Materialism

[Lord Kenneth]

I decided to make a topic. Because.

Well, I want Ian and UCE to explain to me why materialism is, well, silly (that's what they think, obviously).

Also, I haven't discussed things in this realm very much, so go easy on me (explain things in ways I can understand).

Originally posted by Dark Cobra
I decided to make a topic. Because.

Well, I want Ian and UCE to explain to me why materialism is, well, silly (that's what they think, obviously).

Also, I haven't discussed things in this realm very much, so go easy on me (explain things in ways I can understand).

Stare deeply into Pandoras' box...... ;)

The problem is known as the mind-body problem and it is very well described here :

http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/mind.htm

NB : Most materialists encountering this paper misunderstand statement 5 :


1. For any system, every fact about the whole is a necessary consequence of the nature and relations of the parts.

2. People are made of atoms.

3. Atoms are purely physical objects, with nothing but physical properties and physical relations to one another.

4. People have mental states.

5. No statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from any set of purely physical descriptions.


Just to avoid that discussion, I should point out that statement 5 is about linguistics, and is a natural consequence of a linguistic dualism which really does exist. All five of the above theses can be succesfully defended as true.

The solution to the mind-body problem that works is Berkeleys solution, however this is generally dismissed as 'ludicrous', mainly because it isn't properly understood:

http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~ursa/philos/az98.htm

My own take on the solution, posted on another site about a year ago :

http://www.mythical.net/cgi-bin/ubbcgi/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=2&t=000122


The problem I have found is that the materialists will defend their belief system as fanatically as any Christian. They are not interested in the solution. They are interested in trying to demonstrate the problem doesn't exist. But the problem does exist, which is why it has been argued about continuously for 400 years.

[c4ts]

Another view says that there simply are no mental phenomena. There is only the physical world. The existence of consciousness, therefore, must be some kind of massive delusion: contrary to popular opinion, nobody has any opinions, desires, or feelings. We are all just mindless automata. This lunatic view may be called radical materialism or eliminative materialism.

Franko is constantly defending this one. All he does is add the Logical Goddess as a controller of the functions of these automata. "You are made of atoms. Atoms obey TLOP. Therefore, you obey TLOP." (Given that TLOP are the commands of the LG, so that "obedience" to TLOP is actually obedience of the Goddess's every whim.)

A fifth view is that mental phenomena are, surprisingly, a subset of physical phenomena. All mental states, it turns out, are really states of the central nervous systems of animals. "Pain" just happens to be another word for a certain kind of brain state, just as "light" happens to be another word for electromagnetic radiation within a certain range of wavelengths. This view is called the mind/brain identity theory.

So the case for 5 is that physical states are the cause for mental action, because the mind itself operates within the boundaries of the physical world. This is not absurd, as far as I can tell.

Finally, there is (5). What reason is there for thinking that is true? Well, we can compare it with a number of similar principles to get the general idea. In moral philosophy, there is a principle sometimes called Hume's law that says it is not possible to derive a normative judgement from a descriptive judgement. A normative judgement is a judgement about what is good or bad, right or wrong, and a descriptive judgement is basically anything else. Another way this is stated is that you cannot deduce an "ought" from an "is": you can't derive what ought to be the case solely on the basis of what is the case. This principle is almost universally acknowledged. And it is merely part of a more general pattern. For example, you can't derive a statement describing distances from any set of statements that don't describe distances. You can not derive a statement about colors from any set of non-color statements. You can't derive geometrical statements from non-geometrical ones. And generally, if you have an inference in which the conclusion talks about one thing and the premises talk about something else, the inference is invalid. In the same way, it is a conceptual truth that you cannot derive a mental description from a physical description. After all, just consider some physical concepts, such as spatial/geometrical properties, mass, force, and electric charge. Is it plausible that there is any way that these concepts could be used to explain what it feels like to be in pain? Say whatever you like about masses, positions, and forces of particles, you will not have ascribed any mental states to anything.

But you can completely alter a mental state by physically affecting the brain. For example, you can introduce hallucinogenic chemicals or perform a lobotomy. Consequently, you can mitigate or deny certain mental states such as "pain" through the introduction of drugs like morphine. Just because the experience of pain is unintelligible or inexplicable does not mean it is not occuring in a strictly physical sense. The interpretation and operation of consciousness for a conscious human being undeniably bound to the brain, for if the brain is removed or ceases to function, consciousness is no longer possible, just as vision goes away if the eyes are removed. There are also medical studies involving MRI which show links between electromagnetic activity in the brain and mental activity. The argument presented againsts 5 suggests that consciousness occurs without the presence of a physiscal body to support it, and if that is true, I would appreciate some evidence to support it.

I also do not understand this statement here:
In the same way, it is a conceptual truth that you cannot derive a mental description from a physical description.
The problem is, how can a description exist without mental interpretation?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

1. For any system, every fact about the whole is a necessary consequence of the nature and relations of the parts.

2. People are made of atoms.

3. Atoms are purely physical objects, with nothing but physical properties and physical relations to one another.

4. People have mental states.

5. No statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from any set of purely physical descriptions.

Please, not this nonsense again. :rolleyes:

Just to avoid that discussion, I should point out that statement 5 is about linguistics, and is a natural consequence of a linguistic dualism which really does exist. All five of the above theses can be successfully defended as true.

Given that those five statements cannot all be true, under any logical framework, the above is clearly false. There are several possibilities:

2 is false: People are not really made of atoms, but instead also have some sort of non-physical component (dualism).

3 is false: Atoms are not purely physical objects, but can instead be affected by some non-physical agency (supernaturalism).

4 is false: People do not have mental states, under whatever definition of "mental" you are using.

5 is false: Any statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from a set of purely physical descriptions.

Materialism would assert that either 4 or 5 is false, depending on how you define "mental". But any logical framework must hold that at least one of the above is false, or else it is logically inconsistent.

As for number 5 being a natural consequence of linguistic dualism, that is only true if you are using a dualistic definition of "mental", in which case a materialist would argue that number 4 is false, and number 5 is thus meaningless.


Dr. Stupid

[Lord Kenneth]

It seems to me that...

1. Humans are made up of what is in the universe.

2. Ideas and thoughts are processed in the brain.

3. The brain is made up of what is in the universe.

So then, ideas and thoughts of humans are the result of biological processes.

[c4ts]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
As for number 5 being a natural consequence of linguistic dualism, that is only true if you are using a dualistic definition of "mental"

Thank you for clearing that up.

[Lord Kenneth]

Although this is a bit off the discussion, it seems odd that UCE is quick to talk about how dogmatic materialists are, when he is quick to use language that is almost insulting even though it is obvious one can simply be mistaken.

He himself should know that, after all, he has said he has switched points of view.

[c4ts]

It would follow that the refutation of materialism would require the confirmation of existence outside the universe as it can be percieved or comprehended by man, not merely explanations of actions or things within the system by the introduction of a force whose origins are external to that universe. Without such knowledge, if the force itself is found to occur entirely within the universe, then it can be incorporated into materialism. In this case, the force would be self-awareness, and it is dependent upon physical properties of the matter from which the human brain is composed.

This dependence leaves two possibilities, either matter is a property of the mind, or the mind is a property of matter. Unless I am presenting a false dilemma (if I am, please provide another possibility), only one of them is true.

