Define Consiousness

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
What I wrote was hardly complicated, But, Bill, it was unnecessarily complicated unless you are playing empty "bullsh" word games ala "feints". It's kind of amusing to see you attacking dualists for such a move in one post while apparently demonstrating it yourself in another nearby post.

I'm inferring from your pointless and long lecture that my prior post touched a nerve. So what if qualia are a "thin thread" -- like I've said before, we are discussing almost nothing here, and that's something no matter how you try trivialize it out of existence.

... how are we ever to falsify "qualia?" ... The corollary question, if you can offer no such tests, is: why should we entertain the notion at all? As I pointed out to you quite a long time ago, Bill, there are two separable issues here: Emulations of human consciousness on something like modern computers, and supposition fields and the like in what passes for ordinary human mind/brains. Adult humans start with qualia, whether qualia "exist" or not (I don't necessarily agree with Ian that qualia exist but that's a separate issue).

How? I repeat:

quote posted by BillHoyt:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Mr. E
I suppose by evaluating the limit of consciousness as quale-content approaches zero, if I get what you reiterated through the fog of your complicated words.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I believe I've here addressed all of your plaints.


ME

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Mr. E

How? I repeat:

quote posted by BillHoyt:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Mr. E
I suppose by evaluating the limit of consciousness as quale-content approaches zero, if I get what you reiterated through the fog of your complicated words.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I believe I've here addressed all of your plaints.


ME

As usual, mystery, you've written a boatload of nothing. If you'd like to get somewhere with the discussion, may I suggest placing content into your posts?

I specifically asked for a test to falsify the notion of "qualia." Here, you state a presumption of "qualia" existence and state we should somehow manipulate the very things whose existence is to be falsified. This is patent, circular nonsense. Give me a test that falsifies.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
As usual, mystery, you've written a boatload of nothing. If you'd like to get somewhere with the discussion, may I suggest placing content into your posts? May I suggest you start reading for content?

I specifically asked for a test to falsify the notion of "qualia."I figure at this point: That's a Popper "falsifiable" joke, or a silly "notion" language game.

Here, you state a presumption of "qualia" existence and state we should somehow manipulate the very things whose existence is to be falsified. I seem to recall distancing my position from that of Ian rather explicitly.


ME

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Mr. E
I seem to recall distancing my position from that of Ian rather explicitly.


ME

Just answer the question, mystery. How do you falsify the notion of "qualia?" The cricket chirps here are amazing. So far, Ian has weighed in with an abolute dodge of the question, and you've weighed in with more pseudomathematical patter that assumes the existence of the very thing we'd like to test. That's pretzel logic.

How do you falsify the notion of "qualia?"

[Filip Sandor]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
How do you falsify the notion of "qualia?"

Assuming there is evidence for some phenomon and it cannot be disproven, would this not qualify as further evidence proving that the phenomenon exists?

[Jeff Corey]

I was wondering about that. I have auras that have been described for over 100 years in the medical literature. It starts as a zig-zag arc. Bright percept in my visual field. It gradually extends in a clockwise fashion into a circle, once it described a decreasing spiral.
People who have migraine headaches describe this and similar precursors to the migraine.
Are these qualia?
I quale to ask.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Mr. E

I suggest pending an explanation of 'TIC', that there are not "meta-qualia".I can clear up the first part at least: TIC = "Tongue-In-Cheek".


Originally posted by Filip Sandor

Assuming there is evidence for some phenomon and it cannot be disproven, would this not qualify as further evidence proving that the phenomenon exists?
There is an important difference between something which is not disproven and something which cannot be disproven.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
and you've weighed in with more pseudomathematical patter that assumes the existence of the very thing we'd like to test. That's pretzel logic. I don't know what you would have me understand by "pretzel logic". But tell me, Bill, do illusions exist in any way shape or form?

How do you falsify the notion of "qualia?" If my reiterations haven't addressed this for you yet, maybe I just don't know what the heck you are asking for or you aren't even trying to read my posts for content.

"falsify" usually is a reference to Popper's notion of falsifiability as a criterion for some kind of wannabe scientific theory. Can you show explicitly how it necessarily applies in this context? Otherwise the judgment that you, Bill, are playing empty word games stands.

And the question about illusions is important to answer directly, too.

ME

[BillHoyt]

Okay, now that the dialogue is finally building about the qualia question, I'm going to make the question clearer. Here is Dennett on the qualia problem:

"Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time, but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness that it would be grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia. Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way. My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special."
Quining Qualia (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm)

I share Dennett's exacerbation with "qualia." I also share Dennett's postion that I do not deny the existence of experience. I am simply amazed at the claim that "qualia" are special. I also share with Dennett the perception that "qualia" are elusive, and perhaps, deliberately so.

"What are qualia, exactly? This obstreperous query is dismissed by one author ("only half in jest") by invoking Louis Armstrong's legendary reply when asked what jazz was: "If you got to ask, you ain't never gonna get to know." (Block, 1978, p.281) This amusing tactic perfectly illustrates the presumption that is my target."

Apparently, I also share with Dennett, the (more than) inkling that "qualia" are a ruse, a tactic to define experience in such a way as to make it "special" and "personal," and so, as Ian claims, not subject to science. All the remaining claptrap then falls into place. "Qualia" are then, obvious, and then, obviously wholly subjective and, obviously, disconnected from underlying physical processes and then, obviously, from some ethereal, metaphysical-fog-laden plane. Right. Obvious.

When you define "qualia" this way, it is clearly a gamesmanship. It will serve well as a final escape hatch when all the physical correlates of consciousness are otherwise nailed down. "Qualia" are the final thin reed on which the dualists will remain hanging because "science will never know what red is like to me."

So when I ask for a falisifcation of "qualia," it is this definition for which I want one of the dualists to tell us - now - how we would ever be able to muster evidence against the notion. Now, not later, because the stage is clearly set for a russian dolls set of No True Scotsman maneuvers, each NTS layer revealing yet another NTS within. If they make the bald assertion that Ian makes, then there's no point arguing with them because they have stepped squarely outside of philosophy and squarely into a fundamentalist religion stance. If they can offer a better definition of "qualia" so that the test for physical correlates can, in principle, be devised, then we've got a concept with which to work.

But we've seen, so far, the quality of qualia answers, haven't we? I'm still waiting for something better than Ian's feint.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Okay, now that the dialogue is finally building about the qualia question, I'm going to make the question clearer. Here is Dennett on the qualia problem:

Dennett
"Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties,


Real? What does he mean by real? Exists perhaps? Why should everything that exists have properties?



Dennett
and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience,



What meaning might conscious experiences have in abstraction from qualia? Let's try to imagine we experience a bright summers day, but with no felt like qualities (ie qualia). I submit this is meaningless.

Dennett

I grant that conscious experience has properties.


What properties? What properties does my experience of the taste of chocolate have?


Dennett
I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time,



What "property" happens when I am tasting chocolate? We have the neural correlates of tasting chocolate, and we have the qualia itself. What is this "property" you are referring to??



but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness



I repeat, what properties?



that it would be grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia.



Any of what? These "properties"?? He hasn't stated what he means by properties and why all existents must have them.




Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way.



I don't think they are properties at all. What are they properties of??


My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special."
Quining Qualia (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm)



I agree that conscious experience has no properties. Qualia are not the properties of conscious experience, rather they are conscious experiences.

So much for Dennett. Back to Bill.





So when I ask for a falisifcation of "qualia," it is this definition for which I want one of the dualists to tell us - now - how we would ever be able to muster evidence against the notion. Now, not later, because the stage is clearly set for a russian dolls set of No True Scotsman maneuvers, each NTS layer revealing yet another NTS within. If they make the bald assertion that Ian makes, then there's no point arguing with them because they have stepped squarely outside of philosophy and squarely into a fundamentalist religion stance.

[/B]

Qualia most definitely exist. Of this we can be more certain than anything. Even more certain than the existence of the self.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I agree that conscious experience has no properties.
Wait. That isn't what Dennett said:

"...experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special."
Why should everything that exists have properties?Uh... how about: for coherency? What do you mean by 'real'?
Qualia most definitely exist. Of this we can be more certain than anything. Even more certain than the existence of the self.Why is the equally naked assertion I made above -- that rocks have fnarsciousness -- any less valid?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Wait. That isn't what Dennett said:

Dynamic,

Keep in mind you are debating with Ian, one of the few people with the sheer audacity to quote an author and immediately follow the quote with an outright distortion.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dymanic

Interesting Ian

I agree that conscious experience has no properties.

Wait. That isn't what Dennett said:

"...experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special."



If they have no properties then a fortiori they have no special properties.



Why should everything that exists have properties?

Uh... how about : for coherency?


Tell me how the raw experience of redness is incoherent for not having any properties.




What do you mean by 'real'?



I don't mean anything by it. It only has meaning in a given context.



Qualia most definitely exist. Of this we can be more certain than anything. Even more certain than the existence of the self.


Why is the equally naked assertion I made above -- that rocks have fnarsciousness -- any less valid?


It is not experienced.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If they have no properties then a fortiori they have no special propertiesI though I was confused for a minute there, but I was wrong. Dennett isn't talking about properties of qualia; he's talking about qualia as properties.

Tell me how the raw experience of redness is incoherent for not having any properties
Tell me what you mean by 'raw experiences'.


----------you----------
Qualia most definitely exist. Of this we can be more certain than anything. Even more certain than the existence of the self.
-----------------------
----------me-----------
Why is the equally naked assertion I made above -- that rocks have fnarsciousness -- any less valid?
-----------------------
-----------------------
It is not experienced.
Surely you mean: It is not reported. If it were, you would be forced to accept the existence of fnarsciousness as an objective truth (see subjective objectivity above).

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Wait. That isn't what Dennett said:

"...experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special."



If they have no properties then a fortiori they have no special properties.
[/quote]

Please stop being completely disingenuous, Ian. You know full well that isn't what Dennet wrote. He wrote "has no properties that are special...," not "has no properties." If you want to be taken seriously, then please post seriously.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If they have no properties then a fortiori they have no special properties

Dymanic
I though I was confused for a minute there, but I was wrong. Dennett isn't talking about properties of qualia; he's talking about qualia as properties.


They are properties?? Is that what he thinks?? Most interesting. So what are they properties of exactly?? How does he reconcile this with his argument that they do not exist??




Tell me how the raw experience of redness is incoherent for not having any properties



Tell me what you mean by 'raw experiences'.



Seems to me only a p-zombie could ask such a question.



----------you----------
Qualia most definitely exist. Of this we can be more certain than anything. Even more certain than the existence of the self.
-----------------------
----------me-----------
Why is the equally naked assertion I made above -- that rocks have fnarsciousness -- any less valid?
-----------------------
-----------------------
It is not experienced.


Surely you mean: It is not reported. If it were, you would be forced to accept the existence of fnarsciousness as an objective truth (see subjective objectivity above).


I do not intend wasting my time "conversing" with a p-zombie.

[Interesting Ian]

If they have no properties then a fortiori they have no special properties.


Please stop being completely disingenuous, Ian. You know full well that isn't what Dennet wrote. He wrote "has no properties that are special...," not "has no properties." If you want to be taken seriously, then please post seriously. [/B]

Thought you must have me on ignore.

How disappointing . . .

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

They are properties?? Is that what he thinks?? No, it isn't.
Most interesting.Not interesting enough to get you to read his actual arguments in detail, however.
So what are they properties of exactly?? How does he reconcile this with his argument that they do not exist??I can see how you might be confused, and am willing to give the benefit of the doubt by assuming that you actually are confused, rather than being deliberately disingenuous.

Let's look again at what he actually said:

"...I grant that conscious experience has properties."



"...experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special."

In other words, he does not see consciousness as having any special properties such as qualia.
[b]I do not intend wasting my time "conversing" with a p-zombie.A bit late for that, don't you think?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Just how, exactly, are "qualia" to be falsified, davidsmith73? Please be specific and indicate, very specifically, how the concept of "qualia" is to be refuted.

Have been unable to post messages of the last few days for some reason. Anyway, I'll try to answer to your question -

I think to ask how qualia can be falsified is a statement with no meaning. It is by virtue of qualia that you are able to ask the question in the first place. If there were no qualia then you would not be asking the question and I would not be able to read it or answer it. So a prediction of the lack of existence of qualia would be a lack of consciousness. This is clearly not the case since consciousness is required in order to pose the falsifiability question. A bit of a paradox indeed. I think therefore I am.

Still reading the Dennet link

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I think to ask how qualia can be falsified is a statement with no meaning.Could be. I don't put it beyond some to post meaningless notions in this forum. However...

It is by virtue of qualia that you are able to ask the question in the first place. If there were no qualia then you would not be asking the question and I would not be able to read it or answer it. So a prediction of the lack of existence of qualia would be a lack of consciousness. This is clearly not the case since consciousness is required in order to pose the falsifiability question. A bit of a paradox indeed. I think therefore I am.This strikes me as a mistake. Blind people might not have ordinary visual qualia but still be able to pose questions, even about questions of sight. Posing a question is an act of will, not a matter of passive sense perception the usual ground of qualia. Without qualia the question might tend to be less coherent or more indefinite, but it could still be posed, even if by a poseur.

ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian re BillHoyt

Thought you must have me on ignore.

How disappointing . . . [/B] In curiousity, is this how you go about refuting narrow-minded materialisms?

ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt in re Dymanic
Dynamic,

Keep in mind you are debating with Ian, one of the few people with the sheer audacity to quote an author and immediately follow the quote with an outright distortion. Is that a dualistic demo of the cliche "It takes one to know one"?

ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Real? What does he mean by real? Exists perhaps? Why should everything that exists have properties?Why bother with Dennett at all?
What meaning might conscious experiences have in abstraction from qualia?A lot, if there is any meaning at all.
Let's try to imagine we experience a bright summers day, but with no felt like qualities (ie qualia). I submit this is meaningless. Why pose something so meaningless?

What properties? What properties does my experience of the taste of chocolate have?Neglecting Dennett, I'd answer "Chocolate flavor" for starters if you are a normal human being.

I don't think they are properties at all. What are they properties of??My guess:

Experience of a property vs.
Property of an experience

Just a hunch about subject-object disorientation...



Qualia most definitely exist. Of this we can be more certain than anything. Even more certain than the existence of the self. That's your assumption. Isn't that exactly what BillHoyt might be asking some posters to challenge, their starting assumptions (in one way or another)?

There is lots of "A implies B" floating around. But does A exist and is it falsifiable? So to speak... Anyway, until Ian defines 'exist' meaningfully, is Ian saying anything particulary meaningful at all?

ME

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Mr. E

This strikes me as a mistake. Blind people might not have ordinary visual qualia but still be able to pose questions, even about questions of sight. Posing a question is an act of will, not a matter of passive sense perception the usual ground of qualia. Without qualia the question might tend to be less coherent or more indefinite, but it could still be posed, even if by a poseur.

ME

But even a question that is in the form of mentalese (thought) is qualia. Any experience is qualia. With regards to the question being an act of will, that may or may not be the case. A materialist would surely disagree with you. Either way, I don't think the subject of will has to be relavant here.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt in re nobody
Okay, now that the dialogue is finally building about the qualia question, I'm going to make the question clearer. Here is Dennett on the qualia problem:... "Quining Qualia (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm) Dennet?

So when I ask for a falisifcation of "qualia," it is this definition for which I want one of the dualists to tell us - now - how we would ever be able to muster evidence against the notion. You want someone to defend the Louis Armstrong definition of qualia? Why?

Maybe you could distinguish the differences among: subjective, personal, private. As far as I'm concerned qualia are objective and private, whether they exist or not.

If they can offer a better definition of "qualia" so that the test for physical correlates can, in principle, be devised, then we've got a concept with which to work.I've heard of "neural correlates of consciousness" but what would "physical correlates of qualia" amount to?

But we've seen, so far, the quality of qualia answers, haven't we? I'm still waiting for something better than Ian's feint. My redoubled response to your inquiry stands, despite your apparent ignorance of it. Maybe it's not at all what you were looking for.

ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
But even a question that is in the form of mentalese (thought) is qualia.Oh? Source please? You seem to make the term so broad that it loses specific meaning.

Any experience is qualia.Is? Not all thought is experienced directly as ordinary qualia.

With regards to the question being an act of will, that may or may not be the case. A materialist would surely disagree with you. Either way, I don't think the subject of will has to be relavant here. Which materialist is your client here? Feel free to not think here, but this is a critical thinking forum. I don't get how will is entirely irrelevant to the question of consciousness and qualia. Maybe you could show me.

ME

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Mr. E
Oh? Source please? You seem to make the term so broad that it loses specific meaning.


A thought has to feel like something doesn't it? To limit the notion of qualia to sensory experiences seems illogical to me.


Is? Not all thought is experienced directly as ordinary qualia.

I don't understand how an experience can be void of its qualia. To be so would mean the experience does not exist. To me, qualia are what experiences are made of. I assme you agree that mentalese are included in the category of an experience?


Which materialist is your client here? Feel free to not think here, but this is a critical thinking forum. I don't get how will is entirely irrelevant to the question of consciousness and qualia. Maybe you could show me.

ME

Free will is irrelevant to the issue of whether mentalese has qualia if you regard free will as an independent quale in itself. If you regard free will as being intrinsic to the mentalese then this is a semantic issue and free will has the same quale as the thought.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
[B]A thought has to feel like something doesn't it?Why?

To limit the notion of qualia to sensory experiences seems illogical to me. To extend the notion of qualia to include everything seems meaningless to me.

I don't understand how an experience can be void of its qualia."its qualia"? What is the limit as quale-content goes to zero?

To be so would mean the experience does not exist.Does all cognition have qualia-existence? Why?

To me, qualia are what experiences are made of. I assme you agree that mentalese are included in the category of an experience?I have no reason to believe that mentalese is more than a handy fiction, whether qualia exist or not.

Free will is irrelevant to the issue of whether mentalese has qualia if you regard free will as an independent quale in itself. If you regard free will as being intrinsic to the mentalese then this is a semantic issue and free will has the same quale as the thought. I don't recall mentioning "free will".


ME

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Have been unable to post messages of the last few days for some reason. Anyway, I'll try to answer to your question -

I think to ask how qualia can be falsified is a statement with no meaning. It is by virtue of qualia that you are able to ask the question in the first place. If there were no qualia then you would not be asking the question and I would not be able to read it or answer it. So a prediction of the lack of existence of qualia would be a lack of consciousness. This is clearly not the case since consciousness is required in order to pose the falsifiability question. A bit of a paradox indeed. I think therefore I am.

Still reading the Dennet link

This is nothing more than a bald assertion, then. You have a soul. It is obvious; the soul is what animates you. You wouldn't be able to ask the question if you didn't have a soul.

Would you like to try to address the question, or do you wnat to stick with this non-starter bald assertion?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Mr. E
Dennet?
Dennett...

You want someone to defend the Louis Armstrong definition of qualia? Why?
whom, apparently, you didn't read.

Maybe you could distinguish the differences among: subjective, personal, private. As far as I'm concerned qualia are objective and private, whether they exist or not.
Yes, and invisible unicorns are pink, whether they exist or not. :rolleyes:

I've heard of "neural correlates of consciousness" but what would "physical correlates of qualia" amount to?
I expanded "neural correlates" to "physical correlates" since qualia are so ill-defined.

My redoubled response to your inquiry stands, despite your apparent ignorance of it. Maybe it's not at all what you were looking for.
As I said, it was utter pseudomathematical nonsense. I want you to describe a way to falsify "qualia."

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dymanic
I can see how you might be confused, and am willing to give the benefit of the doubt by assuming that you actually are confused, rather than being deliberately disingenuous.

Let's look again at what he actually said:

"...I grant that conscious experience has properties."

[but]

"...experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special."

In other words, he does not see consciousness as having any special properties such as qualia.





Dymanic, I have already addressed what Dennett has said. What is wrong with the response I have already provided?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mr. E
Originally posted by Interesting Ian re BillHoyt

Thought you must have me on ignore.

How disappointing . . .

In curiousity, is this how you go about refuting narrow-minded materialisms?

Huh??

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
This is nothing more than a bald assertion, then. You have a soul. It is obvious; the soul is what animates you. You wouldn't be able to ask the question if you didn't have a soul.


I can give you practically endless examples of qualia by way of ostensive definition. When you ask a question, beit by word of mouth, written or mentalese, each form of expression is experienced. Therefore each form of expression has a qualia by definition. To falsify the existence of qualia would be to falsify the existence of experience. However, in order to falsify something you must have engaged in the process of analytical thought, which is by way of conscious experience is it not?

Your definition of the "soul" - it is what animates you. How does this relate to the experience of asking a question ?

I have explained why asking for falsification of qualia is an illogical statement because the existence of the whole process of falsification needs to be experienced. You haven't explained why the non-existence of the "soul" would mean experiences (of a question) don't exist.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
But even a question that is in the form of mentalese (thought) is qualia.

E
Oh? Source please? You seem to make the term so broad that it loses specific meaning.



Qualia is somewhat of an ambigious term. So here (http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Qualia) it states that

"qualia most simply defined as the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them".

I don't agree with this definition as I think qualia are sensory experiences themselves, not their properties.

BTW, as an aside the word properties as used in philosophy means:

"The word property, in philosophy and logic, refers to an attribute of an object; thus a red object is said to have the property of redness. The property may be considered a form of object in its own right, able to possess other properties. Properties are therefore subject to the Russell's_Paradox. It differs from the logical concept of class by not having any concept of extensionality, and from the philosophical concept of class in that a property is considered to be distinct from the objects which possess it".
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Property_%28philosophy%29

I agree that an object can have the property of redness (redness as experienced i.e the quale) but the conscious experience of redness does not have the property of redness. Rather the conscious experience of redness is redness.

As regards your dispute with David Smith over the definition of qualia this (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/) link might be helpful.

It states:

"Galen Strawson has recently claimed (1994) that there are such things as the experience of understanding a sentence, the experience of suddenly thinking of something, of suddenly remembering something, and so on. Moreover, in his view, experiences of these sorts are not reducible to associated sensory experiences and/or images. Strawson's position here seems to be that thought-experience is a distinctive experience in its own right. He says, for example: "Each sensory modality is an experiential modality, and thought experience (in which understanding-experience may be included) is an experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities" (p. 196). On Strawson's view, then, some thoughts have qualia".

But then goes on to say that "this view is controversial".

[davidsmith73]

Thanks for those links Ian. Personally, I can't understand why "thoughts" are to be exempt from qualia. It seems inconsistent to declare so. It would be analogous to saying that certain physical processes are exempt from an objective existence.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Dymanic, I have already addressed what Dennett has said. What is wrong with the response I have already provided?What is wrong with it is that it indicates that you have not understood -- much less 'addressed' -- what Dennett has said. This is consistent with your continued refusal to actually read his books.


Originally posted by davidsmith73

Have been unable to post messages of the last few days for some reason.So it wasn't just me after all!

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dymanic
What is wrong with it is that it indicates that you have not understood -- much less 'addressed' -- what Dennett has said. This is consistent with your continued refusal to actually read his books.

If I have not understood it then Dennett should explain himself better. It seems to me that I do not agree with his premises. Are you asserting that I am in error in this, and that I actually do agree with such premises?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Your definition of the "soul" - it is what animates you. How does this relate to the experience of asking a question ?


It is a parallel. The claim is that the soul is immaterial, and therefore, not falsifiable. The claim is that the soul is responsible for animating you. The claim is that you would not be able to reply to this post except for the existence of the soul that animates you.

Do you not see that this is a) parallel to your claims about "qualia" and b) simply a bald assertion?

I think you may have missed my refinement of the question, posted earlier:

"I share Dennett's exacerbation with "qualia." I also share Dennett's postion that I do not deny the existence of experience. I am simply amazed at the claim that "qualia" are special. I also share with Dennett the perception that "qualia" are elusive, and perhaps, deliberately so."

So, please, at long, long last, explain how we falisify "qualia."

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If I have not understood it then Dennett should explain himself better.Or maybe he should just have simpler ideas.

If some of Dennett's arguments are not easily understood, it is due in large part to their running contrary to some of our most deeply entrenched notions about consciousness. Despite this, I think he does an excellent job of explaining them. I don't think you do agree with his premises, but by relying only on second-hand versions, you place yourself at a disadvantage in attempting to refute them. You are like a blindfolded swordsman, vigorously thrusting here and there, but missing your opponent entirely.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Or maybe he should just have simpler ideas.

If some of Dennett's arguments are not easily understood, it is due in large part to their running contrary to some of our most deeply entrenched notions about consciousness. Despite this, I think he does an excellent job of explaining them. I don't think you do agree with his premises, but by relying only on second-hand versions, you place yourself at a disadvantage in attempting to refute them. You are like a blindfolded swordsman, vigorously thrusting here and there, but missing your opponent entirely.

I was not relying on second hand sources. It was a direct quote from Dennett himself from that link. Of which I have read before, and also the first third again yesterday.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
[B]Dennett...That citation was not apparently written by Dennett, thus my question mark. whom, apparently, you didn't read.You cited Dennett re QuiningQualia? Yes, and invisible unicorns are pink, whether they exist or not. :rolleyes:What was you admonishment recently to Ian... something about seriousness ... "obviously disingenuous" was it?

