Ian's "Staying Alive" link

[Rob Lister]

Ian the T posted a link to a quiz.

http://www.philosophers.co.uk/games/identity.htm

It was a pretty cool quiz.

The first question on the quiz went thus:

You have been chosen to go on a very important mission to Mars. You have no choice in this matter, you must go. But you can choose your means of transport.

One method is teletransportation. You will step into a scanner here on earth which will destroy your brain and body, while recording the exact states of all your cells. This information will then be transmitted to a replicator on Mars. Travelling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to reach its destination. The replicator will create, out of new matter, a brain and body exactly like yours. The person on Mars will look like you, think like you, in fact be indistinguishable from you. He or she will certainly feel as though they have merely fallen asleep on Earth and then woken up on Mars. This method is 100 per cent reliable.

The other choice is to go by spaceship. This is very risky and there is 50 per cent chance that the ship will not complete the journey and you will die in transit. But if you do successfully take the spaceship, then your body and brain won't at any stage have been destroyed.

You must make the choice which you think will give your self the biggest chance of surviving. Click one of the two options below:

I chose to be teleported because if the difference between the old-me on earth and the new-me on Mars is "indistinguishable", then the new me is the old me.

In effect, I chose a 100% chance of being dead for three minutes over a 50% chance of being dead forever.

Does my logic fail?

I think Einstein would back me up on this one if he hadn't gone and got himself dead.

[Benguin]

I concur, captain.

Is their some daft trick in the question about one's soul being unresurrected?

[Rolfe]

Originally posted by Rob Lister
I chose to be teleported because if the difference between the old-me on earth and the new-me on Mars is "indistinguishable", then the new me is the old me. I initially chose like you. But then when I got to the last question I contended that the earlier two hadn't given me sufficient information to make a choice.

Which is the gripe I started having on II's thread. Maybe more appropriate for further on this discussion. And especially 'cos I'm going to bed, and I can meditate of the consciousness of sleep as opposed to death....

Rolfe.

[Rolfe]

Originally posted by Benguin
Is their some daft trick in the question about one's soul being unresurrected? I think it's a fatal flaw in the quiz. At that point I decided that I would take the position that preserving this "soul" was the most important criterion for me. Therefore I chose not to be frozen. But it seems to me that I was therefore denied vital information in the earlier choices - no information was given about whether this "soul" would be preserved by teleportation or the bionicisation of the brain, so it was impossible to choose so as to indicate that this was the priority.

I think.

But I'm open to the suggestion that the quiz was more subtle than I realise and the bases were really all covered in a way my simple little brain hasn't yet sussed.

Rolfe.

[Rob Lister]

Originally posted by Rolfe
I think it's a fatal flaw in the quiz. At that point I decided that I would take the position that preserving this "soul" was the most important criterion for me.

The key element for me was that the way the question was worded, the soul was of no value to "me". If it has no value to me, I don't give it consideration.

[Rolfe]

Originally posted by Rob Lister
The key element for me was that the way the question was worded, the soul was of no value to "me". If it has no value to me, I don't give it consideration. Yes, but it might be of philosophical value to you. Given the discoveries that were detailed. And if it was, then what about the earlier questions?

Rolfe.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rolfe in other thread
Am I wrong in suspecting that the quiz was unfair? The concept of the soul wasn't introduced until the last question.
If I'd been told that the reconstituted me on the distant planet would have lost that soul, I'd have chosen differently.



Huh?? Think you've been watching too many horror films. :eek:

A substance dualist is likely to believe any reconstituted self would be a corpse. I, as a subjective idealist, also believe this.

However, neither the dualists nor I am obliged to believe this. What might happen is that the soul would start to operate through the reconstituted body. So if this reconstituted self would definitely be alive, then I would be happy to take the transporter. It's just that I think most probably just a corpse would be created.

What I would definitely reject is the idea that there could be 2 selves ie if we didn't kill off the original so there was 2 copies of me. Materialists have to accept there could be 2 selves and thereby have to face the logical conundrums thereby created. I don't.

[Rolfe]

Oh good! I was really worried Ian might agree with me! :D

Rolfe.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rolfe
Oh good! I was really worried Ian might agree with me! :D

Rolfe.

Relax . .relax . .that'll never happen :) I will never agree with anyone on here, otherwise my name ain't Interesting Ian!

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
...snip...What I would definitely reject is the idea that there could be 2 selves ie if we didn't kill off the original so there was 2 copies of me. Materialists have to accept there could be 2 selves and thereby have to face the logical conundrums thereby created. I don't.

Would someone be kind enough to explain to the ignorant person I am what logical conundrums this would create?

[Eleatic Stranger]

The main problem is that if there were two of you then you would no longer be identical with yourself, which is a logical contradiction. (Identity is logically defined, most commonly, as a two place predicate consisting of the same object in both places.)

However, materialism doesn't necessarily cause this problem, though the issue of personal identity is an interesting one philosophically (I took a course on this just last term, in fact). The test they give is a little simplistic, but it doesn't do too bad of a job of mapping out where one stands on the variety of accounts out there.

[Rob Lister]

Originally posted by Rolfe
Yes, but it might be of philosophical value to you. Given the discoveries that were detailed. And if it was, then what about the earlier questions?

Rolfe.

It had no goal-related value. The goal, survival, was the basis of the test. If I can't measure the survival-factor of the soul -- such as the question implied -- then even if it exists in principle, it does not exist in practice.

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Eleatic Stranger
The main problem is that if there were two of you then you would no longer be identical with yourself, which is a logical contradiction. (Identity is logically defined, most commonly, as a two place predicate consisting of the same object in both places.)

However, materialism doesn't necessarily cause this problem, though the issue of personal identity is an interesting one philosophically (I took a course on this just last term, in fact). The test they give is a little simplistic, but it doesn't do too bad of a job of mapping out where one stands on the variety of accounts out there.

I would still be identical to myself as long as both versions of me somehow are made to have exactly the same experiences.

And when one of the "mes" starts to experience different things, then it will start to be different, like these two fellows->:alc:

I still don't see the problem.:confused:

[Eleatic Stranger]

The problem is that something can only be identical to itself (usually under a different description, that being the point of the identity predicate). If there are two of you, they can't be identical to each other because they are two different objects. If you treat the splits of person-whoever as one object there are all sorts of problems - for instance, if one is at space S1 and the other is at space S2, then the statement "Person-whoever is at space S1" is both true and false simultaneously.

[Z]

What I would definitely reject is the idea that there could be 2 selves ie if we didn't kill off the original so there was 2 copies of me. Materialists have to accept there could be 2 selves and thereby have to face the logical conundrums thereby created. I don't.

Then the whole system wouldn't work, II, because there is nothing in the question that indicates any transfer of material or energy from the first You (the one that was killed) to the second You - in fact, I assume from the precise way the question was worded, that you would be destroyed at Earth by the pattern-read system, probably as a part of determining your exact pattern.

But if that were not necessary, if your pattern could be read without destroying the body, then two yous could suddenly exist, and your entire metaphysic would immediately vanish into smoke, joining God in his unreal realm of fantasies.

There are no logical conundrums for the materialist any more than there are if you were to clone yourself exactly. THe only reason you have no logical conundrums is because you reject the idea that two selves could exist. This means you also reject that the machine can do what they described.

From the test:

One method is teletransportation. You will step into a scanner here on earth which will destroy your brain and body, while recording the exact states of all your cells. This information will then be transmitted to a replicator on Mars. Travelling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to reach its destination. The replicator will create, out of new matter, a brain and body exactly like yours. The person on Mars will look like you, think like you, in fact be indistinguishable from you. He or she will certainly feel as though they have merely fallen asleep on Earth and then woken up on Mars. This method is 100 per cent reliable.

In other words: you will be killed on Earth in order to record the state of all your cells. Then, on Mars, new matter will be reorganized to perfectly resemble you, and to the new being you will be indistinguishable from the original.

Why do you seem to miss this key fact? There is no material being transmitted between the two bodies, therefore, Materialistically speaking, the creature on Mars is not YOU, only a nearly-identical version of you. (Its very awareness of the process marks a significant difference already, but I already discussed this)

Materialists MUST choose the spaceship option - it's only logical.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Relax . .relax . .that'll never happen :) I will never agree with anyone on here, otherwise my name ain't Interesting Ian!
Absolutely right, Neo.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Materialists MUST choose the spaceship option - it's only logical.
I chose the spaceship option, but for other reasons.

Question: If the material beamed over to Mars was the material from Earth, would you still be the same person, or would a new person be created out of the same material? How would it be any different than using new matter to create an identical replica?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Correa Neto
I would still be identical to myself as long as both versions of me somehow are made to have exactly the same experiences.

And when one of the "mes" starts to experience different things, then it will start to be different, like these two fellows->:alc:

I still don't see the problem.:confused:

I discussed this almost a year ago on a thread on here. Here is one thought experiment which I mentioned which illustrates the difficulty for materialism. Unfortunately I take for granted that people agree that both duplicate and original have equal right to claim that they are the originally you. Perplexingly people on here are now disagreeing with this. But for those who concede this . . .

{quote}

I think it has been broadly agreed that with a star trek teletransporter device, where the original person gets destroyed and a perfect duplicate gets created somewhere else, that the duplicate would be you in the absolute fullest sense of the word. Anyway I'm going to take for granted that this is agreed upon.

Now if we imagine a case where the original person is not destroyed and simply get duplicated, we will then have 2 streams of consciousnesses. Let's imagine that someone offers me £10,000,000 if I agree to be duplicated with the duplicate being killed after about an hour after duplication. And let's for the sake of argumentation ignore the ethical implications. Now this might seem like a good deal to me. After all, how could I lose out? A duplicate is created, lives for an hour, and then is destroyed. So after the duplicate is destroyed is exactly the same as before the duplicate was created, except I'm £10,000,000 richer! :D

So ok, I agree to it. Now let's suppose that the copying will take place in a room with a TV set. The copying will take place sometime whilst I am watching my favorite film of all time Groundhog Day, although precisely when duplication will take place is not specified. It could take place anytime during the duration of the film. Imagine also that the duplicate will suddenly appear in an absolute identical room with the same film playing which is also precisely synchronized to the other film.

It should be obvious that nothing untoward will happen at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the original obviously nothing will happen. I will be watching the film and will notice absolutely nothing at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the duplicate, again I will note nothing untoward. At the precise moment of duplication I will suddenly appear in the duplicate room, sitting exactly in the same relative position and posture, the film will be continuous with the film being shown in the other room, and my memories will be continuous with the original Ian just prior to duplication.

So ok, I'm sitting there watching the film, and I most probably will be thinking to myself "hmmmm, I wonder if I have been duplicated yet or not?". Because I have no way of knowing. Moreover, even if I have been duplicated, I have absolutely no way of telling whether I am the original or the duplicate. But now the end of the film arrives. I know that duplication must have taken place, but there is absolutely nothing about the character of my experiences which could enable me to determine whether I am the original or the duplicate. My consciousness has been continous. I might feel therefore that I must be the original Ian. But of course the duplicate will be thinking exactly the same thoughts. Bearing this in mind I cannot ascribe anymore probability than I am the original than the duplicate, and the same reasoning will be gone through by the other Ian. So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.

Then the door to the room opens, and the person standing there says "I regret to inform you that you are the duplicate Ian, and therefore must be immediately executed".

So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd! After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place? Then, since no duplicate is created, there is absolute 100% certainty that I am the original Ian.

It might be popinted out that at least the other Ian gets the £10,000,000. But this doesn't interest me anymore than anyone else I like who receives £10,000,000.

I honestly don't think there is anyway around this paradox apart from suggesting my own solution, namely that after duplication and before an Ian gets destroyed, in other words whilst there exist 2 Ians', I will simultaneously experience out of both of Ian's bodies. Otherwise materialism just generates an incoherency. [/QUOTE]

[Z]

Ian, your little story illustrates several of your fundamental character flaws.

Unfortunately I take for granted that people agree that both duplicate and original have equal right to claim that they are the originally you.

This is true for your example, but false for the teletransporter example, because you have two huge experiential differences. The first is, awareness of the process. The second is, by knowing whether you are on Earth or Mars, you know whether or not you are the original or the duplicate.

I think it has been broadly agreed that with a star trek teletransporter device, where the original person gets destroyed and a perfect duplicate gets created somewhere else, that the duplicate would be you in the absolute fullest sense of the word. Anyway I'm going to take for granted that this is agreed upon.

As I pointed out elsewhere, technically you aren't 'destroyed' on the Trek transporter; merely converted to energy and beamed to another location, where you are hollywood technomagically reassembled. This concept brings up its own errors, ideologies, and philosophies, but let's avoid those for now.

Even avoiding the error in your Trek knowledge, I would have to disagree that the duplicate is you in the fullest sense of the word. In fact, if you are destroyed, then you cease to exist; the creation of a duplicate is irrelevant.
--snip--
So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd!

Actually, there's no paradox at all. One Ian occupies position X1, Y1, Z1, T1 and the other occupies position X2, Y2, Z2, T1. The Ian in position 1 and the Ian in position 2 both may BELIEVE that they are the same Ian, but in fact, one has only just now spontaneously appeared (let's say in position 2). There is no subjective way either one would know which they were, but to any objective observer in possession of the facts, the duplicate would be clearly known. Plus, minute variables may have already made a difference between the time Ian(1) and Ian(2) finish watching the movie. Perhaps Ian(1) scratched his ear, while Ian(2) didn't - and one has a tiny scratch, while the other doesn't. This would demonstrate immediately the fact that these are two separate entities rather than one entity with two bodies.

This is the same sort of premise demonstrated in Total Recall. Here, we have someone who is being told he will have memories of a pleasant, adventurous vacation implanted, when in fact (it appears) instead, it turns out memories of his mundane life were implanted instead. So who is this person? The secret agent under a mind wipe, or the mundane fellow under a vacation delusion? Is he even experiencing reality, or just 'remembering' the experiences he was implanted with?

Ian, here's the real kicker - Let's say room 1 is 19 feet down the hall from room 2 and 12 feet from the hall closet, and that Ian(orig), for some reason, opted to count the distance between the hall closet where he hung his hat, and the room he was led to. Now, if, for some reason, either Ian were to return to that closet, he would instantly have the means for knowing if he were a clone or not.

Likewise, let's say that Ian had Sherlock Holmes-style powers of observation of minutae, and noticed that there was a slight dent in the TV monitor casing - which suddenly wasn't there. This would give Ian the awareness that he may, in fact, be the fake Ian.

In fact, any of a number of variations would give the duplicate the instant (depending on his mental swiftness) awareness that he was not the original. So it's hardly a paradox, nor is it absurd. It is simply reasonable.

I honestly don't think there is anyway around this paradox apart from suggesting my own solution, namely that after duplication and before an Ian gets destroyed, in other words whilst there exist 2 Ians', I will simultaneously experience out of both of Ian's bodies. Otherwise materialism just generates an incoherency.

First, it's not a paradox. Linguistics, Ian - give it a read some time.

Second, the only way you would be able to simultaneously experience out of both Ian's bodies would be if some form of communication existed between the two - an impossibility. Your 'solution' is what generates an incoherency, not materialism.

In other words, you fail to understand even the most simple concepts that you are espousing. You cannot even use the terminology correctly, and your 'ideal' identical rooms would be next-to-impossible to implement without a great deal of effort.

Why, they would even have to assure that you didn't touch anything, since any fingerprint that somehow became visible then vanished suddenly could lead you to an awareness of your duplicated state!

Anyway, this rebuttal was not aimed at you, Ian, since you are never wrong :rolleyes: but for the passing reader, who hopefully has more sense than you do.

[Taffer]

I attempted this explanation in II's thread, so I'll post it here for judgement.

Taffer wrote:
The variables are (Hah!):
X = My physical body, brain, etc.
X2 = My cloned body, exact in every detail.
Y = My personality, emotions, memories, wishes/dreams etc.
Z = My sense of self, as experienced by me (my conciousness, self awareness etc).
Z2 = My clones sense of self, as experienced by him (his conciousness, self awareness etc). Note that this is not mine. It is the same as mine (as in, he experiences his sense of self in the way that I would, but it is not mine).

Ok, so I step onto the transporter plate, and yell "beam me up Scotty", or "Energize" or whatever (depending on what era of Star Trek you are using ). My body is 'copied', that information is sent to mars, and then it is 'pasted' into the clone machine that spits out another me. So far we have X, which is now destroyed, and X2, which has just been made on mars.

X would have a Y personality, and would have a Z sense of self. However, X is now dead, so we have to look at X2. X2 would have a Y personality (becase this is created by the physical properties of the brain in question), but would have a Z2 sense of self. Why? Because Z, my sense of self, was destroyed when my brain was destroyed. Z2 would appear the same to Z, because again it is a product of the functions of the brain, which are the same in X and X2, but it is not the same. This is the crux of it. We are told to judge each question based on survival, and although X2 would survive, with Y personality, it would Z2 sense of self, which is not mine. Therefore I would take the shuttle, because there is a chance that Z will survive, and thus *I* would survive.

Maybe I should use different terms. Assume, for the moment, that your 'sense of self' is found to be an actual thing. The moment your brain starts up, an 'energy spot' is created in your brain. This 'energy spot' is your self awareness, your sense of self. It is your self. However, it is created, as a byproduct, by the processes that make up your brain. Maybe your brain cells excrete a chemical which forms this 'energy spot'. If, for any reason, your brain stops running, this 'energy spot' will die. If you stop you copy yourself on the transporter, then destroy X (while you are creating X2 on mars), this 'energy spot' in X will die. Thus you will die.
However, when you 'start up' the brain in X2, this 'energy spot' will be created again, and it will, for all the world, look like the 'energy spot' in X. BUT. As there was a break in the continuity of your brain, this 'energy spot' is a duplicate that is not the same as the 'energy spot' in X. Thus your sense of self, or your energy spot, or whatever, will have died, and all Z2 is is a duplicate of Z. To everyone but you, and possible X2, they will not be able to tell the difference. Even if you were to examine the 'energy spot', it would seem the same. But from your point of view, you will have died. You will no longer be. You will be an ex parrot!

[Z]

Some have mentioned how the two beings would be 'indistinguishable' but this isn't true - it would only be 'indistinguishable' to the second entity; the first would definitely experience a difference, being dead!

[Taffer]

Hah! Exactly! And although we seem to disagree on the second question, it doesn't really change anything. If for nothing else, but that (like you said) the second question is based upon survival and (like I said) interpretation, rather then philisophical stand points.

[Z]

Well, I don't know if you caught it in the other thread, but since my view is that bodily and psychological continuity are necessary for self, then the disruption of the psychological continuity of zaayrdragon in favor of the spontaneous generation of the psychological continuity of Harry Spudnik (or whatever) becomes a problem for the self. zaayrdragon would still 'die', this time in the death of his memories, thought processes, etc... This is easily observed in those who suffer brain damage of this fashion. The old person ceases to exist, and a new person emerges, sometimes SIGNIFICANTLY different from the original. This usually leads to slews of problems for the patient and his loved ones... especially since this new person is constantly facing evidence that he SHOULD be someone that he isn't.

[Taffer]

And I agree with you (I just posted a reply to said post) with that. But I only think that physical continuity is require, if we are talking simply about survival of conciusness. If we are talking about survival of the person zaayrdragon, to itself and others, however then I agree with you. The implants will, if performed in such a way as to allow unbroken continuity of brain functions, allow the survival of both *you* and your personality.

[Z]

Agreed.

Of course, I also operate under the assumption that psychological continuity and physical continuity are interdependant - that psychological continuity is a product of physical continuity. So any change to the physical would result in a change to the psychological.

If, for example, in question 1, they somehow removed my brain, then did the blast-and-clone, while shipping my brain via spaceship (why they would do that, I have no idea), and plugged me into the new body on the other end, I would be fine with that.

Question 2 is just a doozy from my standpoint, because in both cases, the physical is altered badly, thus altering the psychological; but at least, in the silicon choice, the psychological continuity is partially preserved and later restored, while in the other choice, the physical changes result in a total psychological continuity re-write (which entails a destruction ! and a creation).

I'd say the third question was the easiest of all, even though it should have included a third possible choice.

[Taffer]

I agree. My only problem, I guess, is that I'm working under the assumption that a psychological state is caused by the physical state. In that any change to the physical state would change the psychological state. And also that the state of 'self awareness' is also caused by the physical state. Thus we are told that the virus changes memories, personality etc, so we can assume that it changes the physical areas which those psychological states are created from, but it doesn't say if it changes anything else. Thus we can assume that the physical states that create the state of 'self awareness' are left untouched by the virus.

However, with the replacements, we are told that large parts of the brain are replaced. I guess I am just assuming that by "large parts" it means almost all, and that it would be enough to disrupt the state of 'self awareness'.

[Taffer]

(In reply to the post on II's thread)

I wouldn't choose the Teletrans as it disrupts the continuity of the physical state of the brain...I.E. you are killed.

Thus, I wouldn't choose the replacements because it disrupts the continuity of the physical state of the brain...I.E. you are killed.

[Z]

Yes, I agree - how much of the brain can be replaced before self is destroyed?

Yet I read into this an assumption that a sufficient amount of your brain would remain to be 'you'.

Really, the question is, once again, poorly written - it leaves too much open to interpretation again. If they said the 'whole brain', well, I'd probably opt for the virus instead. (Lose-lose scenario)

Then again, I might not - either way, I'd be 'dead'. But my stubborn opinions might live on! :D

Ever read the Heechee Saga by Pohl? If you can slog through the thoroughly depressing first book (Gateway), the other books covered transferred intelligence quite thoughtfully. The main character's 'mind' is transferred into computers, where 'he' continues a pseudo-existence in the computer world with his friends and family. The original Him is truly dead, but 'he' lives on.

Made me think about the link between brain and mind a LONG time ago!

[Z]

Thus, I wouldn't choose the replacements because it disrupts the continuity of the physical state of the brain...I.E. you are killed.

Ya gotta admit, question 2 is a doozy. Depending on interpretation, you could very well be facing a lose-lose situation. Since the virus ALSO disrupts the continuity of the physical state of the brain... you are also killed.

This test is great for one reason - it made us think. But otherwise, it's very poorly done.

[Taffer]

:D

I havn't read that, but I might have a look at it. It'd probably go well with my philosophy paper too.

But I agree that the question is badly written.

I dunno...if only small parts of the brain are replaced, then I guess it'd be better then living with a whole brain but without your same personality. But I also believe that you could replace your entire brain with a computer if every function of your brain was replicated, and your brain was replaced slowly and carefully enough. For example, the first computer 'synapse' was put in place of an actual one, and it would need to function the same, be able to interact with the other biological synapses etc. It's an interesting thought. I think that, given enough technology, it could be done.

The problem that arrises, thought, is that there would be no way to test if it worked or not. If you created a computer program as complicated as the working of a brain, and it replicated all the brains functions exactly, it would seem for all the world to be just like the original. So even if the original was destroyed, the computer copy would swear that it was the original inside a computer. But from the point of view of the original, they would have died. Problematic. I think that a problem like this could not be tested, but would rather have to be worked out through logic and the known workings of the brain.

[Taffer]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Ya gotta admit, question 2 is a doozy. Depending on interpretation, you could very well be facing a lose-lose situation. Since the virus ALSO disrupts the continuity of the physical state of the brain... you are also killed.

This test is great for one reason - it made us think. But otherwise, it's very poorly done.

Agreed. I do think I face a lose-lose situation, and I simply choose the virus because I feel there is a greater change of keeping the required physical continuity to keep psychological continuity which keeps self aware continuity.

[Badly Shaved Monkey]

Here's a thought to stick a broom handle through the bicycle spokes of this discussion.

Forget about teleporters, think about the real world. There is no continuous existence from moment to moment. If time and everything else is quantised we jump from instant to instant, each correlated with the past with each 'now' a creation based on probabilities set up in the previous instant. The teleporter would be no different from this if, by the power of science fiction, things are so organised that the next successive 'now' for all your body bits is for them to be on Mars not Earth. This makes the teleporter non-scary, but real life really scary.

I think I'm right in saying that although the subjective experience of going forwards in time behaves as above, if time is sliced according to all the different angles available to different observers then to a hypothetical view 'outside' the Universe all the 'nows' co-exist and the subjective experience of time passing is just a trajectory through that array of 'nows'.

Subsidiary discussion: why pop physics books are dangerous to those who lack the mathematical background to deal in anything other than the metaphors they use.

Time for a lie down.

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Rob Lister
I chose to be teleported because if the difference between the old-me on earth and the new-me on Mars is "indistinguishable", then the new me is the old me.

In effect, I chose a 100% chance of being dead for three minutes over a 50% chance of being dead forever.

Does my logic fail?

I think Einstein would back me up on this one if he hadn't gone and got himself dead. Don't worry about Einstein, I agree with you. :)

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Benguin
Is their some daft trick in the question about one's soul being unresurrected? If you don't believe in a soul (and you don't do you?), then don't worry about the soul.

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Rolfe
At that point I decided that I would take the position that preserving this "soul" was the most important criterion for me. You DO believe in a soul?

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Rob Lister
The key element for me was that the way the question was worded, the soul was of no value to "me". If it has no value to me, I don't give it consideration. We agree again. :)

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Rolfe
Yes, but it might be of philosophical value to you. What does this mean. If you don't believe in a soul, how can it have any sort of value to you?

Just asking,
BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Eleatic Stranger
The problem is that something can only be identical to itself (usually under a different description, that being the point of the identity predicate). If there are two of you, they can't be identical to each other because they are two different objects. If you treat the splits of person-whoever as one object there are all sorts of problems - for instance, if one is at space S1 and the other is at space S2, then the statement "Person-whoever is at space S1" is both true and false simultaneously. I think everyone here is using the word "identical" somewhat differently. We talk about the duplicate being identical but not the same as the original.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
....you will be killed on Earth in order to record the state of all your cells. Then, on Mars, new matter will be reorganized to perfectly resemble you, and to the new being you will be indistinguishable from the original.

Why do you seem to miss this key fact? There is no material being transmitted between the two bodies, therefore, Materialistically speaking, the creature on Mars is not YOU, only a nearly-identical version of you. (Its very awareness of the process marks a significant difference already, but I already discussed this)

Materialists MUST choose the spaceship option - it's only logical. Imagine a duplicator that destroys the original and creates a duplicate in the exact position of the original from a external supply of atoms and assume that this can be done 100% accurately so that the structure and function of the duplicate is identical to the original. Imagine further that no one can tell whether a duplication takes place (says its a 50% chance that it happens).
How would you interpret this scenario.

BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Question: If the material beamed over to Mars was the material from Earth, would you still be the same person, or would a new person be created out of the same material? How would it be any different than using new matter to create an identical replica? It makes absolutely no difference.

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

In reference to your scenario....

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Now if we imagine a case where the original person is not destroyed and simply get duplicated, we will then have 2 streams of consciousnesses. Let's imagine that someone offers me £10,000,000 if I agree to be duplicated with the duplicate being killed after about an hour after duplication. And let's for the sake of argumentation ignore the ethical implications. Now this might seem like a good deal to me. After all, how could I lose out? A duplicate is created, lives for an hour, and then is destroyed. So after the duplicate is destroyed is exactly the same as before the duplicate was created, except I'm £10,000,000 richer! :D
The following statement doesn't ring true for me.....

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original. You are looking at this from the Materialist perspective, right?
Okay. So who is the "I" in the above sentence? From the materialist perspective there are two *I*s. The *I* in the original and the *I* in the duplicate. The *I* in the original will get the money 100%. The *I* in the duplicate will be killed in one hour 100%. There is no 50%. One gets the money and the other dies.

But I may be misunderstanding your use of "I" in the quote.

BillyJoe.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This is true for your example, but false for the teletransporter example, because you have two huge experiential differences. The first is, awareness of the process. The second is, by knowing whether you are on Earth or Mars, you know whether or not you are the original or the duplicate. But the Materialist's interpretation should be able to account for both shouldn't it.
But, in any case, if the original dies, aren't *you* happy to continue as the duplicate (forget teh fact that you would rather be dead than stranded on Mars for the rest of yoru life)

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
I would have to disagree that the duplicate is you in the fullest sense of the word. In fact, if you are destroyed, then you cease to exist; the creation of a duplicate is irrelevant.
Well, it seems you aren't. So, are you a Materialist or are you a substance Dualist.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Actually, there's no paradox at all. One Ian occupies position X1, Y1, Z1, T1 and the other occupies position X2, Y2, Z2, T1. The Ian in position 1 and the Ian in position 2 both may BELIEVE that they are the same Ian, but in fact, one has only just now spontaneously appeared (let's say in position 2). There is no subjective way either one would know which they were, but to any objective observer in possession of the facts, the duplicate would be clearly known. Plus, minute variables may have already made a difference between the time Ian(1) and Ian(2) finish watching the movie. Perhaps Ian(1) scratched his ear, while Ian(2) didn't - and one has a tiny scratch, while the other doesn't. This would demonstrate immediately the fact that these are two separate entities rather than one entity with two bodies. But just imagine that there is absolutely no way to tell the difference. Come on, it's not that hard. :(

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Second, the only way you would be able to simultaneously experience out of both Ian's bodies would be if some form of communication existed between the two - an impossibility. Agreed. :)

regards,
BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
[B]Ian, your little story illustrates several of your fundamental character flaws.



This is true for your example, but false for the teletransporter example, because you have two huge experiential differences. The first is, awareness of the process. The second is, by knowing whether you are on Earth or Mars, you know whether or not you are the original or the duplicate.



As I pointed out elsewhere, technically you aren't 'destroyed' on the Trek transporter; merely converted to energy and beamed to another location, where you are hollywood technomagically reassembled. This concept brings up its own errors, ideologies, and philosophies, but let's avoid those for now.

Even avoiding the error in your Trek knowledge, I would have to disagree that the duplicate is you in the fullest sense of the word. In fact, if you are destroyed, then you cease to exist; the creation of a duplicate is irrelevant.
--snip--


Actually, there's no paradox at all. One Ian occupies position X1, Y1, Z1, T1 and the other occupies position X2, Y2, Z2, T1. The Ian in position 1 and the Ian in position 2 both may BELIEVE that they are the same Ian, but in fact, one has only just now spontaneously appeared (let's say in position 2). There is no subjective way either one would know which they were, but to any objective observer in possession of the facts, the duplicate would be clearly known. Plus, minute variables may have already made a difference between the time Ian(1) and Ian(2) finish watching the movie. Perhaps Ian(1) scratched his ear, while Ian(2) didn't - and one has a tiny scratch, while the other doesn't. This would demonstrate immediately the fact that these are two separate entities rather than one entity with two bodies.

This is the same sort of premise demonstrated in Total Recall. Here, we have someone who is being told he will have memories of a pleasant, adventurous vacation implanted, when in fact (it appears) instead, it turns out memories of his mundane life were implanted instead. So who is this person? The secret agent under a mind wipe, or the mundane fellow under a vacation delusion? Is he even experiencing reality, or just 'remembering' the experiences he was implanted with?

Ian, here's the real kicker - Let's say room 1 is 19 feet down the hall from room 2 and 12 feet from the hall closet, and that Ian(orig), for some reason, opted to count the distance between the hall closet where he hung his hat, and the room he was led to. Now, if, for some reason, either Ian were to return to that closet, he would instantly have the means for knowing if he were a clone or not.

