Free Will?

OK, let's have at it.

Is there such a thing as free will?

[Dragonrock]

What are you? The substitute Franko?

Editted to point out that I missed the "Window of opportunity" thread.

[whitefork]

Let me ask a related question.

Is there human causation?

If we can cause things to happen, whether as a final cause or an intermediate one, do we even need to postulate free will?

Originally posted by Dragonrock
What are you? The substitute Franko?

Editted to point out that I missed the "Window of opportunity" thread.

Got a problem with that A-THEIST?????



:D

[Upchurch]

the best I've ever been able to conclude about the issues is that we at least have the illusion of free will. It's hard for me to say one way or the other beyond that, because I can understand the arguments on both sides without any clear cut evidence one way or the other.

My personal opinion? Not enough information to answer the question.

[whitefork]

You know, when he comes back, everybody's going to be blaming you and DWB with his poll over in Banter.

Speak not his name.

Originally posted by whitefork
You know, when he comes back, everybody's going to be blaming you and DWB with his poll over in Banter.

Speak not his name.

Whose name?

I prefer to consider that I have been instrumental in kickstarting a discussion and taking advantage of his absence. Yeah, that's the ticket.

[Dragonrock]

Originally posted by sundog


Got a problem with that A-THEIST?????



:D

A problem with the fact that I missed the other thread?

:)

Originally posted by Dragonrock


A problem with the fact that I missed the other thread?

:)

Don't tempt me, I'll do it. I swear I will...

[Dragonrock]

Originally posted by sundog


Got a problem with that A-THEIST?????



:D

A problem with which A-theist?

Originally posted by Dragonrock


A problem with which A-theist?

OK, you made me do it.

TLOP/controls YOU/controls CAR.

Oh crap, I've hijacked my own thread.

I find the idea that most random processes are just masking more deterministic process we simply don't know about to be compelling. Someone tell me why it's garbage.

[zakur]

Originally posted by sundog


Whose name?

I prefer to consider that I have been instrumental in kickstarting a discussion and taking advantage of his absence. Yeah, that's the ticket. He's gone?! :eek:

[Dragonrock]

Originally posted by zakur
He's gone?! :eek:

One can only hope.

And if it's true I might just pray and say thank you.

[Lord Kenneth]

Well...

Free will, as in a magical human power to decide and have sole responsibiliy... No.

Free will, as in your actions not being predetermined... yes.

Originally posted by Dark Cobra
Well...

Free will, as in a magical human power to decide and have sole responsibiliy... No.

Free will, as in your actions not being predetermined... yes.

I'm afraid the gist of your argument went by too fast for me to catch it. ;)

Care to expand on those opinions?

[c4ts]

Originally posted by zakur
He's gone?! :eek:

Yeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeehaaaaaaaawwwwwwww!!!! ahem...

I think there is such thing as free will, because failure is so much easier to achieve than success, and I seem to be able to break rules. This means that it is not simply a 50/50 choice between one thing and another, but everything you do in life is not moving towards some destination or other as part of an extremely complex plan. For you could be "destined" to be a musician, but completely f*ck that idea and be a mediocore realtor or a bum or mailman or a crazy naked guy who lives in a tree (etc)... and there is very little preventing you from sitting on your ass and watching TV, whereas a number of complicated circumstances such as competition can prevent you from becoming a musician. To cast free will aside and take all this into consideration is to say that something like the Logical Goddess wills you to fail, which is absurd.

[Beleth]

I believe I have free will, and no argument I have seen has led me to believe otherwise.

For starters, there are things that curtail or reduce my free will. A jail cell, or a blackmailer, for instance. You can't reduce something that doesn't exist.

Franko's TLOP argument falls apart when you realize that TLOP don't control anything. At best, they predict things. Consider - what happens when an observed natural event conflicts with a law of physics? The law gets revised, not the event. Science is all about knowledge and not at all about control.

Do we just have an illusion of free will? The difference between an illusion and the real thing is that there is a difference. There's a man behind the curtain, or an invisible black thread, or whatever. If you are going to call something an illusion, you better be prepared to point out that difference.

[Dub]

There is a difference between what you want to do, i.e. your will, and what you can actually do (which is constrained for various reasons, e.g other people, laws [TLOPS] etc). I see nothing controlling my ability to think what I want to do (my will). Therefore I am free to 'will' what I want to do. Whether I can actually do what I am 'willing' is besides the point. An athlete may have the 'will' to win, but that doesnt mean he can.

It seems unlikely that a deity has predetermined the actions of a person when they are seen to carry out self damaging acts (suicide, etc), acts to hurt others (murder etc), or acts that would 'anger' the chossen deity. Why would the deity create something he knows is going to piss him off?

Why do christians who believe in no free-will preach, and try and convert people to their church? Surely nothing they do will have any affect as its all predetermined. The people they are preaching to are unable to make a choice to join them regardless of what they tell them.

[Dub]

Originally posted by Beleth
I believe I have free will, and no argument I have seen has led me to believe otherwise.

For starters, there are things that curtail or reduce my free will. A jail cell, or a blackmailer, for instance. You can't reduce something that doesn't exist.


I agree with you so far however, the jail cell though, would not control you 'will' per se, only the actions it is possible for you to actually perform. Im sure most prisoner's will is to be free, but they cant achieve this due to the constraints they are under.


Franko's TLOP argument falls apart when you realize that TLOP don't control anything. At best, they predict things. Consider - what happens when an observed natural event conflicts with a law of physics? The law gets revised, not the event. Science is all about knowledge and not at all about control.


Yep, TLOP dont tell you what want to do, they limit what you can do. TLOP are like a policman following you round preventing you from breaking the law. At no point does he tell you what you want to do, he only prevents you from actually breaking the law.


Do we just have an illusion of free will? The difference between an illusion and the real thing is that there is a difference. There's a man behind the curtain, or an invisible black thread, or whatever. If you are going to call something an illusion, you better be prepared to point out that difference.

The burden of proof is on proving that it is an illusion.

Originally posted by Dub


the jail cell though, would not control you 'will' per se, only the actions it is possible for you to actually perform. [/B]

Is free will a meaningful concept if it isn't expressed by actions?

[Lord Kenneth]

Originally posted by sundog


I'm afraid the gist of your argument went by too fast for me to catch it. ;)

Care to expand on those opinions?


1. Humans are the sole responsibility of their actions.

This appears to be false, as I can only percieve of two situations- entirely random, or a non-random outcome.

If decisions are based random or somewhat randomly, free will is non-existant because our decisions are not being made by us, but determined by randomness.

If not random, previous circumstances are indicating what will happen in the future.

2. Decisions are not predetermined

It depends on what you mean. Under "normal "conditions, if you strike a ball against a wall, it will have an equal and opposite reaction, so if you want to consider that "predetermined", go ahead, but that's not really fitting what "predetermined" means. There apparently are no gods or magical beings deciding what you will do.

[Beleth]

Originally posted by Dub
Yep, TLOP dont tell you what want to do, they limit what you can do. TLOP are like a policman following you round preventing you from breaking the law. At no point does he tell you what you want to do, he only prevents you from actually breaking the law.No no no. You have this exactly backwards. It's subtle, so I will try to explain it again.

A policeman (more generically, the Laws of Traffic) has control. You see a sign that says "Speed Limit 25," and if you go 26, in theory you get a ticket. If the laws of traffic and your behavior conflict, it is the behavior that gets modified, not the law.

The Laws of Physics are just the opposite. If a law of physics (Newtonian "velocity increases as a force is applied") conflicts with observable phenomenon (the highest possible velocity is the speed of light), then the law gets changed, not the behavior.

TLOP are our best guesses - our best predictions - as to what the universe is really like. What causes the universe to be the way it is, is beyond what we can observe.

I think it was Einstein that once said "the universe is like a giant unopenable pocketwatch, and scientists are trying to figure out what the insides are like by looking at the hands move and listening to the noises it makes."

[Dub]

Originally posted by sundog


Is free will a meaningful concept if it isn't expressed by actions?

Not really, its still free-will whether it is ultimately expressed or not. The point is that it is possible to make 'free' decisions (to want to do something).

Originally posted by Dub


Not really, its still free-will whether it is ultimately expressed or not.

Really? Do you others buy this definition of free will as being completely mental?

[Dub]

Originally posted by Beleth
No no no. You have this exactly backwards. It's subtle, so I will try to explain it again.

A policeman (more generically, the Laws of Traffic) has control. You see a sign that says "Speed Limit 25," and if you go 26, in theory you get a ticket. If the laws of traffic and your behavior conflict, it is the behavior that gets modified, not the law.


Its not backwards at all. It's subtle, so I will try to explain it again. TLOP, as far as we know cannot be broken (this doesnt mean they never can). The policeman in my example is merely preventing the law from being broken. My point, which you have missed, has nothing to do with conflicts between behaviour and the law. I was merely pointing out that how TLOPs do not control free will by the restrictions they place. They only limit what we currently believe is physically possible. You incorrectly state: "the Laws of Traffic has control" the traffic law has no direct control over me at all. If I want to break the speed limit I can, quite easily. I may abide by what the law states, and thus my behaviour is in-directly controlled by it. My point is that 'legal' laws are easily breakable. Therefore I included a policeman following you around preventing you for breaking them. As a direct control. As far as we currently know, it is not possible to break TLOP. Therefore they are not just a writen law, but they cannot be broken (as far as we currently know).

[Dub]

Originally posted by sundog


Really? Do you others buy this definition of free will as being completely mental?


will1 ( P ) Pronunciation Key (wl)
n.

The mental faculty by which one deliberately chooses or decides upon a course of action.

So if, after freely deciding your course of action, you find that its actually not possible (for whatever reason), does that mean you didnt freely decide to take it in the first place? If someone decides to climb a mountain, is it only free-will if they actually do it?

[KS_SKEPTIC]

Originally posted by sundog
OK, let's have at it.

Is there such a thing as free will?

YES, I have a picture of it!!!:D :rolleyes: ;)

[UnrepentantSinner]

Aren't there already numerous threads on this subject?

[Beleth]

Originally posted by Dub
Its not backwards at all. It's subtle, so I will try to explain it again.Please refain from mocking me. It is disrespectful, and I'd really like to have a respectful discussion about free will on this board for once.

TLOP, as far as we know cannot be broken (this doesnt mean they never can).I think that we have a misunderstanding as to our definitions here.

When I say TLOP, I mean the laws of physics that we have derived by observing the universe around us. I do not mean the underlying laws, if they exist, that actually control the universe.

You incorrectly state: "the Laws of Traffic has control" the traffic law has no direct control over me at all. If I want to break the speed limit I can, quite easily.I never said you couldn't. But if you do, you run the risk of being fined.

The laws of traffic have control because if your behavior and the restrictions of the law conflict, it's your behavior that changes, not the law. The behavior that changes is not necessarily that you drive at or less than the posted speed limit; the behavior that changes might be that you give some amount of money (a fine) to the government, or spend some time in a room (a jail cell) selected for you by the legal system.

I may abide by what the law states, and thus my behaviour is in-directly controlled by it. My point is that 'legal' laws are easily breakable. Therefore I included a policeman following you around preventing you for breaking them. As a direct control.But that's simply not how TLOP work.

All TLOP can do is predict, and it's my actions that shape TLOP. As we know more about the workings of the universe, as in my previous example regarding velocity, TLOP change.

It's like a policeman following me around saying "On this trip, you will not go above 25." And it just so happens that I spend the entire drive in rush hour on a crowded freeway, where it is impossible for me to go over 25.

It's not the policeman, or his statement, that is preventing me from going more than 25, even though he said it before I started driving. He made a prediction that came true; he had no control himself over how fast I drove.

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by sundog


Really? Do you others buy this definition of free will as being completely mental? Completely mental? What does that mean? Our brain is able to think freely. Our possibilites for implementing our thoughts in practical action are more limited, but so what?

Unless we can show (or decide to believe) that a mental process is completely detatched from the physical brain, then even a free thought is free will in the physical world.

I can fly. I need an aircraft, but fly I can. This is because somebody once thought "I want to fly". For the first many people to think this, it was impossible, but eventually man's will to fly resulted in us building aircraft.

Hans

Edited for some surplus and some missing words :rolleyes:

[Peskanov]

Can anybody post the definitions of "libertarian free will" and "compatibilist free will", as were used in past threads?
I still think "libertarian free will" definitions is just an abuse of the language. I don't rembenber how the other is defined...

The background question is...How many time will take everybody to accept that our brain is just a meat computer?
Hey, after all it is not a bad one: 100 teraflops, 300 Herz., no fan! :)

BTW, what do you people think about brain prothesis? Does a person with artificial brain parts have free will? I can't think any reason to say "no".

[Dub]

Originally posted by Beleth
Please refain from mocking me. It is disrespectful, and I'd really like to have a respectful discussion about free will on this board for once.

I think that we have a misunderstanding as to our definitions here.

When I say TLOP, I mean the laws of physics that we have derived by observing the universe around us. I do not mean the underlying laws, if they exist, that actually control the universe.

I never said you couldn't. But if you do, you run the risk of being fined.

The laws of traffic have control because if your behavior and the restrictions of the law conflict, it's your behavior that changes, not the law. The behavior that changes is not necessarily that you drive at or less than the posted speed limit; the behavior that changes might be that you give some amount of money (a fine) to the government, or spend some time in a room (a jail cell) selected for you by the legal system.

But that's simply not how TLOP work.

All TLOP can do is predict, and it's my actions that shape TLOP. As we know more about the workings of the universe, as in my previous example regarding velocity, TLOP change.

It's like a policeman following me around saying "On this trip, you will not go above 25." And it just so happens that I spend the entire drive in rush hour on a crowded freeway, where it is impossible for me to go over 25.

It's not the policeman, or his statement, that is preventing me from going more than 25, even though he said it before I started driving. He made a prediction that came true; he had no control himself over how fast I drove.

Again you have still misssed the point I was making. I am fully aware of the prinicples surrounding TLOP.

My usage of TLOP is of the underlying laws, not man's current definiton of them.

You started of the direspect, I merely replied in the same. Treat me like that, I will respond the same, simple. I suggest if you want a serious debate you refrain from preaching to people as if they are stupid, especially when you have mis-understood the point they are trying to make. So dont get on your high horse and tell me how to behave when you're the person that drags down the level of debate to begin with.

[zakur]

Originally posted by Dragonrock
One can only hope.

And if it's true I might just pray and say thank you. To the Logical Goddess™, or some other silly deity. ;)

[whitefork]

Take a legal point of view. For society to function, we assume that all people are responsible for the consequences of their actions with certain well-defined exceptions.

The defense "I was unable to stop myself from commiting this crime because I have no free will" is not permitted. Whether free will is real or an illusion, it's a necessary assumption for our existence as social beings. It may in fact be nothing more than a social construct, but does that make it any less real?

Similarly, one may deny the existence of "natural law" while being a law-abiding individual. CWL and I have disagreed on this point, but he's a lawyer and probably has some deeper insight into the matter than I.

[Peter Soderqvist]

Originally posted by sundog
OK, let's have at it.

Is there such a thing as free will?

Of course we have free will!
When we acquire of age (majority) the meaning of that, is that we are responsible for our acts! How can you hold someone responsible, if his decisions have no merit?
A thermostat is responsible for the temperature level in a building, a heart, or a liver, or a stomach have lot of bodily responsibilities too, and it follows from that, that you are responsible for your actions too! :)

[slimshady2357]

Originally posted by Peskanov
Can anybody post the definitions of "libertarian free will" and "compatibilist free will", as were used in past threads?
I still think "libertarian free will" definitions is just an abuse of the language. I don't rembenber how the other is defined...

Well compatibilist free will is kind of like watered down free will. It has nothing to do with being the ultimate cause of your actions and everything to do with not being constrained. In this sense it is a definition of free will that is 'compatible' with determinism and therefore the name :)

I think an adequate definition to start with (that could be tweaked for more accuracy) would be:

Having free will is not being restrained (physically or through coercion, say) from doing what you want to do.

Now libertarian free will is much harder to define. I think that you would have a wide range of people telling you it cannot be defined, or that no meaningful definition has been ever provided.

For instance, both Victor and Franko hold this view (that libertarian free will has never been meaningfully defined, as far as I know Franko is not a combatibilist, though the definition is so trivial I don't see how anyone couldn't be).

I think to understand libertarian free will you need to see it in a similar way to a fundamental force in nature. My own intuitive belief is that this is the case one way or another. That consciousness is like a fundamental force in reality, that it is like a fountain of spontaneity and creativity into the universe.

Now, like I said, this is merely my intuitive belief, the evidence is highly subjective and I fully understand that what I believe is most likely unfalsifiable. No big deal to me :) I don't use that belief very much in everyday life ;)


The background question is...How many time will take everybody to accept that our brain is just a meat computer?
Hey, after all it is not a bad one: 100 teraflops, 300 Herz., no fan! :)

I'm not sure what 'how many time will take' means :D But I assume you meant a combination of 'how long will it take' and 'how many times will they have to see it' or something like that :D

I don't know.... maybe until there is some conclusive evidence?

BTW, what do you people think about brain prothesis? Does a person with artificial brain parts have free will? I can't think any reason to say "no".

I would say there are a lot of variables in there ;) How much is artificial? when was it installed? What was the change, both from third person and first person persepectives, in the person?

Plus, what version of free will are you talking about? ;) :p

Anyway, that should provide material for you to rip into :D

Adam

edited for spelling

[Samus]

Originally posted by whitefork
You know, when he comes back, everybody's going to be blaming you and DWB with his poll over in Banter. That's it, just for that, I'm going to bump my poll! :)

The problem with free will is that it is ill-defined. When arguing with those that say we don't have free will (viz. Franko and Musclebrains) they want you to adopt a specific definition that molds to their beliefs. If one defines free will as being able to do whatever you want, TLOP be damned, then it makes sense that we don't have free will. I can't jump 50 feet in the air because I feel like it, I'm bound by TLOP.

If you define free will as the ability to look at a situation and make a decision based on what you know and a little bit of chance, then yes, we do have it. Note that the decision is not necessarily the one that provides "maximum perceived benefit" -- how many of us have made stupid decisions?

Overall, I'm with Upchurch on the free will argument, not enough information to provide a good answer.