I expanded "neural correlates" to "physical correlates" since qualia are so ill-defined. It is qualia which are so ill-defined, or by contrast 'qualia' which is ill-defined, to you?
As I said, it was utter pseudomathematical nonsense. I want you to describe a way to falsify "qualia." Please make up your mind what you want, Bill. One day you talk about falisfying some notion of "qualia", now you have dropped 'notion' from your repertoire. Merely declaring something to be nonsense could be a sign of innallecshul bigotry, Bill, hardly a demo of critical thinking or a serious approach to the topic.


ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Qualia is somewhat of an ambigious term.
[also from Ian's post]
Originally posted by davidsmith73
But even a question that is in the form of mentalese (thought) is qualia.
E
Oh? Source please? You seem to make the term so broad that it loses specific meaning.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thanks, Ian, but "mentalese (thought)" was more the target of my sentence. Yes, there are ambiguities in language. It also seems that for some or all human beings, some qualia are more definite than are others. When looking at a Japanese flag, the red part is clearly distinct from the white part. When directing one's gaze to the same material object in very dim lighting, that distinction is hardly as clear and vanishes at some point into something like a fog. But it's clear that these are or can be referred to as objective qualia, and most people who consider it would acknowledge that they are formed up by some kind of brain activity in concert with retinal outputs. The question of the qualia of mentalese is a bit more diffuse, at least for me, to say the least. For instance: Are they objective in the same sense of the terms as visual qualia are objective? Is 'mentalese' a handy fictional term to decribe ignorance or is it more a pointer to a deep insight into duality?


ME

[Mr. E]

Further followup to Ian's post:
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
"Galen Strawson has recently claimed (1994) that there are such things as the experience of understanding a sentence, the experience of suddenly thinking of something, of suddenly remembering something, and so on. Moreover, in his view, experiences of these sorts are not reducible to associated sensory experiences and/or images. Strawson's position here seems to be that thought-experience is a distinctive experience in its own right. He says, for example: "Each sensory modality is an experiential modality, and thought experience (in which understanding-experience may be included) is an experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities" (p. 196). On Strawson's view, then, some thoughts have qualia". If a moment of sudden understanding is a thought, fine. But that's not existence, it's occurrence. It's "Aha!" or "Eureka!" and the like when expressed in common language, responses to a perhaps emotional component of thought-reorganization.

ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
[ME] In curiousity, is this how you go about refuting narrow-minded materialisms?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Huh?? So your method is to say, "Huh??". Okay.


ME

Reference final section: http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870617811&highlight=materialisms#post1870617811

[Atlas]

This notion of qualia still escapes me. For me, a thought experience is made of thought (and emotion). Qualia seems to be more a distraction. They cannot be proved, disproved or studied. They can be defined and conjectured on. So can soul.

They do seem like soul in that they are ineffable and immaterial. They are just the apprehended rather than the apprehender. They seem a perfect conjecture for an already assumed conclusion.

Regarding the the real world light reflection of redness, there is no doubt that it is apprehended. Do we need to postulate an intermediate state of redness that is the qualia of it or is it more prosperous to continue exploring the mechanism of the senses. These pay huge dividends. We can fix some defective apprehensions with corrective lenses or surgeries. Qualia hold no such promise. They offer the same value as "soul". Something supernatural that can be talked about, perhaps felt, but as private as thought and manipulated physically with drugs like LSD.

And that goes to the heart of my problem with qualia. They cannot affect the physical world but with LSD even redness is more than redness. So there does not seem to be a qualia of redness that is objective and the same. It seems as though a drug like LSD has an affect on the organism that modifies the apprehension mechanism. Either that or LSD modifies the qualia being apprehended. Which is more likely?

[Dancing David]

Hi, I am back to the forum, and it would appear that I have a lot of reading to do . I am thrilled to see that the thread has run to thirteen pages. I think I left off around page six and so i will be doing a lot of catching up.

In the mean time I think that I have thought about and clarified my own point in the OP, consiousness may or may not exist but does it exist outside of the processes which occur in the brain. that most likely would have been a better approach. I still hold to my reductionist view that it is merely a series of sub events lumped under a rubric.

i see we are back to the ineffable qualia. And while they are like quarks, at least we can determine the properties of quarks.

Where exists a qualia without an organic frame work? Qualia are learned they do not stand alone!

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Hi, I am back to the forum, Welcome back.

In the mean time I think that I have thought about and clarified my own point in the OP, consiousness may or may not exist but does it exist outside of the processes which occur in the brain. that most likely would have been a better approach. I still hold to my reductionist view that it is merely a series of sub events lumped under a rubric.That's two things at once! One point of Synthetic Consciousness is to lay the groundwork for consciousness other than that produced by a human brain.

But directly to your text: "does it exist outside of the processes" is multiply ambiguous.

If it exists now, could it ever exist "outside" in the future?
Does it exist at all, now or ever?
Does it rather "exist" IN the processes...?
Does it exist causally or only as a useless by-product of the processes...?
What processes?

Evidently 'exist' is a big player in this, so a definition of the term might be a good start if not a good end.

Qualia are learned they do not stand alone! Maybe. Do you mean they are learned, as in acculturation? I think few would argue that children learn how to name their experiences, but you seem to be suggesting something more subtle.

ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Atlas
This notion of qualia still escapes me. For me, a thought experience is made of thought (and emotion). Qualia seems to be more a distraction. They cannot be proved, disproved or studied. Sure they can. I posted a link re the Chesire Cat experiment as a starting point for studying human visual experience. "Proved" generally means "tested" - since you admit the term can be defined (right?) that to which the term refers might be testable or not. It depends on what test you'd do.

They are just the apprehended rather than the apprehender.Aren't they both, sometimes? Are you trying to make 'qualia' cover too much territory?

Regarding the the real world light reflection of redness, there is no doubt that it is apprehended. Do we need to postulate an intermediate state of redness that is the qualia of it or is it more prosperous to continue exploring the mechanism of the senses. Or manipulated otherwise. There might be interesting "intermediate states" in the process of forming up an "image", both prior to and subsequent to the formation of the image itself. And that goes to the heart of my problem with qualia. They cannot affect the physical worldThat's only one view. If qualia are necessary (or even useful) for well-informed action in the world, then surely they can be said to affect the physical world of bricks and mortar.
So there does not seem to be a qualia of redness that is objective and the same. "and the same"?

ME

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Mr. E
Sure they can. I posted a link re the Chesire Cat experiment as a starting point for studying human visual experience. "Proved" generally means "tested" - since you admit the term can be defined (right?) that to which the term refers might be testable or not. It depends on what test you'd do.
I think I remember the post but don't know where to look. Can you post the link again.

Aren't they both, sometimes? You tell me... I don't see it.

Are you trying to make 'qualia' cover too much territory? Nope... No territory at all... They don't exist any more than fairies - that's my position until I hear a convincing argument.

Or manipulated otherwise. There might be interesting "intermediate states" in the process of forming up an "image", both prior to and subsequent to the formation of the image itself. That's only one view. If qualia are necessary (or even useful) for well-informed action in the world, then surely they can be said to affect the physical world of bricks and mortar.
"and the same"? I'd prefer if you provided examples or links so that I could understand where you are coming from. I know it's one view, but please provide an example of qualia affecting the world. The definitions I've seen say they are completely private phenomena.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Atlas
I think I remember the post but don't know where to look. Can you post the link again.
Sorry, the post seems to have been removed from the forum. Maybe it was on page 4 when a paranormal event occured in the forum in early September. Here is another link: http://www.campusi.com/isbn_0471115169.htm
[qualia] don't exist any more than fairies - that's my position until I hear a convincing argument. Can you explain this from a post of yours: "Visual qualia... I wasn't thinking of that but to me the brain pumps thought and I would put visual qualia as one of the things on the input side of that pump. "?

They don't exist but they play a notable role, right?

please provide an example of qualia affecting the world. The definitions I've seen say they are completely private phenomena. Here is an example of how qualia can play a role: You see a green light, so you look both ways and you step on the gas pedal. If you don't see the green light etc. you wait or else you kill the pedestrian in the crosswalk and probably spend a lot of real time dealing with the legal system. That seems like a real world consequence of some note.


ME

[Dancing David]

Mister E:
briefly Qualia are learned in that a baby must be exposed to visual and other stimuli to have the perceptive experience of qualia. The neurological networks must learn to percieve the sensations and perceptions referred to as qualia. Without exposure and stimulation there is point beyond which the system will never learn to percieve certain stimuli.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Atlas
This notion of qualia still escapes me.



If this is truly so, and other people are wondering whether they exist, then it must be me who cannot be understanding what they are. I thought it was just raw experiences; especially those from the 5 senses. They simply replace sense data because of the duality that implies i.e in looking at a horse, there is a real physical horse and in addition there is an image of a horse which only exists in your mind. Qualia just tries to eliminate this apparent absurdity.

{shrugs}

But, as I say, given that people keep saying they probably do not exist, and they are mysterious, then one of us is not understanding what they are. I'm willing to concede that it might well be me. So what am I not understanding? I mean you surely cannot be denying that people experience greenness??


For me, a thought experience is made of thought (and emotion). Qualia seems to be more a distraction. They cannot be proved, disproved or studied. They can be defined and conjectured on. So can soul.


I don't understand how they can be defined. This is the whole purpose of the knowledge argument isn't it? You know, the one about Mary, the brilliant scientist who knows everything there is possible to know about color, but who has lived in a room with only black and white things in it (and shades in between) all her life. The one day she goes outside and gets to know what the experience of seeing green is actually like. Thus it is clear that only the experience of greenness can convey what it is like. Thus no definition is possible.



They do seem like soul in that they are ineffable and immaterial.




Quick correction; not the soul, but self. Or substantial self if you like.


They are just the apprehended rather than the apprehender. They seem a perfect conjecture for an already assumed conclusion.


:confused:



Regarding the the real world light reflection of redness, there is no doubt that it is apprehended. Do we need to postulate an intermediate state of redness that is the qualia of it or is it more prosperous to continue exploring the mechanism of the senses. These pay huge dividends. We can fix some defective apprehensions with corrective lenses or surgeries. Qualia hold no such promise. They offer the same value as "soul". Something supernatural that can be talked about, perhaps felt, but as private as thought and manipulated physically with drugs like LSD.

And that goes to the heart of my problem with qualia. They cannot affect the physical world



Does the experience of a glorious sunset over an ocean really not effect you? Is it not the characteristic feel conveyed by your raw experience which is effecting you?


but with LSD even redness is more than redness. So there does not seem to be a qualia of redness that is objective and the same. It seems as though a drug like LSD has an affect on the organism that modifies the apprehension mechanism. Either that or LSD modifies the qualia being apprehended. Which is more likely? [/B]

LSD effects the brain. Both the brain and self as well as external reality all have roles in determining the characteristics of our qualia.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dancing David


i see we are back to the ineffable qualia. And while they are like quarks, at least we can determine the properties of quarks.

[/B]

That's all a quark is, its properties. It is not an existent which has properties.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Atlas

E
Are you trying to make 'qualia' cover too much territory?

Atlas
Nope... No territory at all... They don't exist any more than fairies - that's my position until I hear a convincing argument.



Can we take a specific example to make sure we're all talking about the same thing? Are you actually denying that you have the qualitative experience of greenness when you see a green object?? Or am I understanding something different to everyone else by the term "qualia"??

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Dancing David

briefly Qualia are learned in that a baby must be exposed to visual and other stimuli to have the perceptive experience of qualia. The neurological networks must learn to percieve the sensations and perceptions referred to as qualia. Without exposure and stimulation there is point beyond which the system will never learn to percieve certain stimuli.
Well, hold on. The whole deal with qualia is that they lie outside what can be captured by that sort of functional explanation. Qualia are not simply sensations and perceptions (of the sort every p-zombie has) but the experience (the 'raw experience') of those sensations and perceptions.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Well, hold on. The whole deal with qualia is that they lie outside what can be captured by that sort of functional explanation. Qualia are not simply sensations and perceptions (of the sort every p-zombie has) but the experience (the 'raw experience') of those sensations and perceptions.

But qualia do play a function. To take E's example, what about flooring the accelerator on seeing a green light at traffic lights? So the raw experience of greenness does play a causal role. Only under epiphenomenalism does one deny this.

Edited to add: And come to think of it, materialists deny this too??

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

But qualia do play a function. To take E's example, what about flooring the accelerator on seeing a green light at traffic lights? So the raw experience of greenness does play a causal role.
Causal schmausal. You could just about do that with Lego Mindstorms.

"Combine sensors to create robots that respond to their environments. " (http://shop.lego.com/product.asp?p=B565&cn=55&d=13&t=5)

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Atlas


And that goes to the heart of my problem with qualia. They cannot affect the physical world

Only if you assume the physical world has an objective reality. If one adopts a mental monist philosophy and the physical world is indeed "made" of qualia, then the whole range of physical interactions we usually associate with an objective reality could be viewed as really occuring within the experiential realm.


but with LSD even redness is more than redness. So there does not seem to be a qualia of redness that is objective and the same. It seems as though a drug like LSD has an affect on the organism that modifies the apprehension mechanism. Either that or LSD modifies the qualia being apprehended. Which is more likely?

Interesting point. Either way, one can still identify some kind of qualia - what redness feels like under LSD. I suppose it is exactly the same thing as asking whether viewing redness in dim light as opposed to bright light changes the apprehension mechanism or the qualia. I do not think it makes a difference to the issue. Dim redness still has its immediate phenomenology.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Qualia are not simply sensations and perceptions (of the sort every p-zombie has) but the experience (the 'raw experience') of those sensations and perceptions.

I see no difference between a "sensation" and a "raw sensation". They are the same thing. Can you explain why they aren't?

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

I see no difference between a "sensation" and a "raw sensation". They are the same thing. Can you explain why they aren't?Nope. Sure can't.

Ian?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Mister E:
briefly Qualia are learned in that a baby must be exposed to visual and other stimuli to have the perceptive experience of qualia. The neurological networks must learn to percieve the sensations and perceptions referred to as qualia. Without exposure and stimulation there is point beyond which the system will never learn to percieve certain stimuli.

I don't quite understand the relevance of this point. Firstly, I acknowledge that you are coming from a materialist viewpoint so I shall jump along side you for a moment even thought I don't agree with this standpoint. So, if a neural network is exposed to a stimulus for a period of time and various connections are strengthened etc, (which constitutes the physical side of learning) then there still must be a point when out of this growing network comes the first cruical pattern of activity that corresponds to first injection into conscious experience of the qualia. So, in terms of an explanation as to how a particular pattern of activity corresponds to a particular experience, the preceeding strengthening of connections is irrelavent. It only says something about how the particular pattern of connections is organised in the first place.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Nope. Sure can't.

Ian?

So what did you mean by your post?

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

So what did you mean by your post?
I meant to expose the meaninglessness of the distinction -- 'raw' versus whatever. Thanks for playing.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Causal schmausal. You could just about do that with Lego Mindstorms.

"Combine sensors to create robots that respond to their environments. " (http://shop.lego.com/product.asp?p=B565&cn=55&d=13&t=5)

They're just machines, mechanical contrations. We floor the accelerator apparently because of the actual experience of greenness.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Nope. Sure can't.

Ian?

Dymanic is talking about "sensation" as in the functional aspect of sensation i.e the appropriate processes in the brain. The same goes for when materialists use the word consciousness. They tend to define consciousness by what it does rather than what it is. They've redefined words to reflect their belief system. Of course this unfortunatly causes no end of confusion and talking at cross-purposes.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If this is truly so, and other people are wondering whether they exist, then it must be me who cannot be understanding what they are. I thought it was just raw experiences; especially those from the 5 senses. They simply replace sense data because of the duality that implies i.e in looking at a horse, there is a real physical horse and in addition there is an image of a horse which only exists in your mind. Qualia just tries to eliminate this apparent absurdity. First, I want to say, thanks for meeting me half way on this. I realy don't know much about qualia. Thirty years ago in a college philosophy class, I was presented with notions of Heidegger's sense data. I did not at that time understand any concept of or need for qualia. It seemed to me back then that there were real world objects that had qualities and that we were apprehending aspects of those objects through the qualites and reflected energies (light and heat) directly as perceptions which were incorporated often unconsciously. He had a concept of Dasein that was a little beyond me but it was very much real world stuff. I have been confusing notions of qualia and sense data... some sources have contributed to my confusion using the terms somewhat interchangably.

In this comment you mention the image of the real horse. I don't know how many qualia that would imply. The raw experience, is it one or many qualia. Are we experiencing nose, eyes, ears, face, mane, neck, shoulder, leg, body, back, tail, brown and white - or are we experiencing horse?

But, as I say, given that people keep saying they probably do not exist, and they are mysterious, then one of us is not understanding what they are. I'm willing to concede that it might well be me. So what am I not understanding? I mean you surely cannot be denying that people experience greenness??

I don't understand how they can be defined. This is the whole purpose of the knowledge argument isn't it? You know, the one about Mary, the brilliant scientist who knows everything there is possible to know about color, but who has lived in a room with only black and white things in it (and shades in between) all her life. The one day she goes outside and gets to know what the experience of seeing green is actually like. Thus it is clear that only the experience of greenness can convey what it is like. Thus no definition is possible. Perhaps the individual qualia cannot be defined but the notion can be or we wouldn't be talking about it. In this thread we are supposed to define consciousness... another experience that escapes easy definition.

I believe the bodies of plants and animals evolved to detect and appreciate real world phenomena. The amoeba knows when he is in the proximity of salt and recoils to escape. Up through evolution this same apprehension and appreciation of the real world in combination with an organism's survival impulse and it's natural discrimination of pleasure and pain combine to break the world's sensory offerings like a prism breaks light. Our body is the prism's glass and the brain is the prism's angle precisely edged to project real world inputs into interiorly stored appreciations. (edit: I know this is a metaphor - that it is not true - I offer it not for argument but more to approximate my position for discussion.)

Does the experience of a glorious sunset over an ocean really not effect you? Is it not the characteristic feel conveyed by your raw experience which is effecting you? Absolutely. But that is an emotional by product. It is not input from the sunset. It is actually an output derived when the sunset is appreciated in association with "the best things in life". We actually have to be ready for it or there is little effect. A whistling teapot demands our attention in a way that a beautiful sunset does not.

LSD effects the brain. Both the brain and self as well as external reality all have roles in determining the characteristics of our qualia. OK. I can't argue with that. I think when we delve into our definitions of self we find disagreement.

I want to cover some other thoughts in this post. I missed Mr. E's request for expansion on a throwaway thought about "redness being the same". I merely meant that, even internally, we have no objective measure for what we mean and I used LSD as a change agent to show that the same red object one time is electric red in another. That is, qualia are not continuous in consciousness. They are fluid, meaning one thing here, something else there, and in the end I do not see them as distinguishable from thought. I also mentioned though that I saw them as on the input side of the thought pump I called the brain. I was at that time thinking of qualia as sensation as well as association which is the mechanism by which the brain creates thought images and logic, desire and will. Even here I'm being overly succinct as this is very much at the heart of this long thread.

Strangly I find myself an idealistic physicalist. I believe consciousness is shortchanged by analyzing it into it's constituent parts. I believe it to be more than the sum of it's parts. But I also believe it is a natural expression of matter.

That probably sounds strange and I don't know exactly how I feel about it in the big picture. I feel like the force of gravity is an expression of matter's attraction for itself. Life and consciousness evolve as forces of redistribution of matter. What gravity assembles life and consciousness disassemble and reassemble. We eat and procreate, a bizarre transformation of the materials of the world into our very selves. Likewise the power of idea and communication transforms the earth into a skyscraper or bridge. But the forces are as much shaped by as shape the natural physical world.

As for Mr E's traffic signal, in shorthand we say green means go. But there is alot of other information being processed. There may be a siren wailing, or children in the crosswalk. It is not greenness that affects the physical world. It is our appreciation of all the associations we make with the moment. We may be a pedestrian. We may be waiting for someone. Some people sometimes go on red. That green traffic signal may predict the flow of traffic but the internalized perceived qualia of greenness is a cork on the sea - alone it has no affect.

So for me, the assembly of stimuli, concepts, and memories with the power of emotions is what drives consciousness. Qualia are not real like thoughts are real. Qualia is a word like deja vu. It has meaning because it feels like something. But in reality the light of mind is a real world effect like electric current hitting a tungsten filament.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

They're just machines, mechanical contraptions.They're cool though, aren't they? My kid's getting one for Christmas whether he wants it or not.

We floor the accelerator apparently because of the actual experience of greenness.Why bother making the qualia causal at all? You could as easily say that we respond mechanically, while at the same time experiencing the sensations -- isn't that what you would say if I mentioned reflexive reactions?

Dymanic is talking about "sensation" as in the functional aspect of sensation i.e the appropriate processes in the brain. Actually, it started with my response to DD's post, where he proposed a functionalist definition for qualia. I was simply pointing out the contradiction in attempting to do that. I'm still curious about this 'raw' business.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
It is a parallel. The claim is that the soul is immaterial, and therefore, not falsifiable. The claim is that the soul is responsible for animating you. The claim is that you would not be able to reply to this post except for the existence of the soul that animates you.

My claim is that the question exists as an experience. I cannot see you disagreeing with this since the alternative is to suppose that it exists objectively. You say yourself that you do not deny that experiences exist (which I am curious for you to explain why given your current stance). The experience of a question is different to the experience of redness, so we can say their qualia (the way they feel) are different. So here, we would be trying to falsify the existence of a thing while at the same time acknowledging that the falsification process requires that the thing exists. Where your soul parallel breaks down is where you cannot explain why the soul is responsible for the experience of a question. You have evoked a separate entity to account for the ability to pose a question. I am saying that the actual question is the entity that needs to be falsified. When you realise this, the paradox becomes clear and there is no empty assertion.


"I share Dennett's exacerbation with "qualia." I also share Dennett's postion that I do not deny the existence of experience.

Why do you not deny the existence of experience?


I am simply amazed at the claim that "qualia" are special. I also share with Dennett the perception that "qualia" are elusive, and perhaps, deliberately so."


Dennet mentioned that his critics accused him of creating straw man arguments. I agree with his critics with particular reference to the above. What does “special� mean in this context?

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Causal schmausal. You could just about do that with Lego Mindstorms. That reads as a confession that one could not do it. I suppose everyone here knows that behaviors can be faked to *some* extent - humans do it a lot... as I pointed out earlier re empathy and re running emulations on a computer-like machine, and I recall someone mentioning Turing, too.

Rhetorical question: Is this thread merely a latter-day Turing Test, an empty AI word game, or is it also a discussion of consciousness presented on a message board in a critical thinking forum?


ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Mister E:
briefly Qualia are learned in that a baby must be exposed to visual and other stimuli to have the perceptive experience of qualia. The neurological networks must learn to percieve the sensations and perceptions referred to as qualia. Without exposure and stimulation there is point beyond which the system will never learn to percieve certain stimuli.

Maybe I attempt to reword your statement?

We say that Qualia are learned in that a baby must be exposed to sense stimuli to be able to have perceptive experience, to develop a fuller ability to process stimuli. The neurological networks must "learn" to perc[ei]ve the sensations and perceptions lumped together under 'qualia'. Without exposure and stimulation there is [a] point beyond which the system will never learn to perc[ei]ve certain stimuli.

Does that mean the same thing you intended to convey by your words?

I think one confusion about qualia is shown in the discussion of the difference between an overall experience and a raw sensation. An overall experience such as that of a beautiful sunset might include quasi-reflexive components in addition to a myriad of specific visual forms and values (particular evoked quales). We generally refer to the part of the experience which is consequent as the emotional aspect of the experience. This can be considered a quale in its own right for those who do have the particular consequent component.

So Ian is quite accurate to suggest that the viewing of the sunset *effects* the "you" in one - it causes one to have an additional experience.

The ambiguity would seem to lie in two common attempts to define 'qualia': What it is like to... (eg. Mary) VS. The feel of.... (eg., falling in love at sunset).

Resolving this apparently simple linguistic ambiguity formally can avoid unnecessary confusions and lead to deeper probes.

I hope that helps address the challenge of the OP.

ME

[Mr. E]

I'm going to jump into Atlas' reply to Ian in very small part where Atlas references a post of mine:

Originally posted by Atlas
As for Mr E's traffic signal, in shorthand we say green means go. But there is alot of other information being processed. There may be a siren wailing, or children in the crosswalk. It is not greenness that affects the physical world. It is our appreciation of all the associations we make with the moment. We may be a pedestrian. We may be waiting for someone. Some people sometimes go on red. That green traffic signal may predict the flow of traffic but the internalized perceived qualia of greenness is a cork on the sea - alone it has no affect. None of that denies the point of the example, that without seeing the green we would either wait forever or kill people with our cars. Except perhaps for the epiphenomenalists, having something to recognize (whether the greenness or the lack of targets in the crosswalk etc.) plays a causal role in determining actions in the material world whether will is free or not. The greenness by itself of course does not force the foot onto the accelerator in a normal conscious test subject.

Qualia are not real like thoughts are real
That would be more throwaway bunk from you, right, Atlas?


ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Dymanic
I meant to expose the meaninglessness of the distinction -- 'raw' versus whatever. Thanks for playing. It doesn't seem that your post succeeded. Care to play again?

ME

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Mr. E

Rhetorical question: Is this thread merely a latter-day Turing Test, an empty AI word game, or is it also a discussion of consciousness presented on a message board in a critical thinking forum?
I think that is something that can be answered only subjectively. Your contributions so far suggest that for you it is somewhat more of the former than the latter.
Except perhaps for the epiphenomenalists, having something to recognize (whether the greenness or the lack of targets in the crosswalk etc.) plays a causal role in determining actions in the material world whether will is free or not.Bzzzt! It is obvious that you have entirely missed the point as to what is meant by 'qualia'. My advice: read more, post less.
I meant to expose the meaninglessness of the distinction -- 'raw' versus whatever. Thanks for playing.
------------------------
It doesn't seem that your post succeeded. Care to play again?Until someone offers something by way of clarification as to what is added by the use of the term 'raw', I will assume that it is nothing more than a rather trivial rhetorical device. If you'd like to take a shot at it, knock yourself out.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Filip Sandor

I don't know which answer to your question obliterates dualism as a logical alternative to monism.

None. Or all.

What don't you understand about my previous response to your question?
One way to think about it is: Assume 'physical' exists; then, whatever effects or affects the 'physical', must also be physical -- or one is a dualist. Ditto if 'not-physical' is the assumption.

See the problem?

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
...I thought it was just raw experiences; especially those from the 5 senses. They simply replace sense data because of the duality that implies i.e in looking at a horse, there is a real physical horse and in addition there is an image of a horse which only exists in your mind. Qualia just tries to eliminate this apparent absurdity. ... Ian,

The apparent absurdity is dualism, is it not? But what then is a raw experience? Is it not an experience of the physical world. Is there no referent for your beautiful sunset qualia?

I don't know what qualia are if they are not thought. What are they made of. Are they really rehashed Platonic Ideals that are available to the human mind to compare against reality's accidental differences.

If I stand in the sun, I get a warm and bright feeling. I don't need qualia to explain that. The physical body knows it's pleasures. Likewise, the colors. Or perhaps I should say that, like space and time, the human has built in, a priori, appreciations of reality. I just get the feeling that qualia are being advocated to deny physical reality. If not, they validate dualism - don't they?

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Well, hold on. The whole deal with qualia is that they lie outside what can be captured by that sort of functional explanation. Qualia are not simply sensations and perceptions (of the sort every p-zombie has) but the experience (the 'raw experience') of those sensations and perceptions.

Ah, yes the bizzare definition of qualia.

However they are learnt, a child that is never exposed to color will loose the ability to percieve color.

The deal that is usualy presented is that that they are unique and therefore not objective, if I recall the argument correctly.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Atlas
I just get the feeling that qualia are being advocated to deny physical reality. If not, they validate dualism - don't they?

Hmm. I'd say qualia are not "advocated"; they are the only known existent for any of us.

And of course they are either "physical" and part & parcel of "physical reality", or ... given that interactive dualism is a rediculous concept ... part & parcel of the obverse "~physical reality"; name it thought, spirit, life, consciousness, sentience, awareness, or what you will.

BTW, "will" -- mentioned earlier -- imho is a very key part of this discussion.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Until someone offers something by way of clarification as to what is added by the use of the term 'raw', I will assume that it is nothing more than a rather trivial rhetorical device. I suppose that works for some.

"I meant to expose the meaninglessness of the distinction -- 'raw' versus whatever. "

Okay. Let's look at this as stated:

a) You, Dymanic, are chicken.

b) When raw, you are likely toxic, coated with the likes of salmonella just waiting to infest and destroy a conscious human being.

c) When cooked, you might be cooked in any of 6 senses --

poached
sauteed
deep-fried
roasted
baked
broiled

c') -- and done from rare (dangerously unrecognizable as food) to charred beyond recognition (tasteless, to say the least).

Empty word game, important nearly exact metaphor for the student of consciousness, or what?


Raw sensations would be the edge of consciousness forming up as/by subconscious impressions teasing say the visual cortex into an excited state and generating proto-qualia and qualia. Clear-cut sensations would be well-defined by contrast with/by other proximally located qualia -- like the red spot on the white backrground already mentioned. They would persist over time, subject to attention deficit disorder and the like.

Of course, you, Dymanic, are not chicken, that was only a rather trivial rhetorical device.


ME

PS - In case it's not clear, there is no personal attack in this post.

edit - PPS - As noted earlier all posts by "ME" Copyright 2004, Fair Use rights allowed.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Dancing David
The deal that is usualy presented is that that they are unique and therefore not objective, if I recall the argument correctly. [/B] Never mind Dymanics text and "usual (mis)presentations", I've stated the position that they can be private and objective, whether "exist" is the correct term for them or not. Do you hold a similar position?

ME

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
Hmm. I'd say qualia are not "advocated"; they are the only known existent for any of us.

And of course they are either "physical" and part & parcel of "physical reality", or ... given that interactive dualism is a rediculous concept ... part & parcel of the obverse "~physical reality"; name it thought, spirit, life, consciousness, sentience, awareness, or what you will.

BTW, "will" -- mentioned earlier -- imho is a very key part of this discussion. The only known existent for any of us...

I could deal with that - as long as the existents are referents of a physical world reality. Take the sunshine on my skin - that warmth I feel is one of the qualia of the experience. To me it can be explained by physical reality. The world seems tuned to matter energy exchanges... water does not need qualia to "know" when it is time to freeze, nor ice to melt. We too know warm from not warm. If we know that because of physical qualia manifestations like chemical/electrical reactions acting as nerve impulse on pleasure centers of the brain (if we have those) then I have no problem with the concept of qualia as a medium of exchange between the body and it's consciousness.

I know whether I feel warm so whatever word or words best illustrate the mechanism by which I know that I know that, I'm on board.

I must say again that I am caught by this problem. The physical world is undoubtedly real. So too is the force of consciousness. You mentioned will - I think that it is central to the issue of consciousness although I'm not sure how qualia fit exactly.

I'm thinking of consciousness on the model of a breathing human being. We breathe in, and consciousness intakes stimuli from many senses. We breathe out and consciousness, using will, assembles it's goal and acts on the world around it, getting a drink of water or building a skyscraper.

OK, I apologize for my own metaphoritus. It's an affliction. If you guys pick on me beware, all you'll do is force me into different ones. Maybe someone will explain to me the qualia of my experience that drives me to metaphors instead of describing the qualia of the experience itself.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
My claim is that the question exists as an experience. I cannot see you disagreeing with this since the alternative is to suppose that it exists objectively.
It seems that you already presume "purely subjective" when you write "experience." Otherwise, I can't see a reason for you to draw a contrast between "experience" and "objective existence."
You say yourself that you do not deny that experiences exist (which I am curious for you to explain why given your current stance).
Again, you seem to presume "purely subjective." Ryle describes this in many discussions of "category mistakes."
The experience of a question is different to the experience of redness, so we can say their qualia (the way they feel) are different.
What is so different about a question and and observation? You make many presumptions. First and foremost seems to be the presumption that the question is not fully traceable to chemical and electrical events within your body. This flies in the face of all the evidence to the contrary.
So here, we would be trying to falsify the existence of a thing while at the same time acknowledging that the falsification process requires that the thing exists.
Once again, you presume the existence of the very thing you wish to falsify. We're not talking about experience here; we're talking about this magical, immaterial "qualia."
Where your soul parallel breaks down is where you cannot explain why the soul is responsible for the experience of a question. You have evoked a separate entity to account for the ability to pose a question. I am saying that the actual question is the entity that needs to be falsified. When you realise this, the paradox becomes clear and there is no empty assertion.
No, I defined the "soul" as animating you. I took a parallel path to yours by baldly asserting that you can not be animated without a soul and QED'd it in the same lame way you are trying to QED "qualia."

Now, can you, at long last, present a way to falsify "qualia?"



Why do you not deny the existence of experience?



Dennet mentioned that his critics accused him of creating straw man arguments. I agree with his critics with particular reference to the above. What does “special� mean in this context? [/B][/QUOTE]

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Dancing David

Ah, yes the bizzare definition of qualia.
To paraphrase Dennett, "qualia" is a bizzare term for something that could not be less bizzare to each of us: the ways things seem to us.

That's the problem.

If you want to take a functionalist approach to explaining 'the way things seem to us', then fine. I'm with you all the way. But let's be clear on what we're doing. We are offering an alternative to the notion of qualia, not a functionalist explanation for it. We can talk about the organizational structure of the brain, and the sorts of activity that take place there, and we can do that without using the "Q" word at all.



Originally posted by Atlas

If we know that because of physical qualia manifestations like chemical/electrical reactions acting as nerve impulse on pleasure centers of the brain (if we have those) then I have no problem with the concept of qualia as a medium of exchange between the body and it's consciousness.Here it is again.

Electro-chemical impulses are exactly what qualia are not. The Lego robot, suitably equipped with a camera and capable of distinguishing between different wavelengths of light, could be programmed to 'go on green' -- but it would not 'experience' green (so the argument goes).
I have no problem with the concept of qualia as a medium of exchange between the body and it's consciousness.Whether you meant to or not, I think you've really hit the nail on the head there. The whole notion of qualia rests on the ease with which we are naturally inclined to accept the dualist assumptions that necessitate such a medium of exchange.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
It seems that you already presume "purely subjective" when you write "experience." Otherwise, I can't see a reason for you to draw a contrast between "experience" and "objective existence."



Of course I presume experiences are purely subjective. The two terms have exactly the same meaning. You surely can't mean anything other than purely subjective when you write "experience", unless you would care to explain otherwise.


Again, you seem to presume "purely subjective." Ryle describes this in many discussions of "category mistakes."


Care to explain in your own words what these "category mistakes" are?


What is so different about a question and and observation? You make many presumptions. First and foremost seems to be the presumption that the question is not fully traceable to chemical and electrical events within your body. This flies in the face of all the evidence to the contrary.


And we are back to the hard problem again. I ask you once more - why do you not deny the existence of experience?


Once again, you presume the existence of the very thing you wish to falsify. We're not talking about experience here; we're talking about this magical, immaterial "qualia."


to me, experience and qualia are synonyms. By the way, I don't think qualia are "magical".


No, I defined the "soul" as animating you. I took a parallel path to yours by baldly asserting that you can not be animated without a soul and QED'd it in the same lame way you are trying to QED "qualia."


Well, you clearly do not understand where your parallel breaks down.


Now, can you, at long last, present a way to falsify "qualia?"

I've already explained why it's meaningless to entertain the falsification of qualia

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Dymanic

Electro-chemical impulses are exactly what qualia are not. The Lego robot, suitably equipped with a camera and capable of distinguishing between different wavelengths of light, could be programmed to 'go on green' -- but it would not 'experience' green (so the argument goes). I used bad sentence structure. I was referring to the result from the stimulated pleasure center that would ostensibly be the qualia of bright and warmth. I certainly wouldn't have objected to the term dualist in any description of myself before joining this forum. I'm searching for language to express the physicalist viewpoint while at the same time celebrating that which is called consciousness.

Toward that end I am putting forward the quale of warmth. It seems a whole body experience that is different from "greeness". I believe it ties easily to the survival impulse and is one of the necessary "knowings" all animals share. It is neither imaged nor necessarily articulated as many qualia are.

I have no trouble anymore using the word God or Soul in conversations with believers. I mean something totally different when I use the term but in casual conversation with inoffensive people I don't mind the appearence of support for their worldview. I can be honest within my definitions and am open about those definitions when pressed but I do not feel the need to be in opposition to people I like if they merely have a way of speaking that I understand but don't agree with.

I'm looking to understand this issue in the same way. Qualia is a word and concept that won't be going away for awhile. Hammegk points out that it's a term that can be used just as honestly by physicalists as idealists. I agree with that. I just think that idealists have coopted the word with an epiphenomenal definition and a few visual qualia ideas that they can use for the strange purpose of denying physical reality. I want to get away from visual qualia for awhile. I like Ian's "smell of bacon and eggs" because I think one can discuss the evolving organism's relation to smell and survival in the physical world. Likewise the warmth of sunshine is good for me because it has real world consequences for things as unconscious as seeds.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
... to me, experience and qualia are synonyms. ... David,

Is this common or unique to you. Do you have a link to someone discussing qualia that makes this assertion or defines qualia this way? Just asking. The word experience seems so real world compared to qualia. It also leans more toward learning whereas qualia seems to lean more toward information. That's my take anyway from the discussion so far.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Atlas
...I just think that idealists have coopted the word with an epiphenomenal definition and a few visual qualia ideas that they can use for the strange purpose of denying physical reality. ....

Idealists deny the "physical -- with the connotations that word carries" but accept that objective reality exists, and assume that it's the same for all awareness that recognizes it.

Accept dualism:
or,
choose "physical" (one implication, consciousness is an epiphenomena)
or,
choose "~physical" (one implication, physical is the epiphenomena).

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Of course I presume experiences are purely subjective. The two terms have exactly the same meaning. You surely can't mean anything other than purely subjective when you write "experience", unless you would care to explain otherwise.
No, the question is deeper than you're allowing, and gets to Ryle's whole discussion of "category mistake." Experience is subjective in one sense, because I am the one with my set of experiences. But you have not demonstrated that experience is subjective in the other sense; the sense that it is inaccessible to objective verification or inquiry. The root cause of your error is the category mistake of thinking that minds and bodies belong to different categories.

When I write "experience," I think of it as a collection of my memories, any one of which can be made to replay in my mind by electrical stimulation of my brain. (This research was long ago established and repeated several times.) It is a function of my brain and my body. I easily envision the day in which someone will be able to probe my brain and replay, for any external observer to see, any one of my experiences. I warn the strippers about this whenever they suggest particularly kinky things, of course.

You seem to assume that because your experiences are subjective, in the first sense, that they are necessarily subjective in the second sense. You assume the existence of this immaterial, ineffable "qualia" and then demand we ignore hundreds of years of evidence to accomodate your foregone conclusion. Not gonna happen.

By the way, I don't think qualia are "magical".
I think you need to think about the implications of your position again. You have disconnected qualia from a basis in the material realm.

I've already explained why it's meaningless to entertain the falsification of qualia
See? There you go again.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Filip Sandor
.... Does matter have a mind of it's own that tells it what to do when 'the laws aren't watching' the way we seem to have a mind?


Consider Mach's principle and the value of inertial mass we would assign to a specific perceived object. Then, what is your answer to your question?

Originally posted by davidsmith73
The main difference between the materialist philosophy and the mental monist one is that the latter does not have the hard problem of consciousness to deal with.

Or "consciousness" -- dare I call it awareness -- in all aspects.

Originally posted by Atlas

In the minority there are folks like hammegk, who refuse to live in the paradox they see and so throw pragmatism down for illusion.
Illusion? No; the question is what is the nature of the beast.

Originally posted by Atlas

... I'm never sure if you're thumnailing or nutshelling. Does Objective Idealism accept that human consciousness is an aspect of a unified higher consciousness that is not dependent upon *I* but also that reality is unreal, unphysical, simultaneously created and apprehended by higher consciousness and it's aspects? I still don't like you destroying my world. One of us is a windmill, the other is Don Quixote.
What is "higher" consciousness? Either consciousness exists, or it does not. What world am I destroying?

Originally posted by Mr. E

"its qualia"? What is the limit as quale-content goes to zero?

~consciousness ... some might say 'death'.

Originally posted by Dancing David

i see we are back to the ineffable qualia. And while they are like quarks, at least we can determine the properties of quarks.
We can? Can you falsify their existence, too?

Originally posted by Dancing David

Where exists a qualia without an organic frame work? Qualia are learned they do not stand alone!
I'd say: Where exists a physical frame without a quale? Physical frames are defined they do not stand alone! :p

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by hammegk
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Mr. E

"its qualia"? What is the limit as quale-content goes to zero?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

~consciousness ... some might say 'death'. 'Death' usually means something terminal involving cremation or internment in a coffin. I'm not talking directly about that.

BTW, I'm understanding the '~' character to amount to traditional logical negation ala the excluded middle principle, A or ~A but not both.

The response I offered earlier to BillHoyt was the question of whether we can come to understand the proper role of qualia by evaluating what happens to consciousness as quale-content is systematically eliminated bit by bit from a conscious system. Bill refuses to address the issue seriously, for whatever good reasons he may have. Qualia may appear magically in some loose sense of the word; the goal of reverse engineering is to "de-magicalize" this, make it understandable, and then possibly to reproduce it.

Speaking for myself, there seem to be things I cannot do effectively without qualia. So they are necessary to that extent, whether they exist or not.

ME

edit - correct 'where' to 'whether'

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Mr. E
'Death' usually means something terminal involving cremation or internment in a coffin. I'm not talking directly about that.
Nor was I. Think of it as ~Life (or may I call it .. physical matter as we perceive it).


BTW, I'm understanding the '~' character to amount to traditional logical negation ala the excluded middle principle, A or ~A but not both.
Yes.

Unfortunately, as I understand it, one answer to the Bell-Aspect problem is that Aristotelian logic Does Not Apply to reality.


The response I offered earlier to BillHoyt was the question of whether we can come to understand the proper role of qualia by evaluating what happens to consciousness as quale-content is systematically eliminated bit by bit from a conscious system.
And some might say nothing but qualia exist.

II does want a Self, but I haven't figured out how that part might work. Some form of non-interactive dualism might do it I suppose.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Atlas

... I'm never sure if you're thumnailing or nutshelling. Does Objective Idealism accept that human consciousness is an aspect of a unified higher consciousness that is not dependent upon *I* but also that reality is unreal, unphysical, simultaneously created and apprehended by higher consciousness and it's aspects? I still don't like you destroying my world. One of us is a windmill, the other is Don Quixote.
Originally posted by hammegk
What is "higher" consciousness? Either consciousness exists, or it does not. What world am I destroying?
Consciousness appears to be the product of a physical brain. Some I suppose grant plants consciousness. I don't. Animals have it and humans have it to a greater degree primarily, I believe, because of their mastery of language. Now that may also be my bias for my own species but we seem to be able to use consciousness in ways that animals can't. We multiply or leverage it's power with machines that we design and build.

Higher consciousness though is different. For me, it exists external to a physical body... external to a brain. I don't believe in that form of consciousness at all but many do and believe our own consciousness is fractured off or descending from that unified higher consciousness they may even name as God.

I'd like your opinion. Can consciousness exist external to a physical brain? If so, is it different from our own with it's input from stimuli, process against memory associations, and output as volition?

As far as my world. I grew up Catholic and later fell in love with Zen. Each maintained that this world was illusion and a greater reality or truth existed beyond our senses. Each maintained a higher consciousness though each approached these issues differently.

Each of these allowed adherents a conscious appreciation of the beauty and warmth of their truth. That is, each offered a form of conscious emotionalism or emotional consciousness.

Skepticiam seems colder and harder at first. Science seems like work at first. But both have an appeal as well and both allow for but do not necesarily celebrate emotionalism. But it is life and skeptics are all for life especially because of it's finality.

Realizing it is one thing, embracing it is another. I embrace the physical world. I embrace man's tiny existence in the world and the universe. Matter in all it's forms is truth. It lights the universe and consciousness rises from matter like fusion power.

That's where I am coming from. Though I like to think that consciousness is capable of much more. It is really the power of many consciousnesses that is producing the fusion of the modern technological world.

I wish you'd write a whole paragraph or two sometime on how you size things up. Your one and two sentence answers often raise more questions about where you come from than they answer.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Mr. E
'The response I offered earlier to BillHoyt was the question of whether we can come to understand the proper role of qualia by evaluating what happens to consciousness as quale-content is systematically eliminated bit by bit from a conscious system. Bill refuses to address the issue seriously, for whatever good reasons he may have. Qualia may appear magically in some loose sense of the word; the goal of reverse engineering is to "de-magicalize" this, make it understandable, and then possibly to reproduce it.
I addressed this, mystery. I responded that you failed to answer the question. You cannot falsify something by presuming its existence in this way. Let us say we concoct the idea that blinking string of christmas lights works because there is a little elf with a little switch inside one of them. We then propose an experiment like yours: we will take the bulbs out, one at a time, until the string stops blinking. When we find the elf-bulb we declare the research done.

Now go back to your description of removing quale content and compare it to removing the elf-bulb. Do you see the problem? Do you see you didn't distinguish between the elf hypothesis and any number of alternative elf hypotheses? You simply retained your a priori assumption, and got nowhere. Your "removing quale content" experiment is the same. You simply retained your a priori assumption, and got nowhere.

Now, please, somebody propose something to falsify qualia. So far, we've got two basic kinds of answers. In the first the poster baldly asserts that qualia are obviously real, but immaterial and not subject to scientific inquiry. In the second, the poster sets out to prove X by assuming X.

[Mr. E]

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Mr. E
'The response I offered earlier to BillHoyt was the question of whether we can come to understand the proper role of qualia by evaluating what happens to consciousness as quale-content is systematically eliminated bit by bit from a conscious system. Bill refuses to address the issue seriously, for whatever good reasons he may have. Qualia may appear magically in some loose sense of the word; the goal of reverse engineering is to "de-magicalize" this, make it understandable, and then possibly to reproduce it.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I addressed this, mystery. I responded that you failed to answer the question. As I've pointed out before, empty denial is insufficient. You had and yet have not defined your terms sufficiently to require me to offer you any other response as an answer. Obstinacy is not the same as perseverance.

You cannot falsify something by presuming its existence in this way. Which way and why not? Or better yet, tell us the formula for falsification as you would have us use it. I've asked about Popper, you've ignored the repeated inquiry or I missed some post of yours explicit to the inquiry.

Now go back to your description of removing quale content and compare it to removing the elf-bulb. Do you see the problem? Yeah, the problem is that the fairy tale doesn't even closely resemble what I supposed.

In the second, the poster sets out to prove X by assuming X.Not if you refer to my answer.


ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by hammegk
Nor was I. Think of it as ~Life (or may I call it .. physical matter as we perceive it).You mean physical matter as we infer from our perceptions of it, rocks-in-themselves for example? The very act of perceiving something is of course as far as we know a matter of Life, conscious Life even.
Unfortunately, as I understand it, one answer to the Bell-Aspect problem is that Aristotelian logic Does Not Apply to reality.Am I correct in assuming that you agree that bunk exists or at least occurs, whether fictional or real or some mixed state, and further that not all proposed answers are to be taken seriously?
And some might say nothing but qualia exist. That would be their problem first. So far I haven't seen a definition of 'exist' which makes such an assertion of more than passing interest.

ME

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Mr. E
As I've pointed out before, empty denial is insufficient. You had and yet have not defined your terms sufficiently to require me to offer you any other response as an answer. Obstinacy is not the same as perseverance.
Excuse me, but those presupposing the existence of "qualia" as an immaterial, special thing are the ones making the claim. The onus is on them to provide evidence. That goes as well for those taking the position that the question is beyond the realm of science. The onus is on them to provide evidence.

Which way and why not? Or better yet, tell us the formula for falsification as you would have us use it. I've asked about Popper, you've ignored the repeated inquiry or I missed some post of yours explicit to the inquiry.
There is no formula, mystery. Never has been, never will. Perhaps you simply fail to grasp the concept? You must provide an experiment that will distinguish between an immaterial "qualia" hypothesis and all others. You've repeatedly presumed quale existence and suggested that we simply cut off all quale and see what happens. That's laughable, mystery, and certainly fails to address the base issues of distinguishing between the quale hypothesis and the host of alternatives.

Yeah, the problem is that the fairy tale doesn't even closely resemble what I supposed.

Not if you refer to my answer.


ME
It most assuredly does. You hypothesize X. I ask for falsification. You propose we eliminate the hypothesized Xs and see what happens. That's a zip, zero, nada, non-starter.

Address the question, please: how do you falsify the "qualia" hypothesis?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
No, the question is deeper than you're allowing, and gets to Ryle's whole discussion of "category mistake." Experience is subjective in one sense, because I am the one with my set of experiences. But you have not demonstrated that experience is subjective in the other sense; the sense that it is inaccessible to objective verification or inquiry. The root cause of your error is the category mistake of thinking that minds and bodies belong to different categories.

I have not assumed that minds and bodies belong to different categories. By this one is making an ontological distinction between a physical objective reality (bodies) and a subjective reality (minds) and doing so creates dualism. However, to reflect on the nature of experience, one does not need to conceive of an objective physical reality. In fact, I have suggested that it is more appropriate to assume that objective physical reality does not exist.

When you ask for verification of subjectivity (in your second sense) the question becomes meaningless because one has to either assume objective reality is the only reality, or experiential reality is the only reality, or both (dualism). These are the fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality that we must make before we can go any further. To then ask for a verification of such assumptions is meaningless, as I have been trying to explain. Consider how you would verify the existence of an objective reality to me. But then again, I wouldn't expect such a question to be answered, simply because it's also meaningless.


When I write "experience," I think of it as a collection of my memories, any one of which can be made to replay in my mind by electrical stimulation of my brain.

