separate and distinct entity existant on Mars.

If two identical programs operate on two identical machines, are they the same program? Of course not - because at any moment, new inputs could differ, immediately changing the two programs. Likewise, self (earth) and self (mars) are two identical but separate entities, which at any moment, could receive new stimuli differentiating them.

If you turn off one machine, is it happy to continue in machine two? Or is it simply off?

This is so glaringly obvious, even Ian ought to appreciate it.



Nope, seems he's too dense even for that.

Ian, it's OK - you've been wrong before, We expect it from you by now. No need to despair, son.

LMAO! You're wrong zaayrdragon. Still, I'm not bothered, my metaphysic doesn't create any logical conundrums.

[Z]

Of course not, Ian - because, in your metaphysic, logic has taken a holiday and is now sipping martinis on Waikiki with semantic comprehension and a cute blonde from the 18th dimension.

But, all insults aside, how am I wrong, exactly? Please, show me precisely where I'm wrong.

[Z]

When we were kids, I used to play a game called "Star Frontiers". One of the safeguards against losing your character was to submit yourself for cloning. Essentially, you were placed in deep-freeze, and a perfect copy was made that even had your memories. This copy also carried a tiny implant that, through the wonders of sci-fi technomagic, continually transmitted data about your brain-state back to central storage, to be added to your dormant body. So, in essence, your clone became an extension of you- the link was sufficient that the 'self' was practically extended into multiple beings.

Somehow, we got into discussing the philosophical standings of such a system. What if, by some error, a clone didn't die, but was merely cut off from central storage, making it believe that the clone DID die? A new clone would be produced that believed the last one had died, but the other clone would be living on, unaware of this situation. So, according to the game rules, if the two clones ever met, each would immediately try to kill the other (no reasons were offered).

Instead, we decided each was a seperate entity, and this automatically led to several ethical questions and one minor sci-fi one. The sci-tech question was simply, if the first clone was no longer 'cut off', would the original self be receiving transmissions from both clones? Would the data write inconsistantly and cause a period of perceived schizophrenia for the original and any subsequent clones? Or would the data somehow lock up the reception system, thereby cutting off both clones and causing a third to be created?

Ethically, the question invariably arose about the rights of each clone. Were they to be treated as seperate entities? As property of the original? As property of the company performing the process?

Through the course of our game, we eventually started a campaign to end this use of cloning, as we came to the conclusion that it was inherently unethical in nature.

This topic was also covered, IIRC, in Marvel Comics, when Dr. Doom operated a clone for a time, and the clone was convinced that IT was Dr. Doom - and again, when Spider-Man was apparently cloned, and the clone assumed the role of the actual Parker, while the original somehow was convinced he was the clone.

Fictional supercloning is fun, isn't it?

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Identically - the original self is gone. However, no one would know it, except the original self.

It doesn't matter to anyone else, anywhere else, but to the original, it certainly would matter (if there was anything left to be concerned, that is). If it happened to you, you'd be dead and replaced with a perfect replica, and no one would ever know the difference. But you'd know - well, you'd know nothing, because you'd be dead. End of story. Interesting interpretation. :cool:
But, of course, there is no self being produced by the original brain because the original brain is, as you say, dead. So try again. I think you will find an interpretation consistent with your previous posts very difficult to accomplish. That would tend to suggest that there is something very wrong with your view.

BillyJoe
(edit: punctuation to make it easier to read)

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon'

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This is so glaringly obvious, even Ian ought to appreciate it. I agree, it is glaringly obvious what your (with all due respect) wrongful interpretation is. The problem is that the correct interpretation is not glaringly obvious. This is why you are having trouble with it. I'm not trying to be obnoxious here. I was in your position not long ago.

regards,
BillyJoe.

[Taffer]

But, of course, there is no self being produced by the original brain because the original brain is, as you say, dead. So try again. I think you will find an interpretation consistent with your previous posts very difficult to accomplish. That would tend to suggest that there is something very wrong with your view.


No, there is nothing wrong with his view. That is the whole bloody point. He brain is dead, so there is no self being produced by the original brain. Any clone of the original brain will be a seperate entity that, by the laws of physics, is exactly the same as the original was. The self produced by the new brain is exactly the same as the original was. But it is not the self produced by the original. It is, plain and simply, a self produced by an exact copy. Although it is the same as the original, it isn't the original. Why? Because the original is dead. It can't be the original. It was killed as a part of cloning process, and it's self is no longer produced. I keep saying, follow along from the original's point of view only and you should see what I mean.

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

We're duplicating here. :D
Please see my last post in the other thread.

BillyJoe.

[Taffer]

Yeah, the same thing happened with me and zaayrdragon. Lets choose a thread and stick to it eh? I choose II's thread, as what we are discussing is more relevent over there.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Taffer
Yeah, the same thing happened with me and zaayrdragon. Lets choose a thread and stick to it eh? I choose II's thread, as what we are discussing is more relevent over there.

Yes, I choose my thread too, because it's important to me that my threads go on and on and on . . :D

[Taffer]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yes, I choose my thread too, because it's important to me that my threads go on and on and on . . :D

Deflate that swolen head! :p I chose this one for the discussion zaayrdragon and I were having.

Anyway, it's 2:30 here. Time for some bloody sleep before my morning lectures! Gah! None of my Bio lectures are this interesting! The only thing that comes close is Philosophy, and I only have 2 lectures a week :(.

Oh well, 'night Interesting Ian, BillyJoe, zaayrdragon and others.