I say matter is not a property of the mind, because the state of the mind does not affect matter. To say otherwise would require evidence of a mind existing without matter to support it.

I'm going to be selective about what I respond to in this thread, for reasons of being bored of endless repetition.

But I liked this :

Stimp :


Given that those five statements cannot all be true, under any logical framework, the above is clearly false.


I maintain that some sort of mentalism, linked to above, provides a solution which allows all 5 theses to be true at the same time.

The original paper rejects Berkeley...

1) because it is "lunatic", in the authors opinion

and

2) "idealism a denial of (2) and (3) insofar as it implies there aren't any atoms"

...which is a straightforward failure to understand idealism. The atoms exist, they just don't exist independently of the mental realm.

Originally posted by Dark Cobra
[B]It seems to me that...

1. Humans are made up of what is in the universe.


The physical Universe. We are currently discussing the relationship between consciousness and matter. Which is more 'real'?



Although this is a bit off the discussion, it seems odd that UCE is quick to talk about how dogmatic materialists are, when he is quick to use language that is almost insulting even though it is obvious one can simply be mistaken.

He himself should know that, after all, he has said he has switched points of view.


It was partly the strength of my own certainty when I held the opposite view that motivates me to conduct myself like this. I KNEW I was right. I do not want to be insulting. I understand precisely why the skeptical/materialist/scientistic viewpoint persists, and would even go so far as to say I would not like to live in a world where it did not exist. It isn't wrong. It is half right.

[c4ts]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
I'm going to be selective about what I respond to in this thread, for reasons of being bored of endless repetition.

Why don't you elaborate instead? That would end the repetition, rather than make you a part of it.

[Lord Kenneth]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


The physical Universe. We are currently discussing the relationship between consciousness and matter. Which is more 'real'?


Conciousness is apparently a product of matter (and energy processes).

[c4ts]

I say matter is more real than consciousness (given that neither one is unreal), because matter keeps on existing, even when you don't.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat -
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From Website
5. No statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from any set of purely physical descriptions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stimp
As for number 5 being a natural consequence of linguistic dualism, that is only true if you are using a dualistic definition of "mental", in which case a materialist would argue that number 4 is false, and number 5 is thus meaningless.


Dr. Stupid [/B]

5 cannot be meaningless. It's meaning is perfectly self-evident and clear. Either mental facts can be derived from physical facts or they can't be. What conceivable meaning could there be in ascribing it as meaningless?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by c4ts
I say matter is more real than consciousness (given that neither one is unreal), because matter keeps on existing, even when you don't.

How do you know this?

[c4ts]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


How do you know this?

I witnessed the death of my grandmother. After she died, her body continued to exist, so we hired specialists to dress it up and bury it. Nothing was observed to leave the body as it ceased to function and behave like my grandmother. Essentialy, the matter remained, but it was no longer conscious.

[evildave]

No statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from any set of purely physical descriptions.

Or they've simply misinterpreted a lack of expressiveness of one or more description systems as a "proof" of something being indescribable.

As an example, a handheld scientific calculator with a 64x64 plotting display that can handle 128 variables is poorly suited to describe a complex 3D structure that contains billions of unique operating parts.

If you only have one sheet of typing paper, describing how a space shuttle works, down to the last line of code in the computer that controls a waste vent fan in the privy is problematic.

We may not live to see it, but a system of description that contains enough information at once to contain a valid model of "human mind" will come.

If you really don't think that grey meat in your skull is imporant for anything, you can always remove it and then let us know how it went.

[c4ts]

Originally posted by evildave
If you really don't think that grey meat in your skull is imporant for anything, you can always remove it and then let us know how it went.

Heh heh... I'm adding that to my sig.

[Yahzi]

The problem I have found is that the materialists will defend their belief system as fanatically as any Christian. They are not interested in the solution.

Why should they be? What problems does it solve, other than a few linguistic condrums?

Idealism that is indistinguishable from materalism is pointless. Idealism that can be distinguished from materialism is false (as Randi's million demonstrates).

It is not that we defend our belief system; it is that we reject unnecessary beliefs. In this we are entitled to be dogmatic to the extreme, since what we are defending is the very basis of Reason itself.

All that intensity you feel is merely the sharp edge of Occam's Razor.

Originally posted by c4ts


Why don't you elaborate instead? That would end the repetition, rather than make you a part of it.

Well, that rather depends who asks the question. I can't be bothered to refute Stimpson claiming that "People are made of atoms" is wrong. It is a rather pathetic claim made by someone who should know better, but also knows there is no better way of refuting the proof. I realise some other people haven't been through this a hundred times already.


DC


Conciousness is apparently a product of matter (and energy processes).


Why is that 'apparent'?


c4ts :


I say matter is more real than consciousness (given that neither one is unreal), because matter keeps on existing, even when you don't.


How do you know that?

If all conscious beings died and left a completely lifeless Universe, in what manner could it be said to 'exist'?



I witnessed the death of my grandmother.


"I witnessed..."

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Stare deeply into Pandoras' box...... ;)

The problem is known as the mind-body problem and it is very well described here :

http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/mind.htm

NB : Most materialists encountering this paper misunderstand statement 5 :



Just to avoid that discussion, I should point out that statement 5 is about linguistics, and is a natural consequence of a linguistic dualism which really does exist. All five of the above theses can be succesfully defended as true.

The solution to the mind-body problem that works is Berkeleys solution, however this is generally dismissed as 'ludicrous', mainly because it isn't properly understood:

http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~ursa/philos/az98.htm

My own take on the solution, posted on another site about a year ago :

http://www.mythical.net/cgi-bin/ubbcgi/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=2&t=000122


The problem I have found is that the materialists will defend their belief system as fanatically as any Christian. They are not interested in the solution. They are interested in trying to demonstrate the problem doesn't exist. But the problem does exist, which is why it has been argued about continuously for 400 years.

I've read as far as the second post but don't care to read the replies, as I doubt you would consider them anyway.

Materialism:

"If you can't percieve 'it' or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist"

Premise:
1) The universe contains all things that exist
1, 1) All things that exist are contained in the universe.

2) If a human being cannot percieve 'it', or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist.

1, 2) All things that exist can be percieved or reduced to something that can be percieved.

OR:

If 'it' can not be percieved or reduced to something that can be percieved then 'it' does not exist.


This should help you quickly understand why UE's argument is invalid. No where does materialism claim that all things that exist somehow posses the trait of "physicalness" nor does materialism claim that "physicalness" is somehow different from "mentalness".

Those are UE's claims.

Materialism cannot be proven false, because to prove that something exists that we cannot percieve is to prove that we can reduce it to something that can be percieved.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


The physical Universe. We are currently discussing the relationship between consciousness and matter. Which is more 'real'?

The univerise is defined such that all things that exist are contained in the universe.

Rusty :


Premise:
1) The universe contains all things that exist
1, 1) All things that exist are contained in the universe.

2) If a human being cannot percieve 'it', or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist.

1, 2) All things that exist can be percieved or reduced to something that can be percieved.

OR:

If 'it' can not be percieved or reduced to something that can be percieved then 'it' does not exist.


This should help you quickly understand why UE's argument is invalid. No where does materialism claim that all things that exist somehow posses the trait of "physicalness" nor does materialism claim that "physicalness" is somehow different from "mentalness".