Likewise, let's say that Ian had Sherlock Holmes-style powers of observation of minutae, and noticed that there was a slight dent in the TV monitor casing - which suddenly wasn't there. This would give Ian the awareness that he may, in fact, be the fake Ian.

In fact, any of a number of variations would give the duplicate the instant (depending on his mental swiftness) awareness that he was not the original. So it's hardly a paradox, nor is it absurd. It is simply reasonable.



I truly despair :cry:

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
X would have a Y personality, and would have a Z sense of self. However, X is now dead, so we have to look at X2. X2 would have a Y personality (becase this is created by the physical properties of the brain in question), but would have a Z2 sense of self. Why? Because Z, my sense of self, was destroyed when my brain was destroyed. So, the personality remains the same but the sense of self doesn't. Why? Why the personality but not the sense of self. They are both products of the brains function. Then you say "my sense of self". Who is the "my". The Materialist's version is: "X's sense of self". There is X's sense of self, Z. And there is X2's sense of self. X2's sense of self is identical to X1's sense of self. This means that X2's sense of self is Z.

Originally posted by Taffer
Z2 would appear the same to Z, because again it is a product of the functions of the brain, which are the same in X and X2, but it is not the same.No, not the same but identical in every way with absolutely no way to distinguish between them if it is set up as in II's scenario.

Originally posted by Taffer
Therefore I would take the shuttle, because there is a chance that Z will survive, and thus *I* would survive. Then *you* have swapped a 100% chance of survival for a 50% chance of survival.

regards,
BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
zaayrdragon,

Imagine a duplicator that destroys the original and creates a duplicate in the exact position of the original from a external supply of atoms and assume that this can be done 100% accurately so that the structure and function of the duplicate is identical to the original. Imagine further that no one can tell whether a duplication takes place (says its a 50% chance that it happens).
How would you interpret this scenario.

BillyJoe

Yea. And this happens anyway doesn't it? I mean all the stuff comprising our bodies gets completely replaced every 7 years or so. It's not material stuff which ensures you're the same person, but the patterns and functions.

[BillyJoe]

Hey, Taffer and zaayrdragon, will the two of you stop agreeing with each other. It's bad enough both of you being individually wrong, without the two of you teaming up to be wrong. :D

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yea. And this happens anyway doesn't it? I mean all the stuff comprising our bodies gets completely replaced every 7 years or so. It's not material stuff which ensures you're the same person, but the patterns and functions. Okay, I'll agree with you just this once. :)

[Z]

Imagine a duplicator that destroys the original and creates a duplicate in the exact position of the original from a external supply of atoms and assume that this can be done 100% accurately so that the structure and function of the duplicate is identical to the original. Imagine further that no one can tell whether a duplication takes place (says its a 50% chance that it happens). How would you interpret this scenario.

Identically - the original self is gone. However, no one would know it, except the original self.

It doesn't matter to anyone else, anywhere else, but to the original, it certainly would matter (if there was anything left to be concerned, that is). If it happened to you, you'd be dead and replaced with a perfect replica, and no one would ever know the difference. But you'd know - well, you'd know nothing, because you'd be dead. End of story.

[Z]

But, in any case, if the original dies, aren't *you* happy to continue as the duplicate (forget teh fact that you would rather be dead than stranded on Mars for the rest of yoru life)

No, because I am not my duplicate. My duplicate is a separate and distinct entity existant on Mars.

If two identical programs operate on two identical machines, are they the same program? Of course not - because at any moment, new inputs could differ, immediately changing the two programs. Likewise, self (earth) and self (mars) are two identical but separate entities, which at any moment, could receive new stimuli differentiating them.

If you turn off one machine, is it happy to continue in machine two? Or is it simply off?

This is so glaringly obvious, even Ian ought to appreciate it.

I truly despair

Nope, seems he's too dense even for that.

Ian, it's OK - you've been wrong before, We expect it from you by now. No need to despair, son.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
No, because I am not my duplicate. My duplicate is a separate and distinct entity existant on Mars.

If two identical programs operate on two identical machines, are they the same program? Of course not - because at any moment, new inputs could differ, immediately changing the two programs. Likewise, self (earth) and self (mars) are two identical but separate entities, which at any moment, could receive new stimuli differentiating them.

If you turn off one machine, is it happy to continue in machine two? Or is it simply off?

This is so glaringly obvious, even Ian ought to appreciate it.



Nope, seems he's too dense even for that.

Ian, it's OK - you've been wrong before, We expect it from you by now. No need to despair, son.

LMAO! You're wrong zaayrdragon. Still, I'm not bothered, my metaphysic doesn't create any logical conundrums.

[Z]

Of course not, Ian - because, in your metaphysic, logic has taken a holiday and is now sipping martinis on Waikiki with semantic comprehension and a cute blonde from the 18th dimension.

But, all insults aside, how am I wrong, exactly? Please, show me precisely where I'm wrong.

[Z]

When we were kids, I used to play a game called "Star Frontiers". One of the safeguards against losing your character was to submit yourself for cloning. Essentially, you were placed in deep-freeze, and a perfect copy was made that even had your memories. This copy also carried a tiny implant that, through the wonders of sci-fi technomagic, continually transmitted data about your brain-state back to central storage, to be added to your dormant body. So, in essence, your clone became an extension of you- the link was sufficient that the 'self' was practically extended into multiple beings.

Somehow, we got into discussing the philosophical standings of such a system. What if, by some error, a clone didn't die, but was merely cut off from central storage, making it believe that the clone DID die? A new clone would be produced that believed the last one had died, but the other clone would be living on, unaware of this situation. So, according to the game rules, if the two clones ever met, each would immediately try to kill the other (no reasons were offered).

Instead, we decided each was a seperate entity, and this automatically led to several ethical questions and one minor sci-fi one. The sci-tech question was simply, if the first clone was no longer 'cut off', would the original self be receiving transmissions from both clones? Would the data write inconsistantly and cause a period of perceived schizophrenia for the original and any subsequent clones? Or would the data somehow lock up the reception system, thereby cutting off both clones and causing a third to be created?

Ethically, the question invariably arose about the rights of each clone. Were they to be treated as seperate entities? As property of the original? As property of the company performing the process?

Through the course of our game, we eventually started a campaign to end this use of cloning, as we came to the conclusion that it was inherently unethical in nature.

This topic was also covered, IIRC, in Marvel Comics, when Dr. Doom operated a clone for a time, and the clone was convinced that IT was Dr. Doom - and again, when Spider-Man was apparently cloned, and the clone assumed the role of the actual Parker, while the original somehow was convinced he was the clone.

Fictional supercloning is fun, isn't it?

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Identically - the original self is gone. However, no one would know it, except the original self.

It doesn't matter to anyone else, anywhere else, but to the original, it certainly would matter (if there was anything left to be concerned, that is). If it happened to you, you'd be dead and replaced with a perfect replica, and no one would ever know the difference. But you'd know - well, you'd know nothing, because you'd be dead. End of story. Interesting interpretation. :cool:
But, of course, there is no self being produced by the original brain because the original brain is, as you say, dead. So try again. I think you will find an interpretation consistent with your previous posts very difficult to accomplish. That would tend to suggest that there is something very wrong with your view.

BillyJoe
(edit: punctuation to make it easier to read)

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon'

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This is so glaringly obvious, even Ian ought to appreciate it. I agree, it is glaringly obvious what your (with all due respect) wrongful interpretation is. The problem is that the correct interpretation is not glaringly obvious. This is why you are having trouble with it. I'm not trying to be obnoxious here. I was in your position not long ago.

regards,
BillyJoe.

[Taffer]

But, of course, there is no self being produced by the original brain because the original brain is, as you say, dead. So try again. I think you will find an interpretation consistent with your previous posts very difficult to accomplish. That would tend to suggest that there is something very wrong with your view.


No, there is nothing wrong with his view. That is the whole bloody point. He brain is dead, so there is no self being produced by the original brain. Any clone of the original brain will be a seperate entity that, by the laws of physics, is exactly the same as the original was. The self produced by the new brain is exactly the same as the original was. But it is not the self produced by the original. It is, plain and simply, a self produced by an exact copy. Although it is the same as the original, it isn't the original. Why? Because the original is dead. It can't be the original. It was killed as a part of cloning process, and it's self is no longer produced. I keep saying, follow along from the original's point of view only and you should see what I mean.

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

We're duplicating here. :D
Please see my last post in the other thread.

BillyJoe.

[Taffer]

Yeah, the same thing happened with me and zaayrdragon. Lets choose a thread and stick to it eh? I choose II's thread, as what we are discussing is more relevent over there.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Taffer
Yeah, the same thing happened with me and zaayrdragon. Lets choose a thread and stick to it eh? I choose II's thread, as what we are discussing is more relevent over there.

Yes, I choose my thread too, because it's important to me that my threads go on and on and on . . :D

[Taffer]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yes, I choose my thread too, because it's important to me that my threads go on and on and on . . :D

Deflate that swolen head! :p I chose this one for the discussion zaayrdragon and I were having.

Anyway, it's 2:30 here. Time for some bloody sleep before my morning lectures! Gah! None of my Bio lectures are this interesting! The only thing that comes close is Philosophy, and I only have 2 lectures a week :(.

Oh well, 'night Interesting Ian, BillyJoe, zaayrdragon and others.

[Correa Neto]

IIan,

The tough experiment you described is no different at all from those presented by the other posters. The results are quite similar, also. Yes, I could use less bandwidth and just say I agree with you, but I preffer to use those two sentences above:p

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
..snip...I honestly don't think there is anyway around this paradox apart from suggesting my own solution, namely that after duplication and before an Ian gets destroyed, in other words whilst there exist 2 Ians', I will simultaneously experience out of both of Ian's bodies. Otherwise materialism just generates an incoherency.

Here's where I, and AFAIK most other posters around disagree. There is no paradox at all! At least not this particular one.

There are two IIan selves after duplication, at different XYZ coordinates. Both IIan selves are identical and produced by interactions between your brain, the hormones produced by your body and what's stored in your brain. They will start to differentiate at the moment they start to have different experiences. Still, both have the right to claim being IIan and both are.

And yes, you can claim that you will experience simultaneously what both IIans will experience, but just because both are IIans. But, if the IIan located at coordinates X1Y1Z1 drinks a beer, at time t=10, the IIan located at X2Y2Z2 can not possibly feel the taste unless get drinks it by himself! there is no communication between both IIan's neural systems. The only possible way would be to somehow link their brains and transmitt impulses from one to the other.

If your claim were true, during the cloned frongs experiment I proposed on the other thread, frog copy A would feel when frog B is stimulated. Note also that forms of cloning happens in nature, and we would have already detected such effects!

[Rolfe]

I've been interested in SF treatments of the duplicated hero, because fiction is a good way of dramatising the possibilities. A lot of it is in Star Trek related stuff.

The first one I know about is in Classic ST, Where Kirk is duplicated by the transporter - but the selves are not identical, there is good-but-weak Kirk and a raving monster that is his strong side. Of course the good-but-weak version is treated as the "real" Kirk, who just has to get back with the raving monster to get his personality back together. Then in the first ST spin-off novel by James Blish, Spock must Die!, the same sort of thing happens to Spock. This time the evil duplicate is better at dissembling, but there's still no doubt which one is the original - apart from anything else the duplicate is a mirror-image.

Then there were two novels, The Price of the Phoenix and The Fate of the Phoenix where the whole idea that the transporter can create duplicate people was explored very thoroughly, to the point of political destabilisation if planetary leaders are duplicated. This time we did have two identical individuals, not an "evil twin". And only one job, one pension plan and so on.... But due to a convenient plot token, it was still possible to view one as the original and one as the duplicate, and Kirk being such a noble sort of guy (excuse me while I puke), the one who wasn't the original volunteered to have a new life carved out for him.

TNG did a better one where Riker was genuinely duplicated, but then the duplicate was accidentally abandoned on the planet for ten years and when he was rediscovered things had moved on so far that they weren't really identical and it wasn't too hard to find a new life for him. I still think the stranded one was remarkably ready to give up his name though - if that had been me, that's the last think I'd have wanted to lose.

Better was the teleporter accident near the end of one of the radio episodes of Blake's Seven where Avon both teleports down to join one group of the cast on the planet, and stays behind with the other lot. This was more daring, in that there was no way to call one the original and one a copy - in fact it was a little while before anyone realised that there were two of him. Interesting. But this was Avon, and both of them were armed. Which one survived? Who cares.

Farscape had the interesting one, but even they copped out a bit. First two of the cast were duplicated and one copy quickly killed, allowing for interesting drama when the bodies were found. Then Crighton was duplicated and both survived. Identical. Aeryn made one of them wear a jacket to distinguish him. Why me? There was fascination, wariness, and some hostility (there was only one of Aeryn after all). I loved the obsessive playing of "scissors, paper, stone" where at first the two of him always chose the same one, then gradually they started to drift apart. Some good plot mileage was made of this, including one of the pair being able to pass a (non-woo-woo) lie detector test that the other would have failed, and the psychology was cooking up nicely, including a rather reluctant blood transfusion. Then the plot split, with one of him going off in the Farscape equivalent of Starbug, and the other staying on Mora. I was really looking forward to the two meeting again. But they killed the one that was with Aeryn, giving a good opportunity for some genuine emotional manipulation by killing the hero while not killing the hero, and the remaining Crighton's ambivalence when reunited with the now-pregnant Aeryn. So again, not really followed through. And in that scenario, Crighton didn't really have a life of his own (apart from Aeryn) anyway, so there wasn't quite the same potential for conflict.

I'm still waiting for a really good fictional treatment of this one.

Rolfe.

[Anders]

The teleportation question is truly intriging. I, personally, have been struggeling with it, on and off, for quite some time.

Will it be the same personality that arrives on Mars or someone else?

First I was thinking that one personlity is unique and is bound to one (1) body and brain. That was my thinking a few years ago.

However, the brain works like any other part of the body or any other tissue, mayby a bit more complicated, but an phosphate atom is still an phosphate atom whether it is in the brain or in the blood cells. (phosphate is a major ingreedient in ATP, the major energy carrier in the cell). So, we have no soul, period. Which means that taking apart all atoms in our body, and putting them together at another place would not in any way effect me or my personality.

Well, the main issue is that we have no soul, if we had, teleportation would be disasterous.

Thats my 2 cents, or what you call it, on this issue.

[rppa]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Bearing this in mind I cannot ascribe anymore probability than I am the original than the duplicate, and the same reasoning will be gone through by the other Ian. So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.

So what's the paradox? Neither the original nor the duplicate has all the data available, so they don't know which is which. Nevertheless, there was never any question at any time in your experiment which one was original and which was duplicate. Just because the Ian's don't know, that doesn't affect the actual situation.

Your "paradox" is no more a paradox than this: you and I are sitting in chairs. We are told that a coin will be flipped to determine which of us will be killed at the end of the experiment. So we each conclude there is a 50/50 chance of survival. A few minutes later, the experimenter points to one of us and says "sorry, you lose". No coin flip. What we didn't know is that the choice was made when we sat down, as the back of one of the chairs has a big sign on it that says "shoot this one".

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by rppa
So what's the paradox? Neither the original nor the duplicate has all the data available, so they don't know which is which. Nevertheless, there was never any question at any time in your experiment which one was original and which was duplicate. Just because the Ian's don't know, that doesn't affect the actual situation.

Your "paradox" is no more a paradox than this: you and I are sitting in chairs. We are told that a coin will be flipped to determine which of us will be killed at the end of the experiment. So we each conclude there is a 50/50 chance of survival. A few minutes later, the experimenter points to one of us and says "sorry, you lose". No coin flip. What we didn't know is that the choice was made when we sat down, as the back of one of the chairs has a big sign on it that says "shoot this one".

Well, I've spelt out the paradox. If you and others don't understand what I'm talking about then I guess there's nothing further I can add.

[Eleatic Stranger]

Instead, we decided each was a seperate entity, and this automatically led to several ethical questions and one minor sci-fi one. The sci-tech question was simply, if the first clone was no longer 'cut off', would the original self be receiving transmissions from both clones? Would the data write inconsistantly and cause a period of perceived schizophrenia for the original and any subsequent clones? Or would the data somehow lock up the reception system, thereby cutting off both clones and causing a third to be created?

Avignon residency - The Game!

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Anders
First I was thinking that one personlity is unique and is bound to one (1) body and brain. That was my thinking a few years ago.Coincidentally, so did I.

Originally posted by Anders
However, the brain works like any other part of the body or any other tissue, mayby a bit more complicated, but an phosphate atom is still an phosphate atom.....Which means that taking apart all atoms in our body, and putting them together at another place would not in any way effect me or my personality. Then you must be a Materialist. :)

BJ

[Correa Neto]

As I wrote before...

IIan, yes, you can claim that you will experience simultaneously what both IIans will experience, but just because both are IIans.

But, if the IIan located at coordinates X1Y1Z1 drinks a beer, at time t=10, the IIan located at X2Y2Z2 can not possibly feel the taste unless he drinks it by himself! There is no communication between both IIan's neural systems. The only possible way would be to somehow link their brains and transmitt impulses from one to the other with the propper encoding and decoding.

Or you disagree with that?

If you agree, there is no paradox at all. If not, please provide an explanation of why.

Actually IIan's non-materialistic positions have other faults that were somehow exposed or delineated in these two threads..

He said he belives the copy machine would most likely create a lifeless corpse, since there would be no self, soul -call it whatever you want- animating the body.

OK, no paradox here, since still a single self exist. But then, using the machine from the "Staying Alive" is suicide.

And the non-materilialistic view causes a lot of questions and problems, much more than the materialistic IMHO.

All real-life cloning (artificial and natural) experiments would produce just soul less corpses... Assuming the self is at least in part, composed by what could be called a soul, that is somehow incorporated during the formation of a body, then

(i) When and how does body and soul join?
(ii) Why cloning produces healthy frogs, cows and sheep while just human corpses?
(iii) Why do you think artificial insemination and in-vitro fertilization work, creating humans with souls while the cloning of humans and the ficticious copying machine should not not?

Not to mention that non-materialists complicate the problem of the origin of the self. In materialism, the self is created and maintained by the body, mess with the body and you mess with the self. The non-materialists just move the problems away from their sight. What creates the souls? Why messing with the brain messes the self? Why can't we measure some properties of a soul with some sort of device?

Non-materialism in all color and shapes AFAIK fail to provide answers to that. Just complicated constructs and not a single pratical answer. Actually I would say usefull answer. But I concede this can be disputed.

Rolfe,

Yes, he should have fought more for his ID... Anyway, that was not the plot... Even tough a nice script about a legal battle over who really has the right to own the identity could be created follwiing this line. However, I liked the episode (and the follow-ups) because he was not a twisted version of the original Riker, and because the episode did not ended with the usual fight between the versions. It was the same person having to face with other challenges and situations.

Never been too much of a fan of Farscape, so I can't comment on that...

[chance]

I have never thought about teleportation like that before i.e. destroying the body to copy it, then reconstructing from scratch at the other end. That being the case are you committing suicide by stepping into the machine? Are the technicians guilty of aiding your suicide, because what is constructed at the other end is not the original you, but a perfect copy. Interesting Ian Materialists have to accept there could be 2 selves and thereby have to face the logical conundrums thereby created. Yes they would, there being no objection to send the pattern of you to various receivers and make multiple copies, interesting quandary. What if there is a delay and you are temporality stored in a computer buffer, it that computer ‘legally’ you?

I suppose it boils down to what you consider is the self, are we a collection of memories and abilities contained in a watery meat bag? Or is there some requirement to be kept whole?

[asthmatic camel]

I know I'm going to get slammed for saying this but I just can't help myself. It would be entirely possible to build a spaceship capable of carrying people to Mars. So far as I'm aware, no-one has any idea how a "teleporter" might be built.

So why on earth are you all discussing this ? Make a choice between the possible and the extremely improbable ? What for ?

Oh well, I'll bow out and allow you all to continue dreaming. :D

[chance]

asthmatic camel know I'm going to get slammed for saying this but I just can't help myself. It would be entirely possible to build a spaceship capable of carrying people to Mars. So far as I'm aware, no-one has any idea how a "teleporter" might be built.

So why on earth are you all discussing this ? Make a choice between the possible and the extremely improbable ? What for ? Thought experiments are fun, interesting Ian question is really making you examine what you think of your self as, the soundness behind teleportation is irrelevant.

[The Cats Venm]

What a fascinating discussion. It's rare on this board to see an honest discussion and not an argument.


My two cents:

In regards to the quiz, I chose spaceship, silicon, freezing.

Now on the question of sense of self, the way I see it is that the self only continues as long as there is a 'charge' in the brain (like RAM). In the teletransporter example, the clone on mars my feel like me, but will not be the original me. It will be a brand new self that started the moment when it was created. The real me, with my sense of self that I had been running since I was born, has died and it's self has ended.

The reason I have no problem with the silicon brain choice is that I looked at it no differently that the natural replacement of cells in the body. If it's done slowly, and the 'charge' never goes out, I am still the same self.

The soul question was a no-brainer as I don't believe in a soul and it was useless as phrased in the question anyway (I think that the only real failing of the quiz was the ambiguous objective of survival, it was only in the last question where the specified 'sense of self' when they should have said that up front).


Here's something that came to mind when reading this thread:
When someone has surgery or an accident, has all brain activity stop thus being 'dead', then is revived again, do they share the same sense of self? I would have to say no as their 'charge' had been ended, they are no different to an exact clone (memories and all) created by the teletransporter.

Keep in mind that the self is different to memory. A new self with old memories would feel as if it had existed all along, but it clearly hadn't. In fact, any one of us could never really know when our self began, only that it had not ended.

[Soapy Sam]

Does the spaceship have windows?

If so I choose the spaceship.

Otherwise I'll go by teleport, do the job and sightsee on Mars.

No point in travel if you can't look out the window.

I find the rest of the debate rather pointless. If Your soul can survive A BA flight to Sydney, it can survive anything. And at least they can teleport a decent cup of cofffee through with you.

[Taffer]

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
What a fascinating discussion. It's rare on this board to see an honest discussion and not an argument.

Indeed :)


My two cents:

In regards to the quiz, I chose spaceship, silicon, freezing.

Now on the question of sense of self, the way I see it is that the self only continues as long as there is a 'charge' in the brain (like RAM). In the teletransporter example, the clone on mars my feel like me, but will not be the original me. It will be a brand new self that started the moment when it was created. The real me, with my sense of self that I had been running since I was born, has died and it's self has ended.

I agree with this viewpoint, and so does (I believe) zaayrdragon. And some others too, I'm sure. Makes sense to me ;).


The reason I have no problem with the silicon brain choice is that I looked at it no differently that the natural replacement of cells in the body. If it's done slowly, and the 'charge' never goes out, I am still the same self.

That's the discussion zaayrdragon and I were having. The way the question was worded, to me, seemed like it wasn't done slowly but rather fast. If it had said something like "it is done slowly enough to not disrupt the brain patterns at all" I'd have agreed to it in a heart beat. The problem with question 2 is how you interpret it.


The soul question was a no-brainer as I don't believe in a soul and it was useless as phrased in the question anyway (I think that the only real failing of the quiz was the ambiguous objective of survival, it was only in the last question where the specified 'sense of self' when they should have said that up front).

Agreed.


Here's something that came to mind when reading this thread:
When someone has surgery or an accident, has all brain activity stop thus being 'dead', then is revived again, do they share the same sense of self? I would have to say no as their 'charge' had been ended, they are no different to an exact clone (memories and all) created by the teletransporter.

I was thinking this very thing last night. I'd have to say that in most cases, the brain functions have not stopped completely. I'd say in almost all cases this is true, actually (I'm basing this on no medical knowledge whatsoever by the way), so the answer would be "yes, it's the same 'self'". I'm not sure about braindead people though (although I'm pretty sure they don't come back to 'life'.


Keep in mind that the self is different to memory. A new self with old memories would feel as if it had existed all along, but it clearly hadn't. In fact, any one of us could never really know when our self began, only that it had not ended.

Here's a spooky thought. The clone would not be able to know it is a clone. What if you are a clone, right now? You wouldn't know it, would you? You'd have the same memories as the original. As you believe you have lived your life at the moment, it could in fact be that you were created in some lab yesterday....there is know way to know

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Soapy Sam


I find the rest of the debate rather pointless. If Your soul can survive A BA flight to Sydney, it can survive anything. And at least they can teleport a decent cup of cofffee through with you. [/B]

The debate is not pointless. It exposes our assumptions about the self. It gets us to think.

And this cannot be more important. What is more important than knowing what we are? Whether materialism is correct, or we are a soul?

I cannot understand people who just live their lives and never ever think to themselves about anything, about what they ultimately are, where they are going, the meaning or purpose to it all. Our lives should involve more than bare living.

[BillyJoe]

Cat,

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
In the teletransporter example, the clone on mars my feel like me, but will not be the original me. It will be a brand new self that started the moment when it was created. The real me, with my sense of self that I had been running since I was born, has died and it's self has ended. Scan this phrase carefully and see if you can't spot the dualist language: "my sense of self".
YOU do not have a sense of self. YOU are the sense of self. There is no soul/spirit/essence in the brain that has a self. This is the error in your thinking. Can you see that?

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
The reason I have no problem with the silicon brain choice is that I looked at it no differently that the natural replacement of cells in the body. If it's done slowly, and the 'charge' never goes out, I am still the same self. Why does it have to be done slowly? I don't understand this. And how slowly. Is one year or one day slow enough? What about one hour? One minute? A second?
You see, it doesn't make sense. The time course is irrelevant.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
Here's something that came to mind when reading this thread:
When someone has surgery or an accident, has all brain activity stop thus being 'dead', then is revived again, do they share the same sense of self? I would have to say no as their 'charge' had been ended, they are no different to an exact clone (memories and all) created by the teletransporter. Forget anaesthesia. Every night you go to sleep. After six hours or so you wake up again. There has been a clear temporal discontinuity in the self. But this has not affected the self. In other words, the self can survive both a temporal (and a spacial) discontinuity.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
A new self with old memories would feel as if it had existed all along, but it clearly hadn't. In fact, any one of us could never really know when our self began, only that it had not ended. Can you see how your second sentence contradicts your first sentence? Think about this a bit. The fact that you have even written that second sentence suggests that the begginnings to the solution of the problem of identity for materialism could be within you. :)
(Just get rid of that dualist language though ;) )

regards,
BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
In reference to your scenario....



quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Now if we imagine a case where the original person is not destroyed and simply get duplicated, we will then have 2 streams of consciousnesses. Let's imagine that someone offers me £10,000,000 if I agree to be duplicated with the duplicate being killed after about an hour after duplication. And let's for the sake of argumentation ignore the ethical implications. Now this might seem like a good deal to me. After all, how could I lose out? A duplicate is created, lives for an hour, and then is destroyed. So after the duplicate is destroyed is exactly the same as before the duplicate was created, except I'm £10,000,000 richer!

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The following statement doesn't ring true for me.....


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You are looking at this from the Materialist perspective, right?
Okay. So who is the "I" in the above sentence? From the materialist perspective there are two *I*s. The *I* in the original and the *I* in the duplicate. The *I* in the original will get the money 100%. The *I* in the duplicate will be killed in one hour 100%. There is no 50%. One gets the money and the other dies.

But I may be misunderstanding your use of "I" in the quote.



I'm talking about the "*I*" prior to duplication. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that I only have 50% chance of surviving. There's an incoherency here.

Therefore materialism is refuted.

[The Cats Venm]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Scan this phrase carefully and see if you can't spot the dualist language: "my sense of self".
YOU do not have a sense of self. YOU are the sense of self. There is no soul/spirit/essence in the brain that has a self. This is the error in your thinking. Can you see that?

Maybe I'm a dualist then. I don't know. I don't claim to be anything. I'm not saying that there is a soul/spirit/essence in the brain.

We are the sense of self, fine, but if I end, and then am started again, is still me? Do you understand what I'm saying? The reason I use the term ‘sense of self’ is in an attempt to be more clear. Saying that I’m the same me but not the same me, doesn’t really explain anything.


Why does it have to be done slowly? I don't understand this. And how slowly. Is one year or one day slow enough? What about one hour? One minute? A second?
You see, it doesn't make sense. The time course is irrelevant.

Did you understand what I meant by a 'charge'?

Do dead people have feelings? I would guess no, because there is no activity in their brains. This activity is what generates the sense of self (‘you’ are the activity in your brain). If it stops, that particular instance of the self ceases to exist, and a new sense of self is generated when activity begins again.

It has to be done slowly enough that the brains activity never stops.


Forget anaesthesia. Every night you go to sleep. After six hours or so you wake up again. There has been a clear temporal discontinuity in the self. But this has not affected the self. In other words, the self can survive both a temporal (and a spatial) discontinuity.

You don't die when you go to sleep.

The gap is in your memory not your 'self'.


Can you see how your second sentence contradicts your first sentence? Think about this a bit. The fact that you have even written that second sentence suggests that the beginnings to the solution of the problem of identity for materialism could be within you. :)
(Just get rid of that dualist language though ;) )

No, I don't see how the two contradict each other. Could you explain?

I'm no expert, so I use the words that seem best to me. Maybe you are interpreting me wrong because the words I used have particular connotation to you?

[The Cats Venm]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I'm talking about the "*I*" prior to duplication. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that I only have 50% chance of surviving. There's an incoherency here.

Therefore materialism is refuted.

The original *I* has an 100% chance of survival (provided the testers weren't lieing).

The duplicate mearly uses the original as a pattern. It is not the original in any way, simply similar (identical) in appearance and composition.

The duplicate has an 100% chance of being killed (unless he fights back), and will feel quite ripped off because he has the same memories as the original.

It is a perfectly safe situation for the original. It is your example that is flawed. The original you, the you prior to duplication, would not suddenly find men coming in, telling him that he's the duplicate and will be killed.

Therefore Ian is refuted.

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
[b]...snip...I cannot understand people who just live their lives and never ever think to themselves about anything, about what they ultimately are, where they are going, the meaning or purpose to it all. Our lives should involve more than bare living.

Because thinking hurts...

Most people do not really want to think (in terms of challenging and testing) about such issues, since it potentially can alter the way they see things. And not necessaryly providing a cozy confortable view of the world. That's why they rely on religion (among other things). They let someone else do the brain job and guide them as sheep.

But, in the end I think there's no purpose at all.

Taffer, regarding yout post-

Originally posted by Taffer

...snip...
I was thinking this very thing last night. I'd have to say that in most cases, the brain functions have not stopped completely. I'd say in almost all cases this is true, actually (I'm basing this on no medical knowledge whatsoever by the way), so the answer would be "yes, it's the same 'self'". I'm not sure about braindead people though (although I'm pretty sure they don't come back to 'life'.
...snip...

Assuming that the self is created by -and dependent from- our body and the data stored within our brain, I think if all electric activity on a brain is terminated at say, T=10, and kept with no residual charge untill T=15, and then its is started again (say by a Dr. Frankenstein-like machine), the result would be a brand new self (provided no brain damage happened and that the data stored within it has not been erased by the lack of electric impulses), nearly identical to the original (since the original one ceased to exist at T=10 and the new one came in to existence only at T=5). But this new self could claim its identity, since it would also be "the original person". Yes, this raises some questions, since certain medical procedures could theoretically be defined as murder.