[Correa Neto]

IIan,

The tough experiment you described is no different at all from those presented by the other posters. The results are quite similar, also. Yes, I could use less bandwidth and just say I agree with you, but I preffer to use those two sentences above:p

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
..snip...I honestly don't think there is anyway around this paradox apart from suggesting my own solution, namely that after duplication and before an Ian gets destroyed, in other words whilst there exist 2 Ians', I will simultaneously experience out of both of Ian's bodies. Otherwise materialism just generates an incoherency.

Here's where I, and AFAIK most other posters around disagree. There is no paradox at all! At least not this particular one.

There are two IIan selves after duplication, at different XYZ coordinates. Both IIan selves are identical and produced by interactions between your brain, the hormones produced by your body and what's stored in your brain. They will start to differentiate at the moment they start to have different experiences. Still, both have the right to claim being IIan and both are.

And yes, you can claim that you will experience simultaneously what both IIans will experience, but just because both are IIans. But, if the IIan located at coordinates X1Y1Z1 drinks a beer, at time t=10, the IIan located at X2Y2Z2 can not possibly feel the taste unless get drinks it by himself! there is no communication between both IIan's neural systems. The only possible way would be to somehow link their brains and transmitt impulses from one to the other.

If your claim were true, during the cloned frongs experiment I proposed on the other thread, frog copy A would feel when frog B is stimulated. Note also that forms of cloning happens in nature, and we would have already detected such effects!

[Rolfe]

I've been interested in SF treatments of the duplicated hero, because fiction is a good way of dramatising the possibilities. A lot of it is in Star Trek related stuff.

The first one I know about is in Classic ST, Where Kirk is duplicated by the transporter - but the selves are not identical, there is good-but-weak Kirk and a raving monster that is his strong side. Of course the good-but-weak version is treated as the "real" Kirk, who just has to get back with the raving monster to get his personality back together. Then in the first ST spin-off novel by James Blish, Spock must Die!, the same sort of thing happens to Spock. This time the evil duplicate is better at dissembling, but there's still no doubt which one is the original - apart from anything else the duplicate is a mirror-image.

Then there were two novels, The Price of the Phoenix and The Fate of the Phoenix where the whole idea that the transporter can create duplicate people was explored very thoroughly, to the point of political destabilisation if planetary leaders are duplicated. This time we did have two identical individuals, not an "evil twin". And only one job, one pension plan and so on.... But due to a convenient plot token, it was still possible to view one as the original and one as the duplicate, and Kirk being such a noble sort of guy (excuse me while I puke), the one who wasn't the original volunteered to have a new life carved out for him.

TNG did a better one where Riker was genuinely duplicated, but then the duplicate was accidentally abandoned on the planet for ten years and when he was rediscovered things had moved on so far that they weren't really identical and it wasn't too hard to find a new life for him. I still think the stranded one was remarkably ready to give up his name though - if that had been me, that's the last think I'd have wanted to lose.

Better was the teleporter accident near the end of one of the radio episodes of Blake's Seven where Avon both teleports down to join one group of the cast on the planet, and stays behind with the other lot. This was more daring, in that there was no way to call one the original and one a copy - in fact it was a little while before anyone realised that there were two of him. Interesting. But this was Avon, and both of them were armed. Which one survived? Who cares.

Farscape had the interesting one, but even they copped out a bit. First two of the cast were duplicated and one copy quickly killed, allowing for interesting drama when the bodies were found. Then Crighton was duplicated and both survived. Identical. Aeryn made one of them wear a jacket to distinguish him. Why me? There was fascination, wariness, and some hostility (there was only one of Aeryn after all). I loved the obsessive playing of "scissors, paper, stone" where at first the two of him always chose the same one, then gradually they started to drift apart. Some good plot mileage was made of this, including one of the pair being able to pass a (non-woo-woo) lie detector test that the other would have failed, and the psychology was cooking up nicely, including a rather reluctant blood transfusion. Then the plot split, with one of him going off in the Farscape equivalent of Starbug, and the other staying on Mora. I was really looking forward to the two meeting again. But they killed the one that was with Aeryn, giving a good opportunity for some genuine emotional manipulation by killing the hero while not killing the hero, and the remaining Crighton's ambivalence when reunited with the now-pregnant Aeryn. So again, not really followed through. And in that scenario, Crighton didn't really have a life of his own (apart from Aeryn) anyway, so there wasn't quite the same potential for conflict.

I'm still waiting for a really good fictional treatment of this one.

Rolfe.

[Anders]

The teleportation question is truly intriging. I, personally, have been struggeling with it, on and off, for quite some time.

Will it be the same personality that arrives on Mars or someone else?

First I was thinking that one personlity is unique and is bound to one (1) body and brain. That was my thinking a few years ago.

However, the brain works like any other part of the body or any other tissue, mayby a bit more complicated, but an phosphate atom is still an phosphate atom whether it is in the brain or in the blood cells. (phosphate is a major ingreedient in ATP, the major energy carrier in the cell). So, we have no soul, period. Which means that taking apart all atoms in our body, and putting them together at another place would not in any way effect me or my personality.

Well, the main issue is that we have no soul, if we had, teleportation would be disasterous.

Thats my 2 cents, or what you call it, on this issue.

[rppa]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Bearing this in mind I cannot ascribe anymore probability than I am the original than the duplicate, and the same reasoning will be gone through by the other Ian. So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.

So what's the paradox? Neither the original nor the duplicate has all the data available, so they don't know which is which. Nevertheless, there was never any question at any time in your experiment which one was original and which was duplicate. Just because the Ian's don't know, that doesn't affect the actual situation.