[LW]

Originally posted by Beleth

When I say TLOP, I mean the laws of physics that we have derived by observing the universe around us. I do not mean the underlying laws, if they exist, that actually control the universe.
But the thing is that the particular poster who started to use the term TLOP in this forum means the underlying laws when he uses it. Or at least I think he does, it is difficult to be certain. This means that when you use the term, a lot of people will think that you too use it for the "underlying reality".

And as for my view of free will, I say that we have at least a very good illusion of free will.

[Peter Soderqvist]

TO LW
What is the difference between just free will, and a very good illusion of free will?

Originally posted by UnrepentantSinner
Aren't there already numerous threads on this subject?

None that haven't been taken over by Franko. That was the point. :)

[LW]

Originally posted by Peter Soderqvist
TO LW
What is the difference between just free will, and a very good illusion of free will?
Well, it is possible that even though I think that I have a free choice over two or more alternatives,
the choice is actually made by some autonomous decision-making part of my brain that I can't conciously control. Furthermore, it is possible that this hypotethical part is deterministic in the sense that given two sets of identical inputs, it will always produce an identical output, so there really isn't a choice at all.

We can go even deeper and note that our brain processes are essentially chemical reactions that happen inside our skulls and that we don't have a concious control over them.

[slimshady2357]

Originally posted by sundog

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by UnrepentantSinner
Aren't there already numerous threads on this subject?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

None that haven't been taken over by Franko. That was the point. :)

And I like how he has no problem starting the 1000th thread on the war, but complains about a new thread on free will :rolleyes:

Adam

[Peskanov]

slimshady,

----
quote:
I think to understand libertarian free will you need to see it in a similar way to a fundamental force in nature. My own intuitive belief is that this is the case one way or another. That consciousness is like a fundamental force in reality, that it is like a fountain of spontaneity and creativity into the universe.
----

I reckon and accept "free will" as an intuitive concept, I only reject the "no cause, no possible determination" aproach most "libertarian free will" defenders take...

I think if we try to define free will following intuition we will get a meaningful concept.
To put my money where my mouth is, here is my bet:

I feel my will is free because my decissions are:
- Influenced but not determined by my past experiences.
- Influenced but not determined by my emotions.
- Influenced but not determined by my reason.
- Influenced by causes I am not full aware of.

This is, I think, a good start to coin a meaningful definition of free will: as the result of lots of factors.

About if this can be formally described, IMO is a question of complexity. The brain is complex, that's all.

[Peskanov]

----
Upchurch said:
My personal opinion? Not enough information to answer the question.
----

----
dwd said:

Overall, I'm with Upchurch on the free will argument, not enough information to provide a good answer.
----

----
slimshady said:
I'm not sure what 'how many time will take' means But I assume you meant a combination of 'how long will it take' and 'how many times will they have to see it' or something like that

I don't know.... maybe until there is some conclusive evidence?
----


We have plenty of information that the brain is just an information cruncher machine, or, if you want, a computer.
What would be 'conclusive evidence' for any of you? A full description of the signals travelling the brain?
I don't need to understand the inner workings of a clock to learn that it is a mechanical device when I see the inside...
So, what information do you feel is lacking?

[Beleth]

Originally posted by Dub
My usage of TLOP is of the underlying laws, not man's current definiton of them.Okay then.

My position is that we have no idea what the underlying laws are. We can only observe the effect these laws have on the universe, and postulate our own set of laws that mimic as accurately as possible the underlying laws.

No matter how accurate the laws we postulate are, they are just predictive shadows of the controlling laws, and do not control anything themselves.

That's how scientists have been describing science since time immemorial. The laws of nature that we know can only predict; they do not control.


-- Edit --
And I apologize if I am coming off as preachy. I have a belief; I am merely attempting to explain it in a polite, rational, understandable manner. I have found that the main reason people disagree with me is that they have a different interpretation of the nature of TLOP than I do... which is the case here.

[Beleth]

Originally posted by Dub
So if, after freely deciding your course of action, you find that its actually not possible (for whatever reason), does that mean you didnt freely decide to take it in the first place? If someone decides to climb a mountain, is it only free-will if they actually do it? Free will is more than just will. More precisely, the expression of free will is more than just the expression of will.

One of Franko's attempts at a reductio ad absurdum argument ends with the Moon having free will. Maybe the Moon wants to do something besides revolve around the Earth, but lacks the ability to do so.

It also goes back to an old childhood evasion:
"I can jump over this 20-foot wall!"
"Okay, prove it!"
"Um, I can do it, I just choose not to do it."

Is there a difference between not willing to do something and not being able to do something? The end effect is the same: the thing is not done. To be honest, I haven't made my mind up yet about this.

[MRC_Hans]

From a materialistic POV, there is only physics. Our brain consists of matter, our "self" consists of the combination of brain and information. Under this premise, free will includes the ability to think freely.

Under a totally deterministic cosmology, even free thought is impossible, it would always be determined by the past state.

Obviously, not all free thoughts can be implemented in real life. Not only physical laws, but human laws, norms, and traditions limit what we choose to do in practice.

"I can jump over this 20-foot wall!"
"Okay, prove it!"
"Um, I can do it, I just choose not to do it."
The free choice here in not the impossible jump, but the decision to try and boost your position by boasting, then when challenged, to try and spread confusion instead. But there can be an underlying true wish to jump 20 feet, and that might make you a pole vaulter later.

Hans

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by sundog
OK, let's have at it.

Is there such a thing as free will?


Ack, I'm too busy to read this whole thread but I love this topic. Perhaps when I have more free time I will come back.

What kind of "free will" do you want, though?

Argh, need more time!! I'll get back here and argue the libertarian view =)

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by whitefork
Let me ask a related question.

Is there human causation?

If we can cause things to happen, whether as a final cause or an intermediate one, do we even need to postulate free will?

Yes because you have not established any premises that connect humans being able to cause things to happen and humans possesing free will.

Originally posted by Dark Cobra
Well...

Free will, as in a magical human power to decide and have sole responsibiliy... No.

Free will, as in your actions not being predetermined... yes.

Free will is not gained by not having your actions predetermined. I will assert that free will is gained by being able to have chosen other then you did choose.

Originally posted by c4ts
I think there is such thing as free will, because failure is so much easier to achieve than success, and I seem to be able to break rules.

I'm glad you summed up your argument in the final clause of that sentance, it makes things so much easier. You seem to be able to break what rules? What does breaking rules (what rules?) have to do with possesing free will?

Originally posted by Beleth
For starters, there are things that curtail or reduce my free will. A jail cell, or a blackmailer, for instance. You can't reduce something that doesn't exist.

Franko's TLOP argument falls apart when you realize that TLOP don't control anything. At best, they predict things. Consider - what happens when an observed natural event conflicts with a law of physics? The law gets revised, not the event. Science is all about knowledge and not at all about control.

You have confused freedom of action with freedom of the will. Freedom of action is the ability to motivate your choice into an action. I can take away your ability to motivate your choice to stand up by tying you down. This is reducing your freedom of action. Just like I can choose to jump to the moon as much as I want but I do not posses the freedom of action to jump to the moon.

If I'm reading TLOP correctly (the laws of physics?) then I'm assuming this Franko person presented the determinist view? If a law is revised then it is not a law, so it was not a law of physics, so we misunderstood what the law was. The laws of physics don't predict anything, they are the causal bond between two events.

Originally posted by Dub
There is a difference between what you want to do, i.e. your will, and what you can actually do (which is constrained for various reasons, e.g other people, laws [TLOPS] etc). I see nothing controlling my ability to think what I want to do (my will). Therefore I am free to 'will' what I want to do. Whether I can actually do what I am 'willing' is besides the point. An athlete may have the 'will' to win, but that doesnt mean he can.

Just because you don't see anything 'controlling' your ability to choose what you want to choose doesn't mean you can will what you to choose.

Originally posted by Dub
Yep, TLOP dont tell you what want to do, they limit what you can do. TLOP are like a policman following you round preventing you from breaking the law. At no point does he tell you what you want to do, he only prevents you from actually breaking the law.

If your brain is simply a collection of chemical reactions then it would appear that you are constrained by your circumstances. Constraint being a controlling influence on your ability to choose what you choose.

Hence you are not able to choose to run for President of the United States of America because you do not want to choose such. But you do not want to choose that because of the ways you were raised and the experiences you have had. You can't exercise control over those things, hence you have no free will and believing that you do does not make it so. It is the laws of physics that bind the causaul chain together, and these laws of physics (by definition) can not be changed.

And if reading this makes you want to run for President you still had no control over my posting this, and this post is what 'constrained' you to choose to run for President.

Originally posted by Sundog
Is free will a meaningful concept if it isn't expressed by actions?

The big question, what is free will? I assert (again in case you missed it) that free will is the ability to choose other then you did choose. It does not matter whether those choices can be translated into actions, that is freedom of action.

Originally posted by Beleth
The Laws of Physics are just the opposite. If a law of physics (Newtonian "velocity increases as a force is applied") conflicts with observable phenomenon (the highest possible velocity is the speed of light), then the law gets changed, not the behavior.

TLOP are our best guesses - our best predictions - as to what the universe is really like. What causes the universe to be the way it is, is beyond what we can observe.


No, the way we apply the laws of physics is to be forced to constantly change them because what we thought was a law really was not. If something violates a law of physics then the thing that we thought was a law of physics really wasn't. We were mistaken in believing that it was.

Originally posted by Dub
Its not backwards at all. It's subtle, so I will try to explain it again. TLOP, as far as we know cannot be broken (this doesnt mean they never can). The policeman in my example is merely preventing the law from being broken. My point, which you have missed, has nothing to do with conflicts between behaviour and the law. I was merely pointing out that how TLOPs do not control free will by the restrictions they place. They only limit what we currently believe is physically possible. You incorrectly state: "the Laws of Traffic has control" the traffic law has no direct control over me at all. If I want to break the speed limit I can, quite easily. I may abide by what the law states, and thus my behaviour is in-directly controlled by it. My point is that 'legal' laws are easily breakable. Therefore I included a policeman following you around preventing you for breaking them. As a direct control. As far as we currently know, it is not possible to break TLOP. Therefore they are not just a writen law, but they cannot be broken (as far as we currently know).


The laws of physics cannot be broken by defintion. If they are broken then they are not and were never a law of physics. It can be debated whether there truly are any laws of physics in that sense, but that is the sense which it is used in.

Originally posted by Beleth
When I say TLOP, I mean the laws of physics that we have derived by observing the universe around us. I do not mean the underlying laws, if they exist, that actually control the universe.


But that is what everyone else means. The underlying laws are the laws of physics. The way we use them is by trying to get as close to those underlying laws as possible.

Originally posted by Beleth
The laws of traffic have control because if your behavior and the restrictions of the law conflict, it's your behavior that changes, not the law. The behavior that changes is not necessarily that you drive at or less than the posted speed limit; the behavior that changes might be that you give some amount of money (a fine) to the government, or spend some time in a room (a jail cell) selected for you by the legal system.


This is not being controlled but being constrained. The circumstances of the situation are such that you are constrained to having few choices, those being: Obey the speed limit or Pay a fine. (simplified, btw).

Originally posted by Peskanov

Can anybody post the definitions of "libertarian free will" and "compatibilist free will", as were used in past threads?
I still think "libertarian free will" definitions is just an abuse of the language. I don't rembenber how the other is defined...



I will make this short:

Compatibilists believe that free will can exist even in a world were everything (humans and human "thoughts) are completely causaully determined.

Libertarians believe that free will cannot exist in such a world, but that we do have free will. This free will comes from an 'agent' that exists outside of these causaul chains. This 'agent' can start causaul chains but is not caused by these same chains.

Originally posted by whitefork

Take a legal point of view. For society to function, we assume that all people are responsible for the consequences of their actions with certain well-defined exceptions.

The defense "I was unable to stop myself from commiting this crime because I have no free will" is not permitted. Whether free will is real or an illusion, it's a necessary assumption for our existence as social beings. It may in fact be nothing more than a social construct, but does that make it any less real?

A very interesting argument but not one that can be used to prove free will. Societies are more then capable of believing false things. Take the Aryan soceities of the past (and present) and conflicting beliefs among societies.

Originally posted by Peter Soderqvist


Of course we have free will!
When we acquire of age (majority) the meaning of that, is that we are responsible for our acts! How can you hold someone responsible, if his decisions have no merit?
A thermostat is responsible for the temperature level in a building, a heart, or a liver, or a stomach have lot of bodily responsibilities too, and it follows from that, that you are responsible for your actions too!

I assert that free will has nothing to do with moral responsibility. You are morally responsible if you respond to reason.

You have three bank tellers. There is a bank robbery at each bank. In all three robberies the robber pulls a gun on the bank teller and command them to give him all the money.

Teller #1 sees the gun and his brain shuts down. He is so afraid of being shot that he no longer considers what the robber is asking, he simply does it. He would do whatever the robber told him to do in that instant. He is not morally responsible, he has no free will.

Teller #2 sees the gun and considers all his options. He decides that the best option for him to take is to give the robber all of the money. He is morally responsible. We may consider all the options and decide not to hold him blameworthy but he is morally reponsible.

Teller #3 sees the gun but he knows that the bank robber is going to use this money to blow up school busses. He considers his options and decides to give the robber all of the money. He i morally responsible. The bank robber blows up many many school busses. Now it is not so clear if this bank teller (who knew what was going to happen) is blameworthy or not.

Originally posted by slimshady2357



Of course we have free will!
Well compatibilist free will is kind of like watered down free will. It has nothing to do with being the ultimate cause of your actions and everything to do with not being constrained. In this sense it is a definition of free will that is 'compatible' with determinism and therefore the name

Now libertarian free will is much harder to define. I think that you would have a wide range of people telling you it cannot be defined, or that no meaningful definition has been ever provided.

For compatabilism I believe that the generally agreed upon starting point is A. J. Ayer's Philisophical Essays and an excellent view of Libertarianism can be found in Roderick Chicholm's Free Will.

I'm also a libertarian. Libertarians are not compatabilists.



Ack. Thats enough, better get back to work.

[Beleth]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
Originally posted by Beleth
For starters, there are things that curtail or reduce my free will. A jail cell, or a blackmailer, for instance.You have confused freedom of action with freedom of the will. Freedom of action is the ability to motivate your choice into an action. I can take away your ability to motivate your choice to stand up by tying you down. This is reducing your freedom of action. Just like I can choose to jump to the moon as much as I want but I do not posses the freedom of action to jump to the moon.So then how does one demonstrate freedom of the will except through freedom of action? If free will were just merely the exercising of will - the ability to make a choice but not to act upon that choice - then it becomes a meaningless concept, IMHO. The Moon really could have free will, but since it doesn't have freedom of action, it appears that it does not have free will.

I'm not saying you are wrong. It's an interesting path to go down, if nothing else. I'm just saying that I'm not yet convinced.

If I'm reading TLOP correctly (the laws of physics?) then I'm assuming this Franko person presented the determinist view?He calls himself a Fatalist, but yeah.

If a law is revised then it is not a law, so it was not a law of physics, so we misunderstood what the law was. The laws of physics don't predict anything, they are the causal bond between two events.Okay. The true, actual, behind-the-scenes Laws of Physics that actually control the universe cannot be revised, true. But we as humans and scientists and observers of the universe have no idea - cannot possibly have an idea - of what those Laws are.

The best we can scientifically do is come up with theories as to what those Controlling Laws are, and revise those theories as new observations are made that clash with the current theories. This malleability is science's big strength, and is what separates it from magic and religion.


The big question, what is free will? I assert (again in case you missed it) that free will is the ability to choose other then you did choose. It does not matter whether those choices can be translated into actions, that is freedom of action.And I assert again that this definition of free will is insufficient, as it gives everything in the universe the potential to have free will, and makes free will untestable. Maybe the Moon chooses one day to fly out into space. Maybe it chose to fly out into space tens of millions of years ago. It hasn't, because it does not have the freedom of action to do so; and because it hasn't, because it has followed the same theories of orbital mechanics that were developed long ago, we say that it doesn't have free will.



When I say TLOP, I mean the laws of physics that we have derived by observing the universe around us. I do not mean the underlying laws, if they exist, that actually control the universe.But that is what everyone else means. The underlying laws are the laws of physics. The way we use them is by trying to get as close to those underlying laws as possible.Yeah, I know. I need to come up with a new phrase to describe what I mean. I have been using "theory" in this post, but I think it's making me sound too much like a Creationist.



This is not being controlled but being constrained. The circumstances of the situation are such that you are constrained to having few choices, those being: Obey the speed limit or Pay a fine. (simplified, btw).What is control, then, but a means of constraining something else?

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Thank you for the reply :)

Originally posted by Beleth
You have confused freedom of action with freedom of the will. Freedom of action is the ability to motivate your choice into an action. I can take away your ability to motivate your choice to stand up by tying you down. This is reducing your freedom of action. Just like I can choose to jump to the moon as much as I want but I do not posses the freedom of action to jump to the moon.So then how does one demonstrate freedom of the will except through freedom of action? If free will were just merely the exercising of will - the ability to make a choice but not to act upon that choice - then it becomes a meaningless concept, IMHO. The Moon really could have free will, but since it doesn't have freedom of action, it appears that it does not have free will.

I'm not saying you are wrong. It's an interesting path to go down, if nothing else. I'm just saying that I'm not yet convinced.

[/QUOTE]

I suppose we would have to say that if the moon has the capability to choose then it could posses free will. It may posses no freedom of action what-so-ever but it could posses free will. It appears (if we seperate the definitions) that we could desire both freedom of the will and freedom of action.

If we seperate them then freedom of the will is still important. If you cannot choose what you choose (say you are a computer program that can only choose what you have been programmed to choose) but have complete freedom of action then we may think that it would be nice to have that freedom of the will. Although, we may never realize that we can't choose what 'we' want to choose.

Really quickly, I assert (in the libertarian view) that the 'we' above is really the 'agent' which is special in that it can choose without being caused to do so. What this 'agent' is, I can only speculate.


He calls himself a Fatalist, but yeah.


Really? Is he still here? I have not heard any of fatalist still proffering their belief systems for some time. They mostly are just ribbed off until they don't want to talk anymore :)


Okay. The true, actual, behind-the-scenes Laws of Physics that actually control the universe cannot be revised, true. But we as humans and scientists and observers of the universe have no idea - cannot possibly have an idea - of what those Laws are.