Cognitive memories are in the category of experiences. Therefore you have to explain what experiences are. You can't just refer to a subset of experiences as an attempt to explain why you think they exist. Also, repeating the fact that experiences are correlated with physical processes does not address the hard problem. You say that experiences exist. You therefore must give some indication as to what criteria you identify an experience by.
So here's my question;

How do you identify a physical process that gives rise to an experience as opposed to one that does not?

I think you will find that upon answering that question, you must be forced to identify the subjective nature of experiences (in your second sense). Please explain if you don't.


You seem to assume that because your experiences are subjective, in the first sense, that they are necessarily subjective in the second sense. You assume the existence of this immaterial, ineffable "qualia" and then demand we ignore hundreds of years of evidence to accomodate your foregone conclusion. Not gonna happen.

No, I don't think I have assumed subjectivity in the first sense. Can you point out where I have? In fact, I would go so far as to say that experiences are not private at all. So, I haven't made any link with the assumed privacy of experiences and their subjective nature, unless you can point out where.


I think you need to think about the implications of your position again. You have disconnected qualia from a basis in the material realm.

Correct, I have disconnected experiences from objective physical reality. However I don't see how "magic" now comes into it. I don't even know what you mean by the term.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Mr. E
You mean physical matter as we infer from our perceptions of it, rocks-in-themselves for example? The very act of perceiving something is of course as far as we know a matter of Life, conscious Life even.

So far I haven't seen a definition of 'exist' which makes such an assertion of more than passing interest.
Can something be said to 'exist' in a state of total unawareness of its surroundings? I'd say no; now, what is that awareness, and when does it begin? Or could we say when does "consciousness" begin?


I note that this in no way suggests the antropomorphic definition of consciousness some seem to ascribe to it.




Am I correct in assuming that you agree that bunk exists or at least occurs, whether fictional or real or some mixed state, and further that not all proposed answers are to be taken seriously?

Of course. Tell me, do you take my comment(s) to be a priori bunk, or is that your considered opinion?


That would be their problem first.
ME
You deny "thought" to be an existent? If so, how interesting. Actually, my most objective sense is that *I* think, but of course that could be The Solipsist's dream(i.e. Thought Exists).


The ongoing discussion of falsifying qualia is a materialistic laugher. For individual human level qualia, its easy; Die (in the human sense).


by Atlas
I'd like your opinion. Can consciousness exist external to a physical brain?
Not at "human" level. The perceived-as-physical brain is necessary, but is it sufficient? To date the answer remains "no" to reductionists' dismay.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I have not assumed that minds and bodies belong to different categories. By this one is making an ontological distinction between a physical objective reality (bodies) and a subjective reality (minds) and doing so creates dualism. However, to reflect on the nature of experience, one does not need to conceive of an objective physical reality. In fact, I have suggested that it is more appropriate to assume that objective physical reality does not exist.
And with that suggestion, you are immediately outside rationality. You are immediately outside one of the few axioms of science.

When you ask for verification of subjectivity (in your second sense) the question becomes meaningless because one has to either assume objective reality is the only reality, or experiential reality is the only reality, or both (dualism). These are the fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality that we must make before we can go any further. To then ask for a verification of such assumptions is meaningless, as I have been trying to explain. Consider how you would verify the existence of an objective reality to me. But then again, I wouldn't expect such a question to be answered, simply because it's also meaningless.
What is truly meaningless is this metaphysical fog. The existence of objective reality is axiomatic to science, and has been for several hundred years. In all those years of experimentation, there has yet to be compelling evidence against this axiom. If you wish to assume that you wanted the experience of a snowball hitting you from behind rather than having been caught off guard by some mischievous kids, then be my guest. I hope you'll pardon the snickering from the kids and anybody else not caught in this metaphysical fog.

Cognitive memories are in the category of experiences. Therefore you have to explain what experiences are. You can't just refer to a subset of experiences as an attempt to explain why you think they exist. Also, repeating the fact that experiences are correlated with physical processes does not address the hard problem. You say that experiences exist. You therefore must give some indication as to what criteria you identify an experience by.
I already have. I even alluded to the research indicating that specific experiences can be recalled by probing specific brain cells. Here's the easy way to clear the fog. Get a plane ticket. Get on the flight. Fly someplace. I will make the simple claim that, unless you died in flight or on some serious drugs, you will have had the experience of that flight. We can objectively verify that experience by checking your purchase records, and the airline's manifest. Then we can objectively verify the experience within you (if you will) by probing an area of your brain that will trigger your recall of that experience.

So here's my question;

How do you identify a physical process that gives rise to an experience as opposed to one that does not?

I think you will find that upon answering that question, you must be forced to identify the subjective nature of experiences (in your second sense). Please explain if you don't.
I just did. Again. And again. I can probe your memory. But, of course, if you don't believe you have a brain, I will certainly not refute that contention.

No, I don't think I have assumed subjectivity in the first sense. Can you point out where I have? In fact, I would go so far as to say that experiences are not private at all. So, I haven't made any link with the assumed privacy of experiences and their subjective nature, unless you can point out where.
Excuse me, but you are arguing objective reality ain't, and now you are arguing subjective reality ain't. How about just concluding "ain't," it would be just as silly and not waste our time.

Correct, I have disconnected experiences from objective physical reality. However I don't see how "magic" now comes into it. I don't even know what you mean by the term.
If it ain't rooted in matter or energy, sir, it is rooted in magic. Some mystical, ephemeral nothingness that you have to explain, not I.

[T'ai Chi]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

I can probe your memory.

Could you explain how you plan on doing that?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by jzs
Could you explain how you plan on doing that?

"We are in the operating room of the Montreal Neurological Institute observing brain surgery on Buddy, a young man with uncontrollable epileptic seizures. The surgeon wants to operate to remove a tumor, but first he must discover what the consequences will be of removing various portions of the brain tissue surrounding the tumor ... Suddenly an unexpected response occurs. The patient is grinning; he is smiling; eyes opening when that area is stimulated. "Buddy, what happened, what did you just experience?" "Doc, I heard a song, or rather a part of a song, a melody." "Buddy, have you ever heard it before?" "Yes, I remember having heard it a long time ago, but I can't remember the name of the tune." When another brain site is stimulated, the patient recalls in vivid detail a thrilling childhood experience. ... As if by pushing an electronic memory button, the surgeon, Dr. Wilder Penfield, has touched memories stored silently for years in the recesses of his patient's brains."

Penfield's stimulated memory recall work dates back to the 1940s.

Memory (http://pages.slc.edu/~ebj/IM_97/Lecture7/L7.html)

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
And with that suggestion, you are immediately outside rationality. You are immediately outside one of the few axioms of science.

Yes I am. But only a science that contends that its descriptions are of a reality that lies outside experience. That assumption is not necessary for science to work purely as a method of describing and making prediction about our experiences.


What is truly meaningless is this metaphysical fog. The existence of objective reality is axiomatic to science, and has been for several hundred years. In all those years of experimentation, there has yet to be compelling evidence against this axiom.

I shall quote you here Bill:

"Now, please, somebody propose something to falsify qualia. So far, we've got two basic kinds of answers. In the first the poster baldly asserts that qualia are obviously real, but immaterial and not subject to scientific inquiry. In the second, the poster sets out to prove X by assuming X."

You can see the hypocracy I'm sure. If you are postulating that its possible to have evidence for or against the axiom of objectivity, then you are trying to prove objectivity while at the same time assuming objectivity.



I already have. I even alluded to the research indicating that specific experiences can be recalled by probing specific brain cells. Here's the easy way to clear the fog. Get a plane ticket. Get on the flight. Fly someplace. I will make the simple claim that, unless you died in flight or on some serious drugs, you will have had the experience of that flight. We can objectively verify that experience by checking your purchase records, and the airline's manifest. Then we can objectively verify the experience within you (if you will) by probing an area of your brain that will trigger your recall of that experience.

So your criteria for identifying an experience is - do something and you will have an experience of it. Oh dear Bill, this is not good enough. Please don't waste my time with this poor excuse for philosophical thought. All of your suggestion above completely side-step the issue which is the nature of the experience itself.


I just did. Again. And again. I can probe your memory. But, of course, if you don't believe you have a brain, I will certainly not refute that contention.

The hard problem will not just go away.
I shall ask you once again. Now you must answer this question Bill, its very important for this discussion.

you excite my brain cells and what happens .....?



Excuse me, but you are arguing objective reality ain't, and now you are arguing subjective reality ain't. How about just concluding "ain't," it would be just as silly and not waste our time.


No Bill, you know very well that I am talking about subjectivity existing in your second sense.


If it ain't rooted in matter or energy, sir, it is rooted in magic. Some mystical, ephemeral nothingness that you have to explain, not I.

No, you brought up the term "magic" so you must explain why it is necessary. I have never used the terms mystical, ephemeral or nothingness either. Sorry try again.

[T'ai Chi]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

Penfield's stimulated memory recall work dates back to the 1940s.

Memory (http://pages.slc.edu/~ebj/IM_97/Lecture7/L7.html)

The page you linked to doesn't present a favorable view of this at all.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

How do you identify a physical process that gives rise to an experience as opposed to one that does not?
That is an interesting question. It gets me thinking about physical processes that do not give rise to experiences, despite demonstrable evidence that information was aquired through the senses, and perhaps even acted upon (such as in the split-brain patients). Clearly, different sensa produce different effects -- or, the same sensa produce different effects at different times. Crick and Koch stuck their necks out with the business about 40-hertz oscillations, but it's a long way from a satisfactory explanation.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Yes I am.

Actually, you may not be.

Science works equally well with

Objective, physical, reality exists,

or

Objective, ~physical, reality exists.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by jzs
The page you linked to doesn't present a favorable view of this at all.

Well, perhaps you should give it another look. The lecturer who wrote this was objecting to the bold claims made, not to the reality of the data.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Dymanic
That is an interesting question. It gets me thinking about physical processes that do not give rise to experiences, despite demonstrable evidence that information was aquired through the senses, and perhaps even acted upon (such as in the split-brain patients). Clearly, different sensa produce different effects -- or, the same sensa produce different effects at different times. Crick and Koch stuck their necks out with the business about 40-hertz oscillations, but it's a long way from a satisfactory explanation. Are you referring to such as in this link? http://leadwise.com/leadu/Intention/goals/newman.htm#sec3

ME

[hammegk]

Assume that objective, physical, reality exists, and that paper presents what to me is a good overview of scientific reductionism applied to HPC in particular.

As to explaining the emergent property -- or epiphenomena -- or whatever -- of "consciousness", pah.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Yes I am. But only a science that contends that its descriptions are of a reality that lies outside experience. That assumption is not necessary for science to work purely as a method of describing and making prediction about our experiences.
"Science that contends its descriptions are of a reality that lies outside experience," sir, is nearly 100% of science. The bit of "science" excluded is considered "borderland" science with good reason.

You really need to look at the "axioms of science" that I've posted here several times over the past few years. "Objective, external reality" is axiomatic.

I shall quote you here Bill:

"Now, please, somebody propose something to falsify qualia. So far, we've got two basic kinds of answers. In the first the poster baldly asserts that qualia are obviously real, but immaterial and not subject to scientific inquiry. In the second, the poster sets out to prove X by assuming X."

You can see the hypocracy I'm sure. If you are postulating that its possible to have evidence for or against the axiom of objectivity, then you are trying to prove objectivity while at the same time assuming objectivity.
No. Objective reality is axiomatic. It is considered axiomatic for two reasons: 1. Nothing in the past hundreds of years of science has compelling pointing to an alternative conclusion and 2. We cannot yet find a test to falsify it. Should 1 change we would have an abundance of alternative hypotheses accompanied by a surfeit of research proposals to falsify them. This is the essential difference. You presume qualia as an immaterial something-ior-other. You also cite evidence you claims confirms the existence of qualia. Clearly, sir, there are alternative hypotheses. Clearly, sir, if your evidence were of any quality here, you would be able to devise a test to rule out one of these hypotheses. You can't.
So your criteria for identifying an experience is - do something and you will have an experience of it. Oh dear Bill, this is not good enough. Please don't waste my time with this poor excuse for philosophical thought. All of your suggestion above completely side-step the issue which is the nature of the experience itself.
So now you claim that an experience is not an experience? Why? Because there was a physical root cause to it? How much further down this ruse will you take us, david, before you realize you are demonstrating my major contention here? "Qualia" are a philosophical ruse devised to provide a No True Scotsman when the "hard problem" is solved. You've just demonstrated the ruse here by asking about experience, and then poo-pooing an example of it because it is rooted in the objective and not in a metaphysical fog.

Is it seriously your contention that an experience of an event is not an experience? Why? Why is this different from Ian's "red?" You're in a complete muddle here. Clean up your boots as you try to pull yourself up. Can't you hear the giggling?

The hard problem will not just go away.
I shall ask you once again. Now you must answer this question Bill, its very important for this discussion.

you excite my brain cells and what happens .....? [/qiuote]
Apparently nothing from the paltry quality of your argumentation thus far. For most people, however, a chain of neural associations is kicked off, recalling a memory or memories.
[quote]No Bill, you know very well that I am talking about subjectivity existing in your second sense.
I know full well you are denying a connection to the objective and continue to hide behind layers of meaning for "private" and "subjective," as you are with this next bit...

No, you brought up the term "magic" so you must explain why it is necessary. I have never used the terms mystical, ephemeral or nothingness either. Sorry try again.
Stop playing word games. The core question here is obvious: is it brain function or not? Physical or not? If you claim it is not physical or in some other way special and outside science, you are claiming magic. Call it whatever you want, it ain't science, it ain't physical. Do you deny this? Or do you simply want to continue hiding behind words and not address the fact you cannot give us a means to falsify "qualia." Why can't you?

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Excuse me, but those presupposing the existence of "qualia" as an immaterial, special thing are the ones making the claim. The onus is on them to provide evidence. I can conceive of qualia as non-material and special, given fairly ordinary definitions of the terms. What exact claim requires defense?

There is no formula, mystery.Okay, so your obstinate obsessive demands for people to "falsify" something are fake. Fine. Don't you have some better way to waste time?

It most assuredly does. You hypothesize X. I ask for falsification. You propose we eliminate the hypothesized Xs and see what happens. That's a zip, zero, nada, non-starter.Since you have not at all correctly formulated the situation, it is your text which is not starting, again.

Address the question, please: how do you falsify the "qualia" hypothesis? [/B] I suppose one would do it in the same general way as one would falsify any hypothesis warranting falsification.


ME

[hammegk]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
You really need to look at the "axioms of science" that I've posted here several times over the past few years. "Objective, external reality" is axiomatic.


No. Objective reality is axiomatic.

Which is it I wonder? I note that "physical" has disappeared from Bill's Axiom. Where did it get to?

And "Objective, external reality"? External to what?


Someone who isn't on his ignore list should ask him.

[Jeff Corey]

I haven't said much here, beyond a psych textbook definition of "consciousness" on page 1. I was later insulted for that.
So I decided to see what "qualia" were, because you all were using the term differently than I had been taught.
What did I find?
"Qualia comprize the thingness of something."
"Oh, no. The somethingness of some thing!"
I was reminded of the Lutonian Philosophy Department on SCTV.

I report I see "red".
Is this a quale?
Is the quality "red" a quale?

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by hammegk
[B]Can something be said to 'exist' in a state of total unawareness of its surroundings? I'd say no; now, what is that awareness, and when does it begin? Or could we say when does "consciousness" begin?I'm not sure what you are asking nor what you are asking about. It might be that 'exist' is not well-defined or is multivalent. Is a rock aware of its surroundings in a meaningful way even if it is affected by them somehow? But if we accept for the sake of argument that people exist (even if they exist in confusion in large part) we can consider how it is that they are at all aware of their surroundings. Then consciousness "begins" when sensation is synthesized with awareness, as I've stated earlier.

I note that this in no way suggests the antropomorphic definition of consciousness some seem to ascribe to it.Anthropomorphic? Do you consider my definition such a one?


Of course. Tell me, do you take my comment(s) to be a priori bunk, or is that your considered opinion?Tell me, how is this to become meaningful either way?

You deny "thought" to be an existent? If so, how interesting. Actually, my most objective sense is that *I* think, but of course that could be The Solipsist's dream(i.e. Thought Exists).I don't recall denying that. I may have suggested that some thoughts are experienced while others are not. May I suggest that the sense you refer to is better stated "I (dis)believe", not "I think"?

I guess your Solipsism reference is targetted at II. It might be possible to argue from Self + Qualia being the only existents to the notion that other people are not real, what I understand as a necessary consequent of Solipsism. I figure II's notion is that "infinite mind" would somehow accommodate a world of some billions of solipsistic entities (ordinary people) who falsely believe they are not what they truly are.


The ongoing discussion of falsifying qualia is a materialistic laugher. For individual human level qualia, its easy; Die (in the human sense).Good humor is good, dry or wet. There might be harder but more rewarding ways than your terminal method. If you are recommending death to narrow-minded materialists, you might want to be aware that assisting a suicide might be against the law.


ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by hammegk
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No. Objective reality is axiomatic.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Which is it I wonder? I note that "physical" has disapperared from Bill's Axiom. Where did it get to?
And "Objective, external reality"? External to what?
Someone who isn't on his ignore list should ask him. Okay, I will play along and have posted this in that spirit. Bill seems to be a closet dualist defending some vague materialism construced (constructed or construed) out of misconstructions of historical facts.

For me, what makes "external reality" objective for science is simply the definition of science as having the objective of exploring nature honestly combined with the notion that there might be something real "behind" the phenomena we commonly refer to as phenomena of nature. But that doesn't say that reality exists nor that it is purely physical if it is physical at all.

However it strikes me that this direction might be rather atopical.

ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
I report I see "red".
Is this a quale?[/B] Reports might or might not be. If false, then possibly not. If true, then why not?

Should this forum have a sign saying: "Check your sense of humor at the "cloakroom", please!"?

There seem to be two kinds of quale, seriously speaking: Redness and the feeling associated with redness.

Were you insulted or was the target text insulting?

ME

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Mr. E
Okay, I will play along and have posted this in that spirit.

Thanks, but unfortunately you rather mangled it. Any chance for a bit of formatting, and including all of the words? Although, who knows, Bill might actually look at the source.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by hammegk
Thanks, but unfortunately you rather mangled it. Any chance for a bit of formatting, and including all of the words? Although, who knows, Bill might actually look at the source. Patience is a virtue. The way of Found Art should not be over-corrected. Time will tell.

ME

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by hammegk

I'd say: Where exists a physical frame without a quale? Physical frames are defined they do not stand alone! :p

Well duh, I agree Hamme, no need for tounge wagging. It would appear that the realm of observation is observed because there is some frame work for observation.

Mu, physical frames are only a descriptive convinience.
Materialism and idealism differ only in an untestable hypothesis. idealism sufferes from the HPC as much as the materialist, they are equal.

[Jeff Corey]

That reaaly struck me as incomprehensible.
Please tell me what quales are and stop playing around.

[T'ai Chi]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Well, perhaps you should give it another look. The lecturer who wrote this was objecting to the bold claims made, not to the reality of the data.

You said: "I can probe your memory."

I said: "Could you explain how you plan on doing that?"

You: posted a link to that site

I: looked at that site, which cleary says the data for claims of probing memory is of poor quality

Question: How does that page support your claim of you being able to probe memory?

From the page:
(underline mine)


Firstly, the numbers are not impressive: in only 40 out of 1,132 cases did he find any memory recovery; excluding patients who heard only music or voices and those whose responses were too vague to classify, less than 3% of the patients experienced the "lifelike memories" for which Penfield's work is so famous.


and


Secondly, there was no attempt to check the veracity of the memories, and the patient protocols read like reconstructions, heavily based on inferences.


Please present additional data in a Hoytgram or whatever form you'd like, to back up your claim.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
That reaaly struck me as incomprehensible.
Please tell me what quales are and stop playing around. It was compact with an eye to reducing verbiage. I guess you are asking me to unpack it for you, and that you are doing it in a rather rude fashion. "There seem to be two kinds of quale, seriously speaking: Redness and the feeling associated with redness." Did you mean to ask "How am I?" or maybe "How do qualia occur, what brain processes create the impression of redness when I, Jeff, see red?"

??

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Jeff Corey
I report I see "red".
Is this a quale?[/B]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[ME] Reports might or might not be. If false, then possibly not. If true, then why not?
----------------------------
:endquote

Reports might or might not be qualia.
If you report falsely, then maybe "red" doesn't represent a genuine experience. If you report truly, then why should we doubt that you saw red?

Okay?


ME

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Mr. E
I can conceive of qualia as non-material and special, given fairly ordinary definitions of the terms. What exact claim requires defense?
Things in our universe are either matter or energy. "Non-material" is the extraordinary claim. This is dirt simple, but somehow must be avoided by you and others in this discussion. I repeat, for the umpteenth time: is it rooted in the brain and body or not? If it is not rooted in the brain, then you are defending an hypothesis requiring a means of falsification.

Stop playing games.

Okay, so your obstinate obsessive demands for people to "falsify" something are fake. Fine. Don't you have some better way to waste time?
This is the fallacy of the excluded middle. There is no formula for developing research, mystery. You, sir, stop playing games and stop wasting our time.

Since you have not at all correctly formulated the situation, it is your text which is not starting, again.
Educate yourself, mystery. So far your record of posts at JREF appears to be those of a crank who likes to toy with mathematical and scientific concepts but who has precious little understanding of either. Your pap about vector cross-products and consciousness was trully worthy of AIR or MAD magazine.

This demand for a "formula" is indicative of serious reasoning flaws. There is no formula. That does not mean the request is fake. Your reasoning is fallacious.

I suppose one would do it in the same general way as one would falsify any hypothesis warranting falsification.
You haven't a clue how science works, have you? Somehow, you believe this bafflegab will cover your ignorance. I'm afraid only education can do that. When will you begin yours?

[Atlas]

When a camera takes a photograph, is it manipulating qualia? No.
When a TV or radio relays real world events to our living room, is it manipulating qualia. No.
When a mirror reflects the colors and surfaces in a room, is it manipulating qualia? No.
When a filmstrip is shown on the screen, is it manipulating qualia? No.

A conscious receiver is the only material entity that operates on the invented conceptual qualia.

Even though the material world is replete with examples of energy or event storage...

Throw a blanket on your grass in the summer and leave it for a few days. When the blanket is removed the quality of the grass or energy stored there is different from the surrounding grass.

Human consciousness is not even enhanced by the utilization of the phenomenal or epiphenomenal qualia. For idealists, it is an added term that is done more because of an agenda than a critical analysis.

Matter captures and stores energy inputs. Sometimes those inputs can be retrieved. The universe is like a big memory. Place yourself 100 light-years from an event and watch the event of 100 years ago unfold before you.

All I'm saying is qualia can be a term that someone might choose to help explain the transfer of real world stimuli into the stuff of Idea, but it is disingenuous to believe that postulating ineffable, immaterial qualia proves Physicalism false.

Physicalism combined with science produces results. Follow immateriality where you will and you get nothing. For thousands of years we were thirsting in the desert and now have finally found a spring to slake our unquenchable thirst... some of you would have us go back to the empty glass of immateriality.

What would be gained?

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
[B]Things in our universe are either matter or energy. I don't know which universe that would be, but it seems to me that the real objects of physics are energy, momentum, and spin, to a pretty fair approximation. Maybe you can correct my understanding of physics, educate me on this subject.

"Non-material" is the extraordinary claim.Ever seen a photon, Bill? I have not. How about a meta-stable state in an excited ruby laser?
Stop playing games.Maybe if you could be more consistent and coherent in your demands, it wouldn't take so much "game playing" to tease out the knots of the muddle you seem to be in.
There is no formula for developing research, mystery. You don't have a functional definition of "to falsify". Got it.
This demand for a "formula" is indicative of serious reasoning flaws.See above, or let me translate: "I, BillHoyt, by asking for falsification as I did, was indicating that my presentation in this forum includes serious reasoning flaws".


ME

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Mr. E
I don't know which universe that would be, but it seems to me that the real objects of physics are energy, momentum, and spin, to a pretty fair approximation. Maybe you can correct my understanding of physics, educate me on this subject.
I suggest you start with a very elementary physics text. You seem to have missed out on some very basic concepts One has to shake one's head and wonder how you get either momentum or spin without a bit of matter. But, no matter, we've already heard from you on vector math, DNA and "hyper-calculations." :rolleyes:

Ever seen a photon, Bill? I have not.
Sorry to hear about your blindness. What on earth do you think you are looking at as you read this, mystery?
How about a meta-stable state in an excited ruby laser?
Obviously you confuse "material" with "visible." Add a dictionary to the physics text you require.
Maybe if you could be more consistent and coherent in your demands, it wouldn't take so much "game playing" to tease out the knots of the muddle you seem to be in.
Your lack of comprehension is not a reflection on my consistency. Grow up.
You don't have a functional definition of "to falsify". Got it.
See above, or let me translate: "I, BillHoyt, by asking for falsification as I did, was indicating that my presentation in this forum includes serious reasoning flaws".
Mystery, the concept is simple. YOU need to define qualia sufficiently to be able to suggest a test that can distinguish between your qualia hypothesis and any alternative hypothesis. Your description of removing qualia one by one and seeing what happens is puerile and non-responsive. Couching in more psuedomathematical terms about limits is crank nonsense.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ME] Ever seen a photon, Bill? I have not.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sorry to hear about your blindness. What on earth do you think you are looking at as you read this, mystery? Bill, have you ever seen a photon? Have you ever held one in your hand, tasted one, heard one, smelled one? A simple excluded-middle Yes/No answer will suffice to put me in my place.