I think that there is no loss of continuity (or perhaps it would be better to write "a perception of continuity loss by an external observer") because our body gradually and slowly changes the material its made of . Also, regardless of the change, I think that as long as there is still some electrical activity on the brain (how much I don't know, ask to a neurologist), there is also no (perceived) loss of continuity in the self.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I'm talking about the "*I*" prior to duplication. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that I only have 50% chance of surviving. There's an incoherency here.

Therefore materialism is refuted.

No. Yes, you died but you survived, and yes again, you had 50% of being killed. As above you experienced both, but just because there were two selves that could claim to be IIan.

And using BillyJoe's words,
Originally posted by BillyJoe
YOU do not have a sense of self. YOU are the sense of self.

To which I will add
And the self is created by interactions between the body and the data stored within the brain. Two identical independent bodies with the same stored data will generate two independent and identical selves.

At and after a given time (say, T=killing) IIand at XYZ is dead, while IIan at X1Y1Z1 is alive. Between the time of duplication and before the killing time, there are two identical bodies, each one with identical brains tha contain the same data. Both can claim to be -and are- you. But IIan at X1Y1Z1 will not feel any physical stimulae applied just to IIan located at XYZ.

Materilaism is not refuted.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
The original *I* has an 100% chance of survival (provided the testers weren't lieing).

The duplicate mearly uses the original as a pattern. It is not the original in any way, simply similar (identical) in appearance and composition.



OK, I've agreed to get duplicated for £10,000,000. An easy £10,000,000 right? This is because all I have to do is stay in this room and I won't even notice when I get duplicated, and I will never see my duplicate before he gets executed anyway.

Now let's modify the original thought experiment so that the duplicate gets created in a room looking different from the room where I am (ie the original).

Now, as part of my ongoing experiences, is it not possible, at the precise moment that duplication takes place, that I will experience a sudden change in perspective and find that I am now my duplicate?? Oh no! :eek: Do you see the problem I'm having here?? How can I be certain that my stream of consciousness will not suddenly jump into the other body at the moment of duplication??

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
OK, I've agreed to get duplicated for £10,000,000. An easy £10,000,000 right? This is because all I have to do is stay in this room and I won't even notice when I get duplicated, and I will never see my duplicate before he gets executed anyway.

Now let's modify the original thought experiment so that the duplicate gets created in a room looking different from the room where I am (ie the original).

Now, as part of my ongoing experiences, is it not possible, at the precise moment that duplication takes place, that I will experience a sudden change in perspective and find that I am now my duplicate?? Oh no! :eek: Do you see the problem I'm having here?? How can I be certain that my stream of consciousness will not suddenly jump into the other body at the moment of duplication??

You can be 100% certain.
Your stream of consiousness is generated by your body. Your copy will have his stream of consiousness by his body. And since you both are different physical entities and there's nothing linking you both, transmitting data from one to the other, there will be no jump.

If you were blinfolded, copied without notice of what's going and the copy created also blinfolded in front of you, and assuming the costruction process is not felt by the template and the copy, taking the bandages simultanously would create just a big surprise on you both. After this feeling is gone, you'll experience what twin brothers experience when looking at each other. No consiousness jumps, no feelings/sensations/experiences transfers.

[The Cats Venm]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
OK, I've agreed to get duplicated for £10,000,000. An easy £10,000,000 right? This is because all I have to do is stay in this room and I won't even notice when I get duplicated, and I will never see my duplicate before he gets executed anyway.

Now let's modify the original thought experiment so that the duplicate gets created in a room looking different from the room where I am (ie the original).

Now, as part of my ongoing experiences, is it not possible, at the precise moment that duplication takes place, that I will experience a sudden change in perspective and find that I am now my duplicate?? Oh no! :eek: Do you see the problem I'm having here?? How can I be certain that my stream of consciousness will not suddenly jump into the other body at the moment of duplication??

It all depends on how the duplication is done.

I was assuming it would be done like in the teletransporter example in your link. Because mearly your pattern is being examined and a second 'you' built elsewhere, there is absolutely no chance of your stream of consciousness switching. There would simply be another created (and then destroyed).

Now if the duplication was done by taking, say, 50% of your original material and adding 50% new material to each 'you', then I'm not sure what would happen. I would think that there would be no way to do that without stopping the activity in your brain, so the original 'you' would cease to be and two new 'you's' would be created. Neither of these people would be original, and the people doing the test would have been lieing when they said that they would kill the duplicate. Since they could't determine a duplicate, it would not be fair to kill either Ian, they both have equal claim.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Correa Neto
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
OK, I've agreed to get duplicated for £10,000,000. An easy £10,000,000 right? This is because all I have to do is stay in this room and I won't even notice when I get duplicated, and I will never see my duplicate before he gets executed anyway.

Now let's modify the original thought experiment so that the duplicate gets created in a room looking different from the room where I am (ie the original).

Now, as part of my ongoing experiences, is it not possible, at the precise moment that duplication takes place, that I will experience a sudden change in perspective and find that I am now my duplicate?? Oh no! Do you see the problem I'm having here?? How can I be certain that my stream of consciousness will not suddenly jump into the other body at the moment of duplication??
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



You can be 100% certain.
Your stream of consiousness is generated by your body. Your copy will have his stream of consiousness by his body. And since you both are different physical entities and there's nothing linking you both, transmitting data from one to the other, there will be no jump.

You're coming from the position that in a teletransporter where your body is destroyed and a replica gets created at the destination point, that you will have literally have been killed to be replaced by someone who behaves exactly like you and has your memories.

But this is a blatant denial of materialism!

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You're coming from the position that in a teletransporter where your body is destroyed and a replica gets created at the destination point, that you will have literally have been killed to be replaced by someone who behaves exactly like you and has your memories.

But this is a blatant denial of materialism!

No.

The self is created by interactions between the brain, body and data stored in the brain. Duplicate all of this and you will make a new self, independent from the original. No souls, no consiousness jump.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Eleatic Stranger
Avignon residency - The Game!
You know ES, if you dumb it down a little, we could all play.

You seem like you're going for the Dennis Miller award with these obscure references.

I had to look it up and realized that I couldn't have possibly known about this because I was raised Catholic.
<blockquote>The French King, Philip the Fair (1285-1314) was determined to gain control of the papacy. Philip forced pope Clement V (in office 1305-1314) to move the papal curia from Rome to the French city of Avignon. This period became known as the Avignon residency or, more colorfully, the Babylonian captivity.

The Avignon residency was to continue until 1378 under six more popes: John XXII (in office 1316-1334), Benedict XII (1334-1342), Clement VI (1342-1352), Innocent VI (1352-1362), Urban V (1362-1370), and Gregory XI (1370-1378).

When Pope Gregory XI returned to Rome in 1377, he reestablished the papal curia in that city. His untimely death in 1378 led to the election of two popes, pope Urban VI (in office 1378-1389) and the antipope Clement VII (in office 1378-1394), Clement took up residency in Avignon, while Urban stayed in Rome. For a period of forty years the Catholic Church had two popes. This period is widely referred to as the "Great Schism". </blockquote>Not exactly Earth and Mars - but it was a long time ago.

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that I only have 50% chance of surviving. There's an incoherency here. I don't see that. The self that is produced in the brain of the original has 100% chance of survival.

[BillyJoe]

Cat,

I am having difficulty answering your post. I think you are right, there is probably an interpretation problem. Anyway I will try...

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
Maybe I'm a dualist then. I don't know. I don't claim to be anything. I'm not saying that there is a soul/spirit/essence in the brain. Well, a dualist does believe in a soul/spirit/essence. It is actually difficult to discus the problem of identity without inadvertantly using Dualist language. You may not believe in a soul/spirit/essence, but sometimes the language you use to describe identity in materialist terms shows that you have not really let go of a soul/spirit/essence. Which, of course, means you don't really succeed.
(When I say "you" above, I mean it generally. I'm not speaking about you in particular)

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
We are the sense of self, fine, but if I end, and then am started again, is still me? Do you understand what I'm saying? Well, to answer this you need to think about the duplicator scenario where OriginalCat is vapourized. Are you happy to say that the self produced in the brain of DuplicateCat is sufficient for *Cat*s survival. Remember, the self does not have to be spacially or temporally continuous.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
Did you understand what I meant by a 'charge'?.....Do dead people have feelings? I would guess no, because there is no activity in their brains. This activity is what generates the sense of self (‘you’ are the activity in your brain). If it stops, that particular instance of the self ceases to exist, and a new sense of self is generated when activity begins again. Are you talking about consciousness? If so, I would agree that consciousness is necessary for a self to exist but the self requires more than just consciousness. Is that what you mean by "charge"?

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
It has to be done slowly enough that the brains activity never stops.If it is done instantly, would you agree that brain activity doesn't stop?

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
You don't die when you go to sleep. The gap is in your memory not your 'self'. The body or brain doesn't have to die for the self to cease to exist. If there is a gap in your memory from the time you went to sleep till the time you wake up, in what sense is there any self in existence during that period.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
No, I don't see how the two contradict each other. Could you explain? You wrote....

"A new self with old memories would feel as if it had existed all along, but it clearly hadn't. In fact, any one of us could never really know when our self began, only that it had not ended. "

In the first sentence you are saying that the self (produced in the brain) of the duplicate can't be said to have existed before the duplication solely by virtue of the fact that it has the same memories as the self (produced in the brain) of the original. Which is my opponents view. In the second sentence you say that the self cannot know when it began implying that there is, from the self's point of view, no difference between the self in the original and the self in the duplicate. Which is my view.
The only problem was your phrase "when our self began". You have to remember, unless tou do believe in a soul/spirit/essence, that that you must say either "when the self began" or "when *we* began". When you say our self you are implying that there is something/someone who has a self. If you are implying that, you are implying the exsitence of a soul/spirit/essence. Can you see that?

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
I'm no expert, so I use the words that seem best to me. Maybe you are interpreting me wrong because the words I used have particular connotation to you? But the problem is, if you explain the problem of identity using langauge that implies the existence of a soul/spirit/essence, then you cannot claim to be someone who doesn't believe in a soul/spirit/essence.

regards,
BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Cat,

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
The original *I* has an 100% chance of survival...I agree.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
The duplicate mearly uses the original as a pattern. It is not the original in any way, simply similar (identical) in appearance and composition. Are you talking about the duplicate's body ("appearance") here or the *I* of the duplicate? I will assume you mean the *I*. I agree with you that there are two *I*s. But, unless you really do believe in a soul/spirit/essence, the is no sense in which YOU can be either, because, in this sense, YOU do not exist (ie YOU = soul/spirit/essence). There are simply two identical (but not the same) *I*s.

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
The duplicate has an 100% chance of being killed....and will feel quite ripped off because he has the same memories as the original. Well, not only identical memories, the whole pattern of neural activity is identical. But, yes, this *I* has 100% chance of being killed

Originally posted by The Cats Venm
It is a perfectly safe situation for the original. It is your example that is flawed. The original you, the you prior to duplication, would not suddenly find men coming in, telling him that he's the duplicate and will be killed. I agree with this. Except it is not the example that is flawed but Ian's interpretation of it.

regards,
BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Correa Neto,

Concerning continuity....

Originally posted by Correa Neto
Assuming that the self is created by -and dependent from- our body and the data stored within our brain, I think if all electric activity on a brain is terminated at say, T=10, and kept with no residual charge untill T=15, and then its is started again (say by a Dr. Frankenstein-like machine), the result would be a brand new self (provided no brain damage happened and that the data stored within it has not been erased by the lack of electric impulses), nearly identical to the original (since the original one ceased to exist at T=10 and the new one came in to existence only at T=5). But this new self could claim its identity, since it would also be "the original person". Yes, this raises some questions, since certain medical procedures could theoretically be defined as murder.

I think that there is no loss of continuity (or perhaps it would be better to write "a perception of continuity loss by an external observer") because our body gradually and slowly changes the material its made of . Also, regardless of the change, I think that as long as there is still some electrical activity on the brain (how much I don't know, ask to a neurologist), there is also no (perceived) loss of continuity in the self. The self does not need continuity in either time or space. The folowing example illustrates both:
I am knocked unconscious and taken to a hospital wher I regain consciousness. During the priod of unconsciousness, there is no self. I you think there is, you will need to explain how. The self surely requires that there be consciousness. If I am right, and surely I am, then the self does not require temporal or spacial continuity.

BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Originally posted by The Cats Venm
It is a perfectly safe situation for the original. It is your example that is flawed. The original you, the you prior to duplication, would not suddenly find men coming in, telling him that he's the duplicate and will be killed.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Billy
I agree with this. Except it is not the example that is flawed but Ian's interpretation of it.



Then let's suppose that the duplicate gets given the £10,000,000 and the original gets executed. Would you still be delighted to agree to this?

[BillyJoe]

Correa Neto,

Originally posted by Correa Neto
You can be 100% certain.
Your stream of consiousness is generated by your body. Your copy will have his stream of consiousness by his body. And since you both are different physical entities and there's nothing linking you both, transmitting data from one to the other, there will be no jump.

If you were blinfolded, copied without notice of what's going and the copy created also blinfolded in front of you, and assuming the costruction process is not felt by the template and the copy, taking the bandages simultanously would create just a big surprise on you both. After this feeling is gone, you'll experience what twin brothers experience when looking at each other. No consiousness jumps, no feelings/sensations/experiences transfers. Actually the self does not even require a stream of consciousness. Or, in other words, the self does not require continuity of pattern. How do we know? Because it happens all the time before and after sleep. It is extremely unlikely that the pattern of neural activity after waking is the same as the pattern of neural activity on going to sleep. And, since the self requires consciousness and there is no consciousness during sleep, the self does not exist during sleep. Therefore the self does not require continuity of pattern.
(If you think I'm exaggerating that there is no consciousness during sleep, then think instead about the situation before and after a period of coma)

So the self is starting to look quite a different beast from what we first might have imagined......

The self can be discontinuous in time space and pattern.

BillyJoe.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Correa Neto
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You're coming from the position that in a teletransporter where your body is destroyed and a replica gets created at the destination point, that you will have literally have been killed to be replaced by someone who behaves exactly like you and has your memories.

But this is a blatant denial of materialism!
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Correo
No.



Yes



The self is created by interactions between the brain, body and data stored in the brain. Duplicate all of this and you will make a new self, independent from the original. No souls, no consiousness jump.

It's not a new self.

Materialism holds that only structure and function determines self. Same structure and function, then same self. Thus 2 identical brains will be the same self. If the structure and function is not sufficient to determine the self, then something extra apart from structure and function is required. This, by definition of materialism, contradicts materialism.

[Correa Neto]

I don't think the self really has continuity. Actually I think (or perhaps better write belive, since I have no solid evidence for this) thjat the continuity is an illusion.

In the tought experiment where brain activity ended but there was no (serious?) damage to the stored data, between T=10 and T=15 there is no self. A "new"one will be produced once the body is "reactivated" (for the lack of a better word).

There is no continuity for an external observer, but the "new" self experiences a discontinuity (with no data, just a blank between T=10 and T=15) from his point of view.

We experience and illusion of continuity. We don't feel a discontinuity during the regular periodic mass renewall of the body because its gradual and (supposedly) no data is lost. probably some ammount of charge or activity is needed in the brain to create the self (again, I have no idea what is the required level). Below that level (say, knocked out while boxiing), there's no self. Restore the charge, there is one again, with illusions of continuity.

It may be a dry view, with no hope according to some, but I'm confortable with that. Anyway if I'm wrong, one day I will be pleasantly surprised after crossing a tunnel of light and then I will happily say IIan, sorry I was wrong". But I don't see this happening.

[Z]

The 'self' is continuous neural activity, not consciousness. The self remains during sleep, during a coma (assuming some level of brain activity), etc. Only when the brain shuts completely down, when 'brain death' occurs, can we say that the 'self' experiences an interruption. If the brain is then restarted, the 'self' generated could then be argued to be a different one, but could also be argued to be the same one with an interruption of service, because it is STILL the same product of the same brain, albeit removed from the original product by a gap of service. At this point, the contraversy arises - not during sleep or coma.

Materialism is STILL not refuted. :D

[Z]

Ian,

Same structure, same function, different materia, different coordinates = different object, different product.

Three identical generators are not generating the exact same electricity, right? Only three identical electrical outputs.

Materialism stands firm.

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You're coming from the position that in a teletransporter where your body is destroyed and a replica gets created at the destination point, that you will have literally have been killed to be replaced by someone who behaves exactly like you and has your memories.

But this is a blatant denial of materialism! I agree. Except that I would qualify the "you" in your post.

There is a *you* which IS the pattern of neural activity in the brain of the original. There is also a *you* which IS the pattern of neural activity in the brain of the duplicate. If the original survives, there will bve two *you*s: the pattern of neural activity in the brain of in the original AND the pattern of neural activity in the brain of duplicate. But they will not be the same *you*because they occupy different space coordinates. If the original dies, the *you* will be the pattern of neural activity in the brain of in the duplicate only. Either way *you* survives.

Where are YOU? Nowhere. There is no soul/spirit/essence.

BillyJoe

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then let's suppose that the duplicate gets given the £10,000,000 and the original gets executed. Would you still be delighted to agree to this?

IIan, you are confusing survival instinct with the notion of self...
No self -even in the case on discontinuous existence- would like to face termination.

You belive in life after death. So, you would not care about undergoing any of the experiences presented, eh?

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Materialism holds that only structure and function determines self. Same structure and function, then same self. Thus 2 identical brains will be the same self. If the structure and function is not sufficient to determine the self, then something extra apart from structure and function is required. This, by definition of materialism, contradicts materialism.

You are contradictiong yourself.

They are identical -the same if want to put in these terms. But are at different spatial (and in some cases temporal) positions. Even if their time coordinates are the same, they will not share sensations created by different stimulae. Nothing is transmitting data between them.

If body and stored data determines self, and if the body is deactivated, during the deactivation time there's no self at all. If you have n identical bodies with identical stored data, you'll have n identical bodies , each one with its own self, and all of them will be identical.

edited to remove cut-and-paste leftovers...

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Ian,

I agree. Except that I would qualify the "you" in your post.

There is a *you* which IS the pattern of neural activity in the brain of the original. There is also a *you* which IS the pattern of neural activity in the brain of the duplicate. If the original survives, there will bve two *you*s: the pattern of neural activity in the brain of in the original AND the pattern of neural activity in the brain of duplicate. But they will not be the same *you*because they occupy different space coordinates. If the original dies, the *you* will be the pattern of neural activity in the brain of in the duplicate only. Either way *you* survives.

Where are YOU? Nowhere. There is no soul/spirit/essence.

BillyJoe

You know, there can be a (substantial) self without it being a soul or spirit. It is not clear to me why one indeed could not be an interactive dualist, and yet for the self to be ontologically dependent on the brain. So no life after death.

Or if there is a difficulty in being a substance dualist but not believing in survival, could someone explain?

[MRC_Hans]

But once you accept "you" as being effectively synonymous with the neural activity in the brain, it renders dualism superfluous. Not impossible, but superfluous.

Hans

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then let's suppose that the duplicate gets given the £10,000,000 and the original gets executed. Would you still be delighted to agree to this? If the pattern of neural activity in the original is *BillyJoe* then, no, *BillyJoe* is not happy with this. Neither would *BillyJoe* be happy with the original scenario. In both scenarios *BillyJoe* will receive $10,000,000 but, also in both scenarios, *BillyJoe* will be executed. *BillyJoe* may want *BillyJoe* to receive $10,000,000 but *BillyJoe* sure as hell doesn't want *BillyJoe* executed.

In the original scenario, the chance that *BillyJoe* in the original receives $10,000,000 is 100% and the chance that *BillyJoe* in the duplicate is executed is 100%.

In the alternative scenario, the chance that *BillyJoe* in the original is executed is 100% and the chance that *BillyJoe* in the duplicate receives $10,000,000 is 100%.

But in both cases, *BillyJoe* doesn't want that execution, so *BillyJoe* does not agree to either scenario.

BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Correa Neto
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then let's suppose that the duplicate gets given the £10,000,000 and the original gets executed. Would you still be delighted to agree to this?
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IIan, you are confusing survival instinct with the notion of self...
No self -even in the case on discontinuous existence- would like to face termination.

You belive in life after death. So, you would not care about undergoing any of the experiences presented, eh?

It's not a new self.



Could someone translate for me? Did he say yes or no?

Correa, I am not saying there's a new self. Indeed it's you lot who are saying that.

Anyway, what you're effectively saying is you would not like to travel on a teletransporter. This is in conflict with materialism.




quote:
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Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Materialism holds that only structure and function determines self. Same structure and function, then same self. Thus 2 identical brains will be the same self. If the structure and function is not sufficient to determine the self, then something extra apart from structure and function is required. This, by definition of materialism, contradicts materialism.
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Correa

You are contradictiong yourself.

They are identical -the same if want to put in these terms. But are at different spatial (and in some cases temporal) positions. Even if their time coordinates are the same, they will not share sensations created by different stimulae. Nothing is transmitting data between them.



Spacial location cannot determine the self. Only function and structure does. Otherwise when someone dances - step to the left . .one . .two . . . . .step to the right . .one . .two - they would continuously being changing back and forth from one self to the other (with each step). And also there is no absolute space.

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Correa Neto
I don't think the self really has continuity. Actually I think (or perhaps better write belive, since I have no solid evidence for this) thjat the continuity is an illusion.

In the tought experiment where brain activity ended but there was no (serious?) damage to the stored data, between T=10 and T=15 there is no self. A "new"one will be produced once the body is "reactivated" (for the lack of a better word).

There is no continuity for an external observer, but the "new" self experiences a discontinuity (with no data, just a blank between T=10 and T=15) from his point of view.

We experience and illusion of continuity. We don't feel a discontinuity during the regular periodic mass renewall of the body because its gradual and (supposedly) no data is lost. probably some ammount of charge or activity is needed in the brain to create the self (again, I have no idea what is the required level). Below that level (say, knocked out while boxiing), there's no self. Restore the charge, there is one again, with illusions of continuity. Yes, it's all an illusion.

No temporal continuity.
No spacial continuity.
No pattern continuity.

The self has no continuity at all.
The only sense that can be made of this is that a self is a pattern of neural activity at a particular time instant, t. To keep track of this self, we can label it self_t. In the very next instant, there is a second self, which we label self_t+1 followed by self_t+2. Each successive self is almost identical to the the one before (with almost all memories, emotional states etc of the perceding self). This creates the illusion of continuity. This is the only way we can explain, in materialist terms, the discontinuities that exist with respect to time place and pattern.

It also means that we can use the teleporter.

BillyJoe

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
*snip*
Spacial location cannot determine the self. Only function and structure does. Otherwise when someone dances - step to the left . .one . .two . . . . .step to the right . .one . .two - they would continuously being changing back and forth from one self to the other (with each step). And also there is no absolute space. No. I think you are being just a little obtuse here. What is meant is that once the two selfs are separated spatially, they cease to be identical, because whatever they perceive from the separation and on is basically different.

Imagine you have a novel that is being written by several authors. The manuscript is circulated among them and each in turn makes a contribution. No matter where the novel is, it remains the one and only novel (not the same, because it evolves with time, but so does the self). Now, at some point, a copy is made of the novel and both are put into circulation. From the moment one author has put a single letter in one of the manuscripts, they are no longer identical. They are branching away from each other.

In the programming business, where many authors are rather the norm, this is called a delta situation. They usually occur when management tries to increase effectivity by having several programmers working concurrently. It gains a lot of time which is subsequently lost again by the trouble of unravelling the delta :rolleyes:.

Hans

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
The 'self' is continuous neural activity, not consciousness. The self remains during sleep, during a coma (assuming some level of brain activity), etc. Only when the brain shuts completely down, when 'brain death' occurs, can we say that the 'self' experiences an interruption. If the brain is then restarted, the 'self' generated could then be argued to be a different one, but could also be argued to be the same one with an interruption of service, because it is STILL the same product of the same brain, albeit removed from the original product by a gap of service. At this point, the contraversy arises - not during sleep or coma.

Materialism is STILL not refuted. :D zaayrdragon, you really must let go.
None of this makes any sense at all.

Sorry,
BillyJoe

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Could someone translate for me? Did he say yes or no?

Correa, I am not saying there's a new self. Indeed it's you lot who are saying that.

Anyway, what you're effectively saying is you would not like to travel on a teletransporter. This is in conflict with materialism.


I said yes and no it depends on the question:p!

Do you agree that each self has its own self-preservation (pun intended) instinct and may not want to use any of the presented options or tests?

Did you noticed wich tought experiment I was refering to?

Or you are just using the usual diversionary tactics?

You are creating the contradictions with the idea of no new selfs being created. With the presented individual creation of selves by the bodies, there are no paradoxes but the ethical ones.

BTW, a non-materialist theoretically would have no problem with any of the choices unless he/she is not sure of his/hers positions. But here enters the self-preservation instinct.


Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Spacial location cannot determine the self. Only function and structure does. Otherwise when someone dances - step to the left . .one . .two . . . . .step to the right . .one . .two - they would continuously being changing back and forth from one self to the other (with each step). And also there is no absolute space.

Now, that was...:rolleyes:
No one here said that it is the spacial location determine the self. The experiences generated at each spatial location will be stored in the brain of each individual and help create the self.

If the spatial location of the template and copies are different, isolated and with different environments, then copy and template willl be subject to different stimulae. Therefore, they will start to diferentiate, since there's no sharing of information.

Nothing backs your claim that if you had a perfect copy of yourself, stimulae presented to the copy would be felt by you.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then let's suppose that the duplicate gets given the £10,000,000 and the original gets executed. Would you still be delighted to agree to this?
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If the pattern of neural activity in the original is *BillyJoe* then, no, *BillyJoe* is not happy with this. Neither would *BillyJoe* be happy with the original scenario. In both scenarios *BillyJoe* will receive $10,000,000 but, also in both scenarios, *BillyJoe* will be executed. *BillyJoe* may want *BillyJoe* to receive $10,000,000 but *BillyJoe* sure as hell doesn't want *BillyJoe* executed.

In the original scenario, the chance that *BillyJoe* in the original receives $10,000,000 is 100% and the chance that *BillyJoe* in the duplicate is executed is 100%.

In the alternative scenario, the chance that *BillyJoe* in the original is executed is 100% and the chance that *BillyJoe* in the duplicate receives $10,000,000 is 100%.

But in both cases, *BillyJoe* doesn't want that execution, so *BillyJoe* does not agree to either scenario.



You're digging yourself a hole here Billy. If you're not happy about your double being executed (whether you are original or replica), then you ought not to be happy about taking the teletransporter to get somewhere! Because what happens with the teletransporter is that your original gets effectively executed.

So, even if the original gets killed, you (the original prior to duplication) should be quite happy to agree that your duplicate gets £10,000,000.

But this seems absurd. However you have partially provided a solution to yourself. There is no enduring self. Quite literally you are continually ceasing to exist to be replaced by another you. So if you are the original, you ought not to mind at all being executed!. You ought not to mind because you are continually literally dying every infinitesimal fraction of a second anyway. So actual execution - if painless - is no more worse than your current second by second dying.

If you do not agree for you to be executed and for your duplicate to receive £10,000,000, then this is just as inconsistent as someone saying they do not want their £10,000,000 which they won on the lottery.

As I keep saying, materialism is staggeringly counter-intuitive.

But I reject materialism. I say that we have to endorse the idea of a enduring self. We are the same person from second to second. Indeed I am literally the same person as I am when drunk, or as an fetus before birth, or if I should ever get Alzheimer's. I am not my mind states - otherwise, since my mind states change all the time I cease to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second in my life. Rather I have mind states.

[Anders]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Coincidentally, so did I.

Then you must be a Materialist. :)

BJ
Well, can't argue that! :)

[Anders]

First of all, why all the money?
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
... Because what happens with the teletransporter is that your original gets effectively executed.

Yes, but who cares, The dead body don't, and the teleported body don't know that's it has beeing executed, teleported and reassambled unless someone tells it.

...
But this seems absurd. However you have partially provided a solution to yourself. There is no enduring self. Quite literally you are continually ceasing to exist to be replaced by another you. So if you are the original, you ought not to mind at all being executed!. You ought not to mind because you are continually literally dying every infinitesimal fraction of a second anyway. So actual execution - if painless - is no more worse than your current second by second dying.

Well, I can't talk for anybody but myself (I'm not Sylvia Brown), but this is my 2 cents: I, my personality won't be dead, it would be living on as a perfect copy of itself. And no, execution is probably not painless, usually death is quite painfull. That's what I've seen in the movies anyway.

....
As I keep saying, materialism is staggeringly counter-intuitive.

No it's not, it's very intuitive, as first sight, then we have the relativity theory and quantum mechanics, and then it starts to get a bit counter-intuitive. But it's still materialism.

But I reject materialism.

We know that, only too well...

I say that we have to endorse the idea of a enduring self. We are the same person from second to second.

Acctually, there are some results that shows that it is not like that. Strange ha?

Indeed I am literally the same person as I am when drunk, or as an fetus before birth, or if I should ever get Alzheimer's. I am not my mind states - otherwise, since my mind states change all the time I cease to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second in my life. Rather I have mind states.
Our personality is the result of chemical and elctrical reactions in the brain. All these reactions is explainible by the ordinary knowledge of biochemistry. Take away one protein and we'll change personality. Take away one part of the brain and we loose on distinct function, like speech, sight, the ability to get angry.

We can actually say that we cease to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second. But that just our personality, not our body of course. Perhaps you've seen some of the work on consciousness made by Blackmore: http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/journalism/thes01.htm

[Taffer]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
zaayrdragon,

zaayrdragon, you really must let go.
None of this makes any sense at all.

Sorry,
BillyJoe

Firstly this is a very arrogent statement, BillyJoe. You have no proof that you are correct, and we are wrong. We are simply discussing our own belief, which can never be right or wrong.

Secondly, as I and others on this board both understand and agree with what he has said, I would argue that it is you who does not understand.

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

If you do not agree for you to be executed and for your duplicate to receive £10,000,000, then this is just as inconsistent as someone saying they do not want their £10,000,000 which they won on the lottery.

You are refusing to see that self-preservation instinct and ethics are a component on his decision .

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
As I keep saying, materialism is staggeringly counter-intuitive.

And? I think non-materialism is staggering counter-intuitive! Specially claims that independent entities submitted to diferent physical stimulae will share the sensations triggered by the stimulae.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
But I reject materialism. I say that we have to endorse the idea of a enduring self. We are the same person from second to second. Indeed I am literally the same person as I am when drunk, or as an fetus before birth, or if I should ever get Alzheimer's. I am not my mind states - otherwise, since my mind states change all the time I cease to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second in my life. Rather I have mind states.

Or you have the illusion of not being your mind states...

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Anders
First of all, why all the money?


quote:
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Originally posted by Interesting Ian
... Because what happens with the teletransporter is that your original gets effectively executed.

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Yes, but who cares, The dead body don't, and the teleported body don't know that's it has beeing executed, teleported and reassambled unless someone tells it.



Ummmm . .what?? Where did you quote me from? And if one is faced with the prospect of execution, then that surely is undesirable.