Your "paradox" is no more a paradox than this: you and I are sitting in chairs. We are told that a coin will be flipped to determine which of us will be killed at the end of the experiment. So we each conclude there is a 50/50 chance of survival. A few minutes later, the experimenter points to one of us and says "sorry, you lose". No coin flip. What we didn't know is that the choice was made when we sat down, as the back of one of the chairs has a big sign on it that says "shoot this one".

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by rppa
So what's the paradox? Neither the original nor the duplicate has all the data available, so they don't know which is which. Nevertheless, there was never any question at any time in your experiment which one was original and which was duplicate. Just because the Ian's don't know, that doesn't affect the actual situation.

Your "paradox" is no more a paradox than this: you and I are sitting in chairs. We are told that a coin will be flipped to determine which of us will be killed at the end of the experiment. So we each conclude there is a 50/50 chance of survival. A few minutes later, the experimenter points to one of us and says "sorry, you lose". No coin flip. What we didn't know is that the choice was made when we sat down, as the back of one of the chairs has a big sign on it that says "shoot this one".

Well, I've spelt out the paradox. If you and others don't understand what I'm talking about then I guess there's nothing further I can add.

[Eleatic Stranger]

Instead, we decided each was a seperate entity, and this automatically led to several ethical questions and one minor sci-fi one. The sci-tech question was simply, if the first clone was no longer 'cut off', would the original self be receiving transmissions from both clones? Would the data write inconsistantly and cause a period of perceived schizophrenia for the original and any subsequent clones? Or would the data somehow lock up the reception system, thereby cutting off both clones and causing a third to be created?

Avignon residency - The Game!

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Anders
First I was thinking that one personlity is unique and is bound to one (1) body and brain. That was my thinking a few years ago.Coincidentally, so did I.

Originally posted by Anders
However, the brain works like any other part of the body or any other tissue, mayby a bit more complicated, but an phosphate atom is still an phosphate atom.....Which means that taking apart all atoms in our body, and putting them together at another place would not in any way effect me or my personality. Then you must be a Materialist. :)

BJ

[Correa Neto]

As I wrote before...

IIan, yes, you can claim that you will experience simultaneously what both IIans will experience, but just because both are IIans.

But, if the IIan located at coordinates X1Y1Z1 drinks a beer, at time t=10, the IIan located at X2Y2Z2 can not possibly feel the taste unless he drinks it by himself! There is no communication between both IIan's neural systems. The only possible way would be to somehow link their brains and transmitt impulses from one to the other with the propper encoding and decoding.

Or you disagree with that?

If you agree, there is no paradox at all. If not, please provide an explanation of why.

Actually IIan's non-materialistic positions have other faults that were somehow exposed or delineated in these two threads..

He said he belives the copy machine would most likely create a lifeless corpse, since there would be no self, soul -call it whatever you want- animating the body.

OK, no paradox here, since still a single self exist. But then, using the machine from the "Staying Alive" is suicide.

And the non-materilialistic view causes a lot of questions and problems, much more than the materialistic IMHO.

All real-life cloning (artificial and natural) experiments would produce just soul less corpses... Assuming the self is at least in part, composed by what could be called a soul, that is somehow incorporated during the formation of a body, then

(i) When and how does body and soul join?
(ii) Why cloning produces healthy frogs, cows and sheep while just human corpses?
(iii) Why do you think artificial insemination and in-vitro fertilization work, creating humans with souls while the cloning of humans and the ficticious copying machine should not not?

Not to mention that non-materialists complicate the problem of the origin of the self. In materialism, the self is created and maintained by the body, mess with the body and you mess with the self. The non-materialists just move the problems away from their sight. What creates the souls? Why messing with the brain messes the self? Why can't we measure some properties of a soul with some sort of device?

Non-materialism in all color and shapes AFAIK fail to provide answers to that. Just complicated constructs and not a single pratical answer. Actually I would say usefull answer. But I concede this can be disputed.

Rolfe,

Yes, he should have fought more for his ID... Anyway, that was not the plot... Even tough a nice script about a legal battle over who really has the right to own the identity could be created follwiing this line. However, I liked the episode (and the follow-ups) because he was not a twisted version of the original Riker, and because the episode did not ended with the usual fight between the versions. It was the same person having to face with other challenges and situations.

Never been too much of a fan of Farscape, so I can't comment on that...

[chance]

I have never thought about teleportation like that before i.e. destroying the body to copy it, then reconstructing from scratch at the other end. That being the case are you committing suicide by stepping into the machine? Are the technicians guilty of aiding your suicide, because what is constructed at the other end is not the original you, but a perfect copy. Interesting Ian Materialists have to accept there could be 2 selves and thereby have to face the logical conundrums thereby created. Yes they would, there being no objection to send the pattern of you to various receivers and make multiple copies, interesting quandary. What if there is a delay and you are temporality stored in a computer buffer, it that computer ‘legally’ you?

I suppose it boils down to what you consider is the self, are we a collection of memories and abilities contained in a watery meat bag? Or is there some requirement to be kept whole?

[asthmatic camel]

I know I'm going to get slammed for saying this but I just can't help myself. It would be entirely possible to build a spaceship capable of carrying people to Mars. So far as I'm aware, no-one has any idea how a "teleporter" might be built.

So why on earth are you all discussing this ? Make a choice between the possible and the extremely improbable ? What for ?

Oh well, I'll bow out and allow you all to continue dreaming. :D

[chance]

asthmatic camel know I'm going to get slammed for saying this but I just can't help myself. It would be entirely possible to build a spaceship capable of carrying people to Mars. So far as I'm aware, no-one has any idea how a "teleporter" might be built.