Obviously you confuse "material" with "visible."That could be what you are doing, Bill.

Your lack of comprehension is not a reflection on my consistency. Grow up.You asked. I answered. Again you demonstrate that your demand was fake.

Mystery, the concept is simple. YOU need to define qualia sufficiently to be able to suggest a test that can distinguish between your qualia hypothesis and any alternative hypothesis. Your description of removing qualia one by one and seeing what happens is puerile and non-responsive. Couching in more psuedomathematical terms about limits is crank nonsense. Who just wrote "Your lack of comprehension is not a reflection on my consistency" as quoted above? Present an alternative hypothesis if you think I have presented a hypothesis. Then we might begin to formulate what you deny can be formulated.


ME

[BillHoyt]

Mystery,

Warning: this is my last response to you unless and until you demonstrate an IQ above that of a bag of roasted peanuts. The JREF forums are not here to entertain pimply-faced adolescent crank-trolls who just want to see how long they can keep stupid discussions going. Neither is it here to entertain asylum inmates who've broken into the institution's computer room. Your mission is to reply to this and continue replying in such a manner that I am no longer torn between those two explanations for your nonsense.

The next paragraph will also be directed to you, mystery. You are terribly confused about physics, an important point in my last post that you assiduously avoided. Matter and energy are two of the key constructs, not spin or momentum. You need to get straight that there must be a something in motion for spin to occur. There must also be a something moving to have momentum. Your photon question was similarly silly. You are reading this now only because, yes, you can see photons. If you really can't, then you are really blind; the point of my sardonic response that eluded you. And, finally, onto my "fake demands." You are on the JREF forum, sir, a skeptical forum. If you wish to defend immaterial qualia you are making an extraordinary claim. If you wish to make an extraordinary claim at JREF, you can expect challenges to said claim. You will be asked to back up your assertions. Each time this has happened to you here, you have danced away, playing insane games. Stop it now and answer the question. Your previous "answers" have been non-answers.

For the benefit of those who may be confused about how much of a non-starter mystery's principle answer was, I'll go into some detail here. First, my question for all the quale-heads out there was that they provide a test that, at least in principle, could distinguish between qualia (as something non-material, non-brain/body) and alternative, physical explanations. Some respondents took the path of claiming qualia are outside the magisterium of science. That's a nice, pat, quasi-religious stricture, and simply supports my contention that qualia are a dualist ruse deliberately designed so that dualists can always maintain their stance, even after science fully understands all aspects of the mind and clearly connects those aspects to brain and body. There will always be an England. There will always be qualia. Mystery, however, answered differently:

I suppose by evaluating the limit of consciousness as quale-content approaches zero
The first problem with this is that we already know this limit if we assume a qualia hypothesis. It is "lights out," zip, zero, nada. So we learned nothing. The second problem with this is, if we are trying to falsify the qualia hypothesis, how on earth would we know how to remove them, one by one? Qualia, according to various metaphysical-fog types have no home. They are ineffable, non material. Where would we find them to remove them? How? If we know where and how to remove them, then we must have tied them to something physical, and if so, by removing whatever the physical component is, we have utterly failed to distinguish between the qualia hypothesis and any "rooted in brain / body function" hypothesis.

Let's go to a similar, historically famous falsification experiment. "Aether" was an operating scientific hypothesis for quite a while. Scientists postulated that light waves needed a medium, just as sound waves and ocean waves do. The proposed medium was "aether," and it was assumed to be everywhere in the universe. That posed a problem: how do we falsify this, if we assume it is everywhere? How can we get away from it in order to see it? (Does this not sound like some poster's claims about the non-testability of "qualia?" Does this not sound like the juvenile question of how a fish can possibly know it is in the ocean?)

Michelson and Morley answered the dilemma with an experiement in 1887. They recognized that, if aether is real, then the sun and earth are passing through it at some rate of speed, producing an "aether wind." Meanwhile, the earth is orbiting the sun at a rate of 100,000 km / hour. They measured the speed of light at different times of the year, expecting to see speed differences. The light should be slower as it was trying to travel "upstream" in the "aether wind" and faster as it was trying to travel "downstream" in the wind.

The speeds measured were not different in spring, winter, fall or summer. There was no "aether wind," and, therefore, no "aether." That is falsification. Michelson and Morley derived a necessary conclusion from the hypothesis and, from that necessary conclusion, were able to distinguish between that hypothesis and alternative hypotheses.

We're several pages into this and have yet to get either a reasonable definition of how qualia are not rooted in the physical universe or a proposal to distinguish between this ghost-like/soul-like/anima- and animus-like "qualia" claim and the rational alternatives. We just get shucking and jiving and claims that qualia are necessarily outside the magisterium of science. We just get the very clear picture of qualia-as-dualist-ruse.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Atlas
A conscious receiver is the only material entity that operates on the invented conceptual qualia.

Even though the material world is replete with examples of energy or event storage...
Yeah, that would be game-set-match if everyone agrees that "material" is the correct word to describe what-is.


Human consciousness is not even enhanced by the utilization of the phenomenal or epiphenomenal qualia. For idealists, it is an added term that is done more because of an agenda than a critical analysis.
So true. It is a briar-patch provided by materialists to distance themselves from dualists. It's not associated with objective idealism.


Physicalism combined with science produces results. Follow immateriality where you will and you get nothing. For thousands of years we were thirsting in the desert and now have finally found a spring to slake our unquenchable thirst... some of you would have us go back to the empty glass of immateriality.

What would be gained?
As noted, empirical science provides the same answers to its questions if what-is is Objective and does not depend on assigning to what-is the essence of materiality as you (and Bill etal) appear to define it.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
... this is my last response to you unless and until you demonstrate an IQ above that of a bag of roasted peanuts.I recall one of the first replies to my original post on this forum referred to something in it as "dim".

As for seeing photons, I don't know much about Ryle's category mistakes but there seem to be several problems in this matter.

I reiterate my point about photons: They are not seen. As Bill has admitted that truth trumps order in this thread, and has presented no evidence to prove that photons are seen, I fail to see the point of taking this further with him.

BTW, all the handwringing in the world is unlikely to turn linear momentum into spin, Bill, as anyone who understands the vector cross-product understands. What is the spin-motion of a fermion anyway? Bill further shows his muddle by implying that everything is matter and energy, but then adding a category called "motion" - things are "in motion" according to Bill. "IN"? Which is it Bill?

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I suppose by evaluating the limit of consciousness as quale-content approaches zero
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first problem with this is that we already know this limit if we assume a qualia hypothesis. It is "lights out," zip, zero, nada. So we learned nothing.In math, it is possible to meaningfully evaluate y/x as x goes to zero in some cases (eg. (sin x)/x). If you insist on outright division by zero of course you have zip in the way of math ability, whether one thinks one-dimensionally or otherwise.

The second problem with this is, if we are trying to falsify the qualia hypothesis, how on earth would we know how to remove them, one by one?I'm still waiting for Bill's coherent relevant definition of "to falsify". First it applied to notions, then to "qualia", maybe to concepts, now to hypotheses. How does one falsify "photons", for instance?

Qualia, according to various metaphysical-fog types have no home.I guess I'm not one of those types, Bill. You can remove the majority of your visual qualia simply by closing your eyes as you suggested above, if you have eyes to close. That would be your method, not mine.


ME



http://www.nobeliefs.com/photon.htm

"Interestingly, Lewis did not consider photons as light or radiant energy but "as the carrier of radiant energy." To this day, physicists describe the photon the carrier of the electromagnetic force. This verbage of "carrier" and "radiation" imparts a dualistic nature to the subject which, curiously, rarely gets detailed mention in scientific articles."

edit - PS: "Michelson and Morley answered the dilemma with an experiement in 1887. ... The speeds measured were not different in spring, winter, fall or summer." This shows that the sun revolves around the earth independent of the seasons, right?

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by hammegk
[B]So true. It is a briar-patch provided by materialists to distance themselves from dualists. It's not associated with objective idealism. I've been wondering about those very issues. What if "redness" et al are not necessary but only it seems that way? What if just "beneath" qualia all the causal effects which lead to ordinary actions in the world based on sense organ inputs are taking place? Isn't that a genuine epiphenomenal consideration at this point, not a briar patch, which perhaps the OP poster was suggesting if obtusely?


ME

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Mr. E
I recall one of the first replies to my original post on this forum referred to something in it as "dim".
You're not getting much better.

As for seeing photons, I don't know much about Ryle's category mistakes but there seem to be several problems in this matter.

I reiterate my point about photons: They are not seen. As Bill has admitted that truth trumps order in this thread, and has presented no evidence to prove that photons are seen, I fail to see the point of taking this further with him.
Let's see: you're reading from a screen whose images consist of nothing but a stream of photons. From those photons, you see the words I wrote and respond to them. But you don't see photons, you demurr.

Evidence, please?

BTW, all the handwringing in the world is unlikely to turn linear momentum into spin, Bill, as anyone who understands the vector cross-product understands. What is the spin-motion of a fermion anyway? Bill further shows his muddle by implying that everything is matter and energy, but then adding a category called "motion" - things are "in motion" according to Bill. "IN"? Which is it Bill?
You're an a**. I didn't write anything about linear momentum being turned into spin.

In math, it is possible to meaningfully evaluate y/x as x goes to zero in some cases (eg. (sin x)/x). If you insist on outright division by zero of course you have zip in the way of math ability, whether one thinks one-dimensionally or otherwise.
This has nothing to do with anything being discussed here. You're a second-rate crank, sir.

I'm still waiting for Bill's coherent relevant definition of "to falsify". First it applied to notions, then to "qualia", maybe to concepts, now to hypotheses. How does one falsify "photons", for instance?
You can find the historically significant and classis experiments that falsified the various hypotheses leading to the characterization of photons. This is elementary physics.

I guess I'm not one of those types, Bill. You can remove the majority of your visual qualia simply by closing your eyes as you suggested above, if you have eyes to close. That would be your method, not mine.
You're a crank.


edit - PS: "Michelson and Morley answered the dilemma with an experiement in 1887. ... The speeds measured were not different in spring, winter, fall or summer." This shows that the sun revolves around the earth independent of the seasons, right?
You're a crank. You also failed to improve your posts as I previously described. Welcome to my ignore list, crank.

[davidsmith73]

How do you identify a physical process that gives rise to an experience as opposed to one that does not?

Originally posted by Dymanic
That is an interesting question. It gets me thinking about physical processes that do not give rise to experiences, despite demonstrable evidence that information was aquired through the senses, and perhaps even acted upon (such as in the split-brain patients). Clearly, different sensa produce different effects -- or, the same sensa produce different effects at different times. Crick and Koch stuck their necks out with the business about 40-hertz oscillations, but it's a long way from a satisfactory explanation.

Yes, the neurological disorders such as blindsight and split brain patients is interesting if one is approaching the issue of consciousness from the perspective of physical processes. However, I intended my question to provoke the immediately obvious relationship - one physical process is correlated with an experience, the other is not. Therefore, how is anexperience identified? It must be identified in order for a physical process to be correlated with it. What baffles me with regard to the arguments of Bill et al, is the lack of acknowlegement of the nature of what we are trying to explain. ie, experiences. I asked Bill what happens in this context when we stimulate the correct pathways, and his answer was that a memory is recalled. If you are going to say that then you have to have some conception of what an experience is. In this scenario, you cannot simply say it is the physical process because that would not distinguish the process from any other, as you have pointed out.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Welcome to my ignore list, crank.

My most heartfelt thanks!

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
"Science that contends its descriptions are of a reality that lies outside experience," sir, is nearly 100% of science. The bit of "science" excluded is considered "borderland" science with good reason.

You really need to look at the "axioms of science" that I've posted here several times over the past few years. "Objective, external reality" is axiomatic.

Yes, but is it a necessary axiom? Just because the majority of scientists take the axiom to be true, doesn't make it necessary.


No. Objective reality is axiomatic. It is considered axiomatic for two reasons: 1. Nothing in the past hundreds of years of science has compelling pointing to an alternative conclusion

Hang on, science can't use one of its axioms to conclude the existence of this axiom!
Quoting Bill's objection: "In the second, the poster sets out to prove X by assuming X"


and 2. We cannot yet find a test to falsify it.

You can't inprinciple falsify it because it's an axiom.



So now you claim that an experience is not an experience?

No. I have no idea where you got that from. Please explain


"Qualia" are a philosophical ruse devised to provide a No True Scotsman when the "hard problem" is solved. You've just demonstrated the ruse here by asking about experience, and then poo-pooing an example of it because it is rooted in the objective and not in a metaphysical fog.

I poo-pooed your example because you were not addressing the nature of the experience at all.


Is it seriously your contention that an experience of an event is not an experience?

No, I just pointed out that you have completely side-stepped the issue of the nature of an experience and instead given the conditions within which you are likely to have an experience.


you excite my brain cells and what happens .....?
Apparently nothing from the paltry quality of your argumentation thus far. For most people, however, a chain of neural associations is kicked off, recalling a memory or memories.

Ok so we are getting somewhere. Now, what is the nature of this memory you speak of? (Again, I urge you to answer this question)



Stop playing word games.

You are the one who used the word "magic" Bill. You should explain what yo mean by the term before you throw it about.


The core question here is obvious: is it brain function or not? Physical or not? If you claim it is not physical or in some other way special and outside science, you are claiming magic. Call it whatever you want, it ain't science, it ain't physical. Do you deny this? Or do you simply want to continue hiding behind words and not address the fact you cannot give us a means to falsify "qualia." Why can't you?

I find it interesting that you continue with the word "magic". In fact, I will call it what I want, I much prefer the term "experiential" to refer to the nature of experiences. And no, perhaps it aint science, but then again neither is assuming the existence of an objective reality, because that must come before science can function as a means of obtaining knowledge about such an objective reality. So you see, falsifying qualia is as meaningless as falsifying objective reality.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
What baffles me with regard to the arguments of Bill et al, is the lack of acknowlegement of the nature of what we are trying to explain. ie, experiences. I asked Bill what happens in this context when we stimulate the correct pathways, and his answer was that a memory is recalled. If you are going to say that then you have to have some conception of what an experience is. In this scenario, you cannot simply say it is the physical process because that would not distinguish the process from any other, as you have pointed out.
You're arguing for a "special nature." What evidence do you have for this?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
You're arguing for a "special nature." What evidence do you have for this?

Not evidence, just introspection combined with the incompatibility of the nature of experience with the notion of an objective physical reality.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
..... falsifying qualia is as meaningless as falsifying objective reality.
Well said. But most here won't "get it".

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Not evidence, just introspection combined with the incompatibility of the nature of experience with the notion of an objective physical reality.

None, then.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

Yes, the neurological disorders such as blindsight and split brain patients is interesting if one is approaching the issue of consciousness from the perspective of physical processes. However, I intended my question to provoke the immediately obvious relationship - one physical process is correlated with an experience, the other is not. It's beyond interesting. It's downright bizzare. Apparently, one experience is experienced, while another is not.

Therefore, how is an experience identified? Yes. What constitutes an experience; an observation; an awareness; an understanding? We don't need to ask if these things are special; it is trivially obvious that without them, mountains of information lie inert and useless (and we do not hesitate to point out where an opponent's thoughts are lacking in such 'special' properties).

What we really want to know is: are these in fact discrete events, and do the details regarding their occurrence involve 'special properties' -- this time meaning 'things not explainable by science'? Under this heading are two rather different categories: Things not yet understood, but which we anticipate understanding at some point in the future (e.g., what Popper referred to as: 'promissory materialism'), and things which, for fundamental reasons, must remain forever beyond the pale of science (are we simply expressing our frustration at this possibility when we refer to these as magic?).

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Dymanic
It's beyond interesting. It's downright bizzare. Apparently, one experience is experienced, while another is not.
No; both are experienced. Portions of the experience are inaccessible because of the brain lesions. This points to differing roles for differing portions of the brain.

What we really want to know is: are these in fact discrete events, and do the details regarding their occurrence involve 'special properties' -- this time meaning 'things not explainable by science'? Under this heading are two rather different categories: Things not yet understood, but which we anticipate understanding at some point in the future (e.g., what Popper referred to as: 'promissory materialism'), and things which, for fundamental reasons, must remain forever beyond the pale of science (are we simply expressing our frustration at this possibility when we refer to these as magic?).
The problem is this: there is no evidence for the "magic" conclusion. The "magic" conclusion is epistemologically indefensible, and represents in many respects an argument from ignorance. "Science doesn't yet know, therefore, I can make up crap." Indefensible.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

No; both are experienced. Portions of the experience are inaccessible because of the brain lesions. This points to differing roles for differing portions of the brain.But isn't accessibility the most fundamental requirement for what we refer to as experience? If my brain is doing things that I am not aware of (which seems to happen all the time, btw, despite my intact corpus callosum), is it doing that based on experiences which, though not globally accessible, are experiences nonetheless?
The problem is this: there is no evidence for the "magic" conclusionHow many currently widely held conclusions were without evidence fifty or a hundred years ago? What evidence do we have that there is nothing that is fundamentally beyond our grasp?
Science doesn't yet know, therefore, I can make up crap."And then test it. (Assuming that what is 'made up' has at least some basis in accepted fact) isn't that how science works?

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
You're not getting much better.Keep your eyes closed if you like.Let's see: you're reading from a screen whose images consist of nothing but a stream of photons. From those photons, you see the words I wrote and respond to them. But you don't see photons, you demurr.
Evidence, please? One doesn't see photons, Bill. One might see by means of photons. This distinction seems so obvious, pardon me for not treating you like a one-year old earlier. The term "to see" refers to visible experiences such as stop lights and speeding rabbits. Those are the category of seeable objects. Photons, per physics, don't fit into that category at all well, yet.

I didn't write anything about linear momentum being turned into spin. Right. I wrote correctly that the real objects of physics amounted to three things, one of which is spin, you replied with some silly misconstructions, and here we are.

This has nothing to do with anything being discussed here. You're a second-rate crank, sir.Thanks, I guess. It has everything to do with the notion of properly evaluating a limit in a meaningful way, what I wrote about and you keep referencing (the supposition that consciousness be evaluated in the limit as quale-content goes to zero).

You're a crank. You also failed to improve your posts as I previously described. Welcome to my ignore list, crank. Wow, four times in one post. And this from the one who said there were no rules here.


ME

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dymanic
It's beyond interesting. It's downright bizzare. Apparently, one experience is experienced, while another is not.

Do you not mean - one physical process is experienced while the other is not? (I'm putting my materialist hat on here). With blindsight, the issue is that information about the visual surroundings is processed and acted upon but is not experienced. In other words the physical processes involved in representing the visual field completely bypass involvement with consciousness and are processed "underneath". I would therefore say that blindsight is not going to give us any clues as to how to solve the hard problem.


What we really want to know is: are these in fact discrete events, and do the details regarding their occurrence involve 'special properties' -- this time meaning 'things not explainable by science'? Under this heading are two rather different categories: Things not yet understood, but which we anticipate understanding at some point in the future (e.g., what Popper referred to as: 'promissory materialism'), and things which, for fundamental reasons, must remain forever beyond the pale of science (are we simply expressing our frustration at this possibility when we refer to these as magic?).

I think the second category might be the more appropriate for experiences. However, its important to keep in mind that there are much more familiar assumptions that are made (perhaps not necessary) about the nature of reality that also precede the functioning of scientific knowledge, such as the existence of objective reality.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
No; both are experienced. Portions of the experience are inaccessible because of the brain lesions. This points to differing roles for differing portions of the brain.

I think you are confusing your terms. [meterialist hat on] In such neurological disorders such as visual neglect, we have the brain activity that gives rise to percepts on one side of the visual field and the brain activity that does not give rise to percepts on the other side .Both activities are processed and accessible to other modules such as the motor cortex in order for the patient to act upon such processed information. However only one brain activity is experienced. By definition, we assume that the patient is not conscious of one side of their visual field because they do not report experiencing it. What these disorders tell us is that consciousness can have access to unconsciously processed information. Unfortunately this can't tell us anything about the hard problem. It may be able to tell us a bit better where the correlates of conscious experience are located in the brain (eg, with the use of fMRI). [materialist hat off]


The problem is this: there is no evidence for the "magic" conclusion.

Nor is there evidence for the existence of objective reality, since it must be assumed in order for science to give us knowledge about such a reality

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Dymanic
But isn't accessibility the most fundamental requirement for what we refer to as experience? If my brain is doing things that I am not aware of (which seems to happen all the time, btw, despite my intact corpus callosum), is it doing that based on experiences which, though not globally accessible, are experiences nonetheless?
If there is nobody in the forest to hear the tree fall, did it make a sound? This is something for philosophers to puzzle over. I don't care if you or they want to artfully define things so that they don't exist. I care about reality. The reality of the tree is that we know the fall ends with a crash to the ground. We know that crash has to release energy in the form of sound waves. That is "sound" by a no-nonsense scientific definition.

The reality of "experience" is similar. Did Atilla not slaughter thousands? Did they not experience that? Did not others witness these slaughters? Are they all not now long dead? Does that mean nobody experienced Atilla's slaughters?

How about a dementia patient, who floats in and out of lucidity, one moment remembering key events in her life, the next looking with shock, horror and no recognition at her son? In that moment of horror, did she suddenly lose her experience of having had a son? The next moment, did she suddenly regain it? What about the other logical contradiction of her son having experienced his mom and the mom not having experienced her son? Do you really expect us to believe this definition of experience as completely dissociated from any physical events?
How many currently widely held conclusions were without evidence fifty or a hundred years ago? What evidence do we have that there is nothing that is fundamentally beyond our grasp?
So this gives us liberty to make crap up? And the liberty to define the crap in such a way that we declare it exempt from epistemology? This is nothing but the argument from ignorance fallacy!
And then test it. (Assuming that what is 'made up' has at least some basis in accepted fact) isn't that how science works?
"Basis in accepted fact" and "make crap up" have very little relationship. This was a pretty lame attempt to make a semantic shift.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I think you are confusing your terms. [meterialist hat on] In such neurological disorders such as visual neglect, we have the brain activity that gives rise to percepts on one side of the visual field and the brain activity that does not give rise to percepts on the other side .Both activities are processed and accessible to other modules such as the motor cortex in order for the patient to act upon such processed information. However only one brain activity is experienced. By definition, we assume that the patient is not conscious of one side of their visual field because they do not report experiencing it. What these disorders tell us is that consciousness can have access to unconsciously processed information. Unfortunately this can't tell us anything about the hard problem. It may be able to tell us a bit better where the correlates of conscious experience are located in the brain (eg, with the use of fMRI). [materialist hat off]
Surely you jest here. First of all, I have to ask which part of "differing roles for differing portions of the brain" you didn't understand? Also, I have to ask what you don't understand about the research clearly pointing to differing and conflicting experiences within the brain in many cases of brain lesions.


Nor is there evidence for the existence of objective reality, since it must be assumed in order for science to give us knowledge about such a reality
Surely you can do better than this tu quoque fallacy?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Surely you jest here. First of all, I have to ask which part of "differing roles for differing portions of the brain" you didn't understand? Also, I have to ask what you don't understand about the research clearly pointing to differing and conflicting experiences within the brain in many cases of brain lesions.


I understand the research just fine. By the way, we are talking about blindsight and visual neglect here. Why don't you point out where and how you think I have misunderstood? Or perhaps you know you were originally mistaken when you said that both unconsciously processed and consciously processed information is experienced in these individuals, which is clearly not the case.


Surely you can do better than this tu quoque fallacy?