Erm....this will help nobody understand anything, quickly or otherwise. Materialism, BY DEFINITION, is a claim that all things that exist are physical. That isn't 'My claim'. That is precisely what materialism is.

As for 'mentalness', materialism doesn't really claim anything at all, apart from the implied claim that the mental realm "is really" physical, even though this is counter-intuitive and leads to logical problems.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Rusty :



Erm....this will help nobody understand anything, quickly or otherwise. Materialism, BY DEFINITION, is a claim that all things that exist are physical. That isn't 'My claim'. That is precisely what materialism is.

As for 'mentalness', materialism doesn't really claim anything at all, apart from the implied claim that the mental realm "is really" physical, even though this is counter-intuitive and leads to logical problems.


No, materialism is the claim that all things that exist can be percieved or reduced to such a state that they can be percieved.

Some materialist papers I have read have 'suggested' an additional premise reading:

3) All things that can be percieved are physical.

But most are content with the all things that exist can be percieved clause.

Exist = =/ physical depending on your take of the word.

But let's accept premise 3) for fun.

1) The universe contains all things that exist.

2) If a human being cannot percieve 'it', or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist.

1, 2. 3) All things that exist can be percieved.

4) All things that can be percieved are physical.

3, 4. 5) All things that exist are physical.


Obviously, this premise simply defines physical as "all things that exist", but is not neccessarily a part of materialism.

It still remains valid.

Rusty :


No where does materialism claim that all things that exist somehow posses the trait of "physicalness"

No, materialism is the claim that all things that exist can be percieved or reduced to such a state that they can be percieved.


http://www.skepdic.com/materialism.html


Philosophical materialism (aka physicalism) :

Philosophical materialism (physicalism) is the metaphysical view that there is only one substance in the universe and that substance is physical, empirical or material.


Sounds pretty much like my definition, Rusty, and bears absolutely no resemblance whatsoever to your own.

The rest of your post makes no sense to me whatsover.

What are you talking about? :confused:

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Unfortunatley I have to run. I'll try to make some time later as I think this might be interesting.

Just to let you know, I believe that materialism is a valid argument. I also believe it is a false argument. So we probably do agree on the second point.

I'm not sure where that "physicalism" or physical materialism or whatever we shall call it came from. I am mostly interested in the free will debate, which is where I came into contact with materialism. Metaphysics are not my thing.

I certainly can't see how "physicalism" is invalid, though.

1) There is only one substance in the universe and that substance is physical, empirical or material.

It certainly follows from the single premise that the premise is the conclusion eh?

What is the problem you have with this?

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot

Just to let you know, I believe that materialism is a valid argument. I also believe it is a false argument. So we probably do agree on the second point.


Erm...."materialism" isn't an "argument", it is an ontological/metaphysical claim regarding the nature of reality.


I'm not sure where that "physicalism" or physical materialism or whatever we shall call it came from. I am mostly interested in the free will debate, which is where I came into contact with materialism. Metaphysics are not my thing.


You surprise me. ;)


I certainly can't see how "physicalism" is invalid, though.

1) There is only one substance in the universe and that substance is physical, empirical or material.

It certainly follows from the single premise that the premise is the conclusion eh?

What is the problem you have with this?

The problem is that the materialists around here don't have any better argument than (and I have Win to thank for this characterisation) :

"Phenomenal consciousness sure seems hard to explain under a materialistic metaphysic, but materialism must be true, so consciousness must be physical."

It is usually accompanied by claims (reasonable claims) that dualism also suffers from serious problems. Idealism is usually just dismissed or more often completely ignored.

When the materialist really has his back against the wall, the (fallacious) argument of last resort is that science depends materialism, and if materialism is demonstrated to be false then the sky will fall in on science.

Perhaps I should explain better....

Materialism works very well as a model of the physical Universe. It has been proven as the only metaphysical model to be effective. The problems all arise when we start discussing the relationship between the physical Universe and the subjective realm of the mind. As soon as one makes the claim that the mind is also part of the physical Universe one has gone beyond the normal boundaries of science and started making ontological/metaphysical i.e.philosophical claims. This is resisted - there is a tendency to insist that these are scientific claims, or that there is scientific evidence to support the claim. This is quite simply wrong. There is a reason for this - that being that if one accepts that the nature of the relationship between mind and matter is a metaphysical rather than a scientific claim then science itself must accept certain limitations as to what it has a right to claim it can explain - and some people don't like this. This viewpoint is known as scientistic materialism i.e. the attempt to apply the scientific method where it is inappropriate because the question at hand is philosophical.

Most of it boils down to a failure to understand what Kant proved i.e. that there is a fundamental difference between "the world as we perceive it" and "the world in itself". Most materialists don't seem to have taken this properly into account. If it is taken into account it becomes clear that the mathematical model we know as the laws of physics is really a model of the behaviour of our subjective experiences of the physical world, and the assumption that this physical world self-exists is an additional, metaphysical claim, and a claim which is quite difficult to support. There are various obstacles preventing the materialist from overcoming his belief in the primacy of this "material world". The most serious is the nature of time. After all, the Universe has been here for billions of years before there was any "consciousness" - at least that is the way it appears to the materialist.

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
*snip*

"Phenomenal consciousness sure seems hard to explain under a materialistic metaphysic, but materialism must be true, so consciousness must be physical."

Much more polite than the strawmen of certain, presently absent, friends, but still a strawman. The materialist standpoint is: All we have observational evidence for is materialism. So far, all observations support that consciousness is totally linked to physical brain function, so our working assumption is that consciousness is a physical function.

Materialistic metaphysics is an oxymoron.

It is usually accompanied by claims (reasonable claims) that dualism also suffers from serious problems. Idealism is usually just dismissed or more often completely ignored.

Since materialism is based on observational evidence, it makes little sense for a materialist to consider idealism (as long as no evidence exists for it).

When the materialist really has his back against the wall, the (fallacious) argument of last resort is that science depends materialism, and if materialism is demonstrated to be false then the sky will fall in on science.

A slightly less polite strawman. First of all, it is irrelevant, since materialism has not been proved to be false. Secondly, only idealism will make the sky fall in on science, while dualism is logically possible. Finally, science does not depend on materialism; it is the other way around: Materialism is the emergent conclusion from science.

Hans

Hans


Materialism is the emergent conclusion from science.


How did you figure that one out?

This is exactly what I mean. Materialism is a working assumption which makes possible the study of the physical world. The claim that materialism is an emergent scientific conclusion regarding the explanation of consciousness is total nonsense.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

So it is agreed then, that the definition of materialism that is being discussed here is:

Philosophical materialism (aka physicalism) :

Philosophical materialism (physicalism) is the metaphysical view that there is only one substance in the universe and that substance is physical, empirical or material.

And that the definition of materialism popular discussed in philosophical journals, being:

"If you can't percieve 'it' or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist"

Is not being addressed?

Rusty :


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"If you can't percieve 'it' or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Is not being addressed?


Depends what you are trying to 'reduce it' to. I can very easily 'reduce' everything to conciousness. Is that 'materialism'?

:confused:

Materialism, by definition, says you can reduce 'it' to 'matter'. I don't know where you are getting your definition from - but it sounds more like monism in general than materialism.

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Hans



How did you figure that one out?