The best we can scientifically do is come up with theories as to what those Controlling Laws are, and revise those theories as new observations are made that clash with the current theories. This malleability is science's big strength, and is what separates it from magic and religion.



That sounds true. If we use two definitions for the laws of physics it will just create a confusion. So how about we continue to use TLOP as your definition (what we humans do know) and we will call these underlying laws the laws of nature TLON.



And I assert again that this definition of free will is insufficient, as it gives everything in the universe the potential to have free will, and makes free will untestable. Maybe the Moon chooses one day to fly out into space. Maybe it chose to fly out into space tens of millions of years ago. It hasn't, because it does not have the freedom of action to do so; and because it hasn't, because it has followed the same theories of orbital mechanics that were developed long ago, we say that it doesn't have free will.


Perhaps it is untestable. We will never know for 100% guaranteed. But we can still argue about it :). Ultimately I assert that given this (untestable) argument that "free will is the ability to have chosen other then you did choose" this means if human beings are completely under the laws of nature TLON then we cannot posses free will.


But that is what everyone else means. The underlying laws are the laws of physics. The way we use them is by trying to get as close to those underlying laws as possible.Yeah, I know. I need to come up with a new phrase to describe what I mean. I have been using "theory" in this post, but I think it's making me sound too much like a Creationist.


Hopefully we can agree on TLON for this new phrase?

What is control, then, but a means of constraining something else?

Indeed, I agree that control entails constraint. Ultimate constraint. I think that perhaps we can also agree that constraint does not entail control. So anything that is controlled is fully constrained but anything that is constrained (perhaps not fully) is not controlled.


For example if some crazy co-worker of my work points a gun at my head and tells me I must not eat a turkey sandwich for lunch or he will kill me then I am constrained to not eat that turkey sandwich. But I am not controlled to do so.

If we say that I believe my crazy co-worker is serious then do I have freedom of the will in that decision?

Let me reword this because I did a poor job.

I am about to choose my sandwich for lunch. The deli caterer has two sandwiches, one is turkey and one is ham. The person standing behind me puts a gun to my head and orders me to choose the ham or he will shoot me. I believe him.

So I am constrained but I am not controlled.

Am I free? I would say I am not free. I would say that any reasonable person who is placed in my identical circumstances would choose the ham sandwich. So I choose the ham sandwich. Unless I am unreasonable I would never choose the turkey.

Now if I am unreasonable then am I free? I would say no. In that case we would say that any unreasonable person who is unreasonable in exactly the same way as I am would make exactly the same choice I did.

It would appear to me that the combination of circumstances with human beings being posses of a certain type of reasonableness renders us un-free.

We have to be able to choose other then we did choose, and if anyone who is exactly like us would choose exactly as we did in the exact circumstances then their is not any way for us to choose other then we did.

That is, there is not any other way unless we introduce something else. This something else is the 'agent'. This 'agent' is not bound causually by TLON but is, instead, able to create causaul chains without being caused to create them. This 'agent' allows us the freedom of the will because now any reasonable person would not have chose exactly as I did. Because their is this 'agent' that exists outside of TLON and this 'agent' allows us the freedom of the will.

Here is a libertarian argument that I believe. I believe so because I want to have free will and do not believe that any other argument will give me free will.

[Hellcat]

No Free will is an illusion.

edited to add Free will, saves destoying brain cells thinking

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Radiating Sunflower
No it is an illusion.

What is an illusion?

[BillyTK]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
If we use two definitions for the laws of physics it will just create a confusion. So how about we continue to use TLOP as your definition (what we humans do know) and we will call these underlying laws the laws of nature TLON.


I think it was Evildave (apologies to whoever it was if it wasn't) who came up with the differentiation between PLOP--the perfect laws of physics--or the way that the universe works; and TLOP--the laws of physics as we understand them.

Another differentiation (sorry to whoever came up wtih this but I carnt remember your name :( ) is the difference between the map (our understanding of the laws of physics) and the terrain (the laws of physics as they exist).

Anyway, you kind of referred to the agency/structure debate (big sociology thing about the relationship of individuals to society but fits in here). I've got to say I get frustrated by some of the free will arguments because they're so either/or; either human action is wholly determined and there is no free will (it's all structure) or human action is not determined and there is free will (it's all agency) and it seems to miss the point that they're mutually dependent: experience constrains our actions--our actions depend on past experience--but also enables it--without past experience we'd have nothing to base our actions on.

[Hellcat]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot


What is an illusion?
You :D

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by BillyTK


I think it was Evildave (apologies to whoever it was if it wasn't) who came up with the differentiation between PLOP--the perfect laws of physics--or the way that the universe works; and TLOP--the laws of physics as we understand them.

Another differentiation (sorry to whoever came up wtih this but I carnt remember your name :( ) is the difference between the map (our understanding of the laws of physics) and the terrain (the laws of physics as they exist).

Anyway, you kind of referred to the agency/structure debate (big sociology thing about the relationship of individuals to society but fits in here). I've got to say I get frustrated by some of the free will arguments because they're so either/or; either human action is wholly determined and there is no free will (it's all structure) or human action is not determined and there is free will (it's all agency) and it seems to miss the point that they're mutually dependent: experience constrains our actions--our actions depend on past experience--but also enables it--without past experience we'd have nothing to base our actions on.

So you are saying that without experiences we would have nothing to base our decisions on? So we are only the makeup of our experienes as filtered through our perceptions (to add the agency)? Then we do not have free will, as I defined it.

You certainly may define free will other then I did, but how would you define it?

Again, the definition I am asserting is that:

I posses freedom of the will if I could have done other then I did do.

If my structure/agency wholly constrain my actions then I could not have done other then I did do, and hence (by that definition) I do not posses freedom of the will.

I am not saying that we are not influenced by such things. I am only saying that to enable freedom of the will we have to introduce something else. That something else is the 'agent' and is something that is not constrained by circumstances. That something else would not be constrained by structure/agency either.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Radiating Sunflower

You :D

I do now know why so many of the people on this forum appear to be so abrupt and rude. I do know that I have never had four people put on an ignore list in such a short time.

I will assume that your previous response was serious and address it as such.

Anyone can argue that anything is an illusion. I could argue that everything in the universe takes place in my own mind and that nothing but my mind is real. You can never prove me wrong. How terribly interesting.

But why would we believe such a thing?

I will address your concern in a similar light. Why should we believe that our free will is a simple illusion?

To address it in the concern of the incompatabilist (as you presented no other concern) we have no reason to ever believe that free will is an illusion.

The incompatabilist assumes that freedom of the will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. So if determinism is true then we have no free will.

Now consider this question:

Is determinism true?

Yes or No are our posibilities.

Now let us assume that Yes is the answer and we have no freedom of the will.

Should we believe in freedom of the will?

Yes - We believe something that is not true. But we have no choice to believe it or not because we do not have free will. Therefore I do not have a choice to believe that freedom of the will is not true.

No - We are believing what is true and can act according to the truth of the universe.

Now let us assume that the answer to Is determinism true? is No.

Should we believe in freedom of the will?

Yes - We are believing something that (currently) appears to be correct. We are basing our actions on what appears to be true.

No - We are believing something that currently appears to be false. Our actions are based on a false notion, and consequently we are mistaken.


It appears that unless we have freedom of the will then what we believe is not up to us in any meaningful way. If I decide to believe in freedom of the will or not then I did not have the possibility of deciding otherwise. That was the only decision that I would have made.

[Ossai]

Rusty_the_boy_robot
The big question, what is free will? I assert (again in case you missed it) that free will is the ability to choose other then you did choose. It does not matter whether those choices can be translated into actions, that is freedom of action. Or to put it another way. Person A can choose X or not X, law of excluded middle.

On outside observer can only detect the after effects of free will, ie actions. By observing the actions of others we can make logical guesses on whether or not that person is being controlled but we can never know with 100% certainty.

Ossai

[BillyTK]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot


So you are saying that without experiences we would have nothing to base our decisions on? So we are only the makeup of our experienes as filtered through our perceptions (to add the agency)? Then we do not have free will, as I defined it.

W-e-e-l-l, basically yeah, without experience we have nothing to base our experience on, but that doesn't mean we carnt have free will, just that our choices are necessarily limited, though without that which limits our choices, we would have no basis to make a choice at all... But I admit I wobble somewhere between free will as a necessary political illusion and something else... which I'm still working on ;)

Again, the definition I am asserting is that:

I posses freedom of the will if I could have done other then I did do.

Which I'd actually agree with. Just because my experience informs my decision-making, it doesn't mean I am compelled to obey whatever decision my experience produces. I could always not act on that decision.

If my structure/agency wholly constrain my actions then I could not have done other then I did do, and hence (by that definition) I do not posses freedom of the will.

I am not saying that we are not influenced by such things. I am only saying that to enable freedom of the will we have to introduce something else. That something else is the 'agent' and is something that is not constrained by circumstances. That something else would not be constrained by structure/agency either.

Apologies if my explanation was foggy; structure/agency is a debate about the extent to which we are constrained and the extent to which we are free, rather than a thing which acts on our actions. It's a case at one end you have structure which constrains all actions and no agency, and at the other end you have agents who have total agency (ability to act) without any constraints, kinda like this:

STRUCTURE<---------------------------------------------->AGENCY

with your unconstrained agent sat right over the righthandside of the diagram... is that clearer? :)

Edited for errant symbols

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot


I do now know why so many of the people on this forum appear to be so abrupt and rude. I do know that I have never had four people put on an ignore list in such a short time.

I will assume that your previous response was serious and address it as such.

Anyone can argue that anything is an illusion. I could argue that everything in the universe takes place in my own mind and that nothing but my mind is real. You can never prove me wrong. How terribly interesting.

But why would we believe such a thing?

I will address your concern in a similar light. Why should we believe that our free will is a simple illusion?

To address it in the concern of the incompatabilist (as you presented no other concern) we have no reason to ever believe that free will is an illusion.

The incompatabilist assumes that freedom of the will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. So if determinism is true then we have no free will.

Now consider this question:

Is determinism true?

Yes or No are our possibilities.

Now let us assume that Yes is the answer and we have no freedom of the will.

Should we believe in freedom of the will?

Yes - We believe something that is not true. But we have no choice to believe it or not because we do not have free will. Therefore I do not have a choice to believe that freedom of the will is not true.

No - We are believing what is true and can act according to the truth of the universe.

Now let us assume that the answer to Is determinism true? is No.

Should we believe in freedom of the will?

Yes - We are believing something that (currently) appears to be correct. We are basing our actions on what appears to be true.


Smilies indicate jovial nature:D

Explanation, In a nutshell you are an illusion, I cannot see you, if i cant see you I therefore must say you do not exist and here of become categorized as an illusion. I can see the words but I have no guarantee you wrote them as you do of me. An illusion


Free will I think not entirely sure I can't find my notes on it to clarify (I apologize if its inaccurate) it is Dr Daniel Dennet who wrote the book Freedom Evolved which if I have it the right way round argues for free will existing based on Richard Dawkins 'The selfish Gene' philosophy, and Prof Steven Rose who wrote 'From Brains to Consciousness, and how quantum mechanics which is supporting Karl poppers theory apply to free will blah blah(??) argue against free will existence.

Frankly the Darwinism approach that free will exists seems implausible, but on the other hand could free will and science co exist as a possibility?

Originally posted by Biker Babe


Frankly the Darwinism approach that free will exists seems implausible, but on the other hand could free will and science co exist as a possibility?

Oh my God, a SMART Biker Babe. Yowzah! Chubbie city!

Coming to America anytime soon? :D

Oh crap, I hijacked my own thread again. :

Originally posted by sundog


Oh my God, a SMART Biker Babe. Yowzah! Chubbie city!

Coming to America anytime soon? :D

Oh crap, I hijacked my own thread again. :

:p nope

you bad :mad:

[Loki]

Does Free Will exist?

*At least* compatibilist Free Will exists, because it defines itself into existence. It also properly places Identity into the causal chain. (And it doesn't invalidate moral repsonsiblity.)

Personally, I doubt Libertarian Free Will exists, on two grounds. First, as Rusty points out, it requires the existence of an "agent" that is not bound to the physical world. What this agent is, and how it could 'operate' are undefined (and undefinable?). Second, the ability to be able to "choose other than I chose" is a statement that implies behaviour that is neither random nor determined behaviour. Also, it seems to reduce the identity of the chooser to a partial participant, rather than an owner, of the decision.

[Max560]

Does Free Will exist?

Suppose that time stopped, and the universe as we know it is put through the cosmic photocopier, and 999 999 copies are made. These copies are exact copies, with all particles, waves, etc. aligned in perfect position.

Time starts up again, and gets paused again 20 years later.

Would all 1 000 000 universes still be identical?

Would every living thing on earth or elsewhere be present and accounted for in each universe? Would they have identical lives across universes?

Is it possible to believe that there would be differences, and still be a fatalist?

[Frenchy]

Does the Meme theory dispel free will notions?

[Beleth]

Originally posted by Max560
Suppose that time stopped, and the universe as we know it is put through the cosmic photocopier, and 999 999 copies are made. These copies are exact copies, with all particles, waves, etc. aligned in perfect position.The uncertainty principle precludes doing this, though. You can't determine everything about a particle with exact precision.

So because you can't do this, in 20 years your million copies wouldn't look like each other.

[Max560]

Originally posted by Beleth
The uncertainty principle precludes doing this, though. You can't determine everything about a particle with exact precision.

So because you can't do this, in 20 years your million copies wouldn't look like each other.

Would that be the fatal blow to Fatalism?

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by Max560


Would that be the fatal blow to Fatalism?

Yes.


Hans

[BillyTK]

Originally posted by Loki
Does Free Will exist?

*At least* compatibilist Free Will exists, because it defines itself into existence. It also properly places Identity into the causal chain. (And it doesn't invalidate moral repsonsiblity.)

Personally, I doubt Libertarian Free Will exists, on two grounds. First, as Rusty points out, it requires the existence of an "agent" that is not bound to the physical world. What this agent is, and how it could 'operate' are undefined (and undefinable?). Second, the ability to be able to "choose other than I chose" is a statement that implies behaviour that is neither random nor determined behaviour. Also, it seems to reduce the identity of the chooser to a partial participant, rather than an owner, of the decision.

Interesting comments. But isn't "choose other than I chose" an axiom of compatibilist free will? If I couldn't choose otherwise then how could I be said to be responsible for my actions?

Should I head back to the shallow end? ;)

[Loki]

BillyTK,

Should I head back to the shallow end?
No, it's too crowded here - you have to stay up there in the deep end for a while.

But isn't "choose other than I chose" an axiom of compatibilist free will?
My understanding is exactly the opposite of this - if reality exists in such a way that *I* could conceiveably have chosen a different opton from the one I did chose, then in what sense is the choice the result of *I*?

Hmmm...that doesn't read too well! Let me try again.

Imagine a situation where I have to make a decision. I weigh up all the options, and just as I'm about to decide, we "hit the pause button" on the "video-o-life" machine (patent pending). We then "unpause" the tape, and an observer notes what my decision is. Then we rewind the tape, run it up to the same point, and hit pause again. Now, even though *nothing* at all has changed, Libertarian Free Will says that, when we unpause the tape, the decision may be different the second time round. What then does it say about *me* if my decisions can change for no reason at all?

If I couldn't choose otherwise then how could I be said to be responsible for my actions?
Because any decision you make requires *you* to be part of the process. This makes the decision yours. Compatibilism equates the "degree of responsilbity" to the "degree of external coercion".

Now if you'll excuse, me, I need to go get my philosophical life-jacket checked - it's getting a bit deep around here...

[Max560]

Originally posted by Loki
BillyTK,



Imagine a situation where I have to make a decision. I weigh up all the options, and just as I'm about to decide, we "hit the pause button" on the "video-o-life" machine (patent pending). We then "unpause" the tape, and an observer notes what my decision is. Then we rewind the tape, run it up to the same point, and hit pause again. Now, even though *nothing* at all has changed, Libertarian Free Will says that, when we unpause the tape, the decision may be different the second time round. What then does it say about *me* if my decisions can change for no reason at all?

Now if you'll excuse, me, I need to go get my philosophical life-jacket checked - it's getting a bit deep around here...

I need my philisophical waterwings.

If you are talking about a literal recording of the branching paths you have chosen and keep rewinding it, there would be no change in what your decisions were. In other words, the future has already taken place.

If you are talking about going back in time, then the movie of your life is still being written.

Given the lack of precision in the design of our brain, where a neuron will fire when roughly X number of excitatory synapses relese roughly Y amount of neurotransmitters, you might make roughly the same decisions most of the time (if you could rewind time that is). I think that what this says about *you* is that you are making decisions as well as you can with the equipment you have. The external observer would never see you make the same decisions no matter how may times they skipped back in time.

Any desire to have definate purpose for your actions would require you to be a much simpler machine, operated by someone else.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
BillyTK,


No, it's too crowded here - you have to stay up there in the deep end for a while.


My understanding is exactly the opposite of this - if reality exists in such a way that *I* could conceiveably have chosen a different opton from the one I did chose, then in what sense is the choice the result of *I*?

Hmmm...that doesn't read too well! Let me try again.

Imagine a situation where I have to make a decision. I weigh up all the options, and just as I'm about to decide, we "hit the pause button" on the "video-o-life" machine (patent pending). We then "unpause" the tape, and an observer notes what my decision is. Then we rewind the tape, run it up to the same point, and hit pause again. Now, even though *nothing* at all has changed, Libertarian Free Will says that, when we unpause the tape, the decision may be different the second time round. What then does it say about *me* if my decisions can change for no reason at all?


Because any decision you make requires *you* to be part of the process. This makes the decision yours. Compatibilism equates the "degree of responsilbity" to the "degree of external coercion".

Now if you'll excuse, me, I need to go get my philosophical life-jacket checked - it's getting a bit deep around here...

To bring up the identity of the self we must then say that "I" (according to the libertarian) must be the "agent". The "agent" is what provides identity for human beings.

You say that "my decision can change for no reason at all" but that is not so. It changed because the "agent" created a differing causal chain. The "agent", of course, must be such that it cannot be defined (by human beings). It certainly sounds implausable, but considering that we have free will it is the only plausable explanation.

Compatabilists don't grant free will.

For example if we are to accept that being coerced eliminates your free will, then why are we only allowing other human beings to coerce someone?