Explain the fallacy

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

------------------------
If my brain is doing things that I am not aware of, is it doing that based on experiences which, though not globally accessible, are experiences nonetheless?
------------------------
If there is nobody in the forest to hear the tree fall, did it make a sound?... We know that crash has to release energy in the form of sound waves. That is "sound" by a no-nonsense scientific definition. The reality of "experience" is similar.Ok, so that's a "Yes". Experience is not dependent upon an experiencer. Observation is not dependent upon an observer. Or, maybe observer status does sort of wink on and off; maybe it is something that can be dynamically reallocated, residing now in this sub-process, now in that one. I am curious about how such a status might be described. The subject (or target) of an attentional mechanism? (I just made that up).
So this gives us liberty to make crap up?Yes, we are free to do that.
And the liberty to define the crap in such a way that we declare it exempt from epistemology? This is nothing but the argument from ignorance fallacy!I understand your frustration. An unfortunate consequence of freedom is the potential for misuse. But since I am not attempting to prop up any particular argument by employing this device, I plead not guilty. Like yourself, I provisionally accept materialism's promise to deliver the details at some future time, but I think it is important to avoid the excesses of the past. Science is primarily a series of corrected errors, but the one error that it keeps making over and over is its own infatuation with itself; the arrogance that seems almost inevitably to accompany the aquisition of knowledge, a voice whispering in our ears: "almost there now" -- when we really don't have a clue where we're going, how we'll get there, how long it will take, or even if there really is a 'there' there.
"Basis in accepted fact" and "make crap up" have very little relationship.I can't agree. Every accepted fact germinated in a field fertilized by somebody's made up crap. Time constraints alone force us to be somewhat ruthless in culling out ideas, but we should at least acknowledge that we are being ruthless.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Yes, we are free to do that.
You're free to be a fundamentalist megawooweaniest, too, and to believe we must all worship the Great Cosmic Weanie. You are also free to try to convert all the rest of us to megawooweanism. You are not free to insert these beliefs into rational discussion without providing solid evidence. You are certainly free to try, but we will be free to challenge the assertions.
I understand your frustration. An unfortunate consequence of freedom is the potential for misuse. But since I am not attempting to prop up any particular argument by employing this device, I plead not guilty. Like yourself, I provisionally accept materialism's promise to deliver the details at some future time, but I think it is important to avoid the excesses of the past. Science is primarily a series of corrected errors, but the one error that it keeps making over and over is its own infatuation with itself; the arrogance that seems almost inevitably to accompany the aquisition of knowledge, a voice whispering in our ears: "almost there now" -- when we really don't have a clue where we're going, how we'll get there, how long it will take, or even if there really is a 'there' there.
There was no frustration expressed there. I pointed out the fallacious reasoning. You seem to think that the argument from ignorance is not fallacious. You cannot reason "science doesn't know about x, therefore I claim x is ..." It is fallacious, no matter how you disguise it. Science is not primarily a series of corrected errors; it is primarily a series of successes with errors corrected along the way. Your distortion of the historical record is very telling.
I can't agree. Every accepted fact germinated in a field fertilized by somebody's made up crap. Time constraints alone force us to be somewhat ruthless in culling out ideas, but we should at least acknowledge that we are being ruthless.
More distortions. I hope you realize that the easy response to any universal assertion is to simply state a single contrary example? Shooting down "every accepted fact..." is like shooting fish in a barrel. And, finally, yes, scientists and skeptics are being ruthless in cutting up ideas that don't cut the mustard. You write this, though, as if you don't know that we recognize it, acknowledge it, and actually flaut it.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


You're free to be a fundamentalist megawooweaniest
[...]
but we will be free to challenge the assertions.
I don't disagree with any of that.
You seem to think that the argument from ignorance is not fallacious.
No, I agree that it is. I would remind you first: that I made no such argument, and second: it still doesn't mean that we can know everything.
Science is not primarily a series of corrected errors; it is primarily a series of successes with errors corrected along the way.Science is not a crystal chandelier hanging in the hall of truth, and the successes you speak of did not spring fully-formed into the world. They have no sacred status; they are themselves corrections of earlier errors (some of them rather embarassing).

Shooting down "every accepted fact..." is like shooting fish in a barrel.I don't agree, but I wasn't proposing to do that anyway. Your haste in making such assumptions (in fact your posting style in general) does suggest frustration, born (I presume) of... shall we say 'a plethora of creative ideas'. If that is the case, I can relate to that. My backup explanation is that it comes from just plain orneriness (which I deny relating to, even if everyone who knows me does claim to see it).
And, finally, yes, scientists and skeptics are being ruthless in cutting up ideas that don't cut the mustard.It's more than that. Many ideas are dismissed on sight, undissected. We do this not because it is the ideal way, but because it is the only practical way. But we have no perfect universal template for assessing truth value on sight; if any of what we reject contains truths which could only be found by sifting every grain, we're going to miss them. Our ruthlessness has a price.
You write this, though, as if you don't know that we recognize it, acknowledge it, and actually flaut it.Just checking.

[apoger]

Experience is not dependent upon an experiencer.

Reality is not dependent upon an experiencer.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by apoger
Reality is not dependent upon an experiencer.

If so, what can be said to exist if it has no experience (awareness, perhaps) of the surrounding universe?

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Dymanic
quote of BillHoyt:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Science is not primarily a series of corrected errors; it is primarily a series of successes with errors corrected along the way.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Science is not a crystal chandelier hanging in the hall of truth, and the successes you speak of did not spring fully-formed into the world. They have no sacred status; they are themselves corrections of earlier errors (some of them rather embarassing).

Science, conceived as a body of imperfect knowledge is rather different from Science as the process of acquiring knowledge. As the latter, a "series", BillHoyt is dead wrong. The perhaps not-so public record shows that many hypotheses are proposed, tested, and rejected for each great advance of scientific knowledge. This is a dilemma of consciousness that it must bridge both meanings, meaningfully. Relying on vague metaphor to do so is seldom productive of progress.


ME

[apoger]

If so, what can be said to exist if it has no experience (awareness, perhaps) of the surrounding universe?

If so, who can be said to propose irrelevant questions (hammegk, perhaps) of the surrounding posts?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by apoger
Reality is not dependent upon an experiencer.

If you make this assumption you create the hard problem of consciousness.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by jzs
You said: "I can probe your memory."



Goodbye, T'ai Chi. Even in a different guise, you're easy to spot as the a** you are. Welcome to my ignore list.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
If you make this assumption you create the hard problem of consciousness.

If you make the opposing assumption, you create the harder problem of logical contradictions in the universe.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Dymanic
I don't disagree with any of that.

No, I agree that it is. I would remind you first: that I made no such argument, and second: it still doesn't mean that we can know everything.
I'm not saying we know we can know everything. In fact, it is quite clear we can't when it comes to random processes, for example. Chaotic systems pose similar problems.

My point was that we can't make claims due to our ignorance. You began to step onto those shifting sands when you wrote: "How many currently widely held conclusions were without evidence fifty or a hundred years ago?" The rational response to that is "So what?" It is no cause for speculation-cum-assertion or speculation-cum-claim.
Science is not a crystal chandelier hanging in the hall of truth, and the successes you speak of did not spring fully-formed into the world.
Where did I write that they did?
They have no sacred status; they are themselves corrections of earlier errors (some of them rather embarassing).
You're confounding several different things here, as well as posing false dichotomies, and strawmanning what I wrote. Nothing in science has a sacred status. It is all provisional, and, yes, science proudly and boldly asserts that its processes are self-correcting.

I did not claim successful theories sprang fully formed. They are developed after the painstaking shedding of hypothesis after hypothesis. Sometimes, after the toppling of previous theories. In each and every case, however, two very important points need to be noted: 1) most of what went before was preserved, not tossed out and 2) the new knowledge was vetted through the same basic scientific processes.

It is with those two latter points that I am very comfortable in refuting your image of science not being a crystal chandelier hanging in the hall of truth. It most assuredly is. It most assuredly has earned its epistemological privilege.
I don't agree, but I wasn't proposing to do that anyway. Your haste in making such assumptions (in fact your posting style in general) does suggest frustration, born (I presume) of... shall we say 'a plethora of creative ideas'. If that is the case, I can relate to that. My backup explanation is that it comes from just plain orneriness (which I deny relating to, even if everyone who knows me does claim to see it).
I think you misunderstood my comment about shooting fish in a barrel; I was writing about how scientists shoot down one another's ideas and proposals.
It's more than that. Many ideas are dismissed on sight, undissected. We do this not because it is the ideal way, but because it is the only practical way. But we have no perfect universal template for assessing truth value on sight; if any of what we reject contains truths which could only be found by sifting every grain, we're going to miss them. Our ruthlessness has a price.
It is called Occam's razor, dynamic. And your portrayal of it missing several important points. 1) It is not done for fun. 2) It is not done without a sound basis. 3) It is done with a universal template, called, again, Occam's razor. 4) The price of the ruthlessness only seems high because you have not examined the price of wasting our time with stuff for which we have no evidence.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
If you make the opposing assumption, you create the harder problem of logical contradictions in the universe.

What kind of logical contradictions do you speak of?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
What kind of logical contradictions do you speak of?

If you assert that reality requires an experiencer, then:

o historical facts are no longer reality once the last eyewitness blinks out of existence,

o the dementia patient's "reality" is now in conflict with those around her whenever her lucidity lapses

o then comes right back around when she regains that lucidity.

With A and Not-A being simultaneously declared true, you have now created a logically impossible universe.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by apoger
If so, who can be said to propose irrelevant questions (hammegk, perhaps) of the surrounding posts?

Good, critical, thinking. If it flies past you at warp speed it must be irrelevant.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

I'm not saying we know we can know everything.

My point was that we can't make claims due to our ignorance. You began to step onto those shifting sands when you wrote: "How many currently widely held conclusions were without evidence fifty or a hundred years ago?"Without a doubt, your fallacy detector is calibrated to a very high degree of sensitivity, and having my thoughts tested by such an instrument is one reason I come here (I'd like to claim that it is the only reason, or at least the main reason, but it may be a bit more complicated than that). With such a sensitive instrument, however, the occasional false positive would not be unexpected, and I think that is the case here (...of course, I would).
...I am very comfortable in refuting your image of science not being a crystal chandelier hanging in the hall of truth. It most assuredly is. I'd be more inclined to go with Sagan's candle metaphor myself, but your points are well taken. I don't see enough difference in our respective positions to justify arguing it any further here.
I think you misunderstood my comment about shooting fish in a barrel;You're right. I did.
The price of the ruthlessness only seems high because you have not examined the price of wasting our time with stuff for which we have no evidence.I have, though. I find it high as well -- higher, in fact, than being ruthless. I think we're pretty much in agreement on this.

[T'ai Chi]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Goodbye, T'ai Chi. Even in a different guise, you're easy to spot as the a** you are. Welcome to my ignore list.

This is the Critical Thinking forum Bill. Tough questions get asked. People are requested to back up their claims when they make them. Therefore I'll repeat what you avoided answering:

You said: "I can probe your memory."

I said: "Could you explain how you plan on doing that?"

You: posted a link to that site

I: looked at that site, which cleary says the data for claims of probing memory is of poor quality

From the page:
(underline mine)


Firstly, the numbers are not impressive: in only 40 out of 1,132 cases did he find any memory recovery; excluding patients who heard only music or voices and those whose responses were too vague to classify, less than 3% of the patients experienced the "lifelike memories" for which Penfield's work is so famous.


and


Secondly, there was no attempt to check the veracity of the memories, and the patient protocols read like reconstructions, heavily based on inferences.


So, again, how does this back up your claim of being able to probe memory?

Just provide your explanation please, or provide additional data, without name calling, if you are able.

(also PM'd to Bill)

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Dymanic re BillHoyt
Without a doubt, your fallacy detector is calibrated to a very high degree of sensitivity, and having my thoughts tested by such an instrument is one reason I come here (I'd like to claim that it is the only reason, or at least the main reason, but it may be a bit more complicated than that). With such a sensitive instrument, however, the occasional false positive would not be unexpected, and I think that is the case here (...of course, I would).That was, um, polite, I guess. I know this "I" was amused to read it and then decided it warranted framing.

ME

[BillHoyt]

T'ai Chi/Whodini/Sherlock Holmes/jzs -

You've been put on ignore. Any other of your sock puppets I identify will also be put on ignore.

[CFLarsen]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
T'ai Chi/Whodini/Sherlock Holmes/jzs -

You've been put on ignore. Any other of your sock puppets I identify will also be put on ignore.

Sock puppets are against the rules:
7. You may only have one membership account. Multiple accounts (sock puppets) are not permitted.
Source (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&threadid=42936)

jzs,

Are you T'ai Chi/Whodini? Yes or no, please.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by CFLarsen
Sock puppets are against the rules:
jzs,
Are you T'ai Chi/Whodini? Yes or no, please. Why is that post appearing in this thread? Is there some evidence of sock-puppet behavior in the past few pages besides an apparently baseless accusation?


ME

[Question]

Into.

[T'ai Chi]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
T'ai Chi/Whodini/Sherlock Holmes/jzs -

You've been put on ignore. Any other of your sock puppets I identify will also be put on ignore.

You are attempting to shift the focus, which will not be honored.

This is the Critical Thinking forum and the issue is you made a claim. Basically you have not addressed the question regarding the poor data your presented for evidence of your claim. If you cannot, or don't want to, then that's fine. If you actually have evidence for being able to probe memory, then please present it.

As far as "ignoring", one can track to see if PM's are read by the recipient..

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Without a doubt, your fallacy detector is calibrated to a very high degree of sensitivity, and having my thoughts tested by such an instrument is one reason I come here (I'd like to claim that it is the only reason, or at least the main reason, but it may be a bit more complicated than that). With such a sensitive instrument, however, the occasional false positive would not be unexpected, and I think that is the case here (...of course, I would).
If you wish to claim a false positive, then please provide us more details on where you think you were going with your comments on science, errors and the incompleteness of science's knowledge.
I'd be more inclined to go with Sagan's candle metaphor myself, but your points are well taken. I don't see enough difference in our respective positions to justify arguing it any further here.
The point I'm making, and that was made by Sagan, is that the way to correct errors or to gain more knowledge of the universe is not to assume it or baldly assert it, but to run it through the same processes that have gotten us thus far. The processes of scientific inquiry, falsification, and intersubjective validation continue to prove themselves.

[hammegk]

Reductionism 1 Life 0

~Life seems to stop studies of human consciousness, too! Ain't Science grand?

Any volunteers (as guinea pigs) to assist reductionists in their study of "consciousness"?

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

If you wish to claim a false positive, then please provide us more details on where you think you were going with your comments on science, errors and the incompleteness of science's knowledge.
Guilty until proven innocent, eh?

"If you ain't a burglar, then where you goin' with that crowbar, boy?"

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Guilty until proven innocent, eh?

"If you ain't a burglar, then where you goin' with that crowbar, boy?"

Uh, no, Dynamic. The question was rhetorical. The answer is: there is no place to go with it except to the ad ignorantium fallacy.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by ByllHoit


Uh, no, Dynamic. The question was rhetorical. The answer is: there is no place to go with it except to the ad ignorantium fallacy.You may be able to persuade me that this is the case. Here is my present position:

Where fundamental limits to knowledge exist, we stand to gain, not lose, from identifying them. Heisenberg uncertainty and Gödelian incompleteness are two examples of specific descriptions of such limits. There may be others yet unidentified. The proper application of these tools is something which must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; their mere possession does not constitute prima facie evidence of intent to use them to argue from ignorance.

[CFLarsen]

jzs,

Are you T'ai Chi/Whodini? Yes or no, please.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Dymanic
You may be able to persuade me that this is the case. Here is my present position:

Where fundamental limits to knowledge exist, we stand to gain, not lose, from identifying them. Heisenberg uncertainty and Gödelian incompleteness are two examples of specific descriptions of such limits. There may be others yet unidentified. The proper application of these tools is something which must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; their mere possession does not constitute prima facie evidence of intent to use them to argue from ignorance.
The last sentence is the one where I see the problem again. First of all, I diid not assert anything about the "mere possession ot the 'tools.' The set up certainly is not the knowledge that there are things we don't yet know or even that there are things that we think we cannot know. The set up is to begin to argue for just about anything as a conclusion of that ignorance.ample:

If you were to say "we don't know whether we descended from Neanderthals or not, therefore we should invest more research funds on the issue," you would be making a reasonable and rational case.

Likewise, if you were to say "we don't know whether we descended from Neanderthals or not, and we have already spent $27m trying to find out, therefore we should not throw any more research funds down this black hole," you might also be making a reasonable and rational case.

If, on the other hand, you were to say "we don't know whether we descended from Neanderthals or not, therefore we must teach our children that the Old Testament's explanation is a viable, scientific one," you're engaging in the "Goddidit" thinking so often seen in Creationists. ("Goddidit" is nothing but the argument from ignorance.)

Transfer this to consciousness now, and say "we don't know how it is we are conscious, therefore there must be something immaterial involved." Why? There is no logic here. There is no epistemology here. Have we really exhausted material possibilities? One can hardly make a case for that. Is there any other real evidence in any other field of inquiry that supports such a conclusion? No. None. In fact, every line of inquiry in science for hundreds of years has continued to support a material universe. But suddenly we are to take this bizarre leap of faith and return to an anima/animus type of explanation? There's no support for it other than the beginning assertion: we don't know.

I don't know that you aren't actually George Bush. Wouldn't you and every reader of this forum mock the conclusion that you are? Why? You could be. The problem is, we know from everything else that we know we know that this is a highly unlikely conclusion. If we were totally ignorant of George Bush, but somewhat informed about basic probility and the earth's population, we must also laugh at that conclusion. There's no basis for it; it simply tries to leverage off ignorance.

So back to your previous post:
How many currently widely held conclusions were without evidence fifty or a hundred years ago?
Regardless of how many there may be, there were far far more wrong hypotheses that had to be tested before we could reach those new conclusions. Nearly each one was proposed tentatively. Most, nearly privately. Each with basis in fact, combined with some creative insight.

Let's take the biphospholipid basis of the cell's membrane. It was a bold hypothesis that would explain much that was then unknown about how cell walls worked. Was the original hypothesis based on bizarre speculation? No, it was based on a careful piecing together of research over time. It began in the thirties, when phospholipid behavior on water was first tested. We knew then that phospholipids were in the membrane and it was a natural test to se whether or not they could hold together a membrane. It worked. One problem: the surface tension was way too high. In the 50s biphosopholipid model was proposed. The research supported the model except that electron micrographs showed spaces that the model wouldn't predict. Back to the grind, and that grinding revealed embedded proteins, which would explain the spaces that the simpler model wouldn't explain.

Each step was painstakingly slow, with years in between steps. Each step was built by a small "what if" based on solid knowledge and a small part of the question. Each "what if" was based on knowledge from another area and asking if that operated here.

Simply jumping from "we don't know" to "therefore" gets nowhere. This is the fallacy; there is no basis for the therefore. And this is distinctly different from what happens in science. In science, we look at the materials we know that are in the body and ask "what combination, what processes, what interconnections are we missing in our quest to uncover the secrets of consciousness." Not "well, we don't know, so its a hard problem, so its probably fallen angels."

What evidence do we have that there is nothing that is fundamentally beyond our grasp?

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by hammegk
Reductionism 1 Life 0What is that supposed to mean?

~Life seems to stop studies of human consciousness, too! Ain't Science grand?What are those supposed to mean?

Any volunteers (as guinea pigs) to assist reductionists in their study of "consciousness"? Been there, done that.

Got warp speed?

ME

[T'ai Chi]

Originally posted by CFLarsen
jzs,

Are you T'ai Chi/Whodini? Yes or no, please.


10/21/2004


Dear Mr. Larsen,

I have reviewed your off-topic post and I regret to inform you that I will only focus on issues of science and data. Please accept my best wishes for success in your search.

Sincerely,

jzs

[Dymanic]

Bill,

I appreciate you taking the time. I do have more thoughts on this, but am having a hard time finding a graceful way to link them to this thread's (purported) topic, and I'm afraid we may start getting complaints about the derail. It might make a decent thread in itself, and I might be inclined to start one after I have given it more thought. For the present, please consider my position on 'the limits of science' to be 'under review'.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Mr. E
What is that supposed to mean?

What are those supposed to mean?

Got warp speed?

ME

Yeah, those are a bit on the obtuse side.

Such is life -- choices, choices -- although that's no problem for materialists; all processes (including consciousness) are just random and/or algorithymic.

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by hammegk
Such is life -- choices, choices -- although that's no problem for materialists; all processes (including consciousness) are just random and/or algorithymic. Materialists, in your view, have (or expect to have) full explanations for process but not the states which give anything meaning, such as the state of being conscious. "algorithymic"? What dialect is that from? Looks like a jazz pun on something perhaps like an appendix.


ME

[hammegk]

Wooops. I thought that looked funny....

How about "algorithmic"?


And no, I don't think materialists have -- or will ever have -- "full explanations for process" if that process leads to "life"; forget about "the states which give anything meaning".

[JAK]

Originally posted by Dancing David
I will argue that it doesn't exist. It is a rubric under which many other things are attributed.
Forgive me, I have read many entries, but not all. (And, being a newbie, I haven't figured out how to do a search on a single thread. Any help would be appreciated.)

"Existence" of anything typically results in "a name for it" - even if we are mistaken about what "it" is (as Dancing David postulates). From what I have read so far, much of the discussion involves what consciousness includes.

Has there been any discussion clarifying what consciousness "is not?" In other words, is there "consciousness" during a comatose state? Is there consciousness during deep sleep (delta and theta waves - not REM sleep)? If consciousness does not include coma or deep sleep, does consciousness spring forth immediately upon the end of sleep or coma? In other words, can consciousness be separated from our "waking state"?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by JAK

Has there been any discussion clarifying what consciousness "is not?" In other words, is there "consciousness" during a comatose state? Is there consciousness during deep sleep (delta and theta waves - not REM sleep)? If consciousness does not include coma or deep sleep, does consciousness spring forth immediately upon the end of sleep or coma? In other words, can consciousness be separated from our "waking state"?
At this point you have as an Axiom "human consciousness exists" and are asking what is "human consciousness". Nothing wrong with that, but imnsho, it has zilch to do with the Question "What is consciousness?'.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by JAK
Has there been any discussion clarifying what consciousness "is not?" In other words, is there "consciousness" during a comatose state? Is there consciousness during deep sleep (delta and theta waves - not REM sleep)? If consciousness does not include coma or deep sleep, does consciousness spring forth immediately upon the end of sleep or coma? In other words, can consciousness be separated from our "waking state"? This discussion has probably touched on that JAK. My thumbnail sketch would likely not be the next man's. But, at the risk of opening up this can of worms anew, I would say that there exists a seamless integration of Awareness (via sensation), processing and feedback (memory recall and storage), and will (conscious force moving the body to act.)

Where this integration is not apparent, neither is the estimation of consciousness.

My friend, the cryptic Hammegk, has a concept that seems quite near but continues to escape me. I believe for him existence and consciousness are bound. His take on the coma victim might be illustrative. Care to set me straight once more Hamme?

[JAK]

Originally posted by hammegk
At this point you have as an Axiom "human consciousness exists" and are asking what is "human consciousness". Nothing wrong with that, but imnsho, it has zilch to do with the Question "What is consciousness?'.

If I understand correctly, there is a superset of all things with "consciousness. " Within that, there is a subset of "human consciousness." The latter is the point of discussion and what is being defined, right?

Regarding "human consciousness," there are a couple of quick psychological "parlor tricks" showing that vision is a digital construction in the mind. Would that be of some use to the discussion?

Next, if "human consciousness" can be shown to be tied to an external control system (sympathetic nervous system) of the human organism, and if "sleep/coma" can be shown to be tied to an internal control system (parasympathetic nervous system), would that benefit the discussion?

[hammegk]

The OP:

Define Consiousness

I will argue that it doesn't exist. It is a rubric under which many other things are attributed.

Does not say anything in particular about human consciousness.


Indeed, I contend that "consciousness" is awareness of the surroundings and the ability to react (and assuming free will exists, act) with regards to those surroundings.


Atlas: Is a comatose human more conscious than an animal, a plant, a bacterium, a virus, a quark? How about a human that isn't comatose?

If the only question is "can human consciousness be demonstrated without a perceived-human-body in working condition", the answer is "not to date by empirical science". Now what?

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
Atlas: Is a comatose human more conscious than an animal, a plant, a bacterium, a virus, a quark? How about a human that isn't comatose?

If the only question is "can human consciousness be demonstrated without a perceived-human-body in working condition", the answer is "not to date by empirical science". Now what? I think animals and humans have the same consciousness. Humans have more options in learning, like language and math skills and perhaps better memories.

A comatose human is without consciousness as I perceive it... a seamless intergration including volition. So even if there is some kind of awareness going on it is UN-conscious.

I think a perceived human body in working condition is required for human consciousness.

What about the relationship of cosciousness and existence?

[JAK]

Originally posted by Atlas
...
What about the relationship of cosciousness and existence? [/B]
I'm not sure I understand your question. Consciousness is a subset of that which exists, but I don't think that's what you meant. Regarding coma, some who have been in a coma for years eventually return (at least in part) to consciousness. That seems, perhaps, more pertinent to your question. Yet, that would seem to lead to "sleep" - do we lose "existence" during sleep episodes? Please frame your question again. Thanks.


Originally posted by hammegk

...
Indeed, I contend that "consciousness" is awareness of the surroundings and the ability to react (and assuming free will exists, act) with regards to those surroundings.


Atlas: Is a comatose human more conscious than an animal, a plant, a bacterium, a virus, a quark? How about a human that isn't comatose?

If the only question is "can human consciousness be demonstrated without a perceived-human-body in working condition", the answer is "not to date by empirical science". Now what?
I agree with Hammegk.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by JAK
I'm not sure I understand your question. Consciousness is a subset of that which exists, but I don't think that's what you meant. Regarding coma, some who have been in a coma for years eventually return (at least in part) to consciousness. That seems, perhaps, more pertinent to your question. Yet, that would seem to lead to "sleep" - do we lose "existence" during sleep episodes? Please frame your question again. Thanks.

I agree with Hammegk. I agree with alot that Hamme says too. But then I find that I am often dancing on the edge of his meaning. I always wish for more from the guy, his posts are terse and cryptic to me. I think he understands a lot more about philosophy than I do but his posts often leave me wondering about double meanings.