So why on earth are you all discussing this ? Make a choice between the possible and the extremely improbable ? What for ? Thought experiments are fun, interesting Ian question is really making you examine what you think of your self as, the soundness behind teleportation is irrelevant.

[The Cats Venm]

What a fascinating discussion. It's rare on this board to see an honest discussion and not an argument.


My two cents:

In regards to the quiz, I chose spaceship, silicon, freezing.

Now on the question of sense of self, the way I see it is that the self only continues as long as there is a 'charge' in the brain (like RAM). In the teletransporter example, the clone on mars my feel like me, but will not be the original me. It will be a brand new self that started the moment when it was created. The real me, with my sense of self that I had been running since I was born, has died and it's self has ended.

The reason I have no problem with the silicon brain choice is that I looked at it no differently that the natural replacement of cells in the body. If it's done slowly, and the 'charge' never goes out, I am still the same self.

The soul question was a no-brainer as I don't believe in a soul and it was useless as phrased in the question anyway (I think that the only real failing of the quiz was the ambiguous objective of survival, it was only in the last question where the specified 'sense of self' when they should have said that up front).


Here's something that came to mind when reading this thread:
When someone has surgery or an accident, has all brain activity stop thus being 'dead', then is revived again, do they share the same sense of self? I would have to say no as their 'charge' had been ended, they are no different to an exact clone (memories and all) created by the teletransporter.

Keep in mind that the self is different to memory. A new self with old memories would feel as if it had existed all along, but it clearly hadn't. In fact, any one of us could never really know when our self began, only that it had not ended.

[Soapy Sam]

Does the spaceship have windows?

If so I choose the spaceship.

Otherwise I'll go by teleport, do the job and sightsee on Mars.

No point in travel if you can't look out the window.

I find the rest of the debate rather pointless. If Your soul can survive A BA flight to Sydney, it can survive anything. And at least they can teleport a decent cup of cofffee through with you.

[Taffer]

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
What a fascinating discussion. It's rare on this board to see an honest discussion and not an argument.

Indeed :)


My two cents:

In regards to the quiz, I chose spaceship, silicon, freezing.

Now on the question of sense of self, the way I see it is that the self only continues as long as there is a 'charge' in the brain (like RAM). In the teletransporter example, the clone on mars my feel like me, but will not be the original me. It will be a brand new self that started the moment when it was created. The real me, with my sense of self that I had been running since I was born, has died and it's self has ended.

I agree with this viewpoint, and so does (I believe) zaayrdragon. And some others too, I'm sure. Makes sense to me ;).


The reason I have no problem with the silicon brain choice is that I looked at it no differently that the natural replacement of cells in the body. If it's done slowly, and the 'charge' never goes out, I am still the same self.

That's the discussion zaayrdragon and I were having. The way the question was worded, to me, seemed like it wasn't done slowly but rather fast. If it had said something like "it is done slowly enough to not disrupt the brain patterns at all" I'd have agreed to it in a heart beat. The problem with question 2 is how you interpret it.


The soul question was a no-brainer as I don't believe in a soul and it was useless as phrased in the question anyway (I think that the only real failing of the quiz was the ambiguous objective of survival, it was only in the last question where the specified 'sense of self' when they should have said that up front).

Agreed.


Here's something that came to mind when reading this thread:
When someone has surgery or an accident, has all brain activity stop thus being 'dead', then is revived again, do they share the same sense of self? I would have to say no as their 'charge' had been ended, they are no different to an exact clone (memories and all) created by the teletransporter.

I was thinking this very thing last night. I'd have to say that in most cases, the brain functions have not stopped completely. I'd say in almost all cases this is true, actually (I'm basing this on no medical knowledge whatsoever by the way), so the answer would be "yes, it's the same 'self'". I'm not sure about braindead people though (although I'm pretty sure they don't come back to 'life'.


Keep in mind that the self is different to memory. A new self with old memories would feel as if it had existed all along, but it clearly hadn't. In fact, any one of us could never really know when our self began, only that it had not ended.

Here's a spooky thought. The clone would not be able to know it is a clone. What if you are a clone, right now? You wouldn't know it, would you? You'd have the same memories as the original. As you believe you have lived your life at the moment, it could in fact be that you were created in some lab yesterday....there is know way to know

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Soapy Sam


I find the rest of the debate rather pointless. If Your soul can survive A BA flight to Sydney, it can survive anything. And at least they can teleport a decent cup of cofffee through with you. [/B]

The debate is not pointless. It exposes our assumptions about the self. It gets us to think.

And this cannot be more important. What is more important than knowing what we are? Whether materialism is correct, or we are a soul?

I cannot understand people who just live their lives and never ever think to themselves about anything, about what they ultimately are, where they are going, the meaning or purpose to it all. Our lives should involve more than bare living.

[BillyJoe]

Cat,

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
In the teletransporter example, the clone on mars my feel like me, but will not be the original me. It will be a brand new self that started the moment when it was created. The real me, with my sense of self that I had been running since I was born, has died and it's self has ended. Scan this phrase carefully and see if you can't spot the dualist language: "my sense of self".
YOU do not have a sense of self. YOU are the sense of self. There is no soul/spirit/essence in the brain that has a self. This is the error in your thinking. Can you see that?