What if I am touring the Grand Canyon, Arizona, America, and in a slice of time I am looking up and see a boulder falling. This boulder is falling in such a way that any reasonable person (or any person who's 'reasonableness' is identical to mine) would believe that this boulder is going to crush the person next to me (Fred). Also any reasonable person would believe that given the boulder's rate of descent the only way to prevent the boulder from falling on Fred is to push him out of the way. Unfortunately their is a cactus patch on the other side of Fred. Again, any reasonable person believes that Fred must be pushed hard enough that he will connect with the cactus patch.

Now any reasonable person (or person who is reasonable in exactly the same way as me) would have their actions constrained to:

1) Push Fred into the cactus patch and out of the way of the boulder.
2) Not push Fred into the cactus patch and he gets smashed by the boulder.

Now the compatabilist accounts would claim that I have free will because no "person" is constraining me. However, it is apparent that the circumstance is constraining me. I can create more scenarios that eliminate Fred and only have me as well. But I must get back to work.

The compatabilist's idea that constraint is related to freedom of the will may be true, but without an agent that is unaffected by these circumstances we do not have freedom of the will.

It really comes down to it is this:

1) I have free will.

~~~~~

n) There must be an "agent"

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Beleth
The uncertainty principle precludes doing this, though. You can't determine everything about a particle with exact precision.

So because you can't do this, in 20 years your million copies wouldn't look like each other. .


Yes but if we assume that in a slice of time everything is the same and if we continue to view that slice of time everything remains as it was then we can do it, we just have to word the clause differently.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
Second, the ability to be able to "choose other than I chose" is a statement that implies behaviour that is neither random nor determined behaviour

If all behaviour is random then we have no free will.

If all behaviour is determined then we have no free will.

If behaviour is a mixture of random/determined then we have no free will.

Free will requires "something else" which is what the "agent" is.

How can a combination of random/determined behaviour result in free will?

[Loki]

Rusty,

If all behaviour is random then we have no free will.

If all behaviour is determined then we have no free will.

If behaviour is a mixture of random/determined then we have no free will.

Free will requires "something else" which is what the "agent" is.

Yes, a pretty simple expression of Libertarian Free Will (LFW). I assume you have no issue with the following two points?

1. LFW requires the existence of an 'agent'
2. This agent cannot be deterministic, random, or a combination of these two, in nature/behaviour/process. In short, this *must* place the agent beyond our (current) understanding of the universe.

If the above two points are true then (to me) LFW is illogical, undefined, and essentially an 'empty' definition. First, the existence of the 'agent' is undetectable, except by inference. Second, the nature of the agent defies logical description, since you've eliminated the only possible choices when you rule out determined, randon, and 'combination'. An undetectable 'thing' that has an undefineable behaviour doesn't really explain much, to me.

1) I have (libertarian) free will.
~~~~~
n) There must be an "agent"
Well, there is at least one other possible outcome here :

1) I have (libertarian) free will.
~~~~~
n) There is no "agent", so LFW is an illusion.

You favour the first conclusion (LFW) essentially because of your intuition - but this is far from a proof. I always like to use the "Monty Hall problem" as an perfect example of how human intuition can fail dramatically.

I favour the alternative (Compatibilism) because it is logical - it 'works' whether the "true nature" of the universe is deterministic, random, or a combination - or even if (some) theistic options are true. It's also consistent with the observed nature of the universe, and does not require the addition of a mysterious "agent" into reality.

Compatabilists don't grant free will.

For example if we are to accept that being coerced eliminates your free will, then why are we only allowing other human beings to coerce someone?
Needless to say, I don't agree, and the answer to this seems simple enough - you introduced "freedom of action" and "freedom of will". Well, "freedom of will" is a purely human concept (it doesn't apply to molecules, for example), and therefore the coercion lies in the realm of humans. No one thinks that if gravity drags me down onto your head that I'm responsible for assaulting you. Why does compatibilism limit coercion to humans? Well, because we're talking about a human concept.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
...But there can be an underlying true wish to jump 20 feet, and that might make you a pole vaulter later.

Hans

So true. However, restating the obvious, as a materialist please ask yourself, "at what level of reality did this wish/prayer/setting of goal occur: neuronal, biochemical, other, and what was cause, what was effect, what was "free will" agent?".

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by hammegk


So true. However, restating the obvious, as a materialist please ask yourself, "at what level of reality did this wish/prayer/setting of goal occur: neuronal, biochemical, other, and what was cause, what was effect, what was "free will" agent?". And what is your question? Does it matter if I know, or don't know, exactly how my brain is able to do this? Why should I doubt that is is able to, since I observe that it does?

Hans

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
Rusty,


Yes, a pretty simple expression of Libertarian Free Will (LFW). I assume you have no issue with the following two points?

1. LFW requires the existence of an 'agent'
2. This agent cannot be deterministic, random, or a combination of these two, in nature/behaviour/process. In short, this *must* place the agent beyond our (current) understanding of the universe.

If the above two points are true then (to me) LFW is illogical, undefined, and essentially an 'empty' definition. First, the existence of the 'agent' is undetectable, except by inference. Second, the nature of the agent defies logical description, since you've eliminated the only possible choices when you rule out determined, randon, and 'combination'. An undetectable 'thing' that has an undefineable behaviour doesn't really explain much, to me.



What about quantum physics? It's funny how compatabilist one day learn about quantum physics and go "oh ****" hey it must be random! It can't be that there is our TLOP that are not affecting quantum and that there is Q(uantum)TLOP that are not effecting us? Tell me, if there is quantum physics and we can learn how these quantum interact with non-Q then is it a large stretch to imagine that there is quantum, non-Q, and agent? And possibly more?

Materialism on this board is the flawed version of materialism. Materialism only means that all things can be percieved or reduced to such a state that they can be percieved. The agent can fit with this view, we may never percieve the agent but we may be able to reduce it to such a state that it may be percieved.

The agent can be in a causal chains also. It simply cannot be in causal chains that are orginiating from this worlds set of TLOP. Perhaps the agent is quantum agent particles in the brain and there is a QTLOP that are affecting them.

The agent must simply be in possestion of a one-way street of causality. But do not confuse causality with effects. The TLOP can affect the "agent" but they cannot transfer that cause. Whatever is the cause cannot be transfered acrossed to the agent, but the agent can be affected. The causal chains it introduces into this world, however, cannot be continuations of causal chains from this world.

For example, if I am thirsty due to TLOP there is nothing to stop the "agent" from recognizing that I am thirsty. Then the "agent" can decide whether or not to introduce a new causal chain that will lead me to get a glass of water. Or the "agent" can introduce a new causal chain that lead me to not get a glass of water. Choice can only truly be provided by an agent that is not in the causal chains of TLOP.


Well, there is at least one other possible outcome here :

1) I have (libertarian) free will.
~~~~~
n) There is no "agent", so LFW is an illusion.

You favour the first conclusion (LFW) essentially because of your intuition - but this is far from a proof. I always like to use the "Monty Hall problem" as an perfect example of how human intuition can fail dramatically.



There is no reason to not believe we have free will. It is simple problem that everyone knows for thousands of years:

I have free will.

TRUE- Then I'm correct, good for me.
FALSE- Then I'm incorrect, but I don't have the free will to correct myself. Since I do not have free will but believe I do then I wa going to believe that anyway and it is folly to worry about things that cannot be altered.

You can fill in the TRUE/FALSE for "I don't have free will" yourself.


I favour the alternative (Compatibilism) because it is logical - it 'works' whether the "true nature" of the universe is deterministic, random, or a combination - or even if (some) theistic options are true. It's also consistent with the observed nature of the universe, and does not require the addition of a mysterious "agent" into reality.


Needless to say, I don't agree, and the answer to this seems simple enough - you introduced "freedom of action" and "freedom of will". Well, "freedom of will" is a purely human concept (it doesn't apply to molecules, for example), and therefore the coercion lies in the realm of humans. No one thinks that if gravity drags me down onto your head that I'm responsible for assaulting you. Why does compatibilism limit coercion to humans? Well, because we're talking about a human concept.

So what about the boulder? The boulder is going to fall on Fred, I push Fred out of the way. Let us examine a compatabilist:

Compatabilist will say, "I did what I chose, therefore my choice was translated into action and I am free." Wrong, that is freedom of action.

Frankfurt-compatbilist will say, "I chose what I chose, therefore my choice was based on a 2nd order choice, therefore I am free."

But Frankfurt was mistaken and confused. He say that 2nd order choice -> 1st order choice = freedom of the will. Well what leads to 2nd order choice but constraining circumstances? If I must go through and destroy Frankfurt confusgion again I will.

Quickly it is easy to see that if we give 3rd order -> 2nd order, then we get 4th order -> 3rd order, etc.. etc.. But there must be a limit, otherwise we must create something that can not posses such limits and we may as well call this an agent. We are then using Libertarian views anyway.

Or we can say "you can decisevely identify yourself" which has no meaning other then to say "shut down reasoning" that I can think of. If you wish to get into details please say so and we shall do that.

All compatabilists are confused.

[Loki]

Rusty,

All compatabilists are confused.
After reading your post, this is somewhat true, thought not for the reasons you might think.

Tell me, if there is quantum physics and we can learn how these quantum interact with non-Q then is it a large stretch to imagine that there is quantum, non-Q, and agent? And possibly more?
I'm sure you understand the issue, but you seem confused here - QM offers nothing to the Libertarian, and presents no issue for compatibilism.

The issue revolves around the nature of the agent.

The agent must simply be in possestion of a one-way street of causality.
...
The causal chains it introduces into this world, however, cannot be continuations of causal chains from this world.
...
Then the "agent" can decide whether or not to introduce a new causal chain that will lead me to get a glass of water. Or the "agent" can introduce a new causal chain that lead me to not get a glass of water.
But how does the agent decide which causal chain to introduce? You have already said that the process by which the agent decides which causal chain to introduce is not determined, not random, and not a combination. Since that exhausts the list of logical options, doesn't that leave the agent as 'illogical'?

There is no reason to not believe we have free will.
I am assuming that whenever you write "free will" you mean libertarian free will. Sure, you can 'believe' anything you want. If you wish to believ in something you cannot define, cannot preceive, and cannot describe in any detail at all, then by all means do so. Compatibilism seeks to go one better, and to understand the issue, rather than surrender.

But there must be a limit, otherwise we must create something that can not posses such limits and we may as well call this an agent.
I'm not sure I follow you here - the limit seems clear to me, and has already been mentioned. Free Will exists in the realm of human affairs, and no where else. It makes no sense to me to try and bring physical constraints into a Free Will discussion.

Or we can say "you can decisevely identify yourself" which has no meaning other then to say "shut down reasoning" that I can think of. If you wish to get into details please say so and we shall do that
I'm having trouble deciphering these sentences. Perhaps you do need to 'get into some details', because I have no clear idea what you are trying to say here.

[BillyTK]

Originally posted by Loki
BillyTK,


No, it's too crowded here - you have to stay up there in the deep end for a while.


My understanding is exactly the opposite of this - if reality exists in such a way that *I* could conceiveably have chosen a different opton from the one I did chose, then in what sense is the choice the result of *I*?

Hmmm...that doesn't read too well! Let me try again.

Imagine a situation where I have to make a decision. I weigh up all the options, and just as I'm about to decide, we "hit the pause button" on the "video-o-life" machine (patent pending). We then "unpause" the tape, and an observer notes what my decision is. Then we rewind the tape, run it up to the same point, and hit pause again. Now, even though *nothing* at all has changed, Libertarian Free Will says that, when we unpause the tape, the decision may be different the second time round. What then does it say about *me* if my decisions can change for no reason at all?


Because any decision you make requires *you* to be part of the process. This makes the decision yours. Compatibilism equates the "degree of responsilbity" to the "degree of external coercion".

Now if you'll excuse, me, I need to go get my philosophical life-jacket checked - it's getting a bit deep around here...

Hey! Look at my philosophical water wings! No, I'm not waving... ;)

Thanks for your thoughtful reply. I might be coming unstuck on definitions of words like determined and causal. My understanding of compatibilism was that whilst decisions are causal (dependent on environment/prior states) they are not determined (dictated by environment/prior states). If determinism was the case with behaviour then I wouldn't be even making decisions; the environment would elicit the most appropriate prior state and I would be compelled to act according to that elicitation.

Btw--could you explain on what you mean by "external coercion"? Does this include prior states and environment, for instance?

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
Rusty,


After reading your post, this is somewhat true, thought not for the reasons you might think.


I'm sure you understand the issue, but you seem confused here - QM offers nothing to the Libertarian, and presents no issue for compatibilism.



It offers evidence that may suggest that there can be differing groups of TLOP that are the bits that connect causal chains. If we have one group of TLOP that works for one set of things and another group that works for another set of things then it suggests that we may have yet another group that works for the agent.


The issue revolves around the nature of the agent.


But how does the agent decide which causal chain to introduce? You have already said that the process by which the agent decides which causal chain to introduce is not determined, not random, and not a combination. Since that exhausts the list of logical options, doesn't that leave the agent as 'illogical'?


I put 2 clauses on the agent. These clauses must exist to grant us free will, and since we have free will these two clauses exist.

I do not pretend to be able to define the agent. You claim that we have exhausted the list of logical options and that "leave(s) the agent as 'illogical'.

This is simply false. All it means is that you have exhausted your list of logical options. As have I. It doens't mean that there are not other logical options we do not currently know.


I am assuming that whenever you write "free will" you mean libertarian free will. Sure, you can 'believe' anything you want. If you wish to believ in something you cannot define, cannot preceive, and cannot describe in any detail at all, then by all means do so. Compatibilism seeks to go one better, and to understand the issue, rather than surrender.



I am quite familiar with the compatabilist argument having written and published a few papers defending that very argument in my youth.

I defined free will as:

The ability to have chosen other then you did choose.

If you wish to offer an alternative definition then please offer the alternative and we can then proceed to debate as to the reasons for believing your alternative over the definition I have already offered.


I'm not sure I follow you here - the limit seems clear to me, and has already been mentioned. Free Will exists in the realm of human affairs, and no where else. It makes no sense to me to try and bring physical constraints into a Free Will discussion.

I'm having trouble deciphering these sentences. Perhaps you do need to 'get into some details', because I have no clear idea what you are trying to say here.

Let me copy and paste my first example (since you apparently ignored it) of where free will can be constrained by the "physical" realm. Just what you mean by "physical" has yet to be determined. My claim is that this example will demonstrate that circumstances can constrain just as well as people can constrain.

What if I am touring the Grand Canyon, Arizona, America, and in a slice of time I am looking up and see a boulder falling. This boulder is falling in such a way that any reasonable person (or any person who's 'reasonableness' is identical to mine) would believe that this boulder is going to crush the person next to me (Fred). Also any reasonable person would believe that given the boulder's rate of descent the only way to prevent the boulder from falling on Fred is to push him out of the way. Unfortunately their is a cactus patch on the other side of Fred. Again, any reasonable person believes that Fred must be pushed hard enough that he will connect with the cactus patch.

Now any person who is reasonable in exactly the same way as I am will feel constrained to push Fred into the cactus patch. I may have other options (such as not pushing him) but that is the only option I will take.

Now I have pushed Fred into a cactus patch. No one in their right mind would have me arrested for assault because my actions were constrained.

So I was in circumstances that were such that any reasonable person would do exactly what I did (push Fred).

If you claim unreasonableness then we can replace reasonable person with "any person reasonable in exactly the same way as I am".

It is apparent that in a determined world the circumstances constrain all of our choices completely.

Again, I believe that what you *want* to do is to claim that my definition of free will is incorrect. If that is so then please offer us a more correct version.

[Loki]

Rusty/BillyTK,

These questions require answers that time doesn't permit right now (it's 11pm here at the moment). This will have to wait until tomorrow - sorry about that.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Good night! I will be leaving work soon, so hopefully this means I won't miss to much.

:)

I must be working hard to be here posting. :)

[BillyTK]

Originally posted by Loki
Rusty/BillyTK,

These questions require answers that time doesn't permit right now (it's 11pm here at the moment). This will have to wait until tomorrow - sorry about that.

Hey no probs, whenever you can!

[Loki]

BillyTK,

My understanding of compatibilism was that whilst decisions are causal (dependent on environment/prior states) they are not determined (dictated by environment/prior states).
My understanding differs. As far as I can see, compatibilism says that "free will' exists even if a choice is fully determined by environment/prior states. It does this by addressing the two terms 'free' and 'will' separately.

First, 'will' must be understood for what it is - the sum total of your experience and thoughts. Since only *you* can have exactly your set of experience and thoughts, your will is unique to you. Any decision reached by your will is yours, and is unique in that the causes leading to the decison belong to your internal 'mental' states.

Second, 'free' means "not forced to choose". By examining your experience and prior states, your mental 'will' selects an appropriate course of action. This breaks down if you are 'coerced' to choose a different course from the one preferred by your internal mental states.

If determinism was the case with behaviour then I wouldn't be even making decisions; the environment would elicit the most appropriate prior state and I would be compelled to act according to that elicitation.
How does "making a decision" differ from "environment elicits appropriate prior state"?

Btw--could you explain on what you mean by "external coercion"? Does this include prior states and environment, for instance?
Hopefully, I've better explained what I meant in the first part of this reply. "Prior internal/mental states" are the 'will'. Absense of external 'environmental' pressure is the 'free'.

[Loki]

Rusty,

It offers evidence that may suggest that there can be differing groups of TLOP that are the bits that connect causal chains. If we have one group of TLOP that works for one set of things and another group that works for another set of things then it suggests that we may have yet another group that works for the agent
Well, this seems like grasping at straws to me. You seem to be saying...

1. First, we had classical physics (incompatible with LFW)
2. Now, we discover QM (incompatible with LFW)
3. Therefore, it's possible we'll discover 'X" (compatible with LFW).

I'd draw the opposite conclusion - everything we have ever found seems to point the the impossibility of the Agent. Sure, you can always assume that will one day change, but this is nothing more than a "Free Will of the Gaps".

I do not pretend to be able to define the agent. You claim that we have exhausted the list of logical options and that "leave(s) the agent as 'illogical'.

This is simply false. All it means is that you have exhausted your list of logical options. As have I. It doens't mean that there are not other logical options we do not currently know.
Again, an appeal to "Free Will of the Gaps". You admit you can think of no logical definition for you LFW agent, yet you insist it must exist, and we simply haven't figured it out yet.