My question about existence and consciousness is one of the troublesome areas that Hammegk has led me into. He is an Objective Idealist which I think is much saner than a Subjective Idealist. And I like the term much more than dualist, which we both think is wrongheaded. Unfortunately for me, I can't say for certain that I am not a dualist. I want to be a materialist or a physicalist but I slipup easily. I am an idealist by nature.

Anyway, a big question is whether existence became conscious or whether consciousness was first and existence sprang from it.
Kind of a chicken and egg thing.

Materialists believe (and this is my description) that matter does wonderful things on it's own. It came together and formed the stars, lighting the heavens. It then formed the planets and in another coming together, came alive. In a third great coming together it became conscious.

I think Hammegk has this another way. Consciousness is the fundamental. Matter can contain it, but matter is not necessary to it.

I don't like putting words into his mouth because I readily admit I'm not sure how it all fits into his philosophy, but that's my take.

On another point, I wondered about the comatose individual. Does existence cease without consciousness? My answer is no. I believe the universe is made of dumb matter without an underlying consciousness and consciousness is an emergent aspect of matter like solar energy, unbelievebly unexpected and very very bright. Existence was here for billions of years before consciousness and will be here for billions after consciousness subsides.

It's here I get tangled up. I take it just as axiomatically that for this consciousness, what is existence ceases to be when I cease to be. I'm thinking death here but I can expand it to coma and even nondreaming sleep.

That is, for *I* existence is what is apprehended, consumed, distributed, acted through... All that concludes in the absence of *I*, of local consciousness.

(edit: That is, I seem to have 2 definitions of existence... that which is... and that which is experienced. )

Ok, JAK... is that any better? Where do you stand?

[JAK]

Originally posted by Atlas
...
Ok, JAK... is that any better? Where do you stand?

Blaise Pascal once said, "You may not believe in God, but what if you are wrong?"

There are many experiences in my life that could be explained as either spiritual or the workings of time, space, and matter. In the "spirit" of science, I doggedly and expectantly look for how time, space, and matter have done everything. Yet, in the end, I hope I'm wrong.

I do not believe in dualism for the reasons that Hammegk noted - the communication between a spirit (God, higher self, etc.) and one of us incarnate creatures requires a transmission of energy between the two. Essentially, the spirit would then have to be part of our universe and be a form of energy.

I am hoping we have more to learn about electro-magnetism and other forces of the universe. And though it is, perhaps, a "long shot," I am hoping that God (or at least an after-life) might still be there in that new knowledge.

So, I don't know if I'm an idealist in materialist clothing, or just a bit "touched."

[Atlas]

Originally posted by JAK
Blaise Pascal once said, "You may not believe in God, but what if you are wrong?"
~snip~
So, I don't know if I'm an idealist in materialist clothing, or just a bit "touched." You'll like it around here JAK. The exchanges with other posters will solidify those notions of yourself. (I hope you don't find that you're "tetched".) And there are several posters that maintain spiritual ideals and lives. They are a minority but you've already no doubt guessed that.

I came out of Christianity myself. I wish Pascal had organized his wager around a generic god rather than the Judeo-Christian God of Hell. That was the big flaw for me from him.

After Christianity and dabblings in Buddhism I just started to ponder what I meant by God. I started to realize that the Christian God was as small-minded and petty as any of the ancient Greek, Norse or Roman gods. My God had to be bigger - bigger than big... I got to where I was telling pushy Christians, "My God CONTAINS your God."

I still love that line. (Didn't make me any friends though.)

Now I've gone in another direction. Now I'm telling folks, "God is a feeling." I've expanded that thought in several posts on various threads. I don't have much support but not many attacks either.

I love to read how these other people think about the issues I have always felt were important to figure out. Some of their ideas are brilliant and really challenging. Your own positions will shift, clarify and solidify in exchanges with them.

Welcome to the forum.

(edit: By the way - if you haven't already come across them you might enjoy reading some of the weird threads by Interesting Ian (Subjective Idealist) and Lifegazer (A kind of Solipsist). ) You'll find them both infuriating.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

What is consciousness?



watch



here



hey! pay attention




There you are! THAT is consiousness!

[hammegk]

Agreed.

[fenster]

Good evening, all- I've just joined the Society as well as this forum and I can see I have much to learn- there are some very interesting threads on the site and I hope you are patient with me.
On consciousness- which seems to have a subjective definition- I am reminded of Dostoyevsky: "Excessive consciousness is a disease"....as well as "the consciousness of life is higher than life itself"; I believe that there are varying levels of consciousness within humans. And perhaps this is silly, but I sometimes correllate consciousness with shame.

[JAK]

Originally posted by fenster
Good evening, all- I've just joined the Society as well as this forum and I can see I have much to learn- there are some very interesting threads on the site and I hope you are patient with me.
On consciousness- which seems to have a subjective definition- I am reminded of Dostoyevsky: "Excessive consciousness is a disease"....as well as "the consciousness of life is higher than life itself"; I believe that there are varying levels of consciousness within humans. And perhaps this is silly, but I sometimes correllate consciousness with shame.
In general, consciousness appears to be a defensive mechanism. J. Allen Hobson reports that prolonged consciousness is fatal to rats. Plus, it appears that consciousness is tied to the sympathetic nervous system (fight or flight), so your correlation of consciousness with "shame" may not be far off. Yet, I would only accept it as one of many correlations.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by fenster
Good evening, all- I've just joined the Society as well as this forum and I can see I have much to learn- there are some very interesting threads on the site and I hope you are patient with me.
On consciousness- which seems to have a subjective definition- I am reminded of Dostoyevsky: "Excessive consciousness is a disease"....as well as "the consciousness of life is higher than life itself"; I believe that there are varying levels of consciousness within humans. And perhaps this is silly, but I sometimes correllate consciousness with shame. Good thoughts, fenster. Welcome to the forum. I think this thread has been worked to death. The ideas of consciousness that we have is something that pops up in some measure in quite a few threads though.

I wouldn't mind exploring the nature of shame. Is it learned, is it an evolutionary trait? Is it something that only God could have put in us? That kind of thing.

Why don't you open a new thread and ask the community for it's ideas on the physiological, psychological and religious underpinnings or implications of shame. Or how it has changed someone''s life. I'm not a parent so I've never really seen it weilded as a punishment tool but I've been made to feel it. It seems like it can easily be communicated or transmitted to others. We often link it to guilt but is it different.

Anyway, there are a few different angles one could take on the subject. Depending on the slant identical subjects draw different numbers of responses. As a newby you have to start your first thread sometime. This might be a good topic of interest that will let you meet some of the other posters, idea to idea.

Again, Welcome to the forum.

[JAK]

Originally posted by Atlas
Good thoughts, fenster. Welcome to the forum. I think this

Again, Welcome to the forum.
Fenster, Atlas is one of the "friendlies" around here. Please compare my reply and his reply. You will readily recognize that he will be the better role model.

BTW, welcome ;-)

[fenster]

Thank you for the welcome, guys; Atlas- you're welcome to start a thread re:shame; you've asked the same questions I always ask- is it learned? is it one of the few things (along with consciousness) which differentiates us from all other living things? If it is a selected for trait, how could this have advantaged an individual within a population..... yes- it's a can o'worms. Thanks again, guys.

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by hammegk


Indeed, I contend that "consciousness" is awareness of the surroundings and the ability to react (and assuming free will exists, act) with regards to those surroundings.


And this would fit with my point that consciousness is a series of processes or behaviors. But I may be wrong.

[hammegk]

Back to II's question: On close examination, what is a rock, other than processes and behaviors?

Or should we ask, what is processing and behaving?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I still think my answer is the best... :clap:

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
I still think my answer is the best... :clap: It's answers like that that made even Buddhist monks tell one another, "If you meet the Buddha - kill him."

[hammegk]

Is there not just a single destination?

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
Is there not just a single destination? Yes, but no one really wants to go there.

[hammegk]

Facts not in evidence.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
Facts not in evidence. Nevertheless, living organisms behave as if they contain a powerful impulse to survive. That can be overcome. Deep depression, a mind sickness, overcomes it. And self sacrifice for "that which deserves to live" - ones own children or an idealistic vision like "America" or "the human race".

There are some who embrace it to ride the next comet out of here but they seem to have bought an idea that they are cheating it somehow.

So while I may not present facts as evidence, I do offer those observations. It is certainly not something that we choose to hurry toward - by "we" I mean an extreme majority.

[hammegk]

Hmm. You seem to know what the destination is ... best I can do is walk the path.

[Atlas]

Well, we must all walk the path.... it's the best any of us can do.

But you seem to "know" quite a bit yourself. The question you asked was, I expect, rhetorical - the type of questions that I love to answer, by the way. Is there not just a single destination?

As a reformed, or disillusioned, idealist - I do not see a destination beyond the grave. You seem to, but you don't go into much detail. Since you do not, what makes you think there are not the bi-polar destinations of a Christian type religion.

Even Hades had its Elysian Fields.

[hammegk]

Monism and multiple (or at least bi-polar) destinations ... interesting concept.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
Monism and multiple (or at least bi-polar) destinations ... interesting concept. It is, isn't it? And it seems to prevail in monistic religions that do not use reincarnation as a perfecting mechanism.

For some reason, probably a business reason, major religions posit a monism made from two opposing gods. That seems to be what most people buy into. I suppose people just don't want to think of their deity afflicted with schizophrenia, so they adopt a idealism of opposites for the after death world that mirrors the world of opposites they are immersed in before death.

How do you see it?

[hammegk]

I see I need to think a bit about what's been said. Thanks.

[JAK]

Originally posted by Atlas

...
As a reformed, or disillusioned, idealist - I do not see a destination beyond the grave.
...

I don't think I'm ready to chuck the idea of an afterlife. There still is a shred of hope in an area Interesting Ian presented in a different thread. He posited that the brain is effectively a receiver set. Some research supports the view that some communication within the brain is through various waves. Further, these waves can be measured outside of the skull (neurofeedback technology).

If science has a weakness, it is within the subtle nuances of nature. With Chaos theory, we have found that such subtleties can be critical factors. If God exists, in whatever form, he is much more likely to exist as a subtle nuance than a "big, brass band."

Moreover, our relation to "spirit" may be similar to Houston and the Mars rovers. The rovers must have a minimum amount of intelligence to survive. Periodically, the rovers upload data to Earth and download new software. A "spirit/body" may be similiarly aligned. The data transmission might be very weak and only occur during sleep (or meditation). Plus, these transmissions could very well be intelligently monitored and controlled by "spirit." If scientists attempt to measure such transmissions, "spirit" could purposely stop transmitting or receiving, thus, denying their observation and measurement.

And IF a "spirit" exists for each of us, it may effectively habitate the same "physical" space. So all transmissions may appear to occur internal to the brain.

These questions are very difficult (or impossible) to substantiate or refute. And until we can refute them, it is not rational to discard them.

Even without Interesting Ian's approach, other scenarios can be readily presented which are beyond science's ability to test and measure. With the limitations of science, I believe it is much too early to declare that there is no afterlife.

IMO, the only truly scientific and rational approach is to keep an open mind.

Further, after studying the mind and emotions for over thirty years, it appears to me that our physical health may benefit from adopting a philosophy which at least allows for the existence of an afterlife whether it is true or not.

Atlas, I am reaching out from a boat of idealism to one who seems to have fallen overboard. One day this boat may sink and we may all be gone, but for now, some of us staunchly work to keep it afloat. I entreat you to climb aboard again.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by JAK
Atlas, I am reaching out from a boat of idealism to one who seems to have fallen overboard. One day this boat may sink and we may all be gone, but for now, some of us staunchly work to keep it afloat. I entreat you to climb aboard again. Hi JAK,

I'm outside the boat of idealism, that's true. But I have not sunk myself into the waters of materialism. I'm kinda walking on the water though.

My real philosophy is one that is very idealistic. I haven't completely closed off the idea of an afterlife, but I've moved to the grave as the most likely outcome.

I cannot see any reason besides speciesism that suggests I deserve an afterlife but spiders and mosquitos do not. That which lives and dies deserves life or it doesn't.

My idea of soul is slightly more abstract than a religionist's. I possess a soul transcendent in that ability it has to appreciate what it apprehends. Rocks cannot do that.

Humans do appreciate what they apprehend to a more refined degree than other species. They express that refinement in art, architecture, and their own musings on the universe - but what about that delivers the attribute of eternality on the soul - the fact that we have developed a concept of it?

When I was a Christian I had a concept of an afterlife that lingered beyond my exit from the faith. Since coming to this forum I've tried to look at the whole question again.

I believe that maintaining an idealism is a good thing. I want to be honest with myself as to what is really true about the soul of "me". I support some of the idealists on these boards, with the exception of Iacchus, lifegazer, Interesting Ian and Hammegk.

The first 2 are not open to outside opinion, II is difficult as an individual but he seems a lot deeper. I just naturally find myself on the other side in most discussions with him. Hamme is different. I like him and enjoy the give and take. But he's often cryptic - in a positive way. Iacchus is too but not to further any discussion, more to obfuscate.

I think there has to be some of the cryptic or inexactness to an Idealist's explanation. The soul responds to poetry when science has no answers. Perhaps if I knew more philosophy I wouldn't find Hamme cryptic. Anyway, to me these are the 4 that I stand in opposition to - all for different reasons. I can learn things from II and Hamme but I don't feel that way about Iacchus and lifegazer.

So don't give up on me JAK. I appreciate the nice things you say about me. And I appreciate that your philosophy gives you a positive outlook on life. That is definitely something to treasure, and for that reason I won't stray too far from the boat myself.

[hammegk]

Not knowing where I stand, yet opposing my stance, is an odd juxtaposition.

BTW, my earlier comment on 'monism' has no link I'm aware of to any monastic religion -- or any organized religion as I understand them. I may well be wrong of course.

Afterlife. No ego death? Or what?


You said "I possess a soul transcendent in that ability it has to appreciate what it apprehends. Rocks cannot do that.

Humans do appreciate what they apprehend to a more refined degree than other species."

I find that an interesting contention in that I have no idea of what Rocks do, or do not. As to transcendence and refined apprehension of "life", anthropomorphism would so imply.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
Not knowing where I stand, yet opposing my stance, is an odd juxtaposition.You are unique for me on the board. I've tried a couple approaches to draw you out, but you hold your cards close. So I find I am opposing you without knowing, as you say, where you stand. But it's because I get more out of the exchange that way. If you were a bit more loquacious or if I understood the significance of some of your references things might be different. I don't know though, I'd still have to be persuaded on objective idealism.BTW, my earlier comment on 'monism' has no link I'm aware of to any monastic religion -- or any organized religion as I understand them. I may well be wrong of course.You are not wrong. You said, "Monism and multiple (or at least bi-polar) destinations ... interesting concept." I brought up religious Monism as an example in support of the strangeness - while making the point that it's a strange Monism that requires 2 Gods (Good and Evil).
Afterlife. No ego death? Or what?I'm not sure what you're asking here. But the ego in Christian afterlife seems punished in both directions. In heaven it is lost in adoration and in hell it is burned and burned.
You said "I possess a soul transcendent in that ability it has to appreciate what it apprehends. Rocks cannot do that.

Humans do appreciate what they apprehend to a more refined degree than other species."

I find that an interesting contention in that I have no idea of what Rocks do, or do not. As to transcendence and refined apprehension of "life", anthropomorphism would so imply. You say that you have no idea what rocks do but as an idealist - you surely do. And I am not anthropomorphizing rocks by saying they are not possessed of human appreciation. If you are saying that I was anthropomorphizing soul, yes, I do not differentiate the human and the soul. I use the term soul, actually transcendent soul, to retain a positive sense of idealism and to keep myself from taking offense when family members and others talk to me about God and soul. Though I have drifted from their belief patterns I don't wish to alienate them nor do I wish to lose the words that have offered me my first sense of the miraculous in life. I wanted to preserve the word and it's power to bring about a "spiritual" state, peaceful quiet contemplatude. (It's a state I enjoy.) I needed to define it differently to remain true to my new beliefs. I found the double entendre useful in achieving both goals.

(edit: As I reread your words I think you probably meant that in anthropomorphizing other species I conclude that humans have a refined appreciation. I was speaking more of the expression of that appreciation, our art in all its many forms. I cannot say whether the dog stands in awe of the night sky but that dog communicates no poetry or paintings of it. )

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by hammegk
Back to II's question: On close examination, what is a rock, other than processes and behaviors?

Or should we ask, what is processing and behaving?

Nice call!

Hmm, processes lack the 'intent' that is associated with 'awareness'. ?

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by Atlas
It's answers like that that made even Buddhist monks tell one another, "If you meet the Buddha - kill him."

If you meet the buddha on the road, 'Lean on him."

I don't think that it is fair to blame the buddha for your reaction to koans that are meant to stun the 'thinking'. The reason to kill the buddha if you meet him, is so that you don't make a paragon out of him/her, as the buddha said on his death bed, "Be ye lamps unto yourselfs".

(BTW, thank you for your major contributuin to this thread.)

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by hammegk
Is there not just a single destination?

Hmm, should one mistake the final disposition for the journey. (I don't think that is what you meant.)

The goal of the buddha is a free life, what one does after freedom is well, unspeakable.

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by Atlas
It is, isn't it? And it seems to prevail in monistic religions that do not use reincarnation as a perfecting mechanism.

For some reason, probably a business reason, major religions posit a monism made from two opposing gods. That seems to be what most people buy into. I suppose people just don't want to think of their deity afflicted with schizophrenia, so they adopt a idealism of opposites for the after death world that mirrors the world of opposites they are immersed in before death.

How do you see it?


Interesting, I thought that the 'afterlife' was the political tool of those in power.

The teachings of Jesus seem to be more of the 'recycle' that which is not good. But they were subn\verted by the church. In some asian religion there are six possible destinations the
devi, asuara, humans, animals, ghosts and hell.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Dancing David
If you meet the buddha on the road, 'Lean on him."

I don't think that it is fair to blame the buddha for your reaction to koans that are meant to stun the 'thinking'. The reason to kill the buddha if you meet him, is so that you don't make a paragon out of him/her, as the buddha said on his death bed, "Be ye lamps unto yourselfs". I couldn't resist the opportunity to tweak Bodhi Dharma Zen after his koan post 18 pages into the discussion. Maybe because I didn't think of it first.

But I never understood the reason to kill the Buddha if you meet him on the path. I always took it to mean, "Listen, firstly, it ain't gonna happen. Secondly, if it does you're looking at an imposter. You can tell an imposter from the the real thing simply... The Buddha cannot be killed, he died and escaped the circle of torture we are on."

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
Is there not just a single destination?
Originally posted by Dancing David
Hmm, should one mistake the final disposition for the journey. (I don't think that is what you meant.)

The goal of the buddha is a free life, what one does after freedom is well, unspeakable. This makes me feel dumb. After my joke about killing the Buddha I erased it from my thoughts. I didn't catch that Hamme was referring to Buddhism. I thought he was speaking generally, referring to death. Hence my answer, Yes, but no one really wants to go there.

I always feel like I'm half a step behind the guy. This proves it once again.

I blame Hamme - Why can't he write for us midgets?

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Interesting, I thought that the 'afterlife' was the political tool of those in power. ... I don't think there is a bright line that could be drawn that would identify "afterlife" as strictly a political tool or a business tool.

The invention of purgatory and selling indulgences to get folks out was brilliant marketing and a great moneymaker for the Church's business.

Excommunication is a wonderfully scary political tool to wield over the masses, pretty much assuring the recipient of eternal damnation.

I think the Crusades offered a direct path into heaven for all those who fought the good fight. It's hard not to recognize the political power the church enjoyed in it's control over the idea of a heavenly or hellish afterlife. But there was a lot of money in it too.

[Atlas]

Hey DD,

There's a technology site (free subsription required) run by MIT called TechnologyReview.com (http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/05/02/issue/review_mind.asp?trk=nl) Today there is an article called The Unobservable Mind which starts like this...Consciousness is more familiar to us than any other feature of our world, since it is the route by which anything at all becomes familiar. But this is what makes consciousness so hard to pinpoint. Look for it wherever you like, you encounter only its objects—a face, a dream, a memory, a color, a pain, a melody, a problem, but nowhere the consciousness that shines on them. Trying to grasp it is like trying to observe your own observing, as though you were to look with your own eyes at your own eyes without using a mirror. Not surprisingly, therefore, the thought of consciousness gives rise to peculiar metaphysical anxieties, which we try to allay with images of the soul, the mind, the self, the “subject of consciousness,� the inner entity that thinks and sees and feels and that is the real me inside. But these traditional “solutions� merely duplicate the problem. We cast no light on the consciousness of a human being simply by redescribing it as the consciousness of some inner homunculus—be it a soul, a mind, or a self. On the contrary, by placing that homunculus in some private, inaccessible, and possibly immaterial realm, we merely compound the mystery. I haven't read it because I'm doing other things but I will be reading it shortly. It looks interesting and I wanted to add the thought above to the discussion and link to the article in case you or anyone else is interested.

[hammegk]

LOL.

That quote in a microcosm shows the usual circular path from questioning to full acceptance of a "not-immaterial" world.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
LOL.

That quote in a microcosm shows the usual circular path from questioning to full acceptance of a "not-immaterial" world. It is kinda, isn't it. I mean, apart from the fact that I didn't know what you were referring to, it does describe the arc I find myself on. I haven't reached full acceptence yet. But us midgets dwell in our microcosms and we seem to do nothing but go round and round. It's probably just a matter of time.

[JAK]

Originally posted by hammegk
LOL.

That quote in a microcosm shows the usual circular path from questioning to full acceptance of a "not-immaterial" world.
"not-immaterial"? Is that "not-not-material" - i.e., "material"?

I, for one, do not believe in a "non-material" world. If anything interacts with us, it must be via energy. As soon as the "anything" is interactive with energy, it becomes a variant of it. Once a variant, it is as much "material" as anything else. It may be a superset or an intersection of sets, but it still incorporates a material element.

Further, an intersection of sets would be hard to defend due to internal communication of this being. How does it cross between the boundaries?

My preference is for a superset approach. Science, as it stands today, is certainly not omniscient. As such, there is potential for any number of aspects of physics yet be learned - knowledge which a superior being may be very "fluent" about.

Of course, another scenario can explain reality as a dream created by the spirit. The rules, the perceptions, the consciousness, are all part of the dream - albeit a very elegant dream. We have no proof that others perceive or feel - only externally observable appearances. Are characters in a dream not likewise? Until we can actually merge with the psyche of another and feel what she/he feels - as she/he feels it, we will always question if we are alone and in our own dream, or if others truly exist.

(This is scary. I think I have just laid the groundwork to merge with Lifegazer's philosophy. I'm almost sure I could bridge to it. ... shudder, shudder :)

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by JAK
Of course, another scenario can explain reality as a dream created by the spirit. The rules, the perceptions, the consciousness, are all part of the dream - albeit a very elegant dream. We have no proof that others perceive or feel - only externally observable appearances. Are characters in a dream not likewise? Until we can actually merge with the psyche of another and feel what she/he feels - as she/he feels it, we will always question if we are alone and in our own dream, or if others truly exist.

I like it. Still, on question arises, what causes all the "regularities" that are called "objective world"? if you say "the spirit" then you have Berkeley's approach. Not that there is nothing wrong with that, as I consider it as a fine argument, but somehow it is easier to think in an objective world of "insert latest theoretical frameset here".

[hammegk]

Or, an objective idealist could entertain the notion that the perceived-as-physical is the epiphenomena.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
Or, an objective idealist could entertain the notion that the perceived-as-physical is the epiphenomena. Could you explain this more completely? Epiphenomena are secondary byproducts of some primary. The physical object is a primary. And the physical perceiver is a primary?? And then all perception is epiphenomenal??? Is that it? And those epiphenomena are nonphysical and immaterial?

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by JAK
"not-immaterial"? Is that "not-not-material" - i.e., "material"?

I, for one, do not believe in a "non-material" world. If anything interacts with us, it must be via energy. As soon as the "anything" is interactive with energy, it becomes a variant of it. Once a variant, it is as much "material" as anything else. It may be a superset or an intersection of sets, but it still incorporates a material element.

This seems specious. Energy and material are not the same. Energy is a principle of physics, that there is something real and unchanging overall, something which is conserved in interactions in nature. We measure the transformation of forms of energy by things like Work done = Force through a distance.

But if we ("with us") could be tweaked without that "anything" having to exert a force through a distance, the tweaker would not have done any work. How could this be? In the language of physics here are at least two to consider: No energy well between two alternative paths at least at some point; tunneling between energy wells. Maxwell's Demon wouldn't break a sweat...

The ability to reduce "everything" to the material is simply a process of abstraction overdone - like reducing a soup stock... to carbon and trace elements, it's not tasty nor nourishing at that point. Without the not-material, 'material' doesn't have any more meaning than say, "laritema" or "" does in standard English. It becomes a limiting choice of a conscious being to dictate or rule out some aspect of the obvious.


ME

ps - as an aside, JAK, do you believe in anything, or was your intro remark intended as a statement of your overall absolute skepticism?

[hammegk]

You have it backwards ...

Paraphrasing the materialist cant "If it aint material, it ain't material, since it ain't material" ....