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
The reason I have no problem with the silicon brain choice is that I looked at it no differently that the natural replacement of cells in the body. If it's done slowly, and the 'charge' never goes out, I am still the same self. Why does it have to be done slowly? I don't understand this. And how slowly. Is one year or one day slow enough? What about one hour? One minute? A second?
You see, it doesn't make sense. The time course is irrelevant.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
Here's something that came to mind when reading this thread:
When someone has surgery or an accident, has all brain activity stop thus being 'dead', then is revived again, do they share the same sense of self? I would have to say no as their 'charge' had been ended, they are no different to an exact clone (memories and all) created by the teletransporter. Forget anaesthesia. Every night you go to sleep. After six hours or so you wake up again. There has been a clear temporal discontinuity in the self. But this has not affected the self. In other words, the self can survive both a temporal (and a spacial) discontinuity.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
A new self with old memories would feel as if it had existed all along, but it clearly hadn't. In fact, any one of us could never really know when our self began, only that it had not ended. Can you see how your second sentence contradicts your first sentence? Think about this a bit. The fact that you have even written that second sentence suggests that the begginnings to the solution of the problem of identity for materialism could be within you. :)
(Just get rid of that dualist language though ;) )

regards,
BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
In reference to your scenario....



quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Now if we imagine a case where the original person is not destroyed and simply get duplicated, we will then have 2 streams of consciousnesses. Let's imagine that someone offers me £10,000,000 if I agree to be duplicated with the duplicate being killed after about an hour after duplication. And let's for the sake of argumentation ignore the ethical implications. Now this might seem like a good deal to me. After all, how could I lose out? A duplicate is created, lives for an hour, and then is destroyed. So after the duplicate is destroyed is exactly the same as before the duplicate was created, except I'm £10,000,000 richer!

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The following statement doesn't ring true for me.....


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You are looking at this from the Materialist perspective, right?
Okay. So who is the "I" in the above sentence? From the materialist perspective there are two *I*s. The *I* in the original and the *I* in the duplicate. The *I* in the original will get the money 100%. The *I* in the duplicate will be killed in one hour 100%. There is no 50%. One gets the money and the other dies.

But I may be misunderstanding your use of "I" in the quote.



I'm talking about the "*I*" prior to duplication. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that I only have 50% chance of surviving. There's an incoherency here.

Therefore materialism is refuted.

[The Cats Venm]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Scan this phrase carefully and see if you can't spot the dualist language: "my sense of self".
YOU do not have a sense of self. YOU are the sense of self. There is no soul/spirit/essence in the brain that has a self. This is the error in your thinking. Can you see that?

Maybe I'm a dualist then. I don't know. I don't claim to be anything. I'm not saying that there is a soul/spirit/essence in the brain.

We are the sense of self, fine, but if I end, and then am started again, is still me? Do you understand what I'm saying? The reason I use the term ‘sense of self’ is in an attempt to be more clear. Saying that I’m the same me but not the same me, doesn’t really explain anything.


Why does it have to be done slowly? I don't understand this. And how slowly. Is one year or one day slow enough? What about one hour? One minute? A second?
You see, it doesn't make sense. The time course is irrelevant.

Did you understand what I meant by a 'charge'?

Do dead people have feelings? I would guess no, because there is no activity in their brains. This activity is what generates the sense of self (‘you’ are the activity in your brain). If it stops, that particular instance of the self ceases to exist, and a new sense of self is generated when activity begins again.

It has to be done slowly enough that the brains activity never stops.


Forget anaesthesia. Every night you go to sleep. After six hours or so you wake up again. There has been a clear temporal discontinuity in the self. But this has not affected the self. In other words, the self can survive both a temporal (and a spatial) discontinuity.

You don't die when you go to sleep.

The gap is in your memory not your 'self'.


Can you see how your second sentence contradicts your first sentence? Think about this a bit. The fact that you have even written that second sentence suggests that the beginnings to the solution of the problem of identity for materialism could be within you. :)
(Just get rid of that dualist language though ;) )

No, I don't see how the two contradict each other. Could you explain?

I'm no expert, so I use the words that seem best to me. Maybe you are interpreting me wrong because the words I used have particular connotation to you?

[The Cats Venm]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I'm talking about the "*I*" prior to duplication. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that I only have 50% chance of surviving. There's an incoherency here.

Therefore materialism is refuted.

The original *I* has an 100% chance of survival (provided the testers weren't lieing).

The duplicate mearly uses the original as a pattern. It is not the original in any way, simply similar (identical) in appearance and composition.

The duplicate has an 100% chance of being killed (unless he fights back), and will feel quite ripped off because he has the same memories as the original.

It is a perfectly safe situation for the original. It is your example that is flawed. The original you, the you prior to duplication, would not suddenly find men coming in, telling him that he's the duplicate and will be killed.

Therefore Ian is refuted.

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
[b]...snip...I cannot understand people who just live their lives and never ever think to themselves about anything, about what they ultimately are, where they are going, the meaning or purpose to it all. Our lives should involve more than bare living.

Because thinking hurts...

Most people do not really want to think (in terms of challenging and testing) about such issues, since it potentially can alter the way they see things. And not necessaryly providing a cozy confortable view of the world. That's why they rely on religion (among other things). They let someone else do the brain job and guide them as sheep.

But, in the end I think there's no purpose at all.

Taffer, regarding yout post-

Originally posted by Taffer

...snip...
I was thinking this very thing last night. I'd have to say that in most cases, the brain functions have not stopped completely. I'd say in almost all cases this is true, actually (I'm basing this on no medical knowledge whatsoever by the way), so the answer would be "yes, it's the same 'self'". I'm not sure about braindead people though (although I'm pretty sure they don't come back to 'life'.
...snip...