I'd suggest that this is extreme wishful thinking - you are essentially insisting that 'logic' can somehow eventually be expanded so that 'determinsitic' and 'non-deterministic' do not represent a mutually exclusive set.

I am quite familiar with the compatabilist argument having written and published a few papers defending that very argument in my youth.
Then there's every chance you understand it better than me! My youth was spent doing just about anything other than publishing papers on the philosphy of Free Will.

I defined free will as:

The ability to have chosen other then you did choose.

If you wish to offer an alternative definition then please offer the alternative and we can then proceed to debate as to the reasons for believing your alternative over the definition I have already offered.
Well, your definition seems to say nothing, as far as I can tell. I doubt that it is your assertion that LFW means that if *everything* was the same, including the Agent, then it's possible to get a different decision? I assume what you mean is that if everything "physical" (except the agent) was the same, the decision could change? This seems a rather meaningless defintion of 'free will' - "if something was different, the decision would be different." Compatibilism would make exactly the same statement, so it seems to offer little explanatory power as a definition.

Let me copy and paste my first example (since you apparently ignored it) of where free will can be constrained by the "physical" realm. Just what you mean by "physical" has yet to be determined. My claim is that this example will demonstrate that circumstances can constrain just as well as people can constrain.
Sorry that it appeared I'd overlooked this - I assumed there was no need to address the specific instance because I'd offered a general answer.

Let me try to be clear - I was (perhaps incorrectly) assuming that your questioning was headed towards 'morality', and I jumped into to that discussion.

Can a compatibilist Free Will be constrained by physical factors? Of course. Our ability to think in abstract terms, and to consider concepts beyond the immediate is an essential part of the will. This means that purely physical factors like the presence of a cactus can be an influence in our decison making process - it 'coerces' the decision to some degree. The "moral" aspect is relevant when considering the interaction wirth other humans.

[neutrino_cannon]

Gah! There's no point in Franko being gone if we don't capitalize on it!

Has there been any evidence that the human brain is anything other than a well organised group ofinteresting cells? No! Well then, that certainly rules out magic.

Is there any evidence that the most basic interactions (i.e. smallest) between the most basic of particles (i.e. smallest) are anything but random, or at the very least very hard to predict? Is there any evidence showing that macro scale interactions are the sum of anything other than micro scale ones? No! Well then that certainly rules out perfect causality.

Where does that leave things? It would seem that free will lies in macro unpredictability, if in fact that does exist, which would be very hard to determine.

TLOP controls YOU
YOU type on KEYBOARD
KEYBOARD is made of KEYS
KEYS are made of ATOMS
therefore YOU are made of KEYBOARD!

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
BillyTK,


My understanding differs. As far as I can see, compatibilism says that "free will' exists even if a choice is fully determined by environment/prior states. It does this by addressing the two terms 'free' and 'will' separately.

First, 'will' must be understood for what it is - the sum total of your experience and thoughts. Since only *you* can have exactly your set of experience and thoughts, your will is unique to you. Any decision reached by your will is yours, and is unique in that the causes leading to the decison belong to your internal 'mental' states.

Ah! You have excellently addressed the exact spots of confusion that the compatabilist holds! Thank you!

So my will is unique to me? But if there is no "agent" then it is not. If my will is simply the sum of my brain particles arranged in their particular order then it is possible for a mad scientist to create a physically identical brain to my own, thereby creating another "will" that is identical to my own. Therefore my will is not unique.

Without an "agent" to carry the will or the self or the identity (or whatever you wish to call it) then we do not have a will.

Second, 'free' means "not forced to choose". By examining your experience and prior states, your mental 'will' selects an appropriate course of action. This breaks down if you are 'coerced' to choose a different course from the one preferred by your internal mental states.


In a deterministic world everything is caused.

What does caused mean? Well if something is caused then if you were to take away all prior causal acts then the thing would not have happened.

Well what does causal mean? Something is causal if it's occurances neccesitates the occurance of an effect. How is this neccessitation not constraining?

You say coerced, but everyone else says constrained. Constrained is the common terminology that I will continue to use.

My example demonstrates that in a deterministic world the circumstances of the world constrain you to choose. The causal chains neccesitate your next action, no matter what you think you are choosing you are simply a link on the causal chain.

I will offer you compatabilist constraint in my next post and will demonstrate that compatabilist constrained in a determinstic "agent"-less world cannot offer free will.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
Rusty,


Well, this seems like grasping at straws to me. You seem to be saying...

1. First, we had classical physics (incompatible with LFW)
2. Now, we discover QM (incompatible with LFW)
3. Therefore, it's possible we'll discover 'X" (compatible with LFW).

I'd draw the opposite conclusion - everything we have ever found seems to point the the impossibility of the Agent. Sure, you can always assume that will one day change, but this is nothing more than a "Free Will of the Gaps".

I love how the current crop of compatabilists don't have a valid argument so they instead say, "well you can't prove it in terms of today's science! HAHHAHAHA!!!" You are correct. But I can prove that free will requires it. This means that either:

1) We have free will and an "agent".
or
2) We don't have free will, so there is no "agent".

I assert that we have free will, therefore it logically follows that we have an agent. Please do not make me copy and paste my argument for such again.

Again, an appeal to "Free Will of the Gaps". You admit you can think of no logical definition for you LFW agent, yet you insist it must exist, and we simply haven't figured it out yet.

I'd suggest that this is extreme wishful thinking - you are essentially insisting that 'logic' can somehow eventually be expanded so that 'determinsitic' and 'non-deterministic' do not represent a mutually exclusive set.

That is exactly what I am insisting! Either that is true, or the world is dualistic! I do not know which.

It must exist, free will logically leads to the conclusion that there is an "agent". If you want to prove me wrong then why not stop doing what all confused compatabilist do (free will of the gaps!! free will of the gaps!!) and start addressing my valid argument that the truth of free will leads to an "agent".


Then there's every chance you understand it better than me! My youth was spent doing just about anything other than publishing papers on the philosphy of Free Will.

Perhaps I am a very boring person. :D I did become an accountant, after all.

Well, your definition seems to say nothing, as far as I can tell. I doubt that it is your assertion that LFW means that if *everything* was the same, including the Agent, then it's possible to get a different decision? I assume what you mean is that if everything "physical" (except the agent) was the same, the decision could change? This seems a rather meaningless defintion of 'free will' - "if something was different, the decision would be different." Compatibilism would make exactly the same statement, so it seems to offer little explanatory power as a definition.

My definition means that if everything was the same then it is possible to get a different decision. In a dualistic world the "agent" part would have to be indeterminstic and not-random as well, but that is my assertion! It follows logically from the premise that we have free will!

If you disagree then please address my argument that it does and stop simply going "free will of the gaps!!!"


Sorry that it appeared I'd overlooked this - I assumed there was no need to address the specific instance because I'd offered a general answer.

Let me try to be clear - I was (perhaps incorrectly) assuming that your questioning was headed towards 'morality', and I jumped into to that discussion.

Can a compatibilist Free Will be constrained by physical factors? Of course. Our ability to think in abstract terms, and to consider concepts beyond the immediate is an essential part of the will. This means that purely physical factors like the presence of a cactus can be an influence in our decison making process - it 'coerces' the decision to some degree. The "moral" aspect is relevant when considering the interaction wirth other humans.

I will quote you directly in italics here:

Can a compatibilist Free Will be constrained by physical factors? Of course.

Now I will demonstrate AGAIN how a deterministic world results in circumstances that constrain:

Assume there is no "agent".

First to help you understand the compatabilist 'constraint':

Rusty is a bank teller. A customer points a gun at Rusty and says, "I will shoot you in the head unless you give me all the money in the till." Rusty thinks, "my choices are simple. Give him the money or get shot in the head." Rusty gives him the money.

Rusty did not have free will according to the compatabilist. Why not? Simple, because anyone who is reasonable would have done exactly what Rusty did. Or, more precisely, anyone who is reasonable in exactly the same way as Rusty would have done exactly what Rusty did.

This means that Rusty (and all others who share his reasonableness) could not have chosen other then they did choose. There is my definition of Free Will! Hey, the compatabilist agrees! Thank you confusing compatabilist nonsense!

Moving on...

Now Rusty is standing in a stone maze. The circumstances of the world are such that there is a wall to the left, right, and behind Rusty. Rusty can only walk forwards. The circumstances of the world are such that a boulder is falling straight down and will crush Rusty very soon unless he walks forward. The circumstances of the world are such that there is a depressed trigger in front of Rusty. TCOTW are such that if Rusty were to move forward at all he would set off this trigger (it is very large). Rusty believes that this trigger, if set off, will result in his entire family being tortured and killed.

Rusty doesn't move. Anyone who is reasonable in exactly the same way as Rusty doesn't move.

Would we agree that Rusty was constrained by this stone maze and depression trigger (that results in torture and death of his family)? I will assume yes.

Poor Rusty, in this elaborate circumstance he was denied his free will. He could not have chosen to do other then he did do.

Ignoring the obviousness of how cause does neccesistate by it's very definition we can say that Rusty was constrained because anyone with exaclty the same 'reasonableness' as him would have done exactly what he did do.

Therefore Rusty could not have chosen other then he did choose. There is that nasty definition again!

Now let us put Rusty in his bedroom. Rusty is home from work. The circumstances of the world are such that Rusty wants to go to dinner with his wife. They are such because Rusty has been married to her for several years, Rusty thinks she is pretty, Rusty is hungry, Rusty does not like to eat alone, Rusty likes to speak with his wife when he eats, etc..

These are the circumstances of the world that Rusty (without an "agent") is a part of. These are the circumstances that are constraining this poor "agent"-less Rusty to dinner with his wife. Rusty has no control over these circumstances because Rusty cannot alter the past, and these circumstances were caused by events occuring in the past. If poor Rusty could alter the past then perhaps Rusty would have free will. But, alas, he cannot. Rusty is constrained into having dinner with his wife.

Rusty chooses to have dinner with his wife. Rusty, and anyone with 'reasonableness' exactly like Rusty's in exactly the same circumstances as Rusty would choose exactly what Rusty chose. Rusty (and the others) could not have chosen to choose other then they did.

Therefore we must have an "agent", because Rusty does have free will.

:)

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by neutrino_cannon
Gah! There's no point in Franko being gone if we don't capitalize on it!

Has there been any evidence that the human brain is anything other than a well organised group ofinteresting cells? No! Well then, that certainly rules out magic.

Is there any evidence that the most basic interactions (i.e. smallest) between the most basic of particles (i.e. smallest) are anything but random, or at the very least very hard to predict? Is there any evidence showing that macro scale interactions are the sum of anything other than micro scale ones? No! Well then that certainly rules out perfect causality.

Where does that leave things? It would seem that free will lies in macro unpredictability, if in fact that does exist, which would be very hard to determine.

TLOP controls YOU
YOU type on KEYBOARD
KEYBOARD is made of KEYS
KEYS are made of ATOMS
therefore YOU are made of KEYBOARD!


There is evidence that macro scale interactions are NOT the sum of the micro scale ones.

First we assert TLOQP are made of probabilities and contain inherent randomness. Then we say TLOP apparently do not contain inherent randomness, therefore TLOP must not be a sum of TLOQP.

Therefore TLOAP (The Laws of Agent Causation) can conceivably exist and not be related to TLOP or TLOQP.

[BillyTK]

Hi Loki, thanks for your explanation and the definitions of free will you've provided.

How does "making a decision" differ from "environment elicits appropriate prior state"?
It's basically a question of ownership--do I own my experiences (and therefore my behaviour) or do my experiences own me? If there is no difference between "making a decision" and "environment elicits appropriate prior state" then my experiences own me, and I can have no agency to change my behaviour. If you like, the "thought" aspect of will becomes irrelevant, it's no more than a side-effect, an ineffectual commentary on my actions.

On the other hand, if making a decision is different to environmental elicitation, then "thought" aspect of my will allows me to confront my behaviour and do otherwise; a gross example would be if I'm scared of heights, I can overcome my fear and choose not to avoid high places. Basically, whatever I feel I should do, or could do, or ought to do, I could always do otherwise, even if that "otherwise" is not to do anything.

But on the one hand, we know that the "thought" aspect of will is significant and intrinsic to our experiences and we are not impotent spectators of our own behaviour; it not only interprets our experiences but can also re-interpret them after the fact. On the other hand, to say I can confront my behaviour is possibly a problem of semantics if not an oxymoron because the I that I am is the same thing as the I which produces my behaviour. And on *that* note I need to go and lay down in a darkened room for a while!

[ChuckieR]

[nudge, elbow, barge, pardon]I know I'm a little late to the party, but I thought I'd throw my $0.02 into the kitty.

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
Ah! You have excellently addressed the exact spots of confusion that the compatabilist holds! Thank you!

So my will is unique to me? But if there is no "agent" then it is not. If my will is simply the sum of my brain particles arranged in their particular order then it is possible for a mad scientist to create a physically identical brain to my own, thereby creating another "will" that is identical to my own. Therefore my will is not unique.
Hmmm, but is that really possible? This sort of example that posits some feat that is not even possible in principle really does not help your argument. It will never be possible to have two brains in EXACTLY the same state (something about the exclusion princible, I think - sorry, I definately DO NOT have a degree in physics).

My example demonstrates that in a deterministic world the circumstances of the world constrain you to choose. The causal chains neccesitate your next action, no matter what you think you are choosing you are simply a link on the causal chain.
But I would say that even in a deterministic world, as long as I am fully conscious, it would be impossible for you to exactly predict my next thought/action, no matter what external physical constraints are imposed. See below...

[from the next post]
First to help you understand the compatabilist 'constraint':

Rusty is a bank teller. A customer points a gun at Rusty and says, "I will shoot you in the head unless you give me all the money in the till." Rusty thinks, "my choices are simple. Give him the money or get shot in the head." Rusty gives him the money.

Rusty did not have free will according to the compatabilist. Why not? Simple, because anyone who is reasonable would have done exactly what Rusty did. Or, more precisely, anyone who is reasonable in exactly the same way as Rusty would have done exactly what Rusty did.
This seems like a gross oversimplification (i.e., a "straw man" argument). There is literally an infinity of possible reactions that Rusty could have. He could duck behind the counter, he could shout "Look out behind you!", he could shove the money up his butt and say "Come and get it, big boy."

I would call this version of free will that you are arguing against "Sherlock Holmes" free will, where the characters have only very limited, predictable, stereotyped behaviors (which was typical of Doyle's bad guys/gals). In reality, if you put each living human in that situation no two reactions would be exactly the same.

This means that Rusty (and all others who share his reasonableness) could not have chosen other then they did choose. There is my definition of Free Will! Hey, the compatabilist agrees! Thank you confusing compatabilist nonsense!
Again, this is a very weak Straw Man you are holding up. I doubt that any thoughtful compatabilist would agree with this simplistic vision of free will.

Now Rusty is standing in a stone maze. The circumstances of the world are such that there is a wall to the left, right, and behind Rusty. Rusty can only walk forwards. The circumstances of the world are such that a boulder is falling straight down and will crush Rusty very soon unless he walks forward. The circumstances of the world are such that there is a depressed trigger in front of Rusty. TCOTW are such that if Rusty were to move forward at all he would set off this trigger (it is very large). Rusty believes that this trigger, if set off, will result in his entire family being tortured and killed.

Rusty doesn't move. Anyone who is reasonable in exactly the same way as Rusty doesn't move.

Would we agree that Rusty was constrained by this stone maze and depression trigger (that results in torture and death of his family)? I will assume yes.

Poor Rusty, in this elaborate circumstance he was denied his free will. He could not have chosen to do other then he did do.
Again, it seems to me that these simplistic "physical barriers" have nothing whatsoever to do with "free will". Before the boulder hits the ground, Rusty could run in a circle, he could push the trigger then go back and stand under the boulder, he could pick his nose (or not), etc., etc., etc., an infinity of possibilities. These "toy" situations that you've set up are pretty boring and do nothing to get to the roots of the problem. They may be convincing to you, but they will only convince others of your unwillingness to seriously address the actual compatabilist stance (which, by the way, I am NOT a spokesman for - I'm just making an observation here).

[Loki]

Rusty,

I suspect we have a simple failure to set the definitions. You have said, amongst other things, the following ....
But I can prove that free will requires it.
...
I assert that we have free will, therefore it logically follows that we have an agent.
...
That is exactly what I am insisting!
...
It must exist, free will logically leads to the conclusion that there is an "agent". If you want to prove me wrong then ... start addressing my valid argument that the truth of free will leads to an "agent".
Lets take this a little slower, and put a framework around some comments.

The heart of the discussion is "what is Free Will"? There are (at least) 3 options being discussed :

1. Free Will is Libertarian.
2. Free Will is Compatibilist.
3. Free Will is "other" (including, I guess, non-existent).

You seem to think that you have "proven" that Free Will is Libertarian. If I understand you correctly, it works like this.

1. Define "Free Will" as "The ability to have chosen other then you did choose".
2. Define "Libertarian Free Will" as "The ability to have chosen other then you did choose, via an 'agent'".
3. Therefore, "Free Will" must be "Llibertarian Free Will".

I'm forced to agree with you! If we start from your definition, then Libertarian Free Will is the path to take - not suprising, since the definitions are basically the same.

However, a compatibilist wouldn't accept your initial definition to begin with, so this doesn't amount to anything remotely like proof, as far as I can see. At the very least, if you wish to avoid any appearance of having assumed you conclusion I think your initial definition would need to be something like "The apparent ability to have chosen other then you did choose".

Please do not make me copy and paste my argument for such again.
If your argument is more than "I define Free Will to be Libertarian Free Will" then perhaps you'd better post it again, because I seem to have missed it.

As I mentioned in an earlier post, your definition of Free Will as "The ability to have chosen other then you did choose" is essentially meaningless anyway, under both Libertarian and Compatibilist theories. Repeating what I've said before :

To a Libertarian, "The Ability to have chosen" is called the Agent. This is the concept invented to fulfill the requirement that everything 'physical' can be the same, yet the decision can change. I say the definition is meaningless because it (as you say) requires the Agent, but the Agent is empty of explanatory power. The *only* thing you can say about the the Agent is "it must exist". You cannot offer any information about it's behaviour, nature or mechanism. Actually, that's not quite correct. You can say what the Agent is *not* - it's not determined, not random, and not a combination. Unfortunately, since you've just exhausted all known (and logically possible) options, you're left with an Agent beyond understanding. In short, the Agent explains nothing - you just wrapped the hard issues of Free Will up into a bundle, stuck the name 'Agent' on it, and said "there - solved".