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...
But this seems absurd. However you have partially provided a solution to yourself. There is no enduring self. Quite literally you are continually ceasing to exist to be replaced by another you. So if you are the original, you ought not to mind at all being executed!. You ought not to mind because you are continually literally dying every infinitesimal fraction of a second anyway. So actual execution - if painless - is no more worse than your current second by second dying.

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Well, I can't talk for anybody but myself (I'm not Sylvia Brown), but this is my 2 cents: I, my personality won't be dead, it would be living on as a perfect copy of itself. And no, execution is probably not painless, usually death is quite painfull. That's what I've seen in the movies anyway.



Huh?? What the hell are you talking about?? What has this got to do with what I said??

Do you understand I'm defending materialism here??


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....
As I keep saying, materialism is staggeringly counter-intuitive.

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No it's not, it's very intuitive, as first sight, then we have the relativity theory and quantum mechanics, and then it starts to get a bit counter-intuitive. But it's still materialism.



I'm sorry, if you don't agree that it's staggeringly counter-intuitive, then I am extremely skeptical that you understand it.


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But I reject materialism.

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We know that, only too well...

quote:
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I say that we have to endorse the idea of a enduring self. We are the same person from second to second.

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Acctually, there are some results that shows that it is not like that. Strange ha?



Yeah :rolleyes:, couldn't give me the remotest clue as to why you think I'm not the same person from second to second could you? Reasoning???? Please explain why you think what you do? Otherwise I will write you off as a clueless idiot. I'm 99% certain you are; but go on; prove me wrong!


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Indeed I am literally the same person as I am when drunk, or as an fetus before birth, or if I should ever get Alzheimer's. I am not my mind states - otherwise, since my mind states change all the time, I cease to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second in my life. Rather I have mind states.
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Our personality is the result of chemical and elctrical reactions in the brain.


Is that so? :rolleyes:

Do you have anything to contribute apart from your mindless, idiotic, unsubstantiated assertions?




All these reactions is explainible by the ordinary knowledge of biochemistry.


Clueless idiot.

Explain it then, or desist with your vacuous assertions.




Take away one protein and we'll change personality. Take away one part of the brain and we loose on distinct function, like speech, sight, the ability to get angry.



Yup, so what?? When do you intend to justify your assertions?






We can actually say that we cease to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second. But that just our personality, not our body of course. Perhaps you've seen some of the work on consciousness made by Blackmore: http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/journalism/thes01.htm



I have no interest in Blackmore; unless you claim she's said anything which might give me pause for thought?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Taffer
Firstly this is a very arrogent statement, BillyJoe. You have no proof that you are correct, and we are wrong. We are simply discussing our own belief, which can never be right or wrong.

Secondly, as I and others on this board both understand and agree with what he has said, I would argue that it is you who does not understand.

{sighs} Nope. I'm afraid that BillyJoe has somewhat more of a clue of what materialism implies than you.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Correa Neto
[Originally posted by Interesting Ian

If you do not agree for you to be executed and for your duplicate to receive £10,000,000, then this is just as inconsistent as someone saying they do not want their £10,000,000 which they won on the lottery.
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You are refusing to see that self-preservation instinct and ethics are a component on his decision .



And you are refusing to understand anything.



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Originally posted by Interesting Ian
As I keep saying, materialism is staggeringly counter-intuitive.
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And? I think non-materialism is staggering counter-intuitive!



No, that's not true. You fail to understand what materialism is, and what its denial means.

[chance]

A fugitive has escaped the police, breaks into the teleport complex and zaps himself to somewhere (next room, Mars, don’t matter), is he (the replicated) guilty of any crime?

[Taffer]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
{sighs} Nope. I'm afraid that BillyJoe has somewhat more of a clue of what materialism implies than you.

And what proof do you have that it is he that understands and we that do not? Just because he agrees with you? That is hardly evidence. It is more likely that you and he are simply mistaken, as myself and many others have tried (in vain) to show you.

EDIT: Now it makes a little more sense ;).

[Z]

Wow, look everybody - Idiot Ian learned a new word today. Let's see how many times he'll use 'vacuous' in these posts!

In related stories - Ian has now reverted to calling everyone who is busily proving him wrong an 'idiot' again. 'sigh' He is painfully predictable, isn't he? In fact, he's as much proof that materialism is real as anything else, isn't he? Especially since he apparently learns nothing as time marches on... Oh, except for the occasional new word.

Now, let's see if Idiot Ian will descend even further and return to the same abusive name-calling that has seen him suspended so often in the past. We can clearly see how he is running out of fodder in the fight against materialism; in fact, his views are slowly appearing to align more with materialism than against it.

For those of you entering the game a little behind the power curve, let's review the definition of 'materialism', shall we? Materialism is the view that everything that actually exists, is material or physical. That is, nothing unreal exists. So if there is a 'soul', it must be a material soul; it must conform to material laws of matter and energy, including conservation of mass/energy laws. Ian, of course, rejects this outright and insists it is more logical to believe in unreal properties, things such as invisible, intangible, and completely undetectible souls and Gods which, nonetheless, form the basis for all reality. He is determined that subjective experience is unreal / non-physical in nature, and that subjective experiences are irreproducible phenomenae. He insists that any genetically and physically identical clone would simply be a corpse, under his metaphysic, but swears that a materialist would assume the clone to be an extension of themselves. However, please note that, in the infamous questions mentioned above, there is no mention of awareness of 'soul' until the final question; therefore, it would appear that our 'teletransporter' lacks any means of duplicating the 'soul' component, and therefore, any clone made on Mars may be lacking this key material component. (Remember, the 'soul' is discovered in question 3, proving it to be material in nature).

Materialism doesn't deny the soul, Gentle Reader; it merely states that, if the soul does exist, it must be of a material nature. Nor does materialism in some way eliminate the first-person perspective or subjective awareness; rather, it simply asserts that the experiences and awareness one has are reducible to simple physical/material interactions and are therefore reproducible and fully analyzable.

Frankly, materialism seems like a completely obvious fact - Nothing unreal exists. Well, sure. That's completely consistant with our world, right? In fact, the moment we're aware of anything existing, it is real, right? We're not constantly assuming the existance of easter rabbits, jolly old elves, dragons, and honest lawyers, right?

So, Dear Audience, let's see what other gems of wisdom and wit Idiot Ian can churn out before becoming completely incomprehensible, shall we?

[Taffer]

*Resists urge to go into the 'reality/mind reality' tirade recently presented to him in Philosophy...*

That aside, I believe zaayrdragon has it right.

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You're digging yourself a hole here Billy. I don't have a self, I am a self. ;)

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If you're not happy about your double being executed (whether you are original or replica), then you ought not to be happy about taking the teletransporter to get somewhere! Because what happens with the teletransporter is that your original gets effectively executed. There is a difference though.
When the "double" gets executed, it is the end for that *BillyJoe*. Not only that, he is executed which is not exactly a pleasant prospect. On the other hand when the teleporter vapourizes *BillyJoe*, *BillyJoe* springs into existence in the duplicate. In this case it is not the end for *BillyJoe*. Also the vapourization is instant and painless.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
So, even if the original gets killed, you (the original prior to duplication) should be quite happy to agree that your duplicate gets £10,000,000.Sorry I don't understnd what you are saying here.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
But this seems absurd. However you have partially provided a solution to yourself. There is no enduring self. Quite literally you are continually ceasing to exist to be replaced by another you. So if you are the original, you ought not to mind at all being executed!. You ought not to mind because you are continually literally dying every infinitesimal fraction of a second anyway. So actual execution - if painless - is no more worse than your current second by second dying. *BillyJoe*doesn't mind dying a million times provided every death of *BillyJoe* is instant and painless and provided each dead *BillyJoe* is replaced by another *BillyJoe*. As long as *BillyJoe* lives on, *BillyJoe* is happy

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If you do not agree for you to be executed and for your duplicate to receive £10,000,000, then this is just as inconsistent as someone saying they do not want their £10,000,000 which they won on the lottery. No, *BillyJoe* doesn't mind being instantly and painlessly terminated, and therefore miss out on the $10,000,000, provided *BillyJoe* is replaced by *BillyJoe* who receives the $10,000,000.
As long as *BillyJoe* survives *BillyJoe*s death, *BillyJoe* doesn't mind dying. ;)

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
As I keep saying, materialism is staggeringly counter-intuitive. Yes, I agree. Also those who don't see this probably do not understand materialism. Not naming any names. :)

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
But I reject materialism. I say that we have to endorse the idea of a enduring self. We are the same person from second to second. Indeed I am literally the same person as I am when drunk, or as an fetus before birth, or if I should ever get Alzheimer's. I am not my mind states - otherwise, since my mind states change all the time I cease to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second in my life. Rather I have mind states. Well at least you know what you believe in.

regards,
BillyJoe.

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
Firstly this is a very arrogent statement, BillyJoe. You have no proof that you are correct, and we are wrong. We are simply discussing our own belief, which can never be right or wrong.The thing is I am not saying your belief is right or wrong, I am saying that you do not understand what your belief is. I am trying to show you why, but, sadly, you don't want to look.

Originally posted by Taffer
Secondly, as I and others on this board both understand and agree with what he has said, I would argue that it is you who does not understand. Well, that doesn't follow at all. In fact I understand only too well. I've been there, realized my misunderstanding and moved on.

regards,
BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

chance,

Originally posted by chance
A fugitive has escaped the police, breaks into the teleport complex and zaps himself to somewhere (next room, Mars, don’t matter), is he (the replicated) guilty of any crime? Only if the original was guilty. ;)
And, if the original somehow survives, both the original and the duplicate are guilty. If the original survives and accidentally multiple duplicates are made they are all quilty.

BJ

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
And what proof do you have that it is he that understands and we that do not? Just because he agrees with you? That is hardly evidence. It is more likely that you and he are simply mistaken, as myself and many others have tried (in vain) to show you.

EDIT: Now it makes a little more sense ;). I don't know what you edited but you are still wrong. :D
I do not agree with Ian and Ian doesn't agree with me. Okay?

BJ

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
And you are refusing to understand anything.

So are you.

Your own claim regarding the both copy and template sharing sensations triggered by different physical stimulae is an evidence of that.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No, that's not true. You fail to understand what materialism is, and what its denial means.

Yes it is. Think harder (c'mon, we know you can) and without prejudices about it and you'll find a lot of problems with non-materialism. Your views regarding materialism are heavilly biased and you let this seep int yout tought experiments. You start them with the premisse that materialism is false and keep on running them with it.

I will never claim to fully understand any brand of philosophy or science. That would be too pretentious.

Anyways, it's been an interesting discussion that made think about issues that I have never tought a bit harder. For this, thank you IIan for raising the topic and BillyJoe for the clarifications.

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Materialism doesn't deny the soul..... I would like to see your definition of the soul then.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
.....it merely states that, if the soul does exist.....So Materialism doesn't deny it and it doesn't assert it? I would like to see your definition of materialism then.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
.....if the soul does exist, it must be of a material nature. Well, I think you have redefined "soul" to mean the opposite of what it means to me - an immaterial entity separate from the mind that survives the death of the body.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Nor does materialism in some way eliminate the first-person perspective or subjective awareness.... But it surely makes quite a different interpretation of what subjective experience is. And that interpretation has nothing to do with the soul. In fact, materialism, in my view, attempts to eliminate the soul from its interpetation because there is no evidence for its existence.

I wonder if you could expand on your concept of the soul and how it fits in (or could fit in) with materialism.

thanks,
BillyJoe.

[Anders]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Ummmm . .what?? Where did you quote me from? And if one is faced with the prospect of execution, then that surely is undesirable.


Huh?? What the hell are you talking about?? What has this got to do with what I said??

Do you understand I'm defending materialism here??

I'm sorry, if you don't agree that it's staggeringly counter-intuitive, then I am extremely skeptical that you understand it.

Well I do understand some about the world, and the more I have learned about the world, the more I’ve realised that there are so much more to learn and understand. Have I understood that the world is “staggeringly counter-intuitive�, no I have not, because it probably isn’t. But if I’m wrong, I’m more than willing to learn the correct! Perhaps you, Ian, could provide me with a small example of a counter-intuitive phenomenon in our world?

Yeah :rolleyes:, couldn't give me the remotest clue as to why you think I'm not the same person from second to second could you? Reasoning???? Please explain why you think what you do? Otherwise I will write you off as a clueless idiot. I'm 99% certain you are; but go on; prove me wrong!


Am I a clueless idiot? Well, you have to ask my friends about that. I do function quite well in our society, I have passed a number of exams in various scientific fields, and my bosses has never sacked me from any position.
Are you a clueless idiot InterestingIan? I don’t think so, but than again, I have never met you.
But, we are not discussing me or you, now are we?



Is that so? :rolleyes:

Do you have anything to contribute apart from your mindless, idiotic, unsubstantiated assertions?


I might not be equipped with the same eloquent wording that you have, but that’s probably due to the fact that I am not a resident of a country where the native language is English, and I have never been.
Why do you believe that you are the same personality when you’re drunk or when you suffering from Alzheimer’s? Do you have any support for that notion? Any scientific theories? I would say that as all functions regarding our personality is controlled by proteins and signals between cells in the brain, our personality is easily changeable and also not very continuous. To produce one molecule of certain protein takes from about half a minute to several minutes, and that’s not very continuous. The proteins, or enzymes, catalyze the signal substances which are part of the communication systems used by the cells, also the cells in the brain. When alcohol is consumed it changes the amount of signal substances in the brain, and the personality changes a bit. Same thing with Alzheimer’s, the causing agent, perhaps a prion, changes the behaviour of a protein, which alters the personality a little bit.

What I am saying is that we might not be so continuous that we think we are! If that is a mindless, idiotic, unsubstantiated assertion, well, so be it.

If you want to convince me otherwise, produce some good ideas, not just presenting of fancy philosophy wording. Try to convince me that there are immaterialistic worlds other then the materialistic!

Clueless idiot.

Explain it then, or desist with your vacuous assertions.

I might be a clueless idiot, but I thought we were discussing, not me, nor you, but whether or not we would survive a teleportation and what really happens during that teleportation, especially regarding the personality.
About the “vacuous assertions� regarding that statement that all functions in the brain, that is the tissue that handles our personality, are controlled by electrochemical reactions. Electrochemical reactions are studied in the field of biochemistry.
I don’t regard that as “vacuous assertions�, it is the consensus among most scientists working in the biochemistry field.


Yup, so what?? When do you intend to justify your assertions?

I have no interest in Blackmore; unless you claim she's said anything which might give me pause for thought?
You didn’t read the report, right?
[edited for spelling]

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Taffer
[BI believe zaayrdragon has it right. [/B] Surely you don't agree with EVERYTHING zaayrdragon says, Taffer.

[Taffer]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Taffer,

The thing is I am not saying your belief is right or wrong, I am saying that you do not understand what your belief is. I am trying to show you why, but, sadly, you don't want to look.
I'm more then willing to, you just have not convinced me, nor given any arguments that have not already been countered.


Well, that doesn't follow at all. In fact I understand only too well. I've been there, realized my misunderstanding and moved on.

regards,
BillyJoe
And this can not be used to argue your 'right-ness'. Just because you "have been there before and have realised your misunderstanding" by no means prooves that you are either correct nor that we are incorrect. It simply means that you believe you have the question at hand answered in a satisfactory manor. What I don't understand is that you have yet to put forward an argument that has not already been countered. Perhaps if you were to put forward an argument that myself and others cannot counter, then we might 'see the light'.

[Taffer]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Surely you don't agree with EVERYTHING zaayrdragon says, Taffer.

No, in fact I don't, only those I agree with...obviously. How is that relevant? Or are you trying to assert that I am simply following him blindly?

[Taffer]

Originally posted by Anders
Well I do understand some about the world,
[snip]
You didn’t read the report, right?
[edited for spelling]

That very well worded. however, I'm not sure that perfect continuity is required to maintain the same 'sense of self' that we are talking about in this situation. Althought the 'sense of self' may be maintained over the short periods involved in the various reactions and processes that make up the workings of the brain, I do not believe that they would if the brain ceased to function for, say, 5 minutes. Or 10.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Taffer
[B]And what proof do you have that it is he that understands and we that do not? Just because he agrees with you?

Necessarily if someone agrees with me they must be right.

[Anders]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Necessarily if someone agrees with me they must be right.
You forgot the ;)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Anders
You forgot the ;)

Ah yes, so I did.

;)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
[B]Wow, look everybody - Idiot Ian learned a new word today. Let's see how many times he'll use 'vacuous' in these posts!

In related stories - Ian has now reverted to calling everyone who is busily proving him wrong an 'idiot' again. 'sigh' He is painfully predictable, isn't he? In fact, he's as much proof that materialism is real as anything else, isn't he? Especially since he apparently learns nothing as time marches on... Oh, except for the occasional new word.



I was drunk last night when I made those posts. So quit whining.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon

For those of you entering the game a little behind the power curve, let's review the definition of 'materialism', shall we? Materialism is the view that everything that actually exists, is material or physical. That is, nothing unreal exists.



Nothing "unreal" exists?? I have no idea what this means. What do you define as an "unreal" thing, and what is meant by labelling it as "unreal"?



So if there is a 'soul', it must be a material soul;



Not at all. Even tables and chairs and the whole "physical" Universe is not material. Therefore a fortiori souls are not material.



it must conform to material laws of matter and energy,



There are no such thing as "material laws". You must mean physical laws.



including conservation of mass/energy laws. Ian, of course, rejects this outright and insists it is more logical to believe in unreal properties, things such as invisible, intangible, and completely undetectible souls and Gods which, nonetheless, form the basis for all reality.



That's just reality for you. What would it mean to touch the self, see the self, feel the self etc?? We can only touch, see, feel our bodies, not selves or consciousnesses.





He is determined that subjective experience is unreal / non-physical in nature,



Subjective experience is all there is. If that is unreal then everything is unreal :rolleyes:




Materialism doesn't deny the soul, Gentle Reader;



Yes it does.

[Taffer]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Necessarily if someone agrees with me they must be right.
Only by the assumption that you are right. Which is, of course, just an assumption.


Nothing "unreal" exists?? I have no idea what this means. What do you define as an "unreal" thing, and what is meant by labelling it as "unreal"?

This is an example of you simply not understanding things that you claim to. He means that there is nothing that cannot be explained from simple physical laws and values. There is no 'magical sub-energy that permiates all living and non living forms with an endo-thermic anti-vibration of hydrogenating implosion force'.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Taffer
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Necessarily if someone agrees with me they must be right.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Only by the assumption that you are right. Which is, of course, just an assumption.



I was only making a joke. :rolleyes:



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nothing "unreal" exists?? I have no idea what this means. What do you define as an "unreal" thing, and what is meant by labelling it as "unreal"?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


This is an example of you simply not understanding things that you claim to. He means that there is nothing that cannot be explained from simple physical laws and values.



Then explain the self or consciousness.

[asthmatic camel]

CHANCE wrote;

asthmatic camel

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
know I'm going to get slammed for saying this but I just can't help myself. It would be entirely possible to build a spaceship capable of carrying people to Mars. So far as I'm aware, no-one has any idea how a "teleporter" might be built.

So why on earth are you all discussing this ? Make a choice between the possible and the extremely improbable ? What for ?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thought experiments are fun, interesting Ian question is really making you examine what you think of your self as, the soundness behind teleportation is irrelevant.

Sure, thought experiments are fun. My point was why don't you all think about something productive; like how to build a teleporter ? :D

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
I'm more then willing to, you just have not convinced me, nor given any arguments that have not already been countered.Would you care to point them out because I'm having trouble finding these refutations of my arguments. Seems to me you are quoting bits of my argument and counterpointing them with you own view, I haven't seen any refutations.

Originally posted by Taffer
And this can not be used to argue your 'right-ness'. Just because you "have been there before and have realised your misunderstanding" by no means prooves that you are either correct nor that we are incorrect. It simply means that you believe you have the question at hand answered in a satisfactory manor. I concede your point. :)
But I was not using this to prove that I am right. I was using it in an attempt to press upon you that there is a materialist viewpoint that does not use the concept of a soul/spirit/essence (however well hidden) to explain the teleporter experiment.

Originally posted by Taffer
What I don't understand is that you have yet to put forward an argument that has not already been countered. Perhaps if you were to put forward an argument that myself and others cannot counter, then we might 'see the light'. Taffer, I cannot see where these arguments have been refuted. I would love to see you (any of you) take one of my posts and dissect it away point by point. It hasn't happened to date. You have used the soul (which I do not accept is part of materialism whatever zaayr may say) to resolve a puzzle which I am resolving without resorting to such an unneccessary (sic)concept.

Originally posted by Taffer
Perhaps if you were to put forward an argument that myself and others cannot counter, then we might 'see the light'. How about seeing if you can resolve those teleporter puzzles without resorting to the soul concept (however well hidden from view)

regards,
BillyJoe.

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
No, in fact I don't, only those I agree with...obviously. How is that relevant? Or are you trying to assert that I am simply following him blindly? Well, I wasn't drunk last night but, yeah, I forgot the smily as well. :)

BJ

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
.....I'm not sure that perfect continuity is required to maintain the same 'sense of self' that we are talking about in this situation. Well, here is a start at understanding that your point of view cannot be correct. Your view actually demands continuity in space time and pattern. Otherwise your "hidden soul" must definitely be of the Idealist variety (ie portable) and you cannot claim to be a Materialist in any way, shape or form.
And you are still talking about a "sense of self". This requires something/someone to have this sense of self, whereas, from the point of view of Materialism, there is nothing ("hidden soul") that has a sense of self, there is just a self.

Originally posted by Taffer
Although the 'sense of self' may be maintained over the short periods involved in the various reactions and processes that make up the workings of the brain, I do not believe that they would if the brain ceased to function for, say, 5 minutes. Or 10. So, who would you say you are if you had just been revived from a brain dead situation. Would you have died and another Taffer taken over your brain and body. Or are you again in that brain and body?
You see it just won't work! Can you see that? It can't work.
See if you can talk about this topic without implying, directly or indirectly, that there is something/someone having a self. In other words, try to talk about this topic without resorting to the use of the soul concept. Then you will be on the way to a Materialist view of identity.

regards,
BillyJoe

[Z]

BJ, please keep in mind, I'm not claiming that Materialism says a soul exists; rather, I'm saying that Materialism claims that, if souls exist, then they must be material objects (as in, matter/energy constructs) which can be analyzed, measured, broken-down, reproduced, etc. In fact, AT PRESENT, Materialism claims that Souls do not exist OR are as of yet undetectible given current scientific knowledge.

In fact, I'd venture a guess to say that Materialism doesn't actually deny the existance of anything unless the thing in question is specifically meant to be immaterial in nature.

Remember, by the three questions of this test, we are offered the idea that the 'soul' is material in nature (see question 3), which includes the soul into the materialism P.O.V. Thus, it is the very test Ian is using to point out apparent flaws in the materialism POV that suggests a soul exists, not me. Quit attributing a statement to me that is false.

Materialism likewise doesn't deny God, only states that if God exists, God must be a material being.

IN fact, materialism is perfectly in-line with any of a number of other philosophies, as long as we can assume that there exists some material state which we are presently unaware of that allows for the presence of material objects of such ethereal-like nature as to 'seem' immaterial to us now. For example, centuries ago, the idea that air was made of 'something' would be laughed at. Even more recently, the idea that 'sound' had a material component was met with derision. Moving right along, the idea that 'light' had measurable material quantities was considered ridiculous. At each progressive stage of scientific development, we turn more of the 'immaterial' into the 'material'. Why could this not then be applied to still more apparently immaterial concepts, like 'spirit' and 'soul'? In fact, what Materialism suggests is, eventually, everything will be reduced to material components; every form of matter and energy will be recognized in some material form.

Now, BJ, I do agree that the most common definition of 'soul' does, in fact, include the term 'immaterial' within said definition, and by such definition, there can be no 'soul' in a materialistic universe; however, please try to realise that such definition of 'soul' is in the same position that the definition of 'light' was in hundreds of years ago... light was also considered 'immaterial' at one point, as was air before that, and sound, and heat... As our understanding of things advances, the definition of 'soul' may very well be rewritten to eliminate 'immaterial' references. If the future in the Three Questions were true, this would necessarily have to happen, in fact.

Anyway, please, discuss away - and take my advice: never try to argue reason and logic while drunk. Sure, it worked for Plato, but we all know how far his philosophy got.

[Taffer]

BillyJoe, we have not used a soul at all. I do not believe there is a soul, and can explain the experiment in question without one. You say we have not refuted your argument. Well, I'm sorry, but it seems to me that all of your arguments have, by us, been explained from our point of view. Ok, sure, that might not be a counter argument, but it simply explains those that you say cannot be explained.

How about if I go through my arguent one more time.

Let us assume that x = your physical body, and that x2 = the physical body of the clone. They are, in fact, exactly the same but for their physical location (and their location in 'time'), thus they are two different things.
Let us also assume that your 'personality, experiences, memories and so on' = y. This will be the same for x and x2; they have exact copies of x's brain, so they will have the same personality etc, as what is in the brain is the only thing that effects such things.
Let us again assume that z is the 'perspective' of said individuals. Z is how you experience the world. It is your conciousness, what you consider you, and is your point of view. Z is created by the brain, just as everything else is, but it is a combination of both hardwired features (such as memory) and 'softwire' features (such as continuing electrical charge and chemical reactions). If any of these 'softwire' features cease to function, Z will stop. If they are, after a time, started up again, Z is different...it is a different 'person' who happens to have the same y. Why, you say? Because for z to remain continuous, brain functions must be continous. If z stops (for example, being killed in the transporter) then the new z will actually be z2...it will feel the same as z, but this is only because it has the same y...it is actually a different z, because there was no continuity between the two x's.

So in the end, x,y,z is dead, and x2,y,z2 is created. To the outside observer, x2,y,z2 is exactly the same as x,y,z. But z2 is not continous with z, and even if y is the same, this does not mean it is the same person. Only that the person is exactly the same as the original. Remember, please, that z is not continous, and that z must be continous for z to remain z.

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
BJ, please keep in mind, I'm not claiming that Materialism says a soul exists; rather, I'm saying that Materialism claims that, if souls exist, then they must be material objects (as in, matter/energy constructs) which can be analyzed, measured, broken-down, reproduced, etc. In fact, AT PRESENT, Materialism claims that Souls do not exist OR are as of yet undetectible given current scientific knowledge. Well, I'm glad we are agreed about that last bit. But still, a soul is, by definition, an immaterial entity and hence can never be part of materialism. If we discover some material thing in there that we have not found before it cannot be a soul by definition.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
In fact, I'd venture a guess to say that Materialism doesn't actually deny the existance of anything unless the thing in question is specifically meant to be immaterial in nature. Exactly.....like the soul!

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Materialism likewise doesn't deny God, only states that if God exists, God must be a material being.Well, perhaps Materialism has nothing to say about things that are not known to exist.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
IN fact, materialism is perfectly in-line with any of a number of other philosophies, as long as we can assume that there exists some material state which we are presently unaware of that allows for the presence of material objects of such ethereal-like nature as to 'seem' immaterial to us now. For example, centuries ago, the idea that air was made of 'something' would be laughed at. Even more recently, the idea that 'sound' had a material component was met with derision. Moving right along, the idea that 'light' had measurable material quantities was considered ridiculous. At each progressive stage of scientific development, we turn more of the 'immaterial' into the 'material'. Why could this not then be applied to still more apparently immaterial concepts, like 'spirit' and 'soul'? In fact, what Materialism suggests is, eventually, everything will be reduced to material components; every form of matter and energy will be recognized in some material form. Can we add faeries to this list. They are my favourite. Perhaps Materialism accepts that faeries may exist as well, but, if they do, they will be found to be material. There is no end once you start accepting one possibility, you have accept them all.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Now, BJ, I do agree that the most common definition of 'soul' does, in fact, include the term 'immaterial' within said definition, and by such definition, there can be no 'soul' in a materialistic universe.... Thank you.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
..... however, please try to realise that such definition of 'soul' is in the same position that the definition of 'light' was in hundreds of years ago... light was also considered 'immaterial' at one point, as was air before that, and sound, and heat... As our understanding of things advances, the definition of 'soul' may very well be rewritten to eliminate 'immaterial' references. If the future in the Three Questions were true, this would necessarily have to happen, in fact. Light we can see. Sound we can hear. Air and heat can be felt. Quite a different situation than soul and God don't ou think? Also, are faeries in this category as well. :cool:

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
[BAnyway, please, discuss away - and take my advice: never try to argue reason and logic while drunk. Sure, it worked for Plato, but we all know how far his philosophy got. [/B] No, no, no, you are confusing we with Ian. I hardly ever drink and I am never drunk.

BillyJoe
(Hmmmm.....maybe he still thinks BillyJoe and Ian are the same)

[Z]

OK, last post for a while, I promise -

Faeries and Dragons too - I have an invisible, intangible, crystalline red dragon who protects me. My wife has an invisible, intangible, purple faery. So most anything is possible.

But God? Don't let's be silly... :D

ZD

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Faeries and Dragons too - I have an invisible, intangible, crystalline red dragon who protects me. My wife has an invisible, intangible, purple faery. So most anything is possible.

But God? Don't let's be silly... :D And I thought you'd never understand.
There really must be a God!

BillyJoe.

[Soapy Sam]

Ian said-
"I cannot understand people who just live their lives and never ever think to themselves about anything, about what they ultimately are, where they are going, the meaning or purpose to it all. Our lives should involve more than bare living."

Ian - your inability to understand them would in no way invalidate such attitudes if they actually existed. (I doubt anyone is actually wholly uninterested in these matters). Merely because people do not agree with your views on such issues, or find the subject riveting, does not mean they do not have such views.

In my opinion, the point of questioning anything is not to ramble on forever, but to arrive at acceptable answers, then move on. The answers may be tentative. They may be wrong. So long as they are not contradictory to known fact, they are usable working hypotheses.

My own assumptions about such questions were formed long ago- as, I suspect , were yours. Mine work fine for me. I'm glad yours do, for you. I see little to be gained by incessant repetition of the same discussions. It's interesting when you're thirteen. Then it gets dull.

That said, the high response count to your posts indicate I'm in a minority. Which makes two of us, I suppose.

[chance]

BillJoe Chance> A fugitive has escaped the police, breaks into the teleport complex and zaps himself to somewhere (next room, Mars, don’t matter), is he (the replicated) guilty of any crime? Only if the original was guilty. And, if the original somehow survives, both the original and the duplicate are guilty. If the original survives and accidentally multiple duplicates are made they are all quilty. Yes, assume he (the original) is guilty. Why is the replicate individual guilty? He has only existed for a few moments, the original is dead! Consider this, currently we are assuming the teleport is nice and clean (star trek) but what if all worked as described except, the original body slumps to the floor in a bloody pulp as part of the process (all else is the same). Would that change anything?

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Atlas
Yes, assume he (the original) is guilty. Why is the replicate individual guilty? He has only existed for a few moments, the original is dead! Consider this, currently we are assuming the teleport is nice and clean (star trek) but what if all worked as described except, the original body slumps to the floor in a bloody pulp as part of the process (all else is the same). Would that change anything? Can't help but interject...