Assuming that the self is created by -and dependent from- our body and the data stored within our brain, I think if all electric activity on a brain is terminated at say, T=10, and kept with no residual charge untill T=15, and then its is started again (say by a Dr. Frankenstein-like machine), the result would be a brand new self (provided no brain damage happened and that the data stored within it has not been erased by the lack of electric impulses), nearly identical to the original (since the original one ceased to exist at T=10 and the new one came in to existence only at T=5). But this new self could claim its identity, since it would also be "the original person". Yes, this raises some questions, since certain medical procedures could theoretically be defined as murder.

I think that there is no loss of continuity (or perhaps it would be better to write "a perception of continuity loss by an external observer") because our body gradually and slowly changes the material its made of . Also, regardless of the change, I think that as long as there is still some electrical activity on the brain (how much I don't know, ask to a neurologist), there is also no (perceived) loss of continuity in the self.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I'm talking about the "*I*" prior to duplication. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that I only have 50% chance of surviving. There's an incoherency here.

Therefore materialism is refuted.

No. Yes, you died but you survived, and yes again, you had 50% of being killed. As above you experienced both, but just because there were two selves that could claim to be IIan.

And using BillyJoe's words,
Originally posted by BillyJoe
YOU do not have a sense of self. YOU are the sense of self.

To which I will add
And the self is created by interactions between the body and the data stored within the brain. Two identical independent bodies with the same stored data will generate two independent and identical selves.

At and after a given time (say, T=killing) IIand at XYZ is dead, while IIan at X1Y1Z1 is alive. Between the time of duplication and before the killing time, there are two identical bodies, each one with identical brains tha contain the same data. Both can claim to be -and are- you. But IIan at X1Y1Z1 will not feel any physical stimulae applied just to IIan located at XYZ.

Materilaism is not refuted.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
The original *I* has an 100% chance of survival (provided the testers weren't lieing).

The duplicate mearly uses the original as a pattern. It is not the original in any way, simply similar (identical) in appearance and composition.



OK, I've agreed to get duplicated for £10,000,000. An easy £10,000,000 right? This is because all I have to do is stay in this room and I won't even notice when I get duplicated, and I will never see my duplicate before he gets executed anyway.

Now let's modify the original thought experiment so that the duplicate gets created in a room looking different from the room where I am (ie the original).

Now, as part of my ongoing experiences, is it not possible, at the precise moment that duplication takes place, that I will experience a sudden change in perspective and find that I am now my duplicate?? Oh no! :eek: Do you see the problem I'm having here?? How can I be certain that my stream of consciousness will not suddenly jump into the other body at the moment of duplication??

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
OK, I've agreed to get duplicated for £10,000,000. An easy £10,000,000 right? This is because all I have to do is stay in this room and I won't even notice when I get duplicated, and I will never see my duplicate before he gets executed anyway.

Now let's modify the original thought experiment so that the duplicate gets created in a room looking different from the room where I am (ie the original).

Now, as part of my ongoing experiences, is it not possible, at the precise moment that duplication takes place, that I will experience a sudden change in perspective and find that I am now my duplicate?? Oh no! :eek: Do you see the problem I'm having here?? How can I be certain that my stream of consciousness will not suddenly jump into the other body at the moment of duplication??

You can be 100% certain.
Your stream of consiousness is generated by your body. Your copy will have his stream of consiousness by his body. And since you both are different physical entities and there's nothing linking you both, transmitting data from one to the other, there will be no jump.

If you were blinfolded, copied without notice of what's going and the copy created also blinfolded in front of you, and assuming the costruction process is not felt by the template and the copy, taking the bandages simultanously would create just a big surprise on you both. After this feeling is gone, you'll experience what twin brothers experience when looking at each other. No consiousness jumps, no feelings/sensations/experiences transfers.

[The Cats Venm]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
OK, I've agreed to get duplicated for £10,000,000. An easy £10,000,000 right? This is because all I have to do is stay in this room and I won't even notice when I get duplicated, and I will never see my duplicate before he gets executed anyway.

Now let's modify the original thought experiment so that the duplicate gets created in a room looking different from the room where I am (ie the original).

Now, as part of my ongoing experiences, is it not possible, at the precise moment that duplication takes place, that I will experience a sudden change in perspective and find that I am now my duplicate?? Oh no! :eek: Do you see the problem I'm having here?? How can I be certain that my stream of consciousness will not suddenly jump into the other body at the moment of duplication??

It all depends on how the duplication is done.

I was assuming it would be done like in the teletransporter example in your link. Because mearly your pattern is being examined and a second 'you' built elsewhere, there is absolutely no chance of your stream of consciousness switching. There would simply be another created (and then destroyed).

Now if the duplication was done by taking, say, 50% of your original material and adding 50% new material to each 'you', then I'm not sure what would happen. I would think that there would be no way to do that without stopping the activity in your brain, so the original 'you' would cease to be and two new 'you's' would be created. Neither of these people would be original, and the people doing the test would have been lieing when they said that they would kill the duplicate. Since they could't determine a duplicate, it would not be fair to kill either Ian, they both have equal claim.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Correa Neto
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
OK, I've agreed to get duplicated for £10,000,000. An easy £10,000,000 right? This is because all I have to do is stay in this room and I won't even notice when I get duplicated, and I will never see my duplicate before he gets executed anyway.

Now let's modify the original thought experiment so that the duplicate gets created in a room looking different from the room where I am (ie the original).