To a compatibilist, the definition is fundamentally flawed. It's always hard to get simple and concise definition, but something like "Free Will is choosing what you want to choose" works for me.

Therefore TLOAP (The Laws of Agent Causation) can conceivably exist and not be related to TLOP or TLOQP.
Again, I don't see how. Simplifying a little, you essentally have 'determined' and 'random' as your options. You've already admitted that you can't think of how something can be other than these two - yet in the next breath you declare that this something "can concievably exist". In what sense is it conceivable if you can't conceive of it?

[Loki]

BillyTK,

Again, I have to be quick ... time is short at the moment.

It's basically a question of ownership--do I own my experiences (and therefore my behaviour) or do my experiences own me? If there is no difference between "making a decision" and "environment elicits appropriate prior state" then my experiences own me, and I can have no agency to change my behaviour.
...
On the other hand, if making a decision is different to environmental elicitation, then "thought" aspect of my will allows me to confront my behaviour and do otherwise;
...
But on the one hand, we know that the "thought" aspect of will is significant and intrinsic to our experiences and we are not impotent spectators of our own behaviour; it not only interprets our experiences but can also re-interpret them after the fact. On the other hand, to say I can confront my behaviour is possibly a problem of semantics if not an oxymoron because the I that I am is the same thing as the I which produces my behaviour.
I just posted to Rusty a 'quick and dirty' definition of Compatibilist Free Will :

"Free Will is choosing what you want to choose".

The important concepts are all there - the issue is not whether your choice was determined or not, it's whether the choice represents a desirable outcome for *you*.

Imagine for a moment that Libertarian Free Will is correct - we have an 'Agent' that is an integral part of the decision making process. As Rusty says, Libertarians believe that given the exact same circumstances twice over, it is valid to think you might choose different choices. But what does this imply about the Agent? If *every* single thing aobut you is the same - your genetics, your upbringing, your lunch, everything - but you can make different choices, then how does the Agent reflect *you*? Libertarians are saying it is a reasonable position to say that there you are on your wedding day, standing at the alter, and saying "I do" - yet, conceiveably, everything in your entire life up to that moment could be identical, and you might say "No, I don't". If your decision is not the sum of you, then what is it? If the Agent can whimsically choose alternative given identical "life experiences", then how can this make you the owner of the decision? (And ithe Agent *must* do this, since it is *not* deterministic by definition).

[BillyTK]

Loki
I admit I do have a problem with the Libertarian idea of an agent which is somehow distinct from my will. How can this agent make decisions on that basis? Does *it* have another agent to help? Does that agent require another agent &c &c ad infinitum? Will it get the drinks in at the bar? ;)

I'm giving your definition of compatibilist free will a thorough cogitation. Thanks for your help so far!

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by BillyTK
Hi Loki, thanks for your explanation and the definitions of free will you've provided.

Billy you have just explained the Libertarian free will. Do not let the confusion of the compatabilist spread to you as well.

It's basically a question of ownership--do I own my experiences (and therefore my behaviour) or do my experiences own me? If there is no difference between "making a decision" and "environment elicits appropriate prior state" then my experiences own me, and I can have no agency to change my behaviour. If you like, the "thought" aspect of will becomes irrelevant, it's no more than a side-effect, an ineffectual commentary on my actions.

This is one way to think of it. When you say "If there is no difference between "making a decision" and "environment elicits appropriate prior state" then you do not have free will. Although it might be said better as "present circumstances neccesitate effect", but now I am being anal :)


On the other hand, if making a decision is different to environmental elicitation, then "thought" aspect of my will allows me to confront my behaviour and do otherwise; a gross example would be if I'm scared of heights, I can overcome my fear and choose not to avoid high places. Basically, whatever I feel I should do, or could do, or ought to do, I could always do otherwise, even if that "otherwise" is not to do anything.

No. It may be possible to think of situations in which you would have done otherwise, but if every part of your "thought" was identical and we do not have an "agent" then it was not possible for you to choose other then you chose.

You did not give a concrete example so I will expound:

Billy is afraid of heights, but by the "force" of his will he overcomes his fear and chooses to walk along the cliff edge. But if your will is both a cause and an effect then your will did nothing but process the prior state of the world and translate that effect into a new effect -- the effect of you choosing to walk along the cliff edge. Now if you want to assert that this is free will you will need to offer an alternate definition to freedom of the will.

But on the one hand, we know that the "thought" aspect of will is significant and intrinsic to our experiences and we are not impotent spectators of our own behaviour; it not only interprets our experiences but can also re-interpret them after the fact. On the other hand, to say I can confront my behaviour is possibly a problem of semantics if not an oxymoron because the I that I am is the same thing as the I which produces my behaviour. And on *that* note I need to go and lay down in a darkened room for a while!

Even in a totally causal world where man does not posses freedom of the will he could still re-interpret his experiences. If he did it would have been causally necessary for him to do so, based upon his "reasonablenss" which stems directly from prior states of the world.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by ChuckieR
[nudge, elbow, barge, pardon]I know I'm a little late to the party, but I thought I'd throw my $0.02 into the kitty.

Hmmm, but is that really possible? This sort of example that posits some feat that is not even possible in principle really does not help your argument. It will never be possible to have two brains in EXACTLY the same state (something about the exclusion princible, I think - sorry, I definately DO NOT have a degree in physics).

How about we say that there is a physicaly identical but not locatatively identical brain to my own. Now unless we want to assign attributes to location in the plane of the universe then we will get the same "will".


But I would say that even in a deterministic world, as long as I am fully conscious, it would be impossible for you to exactly predict my next thought/action, no matter what external physical constraints are imposed. See below...

This seems like a gross oversimplification (i.e., a "straw man" argument). There is literally an infinity of possible reactions that Rusty could have. He could duck behind the counter, he could shout "Look out behind you!", he could shove the money up his butt and say "Come and get it, big boy."

I would call this version of free will that you are arguing against "Sherlock Holmes" free will, where the characters have only very limited, predictable, stereotyped behaviors (which was typical of Doyle's bad guys/gals). In reality, if you put each living human in that situation no two reactions would be exactly the same.

The version of free will I am stating is called Libertarian free will. There is no need for you to come and rename it.

Yes, this is a simplification. But it is true. Every action Rusty could take will fall under two catagories:

1) Give the robber all the money in the till.
2) Don't give the robber all the money in the till.

You have turned my argument into a straw man. As I have been asserting for many years, compatabilism only works if you are confused, and hopefully together we can identify the source of this confusion.

Again, this is a very weak Straw Man you are holding up. I doubt that any thoughtful compatabilist would agree with this simplistic vision of free will.[QUOTE]

No compatabilist like to get overly confused with such statements as my third-order volitions motivate my second-order volitions which motivate my will which motivates my action which is to stand up, but I decisively identify myself with my will which retroactively eliminates my volitions and thereby gives me freedom of the will.

Would you like to argue such? I can point out three major flaws in such an argument, but you are only confused as to my argument. It is not a straw man, it is simplified as to avoid confusion.

[QUOTE]Again, it seems to me that these simplistic "physical barriers" have nothing whatsoever to do with "free will". Before the boulder hits the ground, Rusty could run in a circle, he could push the trigger then go back and stand under the boulder, he could pick his nose (or not), etc., etc., etc., an infinity of possibilities. These "toy" situations that you've set up are pretty boring and do nothing to get to the roots of the problem. They may be convincing to you, but they will only convince others of your unwillingness to seriously address the actual compatabilist stance (which, by the way, I am NOT a spokesman for - I'm just making an observation here).

Chuck, you do not know what the compatabilist stance is. I am exactly addressing the 'latest' problem.

Rusty could run around in a circle, he could pick his nose, but suffice it to say the circumstances are such that ALL of his choices will be seperatalble into two catagories:

1) Rusty stays in such a position that he will get crushed by the boulder.
2) Rusty does not stay in such a position that he will get crushed by the boulder but instead sets off the depression trap.

If you want more information please come back and request it. I apologize if I have been rude or snappy to you, I guess work is wearing my patience. :)

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
Rusty,

I suspect we have a simple failure to set the definitions. You have said, amongst other things, the following ....


If you would have read this thread you would have read this:

the definition I am asserting is that:

I posses freedom of the will if I could have done other then I did do.

Lets take this a little slower, and put a framework around some comments.

The heart of the discussion is "what is Free Will"? There are (at least) 3 options being discussed :

1. Free Will is Libertarian.
2. Free Will is Compatibilist.
3. Free Will is "other" (including, I guess, non-existent).

You seem to think that you have "proven" that Free Will is Libertarian. If I understand you correctly, it works like this.

1. Define "Free Will" as "The ability to have chosen other then you did choose".
2. Define "Libertarian Free Will" as "The ability to have chosen other then you did choose, via an 'agent'".
3. Therefore, "Free Will" must be "Llibertarian Free Will".

I'm forced to agree with you! If we start from your definition, then Libertarian Free Will is the path to take - not suprising, since the definitions are basically the same.
[/QUOTE]

Good straw man, but you have no argument. I assert free will is the ability to have chosen other then you did choose.

I have now offered 4 arguments to demonstrate that the only way to have "the ability to have chosen other then you did choose" is from an "agent". You continue to ignore my valid arguments and instead beget the confusion of all compatabilists. Please address my arguments or my definition as I have requested numerous times!

However, a compatibilist wouldn't accept your initial definition to begin with, so this doesn't amount to anything remotely like proof, as far as I can see. At the very least, if you wish to avoid any appearance of having assumed you conclusion I think your initial definition would need to be something like "The apparent ability to have chosen other then you did choose".

No, you are mistaken. The definition of free will I am using has been generally agreed upon for hundreds of years. You assert we should add the word "apparent" to the definition?

For what? Do you believe that freedom of the will should be possesing the "apparent" ability to have chosen other then you did choose? Apparent to whom or what? Does it's "apparent"-ness make it real? If it does then why not say REAL, then eliminate the useless word altogether?

If your argument is more than "I define Free Will to be Libertarian Free Will" then perhaps you'd better post it again, because I seem to have missed it.

As I mentioned in an earlier post, your definition of Free Will as "The ability to have chosen other then you did choose" is essentially meaningless anyway, under both Libertarian and Compatibilist theories. Repeating what I've said before :

To a Libertarian, "The Ability to have chosen" is called the Agent. This is the concept invented to fulfill the requirement that everything 'physical' can be the same, yet the decision can change. I say the definition is meaningless because it (as you say) requires the Agent, but the Agent is empty of explanatory power. The *only* thing you can say about the the Agent is "it must exist". You cannot offer any information about it's behaviour, nature or mechanism. Actually, that's not quite correct. You can say what the Agent is *not* - it's not determined, not random, and not a combination. Unfortunately, since you've just exhausted all known (and logically possible) options, you're left with an Agent beyond understanding. In short, the Agent explains nothing - you just wrapped the hard issues of Free Will up into a bundle, stuck the name 'Agent' on it, and said "there - solved".

I never have claimed to solve the agent. You and your straw men! The "agent" is such:

1) The "agent" is not and can not be caused.
2) The "agent" can cause.

My argument establishes that (if we have free will) then something that can not be caused but can cause must exist. This thing has been named the "agent" by Roderick Chisholm, not by me. It is standard verbage for the "thing" that has those two characteristics.

The "agent" may have more characteristics, it may not. I DO NOT KNOW. Why do you assert that the "agent" is beyond understanding? That is your assertion, my assertion is that the agent possesses those two traits, but we both agree that neither of us can explain the "agent". Just because we cannot explain something doesn't make it fake.

We cannot explain gravity, it must be fake! Hey, so what that you have proof that gravity exists, it cannot be explained so it is fake! That is your argument!

While my proof of the "agent" is not such that everyone views it every day, it is valid proof. If you disagree with the validity of my arguments then please ADDRESS MY ARGUMENTS.

To a compatibilist, the definition is fundamentally flawed. It's always hard to get simple and concise definition, but something like "Free Will is choosing what you want to choose" works for me.

Great tautology.

So if I "want" to choose something then I will choose it? Otherwise I do not have free will? So what is "want"? In a determined world your "want" was the necessary effect of your circumstances in the past, hence your "want" is nothing but more circumstances.

This has been debated and the debate ended. If you wish to pursue this debate then please do so. I will tell you how the debate will go:

We will decide that want is too small a word and will agree that instead of saying want we shall call the makeup of all the 'wants, desires, beliefs, knowledge, etc...' the "reasonableness".

We will then say that "Free will is choosing what your reasonablness dictates you choose".

I will then direct you back to my argument about how your reasonableness is constraining if you do not have an "agent".


Again, I don't see how. Simplifying a little, you essentally have 'determined' and 'random' as your options. You've already admitted that you can't think of how something can be other than these two - yet in the next breath you declare that this something "can concievably exist". In what sense is it conceivable if you can't conceive of it?

I can't conceive of it, you can't conceive of it, but I offered evidence that may support it's possible existence. OMG the audacity! To think that there is something me and you cannot conceive of but may still exist!

It may be conceivable but science and knowledge have not progressed to such a point as to allow me to conceive of it.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by BillyTK
Loki
I admit I do have a problem with the Libertarian idea of an agent which is somehow distinct from my will. How can this agent make decisions on that basis? Does *it* have another agent to help? Does that agent require another agent &c &c ad infinitum? Will it get the drinks in at the bar? ;)

I'm giving your definition of compatibilist free will a thorough cogitation. Thanks for your help so far!

What is the will though?

It is generally agreed upon that there are several major catagories in an action:

WILL causes CHOICE causes ACTION

A Libertarian would assert that the "agent" would fall into the WILL catagory.

If you can think of how the "agent" could function while retaining it's two traits:

1) "Agent" is not caused
2) "Agent" can cause

then please let me know. This is a difficult question. Thinking of "levels" of "agents" has been tried, but it was tried by a compatabilist (Harry Frankfurt) and is ultimately unsuccesful. It's very confusing as well.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

Over in the materialism thread, you asked me to come to this thread, and address your arguments for free-will.

Unfortunately, I cannot find any. You do not seem to have ever made any argument at all supporting the existence of free-will. Instead, all of your arguments seem to begin with the assumption that the existence of free-will is a given. If I am mistaken in this, could you please point out where this argument is?

You have stated in this thread that if free-will, as you have defined it, exists, then there must be an agent which is neither deterministic, nor random. Could you please define what you mean by the word "random"? The only definition I know for this word is "non-deterministic". By this definition, your agent is self-contradictory, so this clearly isn't what you mean by "random". Can you explain what you do mean?

Please note that I am not asking for you to explain exactly what this agent is. I am asking you to define what you mean by the word "random", and nothing more.

Dr. Stupid

[Loki]

Rusty,

I think we've reached an impasse - there seems little more to say.

I assert free will is the ability to have chosen other then you did choose.
...
No, you are mistaken. The definition of free will I am using has been generally agreed upon for hundreds of years.
Fine - I understand you clearly. But I disagree that this definition is valid. As far as I'm aware, no compatibilist will agree that your "hundreds of years old definition" is valid. Simply asserting that it is, and therefore it is, isn't much of an argument.

I have now offered 4 arguments to demonstrate that the only way to have "the ability to have chosen other then you did choose" is from an "agent". You continue to ignore my valid arguments and instead beget the confusion of all compatabilists. Please address my arguments or my definition as I have requested numerous times!

Perhaps you missed this bit from my last post - "I'm forced to agree with you! If we start from your definition, then Libertarian Free Will is the path to take..."

In case there is any more confusion, let me restate this as clearly as possible. If I accept your initial definition of "I posses freedom of the will if I could have done other then I did do" then an Agent is required, and Libertarian Free Will is true. Is that sufficiently clear? I am *not* disputing that LFW satisifies your definition - I am disputing that your definition truly defines 'Free Will'.

I'd be interested to see what arguments you can offer that might establish/support your assertion that your definition is "true". So far, the only thing I can see is "has been generally accepted for hundreds of years". Hopefully we can both see why "because it's always been that way" is not an irrefutable argument.

You assert we should add the word "apparent" to the definition?

For what?
To more accurately reflect the discussion - that we are attempting to explore the "truth" behind something that "appears to be". Your position seems, to me, to be "I appear to have Free Will, therefore I *must* have Free Will". CAn you show a chain of logical statements that leads from :

Premise 1. I appear to have Free will.
Premise 2. ...
...
Premise X. ....
Conclusion. Therefore, I must have Free Will.

Please fill in the missing statements. If you can't, then I'd say again that by removing the word "apparent" from any definition you are simply assuming your conclsuion.

Does it's "apparent"-ness make it real? If it does then why not say REAL, then eliminate the useless word altogether?
The fact that you ask this question makes me doubt that you understand my position. You ask "Does it's "apparent"-ness make it real?" - that's the whole discusion, isn't it? Is it real? The fact that you wish to eliminate any doubt and proceed straight to the conclusion that it is indeed real seems to unambiguously indicate that you're are just assuming your conclusion.

I never have claimed to solve the agent. You and your straw men!
We both agree that the 'Agent' is inexplicable. You label this a 'straw man', but I think you are missing the point. You say :

The "agent" is such:

1) The "agent" is not and can not be caused.
2) The "agent" can cause.

Agreed. However, I'm still saying that your first 'characteristic' is logically incomprehensible, in that the agent is not caused (determined), but is not random/non-determined either. In other words, you assign only two characteristics to this 'agent', but one of them is a logical contradiction. To me, this makes the 'Agent' empty as an explanation of Free Will.

In short, the totality of your explanation seems to be :

"I have Free Will because I have Free Will. Free Will is an Agent; the Agent is whatever is required to make Free Will behave as Free Will".

Not exactly a major leap forward in understanding, as far as I can see.
The "agent" may have more characteristics, it may not. I DO NOT KNOW. Why do you assert that the "agent" is beyond understanding? That is your assertion, my assertion is that the agent possesses those two traits, but we both agree that neither of us can explain the "agent". Just because we cannot explain something doesn't make it fake.