I bet it would throw the police off the trail. :D


(Nice scenario and question)

[BillyJoe]

chance,

Originally posted by chance
Yes, assume he (the original) is guilty. Why is the replicate individual guilty? He has only existed for a few moments, the original is dead! The self in the duplicate is identical to the self in the original. Therefore, the duplicate self feels identically to how the original self feels. He committed the crime as surely as the original. It is in his memory. The idea for the crime, the planning of the crime, and the execution of the crime are all in his memory as clear and fresh as in the memory of the original. The guilt (if he feels guilt) felt by the orignal is also felt by the duplicate. If the original is to be punished for this crime, then the duplicate must also. If the original is to be taken out of circulation to protect the public from repeat behaviour, then likewise for the duplicate because he also would be likely to repeat behaviour.

Originally posted by chance
Consider this, currently we are assuming the teleport is nice and clean (star trek) but what if all worked as described except, the original body slumps to the floor in a bloody pulp as part of the process (all else is the same). Would that change anything? No, not at all.

BillyJoe.

[Taffer]

I agree with that, to be honest. Even though the duplicate didn't commit the crime (as in, his body didn't), as you say the planning, memories etc are still there, so I would send him to prison just like the original. If not because he actually commited the crime, but because he is capable of doing so again.

Therefore, you are punishing the original for the crime, and the duplicate for being a duplicate of the person who commited the crime ;).

[Atlas]

That's a strange thing.

In my previous post I am quoting Chance. But it looks like I'm quoting myself! My apologies. I don't remember doing that.

I can only guess that this conversation about evil twins brought mine to the surface.

I really like the scenario. From my own perspective, which I think is also how chance is looking at it, the new duplicate is a new person and cannot possibly be guilty of the crimes perpetrated by his Original version.

But BillyJoe came back strong. The Duplicate has the memories, desires and intentions. He may be an extreme danger to society.

I don't know how you could get him. Maybe since he is "conjured" out of thin air, we could hunt him down as a witch and burn him.

(Whoops, um... sorry zaayrdragon - would you object to that approach?)

[Z]

"Throw another Pagan on the fire..." (sounds best when sung...)

:D

C'mon - you know Witches don't burn - that's why you set them on fire. If they burn, they aren't Witches. Same reason you toss 'em in water bound - if they drown, they are innocent.

:D

[chance]

BillyJoe, Taffer and Atlas chance> Why is the replicate individual guilty? He has only existed for a few moments, the original is dead! The self in the duplicate is identical to the self in the original. Therefore, the duplicate self feels identically to how the original self feels. He committed the crime as surely as the original. It is in his memory. The idea for the crime, the planning of the crime, and the execution of the crime are all in his memory as clear and fresh as in the memory of the original. The guilt (if he feels guilt) felt by the orignal is also felt by the duplicate. If the original is to be punished for this crime, then the duplicate must also. If the original is to be taken out of circulation to protect the public from repeat behaviour, then likewise for the duplicate because he also would be likely to repeat behaviour. Good answer, this response relies on a POV that the self is very materialistic, no more than a collection of electrical patterns in the brain. The criminal act committed previously is attached to that ‘brain pattern’ the body that that pattern inhabits is irrelevant, I think someone like interesting Ian would have to take a contrary position and let the duplicate go free. The problem is off course the law, in that it must recognise this point of view, currently with a dead body (or equivalent) in the transmitter, I’m sure a good lawyer could argue otherwise.

BUT there is a problem with this outlook, is a criminal who suffers from some form of permeant amnesia (or brain damage), also ‘guilty’ (thus requiring punishment) of a crime committed before the amnesia?

[jj]

Originally posted by Rob Lister
I chose to be teleported because if the difference between the old-me on earth and the new-me on Mars is "indistinguishable", then the new me is the old me.

In effect, I chose a 100% chance of being dead for three minutes over a 50% chance of being dead forever.

Does my logic fail?

I think Einstein would back me up on this one if he hadn't gone and got himself dead.

Hm, is that 3 minutes the transmission time? I forget how long it takes at 'c' between here and Mars (and what position is Mars in relative to Earth?). If that's transmission time, you're travelling at 'c'. Does any time elapse for you? Are even dead at all?

[jj]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
However, neither the dualists nor I am obliged to believe this. What might happen is that the soul would start to operate through the reconstituted body.


Ok, you dualists and the like may assume that the soul goes along with the material, I guess.


So if this reconstituted self would definitely be alive, then I would be happy to take the transporter. It's just that I think most probably just a corpse would be created.


Well, so do I, but for reasons entirely different, having to do with the difficulty of locating atoms back where they belong, and having to do with transmission error. I think the problem would be material, and the question, although admittedly hypothetical, is outside of physics.

For the hypotheses that it is inside physics, and is known to work, of course I'd take the transporter.


What I would definitely reject is the idea that there could be 2 selves ie if we didn't kill off the original so there was 2 copies of me. Materialists have to accept there could be 2 selves and thereby have to face the logical conundrums thereby created. I don't.

There is no logical conundrum if two exist, you made a copy. So what? I don't think you can make a copy, but that's a different problem altogether.

There are days, especially at standards meetings, when I wish I could in fact run the copier on myself. I'm quite sure that some of the other folks are in fact relieved that physics and the uncertainty principle still reign.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by chance
Good answer, this response relies on a POV that the self is very materialistic, no more than a collection of electrical patterns in the brain. The criminal act committed previously is attached to that ‘brain pattern’ the body that that pattern inhabits is irrelevant, I think someone like interesting Ian would have to take a contrary position and let the duplicate go free. The problem is off course the law, in that it must recognise this point of view, currently with a dead body (or equivalent) in the transmitter, I’m sure a good lawyer could argue otherwise.



There wouldn't be any duplicate, just a corpse.

[jj]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
There wouldn't be any duplicate, just a corpse.

We understand that this is your position. What we don't see is your evidence.

[chance]

Interesting Ian There wouldn't be any duplicate, just a corpse. Well that’s a bit of a discussion killer. There is no philosophical dilemma if teleportation does not work in the first place. For the purpose of this discussion we must assume that it does work, as per the OP.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
There wouldn't be any duplicate, just a corpse.
Why couldnt a new soul infest the new body?

[Taffer]

Didn't you know? Souls only work on bodies born the 'natural' way ;).

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
I agree with that, to be honest. Even though the duplicate didn't commit the crime (as in, his body didn't), as you say the planning, memories etc are still there, so I would send him to prison just like the original. If not because he actually commited the crime, but because he is capable of doing so again.

Therefore, you are punishing the original for the crime, and the duplicate for being a duplicate of the person who commited the crime ;). You may be closer than you think. :)

There is absolutely no way to distinguish the duplicate from the original. Except position in space. And that is not an important difference: The self after recovery from coma may be in hospital, whereas the self before being knocked out cold may have been on a football field. Unless you want to say the self is present during the period of unconsciousness, this means spacial continuity is not essential for the self.
There is, therefore, no basis for saying you are the self in the original but not in the duplicate. This is why the version of the teleporter experiment where the original is scanned and vapourized and the duplicate produced in the originals spacial coordinates is so instructive. If it is done instantly whilst the original is going about his business, he will feel absolutely no difference. There can be no difference. There is no difference.
The duplicate self is just as legitimately you as the original is you. If the above teleporter experiment happened to you, you would notice absolutely no difference. This is easy to understand. The second part is not so easy to understand but it can be understood. What's more, it must be correct: If the original survives, there are two selves who are equally legitimately you. All that's needed is a bit of lateral thinking.

BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by chance
Interesting Ian

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There wouldn't be any duplicate, just a corpse.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well that’s a bit of a discussion killer. There is no philosophical dilemma if teleportation does not work in the first place. For the purpose of this discussion we must assume that it does work, as per the OP.

I never said that teleportation couldn't work. But if it does work then the original must necessarily end up a corpse.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Why couldnt a new soul infest the new body?

Because we're talking about a matter duplicator. A matter duplicator would only duplicate matter.

Edited to add. Where would the new soul come from?

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by chance
....this response relies on a POV that the self is very materialistic, no more than a collection of electrical patterns in the brain. The criminal act committed previously is attached to that ‘brain pattern’ the body that that pattern inhabits is irrelevant.... Yes! Tell Taffer!

Originally posted by chance
I think someone like interesting Ian would have to take a contrary position and let the duplicate go free. Yes, I think you are correct. Interesting Ian?

Originally posted by chance
BUT there is a problem with this outlook, is a criminal who suffers from some form of permanent amnesia (or brain damage), also ‘guilty’ (thus requiring punishment) of a crime committed before the amnesia? Very interesting.

He certainly wouldn't feel guilty. Perhaps he wouldn't even be likely to repeat the behaviour because he wouldn't remember and therefore wouldn't be influenced by his previous thoughts and emotions. On the other hand there are the victims or their surviving family and friends to consider.

Also, if we consider them not guilty by reason of no memory of the crime, then perhaps an appropriate managemnet of a criminal not so afflicted would be to induce complete amnesia in them.

BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by chance
Interesting Ian Well that’s a bit of a discussion killer. There is no philosophical dilemma if teleportation does not work in the first place. For the purpose of this discussion we must assume that it does work, as per the OP. Yes, Ian, get with it. We are discussing the POV of a Materialist.

[Taffer]

And here is where I disagree.

I think that spacial continuity is needed to maintain a 'self'. While both the duplicate and the original are both you, you only feel like one of them. That is to say, the original.

My point is simply that from your point of view, my duplicate and I are identical, and are both me. However, from the perspective of the original, only one is the original. Namely, the original. Both the original and the duplicate have seperate, yet identical, selves. They are the same, but they are not one and the same. Get the difference?

In the crime situation, I would argue that the duplicate is guilty simply by the fact that it is possible that he would reoffend; with the same memories, feelings, motivations etc, it is all to likely that he would, for example, kill again.
However, I do not think he is guilty of actually commiting the crime. He, the duplicate, did not commit the crime himself. The original did. They have the same sense of self, it is true, and no-one would be able to tell them apart. But the duplicates hands did not, for example, pull the trigger. The original's did.

However, this doesn't change anything, as the way I see it they should both be locked up.

Again I go back to the point I raised earlier. If you are faced with the situation when one of you must die, would you choose yourself or your duplicate? Of course, by nature of self preservation, you would choose the duplicate. If you don't consider it the same thing then, why do you do so afterwards?

[Interesting Ian]

Chance said:
I think someone like interesting Ian would have to take a contrary position and let the duplicate go free.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And BillyJoe regarding this said:

Yes, I think you are correct. Interesting Ian?




To which I said:

"There wouldn't be any duplicate, just a corpse".



Chance replied:

Well that’s a bit of a discussion killer. There is no philosophical dilemma if teleportation does not work in the first place. For the purpose of this discussion we must assume that it does work, as per the OP.

BillyJoe agreeing observed:
Yes, Ian, get with it. We are discussing the POV of a Materialist.



But Chance and BillyJoe asked me what my position is. Therefore if they don't want to know my position, but want to know what I think a materialist should say, then the question should have been put differently.

So to respond, the duplicate most certainly should not go free. He is fully responsible for the crime. This is extremely obvious, and if anyone disagrees then they are not materialists.

I have no idea why people think I should take a contrary position since you are asking what my position would be if I were a materialist :rolleyes:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by chance
BUT there is a problem with this outlook, is a criminal who suffers from some form of permanent amnesia (or brain damage), also ‘guilty’ (thus requiring punishment) of a crime committed before the amnesia?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BillyJoe
Very interesting.

He certainly wouldn't feel guilty.



If materialism is true there is no crime. Our actions are simply a result of physical laws. Would you reprimand a boulder which rolled down a hill and ended up running over your toe?? A criminal is no more to be reprimanded than that boulder.

[Taffer]

A bolder has no choice.

We have a choice.

Next...

[Z]

f materialism is true there is no crime. Our actions are simply a result of physical laws. Would you reprimand a boulder which rolled down a hill and ended up running over your toe?? A criminal is no more to be reprimanded than that boulder.

Exactly right. Which is why the assignment of 'good and evil' are arbitrary ones, meant only to protect the 'common good' i.e. the social and community health, rather than referring to some 'objective good'.

If someone commits a 'crime', then they are violating the laws produced by man to protect man in general; but to punish them for commiting such crime is faulty. Better, as BJ suggests, to induce a state of amnesia (provided we could also erase the motivating factors leading to the crime) in the criminal. Behavioural modification would be far better than punishment, and far more logical.

But until we possess that technology, we're left with crime deterrent i.e. fear of punishment.

As to the question of 'soul', Ian, do recall that question 3 in this scenario stipulates a material soul. Thus, the question remains valid: How does the teletransporter duplicate a 'soul' in question one before the discovery of the properties of said 'soul'? and if no soul is duplicated, where does the clone on Mars get a 'soul' from?

Which is why these questions are fundamentally flawed to begin with.

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
I think that spacial continuity is needed to maintain a 'self'. Then what about that scenario where the original is vapourized and the duplicate instantly appears in the exact same orientation and position in space as the original.
And what about when you wake up in hospital after being knocked out on the footy field?

Originally posted by Taffer
While both the duplicate and the original are both you, you only feel like one of them. That is to say, the original. But what is it that makes this difference if spacial continuity is unimportant as surely it must be?

Originally posted by Taffer
My point is simply that from your point of view, my duplicate and I are identical, and are both me. Yes! You are getting close. They are both you

Originally posted by Taffer
However, from the perspective of the original, only one is the original. Namely, the original. ....and the original is you! And, from the perspective of the duplicate, only one is the duplicate. Namely, the duplicate......and the duplicate is you!

Originally posted by Taffer
Both the original and the duplicate have seperate, yet identical, selves. They are the same, but they are not one and the same. Get the difference? I get what you are saying but I do not see a difference. What applies to the original applies equally well to the duplicate. Perfect symmetry. In which case what exactly is it that makes you say that you are the original and not the duplicate?

Originally posted by Taffer
In the crime situation, I would argue that the duplicate is guilty simply by the fact that it is possible that he would reoffend; with the same memories, feelings, motivations etc, it is all to likely that he would, for example, kill again. Then should we find quilty all those are going to commit crimes in the future - before thay have actually committed the crime? That would logically follow wouldn't it?

Originally posted by Taffer
However, I do not think he is guilty of actually commiting the crime. He, the duplicate, did not commit the crime himself. The original did. They have the same sense of self, it is true, and no-one would be able to tell them apart. But the duplicates hands did not, for example, pull the trigger. The original's did. The hands are only the agent of the crime. The quilty party is the self. And the two selves are indistinguishable.

Originally posted by Taffer
However, this doesn't change anything, as the way I see it they should both be locked up. Yes.....These selves are identical. They are you. You are quilty. And therefore both these selves are quilty

Originally posted by Taffer
Again I go back to the point I raised earlier. If you are faced with the situation when one of you must die, would you choose yourself or your duplicate? Of course, by nature of self preservation, you would choose the duplicate. If you don't consider it the same thing then, why do you do so afterwards? I would put it this way....
The self in the original would choose the self in the duplicate.
The self in the duplicate would choose the self in the original.
What you are not explaining is why you consider yourself to be the original and not the duplicate. There is no basis for this. Give me a reason - other than a soul/spirit/essence - why you should be one and not the other.
Both the self in the original and the self in the duplicate are you. Which is not to say that you look through both eyes but rather that there are two of you.

BillyJoe

[Taffer]

Aha! Now we are getting somewhere :).

Then what about that scenario where the original is vapourized and the duplicate instantly appears in the exact same orientation and position in space as the original.
And what about when you wake up in hospital after being knocked out on the footy field?

Ok, put it this way. I think that to maintain the same 'self' (note, not the same sense of self) the brain functions must be uninterrupted. When you are knocked out on the footy field, they are not innterrupted enough to result in the 'new' self. But when you are vapourized and a new duplicate is created, there is interruption to the brain functions. However, if the process was done slowly enough so as to not interrupt the brain functions at all, for example replacing the brain with artifical parts, then I would say that the 'new' and the 'old' 'self' are the same.

You asked why I think that the original is the original and doesn't think that the duplicate is also the original. Because they are seperate 'selves', which happen to have the same sense of self. They are not the same, in the same way that two red cars of the same model are not the same. They look the same, they behave the same, they feel the same, but they are not the same. There is no continuity between the brain functions of the original and the brain functions of the duplicate.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Taffer
A bolder has no choice.

We have a choice.

Next...

Libertarian free will is incompatible with materialism.

[Z]

Libertarian free will is incompatible with materialism.

Exactly true - we only have the illusion of choice; in fact, we are responding to the interactions of uncounted particle reactions throughout our brains, environment, etc. Every quantum fluctuation plays a role in determining which choice we will make - or not make. For all practical purposes, we have a choice and a boulder does not; but at the root of reality, we have no choice either.

I think that's the materialism point of view, yes Ian?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Exactly right. Which is why the assignment of 'good and evil' are arbitrary ones, meant only to protect the 'common good' i.e. the social and community health, rather than referring to some 'objective good'.

If someone commits a 'crime', then they are violating the laws produced by man to protect man in general; but to punish them for commiting such crime is faulty. Better, as BJ suggests, to induce a state of amnesia (provided we could also erase the motivating factors leading to the crime) in the criminal. Behavioural modification would be far better than punishment, and far more logical.

But until we possess that technology, we're left with crime deterrent i.e. fear of punishment.



Try telling that to Joe Bloggs and Miss J. Smith.

BTW, to defend materialism for a while, you can be a materialist and still maintain we have free will. How so? Well we can say that we indeed just do whatever we want to do, but that we find when we describe our behaviour afterwards, that it is in accordance with physical laws.

So physical laws do not dictate our behaviour, they do not govern our behaviour, rather they simply describe our behaviour.

Now!

To be consistent you need to maintain the same for all physical processes. So the Universe is not governed by physical laws, but merely described by physical laws.

So the Earth does not orbit the Sun because of physical laws but because of . . um . .what?? Well it just does so for no reason; but the pertinent point here is that afterwards physical laws can describe its behaviour.

The difficulty in this picture is that unless we say all physical things and processes are conscious, then you are ascribing different reasons for why we act as compared to non-conscious things like the Earth; the first by intent, the second by the ". um . .what".

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Exactly true - we only have the illusion of choice; in fact, we are responding to the interactions of uncounted particle reactions throughout our brains, environment, etc. Every quantum fluctuation plays a role in determining which choice we will make - or not make. For all practical purposes, we have a choice and a boulder does not; but at the root of reality, we have no choice either.

I think that's the materialism point of view, yes Ian?

Ummm . .no . .materialists do believe in free will. It's called compatibilism (http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014SECT1). Now I confess to being a bit confused here. Is this "compatibilsim" what I expressed in my above post? It seems to me that what I expressed in the above post is the only type of free will that materialists can believe in (ie we can do whatever we like and find afterwards our behaviour can be described by physical laws). But would that therefore be appropriately called determinism? If I can do whatever I like then this seems to run counter to the definitions of determinism I've encountered.

Any philosophers out there can enlighten me?

[Interesting Ian]

Hmmmm . .further confusion. The definition of compatibilism says:

According to compatibilists, we do have free will. They propound a sense of the word 'free' according to which free will is compatible with determinism, even though determinism is the view that the history of the universe is fixed in such a way that nothing can happen otherwise than it does because everything that happens is necessitated by what has already gone before.
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014SECT1


But it would seem our behaviour is not necessitated. I very strongly suspect from my immediate experience that this is not true because I am immediately aware of my own causal power to make alternative decisions.

Unless they mean by "necessitated" that what I will do I will do, because afterwards I did do it! But this is vacuous. You might as well say we are necessitated because we can view a video recording of some past occurrence of peoples' behaviour, and they repeat the same behaviour on each viewing of the tape!

The pertinent point here is what are we necessitated by, or determined by?? If we are determined by physical laws then this is not compatible with free will. If the self determines its own behaviour, then is this "determinism" as people understand it??

[Z]

Wouldn't it be more proper to say that SOME materialists are compatiblists? Because, as near as I can tell, the logical extension of pure materialism is that every choice is the result of precise material processes, i.e. interactions of physical particles, energies, etc. combined with the manifestations of probabilities, resulting ultimately in what we call a 'choice'.

Consider a ball dropped through a maze of posts. If the ball is mechanically released, shouldn't it fall the same way every time? But, of course, it may not, and often does not. Does the ball, therefore, have a choice of how to fall? Of course not. (Depends on the maze and ball, of course - some can be constructed with very clear certain paths, while others may react differently...)

It's worse still when, instead of balls, we use various particles, which may spin or turn or move differently in response to any given state.

Now, considering the googleplex (sp?) of such particles within our brains, I'd say it's perfectly reasonable to say that the state we ascribe to 'free will' is also compatible with materialistic view of particle interactions.

Another point: to describe a past event in terms of 'physical laws' also includes the ability to determine future events in light of said laws. While we can describe the past orbit of Earth around the Sun in terms of physical laws, we can also determine its future orbit from the same laws. Thus, if we truly can describe the choice someone makes in terms of physical laws, then we can also predict future choices based upon those same laws. If we fail to make a prediction, we must assume that our understanding of said laws is as yet incomplete.

Obviously, our current knowledge is incomplete in many areas. The prime failing of a non-material POV is the failure to recognize this fact - the non-materialists seem to assume that some things exist that fall outside of physical laws, and therefore materialism must fail. Yet they often deny or ignore the concept that future knowledge may yet include those phenomenae which they claim are 'immaterial', thereby continuing to support materialism.

As science progresses, the case for materialism seems to grow stronger, not weaker; and the case for religion, faith, and immaterialism continues to grow weaker, not stronger.

[Z]

Consider also, that the neurological condition of considering a choice further plays into the particle interactions of such a choice. Just thinking about whether to choose vanilla over chocolate sets into motion new particle interactions; even the last-second decision to choose against your previously determined choice is caused by particle interactions in part set by deciding that you will alter your choice. Even such a counter-choice might be predicted, if we had a complete understanding of the mechanism of thought, consideration, etc. Even the willful decision to choose a decision counter to available evidence relies upon the condition of being able and willing to make such a choice.

Consider a life-or-death choice. Logically, our minds are hard-wired in most cases to select life over death. Yet we can choose to take the death option. But why do we do so? Usually, because there are sufficient counter-potentials set up - i.e. enough alternate conditions have been set that we override the life/death switch to achieve a more desireable benefit. Even suicide works this way - we set up the potentials that say that life is no longer worth living, and choose to end our lives.

In other words, Eventually, we will all be discovered to be P-zombies.

[Interesting Ian]

zaayrdragon

I don't see your post as being relevant at all to the free will issue.

I really don't know if all materialists have to be compatibilists, but it would seem so. A choice is a physical process according to the materialist. In other words a choice doesn't result from a physical process, that's a misunderstanding of materialism.

But I can't answer your question because I don't understand what compatibilism means. Does it mean free will as in having genuine power over the course of our lives so that our behaviour is not wholly constrained by external factors (physical laws)?? But how is this compatible with determinism? Of course they can say we are internally determined by none other than ourselves. But then how does their position differ from libertarianism??

Sorry for hijacking the thread. Might start a new thread on this in Philosophy and Religion.

[Z]

If it's any consolation - I don't exactly understand compatiblism either.

[Taffer]

. . um . .what??
It's called Gravity Ian.

I'd never thought about a choice as being a physical process, but I do agree (now that I do think about it) that it makes perfect sense. W appear to have a choice, probably because the physical processes that we use to come to a conclusion are very complicated and convoluted, so we tend no to think of them as effecting our choice.

Kudos to zaayrdragon, once again, for pointing this out to me.:)

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
Aha! Now we are getting somewhere :).Actually we're getting nowhere. :(

Originally posted by Taffer
I think that to maintain the same 'self'....the brain functions must be uninterrupted. And WHY do you think that? You haven't explained WHY you think that. If you don't think the brain's functions are interrrupted when you get knocked out cold, I don't know what else to say. At the very least, that part of the brain's function that produces consciousness, must have been interrupted.

Originally posted by Taffer
When you are knocked out on the footy field, they are not innterrupted enough to result in the 'new' self. How much is enough then? Surely a self depends on consciousness. So, if consciousness is interrupted, the self is

interrupted.

Originally posted by Taffer
(note, not the same sense of self) You are distinguishing "self" and "sense of self"? Do you mean that when you are unconscious, the "sense of self" is gone but the "self" remains? If so, what does this "self" consist of? A potential to have a "sense of self" perhaps?
Maybe you are talking about a soul without realizing it.

Originally posted by Taffer
But when you are vapourized and a new duplicate is created, there is interruption to the brain functions. Actually, one brain function is terminated and another identical brain function is created.

Originally posted by Taffer
However, if the process was done slowly enough so as to not interrupt the brain functions at all, for example replacing the brain with artifical parts, then I would say that the 'new' and the 'old' 'self' are the same. But WHY would you say that? And how slowly? If it is done a molecule at a time, is that enough? And, then, how long between between molecules? A second? A millisecond? A trillionth of a second? And, is two molecules at a time okay? What about three? Ten?

Originally posted by Taffer
You asked why I think that the original is the original and doesn't think that the duplicate is also the original. Well, I asked why you think you are the original but not the duplicate?

Originally posted by Taffer
Because they are seperate 'selves', which happen to have the same sense of self. Exactly! With no basis to say that you are the original and not the duplicate (considering they are identical and that spacial continuity does not matter)

Originally posted by Taffer
They are not the same, in the same way that two red cars of the same model are not the same. They look the same, they behave the same, they feel the same, but they are not the same. No argument from me. They are identical tough.

Originally posted by Taffer
There is no continuity between the brain functions of the original and the brain functions of the duplicate. There doesn't need to be. There is no continuity between the self after recovery from the anaesthetic and the self before the anaesthetic.


The self - as the examples of coma, anaesthesia and sleep demonstrate - can be discontinuous in time, place and pattern. If you don't think so, you must believe that the self persists through periods of unconsciousness. If so, you must explain how the self persists through periods of unconsciouness - without resorting to the concept of a soul.

BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

PREVENTION of nappy rash
Change nappy as soon as possible after it is soiled.


Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Wouldn't it be more proper to say that SOME materialists are compatiblists? Because, as near as I can tell, the logical extension of pure materialism is that every choice is the result of precise material processes, i.e. interactions of physical particles, energies, etc. combined with the manifestations of probabilities, resulting ultimately in what we call a 'choice'.

Consider a ball dropped through a maze of posts. If the ball is mechanically released, shouldn't it fall the same way every time? But, of course, it may not, and often does not. Does the ball, therefore, have a choice of how to fall? Of course not. (Depends on the maze and ball, of course - some can be constructed with very clear certain paths, while others may react differently...)

It's worse still when, instead of balls, we use various particles, which may spin or turn or move differently in response to any given state.

Now, considering the googleplex (sp?) of such particles within our brains, I'd say it's perfectly reasonable to say that the state we ascribe to 'free will' is also compatible with materialistic view of particle interactions.

Another point: to describe a past event in terms of 'physical laws' also includes the ability to determine future events in light of said laws. While we can describe the past orbit of Earth around the Sun in terms of physical laws, we can also determine its future orbit from the same laws. Thus, if we truly can describe the choice someone makes in terms of physical laws, then we can also predict future choices based upon those same laws. If we fail to make a prediction, we must assume that our understanding of said laws is as yet incomplete.

Obviously, our current knowledge is incomplete in many areas. The prime failing of a non-material POV is the failure to recognize this fact - the non-materialists seem to assume that some things exist that fall outside of physical laws, and therefore materialism must fail. Yet they often deny or ignore the concept that future knowledge may yet include those phenomenae which they claim are 'immaterial', thereby continuing to support materialism.

As science progresses, the case for materialism seems to grow stronger, not weaker; and the case for religion, faith, and immaterialism continues to grow weaker, not stronger.

Consider also, that the neurological condition of considering a choice further plays into the particle interactions of such a choice. Just thinking about whether to choose vanilla over chocolate sets into motion new particle interactions; even the last-second decision to choose against your previously determined choice is caused by particle interactions in part set by deciding that you will alter your choice. Even such a counter-choice might be predicted, if we had a complete understanding of the mechanism of thought, consideration, etc. Even the willful decision to choose a decision counter to available evidence relies upon the condition of being able and willing to make such a choice.

Consider a life-or-death choice. Logically, our minds are hard-wired in most cases to select life over death. Yet we can choose to take the death option. But why do we do so? Usually, because there are sufficient counter-potentials set up - i.e. enough alternate conditions have been set that we override the life/death switch to achieve a more desireable benefit. Even suicide works this way - we set up the potentials that say that life is no longer worth living, and choose to end our lives.

In other words, Eventually, we will all be discovered to be P-zombies.

TREATMENT of nappy rash
Clean with water, pat dry and apply a mild cortisone and antifungal cream.

[Taffer]

The self is different from consciousness, Billy.

When I was in 3rd form, I was hit by a car on the main road. I do not remember the events before this happened (about 10 minutes are lost to me). All I remember is waking up in the hospital.

I think that a continous 'sense of self' does not require a continous consciousness. When you are knocked out, the brain functions are still happening, with the exception of the 'conscious' functions. In otherwords, you are still you, but your brain is not processing external stimulae.

However, in the example that you are duplicated, the brain functions cease to be, and then are recreated somewhere else. There is a gap between the two functions.
Not only that, they are different functions, even though these functions are the same. Again, Billy, two red cars are not the same red car, but rather two identical red cars. There is no difference between this analogy and the 'self' argument. If you think that your clone is you, and you will experience life out of it's body, then you must agree that two identical red cars are actually the same car. This is not the case, billy. They are simply two identical red cars.

I think this because I think like a materalist. Materalism tells us that all things, even our 'self' and 'sense of self' are material things. I am assuming, of course, that these things are all caused by brain functions (as seems likely).

Lets go one step further. Lets call a 'sense of self' an attribute of a particular brain. Just like cars can be red, so too can brains have a sense of self. Lets call the sense of self that is BillyJoe 'red' and the sense of self that is Taffer 'blue'. A duplicate of me, will produce another blue self. However, they are not the same self, but rather two things that just happen to be blue. They are not the same car, just two that both happen to be red.

Do you understand now?

[Taffer]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
PREVENTION of nappy rash
Change nappy as soon as possible after it is soiled.




TREATMENT of nappy rash
Clean with water, pat dry and apply a mild cortisone and antifungal cream.

Care to explain?

[BillyJoe]

Ask zaayrdragon. I'm sure he will get it.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Taffer

II
. . um . .what?? (a reference to what makes the Earth go round the Sun if physical laws do not constrain or govern, but merely describe)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


It's called Gravity Ian.



Oh God! I just said that physical laws have to merely describe rather than govern. So gravity doesn't do anything at all! Gravity only describes the behaviour, not constrains it.

That is to say if you want to believe in free will as well as materialism.

I of course believe that physical laws govern. Not that I think gravitation is a real existent. But let's not complicate things. Hell, you get confused over the most simple things imaginable without making things any worse! ;)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillyJoe


You are distinguishing "self" and "sense of self"? Do you mean that when you are unconscious, the "sense of self" is gone but the "self" remains? If so, what does this "self" consist of?



Soul substance :p

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
The self is different from consciousness I didn't say it wasn't. I was saying that consciousness is necessary for the existence of a self. No consciousness, no self. But, yes, there is more to the self than just consciousness.