Now, as part of my ongoing experiences, is it not possible, at the precise moment that duplication takes place, that I will experience a sudden change in perspective and find that I am now my duplicate?? Oh no! Do you see the problem I'm having here?? How can I be certain that my stream of consciousness will not suddenly jump into the other body at the moment of duplication??
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



You can be 100% certain.
Your stream of consiousness is generated by your body. Your copy will have his stream of consiousness by his body. And since you both are different physical entities and there's nothing linking you both, transmitting data from one to the other, there will be no jump.

You're coming from the position that in a teletransporter where your body is destroyed and a replica gets created at the destination point, that you will have literally have been killed to be replaced by someone who behaves exactly like you and has your memories.

But this is a blatant denial of materialism!

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You're coming from the position that in a teletransporter where your body is destroyed and a replica gets created at the destination point, that you will have literally have been killed to be replaced by someone who behaves exactly like you and has your memories.

But this is a blatant denial of materialism!

No.

The self is created by interactions between the brain, body and data stored in the brain. Duplicate all of this and you will make a new self, independent from the original. No souls, no consiousness jump.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Eleatic Stranger
Avignon residency - The Game!
You know ES, if you dumb it down a little, we could all play.

You seem like you're going for the Dennis Miller award with these obscure references.

I had to look it up and realized that I couldn't have possibly known about this because I was raised Catholic.
<blockquote>The French King, Philip the Fair (1285-1314) was determined to gain control of the papacy. Philip forced pope Clement V (in office 1305-1314) to move the papal curia from Rome to the French city of Avignon. This period became known as the Avignon residency or, more colorfully, the Babylonian captivity.

The Avignon residency was to continue until 1378 under six more popes: John XXII (in office 1316-1334), Benedict XII (1334-1342), Clement VI (1342-1352), Innocent VI (1352-1362), Urban V (1362-1370), and Gregory XI (1370-1378).

When Pope Gregory XI returned to Rome in 1377, he reestablished the papal curia in that city. His untimely death in 1378 led to the election of two popes, pope Urban VI (in office 1378-1389) and the antipope Clement VII (in office 1378-1394), Clement took up residency in Avignon, while Urban stayed in Rome. For a period of forty years the Catholic Church had two popes. This period is widely referred to as the "Great Schism". </blockquote>Not exactly Earth and Mars - but it was a long time ago.

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that I only have 50% chance of surviving. There's an incoherency here. I don't see that. The self that is produced in the brain of the original has 100% chance of survival.

[BillyJoe]

Cat,

I am having difficulty answering your post. I think you are right, there is probably an interpretation problem. Anyway I will try...

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
Maybe I'm a dualist then. I don't know. I don't claim to be anything. I'm not saying that there is a soul/spirit/essence in the brain. Well, a dualist does believe in a soul/spirit/essence. It is actually difficult to discus the problem of identity without inadvertantly using Dualist language. You may not believe in a soul/spirit/essence, but sometimes the language you use to describe identity in materialist terms shows that you have not really let go of a soul/spirit/essence. Which, of course, means you don't really succeed.
(When I say "you" above, I mean it generally. I'm not speaking about you in particular)

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
We are the sense of self, fine, but if I end, and then am started again, is still me? Do you understand what I'm saying? Well, to answer this you need to think about the duplicator scenario where OriginalCat is vapourized. Are you happy to say that the self produced in the brain of DuplicateCat is sufficient for *Cat*s survival. Remember, the self does not have to be spacially or temporally continuous.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
Did you understand what I meant by a 'charge'?.....Do dead people have feelings? I would guess no, because there is no activity in their brains. This activity is what generates the sense of self (‘you’ are the activity in your brain). If it stops, that particular instance of the self ceases to exist, and a new sense of self is generated when activity begins again. Are you talking about consciousness? If so, I would agree that consciousness is necessary for a self to exist but the self requires more than just consciousness. Is that what you mean by "charge"?

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
It has to be done slowly enough that the brains activity never stops.If it is done instantly, would you agree that brain activity doesn't stop?

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
You don't die when you go to sleep. The gap is in your memory not your 'self'. The body or brain doesn't have to die for the self to cease to exist. If there is a gap in your memory from the time you went to sleep till the time you wake up, in what sense is there any self in existence during that period.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
No, I don't see how the two contradict each other. Could you explain? You wrote....

"A new self with old memories would feel as if it had existed all along, but it clearly hadn't. In fact, any one of us could never really know when our self began, only that it had not ended. "

In the first sentence you are saying that the self (produced in the brain) of the duplicate can't be said to have existed before the duplication solely by virtue of the fact that it has the same memories as the self (produced in the brain) of the original. Which is my opponents view. In the second sentence you say that the self cannot know when it began implying that there is, from the self's point of view, no difference between the self in the original and the self in the duplicate. Which is my view.
The only problem was your phrase "when our self began". You have to remember, unless tou do believe in a soul/spirit/essence, that that you must say either "when the self began" or "when *we* began". When you say our self you are implying that there is something/someone who has a self. If you are implying that, you are implying the exsitence of a soul/spirit/essence. Can you see that?