We cannot explain gravity, it must be fake! Hey, so what that you have proof that gravity exists, it cannot be explained so it is fake! That is your argument!
Although I'm tempted to say "straw man" straight back at you, that seems unlikely to advance the discussion. You have incorrectly described my point. You say "it cannot be explained so it is fake! That is your argument!". No - what I'm saying is that the Agent *requires* an ability that is logically impossible. You know this, and admit this, yet choose to simply say "it may one day be found to be possible". Fine. Would you then agree to the following statement?

"The LFW 'Agent' is logically impossible given all current human knowledge. For the 'Agent' to operate in the way required by LFW, new and currently inconceivable changes in the very structure of logical thought will be required".

While my proof of the "agent" is not such that everyone views it every day, it is valid proof. If you disagree with the validity of my arguments then please ADDRESS MY ARGUMENTS.
Well, this is where we appear to have nothing else to say - I haven't addressed your arguments because I agree with your agruments! Given your starting point, you conclusion seems sound (if somewhat empty) to me. Again, I am (and have always been) questioning your starting point.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Rusty,

Over in the materialism thread, you asked me to come to this thread, and address your arguments for free-will.

Unfortunately, I cannot find any. [quote]

If you are simply going to continue being obtuse, when I know that you are not stupid but stubborn, then I will not have a discussion with you.

[quote]You do not seem to have ever made any argument at all supporting the existence of free-will.

Correct. My argument is that the existence of free will requires an "agent". If you do not believe we have free will then my argument holds an invalid premise. I have never pretended otherwise, and would take the determinist view in that case.

Instead, all of your arguments seem to begin with the assumption that the existence of free-will is a given. If I am mistaken in this, could you please point out where this argument is?

Yes, that is exactly what I am doing. I am arguing that the existence of free will requires an "agent".

You have stated in this thread that if free-will, as you have defined it, exists, then there must be an agent which is neither deterministic, nor random. Could you please define what you mean by the word "random"? The only definition I know for this word is "non-deterministic". By this definition, your agent is self-contradictory, so this clearly isn't what you mean by "random". Can you explain what you do mean?

I will give you an explanation but will not let you draw me into a tangent. I am not here to define the "agent". I do not hold any opinion on what the "agent" is. My assertion is that free will requires an "agent", not that I know what this "agent" could be.

Random - An occurance of a causal effect that was not caused and was not "agent" caused.
Determined - An occurance of a causal effect that was neccesitated by a prior effect.
Agent - An occurance of a causal effect that was not caused and was not random.

If you want to pin me down I would assert that Random, as we think of it, is flawed. But I will not discuss this with someone who will ignore my valid argument for the existence of an "agent" and will make attacks on the VALID conclusion. I do not and never have pretended to know what the "agent" is.

I am not going to try to define the "agent" any further then:

1) The "agent" can not be caused.
2) The "agent" can cause.

Please note that I am not asking for you to explain exactly what this agent is. I am asking you to define what you mean by the word "random", and nothing more.

Dr. Stupid

We will see. If you attack my conclusion because I cannot explain it then you are a hypocrite and confused as any compatabilist. Perhaps, though, you are earnest and will instead debate my valid argument for the existence of the "agent" (that I cannot explain).

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
Rusty,

I think we've reached an impasse - there seems little more to say.


Perhaps I have been too hasty and driven you away from this thread. I apologize. I will try to actually think about the effects of my verbage in the future. I need to get more patience :(

Fine - I understand you clearly. But I disagree that this definition is valid. As far as I'm aware, no compatibilist will agree that your "hundreds of years old definition" is valid. Simply asserting that it is, and therefore it is, isn't much of an argument.

I assert that it is the classic definition. You assert that it isn't. I will now address your assertion as I should have done before.

You assert the definition of free will is:

I chose what I wanted to choose.

Now let us accept that this is free will. Now I will tell you a story and this will result in the establishment of constraint.

Rusty has a neighbor who is a mad scientist. This mad scientist kidnaps Rusty and inserts a brain-wave device into Rusty's head. This device allows the neighbor to introduce 'wants' into Rusty. The neighbor introduces the 'want' in Rusty to kill his wife and children. Rusty chooses to kill his wife and children.

Rusty want turned into Rusty choice. Rusty was free.

Now you can tell me how your freedom of the will can have a clause introduced into it that will allow this Rusty to NOT be free while keeping the definition the same please. (hint - Ayer did it in 1953 with 'constraint').


Perhaps you missed this bit from my last post - "I'm forced to agree with you! If we start from your definition, then Libertarian Free Will is the path to take..."

In case there is any more confusion, let me restate this as clearly as possible. If I accept your initial definition of "I posses freedom of the will if I could have done other then I did do" then an Agent is required, and Libertarian Free Will is true. Is that sufficiently clear? I am *not* disputing that LFW satisifies your definition - I am disputing that your definition truly defines 'Free Will'.

I'd be interested to see what arguments you can offer that might establish/support your assertion that your definition is "true". So far, the only thing I can see is "has been generally accepted for hundreds of years". Hopefully we can both see why "because it's always been that way" is not an irrefutable argument.


Yes I agree and I should have more patience and address the argument. I suppose, as an explanation, I say that I have had this argument many times and it already leads to constraint. I'm just impatient. My apologies, I will stop being a prick =(


To more accurately reflect the discussion - that we are attempting to explore the "truth" behind something that "appears to be". Your position seems, to me, to be "I appear to have Free Will, therefore I *must* have Free Will". CAn you show a chain of logical statements that leads from :

Premise 1. I appear to have Free will.
Premise 2. ...
...
Premise X. ....
Conclusion. Therefore, I must have Free Will.

Please fill in the missing statements. If you can't, then I'd say again that by removing the word "apparent" from any definition you are simply assuming your conclsuion.


No, I am assuming we have free will. My conclusion is that free will requires an "agent".

I do not want to assume the premise that:

1) We apparently have free will.

Because then I can not argue about what things must be if we DO HAVE FREE WILL.



The fact that you ask this question makes me doubt that you understand my position. You ask "Does it's "apparent"-ness make it real?" - that's the whole discusion, isn't it? Is it real? The fact that you wish to eliminate any doubt and proceed straight to the conclusion that it is indeed real seems to unambiguously indicate that you're are just assuming your conclusion.


You have not been reading my posts. I assume free will exists. That is a foregone conclusion. I then argue that the existence of free will neccesitates the existence of the "agent". If we are to assume that free will does not exist then I would argue that there is no "agent".

I do not care to argue about whether free will exists or not. I take the Dr. Johnson approach.

1. We have free will.

It logically follows from premise #1 that we have free will.


We both agree that the 'Agent' is inexplicable. You label this a 'straw man', but I think you are missing the point. You say :


Agreed. However, I'm still saying that your first 'characteristic' is logically incomprehensible, in that the agent is not caused (determined), but is not random/non-determined either. In other words, you assign only two characteristics to this 'agent', but one of them is a logical contradiction. To me, this makes the 'Agent' empty as an explanation of Free Will.

So you are saying that something being a cause without being caused is incomprehensible? I agree, it is very difficult and I have no logical explanation. But the conclusion follows from the premises.

Do not confuse our inability to, at this time, comprehend the "agent" with the existence of the "agent". Again, I will say that we do not comprehend gravity, but we do not ignorantly dismiss it's existance either.

In short, the totality of your explanation seems to be :

"I have Free Will because I have Free Will. Free Will is an Agent; the Agent is whatever is required to make Free Will behave as Free Will".

Yes, and those two things that are required are:

1) The "agent" cannot be caused.
2) The "agent" can cause.

Not exactly a major leap forward in understanding, as far as I can see.

Although I'm tempted to say "straw man" straight back at you, that seems unlikely to advance the discussion. You have incorrectly described my point. You say "it cannot be explained so it is fake! That is your argument!". No - what I'm saying is that the Agent *requires* an ability that is logically impossible. You know this, and admit this, yet choose to simply say "it may one day be found to be possible". Fine. Would you then agree to the following statement?

"The LFW 'Agent' is logically impossible given all current human knowledge. For the 'Agent' to operate in the way required by LFW, new and currently inconceivable changes in the very structure of logical thought will be required".

You were following my argument after all. I would say that our current generally held scientific beliefs must be changed to accept the existence of the "agent".

If my argument is valid, and my premises are valid, then my conclusion is the logical conclusion.

Just because you do not like it doesn't make it go away.



Well, this is where we appear to have nothing else to say - I haven't addressed your arguments because I agree with your agruments! Given your starting point, you conclusion seems sound (if somewhat empty) to me. Again, I am (and have always been) questioning your starting point.

So what is it of my premises you disagree with? My definition of free will, correct? I addressed that above and we can move in that direction.

[Jethro]

If this agent is not caused, what makes it any different from say, a coin flip? Or more correctly, the result of a measurement of the spin of an electron?

Plus I don't see how your examples make the existence of said agent a necessity.

Let's say you're in the Grand Canyon and Fred is in the path of an oncoming rock. A person would push Fred into the cactus. Well, maybe Fred's a jerk, so as a reasonable person you decide not to save him. Well, Fred's a jerk, but he owes you money, so if you save him maybe he'll pay up. But maybe he's got the money on him now so you can take it from his wallet after he's smooshed. Clearly one's decision depends at least somewhat upon input from the situation.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

Over in the materialism thread, you asked me to come to this thread, and address your arguments for free-will.

Unfortunately, I cannot find any.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you are simply going to continue being obtuse, when I know that you are not stupid but stubborn, then I will not have a discussion with you.

I am not being obtuse or stubborn, nor am I claiming that you have never presented any arguments. I am simply stating that none of the arguments you have presented appear to be arguments for free-will, but instead arguments which begin with the premise that Libertarian free-will does, in fact, exist.

You do not seem to have ever made any argument at all supporting the existence of free-will.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Correct. My argument is that the existence of free will requires an "agent". If you do not believe we have free will then my argument holds an invalid premise. I have never pretended otherwise, and would take the determinist view in that case.

OK. But in the materialist thread you presented the existence of this "agent" as an argument against the validity of materialism. If materialism is incompatible with Libertarian free-will, then you can hardly use an argument that starts with Libertarian free-will as a premise, as an argument against materialism.

Is the problem that you were operating under the impression that materialism claims that LFW exists? If so, then I could see how you could conclude that materialism is flawed, but I do not understand why you have this impression.

Instead, all of your arguments seem to begin with the assumption that the existence of free-will is a given. If I am mistaken in this, could you please point out where this argument is?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yes, that is exactly what I am doing. I am arguing that the existence of free will requires an "agent".

I would tend to agree. This is exactly why I do not think that LFW exists. Its existence would imply a contradiction, namely the existence of an agent which is simultaneously non-deterministic, and not non-deterministic.

You have stated in this thread that if free-will, as you have defined it, exists, then there must be an agent which is neither deterministic, nor random. Could you please define what you mean by the word "random"? The only definition I know for this word is "non-deterministic". By this definition, your agent is self-contradictory, so this clearly isn't what you mean by "random". Can you explain what you do mean?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I will give you an explanation but will not let you draw me into a tangent. I am not here to define the "agent". I do not hold any opinion on what the "agent" is. My assertion is that free will requires an "agent", not that I know what this "agent" could be.

Random - An occurance of a causal effect that was not caused and was not "agent" caused.
Determined - An occurance of a causal effect that was neccesitated by a prior effect.
Agent - An occurance of a causal effect that was not caused and was not random.

OK. I am having trouble here. What is the difference between "caused" and "agent caused"? If something is agent caused, in what sense is it not caused?

And more to the point, you have said that you do not wish to attempt to define what the agent is, but if you do not do so, then how can you define the term "random" in terms of the agent?

The point I am making is this: Before you ever get to the point in your argument of saying that an agent must exist which is not deterministic, and not random, you must first conclude that LFW is incompatible with pure determinism, pure randomness, or a combination of the two. But you cannot make this assertion without first defining what "random" means.

I agree that LFW is incompatible with all three scenarios, but when I say this I am using the definition of random to be "not determined". If this is not the definition you are using, then I cannot say I agree with your argument. Indeed, without a definition for what you mean by random, I do not even know what your argument is.

Can you define the word random without making reference to the agent? If not, I have no idea what you mean when you say that LFW is incompatible with randomness, or a combination of determinism and randomness.

If you want to pin me down I would assert that Random, as we think of it, is flawed.

I have no idea what you think of as "random". To me, it just means "nondeterministic". That is the mathematical definition of the term.

But I will not discuss this with someone who will ignore my valid argument for the existence of an "agent" and will make attacks on the VALID conclusion. I do not and never have pretended to know what the "agent" is.

Since one step in your argument is the claim that LFW is incompatible with pure determinism, pure randomness, or a combination of the two, in order for your argument to valid (or even coherent), you must be able to define what you mean by "random". If you cannot define "agent", then you clearly cannot define "random" in terms of it.

I am not going to try to define the "agent" any further then:

1) The "agent" can not be caused.
2) The "agent" can cause.

That's fine, you don't have to. I just fail to see how this is distinguishable from the mathematical definition of "random", or why you think that this is compatible with LFW.

Incidentally, I have absolutely no problem with the concept of uncaused causes. Indeed, we see them in QM all the time. The word we (meaning physicists) use to describe such phenomena is "random".

Maybe a better way to approach this problem would be for you to explain why you think that LFW is not compatible with a combination of determinism and randomness (using your definition of random). I think it is pretty trivial to see why it is not compatible with determinism, but it is not at all clear to me why it is incompatible with a combination of determinism and randomness, since I don't know what you mean by randomness.

Dr. Stupid

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Stimpson J. Cat I am running out of time at work so I will have to be very brief, due to the snow storm =(

AGENT CAUSED - Not determined, not random
DETERMINED CAUSED - The effect was neccesitated by a prior effect.
RANDOM CAUSED - The effect was not necessitated by any prior event.


I wanted to emphasize that AGENT CAUSED was not RANDOM CAUSED but I inserted that into RANDOM CAUSED definition which was a mistake. I get sick & tired of people telling me that "agent" and random are synonomous.

No doubt you saw the mistake, but unforutnately you seem to be unable to realize that it was a mistake. It can't be that you are obtuse because you have stated several times that you are not obtuse.

I tend to skip the beginning stuff because we've already done some of it in this thread and I've already done most of it.

I suppose you want me to draw all the links I am trying to make, but I cannot do it now.

I'll be back tomorrow or friday.

Also in your post are you asserting that the spin of an electron is random?

Till next time, enjoy your week! :)

[Loki]

Rusty,

I assert that it is the classic definition. You assert that it isn't.
Not quite - it may well be the "classic definition". I'm asserting that it's not the "correct definition".

For now, we seem to agree well enough on LFW, and the need for an Agent. We seem to agree it's "not logically explainable" at the moment. Perhaps our only point of LFW disagreement is :
So you are saying that something being a cause without being caused is incomprehensible? I agree, it is very difficult and I have no logical explanation. But the conclusion follows from the premises.
I'm not disputing that something can be acausal - I'm disputing that the agent can be something that is "not determined" and "not non-determined". But I think the point has been made, so there's little more to add. I see this as rendering the Agent logically incoherent, you see it as making the Agent "currently" logically incoherent - with hope for an eventual resolution. Time to agree to disagree, I think.

Now you can tell me how your freedom of the will can have a clause introduced into it that will allow this Rusty to NOT be free while keeping the definition the same please. (hint - Ayer did it in 1953 with 'constraint').
Okay, but before we go into this I just want to add that my definition is more a "rule of thumb" that guides my thinking, rather than an attempt to create a statement that will withstand endless assault! But it does work well for me, so lets see how well it flies...

The fact that you reference Ayers indicates you feel you can "defeat" his proposal. Okay, lets walk into the trap you seem to have prepared :cool:

The key element in Compatabilist Free Will (CFW) is that the "freedom" of a human's choices is not a freedom from causation, but a freedom from coercion (Ayers uses constraint). In the physical realm, A causes B - saltwater causes rust in a boy robot. However, there is no coercion - saltwater does not demand rust from the boy robot.

The "introduced clause" you refer to above is the division of causes into two categories - those that coerce, and those that don't. If my choice is the result of one or "coercive causes", then it is not a free choice. If the only causes involved in my decison are "non-coercive" then it *is* a free choice.

There, that should give you what you need! Why don't you have a go at explaining why this "division" is either (a) imaginary or (b) a special plead? Hint - don't forget to include humans!

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat


You have stated in this thread that if free-will, as you have defined it, exists, then there must be an agent which is neither deterministic, nor random. Could you please define what you mean by the word "random"? The only definition I know for this word is "non-deterministic". By this definition, your agent is self-contradictory, so this clearly isn't what you mean by "random". Can you explain what you do mean?



You are presupposing the correctness of your position (as you always do). If libertarian free will exists then randon necessarily can't just mean non-deterministic, it also means that the alleged random event was not inniated by a conscious being.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

AGENT CAUSED - Not determined, not random
DETERMINED CAUSED - The effect was neccesitated by a prior effect.
RANDOM CAUSED - The effect was not necessitated by any prior event.

Ummm... Are you sure you want to go with that? Because you have just defined "AGENT CAUSED" to be

"An effect that was not necessitated by a prior effect, and (not not) necessitated by any prior event."

Unless you mean something very different by "effect" and "event", this is clearly a direct contradiction.

I wanted to emphasize that AGENT CAUSED was not RANDOM CAUSED but I inserted that into RANDOM CAUSED definition which was a mistake. I get sick & tired of people telling me that "agent" and random are synonomous.

OK. But the fact remains that without that insertion, your definition of random is simply "not determined", which leaves no logical room for anything else.

No doubt you saw the mistake, but unforutnately you seem to be unable to realize that it was a mistake. It can't be that you are obtuse because you have stated several times that you are not obtuse.

I saw a mistake, but I cannot read your mind. I gave you the benefit of the doubt, by pointing out the problem as I saw it, and asking you to clarify it. Why so defensive?

Also in your post are you asserting that the spin of an electron is random?

I would say that the measurement of an electron's spin is random. To say that the spin of an electron is (or is not) random would be to imply that its spin is something which could be meaningfully said to objectively exist. QM suggests that this is not the case. What can be meaningfully said to objectively exist is the electron, and more specifically, its interactions with other things. Spin is an abstract mathematical construct used to model those interactions.

But the interactions sure seem to be random, and the model is most definitely a random one.