This is exactly what I mean. Materialism is a working assumption which makes possible the study of the physical world. The claim that materialism is an emergent scientific conclusion regarding the explanation of consciousness is total nonsense. Mmmm, I dont quite get the meaning of that, but, I'll try:

How did I figure it out: Well, science shows us an observable universe. Materialism is based on this and it makes the prediction that all things are observable within the rules found by science. So far, this prediction has held.

- and for Rusty: Yes, the working assumption for materialism is that all that exists is observable.

Back to UcE: I did specifically use the term "working assumption" with regard to consciousness, but I do not see any important distinction, in scientific work, between "working assumption" and conclusion". Or, to put it in another way: One project's conclusion is another project's working assumption.

As for materialism being the working conclusion for consciousness, I will insist. While we do not quite understand how consciousness emerges in what is essentially a powerfull computer, all evidence points to this. This evidence has already been discussed in various contexts on this board, but we might sum up:

1) If the brain is disabled, temporarily or permanently, consciousness disappears, respectively temporarily or permanently.

2) If brain function is chemically interfered with, consciousness functions erratically.

3) Interference with brain function, be it from chemicals, age, trauma, or disease may radically alter personality.

Hans

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahzi


Idealism that is indistinguishable from materalism is pointless. Idealism that can be distinguished from materialism is false (as Randi's million demonstrates).


Materialism that is indistinguishable from idealism is pointless. Materialism that can be distinguished from idealism is false (as Randi's million demonstrates).

Hans


Mmmm, I dont quite get the meaning of that, but, I'll try:

How did I figure it out: Well, science shows us an observable universe.


BANG!

Immediately the problem is demonstrated. Science doesn't show us an observable universe! CONSCIOUSNESS shows us an observable Universe! Science allows us to model the behaviour of the observable Universe. You go on to say...


Materialism is based on this.....


Which pretty much sums up the problem. You SEE a Universe, then you claim it self-exists, independent of you SEEING it. You are confusing your perceptions with reality itself. Materialism is therefore based on a fundamentally flawed conception of reality. You only know it is there because you SENSE it, but you immediately claim that science told you it was there, which is totally incorrect, you then claim that materialism is based on this fundamental misconception. QED.


....and it makes the prediction that all things are observable within the rules found by science. So far, this prediction has held.


So far this prediction has held for everything except for phenomenal consciousness, and in this case science has flapped around like a proverbial fish out of water, making no noticeable progress in 400 years. Not surprsingly really, since it was never a scientific question in the first place.


Back to UcE: I did specifically use the term "working assumption" with regard to consciousness, but I do not see any important distinction, in scientific work, between "working assumption" and conclusion".


:eek:

I mean...

:eek: :eek: :eek: :eek: :eek:

If you don't know the difference between a working assumption and a conclusion then we might as well give up talking about it.


Or, to put it in another way: One project's conclusion is another project's working assumption.


Specify please. Which 'project'?



As for materialism being the working conclusion for consciousness, I will insist. While we do not quite understand how consciousness emerges in what is essentially a powerfull computer, all evidence points to this.


Rubbish. You do not understand how consciousness 'emerges' from matter any more than the Christians understand how Jesus rose form the dead. It is PURE FAITH. You can 'insist' on whatever you like. There is no materialistic explanation for the emergence of phenomenal consciousness from matter because the whole idea is based on a conceptual metaphysical logical flaw brought about by a failure to understand Emmanuel Kant and a lack of due respect for philosophy.


This evidence has already been discussed in various contexts on this board, but we might sum up:

1) If the brain is disabled, temporarily or permanently, consciousness disappears, respectively temporarily or permanently.

2) If brain function is chemically interfered with, consciousness functions erratically.

3) Interference with brain function, be it from chemicals, age, trauma, or disease may radically alter personality.


All of which provide evidence of a close correlation between mind and brain which isn't being disputed. Lots of evidence - but unfortunately it is evidence for the wrong thing.

:)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
The physical Universe. We are currently discussing the relationship between consciousness and matter. Which is more 'real'?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The univerise is defined such that all things that exist are contained in the universe.



If non-physical existents have a location shouldn't they be defined as physical? Thus the Universe cannot contain non-physical existents. Thus your definition of the Universe simply presupposes the correctness of materialism. Given that it is logically possible for materialism to be false this would be an inadvisable definition of the Universe.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If non-physical existents have a location shouldn't they be defined as physical? Thus the Universe cannot contain non-physical existents. Thus your definition of the Universe simply presupposes the correctness of materialism. Given that it is logically possible for materialism to be false this would be an inadvisable definition of the Universe.

I didn't define the universe, I put a clause on the definition of the universe. This is one of the 'weaker' points of the argument but you gave an invalid argument.

The clause put on the definition of the universe says that it has to be such that it contains everything that exists. It says nothing about this "physicalness". So if something is "non-physical" and exists then it still exists, and that is what we care about.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Hans



BANG!

Immediately the problem is demonstrated. Science doesn't show us an observable universe! CONSCIOUSNESS shows us an observable Universe! Science allows us to model the behaviour of the observable Universe. You go on to say...



Which pretty much sums up the problem. You SEE a Universe, then you claim it self-exists, independent of you SEEING it. You are confusing your perceptions with reality itself. Materialism is therefore based on a fundamentally flawed conception of reality. You only know it is there because you SENSE it, but you immediately claim that science told you it was there, which is totally incorrect, you then claim that materialism is based on this fundamental misconception. QED.



So far this prediction has held for everything except for phenomenal consciousness, and in this case science has flapped around like a proverbial fish out of water, making no noticeable progress in 400 years. Not surprsingly really, since it was never a scientific question in the first place.



:eek:

I mean...

:eek: :eek: :eek: :eek: :eek:

If you don't know the difference between a working assumption and a conclusion then we might as well give up talking about it.



Specify please. Which 'project'?



Rubbish. You do not understand how consciousness 'emerges' from matter any more than the Christians understand how Jesus rose form the dead. It is PURE FAITH. You can 'insist' on whatever you like. There is no materialistic explanation for the emergence of phenomenal consciousness from matter because the whole idea is based on a conceptual metaphysical logical flaw brought about by a failure to understand Emmanuel Kant and a lack of due respect for philosophy.



All of which provide evidence of a close correlation between mind and brain which isn't being disputed. Lots of evidence - but unfortunately it is evidence for the wrong thing.

:)


You seem to be stuck on the subjective perception vs. objective reality argument.

We don't know anything. We suspect that the universe is a certain way because we see it doing the same things over and over and other people verify this.

The subjective perception vs. objective reality argument is rather boring and the only people who seem to argue (really argue) the subjective perception side are the heavy drug-using population like my idiot brother. I'm now going to remove myself from this argument due to strong emotions regarding it.

But just to let you know, we assume that the world is an objective reality that we percieve (not a subjective perception that we create) because it is the most effective belief as proven by science.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
This should help you quickly understand why UE's argument is invalid. No where does materialism claim that all things that exist somehow posses the trait of "physicalness" nor does materialism claim that "physicalness" is somehow different from "mentalness".



I'm curious as to what you mean by "physicalness"? Materialism by definition is the assertion that all that exists is physical. So your claim is simply false by definition.

Perhaps you would be good enough to adumbrate UCE's argument and how you feel your contribution refutes it. I've read the link that UCE provided and as far as I can see the arguments on that page are sound.