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
I'm no expert, so I use the words that seem best to me. Maybe you are interpreting me wrong because the words I used have particular connotation to you? But the problem is, if you explain the problem of identity using langauge that implies the existence of a soul/spirit/essence, then you cannot claim to be someone who doesn't believe in a soul/spirit/essence.

regards,
BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Cat,

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
The original *I* has an 100% chance of survival...I agree.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
The duplicate mearly uses the original as a pattern. It is not the original in any way, simply similar (identical) in appearance and composition. Are you talking about the duplicate's body ("appearance") here or the *I* of the duplicate? I will assume you mean the *I*. I agree with you that there are two *I*s. But, unless you really do believe in a soul/spirit/essence, the is no sense in which YOU can be either, because, in this sense, YOU do not exist (ie YOU = soul/spirit/essence). There are simply two identical (but not the same) *I*s.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
The duplicate has an 100% chance of being killed....and will feel quite ripped off because he has the same memories as the original. Well, not only identical memories, the whole pattern of neural activity is identical. But, yes, this *I* has 100% chance of being killed

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
It is a perfectly safe situation for the original. It is your example that is flawed. The original you, the you prior to duplication, would not suddenly find men coming in, telling him that he's the duplicate and will be killed. I agree with this. Except it is not the example that is flawed but Ian's interpretation of it.

regards,
BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Correa Neto,

Concerning continuity....

Originally posted by Correa Neto
Assuming that the self is created by -and dependent from- our body and the data stored within our brain, I think if all electric activity on a brain is terminated at say, T=10, and kept with no residual charge untill T=15, and then its is started again (say by a Dr. Frankenstein-like machine), the result would be a brand new self (provided no brain damage happened and that the data stored within it has not been erased by the lack of electric impulses), nearly identical to the original (since the original one ceased to exist at T=10 and the new one came in to existence only at T=5). But this new self could claim its identity, since it would also be "the original person". Yes, this raises some questions, since certain medical procedures could theoretically be defined as murder.

I think that there is no loss of continuity (or perhaps it would be better to write "a perception of continuity loss by an external observer") because our body gradually and slowly changes the material its made of . Also, regardless of the change, I think that as long as there is still some electrical activity on the brain (how much I don't know, ask to a neurologist), there is also no (perceived) loss of continuity in the self. The self does not need continuity in either time or space. The folowing example illustrates both:
I am knocked unconscious and taken to a hospital wher I regain consciousness. During the priod of unconsciousness, there is no self. I you think there is, you will need to explain how. The self surely requires that there be consciousness. If I am right, and surely I am, then the self does not require temporal or spacial continuity.

BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Originally posted by The Cats Venm
It is a perfectly safe situation for the original. It is your example that is flawed. The original you, the you prior to duplication, would not suddenly find men coming in, telling him that he's the duplicate and will be killed.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Billy
I agree with this. Except it is not the example that is flawed but Ian's interpretation of it.



Then let's suppose that the duplicate gets given the £10,000,000 and the original gets executed. Would you still be delighted to agree to this?

[BillyJoe]

Correa Neto,

Originally posted by Correa Neto
You can be 100% certain.
Your stream of consiousness is generated by your body. Your copy will have his stream of consiousness by his body. And since you both are different physical entities and there's nothing linking you both, transmitting data from one to the other, there will be no jump.

If you were blinfolded, copied without notice of what's going and the copy created also blinfolded in front of you, and assuming the costruction process is not felt by the template and the copy, taking the bandages simultanously would create just a big surprise on you both. After this feeling is gone, you'll experience what twin brothers experience when looking at each other. No consiousness jumps, no feelings/sensations/experiences transfers. Actually the self does not even require a stream of consciousness. Or, in other words, the self does not require continuity of pattern. How do we know? Because it happens all the time before and after sleep. It is extremely unlikely that the pattern of neural activity after waking is the same as the pattern of neural activity on going to sleep. And, since the self requires consciousness and there is no consciousness during sleep, the self does not exist during sleep. Therefore the self does not require continuity of pattern.
(If you think I'm exaggerating that there is no consciousness during sleep, then think instead about the situation before and after a period of coma)

So the self is starting to look quite a different beast from what we first might have imagined......

The self can be discontinuous in time space and pattern.

BillyJoe.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Correa Neto
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You're coming from the position that in a teletransporter where your body is destroyed and a replica gets created at the destination point, that you will have literally have been killed to be replaced by someone who behaves exactly like you and has your memories.

But this is a blatant denial of materialism!
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Correo
No.



Yes



The self is created by interactions between the brain, body and data stored in the brain. Duplicate all of this and you will make a new self, independent from the original. No souls, no consiousness jump.

It's not a new self.

Materialism holds that only structure and function determines self. Same structure and function, then same self. Thus 2 identical brains will be the same self. If the structure and function is not sufficient to determine the self, then something extra apart from structure and function is required. This, by definition of materialism, contradicts materialism.

[Correa Neto]

I don't think the self really has continuity. Actually I think (or perhaps better write belive, since I have no solid evidence for this) thjat the continuity is an illusion.

In the tought experiment where brain activity ended but there was no (serious?) damage to the stored data, between T=10 and T=15 there is no self. A "new"one will be produced once the body is "reactivated" (for the lack of a better word).

There is no continuity for an external observer, but the "new" self experiences a discontinuity (with no data, just a blank between T=10 and T=15) from his point of view.

We experience and illusion of continuity. We don't feel a discontinuity during the regular periodic mass renewall of the body because its gradual and (supposedly) no data is lost. probably some ammount of charge or activity is needed in the brain to create the self (again, I have no idea what is the required level). Below that level (say, knocked out while boxiing), there's no self. Restore the charge, there is one again, with illusions of continuity.

It may be a dry view, with no hope according to some, but I'm confortable with that. Anyway if I'm wrong, one day I will be pleasantly surprised after crossing a tunnel of light and then I will happily say IIan, sorry I was wrong". But I don't see this happening.

[Z]

The 'self' is continuous neural activity, not consciousness. The self remains during sleep, during a coma (assuming some level of brain activity), etc. Only when the brain shuts complete