Originally posted by Taffer
When I was in 3rd form, I was hit by a car on the main road. I do not remember the events before this happened (about 10 minutes are lost to me). All I remember is waking up in the hospital. Wouldn't it be a pisser if you killed someone during those ten minutes and ended up in an institution for the criminally insane for something you could not remember doing. Something which, from the point of view of your self ;) , never really happened.

Originally posted by Taffer
I think that a continous 'sense of self' does not require a continous consciousness. . Now, Taffer, how can there be a sense of self without consciousness.? Now, really, how can there be?

Originally posted by Taffer
When you are knocked out, the brain functions are still happening, with the exception of the 'conscious' functions. In otherwords, you are still you, but your brain is not processing external stimulae. What is this you, then, that does not require consciousness for its existence. Can you describe what it is?

Originally posted by Taffer
However, in the example that you are duplicated, the brain functions cease to be, and then are recreated somewhere else. There is a gap between the two functions. There could be a thousand years between the two and it STILL would not matter. All that is important is the pattern.

Originally posted by Taffer
..... two red cars are not the same red car, but rather two identical red cars. There is no difference between this analogy and the 'self' argument...... Yes, agreed.

Originally posted by Taffer
..... If you think that your clone is you, and you will experience life out of it's body, then you must agree that two identical red cars are actually the same car. This is not the case, billy. They are simply two identical red cars. The original car is red and the duplicate car is red. Similarly, the original is BillyJoe and the duplicate is BillyJoe. This is the proper analogy here.

Originally posted by Taffer
Lets go one step further. Lets call a 'sense of self' an attribute of a particular brain. Just like cars can be red, so too can brains have a sense of self. Lets call the sense of self that is BillyJoe 'red' and the sense of self that is Taffer 'blue'. A duplicate of me, will produce another blue self. However, they are not the same self, but rather two things that just happen to be blue. They are not the same car, just two that both happen to be red.Really, Taffer, you are so close to seeing the solution here I can hardly believe you are still NOT seeing it.

The original car has the atribute, red -> The original car is red.
The duplicate car has the attribute, red -> The duplicate car is red.
(The attribute here is the colour)

The original brain has the attribute, Taffer -> The original brain is Taffer.
The duplicate brain has the attribute, Taffer. -> The duplicate brain is Taffer.
(The attribute here is the self)

BillyJoe

[Taffer]

AAAAAAAARG!!!

*few* Now that that is out of my system ;).

BillyJoe, I have for some time seen what your point is, I just do not agree with it.

Put it this way.

Original red car = Red
Duplicate red car = Red
Both cars are red. Sure they are. But they are not the same red car.

Original Taffer = Taffer
Duplicate Taffer = Taffer
They are both Taffer. Sure they are. But they are not the same Taffer.

About your point on consciousness and sense of self. Fair dues, to have a sense of self you must be conscious. I agree. However, that does not take away from the fact that I believe that a conscious brain is not required to maintain the same self.

Aren't these words so horribly bad at describing what we are talking about?

I consider myself the same 'self' now as I was before I was hit by a car. I do not consider the duplicate the same, as there was not continuity of brain functions. In the 'K.O.' example, there was (although not entirely continous, obviously, but IMHO enough to maintain the same self). Now, I realise that the next logical question is "when is it not enough". To this I'd have to say I don't know. Probably as long as the processes in the brain are continuing to be 'complicated' enough to produce the illusion of a self, then it's still the same self. Lets call this level x shall we?

If brain function drops below x, even for a moment, and returns again, the result is a new red car (to continue the analogy). Sure, it is still red, but it is not the same red car.

Please tell me that you are starting to understand?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Taffer
[B]AAAAAAAARG!!!

*few* Now that that is out of my system ;).



It's "phew" not few :eek:

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
BillyJoe, I have for some time seen what your point is, I just do not agree with it. Yes I know you have. But I am trying to get you to agree to it. I am trying to show you how it is correct. That is what you are not seeing. That it is the correct view from the point of view of materialsm.

Originally posted by Taffer
Original red car = Red
Duplicate red car = Red
Both cars are red. Sure they are. But they are not the same red car.

Original Taffer = Taffer
Duplicate Taffer = Taffer
They are both Taffer. Sure they are. But they are not the same Taffer.
You have said that repeatedly and I have repeatedly agreed with you. I still agree, wholeheartedly and sincerely, I do.

Originally posted by Taffer
About your point on consciousness and sense of self. Fair dues, to have a sense of self you must be conscious. I agree. However, that does not take away from the fact that I believe that a conscious brain is not required to maintain the same self. So, if the sense of self requires consciousness, how can it be maintained in the absence of consciousness? It seems a contradiction to me. Doesn't it to you?

Originally posted by Taffer
I consider myself the same 'self' now as I was before I was hit by a car. I do not consider the duplicate the same, as there was not continuity of brain functions. In the 'K.O.' example, there was (although not entirely continous, obviously, but IMHO enough to maintain the same self). Now, I realise that the next logical question is "when is it not enough". To this I'd have to say I don't know. Probably as long as the processes in the brain are continuing to be 'complicated' enough to produce the illusion of a self, then it's still the same self. Lets call this level x shall we? There have been cases of young children pulled out of freezing cold water and revived after an hour of submersion. What sort of brain function, if any, could be left to "maintain the self"? Taffer, can you see that you are beating a dead horse here?

Originally posted by Taffer
Please tell me that you are starting to understand? Yes, I do, Taffer. Honestly I do. As I said, I've been there. I wonder, though, if you are much too attached to this view to ever see why it is not correct.

regards,
BillyJoe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Taffer
all we?

If brain function drops below x, even for a moment, and returns again, the result is a new red car (to continue the analogy). Sure, it is still red, but it is not the same red car.

Please tell me that you are starting to understand? [/B]

To clarify matters employing this 2 red cars analogy. BillyJoe thinks the self corresponds to the colour. But you think the self corresponds to the actual paint used.

[Interesting Ian]

BTW, should anyone be interested, I have started a thread about the free will issue here
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&threadid=44195

[Z]

Actually, BJ, the brain can maintain functions when immersed in cold water for up to an hour, when they would ordinarily cease functions in a few minutes. Self is maintained under this unusual circumstance, and the person can be revived.

Self is independant of consciousness; sense of self is like sense of light or sense of taste, dependant on being conscious to experience. However, the brain is like a computer, always processing some function when it's on, but often idle (or busy in minor housekeeping). As long as the brain maintains a continual functional process, it is the same 'self'. If, however, the brain ceases all processing - including involuntary systems such as breathing, heartbeat, etc - if brain 'death' occurs, then the self is gone. If it is restored to life in the same brain, it is the same self revived - but whether it is truly the original 'self' or a new, identical 'self' is the only questionable condition. If it is restored to life in a different brain, it is a different self.

So, to see whether restoring life after brain death is even a problem, has anyone seen any evidence of a person being fully revived AFTER brain death?

Ian - Yes, BJ considers the 'self' to be the condition of 'red' - regardless of the fact that 50,000 identical cars might be identical 'red'. Taff considers the 'self' to be the precise substance of the paint as applied to that car, and automatically exluding bits that wear away while automatically including bits that are dabbed on later.

BJ seems to want a non-dynamic self, while Taff's self is fully dynamic. The 'self' is always changing, you see. The person you are today is not the exact same person you were two years ago - but a link (via memory) exists to unite you.

Here's a kicker of a thought: The person on Mars is the same self, linked via memory; but the person he was has died and faces oblivion. This apparent contradiction, I think, is why I feel a material continuity is also necessary in identifying an individual entity. The Mars 'self', while being mentally the same 'self', is physically not. He bears an identical physical pattern, but is comprised of an entirely seperate set of atoms and molecules. Granted, even excluding the teletransporter, atomic and molecular continuity must also accept a gradual replacement of components - the food we eat, the wastes we excrete, these do not sufficiently alter the 'self', so we must accept that 'self' is a dynamic system as well.

Ian, here's a question that puzzles me about the non-materialist view: if the Soul is immaterial, why is it bound to a material body? Why can't you just send your soul where you like any given moment? And how is it bound, being immaterial? What, in fact, are the properties of an immaterial thing? I pondered this one at length - I have for years, since my beliefs include immaterial and unreal things - but I cannot wrap my logical processes around this.

[Taffer]

I do not agree with you because I do not think you are correct. You will have to do a damn fine job of convincing me if you want me to change my view, yes? So far you haven't. ;)

To clarify matters employing this 2 red cars analogy. BillyJoe thinks the self corresponds to the colour. But you think the self corresponds to the actual paint used.

Ah, you do understand ;).

This is, as far as I can tell, indeed what I think. But rather it is not the matter that is important, but the brain processes. A duplicates brain processes are simply duplicate processes; they are not the same processes, continous with the original.

You have said that repeatedly and I have repeatedly agreed with you. I still agree, wholeheartedly and sincerely, I do.

Erm, if you do, how come you still disagree with me? The duplicate is Taffer, I agree, but it is not the same Taffer.

[Taffer]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
BJ seems to want a non-dynamic self, while Taff's self is fully dynamic. The 'self' is always changing, you see. The person you are today is not the exact same person you were two years ago - but a link (via memory) exists to unite you.


And Bingo was his name-o :D

[The Cats Venm]

Originally posted by Atlas
Yesterday was my birthday. I turned 52.


Cool! We have the same birthday. I'm 21.


I have always loved philosophy but I always feel that I'm in the wading pool. No matter how much fun I have splashing around I see the big kids in the deep end swimming underwater and sigh.

I feel the same way. I try my best to understand, but sometimes I just can't follow.


Personally, religion and woo of all sorts drives me nuts. I can see why people go for it but I wish they didn't 'need' it like they do. It seems so unneccesary and often detrimental.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Well, BJ, the language is your problem right there - you INSIST that pronouns are inherently dualist. They aren't. Not by a long shot. They are practical language systemics that have absolutely nothing to do with soul. Soul is not a part of the definition of any pronoun at all - soul is irrelevant to discussions of pronouns.

Yes, very practical, I agree.
But the eskimo language has thirty words for our word 'snow'. Try discussing with him the definition of the word 'snow'.

So the only reason it SOUNDS like dualist language is a) you assume "I" must mean "soul" (wrongly)

I am not assuming that 'I' means soul, that is exactly what I am trying to demonstrate to you.

b) the language proper puts a speed bump in your thinking that one self is just as valid as the other from every perspective that counts

This is not what I am saying. I have repeatedly stated that, if the original survives, there are two points of view, two separate points of view.

(in fact, removing pronouns, as you are trying to do, is essentially attempting to remove any POV at all - in which case, NO self matters at all. There are just life forms with various attributes, so who cares if one lives or dies or another is made or not made?

Then you haven't seen me write a thousand times "The brain produces a self"?.

But in order to associate any sense at all to the thread, you HAVE to accept a form of possessive and various pronouns.

How's this then?: The brain possesses the self.
I am trying to demonstrate that the brain generates and therefore owns the POV and that there is no soul in there who has that POV.

You say you want your 'self' to live - or, more to your liking, BJ wants BJ to live, and BJ is just a pattern of neurons firing in the brain. However, there are dozens of BJs out there already.

Dozens of BJs out there already???? Do you mean that if the duplicator produces a dozen BJs? I would agree with this, if that is what you are saying.

So instead you have to get specific - but how specific? If you say, "The BJ that has my face" that may or may not reduce the numbers of possibilities sufficiently; in fact, you have to reduce it to a total description of you, of BJ, in order to avoid confusion.

I don't understand this.

However, a total description of you ALSO includes the exact temporal and spatial locations and movements of you - your dynamic, 4-dimensional location.

There is no ME.

Thus, you are either left with a broad definition allowing anyone or thing labelled 'BJ' to live,

All the BJs are BJ and equally legitimately BJ, with none of the BJs having any preference over the other.

or a very specific definition, in which case only the BJ on Earth wants to live - thus invalidating the desire to allow a clone to live instead.

As long as one BJ lives, BJ lives on. If more than one BJ lives, more than one BJ lives on (but it gets real messy when they all want to go home to BJs wife).

Using pronouns helps reduce this process rapidly. You first state, "I am BJ" then, in order to, with perfect clarity, state the desire of BJ, say, "I want to live". It's exactly like saying X=399, then using X in an equation... or vice versa. It's assigning a generic term to a specific person to label that person precisely - and if the person is labelling themselves, then they are precisely labelling themselves. The moment they do so, there can be no other person with that label to that person. "I am zaayrdragon" is the same as "X$ = 'zaayrdragon'" (to use old BASIC language), and X$ wants to continue existence. However, if we clone X$ we cannot rename the variable X$ unless we are duplicating the variable into a new system entirely i.e. another reality, so X$'s clone must be renamed (perhaps X$ and X$(1)). But this demonstrates that, though both still have the value of "zaayrdragon" they are not the same variable, and can never be the same variable.

The language merely hides the ghost in the machine.
If you want to label the various BJs (the selves produced by the various brains), I will not complain. They are all separate entities after all. But remember they are all still BJ.

So the label of "I am" in no way implies a soul, but merely self-awareness. We can alll agree that we are self-aware, and that self-awareness is labelled as "I am". If another self is made, even if it is identical to the first, that self is not "I am" to the original self, but "He is". To the other self, the original is also "He is" - meaning that "I" is a label specific to the organism speaking.

The self in the original is an instance of BJ and the self in the duplicate is another instance of BJ. There are now two separate instances of BJ. But both are BJ. It's tricky, zaayr, but, despite what you may think, it makes sense.

It's just a language term, BJ - and doesn't imply a soul at all; rather, it implies individuality, self awareness, and separate identity. These are all things that DO exist, and cannot be waved away just because you don't like the language.

The two BJs are separate entities but there is no ME that resides in one of them or HE that resides in the other.

Thus, if I step onto the teleporter and I am destroyed, that's it... no more me. End of story.

That instance of BJ is destroyed but another instance of BJ is created in the duplicate, so BJ lives on.

regards,
BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Cat,

The 'I' is the brain, and the body containing the brain. The 'I' is the physical substance, and the 'self' is the pattern.
Please stop pressing unintended meanings on words that are clear. If I fail you use 'I' or 'me' in the context that I have chosen, then you can correct me (I may then concede or I may explain further, but it is my choice, not yours).
Do not tell me what I am saying! (for example: In that last sentence the 'I' and the 'me' have chosen, though the processes of the brain, the context. The meaning of the sentence is clear. There is no need to correct it.)

I am not intending to correct you, I am intending to show you a translation of what you have just said into materialist langauge. Or, if you prefer, I am giving you my version of what you have just said.

Why can you use short hand when you are so anal about correcting everyone else?
I know what the pattern represents. I was calling you on your simplification. I don't really want you to use the long form every time.
Now that that's cleared up, hopfully we can get past this 'language barrier'.

Everyone had accepted the short hand without question. I am glad ypu have joined us :)

Is the self the neurons, the firing, or the results of the firing (in other words, does it have any physical form or is it insubstantial)?

The self is the pattern of FIRINGS of the neurons.

I don't know much about coma's. Is there any chance that a self could still be present even if it is not generating memories (thus there would be no way of knowing for sure)? There is some brain activity is there not? Or is it in the wrong parts of the brain (the parts that control breathing, heart pumping, etc)?

The self is the feeling of what it is like to be. Do you think that there is anything that it like to be Cat when the brain that produces Cat is in a coma?

But when memories are added, is not the pattern changed, the older self lost forever?

Memories are part of the pattern. The self surives only for an instant to be replaced by another self. So, in a sense, the older is lost forever but, in another sense, the older self lives on in teh newer self through memories duplicated in the newer self.

How can an younger self be considered the same as an older self?

They are not, but they are connected by memories.

How much has to change before they are different selves?

Each self survives for an instant to be replaced by a different self.

If one looses their memory are they the same self?

They are different selves every instant in any case, but if the memory is lost, there is no longer any connection between them.

There is a self in the original right up until he's killed.
I said that it appears that the person was just moved, not that they were. Everyone would have no problems adjusting to the clone because he's identical. The original would find it hard to adjust, because he's dead.

The self in the original doesn't need to adjust because the self in the original is dead.

I messed up the punctuation: If you (as in the original body and brain, don't go all soul nazi on me) go in believing that your self will be transferred, you will die, and your clone will walk out thinking 'golly gee, I was right'.

The self is not transferred, the self is reproduced in teh duplicate. The instance of BJ in the original dies and the BJ in the duplicate is created, so BJ lives on.

If you fear death, you will die, and your clone will walk out thinking 'gee whiz, I was wrong' or alternately 'wow, so this is what it feels like to be a clone'.

The feeling of "what it is like to be" in the duplicate is identical to that in the original. There is no difference. Remember that this is only for an instant, after that the selves immediately diverge.

You know what I meant. No change is nessesary.

Okay, I hope you understand now that I am not correcting you but showing you my version of events. I thought it would be helpful to compare and contrast in this way so as to get at the real nature of the difference between us.

Do you get erotic pleasure out of being right or just telling others they're wrong?
I said 'the generated feeling of self'. Of course it's generated by the brain, WTF else would be generating it?
If I write 'codfish' do you read it as 'jackhammer'?

I said "you are really close here". Sorry, I thought it was a compliment. :(

The self is a pattern (and all that).
The self is being generated anew each moment.
Continuity is an illusion created by memories.
We cannot 'see through' others eyes.
We wouldn't be able to 'see through' a clones eyes.
Why can we see through our our eyes, after the moment passes?

Because WE don't exist. There is just the self (the feeling of what it is like to be) generated by the brain. And the brain doesn't see through the eyes (another error of laguage for zaayrdragon to ponder ;) ), the brain collects information about the environment through the eyes. The traffic is in not out. Only the......yes.....soul looks out through the eyes (are you reading zaayrdragon? :) ).

Why does the self not black out each moment?

I guess it's truer to say that the self builds on, rather than replaces, the self that has gone before. That's why I said "in a sense" above.

Of course, if it did we wouldn't know it ('cause the self is the thing that 'knows').

The self would register a discontinuity in memory.

But the self does know that it hasn't blacked out (I mean totally, not temporarily).

Yes, by the discontinuity in memory.

I have always thought of the self as a steady current of activity in the neurons. Without that, I can't imagine how it would persist.

There is an illusion od persistence through memory

Why is the illusion still here? Why is there an illusion at all. How can a pattern create a self? Could their be infinite generated selves in any collecion of matter? Could a rock have a self?

Oy, I'm heading down multiverse territory here.

If there wasn't an illusion, there would have to be a soul and we materialists can't have that now can we. :)

I understand but I don't see [that the persistence of the self through time is an illusion produced by the fact that the succession of selves are connected or related through memory].

Each self has some of memories (some memories fade) of the selves that have gone before it estending backwards in time. Does that work for you?

I can understand it perfectly for everything but my own perception.

Unfortuntely that is the whole point of this exercise....to show that there is no ME. Goddamn, I'm not getting anywhere am I?

Brain sizzling... ramaging rhinos of logic behind, gaping chazm of unfathomability infront, no escape... eep.

Maybe if you get a little less intense and relax a little, it will all just dawn on you, I don't know.

I'm still not changing the language.

You never know, one day....... [b]

regards,
BillyJoe

[Z]

Nope, you really don't get it, do you BJ?

Let's look in a phone book - probably a listing from Kentucky or Tennessee - and see how many people are named BillyJoe.

Without having one to look at, I'll guess: 250. (Probably more, given the region's predilection for names like this, but this is hypothetical)

So right now in some area there are 250 people who are 'an instance of BJ'.

Ah, but these aren't YOU - of course not - none of them (one presumes) are anything at all like you!

So you could further insist on using the LAST name, too. But suppose your name is BillyJoe Johnson. And in Humperdink County, Kentucky, that 39 of those 250 BillyJoes are also Johnsons. Whoo... still not specific enough.

So you turn to the next qualifier, until you've successfully eliminated all BillyJoe Johnsons? Or do you simply state 'Me' to represent the person labelled BillyJoe Johnson in YOUR place in YOUR time? This has nothing to do with the soul, mind you - it has everything to do with identification of a specific organism. And you cannot say that there is not a specific organism to be identified unless you insist that ALL organisms are identical and equal - which they obviously aren't.

So what if an eskimo has thirty words for 'snow'? What does that have to do with anything? We can still understand each other, because we possess qualifiers that help us further define 'snow' until we can narrow down a particular instance of snow - I simply don't see the point of this statement. BTW - they have no word for 'hello'.

I am not assuming that 'I' means soul, that is exactly what I am trying to demonstrate to you.

So in other words - you are deciding to redefine these terms to fit your metaphysic? And attempting to demonstrate to me why the redefinition of common pronouns should be suitable? But you are trying to redefine a generic term into a dualist term while, at the same time, trying to defend a monist position? Very strange, indeed.

There is no ME.

Of course there is. Don't be silly.

Otherwise, you could not be posting this information. You couldn't be reading this post. I couldn't address you directly if there were no you nor an I to do the addressing. But of course we can address each other, we can directly discuss issues, refer to each other and to ourselves, with perfect clarity - because there is a ME and there is a YOU. What, then, am I, are you? Why, what else, if not the brain/body continuity of this particular life form?

As long as one BJ lives, BJ lives on. If more than one BJ lives, more than one BJ lives on (but it gets real messy when they all want to go home to BJs wife).

Ah, but the label BJ refers to possibly hundreds of individuals, each with their own wives, possibly - it certainly would be confusing if another John Smith walked into John Smith's house and started making love to Jane Smith - considering the sheer number of John Smiths in the world! Ah, but now you must specify - see the statement above - and further define BJ until we know WHICH BJ you are talking about - and of course, if you are going to specify you must continue to do so until we all understand which BJ you are referring to - and there is only one BJ in one dynamic spatial location at one dynamic time that is being referred to.

The language merely hides the ghost in the machine.

But you're swearing there is no ghost in the machine - so what does the language have to hide? It's as easy as that - there is no ghost and the language properly reflects that - but still provides for a perfectly legitimate individual self. No ghost, BJ - you're trying to read into it what isn't there, and what you have already said isn't there... You are very confused, aren't you?

If you want to label the various BJs (the selves produced by the various brains), I will not complain. They are all separate entities after all. But remember they are all still BJ.

Which is no more significant than saying they are all still Canadian or they are all still Republican or they are all still Johnsons. Labelling the various BJs demonstrates that these are all separate entities, as you agree they are - and if they are separate entities, then they are not the SAME entity, which you also agree - so the entity that steps up to be destroyed is not the SAME entity that appears at Mars. Thus, the entity on Earth does NOT continue - you can't say that the totality of what you are lives on if you die. Agreed, BJs will live on, but this is no more pertinent to the survival issue than saying that Canadians live on or Republicans live on - you are mentioning a group, not an individual (albeit a very small group).

The two BJs are separate entities but there is no ME that resides in one of them or HE that resides in the other.

Oh, I agree - there is no ME or HE residing in either one - you can't reside in yourself. Rather, there is a HE and a ME that IS each one, as referred to by one - and a ME and a HE that IS each one, as referred to by the other - each BJ is also "I" to itself and "YOU" to the opposite in direct address. Each BJ IS a person, and a person is represented by a pronoun, thus each BJ is also appropriately pronounciated during referential speech. All very, very simple, really.

And the moment more than one of your brain/body pattern exists, there is a 'you' and a 'him'. It is inevitable - thus, 'you' would die and 'he' would live on.

You see, this is where awareness of the situation really ruins a good master plan. Much better if the Earth-Mars Transit Authority had lied and told everyone that they are instantly transported to Mars (please, no questions) in perfect order - the only people that would know differently would be under the thumb of the Illuminati and probably would never take the damned teletrans anyway.

But it doesn't change the simple reality that this machine murders people as part of its function.

I've said it before, and I'll say it again: you only get as far as the destructive phase. After that, it doesn't matter if one or a million duplicates are made - you've been destroyed, and you'll never live again. (Materialistically speaking, of course)

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Atlas
I think there are definitional issues. The brain has many functions. Saying that 'I' is the brain, is the physical substance, goes further than most of us are willing to go.

I know I've discredited myself with the admission that I fly in dreams like Wonder Woman, but I'd like a chance to put that behind me and offer what I think the materialistic definition of *I* boils down to, and maybe you guys can shoot me out of the sky.

*I* is a semicontinuous manufactured secretion of the brain.

It is appreciated as real but unseen like insulin or bile, but it is something opposite for it is seen but unreal. That is, though we appreciate *I* in the mirror, you can cut the body and find the bile but you cannot cut the body and find the *I*.

The secretion that is *I* gurgles forth produced from apriori pressures as a temporally bonded causally influenced fluid.

It interacts with the brain function called imagination to produce it's forms which appear at times in bond with the surface of the skin of the body, at other times an unbodied consciousness, at other times identical with the universe.

Am I close? Anyone? BillyJoe, Taffer, Ian, Zaayrdragon, Buehler, Buehler?

(edit: I changed temporally bonded causal fluid to temporally bonded causally influenced fluid because *I* appears in dreams unhinged from the causality it is hinged to in the wakeful state.)

(edit2: It's probable not necessary to add that semicontinuous admits a loss of *I* with loss of consciousness through fainting, dreamless sleep, anesthesia, and coma.) I have absolutely no idea what you are talking about, Atlas. :D

BJ

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Well, whether right or wrong - it sounds disgusting. :D

Frankly, I prefer the "I am a Brain" concept. Reduce it all down to flat matter - I am the brain. If I am alive, I live; if I die, I'm dead. If I have senses, I sense; if not, I am senseless. :D

I am wrinkled, gray, and made mostly of fat... Yep, that about describes it... :D That, on the other hand......er..........makes absolutely no sense to me either. :D

[Z]

See, the whole thing about a different 'self' every instant is another misleading concept. The self is not a pattern of neurons firing within a brain - it IS the brain, the pattern, the neurons - and by extension, the memories, the past experiences - You can clamour all you want for illusionary memory if you like, but the brain has a wonderful mechanism for logging the events that occur around it, and that log shows a record of the dynamic changes that have occured to the 'self' over time. The self is not instant - it is dynamic. There isn't one 'self' each nanosecond or whatever, but one 'self' that changes from nanosecond to nanosecond. It is still the same 'self' but changed - just as you can claim to be the same BJ as you were ten years ago, but changed. All things change; all things are dynamic; but they have a continuity in temporal history, a start point, and an end point, at which they become something different entirely.

What makes the brain unique is, it contains a record of its existence that allows it to maintain its awareness of its continuity. Disrupting that continuity causes a fundamental shift in the identity of that brain, since it no longer possesses one of its primary identifiers - memory. Amnesia is a change of self; psychosis can also be a change of self.

It's amazing to see you call youself a materialist when you create the most dualist concepts - then try to argue against them. Is this what is called the straw man? You rail against language that demonstrates a dualist nature - Not because it actually DOES so, but because you choose to redefine it so. You remind me of those feminists who redefine Woman to mean 'less than Man' and use 'handle' instead of 'manipulate' because 'Man' is a part of the word... They redefine the nature of terms and then take offense at those terms. It's crazy! And this is what you seem to be doing - adding unnecessary material to particular terms, then turning against those terms to support your ideas. But can your ideas hold as much water if you don't add the excess information? No, not really. Just like the entire argument loses weight if the original survives the teletrans after all.

For a good, valid argument, it should be valid when the conditions change as well... and this one isn't. YOU don't live on in the duplicate on Mars because YOU are still alive on Earth! - if the conditions change. But for the 'YOU' to be the guy on Mars, you absolutely have to destroy the one on Earth - which demonstrates that you are not REALLY transferring to Mars, but being destroyed.

I remember some friend of mine for a science fair had a really interesting experiment (so it seemed) where he was growing crystals from some chemical solution in a vacuum, and little insects formed on the crystals! We all got pretty excited, until the teacher asked him to reproduce the experiment in class, using school equipment. Well, at first he agreed, and made several attempts - but eventually, he claimed that the experiment only worked if he used his equipment at home. And, specifically, if he used only material from one particular source - Turns out, of course, that one of his chemicals was infested with insect eggs, and that the bell jar he used to generate a vacuum had a minute irregularity along the edge allowing just a tiny bit of air to enter the 'vacuum'. But it demonstrated a point: that if the concept doesn't work when you change any of the apparently non-essential variables, then it really doesn't work at all.

That's what's happening here - change the conditions around the teletrans incident, and you demonstrate that you are not being transported at all - only reproduced. And if you are only being reproduced, you have no reason to desire your own destruction.

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

:(

Originally posted by Taffer
For a 'self' to exist, there must be a brain. So in duplication, the brain is duplicated. You now have two brains, each producting a 'self'.... No problems yet.

Originally posted by Taffer
....that appears the same. The self in the duplicat is identical to the self in the original. I'm not sure why you say "appears". I mean the patterns of neural firings in those identical brains are identical aren't they?

Originally posted by Taffer
However, the first 'self' differs from the second 'self' by location and time. Thus they are seperate 'selves'. The original, when faced with a desicion based on survival, will naturally choose it's own survival over the duplicate's. Both are just a legitimatly Taffer from a 3rd person perspective. But the original will not consider the duplicate to be him also, but rather to be a different Taffer. No argument here either. They are identical but not the same self (page one)

Originally posted by Taffer
Thus, the question is more like saying "step into the transporter and die, while a doppleganger takes over your life Well, it seems you have sold your soul to zaayrdragon. :D
Here you have again introduced the ghost into the machine. :(
It really is easy peasy japaneasy, as DD said. And to think you were almost there too. :(

sadly,
BillyJoe.

[Z]

Thus, the question is more like saying "step into the transporter and die, while a doppleganger takes over your life

BJ, there is no 'ghost in the machine' statement here. If there is, can you point it out WITHOUT redefining established terms?

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Let's look in a phone book - probably a listing from Kentucky or Tennessee - and see how many people are named BillyJoe.

Without having one to look at, I'll guess: 250. (Probably more, given the region's predilection for names like this, but this is hypothetical)

So right now in some area there are 250 people who are 'an instance of BJ'.

Ah, but these aren't YOU - of course not - none of them (one presumes) are anything at all like you!

So you could further insist on using the LAST name, too. But suppose your name is BillyJoe Johnson. And in Humperdink County, Kentucky, that 39 of those 250 BillyJoes are also Johnsons. Whoo... still not specific enough.

So you turn to the next qualifier, until you've successfully eliminated all BillyJoe Johnsons? Or do you simply state 'Me' to represent the person labelled BillyJoe Johnson in YOUR place in YOUR time? This has nothing to do with the soul, mind you - it has everything to do with identification of a specific organism. And you cannot say that there is not a specific organism to be identified unless you insist that ALL organisms are identical and equal - which they obviously aren't. The self in the original is identical to, but not the same, self as the self in the duplicate (my opinion from page one)
You are not arguing against me here. You are agreeing with me (seeing as I said it first. ;) )

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
So in other words - you are deciding to redefine these terms to fit your metaphysic? And attempting to demonstrate to me why the redefinition of common pronouns should be suitable? But you are trying to redefine a generic term into a dualist term while, at the same time, trying to defend a monist position? Very strange, indeed. I am not redefining these words, I am merely pointing out their dualist ancestry. And all I am trying to do is to explain the materilaist point of view. ;)

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Of course there is [a ME]. Don't be silly.