Robot boy :


You seem to be stuck on the subjective perception vs. objective
reality argument.


It is neccesary to ram it down the materialist throat until he finally acknowledges its existence. ;)

Personally, I can think of far more interesting things to talk about.


We don't know anything. We suspect that the universe is a certain way because we see it doing the same things over and over and other people verify this.


Yep - so there is a shared objective noumenon ("world as it really is"). Whether it self-exists or is mind-dependent is not known.


The subjective perception vs. objective reality argument is rather boring and the only people who seem to argue (really argue) the subjective perception side are the heavy drug-using population...


Maybe that is because they have been forced to confront it in a way that others have not.


....like my idiot brother. I'm now going to remove myself from this argument due to strong emotions regarding it.


Fair enough. Maybe your idiot brother knows something you don't. ;)


But just to let you know, we assume that the world is an objective reality that we percieve (not a subjective perception that we create) because it is the most effective belief as proven by science.


I am not arguing about whether the behaviour of the physical world is objective. I am arguing about whether the physical world self-exists independently of Mind.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


I'm curious as to what you mean by "physicalness"? Materialism by definition is the assertion that all that exists is physical. So your claim is simply false by definition.

Perhaps you would be good enough to adumbrate UCE's argument and how you feel your contribution refutes it. I've read the link that UCE provided and as far as I can see the arguments on that page are sound.


No, here are the definitions:

Philosophical materialism (aka physicalism) :

Philosophical materialism (physicalism) is the metaphysical view that there is only one substance in the universe and that substance is physical, empirical or material.




Materialism
"If you can't percieve 'it' or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist"


You are mistaken. Physicalism speaks about a phsycial substance in the universe, materialism speaks about everything is percievable.

Some people have added a strange twist to materialism but that is not being discussed here. It is also weak, akin to the "If you call what is ordinarily called a sparrow, a horse, you can then prove that horses have wings" argument.

The real problem with materialism is obtained when you examine the first premise:

1) The definition of the universe is such that all things that exist are contained in the universe.

This is why most materialists have dropped this premise. You can argue that if the universe is infinite then it is not possible to have a definition of the universe. Hence putting clauses on such a definition is useless.

There is your opening.

But you still have to deal with the meat of materialism. Again, that is:

"If you can't percieve 'it' or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist"

Reducing it to something you can percieve includes defining black holes through mathmatics, etc..

[Q-Source]

I am trying to understand all this debate about body/mind problem.


Originally posted by UndercoverElephant

Materialism works very well as a model of the physical Universe. It has been proven as the only metaphysical model to be effective.

Good.


The problems all arise when we start discussing the relationship between the physical Universe and the subjective realm of the mind.

The Hard Question...


As soon as one makes the claim that the mind is also part of the physical Universe one has gone beyond the normal boundaries of science and started making ontological/metaphysical i.e.philosophical claims.

What exactly is the mind?, Isn't it the state that arises from matter (brain)?

Can the mind arise from other thing besides the brain?

You are right in a way, I think that Science has nothing to do when we have to question about how we perceive ourselves and how we perceive reality, about what is real and what is subjective. They are purely philosophical issues.

But, shouldn't we start by assuming that the mind requires a body to exist?


There is a reason for this - that being that if one accepts that the nature of the relationship between mind and matter is a metaphysical rather than a scientific claim then science itself must accept certain limitations as to what it has a right to claim it can explain - and some people don't like this.

Maybe this is so because we humans have a tendency to explain everything around us and the most reliable method to do this is the scientific method.


This viewpoint is known as scientistic materialism i.e. the attempt to apply the scientific method where it is inappropriate because the question at hand is philosophical.

You are right, however the problem arises when people claim that paranormal events interact with the physical world. So, I think that materialists have the right to examine and explain those events.


Most of it boils down to a failure to understand what Kant proved i.e. that there is a fundamental difference between "the world as we perceive it" and "the world in itself".

I agree with that. As I said, the problem is that people who claim that paranormal events (mental, non-physical events) interact with the physical world are contradicting themselves....and they give materialists a lot of headaches.


The most serious is the nature of time. After all, the Universe has been here for billions of years before there was any "consciousness" - at least that is the way it appears to the materialist.

What? :eek:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot



No, materialism is the claim that all things that exist can be percieved or reduced to such a state that they can be percieved.



The "material" world exists in abstraction from being perceived. Otherwise it is not materialism. If the "material" world cannot be sensibly be said to exist in abstraction from being perceived, then how can you maintain that the perceiver, doing the perceiving, can be reduced to that which can only be said to sensibly exist by virtue of being perceived? You're creating a vicious ontological loop.


Some materialist papers I have read have 'suggested' an additional premise reading:

3) All things that can be percieved are physical.

But most are content with the all things that exist can be percieved clause.



But this is not a definition. It is simply a condition. And BTW, phenomenal consciousness is clearly not perceivable.



Exist = =/ physical depending on your take of the word.

But let's accept premise 3) for fun.

1) The universe contains all things that exist.

2) If a human being cannot percieve 'it', or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist.

1, 2. 3) All things that exist can be percieved.

4) All things that can be percieved are physical.

3, 4. 5) All things that exist are physical.




Is this supposed to actually establish something? Because I'm afraid it doesn't. Your premises all presuppose the conclusion!

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Q-Source
I am trying to understand all this debate about body/mind problem.




Good.



The Hard Question...



What exactly is the mind?, Isn't it the state that arises from matter (brain)?

Can the mind arise from other thing besides the brain?

You are right in a way, I think that Science has nothing to do when we have to question about how we perceive ourselves and how we perceive reality, about what is real and what is subjective. They are purely philosophical issues.

But, shouldn't we start by assuming that the mind requires a body to exist?



Maybe this is so because we humans have a tendency to explain everything around us and the most reliable method to do this is the scientific method.



You are right, however the problem arises when people claim that paranormal events interact with the physical world. So, I think that materialists have the right to examine and explain those events.



I agree with that. As I said, the problem is that people who claim that paranormal events (mental, non-physical events) interact with the physical world are contradicting themselves....and they give materialists a lot of headaches.



What? :eek:

So you are saying that you believe that their is a different universe with non-physical events and that this universe doesn't interact with the physical events universe?

Why should we believe that? Do these things not exist? If they exist (and share the trait of existing) can they not interact?

What do you mean by physical?

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


The "material" world exists in abstraction from being perceived. Otherwise it is not materialism. If the "material" world cannot be sensibly be said to exist in abstraction from being perceived, then how can you maintain that the perceiver, doing the perceiving, can be reduced to that which can only be said to sensibly exist by virtue of being perceived? You're creating a vicious ontological loop.


But this is not a definition. It is simply a condition. And BTW, phenomenal consciousness is clearly not perceivable.



Is this supposed to actually establish something? Because I'm afraid it doesn't. Your premises all presuppose the conclusion!

That is correct, materialism presupposes and objective reality. It puts a clause on existence being that to exist something must be able to be percieved or reduced to such a state that it can be percieved. There is no loop, materialism presupposes and objective reality. Please begin reading my posts several times as you are demonstrating a failure to accurately disseminate the information.

The premises are closely inter-related. They are premises, not proof.