If it is material, it ain't material, since it ain't material. :p

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
You have it backwards ...

Paraphrasing the materialist cant "If it aint material, it ain't material, since it ain't material" ....

If it is material, it ain't material, since it ain't material. :p As usual, that went Whoooosh - right by me. Sometimes I wonder why I ever ask YOU for clarification... you're just doing this to torment me. You know I'm lost so hey, let's spin him around.

Near as I can figure Objective Idealism is saying that the physical world and our intellectual appreciation of it are one and the same thing, though at opposite ends of the continuum of sameness. This is how you escape dualism and this is what you mean when you say, "If it is material, it ain't material, since it ain't material. "

That is, you assume that our intellectual appreciation is immaterial so the world is immaterial as well. This is allowed by utilizing the word "REAL". The intellectual experience, Idea, is real and so is the physical world. Both are real but immaterial.

This separates you from the Subjective Idealist who believes that Idea is real and immaterial but the physical world is not real, it is an illusion manufactured by the intellect.

I struggle with a metaphor. I think metaphor is the only way I can approach this. I need an abstraction of the immaterial idea based on a physical model. It's wild how the mind works to understand what it means when it talks about stuff, don't you think?

Here goes... The physical world is the sea. The intellectual experience of it is the cloud. The cloud is the mind's depiction of its apprehension and appreciation of the sea it sees before it. It is certainly not the sea. It floats apart from that which it is depicting. The Subjective Idealist would say that the cloud creates the sea or something equally weird, saying that the sea is not real but only the cloud is. The Objective Idealist says there is a continuum of real but immaterial vapor the endpoints of which are the cloud and the sea. All of existence is immaterial vapor with endpoints of reality, one appearing physical and one appearing intellectual.

Is this thumbnail metaphor approximating your philosophy and it's distinction from Subjective Idealism.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Atlas
Here goes... The physical world is the sea. The intellectual experience of it is the cloud. The cloud is the mind's depiction of its apprehension and appreciation of the sea it sees before it. It is certainly not the sea. It floats apart from that which it is depicting. The Subjective Idealist would say that the cloud creates the sea or something equally weird, saying that the sea is not real but only the cloud is. The Objective Idealist says there is a continuum of real but immaterial vapor the endpoints of which are the cloud and the sea. All of existence is immaterial vapor with endpoints of reality, one appearing physical and one appearing intellectual.


In this metaphor, I would say that the cloud is everything there is to "decide" if there is a sea. Whether it is, or not, sufficient, is a matter for every individual.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
In this metaphor, I would say that the cloud is everything there is to "decide" if there is a sea. Whether it is, or not, sufficient, is a matter for every individual. Ok, I don't know if there is any disagreement. I was thinking of the cloud as my idea of the sea when the sea is in my view. That is, I have the meaning of the sea in mind supported by the sensory factors I used to process the appearence and sound of the sea into my idea of the sea. That cloud represents that final thought or idea.

Consciousness assembled the idea from the available sensory data in the mysterious way that it does, but perhaps all the decision data is a part of the conclusion. It has decided from the available sense data that the sea is out there.

I'm saying it like this because the Subjective Idealist is creating the sea (as an illusion of reality) out of consciousness while for the Objective Idealist, the sea is as real as his own apprehension and appreciation of it. But there is no material world there for either of them.

My metaphor has passed the deciding stage but if it has decided that it is viewing the sea, then I cannot disagree with the notion that the cloud also represents all of the deciding factors.

Do you think the difference impacts the metaphor's usefulness, (if it ends up being useful at all.) This is really the first time I have been able to articulate what the difference is for me between the Objective and Subjective Idealist - so I am not even sure Hamme will agree. How about you Zen - care to label yourself.

For me, Zen Buddhism was Idealistic and the material world was an illusion, making adherents Subjective Idealists as I understand the term. I lean toward materialism/physicalism but end up with dualism because I cannot escape Idealism. I escape immediately to Pragmatism. Common sense tells me the physical world exists and also that I have ideas of it. I live as a commoner among philosophers.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Atlas
Common sense tells me the physical world exists and also that I have ideas of it. I live as a commoner among philosophers.

No disagreement. I was not aware of the fact that the "I" is seeing the sea while depicting his "cloud version" (if I understand correctly).

Zen is not idealism, both "the world" and "the I" are constructs, both can be transcended when a "middle point" (a superior form of awareness) is reached, this would be called Satori.

My own view is still in development, Im to confused at present time to spell something intelligent.

[JAK]

Originally posted by Mr. E
...
We measure the transformation of forms of energy by things like Work done = Force through a distance.
...
In the language of physics here are at least two to consider: No energy well between two alternative paths at least at some point; tunneling between energy wells. Maxwell's Demon wouldn't break a sweat...

To my knowledge, Maxwell's Demon has not been demonstrated. Also, it represents intelligence via perception, analysis, and gated control. All require the manipulation of energy (performing work).

I'm not familiar with your "energy wells." Please supply a reference which I can research, or please elaborate on what you mean.

The crux of the issue is communication between facets of the universe. Common laws must apply to allow that communication to be coherent. These laws must embody both sender and receiver.

Even if a spirit can introduce new energy into the universe (defying the 1st law of thermodynamics), laws regulating the direction and amount (vectors) are needed if any deft control is to occur:
SPIRIT: "Oops! Sorry, Mrs. Johnson, I meant that idea to hit your neighbor down the street. ... And I think the second degree burns will heal okay."

Originally posted by Mr. E
...
The ability to reduce "everything" to the material is ... like reducing a soup stock... to carbon and trace elements, it's not tasty nor nourishing at that point.
...

I don't believe we have indulged "emergent properties." With emergent properties, life becomes very tasty and nourishing.

Originally posted by Mr. E
...
ps - as an aside, JAK, do you believe in anything, or was your intro remark intended as a statement of your overall absolute skepticism?
...

My intro was due to my confusion. "Not immaterial" appeared to be a double negative. Sorry for extending my confusion.

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
...
Zen is not idealism, both "the world" and "the I" are constructs, both can be transcended when a "middle point" (a superior form of awareness) is reached, this would be called Satori.
...


This whole area is very interesting. But I don't think we have nailed down the analogy fully.

Is there only one entity at the "middle point?" Or do each of us have individual "middle points?"

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
No disagreement. I was not aware of the fact that the "I" is seeing the sea while depicting his "cloud version" (if I understand correctly). I didn't want to extend my metaphor. I wanted the cloud to represent the idea or the interior experience of the sea but a cloud is in the sky. Could I make the sky the mind? Doing so would push my metaphor to seemingly include a a sky god or at least a confusing implied reference to one. I decided not to even mention it and introduced the confusion by not making it plain. Ideas do reside somewhere in the mind but for my metaphor I wanted to leave out the mind and concentrate on the fabric of reality from the 2 Idealist perspectives; How thought relates to the physical. The metaphor is inherently weak as presented because the reader must recognize that the mind behind the idea/cloud is not part of the presentation. Of course, we have a tendency to infer a brain or mind for any floating idea out there. Zen is not idealism, both "the world" and "the I" are constructs, both can be transcended when a "middle point" (a superior form of awareness) is reached, this would be called Satori. I wish I understood it all better. Certainly Zen is not a Physicalism. It seeks the truth of life and creation with an assumption that our perspective is improved by Satori or many Satoris. It offers an experience of the Absolute which might be the Ideal of it's Idealism. Satori comes about through meditation and the use of koans. Enlightenment is an insightful event. We come to the experience of Oneness by seeing that the world of opposites is an illusion. The big opposites, the world and the intellect conspire to keep us unenlightened and koans are designed to exhaust the intellect enabling the Satori experience. And in that experience the *I*, the self, in a way disappears when everything, including it, is One.

I admit that it seems a bit different that Western philosophical/religious Idealism but I wouldn't know how else to catagorize it. Here is a definition from a Wikipedia article...In philosophy, idealism is any theory positing the primacy of spirit, mind, or language over matter. It includes claiming that thought has some crucial role in making the world the way it is--that In philosophy, idealism is any theory positing the primacy of spirit, mind, or language over matter. It includes claiming that thought has some crucial role in making the world the way it is--that thought and the world are made for one another, or that they make one another. It's difficult to accept the One without understanding that that thought and the world are made for one another.

BTW, I haven't looked at Zen in 20 years. I've always liked it. I accept the enlightenment experience as real. I doubt there are any of us that are not visited occasionally by those flashes of insight that are little Satori experiences or would be if they had a Zen direction behind them. Still, for me, even allowing for a Middle Way approach, the meditative discipline, the Satori flash of insight, the goal of enlightenment, the experience of the Absolute - these all suggest Idealism. Of course like Christianity, Zen does not state catgorically that the physical world does not exist. And even science tells us that the appearence of solidity in solid objects is an illusion and that those objects are mostly space. Perhaps this is why I cannot escape my own dualistic perspective.

Well, I must get ready now to witness another kind of unity. My neice is getting married today. I like filling my mind with thoughts of Oneness before this event.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Atlas
. .... I cannot escape my own dualistic perspective.


So it seems, imo.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
So it seems, imo. Your jabs are always welcome. But I wish you'd take a moment and comment on my Cloud and Sea metaphor above. I continue to circle the Idealism and Materialism perspectives to try to find out what my own biases are tending toward. You're the Objective Idealist here, c'mon help me out.

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by Mr. E
This seems specious. Energy and material are not the same.

Proof? Evidence?

Are you aware of why it appears that you can sit on a chair and not walk through walls without doors?
Energy is a principle of physics, that there is something real and unchanging overall, something which is conserved in interactions in nature.

Energy is a principle in that we use it as a term to describe certain changes in state in the apparent world. However what about the photon? It has a small mass that disappears if the photon were ever to rest. It is energy, it does not have most of the attributes mistakenly given to 'matter.
So are photons material or are they a-energy?
We measure the transformation of forms of energy by things like Work done = Force through a distance.


But if we ("with us") could be tweaked without that "anything" having to exert a force through a distance, the tweaker would not have done any work. How could this be? In the language of physics here are at least two to consider: No energy well between two alternative paths at least at some point; tunneling between energy wells. Maxwell's Demon wouldn't break a sweat...

Umm, could you elaborate, this word soup is hard for me to parse, I am sure that it has meaning and I would hate to over critique of it, while I can't understand it.

BTW 'tunneling' is a misnomer ! The electrons engage in a quantum jump, they dont tunnel , they disappear and reappear.


The ability to reduce "everything" to the material is simply a process of abstraction overdone - like reducing a soup stock... to carbon and trace elements, it's not tasty nor nourishing at that point. Without the not-material, 'material' doesn't have any more meaning than say, "laritema" or "" does in standard English. It becomes a limiting choice of a conscious being to dictate or rule out some aspect of the obvious.


ME

ps - as an aside, JAK, do you believe in anything, or was your intro remark intended as a statement of your overall absolute skepticism?

The two are equivalent. Moo!

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Dancing David
The two are equivalent. Moo! Which two?


ME: This seems specious. Energy and material are not the same.

DD: Proof? Evidence?

Indeed, perhaps in a similar relationship! It could depend upon your standards. Consider a battery.

DD: Are you aware of why it appears that you can sit on a chair and not walk through walls without doors?

Perhaps DD will explain the meaning of the question, but I'm guessing it has something to do with consciousness - we are programmed to think we are not one with the universe?

DD: However what about the photon? It has a small mass that disappears if the photon were ever to rest.

As perhaps noted, Einstein proposed an equivalence, not an identity. Are you suggesting that photons are material to consciousness?

DD: So are photons material or are they a-energy?

From the point of view of ordinary consciousness photons are not energy and are not material even if they are part of how one might see what one might see of material things.


ME: But if we ("with us") could be tweaked without that "anything" having to exert a force through a distance, the tweaker would not have done any work. How could this be? In the language of physics here are at least two to consider: No energy well between two alternative paths at least at some point; tunneling between energy wells. Maxwell's Demon wouldn't break a sweat...

DD: Umm, could you elaborate, this word soup is hard for me to parse, I am sure that it has meaning and I would hate to over critique of it, while I can't understand it.

It might be an acquired taste, but one way to acculturation is to taste the soup as best one can and report one's likes and dislikes -- if one doesn't have taste in the first place bootsrapping might be an option. There are three and a half sentences there... one of which is a rhetorical question.

DD: BTW 'tunneling' is a misnomer ! The electrons engage in a quantum jump, they dont tunnel , they disappear and reappear.

Having never seen an electron, I would not know much about their disappearances. In general when things vanish from ones sight and then reappear somewhere else as in a "magic" trick, one suspects a hidden pathway perhaps one which takes the electron out of the apparently material universe for a moment.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ME

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by JAK
[B][Maxwell's Demon] represents intelligence via perception, analysis, and gated control. All require the manipulation of energy (performing work).

You seem to be over-anthropomorphising.

I'm not familiar with your "energy wells." Please supply a reference which I can research, or please elaborate on what you mean.

Consider water in a glass on an ordinary table. Work must be done to lift the water out of the glass so that it might fall to the floor. The water is in a gravitational potential well. The notion of tunneling oringinally has to do with the phenomemon of tunneling at a nanoscopic level - where the "water" doesn't seem to have to climb out of the well via ordinary work.

The crux of the issue is communication between facets of the universe. Common laws must apply to allow that communication to be coherent. These laws must embody both sender and receiver. I'm reluctant to apply my ordinary notions of 'communication' blithely in this matter. If you are assuming that there is a non-material facet to the universe, I would like to hear more about your thinking.

Even if a spirit can introduce new energy into the universe ... such as correspondence in good spirits? I wasn't assuming it was a new energy.


ME

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by JAK
This whole area is very interesting. But I don't think we have nailed down the analogy fully.

Is there only one entity at the "middle point?" Or do each of us have individual "middle points?"

Yes, thats the "difficult" question. But I would say that it is so just from HERE. The analogy is incomplete because reason cant reach that far (I know, is an ad hoc argument), or at least is as far as I can take it.

On THERE, there is nothing like "individuals" nor "one" or "more" "entities" nor nothing known in HERE...

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Atlas
I wish I understood it all better. Certainly Zen is not a Physicalism. It seeks the truth of life and creation with an assumption that our perspective is improved by Satori or many Satoris. It offers an experience of the Absolute which might be the Ideal of it's Idealism.

I think I can take some of your words to TRY to describe it a bit better... is not like:

"an I" having "an experience" of "the absolute".

Its more like

"experiencing" "the absolute" from "the absolute"

if this makes ANY sense

Originally posted by Atlas
We come to the experience of Oneness by seeing that the world of opposites is an illusion.

Yes, but WORDS CANT TOUCH IT. I believed I could understand whats "behind" those concepts, but they dont even come close. Being "THERE" is like opening your eyes for the first time, there is absolutely no way to "transmit" what is like to being THERE, its like talking to a blind "explaining" him light through waves, frequencies and so on.

Originally posted by Atlas
I accept the enlightenment experience as real. I doubt there are any of us that are not visited occasionally by those flashes of insight that are little Satori experiences or would be if they had a Zen direction behind them.

Yes, "little" Satori's. But awaiting there are BIGGER monsters, hidden just around the limits of the world.

Originally posted by Atlas
Perhaps this is why I cannot escape my own dualistic perspective.

The mind is a powerful shield.

[JAK]

Originally posted by Mr. E
...
I'm reluctant to apply my ordinary notions of 'communication' blithely in this matter. If you are assuming that there is a non-material facet to the universe, I would like to hear more about your thinking.
...

My reference to "communication" may be a bad term for what I intended. Perhaps "interacting" is better. What I'm getting at is the ability for one "thing" (thought, object, spirit, whatever) to influence another. Such interaction must have natural "laws" or rules enabling such interactions if they are to include any being, mind, or spirit. These rules would encompass both sides of any interaction (and both sides of any communication). Without rules of interaction, none could occur.

Originally posted by Atlas
...
Perhaps this is why I cannot escape my own dualistic perspective.
...

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
...
The mind is a powerful shield.

Okay, let's take a crack at putting monism and dualism together in a coherent framework.

Regarding “monism� and “dualism,� a variant may be supportable such that monists and dualists can be brought to common ground and agreement. This variant depends upon “Time� being multi-dimensional ...

All of our “time travel� books and movies (The Time Machine, Back to the Future, Somewhere in Time, etc.) have a common factor: regardless of traveling into the future or the past, the time traveler retains memories in sequence. For instance, when Christopher Reeve’s character (Somewhere in Time) goes back to the early 20th century, the character retains memories of being an author from the late 1970s. Thus, his sequence of memories is: birth until 1979, cut to 1916 (roughly), sequence forward for a couple of days in 1916, cut back to 1979, and sequence forward again. He remembered that he, FIRST lived from the 1950s through the 1970s, SECOND lived in 1916 for a couple of days, and THIRD lived again in the 1970s. If his memories were trapped within 1979, then, as he went backwards, his memories would be erased in reverse sequence ... college, high school, grade school, toddler, babbling babe, etc. Without a separate “time track� for the mind and memories, by the time Reeve’s character reached 1916, his mind would be wiped clean leaving him virtually catatonic or infantile at best. (His body should likewise reverse and disappear by the time the early 1950s are reached.) But to retain memories in sequence across time, as it is for time travelers in other books and movies, this must require a separate “time track� or time dimension – at least for the mind. Referencing our three classical material dimensions, X, Y, and Z, the mind would need at least two similar dimensions for our favored concept of time travel to work. One axis (X) would be the material universe. Another axis (Y) would be perpendicular to it and represent the mind which would track upon it. Memories would continue to track forward on the Y (mind) axis regardless of jumping left or right on the X (material/historical) axis.

For an analogy, tornadoes offer a decent reference. Typically, in the northern hemisphere, tornadoes move northeastward. Why? It is the result of two motions: one north and one east. Weather systems usually track west to east (the X axis). Meanwhile, thunderstorms associated with a frontal system move parallel to the front and northward (the Y axis). Put both motions together, and a northeasterly track is created (X,Y). Tornadoes, being manifestations of thunderstorms, show the general track of their parent storms – north and east combined. Even so, the tornado track appears to be in a singular direction of its own accord.

If the mind follows the Y axis and material objects follow the X axis, the combined motion would present the "apparent" direction of time. This, too, would seem singular to us and appear traveling of its own accord.

As for a Z “time� axis? “Spirit,� perhaps? With each lifetime representing an XY plane, a spiritual entity could progress along a Z axis. Each lifetime would be another XY track. (With each new life and XY track being higher on the Z axis, the memories of earlier lives may become inaccessible.) Thus, “spirit� would spiral upwards on the Z axis while creating a stack of lives in XY planes – like a stack of dishes. (And just as dishes have material thickness, a life would have “thickness� on the Z axis.) Kharma/Dharma would become, primarily, part of the Z axis.

This XYZ structure would support an overall “monistic� view while appearing “dualistic.� IF monism and dualism can find common ground, it may be some variant of what I have just described. Multi-dimensional time, again, may hold the key.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
I think I can take some of your words to TRY to describe it a bit better... is not like:

"an I" having "an experience" of "the absolute".

Its more like

"experiencing" "the absolute" from "the absolute"

if this makes ANY sense I like those kinds of corrections. Flying fast is a thrill but perfect speed is being there.
Yes, but WORDS CANT TOUCH IT. I believed I could understand whats "behind" those concepts, but they dont even come close. Being "THERE" is like opening your eyes for the first time, there is absolutely no way to "transmit" what is like to being THERE, its like talking to a blind "explaining" him light through waves, frequencies and so on. No doubt the experience has an emotional aspect to it. Awesomeness generally incites full person WOW. There are a lot of human experiences that words cannot touch. But one outcome is a reorienting of perspective. I believe the death of a loved one offers an approximating experience of the absolute, possibly from the absolute, and also reorients perspective. The abyss is truly one view of the absolute but a view often devoid of balance. It is not a middle way experience generally, but it brings many close to the absolute and makes for profound changes in many many people. Yes, "little" Satori's. But awaiting there are BIGGER monsters, hidden just around the limits of the world. I agree. It seems like Satoris are like, and should be like, tomorrrows. Expect some great ones and you'll enjoy them happening. I've always thought it's a good thing to note how and when insight happens to you. It's useful to know how and when it happens and how it makes you feel so you can take steps to maximize both expectation and affect. The mind is a powerful shield. So true.

I end up though believing that I'd classify Zen with Objective Idealism where the World and the Intellect fit like yin and yang. The middle way accepts them both as real but also immaterial. And the absolute - the oneness - is an experience of the nothingness of everything or somethingness of nothing - a unity of all opposites. But in so being it is an idealistic philosophy.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by JAK
... I don't believe we have indulged "emergent properties." With emergent properties, life becomes very tasty and nourishing. ... I like this simple thought more than the time idea. That is, consciousness is an emergent property of complex living organisms. It's a physicalism (monism) that assumes consciusness to be an unremarkable natural upshot of self organizing entities who are alive. The universe is self organizing. Gravity is a a self organizing force, like life is a self organizing force. Gravity sets the stage for life, an unexpected outcome, by pulling galaxies, solar systems, and planets together. Life sets the stage for consciousness, an unexpected outcome, in a parallel way. In organizations of plant, animal, and human forms consciousness emerges, although at the plant level it's hardly recognizable as the same thing as human consciousness. as different in appearence as a sun is from a black hole.

[Dancing David]

As an aside Mr. E. , I discuss the appearnce of the physical world which is percieved through the organic frame(assumed by appearnce).

Originally posted by Mr. E
Which two?

Uh, duh, matter is eneryy. Is that easier? There is no matter. There is no matter! There is no matter? Matter is a set of traits we impose upon energy at a macro scale.

Moo!


ME: This seems specious. Energy and material are not the same.

DD: Proof? Evidence?

Indeed, perhaps in a similar relationship! It could depend upon your standards. Consider a battery.

Mister E., you miss the point, I can consider a battery. Every attribute that you can choose to ascribe to matter is really a manifestation of energy.

So choose your poison, which attribute do you assign to matter?


DD: Are you aware of why it appears that you can sit on a chair and not walk through walls without doors?

Perhaps DD will explain the meaning of the question, but I'm guessing it has something to do with consciousness - we are programmed to think we are not one with the universe?

Uh, no. Think , hmm. Why don't objects intersect? Is it because they are made of some 'hard' substance that doesn't interpentrate?


DD: However what about the photon? It has a small mass that disappears if the photon were ever to rest.

As perhaps noted, Einstein proposed an equivalence, not an identity. Are you suggesting that photons are material to consciousness?

Uh, Einstein isn't the issue, 'matter' is energy. Are you aware of why Bose_Einstein Condensate?


DD: So are photons material or are they a-energy?

From the point of view of ordinary consciousness photons are not energy and are not material even if they are part of how one might see what one might see of material things.

That is more non-sequiter. It is cake but not cake. No, a photon appears to be energy with a limited amount of what we ascribe as material attributes.



ME: But if we ("with us") could be tweaked without that "anything" having to exert a force through a distance, the tweaker would not have done any work. How could this be? In the language of physics here are at least two to consider: No energy well between two alternative paths at least at some point; tunneling between energy wells. Maxwell's Demon wouldn't break a sweat...

DD: Umm, could you elaborate, this word soup is hard for me to parse, I am sure that it has meaning and I would hate to over critique of it, while I can't understand it.

It might be an acquired taste, but one way to acculturation is to taste the soup as best one can and report one's likes and dislikes -- if one doesn't have taste in the first place bootsrapping might be an option. There are three and a half sentences there... one of which is a rhetorical question.

I like soup, but your statements are nonsensical to me, so you can't explain them?


DD: BTW 'tunneling' is a misnomer ! The electrons engage in a quantum jump, they dont tunnel , they disappear and reappear.

Having never seen an electron, I would not know much about their disappearances. In general when things vanish from ones sight and then reappear somewhere else as in a "magic" trick, one suspects a hidden pathway perhaps one which takes the electron out of the apparently material universe for a moment.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ME


Silly you then. The electron goes to Aruba to scuba then. Except the flight and vacation take zero time. The electron never leaves it just wiggles into the other side of the tunnel. You are ascribing macroscopic attributes to the quantum scale.

[JAK]

Originally posted by Atlas
I like this simple thought more than the time idea. That is, consciousness is an emergent property of complex living organisms. It's a physicalism (monism) that assumes consciusness to be an unremarkable natural upshot of self organizing entities who are alive. The universe is self organizing. Gravity is a a self organizing force, like life is a self organizing force. Gravity sets the stage for life, an unexpected outcome, by pulling galaxies, solar systems, and planets together. Life sets the stage for consciousness, an unexpected outcome, in a parallel way. In organizations of plant, animal, and human forms consciousness emerges, although at the plant level it's hardly recognizable as the same thing as human consciousness. as different in appearence as a sun is from a black hole.

Parsimony is always attractive. I, too, am enamoured with the idea.

Yet, with string theory suggesting 10 dimensions (or 11 - I forgit), my 3-dimensional time uses up 3 instead of the traditional 1. If each of the 3 time dimensions have associated 3 spacial dimensions (don't ask me how), suddenly 9 of the 10 predicted dimensions can be accounted for.

Of course, all would be wild speculation at this point. Meanwhile, the "emergent property" idea is "meatier" given today's science.