Dr. Stupid

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

You have stated in this thread that if free-will, as you have defined it, exists, then there must be an agent which is neither deterministic, nor random. Could you please define what you mean by the word "random"? The only definition I know for this word is "non-deterministic". By this definition, your agent is self-contradictory, so this clearly isn't what you mean by "random". Can you explain what you do mean?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You are presupposing the correctness of your position (as you always do).

Good grief, Ian. Read what I said! I acknowledged that Rusty probably didn't mean "non-deterministic" by "random", and asked him to explain what he does mean. How does this constitute me presupposing the correctness of my position?

I don't suppose you would care to take a crack at defining "random"?

If libertarian free will exists then randon necessarily can't just mean non-deterministic, it also means that the alleged random event was not inniated by a conscious being.

Does initiated mean the same thing as caused? If so, then clearly something which is initiated by a conscious human being is not random, it is determined!

But of course, we aren't talking about events initiated by human beings. We are talking about this hypothetical agent, which Rusty has already said is not caused by anything.

Dr. Stupid

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

How do I unblock Ian...

Agent is not causal, agent is not not causal.

Agent is something else entirely.

This is why you don't like agent, stimpy, because it forces a non-phsycialism world where something "agent" can exist.

The alternative is some variant of determinism which is fun to argue for.

Agent certainly can initiate a new causal chain. It just is not ever necessitated to act. Doesn't mean it can't act, it's just never necessitated by any prior event AND it is never not necessitated by a prior event.

That is what agent is. I don't know why? I could conjecture, I knew you would take this approach. You can't address anything in my valid argument so you take this approach just like I said you would. I must be psychic, I want my million.

Perhaps agent exist in dualist world where necessitate does not compute. I don't know. But my argument is valid and I brought it up because it invalidates physicalism and forces physicalism to adapt. I thought it was interesting to note that physicalism elminateas the possibility of human free will.

I admit that "agent" has big weakness in that it requires a change in the subset of thought that is backbone of science, but it isn't a big change.

ALernatively we can simply believe we do not have free will. To make people happier I will argue soft-determinism and fatalism in a new thread later this weak.

I love arguing for fatalism :).

TLO(thermo-dynamics) control YOU control car. hehehhe

:)

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

argh my brain is starting to catch up with my mouth.

I wish I didn't have to go but I do, I try to come back tomorrow. I been thinking that you are right simpson J. Cat I need to redefine Random to fit. I need some humbe pie it appears.


I'll be thinking on what is good defeinition to use. Perhaps I should use something about, random cause is connected through laws of probability and determined cause is connected through laws of causality and "agent" cause is connected through laws of "agent"?

I will be giving it some though. I'm just glad it don't take much time for my brain to catch up with my mouth.

My apologies for insults.

[Jethro]

The more you keep talking the more it sounds like the agent is simply random, at least by the current definition of the term, and the only reason you presuppose this agent is because if the agent were simply random it could be described by things in the physical world.

So why don't we just say that the agent is random? This doesn't eliminate the possibility that the agent is not physical. It just prevents you from presupposing that a non-physical agent exists in order for free will to exist.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Jethro
The more you keep talking the more it sounds like the agent is simply random, at least by the current definition of the term, and the only reason you presuppose this agent is because if the agent were simply random it could be described by things in the physical world.

So why don't we just say that the agent is random? This doesn't eliminate the possibility that the agent is not physical. It just prevents you from presupposing that a non-physical agent exists in order for free will to exist.


Because a random "agent" does not give me what I believe that I have.

You are right, I need to come up with better definitions. How about if I assert this:


Determined - If something was necessitated by a prior state explainable through TLOP.
Random - If something was necessitated by a prior state explainable through the laws of probability.
"Agent" - If something was not necessitated.


Now I can assert that random things are necessitated by TLOProbability. The measurement of the electron wouldn't take place if not for the prior state (i.e. the existence of the electron, etc..).

Now I believe this leaves the "agent" as no longer a logical fallacy.

Does this put us in agreement (other then the truth of LFW)?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

Determined - If something was necessitated by a prior state explainable through TLOP.
Random - If something was necessitated by a prior state explainable through the laws of probability.
"Agent" - If something was not necessitated.

This is rather problematic.

Determined is OK. But your definition of random does not correspond to anything that I know of. I do not know of any phenomena which are necessitated by a prior state, but which are not explainable through TLOP.

Likewise, your definition of "agent" includes everything that I would describe as random. For example, the decay of a neutron is not (as far as we can tell) necessitated by anything. It either happens, or it does not.

Now I can assert that random things are necessitated by TLOProbability. The measurement of the electron wouldn't take place if not for the prior state (i.e. the existence of the electron, etc..).

The measurement is not what is random. The result of that measurement is. That result is not necessitated by anything. If it was, it would be either determined (if explainable by TLOP), or supernatural (if not).

You also seem to be confused about the laws of probability. These laws are not empirically determined rules, like the laws of physics. They are logical results of the assumption that the events in question are not determined.

In other words, if I start with the assumption that a particular class of event is non-deterministic, then I can logically deduce that these events will be describable by the laws of probability.

This presents another problem with your definitions, because no matter how you define "random" and "agent", if you assert that the agent is not deterministic, then it logically follows that it can be described by the laws of probability, regardless of whether you choose to call it random or not.

Dr. Stupid

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Rusty,



This is rather problematic.

Determined is OK. But your definition of random does not correspond to anything that I know of. I do not know of any phenomena which are necessitated by a prior state, but which are not explainable through TLOP.

Likewise, your definition of "agent" includes everything that I would describe as random. For example, the decay of a neutron is not (as far as we can tell) necessitated by anything. It either happens, or it does not.



The measurement is not what is random. The result of that measurement is. That result is not necessitated by anything. If it was, it would be either determined (if explainable by TLOP), or supernatural (if not).

You also seem to be confused about the laws of probability. These laws are not empirically determined rules, like the laws of physics. They are logical results of the assumption that the events in question are not determined.

In other words, if I start with the assumption that a particular class of event is non-deterministic, then I can logically deduce that these events will be describable by the laws of probability.

This presents another problem with your definitions, because no matter how you define "random" and "agent", if you assert that the agent is not deterministic, then it logically follows that it can be described by the laws of probability, regardless of whether you choose to call it random or not.

Dr. Stupid


You bring up some good points. I've been working on this but I've run into a bit of a brickwall caused by my ignorance on a few subjects. I think I have a valid solution that answers the points you have brought up but I need to refine it a bit more before I present it. I'm gonna start a new thread about randomeness, I hope you will grace me with your presence :)

-Rusty

[Baker]

I have been reading through this thread I know I’m a bit out of my element here its been awhile since I have been out of Politics and Current Events besides the Banter.
But since I do have the free will I’m responding to some of the threads here.

I have been looking up this the subject of this thread I was having problems understand why such a simple sounding subject could cause so much debate.

I found this on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy site.


"Free Will" is largely a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millenia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it.) Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action. (Clearly, there will also be epistemic conditions on responsibility as well, such as being aware -- or failing that, being culpably unaware -- of relevant alternatives to one's action and of the alternatives' moral significance.) But the significance of free will is not exhausted by its connection to moral responsibility. Free will also appears to be a condition on desert for one's accomplishments (why sustained effort and creative work are praiseworthy); on the autonomy and dignity of persons; and on the value we accord to love and friendship. (See Kane, 1996, 81ff.)
Philosophers who distinguish freedom of action and freedom of will do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually) our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or "willings."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/


I hope that this should clear everything up.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Yes that sums up a bit.

Free will is often assosciated with moral responsibility, this is called the responsibility principle. It states that a necessary condition for moral responsibility is free will.

I try to avoid that discussion because I feel it unduly complicates the issue, but I would support the responsibility principle completely. I have never heard any compelling argument to discount the principle. The best one being fairly recent and stating that a necessary condition for moral responsibility is 'reason-responsiveness'. I can't remember who wrote the paper but I can look it up when I get home.

But just because reason-responsiveness may be necessary does not mean that it is sufficient. That argument is currently lacking. Also if we seperate moral responsibility from 'blame-worthiness' then we must ask if we are truly interested in a moral responsilibility that is synonomous with reason-responsiveness or if this 'blame-worthiness' is what we truly care about.

John Fischer, that's who wrote the paper.


My assertion is that if we do not have free will as I defined it then we do not have free will in any meaningful sense. My examples above which validly prove constraint by circumstance serve to undermine the idea of compatabilist free will. It renders compatabilist free will a useless tautology.

If we do not have the freedom to have chosen other then we did choose then we do not have free will.

Of course the existence of the "agent" all depends on the truth of libertarian free will. If we do not have free will then it certainly does not follow that there must exist an "agent", but then we do not have free will. This is where Stimpson J. Cat and I agree.


So what do you think, is the definition of free will:

To have been able to choose other then you chose

correct?

[Baker]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
My assertion is that if we do not have free will as I defined it then we do not have free will in any meaningful sense. My examples above which validly prove constraint by circumstance serve to undermine the idea of compatabilist free will. It renders compatabilist free will a useless tautology.

If we do not have the freedom to have chosen other then we did choose then we do not have free will.

Of course the existence of the "agent" all depends on the truth of libertarian free will. If we do not have free will then it certainly does not follow that there must exist an "agent", but then we do not have free will. This is where Stimpson J. Cat and I agree

I think you are both looking to far into it the problems seems to be a long term goal compared to a short term one.

(Robert Kane 1996)
Kane believes that the free choices of greatest significance to an agent's autonomy are ones that are preceded by efforts of will within the process of deliberation. These are cases where one's will is conflicted, as when one's duty or long-term self-interest compete with a strong desire for a short-term good. As one struggles to sort out and prioritize one's own values, the possible outcomes are not merely undetermined, but also indeterminate: at each stage of the struggle, the possible outcomes have no specific objective probability of occurring. This indeterminacy, Kane believes, is essential to freedom of will.


I used to car pool to work with a Christian friend of mine I'm not a Christian but he would argue god gave us the free will to choose heaven or hell I would argue that it wasn't free will if god decides what happened to us based on are decisions.
He claimed god laid down the rules then gave us a choice to disobey them or go by them.

[Loki]

Rusty,

Perhaps this will move the conversation forward (perhaps not!)

To have been able to choose other then you chose
Can I break this statement down into two parts - there is a "chooser" and a "choice"? So in any given situation where a "choice" that has been made, is it correct to say that this choice is 100% determined?

Is it correct to say that you see LFW as :

1. "physical inputs" - things like memories, environment, limitations, past behaviours, genetics.
2. "agent inputs" - the "desired" causal chain initiated by the agent.
3. "choice" = "physical inputs" + "agent inputs"

Do you believe it is possible, in two given situations, for the "physical inputs" to be identical, and the "agent inputs" to be identical, but for the resultant "choices" to different? If not, why not?

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
Rusty,

Perhaps this will move the conversation forward (perhaps not!)


Can I break this statement down into two parts - there is a "chooser" and a "choice"? So in any given situation where a "choice" that has been made, is it correct to say that this choice is 100% determined?

Is it correct to say that you see LFW as :

1. "physical inputs" - things like memories, environment, limitations, past behaviours, genetics.
2. "agent inputs" - the "desired" causal chain initiated by the agent.
3. "choice" = "physical inputs" + "agent inputs"

Do you believe it is possible, in two given situations, for the "physical inputs" to be identical, and the "agent inputs" to be identical, but for the resultant "choices" to different? If not, why not?

I am saying this:

Free will is to have been able to choose other then you did choose.

If you want to assert a different definition then do so. Now here is the blanket libertarian proof: It starts with determinism (the theory that everything is caused): This is from a summary I wrote awhile back: (edit, this summary is a summary of work mostly from Roderick Chisholm. But there is a lot of others work that went into this summary)

E is a complete description of the state of the universe at a time.

1) Determinism is true.
2) Et plus the laws of physics entail Et+.
3) If P had rendered the proposition that he performed X at time t+ false then the expression Et+ would be rendered false.
4) If Et+ is rendered false then either Et or the laws of physics or both must be false.
5) Et, an expression of the state of the world at any time earlier than t+, can not be rendered false at time t+ or any time after t+.
6) The laws of physics, analytically, can not be rendered false.
7) It follows from 5,6 that P could not have rendered X false.
8) If P had free will then P could have rendered X false.
9) It follows from 7,8 that P could not have had free will.

This is determinism. I believe everything above except I disagree with premise #1. I would assert that:

10) P has free will.

This means that the truth of determinism creates a contradiction and hence the truth of determinism must be discarded.

The argument for the existence of an "agent" is a natural extension of this argument.

So to answer your questions:

Is it correct to say that you see LFW as :

1. "physical inputs" - things like memories, environment, limitations, past behaviours, genetics.

No. Not at all.

2. "agent inputs" - the "desired" causal chain initiated by the agent.

Yes, but I would say "agent" causation. Cause initiated by the "agent".

3. "choice" = "physical inputs" + "agent inputs"

No. Choice would be the initial uncaused "agent" causation.

[Loki]

Rusty,

Hmmm...terminology issues. Let me try again.

No. Choice would be the initial uncaused "agent" causation.
I'm trying to tease apart your terms - you use "cause" and "effect" a lot, so let's try that.

Your definition of Free Will :

"To have been able to choose other than you chose"

In this definition, it appears to me that you are using "to choose" to mean "to cause" and "you chose" to mean "effect". We can then rewrite your definition as :

"To have been able to cause another effect".

In other words, I'm trying to see if you agree that *if* the agent is in state 'X', and the universe is in state 'Y', then you will *always* get choice 'Z'. To get a choice other than 'Z', either the agent or the universe must change. Agreed?

1. Agent state 'X' does not force universe state 'Y' - agreed ?
2. Universe state 'Y' does not force (but may influence) Agent state 'X' - agreed?
3. Agent state 'X' and universe state 'Y' *does* force choice 'Z' - agreed?

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
Rusty,

Hmmm...terminology issues. Let me try again.


I'm trying to tease apart your terms - you use "cause" and "effect" a lot, so let's try that.

Your definition of Free Will :

"To have been able to choose other than you chose"

In this definition, it appears to me that you are using "to choose" to mean "to cause" and "you chose" to mean "effect". We can then rewrite your definition as :

"To have been able to cause another effect".

In other words, I'm trying to see if you agree that *if* the agent is in state 'X', and the universe is in state 'Y', then you will *always* get choice 'Z'. To get a choice other than 'Z', either the agent or the universe must change. Agreed?

1. Agent state 'X' does not force universe state 'Y' - agreed ?
2. Universe state 'Y' does not force (but may influence) Agent state 'X' - agreed?
3. Agent state 'X' and universe state 'Y' *does* force choice 'Z' - agreed?


Let me split this up into the "smallest slices of time":

In the first smallest slice of time "agent" causation occurs. This is X. X represents all "agent" causations.

Also in this slice of time the universe is in state Yt.

Then it follows that X + Yt + TLOP causes Yt+.

Yt+ is the state of the universe at the smallest instance of time after state Y.

Choice is a word that has not been defined yet, so please define it. If you want me to define it then let me know. Although I already used it I never gave the definition, but you can probably see where I am going with it.

Although I wouldn't rule out the possibility of other non-physical effects such that they are caused but have no effect. Since this is not describable in terms of TLOP we could need another variable for it. There is also the possibility of 'something else'. I just have no arguments that support these two things existence.

[Loki]

Rusty,

Choice is a word that has not been defined yet, so please define it. If you want me to define it then let me know. Although I already used it I never gave the definition, but you can probably see where I am going with it
I think you should put your definition of "choice" on the table, since this conversation has been plagued by misunderstandings of terms.

Then it follows that X + Yt + TLOP causes Yt+.
Fine. So you agree that the only way in which Yt+ could be other than what it is, is if either 'X', 'Yt' or TLOP were different - Yt+ is fully, 100% determined by the combination of the 3 factors 'X', 'Yt' and 'TLOP'?

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
Rusty,


I think you should put your definition of "choice" on the table, since this conversation has been plagued by misunderstandings of terms.



Alright for choice:

We have three steps at minimum preceding an action by a human being:

volition -> will -> action

I would assert that choice is the step that takes place in the volition step. Although if you wanted to say that the choice takes place in the will step or even deny the volition step I would not disagree in this thread because it doesn't directly affect my argument in this thread.

(notes on volition)

Volition is choices about choices about actions.
Volitions can possibly extend up many levels but there is a limit.


I will explain volition more if you want, but if you are really interested read up on Harry Frankfurt. He has some good ideas about compatabilism. Then I'll e-mail you a counter-argument.

The basic Frankfurt argument is Free Will is volition being in line with will.


Fine. So you agree that the only way in which Yt+ could be other than what it is, is if either 'X', 'Yt' or TLOP were different - Yt+ is fully, 100% determined by the combination of the 3 factors 'X', 'Yt' and 'TLOP'?

If this is true:

Yt+ X + TLOP = Yt+ then I agree.

Specifically, I disagree with:

Yt + TLOP = Yt+

and I stipulate that X must be included. But I don't discount the possibility of including anything else.

But I believe for the sake of this thread that we can safely assume that I do agree that:

Yt + X + TLOP = Yt+

[Loki]

Rusty,

volition -> will -> action

I would assert that choice is the step that takes place in the volition step.
See, always a good idea to get the terms right. You'd just invalidated the line I was developing! Okay, given that definition of "choice", I need to rethink the point I was building towards.

But I believe for the sake of this thread that we can safely assume that I do agree that:

Yt + X + TLOP = Yt+
And as mentioned above, the clarification of "choice" means this statement probably leads nowhere. Oh well, I need to get to bed anyway - I'll review this tomorrow, and see if I still ahve anything to contribute.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Loki
Rusty,


See, always a good idea to get the terms right. You'd just invalidated the line I was developing! Okay, given that definition of "choice", I need to rethink the point I was building towards.


And as mentioned above, the clarification of "choice" means this statement probably leads nowhere. Oh well, I need to get to bed anyway - I'll review this tomorrow, and see if I still ahve anything to contribute.


NP :)


Yt + X + TLOP = Yt+

And as far as the state of the universe at time t+, it would be

Yt+ + X.

It seems that quantum physics would assert that we need to add another variable, Z, and that Z would be a negative number and would represent all the effects that are not causes (i.e. dissapearing particles). I'm trying to read up on this, but I don't think adding Z would be necessary for the "agent" argument. We also might want to add the E to represent "anything else", even if that E would always be zero.

But basically asserting that we have to add X, and X is always a positive, then it can be asserted that the "agent" is part or all of X.