And you are telling me that consciousness is not percievable? You cannot percieve your own conscoiusness? Then how do you know it is there?

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Hans

BANG!

Uhh? I didn't hear anything. You are not going into all caps anytime soon, I trust?

Immediately the problem is demonstrated. Science doesn't show us an observable universe! CONSCIOUSNESS shows us an observable Universe! Science allows us to model the behaviour of the observable Universe. You go on to say...

Uhh, yes. Without consciousness we would have little science. Science allows us to model the universe, and the universe generally follows the predictions of the model, or, when it does not, we are able to modify the model to fit the new data. Where is the problem?

Which pretty much sums up the problem. You SEE a Universe, then you claim it self-exists, independent of you SEEING it. You are confusing your perceptions with reality itself. Materialism is therefore based on a fundamentally flawed conception of reality. You only know it is there because you SENSE it, but you immediately claim that science told you it was there, which is totally incorrect, you then claim that materialism is based on this fundamental misconception. QED.

Yes, I see a universe. This universe has all the signs of being perfectly able to function whether I observe it or not, so I assume it does. What is your evidence that this is flawed? If my perception is not based on stimuli from reality, then what do you suggest it is based on?

So far this prediction has held for everything except for phenomenal consciousness, and in this case science has flapped around like a proverbial fish out of water, making no noticeable progress in 400 years. Not surprsingly really, since it was never a scientific question in the first place.

What exactly do you mean by this? I can't find "phenomenal consciousness" in my dictionary.

:eek:

I mean...

:eek: :eek: :eek: :eek: :eek:

If you don't know the difference between a working assumption and a conclusion then we might as well give up talking about it.

I do apologize for not living up to your intellectual standards, but try and bear with me.

Dictionary for conclusion: A judgment or decision reached after deliberation.

Once you use this as basis for further research or deliberation, you have a working assumption.

Specify please. Which 'project'?

Any scientific project will use conclusions from earlier projects as working assumptions.

Rubbish. You do not understand how consciousness 'emerges' from matter any more than the Christians understand how Jesus rose form the dead. It is PURE FAITH.

No, it is conclusion from evidence.

You can 'insist' on whatever you like.

Yes, can't we all? :rolleyes:

There is no materialistic explanation for the emergence of phenomenal consciousness from matter because the whole idea is based on a conceptual metaphysical logical flaw brought about by a failure to understand Emmanuel Kant and a lack of due respect for philosophy.

I have to admit my partial ignorance on Kant. Whether my respect for philosophy is due can no doubt be subject to individual interpretation.

All of which provide evidence of a close correlation between mind and brain which isn't being disputed. Lots of evidence - but unfortunately it is evidence for the wrong thing.

Only because you want it to be wrong, methinks. The phenomenon consciousness is closely related to the organ brain. Not only is there an interspecies correlation between brain size and conscious behavior, but interference with brain function interferes with consciousness function. Based on such evidence, for which other organ function would you doubt a causal connection?

:)

Hans

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Rusty :



Depends what you are trying to 'reduce it' to. I can very easily 'reduce' everything to conciousness. Is that 'materialism'?

:confused:

Materialism, by definition, says you can reduce 'it' to 'matter'. I don't know where you are getting your definition from - but it sounds more like monism in general than materialism.

Well they would still say perceivers can be reduced to that which is perceived which is incoherent.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Well they would still say perceivers can be reduced to that which is perceived which is incoherent.

So if you see yourself in the mirror does your head explode?

What happens when I percieve myself? Does this incoherence do something? Maybe that's what makes our heads explode.

[Q-Source]

UCE
If you don't know the difference between a working assumption and a conclusion then we might as well give up talking about it.

Hans
Once you use this as basis for further research or deliberation, you have a working assumption.

Sorry Hans, but UCE is right. You cannot compare a conclusion with a working assumption. An assumption is just like a frame of reference, it may be or may not be true.

For example, in Economics we always make the following assumptions: there is perfect information among consumers and producers, goods are homogeneous, agents are rationals, there is free entry to the market, etc.

Q-S

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

I believe that UE likes to bring up Kant but is closer to the stated essays of Hume. He seems to almost be suggesting that Kant does not believe in objective reality, when Kant was one of the biggest supporters of such a view.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot

So you are saying that you believe that their is a different universe with non-physical events and that this universe doesn't
interact with the physical events universe?

I am trying to understand UCE's point of view.

I am assuming that if he is right, then there shoudn't be any interaction between the physical and mental states. If there is an interaction, then we have the right to apply the scientific method to explain that phenomenon. Ultimately, it is having an effect on the physical world.


Why should we believe that? Do these things not exist? If they exist (and share the trait of existing) can they not interact?
What do you mean by physical?

I don't know if those things exist.

If they interact with the physical (material world), then they do matter and we should pay more attention to them.

If they don't, then UCE is right and Science should not have a word on it.

Q-S

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot

II
The "material" world exists in abstraction from being perceived. Otherwise it is not materialism. If the "material" world cannot be sensibly be said to exist in abstraction from being perceived, then how can you maintain that the perceiver, doing the perceiving, can be reduced to that which can only be said to sensibly exist by virtue of being perceived? You're creating a vicious ontological loop.

II
But this is not a definition. It is simply a condition. And BTW, phenomenal consciousness is clearly not perceivable.


II
Is this supposed to actually establish something? Because I'm afraid it doesn't. Your premises all presuppose the conclusion!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


The Robot said in response to all the above:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
That is correct,
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------


In which case your "argument" was entirely vacuous. So why did you make it?? This is what you said in blue.


Exist = =/ physical depending on your take of the word.

But let's accept premise 3) for fun.

1) The universe contains all things that exist.

2) If a human being cannot percieve 'it', or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist.

1, 2. 3) All things that exist can be percieved.

4) All things that can be percieved are physical.

3, 4. 5) All things that exist are physical.


Now if you agree that this establishes nothing whatsoever then why bother typing it out?




materialism presupposes and objective reality.



You love imprecision don't you? Better would be to say that not only does an objective reality exist, but that it is wholly objective. But even that definition just leads to confusion. Better would be to say that reality is exhausted by all that discernable from a third person perspective.


It puts a clause on existence being that to exist something must be able to be percieved or reduced to such a state that it can be percieved. There is no loop, materialism presupposes and objective reality.


So what? So does idealism. So does dualism etc etc. Now you claim there is no vicious ontological loop. Please explain the error in my reasoning. For your convenience I will reproduce my argument (in indigo).


The "material" world exists in abstraction from being perceived. Otherwise it is not materialism. If the "material" world cannot be sensibly be said to exist in abstraction from being perceived, then how can you maintain that the perceiver, doing the perceiving, can be reduced to that which can only be said to sensibly exist by virtue of being perceived? You're creating a vicious ontological loop.





Please begin reading my posts several times as you are demonstrating a failure to accurately disseminate the information.


There is no information contained within them. You have yet to demonstrate that the refutation of materialism is unsound.



And you are telling me that consciousness is not percievable?


But of course it isn't! English isn't your native language is it? That at least is very clear. Perceivers are not themselves perceivable. What would it mean to sensorily percieve someone elses experience of despair? We infer internal states from bodily behaviour. We can onlyhave an unmediated knowledge of someone elses mind either by telepathy or our separate minds becoming one.