Otherwise, you could not be posting this information. You couldn't be reading this post. I couldn't address you directly if there were no you nor an I to do the addressing. But of course we can address each other, we can directly discuss issues, refer to each other and to ourselves, with perfect clarity - because there is a ME and there is a YOU. What, then, am I, are you? Why, what else, if not the brain/body continuity of this particular life form? Or are those brains (which are promoting the survival of the genes that produced them) communicating with each other through the selves that they produce? Fascinating illusion isn't it?

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Ah, but the label BJ refers to possibly hundreds of individuals, each with their own wives, possibly - it certainly would be confusing if another John Smith walked into John Smith's house and started making love to Jane Smith - considering the sheer number of John Smiths in the world! Ah, but now you must specify - see the statement above - and further define BJ until we know WHICH BJ you are talking about - and of course, if you are going to specify you must continue to do so until we all understand which BJ you are referring to - and there is only one BJ in one dynamic spatial location at one dynamic time that is being referred to. The problem, zaayrdragon, is that you don't think there is anything to understand here and that there could not possibly be an alternative view to yours. I mean that paragraph just makes no sense. Why should BillyJoe go home to BillyJoe's wife just because his name is BillyJoe. The self produced by the brain of that BillyJoe is not identical to the self produced by the original BillyJoe, whereas the self produced by thr brain of the duplicate IS identical to the self produced by original BillyJoe. Big friggin' diference, don't you think?

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But you're swearing there is no ghost in the machine - so what does the language have to hide? It's as easy as that - there is no ghost and the language properly reflects that - but still provides for a perfectly legitimate individual self. No ghost, BJ - you're trying to read into it what isn't there, and what you have already said isn't there... You are very confused, aren't you? The ghost is hiding in the language, so that it seems that when you talk about the brain using this language, there is no ghost in the machine. Remember it is you who approves of this language. It is you who are using this language. You don't see the ghost in the machine because it is hiding in the language you are using to describe the brain. I am trying to remove the ghost from your langauge so that you will see for yourself that your view implies a ghost in the machine.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Which is no more significant than saying they are all still Canadian or they are all still Republican or they are all still Johnsons. Labelling the various BJs demonstrates that these are all separate entities, as you agree they are - and if they are separate entities, then they are not the SAME entity, which you also agree - so the entity that steps up to be destroyed is not the SAME entity that appears at Mars. Agreed.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Thus, the entity on Earth does NOT continue - you can't say that the totality of what you are lives on if you die. Agreed, BJs will live on, but this is no more pertinent to the survival issue than saying that Canadians live on or Republicans live on - you are mentioning a group, not an individual (albeit a very small group). And here is the ghost in the machine. :(

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Oh, I agree - there is no ME or HE residing in either one - you can't reside in yourself. Rather, there is a HE and a ME that IS each one, as referred to by one - and a ME and a HE that IS each one, as referred to by the other - each BJ is also "I" to itself and "YOU" to the opposite in direct address. Each BJ IS a person, and a person is represented by a pronoun, thus each BJ is also appropriately pronounciated during referential speech. All very, very simple, really.) Very simple. And, simply, wrong. Except for this bit....
"you can't reside in yourself"
YOU can't possibly reside in YOUR self. And, if YOU can't reside in YOUR self, then there is nowhere for YOU to reside. Quite simply, YOU do not exist - except as a soul. That self produced by the brain is sufficient to explain everthing.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
And the moment more than one of your brain/body pattern exists, there is a 'you' and a 'him'. It is inevitable - thus, 'you' would die and 'he' would live on. Dualist! :D

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
You see, this is where awareness of the situation really ruins a good master plan. Much better if the Earth-Mars Transit Authority had lied and told everyone that they are instantly transported to Mars (please, no questions) in perfect order - the only people that would know differently would be under the thumb of the Illuminati and probably would never take the damned teletrans anyway. So it seems that it works provided you don't know how it works? And for what reason, then, does it not work just because you DO know how it works.
Okay, imagine you don't know anything (not hard is it :D ). You don't know how the machine works. You don't even know that it is working on you. The machine scans you, vapourises you, uses your molecules to recreate you in the exact same orientation and position and it does all this in an instant. Would you know the difference?
NO!
And I have used your own language to disprove you as well. :D

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But it doesn't change the simple reality that this machine murders people as part of its function.It destroys you and recreates you and you don't see any change whatsoever.
(Still using you own language against you, zaayrdragon :D )

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
I've said it before, and I'll say it again: you only get as far as the destructive phase. After that, it doesn't matter if one or a million duplicates are made - you've been destroyed, and you'll never live again. (Materialistically speaking, of course) I would really like you to think about the above scenario, zaayrdragon. And cut the bull about it being a special case or something, okay? If you can understand how the obvious conclusion of that scenario can be explained, you will be able to extrapolate that explanation to all other scenarios.
And you will be a truely switched on materialist. :)

regards,
BillyJoe.

[BillyJoe]

zaayrdragon,

I haven't had time to read your 11:55 post. I'm going to bed now, otherwise I'll miss my morning run once again. :(

BJ

[Z]

Okay, imagine you don't know anything (not hard is it ). You don't know how the machine works. You don't even know that it is working on you. The machine scans you, vapourises you, uses your molecules to recreate you in the exact same orientation and position and it does all this in an instant. Would you know the difference?

No, you wouldn't KNOW anything - you'd be dead. End of story.

On the other hand, a clone that was just LIKE you would be convinced he WAS you, and would carry on just as you might in the same situation - for all practical intents, he would be you, but he really WOULDN'T be you, now would he? No soul here - just common sense.

Again, you're trying way to hard to insert a ghost in the machine, just so you can rip it out and try to use it in your fight.

Sorry, BJ, but we still haven't found these WMD's... er, souls... in the language.

Quite frankly, you are wrong in this case - the language implies nothing except personal identity. And there's nothing in personal identity that is refuted by materialism.

So can you, really and truly, without resorting to special cases (Sorry, but that's EXACTLY what it is), support your reasoning? If the teletrans didn't destroy anyone, could you truly say you live on on Earth AND on Mars? Of course, you'd insist that 'there is no you' - but I am addressing YOU, the person on Earth, who will never get to Mars because you prefer letting them make a copy and use it on Mars. Fascinating concept, really - if you strip away the destructive process, then you have to consider - what rights should the clone have? How might the clone behave? As Ian pointed out once, as far as the clone is concerned, it might truly believe it IS the real you - provided the cloning scenario were as he described - but in the teletrans example, the clone is FULLY AWARE that it is a clone.

I know your clone would act as if it were BJ and that there was no problem at all - unless you (clone) found out you (original) were still alive on earth. My clone would simply change his name and forge a new life for himself on Mars. Why? Because of the awareness that we are not truly the same person - Waco(Earth) and Waco(Mars) are simply not the same person. So Waco(Mars) would become someone new - Alex, perhaps - I always liked that name.

Nonetheless, the one trying desperately to insert ghosts and souls is you, BJ - I'm simply saying they don't exist, but that individual identity does exist. Is that really so damned difficult?

[DanishDynamite]

BillyJoe:
When I think about it, the flashlight analogy is a pretty good one, And in more ways than one. Light flashing on and off and on again. And a light flashing on in your brain when the analogy suddenly illustrates for you the meaning of what we have been talking about all this time. Of course the analogy would have been totally useless without the preceding discussion. ;). Otherwise I'd have to give DD all the credit with his one short post. No way!

:D

I willingly defer at least 90% of the credit to your marvelous perseverence.

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Remove soul entirely. If you can say each of us exists exactly as we do right now without a soul, then you HAVE to say that each of us has a unique POV/IS a unique POV which exists without a soul (the entire premise of the argument, remember).

So moving on from here - if each of us is/has a unique POV, then we are/experience a unique identity.
No. There is no a priori reason that your self should be unique. At any moment, a thousand selves could be turned ON. At the moment they are turned ON, they are all the one and only you, but they are not unique.
So - If told that 'you will be destroyed' the survival instinct kicks in and the person refuses that process. There is no need to go further than this statement; what happens after is completely irrelevant. You could completely reconstruct the individual from its own original atoms and it still doesn't matter. "You will be destroyed". Nope, sorry, end of discussion.
A point of view which I fail to understand. It's like saying "I refuse to go to sleep since I suspect that when I wake up I won't be the real me". Or, like you refusing to die (painlessly) despite the knowledge that you would be resurected.
For example, if the Taffer that is produced on Mars would save Earth from annihilation, then the species instinct would override the individual instinct - I'd gladly choose to die if my clone could save earth (and there were no other way to do the job). Otherwise, my individual survival instinct will balk at any cloning in the first place.
I don't know why you bring the survival instinct into this discussion. It is irrelevant as far as whether it would be the true blue "you" who would be generated on Mars.
The flashlight analogy makes absolutely no sense to me. A flashlight is a shell that holds batteries and, if turned on, converts energy in the batteries into light; if turned off, it does nothing. Humans (any living thing) do not have an 'on/off' state - we are always on. We have a dormancy phase, and can experience a number of less active states, but the only time we're turned 'off' it's for good. No more 'on' for us.
Once again, you are lapsing into irrlevant territory.

What we are discussing is outside any previous experience in the history of living things on Earth. For example, to say that we don't have an on/off state is truish, but irrelevant. When I say "truish" it is because we don't even need to go as far as an On/Off state. Let me ask you: What did you you personally experience in the last 10^-40 seconds?

So what part of the flashlight analogy relates to the 'self'? A flashlight senses nothing. It has no awareness whatsoever, ergo no sense of self. A flashlight produces light, but this cannot be analogous to 'self' - it is output, which is equivalent to our 'speech', 'motion', etc.
Likewise, the "self" is output. It is the output of a brain (or flashlight) which is turned ON.
Duplicate a creature and what have you done? Created an entirely new creature with an entirely new sense of self/existence of self/whatever.
No. From where does this super sense of self independant of the original come from? As BillyJoe likes to say "ghost in the machine".

If I die, I die forever. I won't magically wake up sensing out of some other creature.
Most likely true, if you are talking about how things are in our world today.
The duplicate may be comforted, knowing he lives on, and believing that he made this choice - but more likely, if he has even half a brain, he'll spend long, sleepless nights pondering his existence.
The duplicate is you. The real you. The one and only you.

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Sorry, BJ, but I have to say you are completely wrong in several areas.

First, I see nowhere, in any precise definition of materialism, that it specifically states that there cannot be a unique POV, a unique self. That the self is the product of a physical process, or is a physical process itself, THIS I see, but no denial of self, of identity.

There are a number of subcategories to materialism, and this is where the arguement seems to start - but materialism as a whole does not deny that each individual living thing has a unique perspective.
Of course each individual living thing has its own perpective. The problem is what is meant by "living".

At the moment of creation of a "you" (turning ON of a particular flashlight containing "you") the "you" created will be you in every sense of the word. When the first information to hit your senses is processed and delivered to your "sense of self", this information will probably be different from any information received by any other yous in existence, and your "sense of self" will begin to diverge from any other you's.

[Z]

OK, DD, I have to say - please don't take offense - but none of that made the least bit of sense.

If 40,000 flashlights are producing 40,000 beams of light, only one beam of light belongs to one flashlight. If I am one of those flashlights, I am only producing one beam; when turned off, 39,999 flashlights could be producing similar beams, but I would be producing nothing.

Several times, in these replies, you say that 'they are all the one and only you'. That makes no sense at all - the point of being 'one and only' is just that: no two people under any conditions can together be the 'one and only' - the semantics alone forbid it. So does the reality.

I would not say, "I don't want to sleep etc." because I am aware that self continues throughout sleep, unconsciousness, etc. However, I would say, "I don't want to die" under a promise of resurrection, simply because there has never been any case of successful resurrection. However, if science can honestly stop ALL of a person's brain functions, drain the brain of all energy, then restore the brain and all its functions and energy precisely as it was before? Then I'd gladly 'die' - in fact, you'd have to change the definition of death, and truly if you could be restored you would not truly be dead, would you?

Why would this then, still be the same me? It may not be - and I concede that it may be no more nor less valid than the teletrans problem. But there's absolutely no way to know the difference there - except for the old pre-dead self, who may never awaken.

But in the teletrans, all we have to do to see where the concept fails, is allow the original to live. With the original still extant, we can clearly see that the reproduction on Mars is not, CANNOT be, the same entity as the original. The self is copied, not transferred.

Sadly, most of your post seems senseless to me, DD. Sorry.

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon OK, DD, I have to say - please don't take offense - but none of that made the least bit of sense. No offence taken.
If 40,000 flashlights are producing 40,000 beams of light, only one beam of light belongs to one flashlight. If I am one of those flashlights, I am only producing one beam; when turned off, 39,999 flashlights could be producing similar beams, but I would be producing nothing.Agreed.
Several times, in these replies, you say that 'they are all the one and only you'. That makes no sense at all - the point of being 'one and only' is just that: no two people under any conditions can together be the 'one and only' - the semantics alone forbid it. So does the reality.
The problem is indeed semantics. Our language is obviously based on our experiences and our needs. The thought experiment we are currently discussing isn't easily couched in this language.

The reality (of our thought experiment) is that when any "you" is activated, that "you" will trully be the real, no holds barred, certified "you". It will not be a duplicate which somehow knows that it isn't the real you.

I would not say, "I don't want to sleep etc." because I am aware that self continues throughout sleep, unconsciousness, etc. However, I would say, "I don't want to die" under a promise of resurrection, simply because there has never been any case of successful resurrection. However, if science can honestly stop ALL of a person's brain functions, drain the brain of all energy, then restore the brain and all its functions and energy precisely as it was before? Then I'd gladly 'die' - in fact, you'd have to change the definition of death, and truly if you could be restored you would not truly be dead, would you?
Which is exactly what will happen in this scenario. You are shut down in real time and then turned on at some other real time, but your sense of continuence continues.
Why would this then, still be the same me? It may not be - and I concede that it may be no more nor less valid than the teletrans problem. But there's absolutely no way to know the difference there - except for the old pre-dead self, who may never awaken. Sorry, not understood.
But in the teletrans, all we have to do to see where the concept fails, is allow the original to live. With the original still extant, we can clearly see that the reproduction on Mars is not, CANNOT be, the same entity as the original. The self is copied, not transferred.
No. The entity on Mars is every possible bit exactly "you" as the one on Earth.

The only thing which makes this scenario relevant is how self-preservation will predictably kick in for the being still on Earth. I just don't see how that relates to the question at hand.
Sadly, most of your post seems senseless to me, DD. Sorry.
That is sad. I hope you will see the light as others have done.

[Z]

Sorry, DD - still not making sense.

If "I" am on Earth, I cannot be on Mars. "He" is on Mars. To him, of course, the reverse is true. But in neither case can I say that "I" am here and on Mars simultaneously. Rather, I can mention the existance of a remarkable being who is exactly like me, that HE is on Mars, and that I hope He stays on Mars and doesn't come home trying to sleep with my wife.

--- on the other hand, that could get interes////NO, forget I said that... :D

You wouldn't 'go to sleep in one location and wake up in the other' - you'd 'go to sleep in one location and never, ever wake up again'. It really is that simple.

I hope you will see the light as others have done, DD.

[Taffer]

Time for the yo-yo to add something to this conversation, yes? :D

DD, I can see your problem (I think). Lets say that the Taffer who is typing this message is the original Taffer, and 10,000 clones are made. What do we have? One original Taffer and 10,000 individual beings who seem to look a lot like Taffer (exactly the same, in fact). But this doesn't change anything. The original Taffer (me) is the Taffer that existed before the clones were made. All the clones wake up in the cloning factory, with all the memories of the original. Thus, they are aware that they are clones. There are not 10,001 Taffers. There are 10,000 beings that are exactly the same as Taffer, and one original Taffer. If the original Taffer is the Taffer that must make the decision to take the teletrans, it will know that the Taffer on mars is only linked to him via memories and brain pattern; the mars Taffer is not linked by continuity. Therefore he will reason that he will 'go to sleep and never wake up again' and that the Taffer on mars will wake up on mars knowing full well that he is not the original, but rather a clone. Now none of this makes a bit of difference to anyone else, other then the original Taffer. Because he is dead.

Think of it like this. I have a golf ball. I make 10,000 copies of this golf ball. I now have 10,001 golf balls. But only one is the golf ball that I played with two weeks ago friday. The other 10,000 golf balls are all golf balls that look like they were played with two weeks ago friday, but were, in fact, not.

[Atlas]

As usual I'm showing up late, but I want to elbow my way in anyway with a new scenario. I'm trying to nail down where my big problem is. Likely, you think it is my tiny brain. That's too easy. I hope to identify it as a body bias. Help me out.
Since I initially started a response to a Zaayrdragon post before things morphed into this, The new scenario's "body" will be the dragon's. Let's begin.

To the materialist, one atom is as good as the next when constructing the brain that will color the self in. They care that the self continues with all of it's capacities and memories. They are willing to trade atoms freely.

The rest of us have an additional respect for any intelligent matter. Once matter has consciousness you cannot treat it as though it does not. You can't copy and destroy it even though we seem to accept that an equivalent consciousness is produced. Why this bias?

For me it has always been the reverence for each human consciousness. Extinguishment is a mini tradgedy. It is final. But it shows that I have a "first-in" bias. Whichever body the consciousness inhabits first gets the reverence.

There is another shading in the broad argument that has been glossed over. I think it's been mixed in and mixed up. That is Life. It's not the same thing as consciousness. You can't have the consciousness without Life but the reverse is not true. What if we change that concept with a new scenario.

What if androids without brains but with internal power sources exist on Mars. Now lets say the teleporter's disintegrator only had enough memory and power to do brains. So Z, you lay down on the table for a brain scan, They find one, it's a little fat, but they use it anyway taking the part that makes you 'you'. In the process you fall into a big sleep. Your brain info is transmitted and reintegrated in an android which has experiences on Mars. Then at the end of the process the android returns your brain, really a 2nd generation copy made of new atoms, back into your skull and you awaken with new memories.

This seems to me much less objectionable but only because I have that "first-in" bias. The consciousness belongs in the body it was first in.

So I ask you, does this represent the bias against stepping into the teleporter that you and I and Taffer have or is there something even more fundamental?

(edit: My point is that if nobody dies it's ok to recreate brains and the self.

[Z]

That does put a different spin on the matter - But again, we'd have to define exactly what part of the brain makes you 'you', wouldn't we? Seems a tricky bit to juggle... Can you clarify this position some more, Atlas?

[Atlas]

C'mon Z, This ain't Brain (http://www.perceptions.couk.com/imgs/brai3a.jpg) surgery... Oh wait. I guess it is.

I wish I had paid attention in the 9th grade when we studied brain surgery. It seems to me that the old brain or lizard brain, you might call it the dragon brain, serves to keep you breathing and your heart pumping and keeps you alive if you're in a coma. You'll definitely want to keep that part.

Then there is the new brain, the Cerebrum, the frontal lobes and brain hemispheres. I think this is where all the higher functions of language and consciousness, and I hope memory. This is what goes into the android.

I know that I don't have a Vulcan brain but in one Star Trek episode some women came and took Spock's brain. Bones was able to drive Spock's body with a device that stimulated his reflex center in his "old" brain or brainstem. I don't want to give away the whole plot but in the end he got his brain back.

I'm proposing this scenario to see if we can figure out exactly the point where we fall into disagreement with the UberMaterialists.

It seems at first, like it should make no difference at all. The self is a creation of the brain and that is what we are going to disintegrate and reconstruct on Mars. Then we get back a disintegrated/reintegrated brain that is exactly what our old brain was but with a few experiences from the POV of a half-android.

For some reason it seems less problematic because the body left behind does not die, it just lies in a coma. And the consciousness is returned to it almost like any other organ transplant.

Do you agree? Does it seem less problematic to you? Why or Why not.

If you agree then we've got to explain why the unconscious body is important. It's not the "self". It just happened to be the matter that had the intellectual light called Zaayrdragon in it. Why wouldn't any matter be just as good.

If you disagree then we still need to know why. The body did not die. The consciousness is housed temporarily in an android but the consciousness takes holidays when we faint or sleep anyway.

I think it's a good scenario for getting at the root of our inability to agree 100% with BillyJoe and DD. I think we're going to come down to something that is not the "ghost in the machine"... We're body bigots.

[Z]

You present an excellent case, Atlas.

However, I fear I would balk at even this procedure. After all, if we positively identify the bits of brain that make up 'you', and then destroy them, we are still destroying 'you'. Also, wouldn't you need to specifically identify if those bits of brain that are responsible for 'youness' are or are not active during sleep or unconsciousness?

I have to admit - it's giving me some pause to think. I haven't heard anyone so far address the higher/lower (old/new) brain concept in so long, I'd forgotten it myself.

It does seem less problematic on the surface - much like question two, where part of the brain is replaced in order to retain continuous mental self-awareness, so this scenario seems to me to be doing much the same thing. Is it so much body bigotry, then? Or bigotry of the personal awareness?

It certainly brings to light a problem with question two on the same basis, then... if you replace the bits of brain that are responsible for personality, etc. wouldn't you cease to experience at all? I feel now this is the same question - though again, question two becomes a lose-lose problem in this case. Either way, the original person that is 'you' is GOING to cease, whether you like it or not.

If I then accept that partial brain replacement is acceptable for maintenance of identity, then I also have to accept a similar situation in your scenario, Atlas - that, in order to maintain identity, part of the brain is destroyed and then replaced, while other parts are left functioning the whole time.

Again, though, the entire time your 'pattern' was on Mars, YOU would truly not be there - and once those memories were restored to the YOU brain, they still wouldn't be YOUR memories, per se...

And, if you didn't DESTROY the part of brain patterned and shipped to Mars, but merely copied it, then you still have the same scenario - two completely separate but identical persons each having their own experiences.

So, I'm afraid I'd still have to say no to this scenario as well... for a number of similar reasons. But probably with less fear of 'death' involved and more respect for life (of others) in this case...

Anyway, go ahead and discuss, the Scaled One must consider this case...

(Thaumacombust the Red Dragon Mage says that we Dragons do not possess an 'old brain/new brain' and that our entire brain IS our conscious self... of course, we Dragons vanish entirely while sleeping, unconscious, etc. Worse, we tend to vanish whenever you small, crunchy things wake up! :D )

[BillyJoe]

SCENARIO:

Okay, imagine you don't know anything (not hard is it :D). You don't know how the machine works. You don't even know that it is working on you. The machine scans you, vapourises you, uses your molecules to recreate you in the exact same orientation and position and it does all this in an instant. Would you know the difference?

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
No, you wouldn't KNOW anything - you'd be dead. End of story. Was that a joke or a knee jerk respose? :cool:
I mean you don't know anything. As far as you are concerned you started off posting on the JREF forum and then you finished posting on the JREF forum. You have no idea that you were scanned, vapourized, and recreated in the same orientation and position. You noticed no difference at all. Suppose I lied and you weren't scanned, vapourized, and recreated after all. What is your answer then? Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you? You have no idea because really from your point of view nothing has changed, absolutely nothing has changed.
This is why we say that both are equally legitimately you. You are not one. You are not the other. You are not both. Both are individually you.
You are not a subject - a soul. You are a predicate - a product of the brain. That's that only way this scenario makes sense from the materialist's perspective.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
On the other hand, a clone that was just LIKE you would be convinced he WAS you, and would carry on just as you might in the same situation - for all practical intents, he would be you, but he really WOULDN'T be you, now would he? No soul here - just common sense. Both of them would be you. But you wouldn't be both of them. If you want to say that you are one and not the other, then you are adding a soul to the you because there is no other way to physically distinguish them.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Again, you're trying way to hard to insert a ghost in the machine, just so you can rip it out and try to use it in your fight.Well, think about that scenario described above. What is there, otherwise, to distinguish one from the other if not a soul.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Sorry, BJ, but we still haven't found these WMD's... er, souls... in the language. I am using your language now. Haven't you noticed? That soul is now well and truly ensconced in your brain. :D

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Quite frankly, you are wrong in this case - the language implies nothing except personal identity. And there's nothing in personal identity that is refuted by materialism. Then find personal identity in the above scenario.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
So can you, really and truly, without resorting to special cases (Sorry, but that's EXACTLY what it is), support your reasoning?But you must be able to explain all cases. This one just makes it impossible to escape the conclusion that the duplicate is you just as surely as the original was you. You cannot explain it any other way without resorting to a soul.
And the inescapable conclusion of this "special case" can easily be extrapolated to all other cases once you understand the implications of this inescapable conclusion.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
I know your clone would act as if it were BJ and that there was no problem at all - unless you (clone) found out you (original) were still alive on earth. My clone would simply change his name and forge a new life for himself on Mars. Why? Because of the awareness that we are not truly the same person - Waco(Earth) and Waco(Mars) are simply not the same person. So Waco(Mars) would become someone new - Alex, perhaps - I always liked that name. These are the ethical issues that result from having a non-destructive teleporter. It is why I would support only a destructive teleporter. However this is a separate issue from the one we are concerned with here.


Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Nonetheless, the one trying desperately to insert ghosts and souls is you, BJ - I'm simply saying they don't exist, but that individual identity does exist. Is that really so damned difficult? You keep stating this. But would you please tell me where exactly the ghost is in my machine. Show me the immaterial soul in my machine.

BillyJoe.

[BillyJoe]

Atlas,

Originally posted by Atlas
To the materialist, one atom is as good as the next when constructing the brain that will color the self in.....They are willing to trade atoms freely. Spot on.
But do you not agree? After all, all our atoms are replaced every seven years. Is there a new self every seven years and when exactly does it become a new one? Rediculous questions, of course but then you must surely agree that it can't matter exactly which atoms are used.
A secondary question is: "Does it matter how long this process takes?.....

Originally posted by Atlas
They care that the self continues with all of it's capacities and memories. It's worse than that. :D
Not ALL the capacities and memories are necessary. Even Taffer has had retrograde amnesia.

Originally posted by Atlas
For me it has always been the reverence for each human consciousness. Extinguishment is a mini tradgedy. It is final. But it shows that I have a "first-in" bias. Whichever body the consciousness inhabits first gets the reverence. The key word here is "bias". Why this bias?
BTW, Atlas, how do you respond to the above scenario.

Originally posted by Atlas
What if androids without brains but with internal power sources exist on Mars. Now lets say the teleporter's disintegrator only had enough memory and power to do brains. So Z, you lay down on the table for a brain scan, They find one, it's a little fat, but they use it anyway taking the part that makes you 'you'. In the process you fall into a big sleep. Your brain info is transmitted and reintegrated in an android which has experiences on Mars. Then at the end of the process the android returns your brain, really a 2nd generation copy made of new atoms, back into your skull and you awaken with new memories. It's you all along (a series of selves connected by memories). But what a weird experience you'd have on Mars looking down at your metallic body. :eek:

Originally posted by Atlas
This seems to me much less objectionable but only because I have that "first-in" bias. The consciousness belongs in the body it was first in. And the basis for this bias? Or don't biases need reasons? (just asking)

Originally posted by Atlas
So I ask you, does this represent the bias against stepping into the teleporter that you and I and Taffer have or is there something even more fundamental?I think that is it. But if there is no basis for this bias, if there is no material evidence ( ;) ) to support this bias, then what are we to conclude about it other than that it is equivalent to the ghost in the machine.

Originally posted by Atlas
(edit: My point is that if nobody dies it's ok to recreate brains and the self. Selves switch off (die) all the time. As long as another, connected to the preceding self by memories, is switched on, it's OK.

BillyJoe

[BillyJoe]

Atlas,

Originally posted by Atlas
I think it's a good scenario for getting at the root of our inability to agree 100% with BillyJoe and DD. I think we're going to come down to something that is not the "ghost in the machine"... We're body bigots. By body bigots, do you mean the body with its brain? Your scenario would suggest otherwise but I'm sure that could not have been what you intended.

But then consider the replacement of molecules one by one over seven years. What if the process is speeded up? As long as the fuction is not disturbed, how could it matter? Suppose the machine merely scanned the brain for the coordinates of each molecule and then removed each molecule and replaced it with an identical molecule without disrupting the brain's function. Is that okay? What if the machine could do that lightning fast - in the blink of an eye. How could the speed make any difference? Are you still you in this scenario? If you don't think so, than you definately have a soul lurking within your point of view. :)

regardds,
BillyJoe.

[BillyJoe]

zaayr,

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Again, though, the entire time your 'pattern' was on Mars, YOU would truly not be there - and once those memories were restored to the YOU brain, they still wouldn't be YOUR memories, per se... Well, it's getting a bit messy around here don't you think. :D

Because of those memories, you'd swear black and blue that you had been on Mars looking down on that metallic body. You can clearly remember scanning the landscape with your mechanical eyes, hearing the metal scrape as you walked about crunching the dust beneath your feet. And such a recent and crystal clear memory it is too.

Hmmm....maybe you were there after all. :)

BJ

[Z]

Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you?

No, you'd either suddenly cease any experience at all, or you'd continue to live as normal. You have no idea how it turned out unless you were alive, in which case you'd have to assume you were the clone - but if you knew NOTHING about the process? Well, of course you won't realize you're the clone. But this is due to false memories, now isn't it?

At many times in our history, we have found ways of implanting apparently false memories into people. Brainwashing is a very potent technique, and people remember all sorts of things that cannot have happened at all. Did they really do the things they remember? No, they simply have false memories. This is all your clone is experiencing - false memories.

YOU would suddenly cease - YOU would be dead.

Suppose the machine merely scanned the brain for the coordinates of each molecule and then removed each molecule and replaced it with an identical molecule without disrupting the brain's function. Is that okay? What if the machine could do that lightning fast - in the blink of an eye. How could the speed make any difference? Are you still you in this scenario? If you don't think so, than you definately have a soul lurking within your point of view.

Has it ever been established whether or not, certainly, the brain replaces itself every seven years as well? I know that some neurogenesis is now believed to occur, but that it's not brain-wide, certainly, and nerve cells in the brain are initially formed during the prenatal years and survive until trauma, injury, etc. destroy them. So, actually, the brain is the one thing NOT systematically replaced on a continual basis. Hmmm... which means, replacing the entire brain would, in fact, kill the original being. So, no, you're wrong again, BJ - the brain MUST be continuous for survival to occur.

This still sheds a new shadow over the second question, though - which still seems like a lose-lose proposition.

So far, reseach shows some regrowth of neurons occurs, but is inhibited by stress, etc. Further, this regrowth occurs when the original neurons are damaged or destroyed - I can't find any evidence that says that neurons are systematically replaced by the body's regenerative functions.

So, as understood under current scientific knowledge, I'd say that you cannot replace the brain without destroying the self.

Because of those memories, you'd swear black and blue that you had been on Mars looking down on that metallic body. You can clearly remember scanning the landscape with your mechanical eyes, hearing the metal scrape as you walked about crunching the dust beneath your feet. And such a recent and crystal clear memory it is too. Hmmm....maybe you were there after all.

I could brainwash you to believe you were a Nazi sympathizer in 1942 too... maybe you were there after all? Nope.

Sorry, BJ - as much as I appreciate the depth you've looked into to reach your conclusions, I'm afraid you're still quite wrong on this point.

[BillyJoe]

SCENARIO:

Suppose the machine had an internal coin which it flipped to decide whether you would be left alone or scanned, vapourized and recreated. In your words, you would either be dead or you wouldn't depending on how the coin toss came out and you have do idea how it turned out. So, are you alive or are you dead? You wouldn't really know whether you were alive or dead would you?

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
You'd either suddenly cease any experience at all, or you'd continue to live as normal. Fair enough, from your point of view.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
You have no idea how it turned out unless you were alive, in which case you'd have to assume you were the clone Read what you just wrote: YOU WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME YOU WERE THE CLONE. !
Don't you mean HE would have to assume HE was the clone? YOU are dead aren't you?

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But if you knew NOTHING about the process? Well, of course you won't realize you're the clone. Again, read what you just wrote: YOU WON'T REALIZE YOU ARE THE CLONE. !
Don't you mean HE won't realise HE is the clone.
And what if the coin turned up tails and no duplication takes place? What wouild you have to say then? That YOU won't realize YOU are YOU?

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But this is due to false memories, now isn't it? False memories are dim, distant, and partial. The memories in our scenario are crstal clear, recent, and complete. There is really no comparison. False memories are implanted memories. The memories in our scenario are holus bolus duplicated.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
At many times in our history, we have found ways of implanting apparently false memories into people. Brainwashing is a very potent technique, and people remember all sorts of things that cannot have happened at all. Did they really do the things they remember? No, they simply have false memories. This is all your clone is experiencing - false memories. You are trying to equate dim, distant, partial, implanted memories with crystal clear, recent, complete, duplicated memories.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
YOU would suddenly cease - YOU would be dead. Or, in your own words, YOU WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME YOU WERE THE CLONE.

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Has it ever been established whether or not, certainly, the brain replaces itself every seven years as well? I know that some neurogenesis is now believed to occur, but that it's not brain-wide, certainly, and nerve cells in the brain are initially formed during the prenatal years and survive until trauma, injury, etc. destroy them. So, actually, the brain is the one thing NOT systematically replaced on a continual basis. The molecules of all the organs, except the brain, are replaced cell by cell. The molecules of the brain are replaced molecule by molecule. That is the only difference that I remember. The molecule by molecule replacement preserves the structure and function of the brain. The structure and function of the brain would not be preserved if the molecules were replaced in units of cells.

BillyJoe

[Atlas]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Okay, imagine you don't know anything (not hard is it :D). You don't know how the machine works. You don't even know that it is working on you. The machine scans you, vapourises you, uses your molecules to recreate you in the exact same orientation and position and it does all this in an instant. Would you know the difference?BillyJoe. Active imagination addendum...
Little Atlas was sitting in his chair and took off his digital watch when he noticed the clock on his TV's cable box (which is supposedly never more than 3 picoseconds off true Super Atomic World TV Time) was 1 minute ahead of his personal timepiece.

Just as Atlas was deciding to set his watch to the correct picosecond a space alien ship from the Vooloorian cluster locked onto his coordinates and disintegrated Atlas capturing his atomic settings and spins and uploading them into the flourescing plasma suspension cylinder that is at the receiving end of the Vooloorian Atomic Info Sucker (patent pending).

Just then MgGthtrTk slithers in and he's like all "What in the name of BlstrFlk is going on here." LothTxr spins in that ungainly way that overweight Voolorgies do when frightened and immediately seeks to hide his displayed array of fine surgical rectal examination instruments, "Oh Hi MgGthrTk - Um nothing at all - Just tidying up".

"Yah right, you lying sack of Vooloodrek, You've uploaded a Turdo, haven't you?" accuses MgGthrTk. (They always call us Turdos and it's one of the BIG reasons I hate aliens.) Anyway, LothTxr is all "Why? I should be able to do what I want on my breaks!" And MgGthrTk is fuming that "We'd all like to do rectal exams but we get permission first." Anyway they go round and round and in the end LothTxr is not allowed to reintegrate the pulsing flourescing plasma that minutes ago was Atlas in his chair. MgGthrTk reverses the settings on the V.A.I.S and turns the dial to Hum, and within 7 seconds Atlas is fully reintegrated with all new atoms in his favorite chair staring at the time on his Cable Box.

A perplexed look comes over him. Without having touched the picosecond adjustment button on his Casio Inferio3000 it is suddenly 8 minutes behind, not just 1. WTF?

The first thing that Atlas thinks of, like I think all of us would, is Alien abduction, but because his rectum is not sore he rules it out. He settles on blaming Casio and demands a brand new Inferio3000.1, which again, I think we all would.

Ok BillyJoe I think you'll agree, it's pretty hard for the super intellijent Atlas to imagine he doesn't know anything. But I tried to find a scenario that would allow me to entertain that wild notion. The timepiece exhibits the continuity aspect from Atlas' POV. No time passed for him and his watch. He is so oblivious to his own reconstruction that he blames the manufacturer of his watch. I have felt this way right along. I'm certain my issues revolve around my notions of life as much as consciousness.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
Atlas,

By body bigots, do you mean the body with its brain? Your scenario would suggest otherwise but I'm sure that could not have been what you intended. Yah, that's it. Illogical as it is. I haven't been able to come up with a good reason why I wouldn't step into the Teleport except that it would extinguish original me.

So I'm of the opinion that while the conscious side of me cares only for the idea of me, the life side of me cares for it's matter.

The impulse to survive is an impulse to survive in the material world materially. I think you discussed with Z that if souls and the afterlife were proven real the idea of survival would change.

For you it already has, but for me -- these atoms got smart in a dumb existence, they deserve a little respect.

[Z]

You are trying to equate dim, distant, partial, implanted memories with crystal clear, recent, complete, duplicated memories.

When we have the technology to implant crystal clear, recent, complete, duplicated memories we will also have the technology to implant crystal clear, recent, complete, false memories as well - so what difference here?

If a similar experiment could be done now, somehow, with our current knowledge of brain technology, and we could somehow duplicate the matter of the brain, the best memories we could implant would be dim, distant, partial, and false - whether they were copied from the original or not.

Like Ian, you confuse the present state of technology with the subject at hand.

The quality of the implanted memory is irrelevant - the fact that the memory is false remains unchanged.

Yes, I didn't strictly maintain my pronoun usage throughout my reply - properly, I should have pre-qualified with, "If you were the clone" in each case. Which would clear up the confusion in :Or, in your own words, YOU WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME YOU WERE THE CLONE.:

Because YOU wouldn't be around to assume anything.

The molecules of all the organs, except the brain, are replaced cell by cell. The molecules of the brain are replaced molecule by molecule. That is the only difference that I remember. The molecule by molecule replacement preserves the structure and function of the brain. The structure and function of the brain would not be preserved if the molecules were replaced in units of cells.

But do we KNOW this for a fact, or is that merely the present state of technology?

I find it highly significant that the brain is the one organ that never replaces itself entirely. This alone should be proof enough of a continuous self - the brain - that remains largely unchanged physically throughout life. And why physical trauma to the brain can cause alterations, even complete alterations, of the self.

The self is continuous as long as the cells of the brain are continuous - destroy those cells and the self is destroyed. Create a copy of the cells and you've created a new self, a new brain, a new person.

As you said, it has to explain every case - including who is who if the original survives. So what's your story there, BJ? If you are cloned but you survive, are you also the clone? Can you be two people at once? I assert, you cannot. You simply have a twin with a precisely equal memory to your own. Him and you. Simple. No souls involved, no spirits, no immortal force passing through the aether.

If I were a dualist, I'd have to insist cloning would be impossible, since you can't duplicate an immaterial soul through a material process. I'd be with Ian, that the cellular creature on the other side would be a corpse.

BTW - doesn't the original question say that cellular states are copied? Thus, the brain would be duplicated at the cellular level, not any smaller? Curious.

As a dualist, I'd argue that the first question would be based on a false premise, as the soul could not be transferred this way - and there could be no duplicate at the other end. And if proven wrong - if a clone DID appear and was alive, I'd have to assume it possessed a different spirit from mine, and in fact would have to wonder where the soul came from, how it appeared on Mars, whether or not it might even be a human soul - all questions based on the idea that there is something other than matter. But as a materialist, I could accept that a life form would be created... but that life form would be separate from me. Thus, no viable reason exists in the question to seek a 100% chance of my own destruction.

In fact, if they can do this, they can just as easily create a fresh pattern from scratch and create a new person there perfectly suited to their needs - so I would never be approached in the first place.

The question itself is at fault heavily - it presumes too much, while ignoring too much as well.

Only one me, only one you... not a soul between us, but all the identities of the world. :D

[Atlas]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
The key word here is "bias". Why this bias? Or don't biases need reasons? (just asking)

I think that is it. But if there is no basis for this bias, if there is no material evidence ( ;) ) to support this bias, then what are we to conclude about it other than that it is equivalent to the ghost in the machine.
I definitely chose the word bias to elicit the questions you ask. But I wondered if Z or Taffer or even you would say, No that's not it. I do think that for me it is it, and as I said in my previous post, it has more to do with my concept of life than it has to do with consciousness.

Anyway, I wanted to see if there was agreement or disagreement before I continued the introspection. But I don't mind ranting a little about bias.

I still think that everybody here has a bias that won't face. My icky definition is supported by all the discussions but you guys just don't want to get it on ya.

"The self is produced by the brain." and "I am a brain." These are radically different statements. No one is a brain. A brain function creates us.

When I said: " *I* is a semicontinuous manufactured secretion of the brain " - I think I'm pretty close to the truth. But you guys, all of yuz, just can't bring youself to admit you're just brain ooze.

That smacks of bias. Even though you want to believe you are foundationally material your language is troubling. The brain must be there, true. But the *I* is produced or secreted by that brain. Like all of the representations of the physical world as Idea, the *I* is just one more Idea, albeit a very special one sometimes called self-awareness. I agree with you Billy, it is the predicate, not the subject.

Yet, that immaterial predicate, *I*, the secretion of the brain is of highest importance, such that we all agree that a source of it must be preserved. Then materialists denigrate the source. They love the concept that *I* will reappear in any source of identical atomic structure and so judge a source like it is a printer producing a page, another printer can produce the same page. Well, that analogy doesn't go very far but that's ok. I think the matter and it's product are chained.

Once matter lifts itself to the point of producing the *I* we have to deal with it. The *I* produced by the original material can be of no less valued than the *I* produced by a duplicated matter. We revere the *I*. Destroying it's source undeniably destroys it just as duplicating it's source reproduces it. The magic of the materialist conception of HenryFording the *I* aside, as long as we live in the physical world we must accept the physical self as the producer of the immaterial *I*. To prefer the aspect to the whole is to prefer the feather to the bird or maybe the air to the planet.

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
[B]Sorry, DD - still not making sense.

If "I" am on Earth, I cannot be on Mars. "He" is on Mars. To him, of course, the reverse is true. But in neither case can I say that "I" am here and on Mars simultaneously. Rather, I can mention the existance of a remarkable being who is exactly like me, that HE is on Mars, and that I hope He stays on Mars and doesn't come home trying to sleep with my wife.
This illustrates the problem that the limits of semantics has on this discussion. You keep refering to "I" as if "I" couldn't have a plural. Understandably so, as no language on Earth has such a plural.

You say that if "I" am on Earth "I" cannot possibly be on Mars. That is only correct if you by "I" mean the particular elementary particles making up the body of the "I" in question. The "I" on Mars, which is every single bit exactly the true "I", does indeed have different particles making up the body. The question is: So what? The individual knows in the deepest core of his being that he trully is you, just as the being on Earth knows this as well. They are the same "I" as they are projected by the same braintype. One has no more a right to claim himself the ultimate true "I" than the other, except in the mind of a matter-bigot.
You wouldn't 'go to sleep in one location and wake up in the other' - you'd 'go to sleep in one location and never, ever wake up again'. It really is that simple.What part of "you" would no longer be projected by your brain?

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by Taffer
Time for the yo-yo to add something to this conversation, yes? :D
Yes indeed! :)
DD, I can see your problem (I think). Lets say that the Taffer who is typing this message is the original Taffer, and 10,000 clones are made. What do we have? One original Taffer and 10,000 individual beings who seem to look a lot like Taffer (exactly the same, in fact). But this doesn't change anything. The original Taffer (me) is the Taffer that existed before the clones were made. All the clones wake up in the cloning factory, with all the memories of the original. Thus, they are aware that they are clones. There are not 10,001 Taffers. There are 10,000 beings that are exactly the same as Taffer, and one original Taffer. If the original Taffer is the Taffer that must make the decision to take the teletrans, it will know that the Taffer on mars is only linked to him via memories and brain pattern; the mars Taffer is not linked by continuity. Therefore he will reason that he will 'go to sleep and never wake up again' and that the Taffer on mars will wake up on mars knowing full well that he is not the original, but rather a clone. Now none of this makes a bit of difference to anyone else, other then the original Taffer. Because he is dead.

Think of it like this. I have a golf ball. I make 10,000 copies of this golf ball. I now have 10,001 golf balls. But only one is the golf ball that I played with two weeks ago friday. The other 10,000 golf balls are all golf balls that look like they were played with two weeks ago friday, but were, in fact, not. [/B]
Yes, the 10,000 Taffers will, when informed of the circumstances of why they have suddenly been transported to a warehouse, be able to know that there was an original Taffer somewhere else. This makes no difference to whether they are every bit as much the Taffer we all know and love (despite his tendecy to flip-flop :)).

Once again, there is no Taffer unless a brain somewhere is projecting Taffer. One brain projecting Taffer is no more the true Taffer than any other brain. There is nothing which can distinguish them, neither to themselves nor physically. They can only be distinguished the moment they don't receive the same inputs as some other Taffer.

[Hellbound]

Try thinking of it this way:

Taffer goes to sleep, knowing that, while he/she is out, clones will be made.

When you wake up, you are in a room with twenty other Taffers also waking up at the same moment.
Are you the original? Is one of the others?

How do you tell?

[DanishDynamite]

OK. I wonder if the following argument has been tried in this thread yet (yes, I haven't read it from the beginning).

Suppose it was possible to make a chip which imulated every funktionality of a human neuron. Suppose we switched a neuron in Taffer's brain with such a chip. Would Taffer still be good old Taffer? Would he feel any different? Would he no longer be able to think "I am the true Taffer, the one and only Taffer"?

If you agree that he could still do so, suppose we then replace every other neuron in his brain with such a chip. Would he still be able to claim that he was the same old Taffer? That his personality and his sense of self was still unchanged?

If so, what happens if we instead build a seperate Taffer brain consisting of these chips, insert them into a copy of Taffer's body, and preload them with the state of Taffer's neurons at time t? Would this Taffer in some way no longer be the true Taffer? If not, why not? What piece of information or what ghost in the machine doesn't the chip Taffer have, which the none-chip Taffer does? What information hasn't been transferred?

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Huntsman
Try thinking of it this way:

Taffer goes to sleep, knowing that, while he/she is out, clones will be made.

When you wake up, you are in a room with twenty other Taffers also waking up at the same moment.
Are you the original? Is one of the others?

How do you tell? That's great. I love it. I'm sure everyone would believe they are the original and where the heck did these clones come from.

That's the odd part for me. When I look at the issue that way no problem - if living clones were shown to be producible Materialism would have passed a test.

But not completely. Now you have to reduce that group back down to 1. We can't have all those dups running around. Would any of them think, Oh well - What the heck - Take me out - It doesn't matter, We're all the same.

[Z]

I propose - and this is only my theory - that as we replace each neuron, the person in question feels less 'self-aware' in the same sense as the original. Maybe nothing they can put a finger on, or maybe something definite, like less emotional reactions. Without having done this, it is difficult to speculate.

Thus, I theorize, that if total brain replacement were to occur, the original being would no longer exist at all.

PRACTICALLY speaking, cloning would be just fine. The clone would have every practical reason for believing it was the same as the original person - provided it didn't have awareness of its status and/or the philosophy I carry, or worse, the 'soul' philosophy - I agree with this, 100%. It would in every way have every right to claim to be the true and proper self as the original - with exception as noted above.

But ignorance of its status wouldn't change the fundamental fact of its status, and the fact is that the original is the only original, and has the only claim to being 'I' from the original's point of view.

I would argue that for any true original sense of self, some of the original brain matter must be present - even if only a few neurons, but it would need to be determined by experiment just what parts of the brain are essential to the self. I would equally say the same if we learned to cause the brain to systematically replace neurons - that if we tricked the brain into replacing itself 100% that the original self would be truly gone forever.

This is all just theory, of course - but I believe fully that self is necessarily the exact same set of neurons firing in the same patterns with the same stored memories. Personally, I feel that irreversible amnesia also is a situation in which original self is destroyed, as are various forms of non-curable insanity.

Does this all predicate a soul? No, not at all. How, after all, can a soul be destroyed through amnesia or brain damage? Surely it cannot, provided it exists at all. Yet we witness people undergo changes of 'self' in this very circumstance, which suggest that soul is not involved, but rather brain.

Perhaps there is a soul, but I would argue it is a thing apart from the 'self' of the physical body - and essentially, given the common definition of 'soul', a completely inconsequential thing at that.

So no total neuron replacement for me, either, DD - onlly partial, and only to the limits that science can determine will not influence the personal sense of self.

The trick, of course, is that the personal sense of self, if it dies, can no longer comment on its selfhood - This leads some of you to believe it no longer matters, and that the new 'self' is just as valid, since the old 'self' is gone.

Again, though, this is just the trick of destroying the original again. If we build these neural nets without destroying the original, we can again witness that the original is still its own 'self', separate from and distinguishable from any duplicates.

If you can come up with a scenario in which a duplicate and an original can both be of the same awareness identically without destroying the original, then you have an arguement that works; until then, the only way your philosophical concept functions is through destruction of the original self.

If the original self is destroyed, it doesn't matter much to ANYONE, as long as a duplicate exists, provided they accept the duplicate as valid. I agree with this. But to the original self, if they are aware that this, in fact, what happens, then it matters very much indeed.

But to do this is the same as claiming that, if a twin is given the same name and memories, that you can kill one twin without consequence. Even that the twin may willingly accept death, since his twin lives on and shares the exact same name and memories. But this of course is ludicrous - no sensible being is going to willingly die just because someone sufficiently like them continues to exist.

Probability-wise, it's likely that every one of us has had a brain-twin throughout time. But that person wasn't the same as the person now, was it? Of course not - and we could argue that the environment and time were significant factors in their state of self. But then, you must accept that the only singular self can exist at one location in one time - which refutes the teletrans experiment. OR you must decide that it is impossible for two brains to ever have been physically identical throughout time, which is unlikely. OR you have to claim that each instance of 'self' in this case is the same 'self' at different eras of time - which leads one to an almost soul-like concept and a concept of reincarnation.

Nonetheless, I must assert that there can only be one 'self' for one 'person' and one 'person' for one 'self'. Destroy that person, and he's gone forever. Replicating a person does not restore the person, only creates a new clone.

These are subtle but significant differences, and they are critical to understanding this predicament!

[Hellbound]

zaayr:

I think the problem you run into only occurs because you restrict it to a single point of view, that of the first person.

Take my example above, 20 clones are made, then the clones and the original are all put into a room. Memories and physical form are identical, at this point. So, the twenty wake up. Due to a lab error, the original was not tagged or marked in any way before or after the cloning process.

So, how does one determine who the original self is?

Would the original self know he was the original self?

Would a clone know he was a clone?

If either of those is a yes, how?

If we randomly select one to keep and get rid of the other 20, does the person still exist? If we had a clone instead of the original, would there be any observable difference between this situation and what would have occured if we did pick the original by chance?

Would the survivor still be recognized as the person?

The point is, there is no way, without specialized knowledge (a specific or privaledged point of view) to tell the difference between a clone and the original. The only way one can tell is if the original maintains knowledge of the cloning event, and ends up in some situation that positively identifies him as the original. Without this immediate difference (removed by simply having the process done while unconscious), the term original becomes, essentially, meaningless. Any of the clones and the original are interchangeable. Each would have the same reason to think themselves the original, each would have the same reasons to think themselves a clone. Anyone without access to specialized knowledge would also have no reason to choose any particular pne as the original, and there is no objective way to determine the original or a copy. A copy that lived on as the original is as much the original as the original was. The memories and structure and patterns produced during cloning (assuming 100% accuracy, for the sake of argument) would also give each copy the same memories, personality, and experiences as the original.

The difference that you are arguing for is one of the specific, and as such cannot apply to the general case. With a simple addition of performing the process during an unconscious period, your objection is no longer relevant. There is no way to tell the original from a copy, or any particular copy from any other, until divergance sets in. Even then, divergence would only seperate them after the fact; it would provide discreteness, but not uniqueness. You could tell them from each other, but would still be unable to identify the original.

That's the point the materialists are trying to get across. The only reason you have to be able to claim one is the original is because the original is the only one you have given special knowledge to, knowledge that causes an immediate and signifigant divergance from the clones, and marks the original differently. Take this knowledge away, or give the same knowledge to all copies (i.e.-each is led to believe it is the original and the others are copies by having all appear walking out of the copy machine simultaneously), and your distinction is no longer viable.

[Hellbound]

Oh, and just one small thing I noticed in you previous post, zaayr:

It is highly unlikely that any of us have ever had a "brain twin". There are approximately 100 billion neurons in a human brain (http://hypertextbook.com/facts/2002/AniciaNdabahaliye2.shtml). Now, even if we assume that they only create relationships in pairs of neurons, that still gives us more possible configurationsthan people that have ever lived, by a wide margin. By the time there is a statistically significant chance of a brain twin, evoilution will have moved on and the species will be different (if still existant).

Considering that the general consensus on memory and personality today is that the neurons of the brain form certain pathways with other neurons, upwards of dozens per neuron, the possbile configurations grow to an astronomical level.

[Z]

Granted on your 'brain twin' observation.

But do recall, the original questions that spawned this thread DID provide you with a unique point of view. In fact, you are presented with all of the necessary specific information to understand who is the original, and who the clone. The specific question was one of self-preservation - in order for you to live, do you allow yourself to be killed? The very question which sparked this debate set forth the problem in toto - and while you seek to invalidate my point with what you call a move from specific to general, that is in fact the only way your point becomes valid. I agree, that if you remove all awareness from the act, and eliminate the first-person point of view of the original, then you have a situation where every one must be treated as equally valid as every other. However, this is not what the original survival question was asking - and this is not the only situation that could arise.

As BJ pointed out, for a philosophy to be valid, it must be valid in every case - including the specific and individual awareness scenario. Thus, as long as there are identifiers and specifics, or an awareness of process, then one and only one person can be the original self. It takes a specific effort - a specific tailoring of the circumstances - to conceal the original from itself and others, thereby eliminating the argument out of hand.

It's like saying that, if you knock Taff unconscious, then put him in a room and rapidly replace the door with more wall, such that it presents a continual front, then Taff will awaken in a bewildering situation where he cannot be where he is without there having been a way in or out. It conceals the fact - the fact that there was a door into the room that is now gone. Just as your scenario conceals the fact that there is only one original experiencing only one sense of selfhood, and numerous duplicates experiencing each one's own sense of selfhood, separate from each other.

In your scenario, which clone (or original) would offer to die? None of them. You have now created new life forms, each with a valid right to life. Each with a valid survival instinct. So not one single member of that group is going to offer himself for destruction, because every one has a self-preservation instinct, and a fully singular awareness of self to protect.

The scenario masks the original sample from everyone, but induces the problem that every single one now has its own sense of self. In fact, your scenario demonstrates another problem with BJ's scenario - the fact that each and every one is experiencing a state of its own selfhood, and not the selfhood of any of the other duplicates. As Ian pointed out, it wouldn't be one mind (or self) seeing out of dozens of bodies, but dozens of identical minds each seeing out of one body - its own body - and no other.

So, while you could no longer differentiate between individuals, you still could clearly see that each and every self is separate, individual, and utterly connected to the physical being that is the self. Hiding the details behind smoke and mirrors, yet still providing us the means to observe where BJ is wrong. Thank you.

[Atlas]

Another excellent post Huntsman.

Strangely, Taffer, Z, and I accept the Materialist idea that if, in fact, the clone was not a corpse, that it would likely have all duplicate memories. Where we diverge is in the equivalence of one with the next.

OK, lets say that you disintegrate an original but store the reconstruction data on a disk. Well, pretty soon people will be asking questions. The police find out what you did and put you on trial for murder. You hold up the disk shouting "You don't understand!"

Even if the court decides to reconstitute the individual, it's clear he's not the same, identical yes, but distinctively different. And you, you're on death row.

All the Materialist arguments, fascinating though they are, can only be appreciated amorally.

That's the problem. Not that we don't accept the duplicate thinks he's the original. It's that we've got a funeral to attend.

[Hellbound]

Ah, yes, but no one is really arguing that each does not have it's own point of view.

The question is, which one is "you"?

The original scenario was modified by me, yes, beacuse the entire idea was to discuss the nature of consciousness and self, not the specifics of the situation.

By granting my case we have shown that self can be duplicated, which is what I was getting to.

In other words, in all discernable ways (from my example), the copys are as much "you" as the original. No matter which ones were killed (irregardless of whether they want to be or not, I don't see how that relates to the primary issue of the nature of consciousness), the one left standing is still "you", for any discernable stance.

If this holds true in the general case (where we assume copies are made, each identical, and then try to determine how we can choose among them), then the specific case they are differentiated not because only one is "really you", but because one has experiences that differ from the others.

This is getting interesting now :) Hopefully you can see what I'm getting at here. I don't think I necessarily agree completely with Billy's stance, but I don't agree that only one is "the real you" either. All are discrete versions of you. Thus, in the teleportation example, the one on Mars is as much you as any other; killing the original does not mean "you" will no longer exist. In fact, if the nature of the teleportation system was such that the individual had to be destroyed in the process of reading the data, no one would ever know the copies were not the original, including the copies themselves.

[DanishDynamite]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
[B]I propose - and this is only my theory - that as we replace each neuron, the person in question feels less 'self-aware' in the same sense as the original. Maybe nothing they can put a finger on, or maybe something definite, like less emotional reactions. Without having done this, it is difficult to speculate.
On what basis can you possibly base this theory? I told you that the chip emmulates every functionality of the neuron. Are you saying that there is some non-physical part to a human neuron which cannot be emmulated by a physical substitute?

PRACTICALLY speaking, cloning would be just fine. The clone would have every practical reason for believing it was the same as the original person - provided it didn't have awareness of its status and/or the philosophy I carry, or worse, the 'soul' philosophy - I agree with this, 100%. It would in every way have every right to claim to be the true and proper self as the original - with exception as noted above.
The clone would have everything, every view, every philosophy of the original. What it won't have, is new information which is different from the originals. The reason it won't is because we are discussing whether it is meaningful, both for the persons involved and in general, to say that there is a difference between the two at the time of activation.
But ignorance of its status wouldn't change the fundamental fact of its status, and the fact is that the original is the only original, and has the only claim to being 'I' from the original's point of view.
It would by definition necessarily be ignorant of it's "special" status as it would require the input of new information to create this awareness.

[Taffer]

I find the solution, now, very simple. All things are unique, by location and time, not only shape, color etc. If my brain pattern, in front of the computer right now, is duplicated and replicated on mars, then the person on mars may act like me, but it isn't the same me as the me sitting in front of the computer, is it? Because I'm sitting in front of the computer and he is on mars.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Taffer
I find the solution, now, very simple. All things are unique, by location and time, not only shape, color etc. If my brain pattern, in front of the computer right now, is duplicated and replicated on mars, then the person on mars may act like me, but it isn't the same me as the me sitting in front of the computer, is it? Because I'm sitting in front of the computer and he is on mars. I think you'll get a smiley rollin his eyes from BJ unless you add that the guy on mars thinks the same way about himself and about you on earth.

[Taffer]

Of course, I assumed that was obvious. Of course, I just got back a Philosophy essay in which I was marked down because of doing just that. Assuming obvious conclusions are obvious to everyone.

[BillyJoe]

Taffer,

Originally posted by Taffer
I find the solution, now, very simple. All things are unique, by location and time, not only shape, color etc. If my brain pattern, in front of the computer right now, is duplicated and replicated on mars, then the person on mars may act like me, but it isn't the same me as the me sitting in front of the computer, is it? Because I'm sitting in front of the computer and he is on mars. :rolleyes:

:D

But seriously.....

Would you care to comment on the following scanarios:


SCANARIO 1:

Okay, imagine you don't know anything. You don't know how the machine works. You don't even know that it is working on you. The machine scans you, vapourises you, uses your molecules to recreate you in the exact same orientation and position and it does all this in an instant. Would you know the difference?


SCANARIO 2:

Taffer goes to sleep, knowing that, while he/she is out, clones will be made. When you wake up, you are in a room with twenty other Taffers also waking up at the same moment. Are you the original? Is one of the others? How do you tell?


bj

[BillyJoe]

Huntsman,

Originally posted by Huntsman
I don't think I necessarily agree completely with Billy's stance :(

Where do we disagree?

BJ

[Taffer]

Originally posted by BillyJoe
SCANARIO 1:

Okay, imagine you don't know anything. You don't know how the machine works. You don't even know that it is working on you. The machine scans you, vapourises you, uses your molecules to recreate you in the exact same orientation and position and it does all this in an instant. Would you know the difference?

If it was in the shortest possible time, i.e a plank time, then no. You wouldn't. No-one could. If it was done fast enough that none of the synapses were interrupted, AT ALL, then no, you wouldn't know the difference, as it would be no different then the way your brain replaces itself. If, however, it wasn't that fast, then yes, you would know the difference. Or rather, you wouldn't know anything at all, because you'd be dead.


SCANARIO 2:

Taffer goes to sleep, knowing that, while he/she is out, clones will be made. When you wake up, you are in a room with twenty other Taffers also waking up at the same moment. Are you the original? Is one of the others? How do you tell?

No, you couldn't know the difference, but an objective, outside observer, would. Lets assume that God is actually an alien (to keep him material ;)). He would know which is the original, and which are the clones.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Taffer
Of course, I assumed that was obvious. Of course, I just got back a Philosophy essay in which I was marked down because of doing just that. Assuming obvious conclusions are obvious to everyone. For your penance you must make 10 posts to lifegazer.

[BillyJoe]

Atlas,

Originally posted by Atlas
OK, lets say that you disintegrate an original but store the reconstruction data on a disk. Well, pretty soon people will be asking questions. The police find out what you did and put you on trial for murder. You hold up the disk shouting "You don't understand!" If you did this with the original's consent, he is correct....you do not understand!

Originally posted by Atlas
Even if the court decides to reconstitute the individual, it's clear he's not the same, identical yes, but distinctively different. And you, you're on death row.Perhaps you had better ask the duplicate. He would have no hesitation in saying who he is and that he consented to the procedure. And the accused would be sitting in death row for a murdering someone who is alive. A gross miscarriage of justice.

Originally posted by Atlas
All the Materialist arguments, fascinating though they are, can only be appreciated amorally.Morals cannot determine the facts, they must be consistent with the facts.

Originally posted by Atlas
That's the problem. Not that we don't accept the duplicate thinks he's the original. It's that we've got a funeral to attend. But, if you accept that it's the self that is important, then the only thing that matters is that the self lives on. And it does.

BillyJoe.