You cannot percieve your own conscoiusness?
Then how do you know it is there?



How do you think?? :eek: Dear me! We have a direct unmediated knowledge of our own phenomenal consciousness. Study what Descartes said about it then you might be able to understand.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
I am not arguing about whether the behaviour of the physical world is objective. I am arguing about whether the physical world self-exists independently of Mind.

Ah I stupidly missed this until just now.

So this is the discussion! Well I cannot prove to you that the world exists objectively!

There is anecdotal evidence that suggests the world exists objectively.

We all seem to share certain experiences and those experiences appear to be repeatable (i.e. if you drop a ball it falls down), but of cource I cannot prove that this is truly happening.

This is more of an epistomological argument, which is not my area of expertise.

I am curious, though, can you support the position that we should believe that the world exists only subjectively (whether that be in our "minds" or some other way)? I mean, I can offer a lot of anecdotal evidence, but can you?

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


In which case your "argument" was entirely vacuous. So why did you make it?? This is what you said in blue.


Exist = =/ physical depending on your take of the word.

But let's accept premise 3) for fun.

1) The universe contains all things that exist.

2) If a human being cannot percieve 'it', or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist.

1, 2. 3) All things that exist can be percieved.

4) All things that can be percieved are physical.

3, 4. 5) All things that exist are physical.


Now if you agree that this establishes nothing whatsoever then why bother typing it out?



You love imprecision don't you? Better would be to say that not only does an objective reality exist, but that it is wholly objective. But even that definition just leads to confusion. Better would be to say that reality is exhausted by all that discernable from a third person perspective.



So what? So does idealism. So does dualism etc etc. Now you claim there is no vicious ontological loop. Please explain the error in my reasoning. For your convenience I will reproduce my argument (in indigo).


The "material" world exists in abstraction from being perceived. Otherwise it is not materialism. If the "material" world cannot be sensibly be said to exist in abstraction from being perceived, then how can you maintain that the perceiver, doing the perceiving, can be reduced to that which can only be said to sensibly exist by virtue of being perceived? You're creating a vicious ontological loop.





There is no information contained within them. You have yet to demonstrate that the refutation of materialism is unsound.



But of course it isn't! English isn't your native language is it? That at least is very clear. Perceivers are not themselves perceivable. What would it mean to sensorily percieve someone elses experience of despair? We infer internal states from bodily behaviour. We can onlyhave an unmediated knowledge of someone elses mind either by telepathy or our separate minds becoming one.



How do you think?? :eek: Dear me! We have a direct unmediated knowledge of our own phenomenal consciousness. Study what Descartes said about it then you might be able to understand.

I am not going to read your personal attack upon me. You are very confused. You were nearly correct when you said:

Your premises all presuppose the conclusion!

But I should have been more clear. They don't presuppose the conclusion, but they were crafted directly to achieve the conclusion.

The premises I put forward are the premises of the materialist. I'm sorry you cannot understand this.

Materialism is not saying that the percieving of things makes them exist, it is saying that things that exist can be percieved.

Please read that sentance again.

And again.

And again.

Wow, does this not look like our conversation?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
Unfortunatley I have to run. I'll try to make some time later as I think this might be interesting.



For that scenario to transpire you'll need to say something of substance first.



Just to let you know, I believe that materialism is a valid argument.



Materialism is not an argument, it is a metaphysic.



I'm not sure where that "physicalism" or physical materialism or whatever we shall call it came from.



I've never heard of "physical materialism". I very much doubt there is any such thing since non-physical materialism is an oxymoron. Physicalism was a term coined due to the recognition that the notion of material substance is incoherent.



I am mostly interested in the free will debate, which is where I came into contact with materialism. Metaphysics are not my thing.



One can tell looking at your "arguments".

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

For that scenario to transpire you'll need to say something of substance first.

What an astounding argument. Obviously Rusty is mistaken.



Materialism is not an argument, it is a metaphysic.



Do you know what an argument is? Here is a link for you www.m-w.com (http://www.m-w.com), try looking up that word.

I've never heard of "physical materialism". I very much doubt there is any such thing since non-physical materialism is an oxymoron. Physicalism was a term coined due to the recognition that the notion of material substance is incoherent.


Then you, obviously, have not read this thread. With each of your posts I read your ignorance and refusal to learn become more and more apparent. You are the second person to be placed on my ignore list.

Good day,

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
Originally posted by Interesting Ian


In which case your "argument" was entirely vacuous. So why did you make it?? This is what you said in blue.


Exist = =/ physical depending on your take of the word.

But let's accept premise 3) for fun.

1) The universe contains all things that exist.

2) If a human being cannot percieve 'it', or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist.

1, 2. 3) All things that exist can be percieved.

4) All things that can be percieved are physical.

3, 4. 5) All things that exist are physical.


Now if you agree that this establishes nothing whatsoever then why bother typing it out?



You love imprecision don't you? Better would be to say that not only does an objective reality exist, but that it is wholly objective. But even that definition just leads to confusion. Better would be to say that reality is exhausted by all that discernable from a third person perspective.



So what? So does idealism. So does dualism etc etc. Now you claim there is no vicious ontological loop. Please explain the error in my reasoning. For your convenience I will reproduce my argument (in indigo).


The "material" world exists in abstraction from being perceived. Otherwise it is not materialism. If the "material" world cannot be sensibly be said to exist in abstraction from being perceived, then how can you maintain that the perceiver, doing the perceiving, can be reduced to that which can only be said to sensibly exist by virtue of being perceived? You're creating a vicious ontological loop.





There is no information contained within them. You have yet to demonstrate that the refutation of materialism is unsound.



But of course it isn't! English isn't your native language is it? That at least is very clear. Perceivers are not themselves perceivable. What would it mean to sensorily percieve someone elses experience of despair? We infer internal states from bodily behaviour. We can onlyhave an unmediated knowledge of someone elses mind either by telepathy or our separate minds becoming one.



How do you think?? Dear me! We have a direct unmediated knowledge of our own phenomenal consciousness. Study what Descartes said about it then you might be able to understand.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[quote]
I am not going to read your personal attack upon me.



The fact that you think it was a personnel attack clearly implies that you haven't read it. If you do not intend to read my corrections of your errors how do you expect to learn anything??


You are very confused.



That's interesting. You think I'm confused even though you haven't read what I said?? If you're not prepared to address my arguments then I suggest you decease being such a tosser and don't bother replying to me.



You were nearly correct when you said:


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Your premises all presuppose the conclusion!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


In fact I was unambigiously completely correct.


But I should have been more clear. They don't presuppose the conclusion, but they were crafted directly to achieve the conclusion.


I suggest you reread what you wrote. Your premises implicitly presuppose the correctness of the materialist metaphysic.

I don't intend to keep repeating myself. Try to get a better grasp of the English language.



The premises I put forward are the premises of the materialist. I'm sorry you cannot understand this.


I understand this perfectly. Therefore if the premises presuppose materilism thye cannot be used to justify materialism.

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by Q-Source

Sorry Hans, but UCE is right. You cannot compare a conclusion with a working assumption. An assumption is just like a frame of reference, it may be or may not be true.

Of course I can compare them. Equal them I can not, and I really did not claim to. It was UCE who started to call what I had called an assumption, a conclusion. But conclusions also may or may not be true.

For example, in Economics we always make the following assumptions: there is perfect information among consumers and producers, goods are homogeneous, agents are rationals, there is free entry to the market, etc.

Yeah, and the result is accordingly :rolleyes: But seriously, this assumption is based either on a conclusion that this is close enough to reality or that the real information is too difficult to obtain (or, most likely, hehe, both).



But, I should know better than go into semantics. ;)


Hans

Q:


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

As soon as one makes the claim that the mind is also part of the physical Universe one has gone beyond the normal boundaries of science and started making ontological/metaphysical i.e.philosophical claims.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What exactly is the mind?



Good question. Materialism doesn't have a sensible answer.


Isn't it the state that arises from matter (brain)?


According to materialist dogma it is.....


Can the mind arise from other thing besides the brain?


Perhaps it doesn't 'arise' from anything at all. Perhaps it is the thing that everything else is made of.

Every night when you dream you are experiencing a material world that isn't really there.....


You are right in a way, I think that Science has nothing to do when we have to question about how we perceive ourselves and how we perceive reality, about what is real and what is subjective. They are purely philosophical issues.


Good. Trouble is that the boundary between science and philosophy has become blurred here because of the relationship between science and materialism. Many scientists, including some long-standing high-profile members of this forum evidently cannot seperate their metaphysical beliefs from the discipline of science. Materialism and science are not the same thing. I must have told Stimpson this at least 150 times.


But, shouldn't we start by assuming that the mind requires a body to exist?


No. We should start by assuming nothing.


quote:
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There is a reason for this - that being that if one accepts that the nature of the relationship between mind and matter is a metaphysical rather than a scientific claim then science itself must accept certain limitations as to what it has a right to claim it can explain - and some people don't like this.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maybe this is so because we humans have a tendency to explain everything around us and the most reliable method to do this is the scientific method.


There are lots of historical reasons for this. However, if science cannot answer a particular question then cannot answer a particular question. There has been a tendency to insist on scientific evidence for something which science cannot address, even in principle.



quote:
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This viewpoint is known as scientistic materialism i.e. the attempt to apply the scientific method where it is inappropriate because the question at hand is philosophical.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You are right, however the problem arises when people claim that paranormal events interact with the physical world. So, I think that materialists have the right to examine and explain those events.


They do, but they must also remember that when they are examining reports of such events that materialism may not be true. The problem is that materialism renders all such events impossible, so the materialist assumes that all the evidence is bogus and discounts it without taking it seriously. Materialistic assumptions litter the debate like thrown away McDonalds cartons.


quote:
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Most of it boils down to a failure to understand what Kant proved i.e. that there is a fundamental difference between "the world as we perceive it" and "the world in itself".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I agree with that. As I said, the problem is that people who claim that paranormal events (mental, non-physical events) interact with the physical world are contradicting themselves....and they give materialists a lot of headaches.


Depends what you mean by "interact". The materialists headaches are largely of their own making. ;)


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The most serious is the nature of time. After all, the Universe has been here for billions of years before there was any "consciousness" - at least that is the way it appears to the materialist.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What?


The whole concept of 'beginning' and 'ending' with linear time in between is associated with metaphysical materialism. In fact Kant also proved that time is a means of human perception - something we impose on the "real world". From the point of view of consciousness (i.e. idealism) there is no beginning and there is no end, there is only NOW.

This is a bit of a simplistic way of looking at it. Idealism can provide a means of looking at all four dimensions of space-time in the same way - both extend potentially infinitely in both directions away from any one point. The Universe is limited to that which has been observed, both in terms of space and time, but further observations can extend infinitely.

G

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Q:




Good question. Materialism doesn't have a sensible answer.



According to materialist dogma it is.....



Perhaps it doesn't 'arise' from anything at all. Perhaps it is the thing that everything else is made of.

Every night when you dream you are experiencing a material world that isn't really there.....



Materialism doesn't need to answer this question, it is outside the scope of the premises.

Good. Trouble is that the boundary between science and philosophy has become blurred here because of the relationship between science and materialism. Many scientists, including some long-standing high-profile members of this forum evidently cannot seperate their metaphysical beliefs from the discipline of science. Materialism and science are not the same thing. I must have told Stimpson this at least 150 times.

No. We should start by assuming nothing.

There are lots of historical reasons for this. However, if science cannot answer a particular question then cannot answer a particular question. There has been a tendency to insist on scientific evidence for something which science cannot address, even in principle.


There is no boundary between science and philosophy. Philosophy tries to figure out certain questions to ask, but it cannot answer them.


They do, but they must also remember that when they are examining reports of such events that materialism may not be true. The problem is that materialism renders all such events impossible, so the materialist assumes that all the evidence is bogus and discounts it without taking it seriously. Materialistic assumptions litter the debate like thrown away McDonalds cartons.

Depends what you mean by "interact". The materialists headaches are largely of their own making. ;)


You still do not understand what materialism is. You are not talking about materialism, you are talking about subjective existence. YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT SUBJECTIVE EXISTENCE. If I yell perhaps you will hear me.

Materialists are talking about objective existence.



The whole concept of 'beginning' and 'ending' with linear time in between is associated with metaphysical materialism. In fact Kant also proved that time is a means of human perception - something we impose on the "real world". From the point of view of consciousness (i.e. idealism) there is no beginning and there is no end, there is only NOW.

This is a bit of a simplistic way of looking at it. Idealism can provide a means of looking at all four dimensions of space-time in the same way - both extend potentially infinitely in both directions away from any one point. The Universe is limited to that which has been observed, both in terms of space and time, but further observations can extend infinitely.


Materialism would say that we know time is real because we can percieve it. KANT AGREES. You are very confused! KANT AGREES WITH THE MATERIALIST.

Hume is the one who disagreed!

Yes, we only understand time (and anything) through our subjective perceptions but they exist objectively! This is objective reality! Kant argued for objectively reality!

ARGH.

Hans :


Yes, I see a universe. This universe has all the signs of being perfectly able to function whether I observe it or not, so I assume it does.


Erm...I think Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schroedinger may disagree with you on this one. ;)


What is your evidence that this is flawed? If my perception is not based on stimuli from reality, then what do you suggest it is based on?


Sure, it is based on information contained within the physcial world. I am suggesting that the physical world itself is composed of information existing in a mental realm which encompasses all things.


What exactly do you mean by this? I can't find "phenomenal consciousness" in my dictionary.


I mean science has not explained why consciousness exists at all. Consciousness is just 'tacked on' to the physical world, as II puts it.


I have to admit my partial ignorance on Kant. Whether my respect for philosophy is due can no doubt be subject to individual interpretation.


http://www.faragher.freeserve.co.uk/thingdef1.htm


All of which provide evidence of a close correlation between mind and brain which isn't being disputed. Lots of evidence - but unfortunately it is evidence for the wrong thing.

Only because you want it to be wrong, methinks.


Nope. It is just wrong. I never once stated there was not a very close correlation between mind and brain. I am interested in the thing which makes them different (since being correlates there must be a difference - else they would be the same thing....)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot

Materialism is not saying that the percieving of things makes them exist, it is saying that things that exist can be percieved.





Please read that sentance again.

And again.

And again.

Wow, does this not look like our conversation? [/B]

You said before (your contribution in blue)


This should help you quickly understand why UE's argument is invalid. No where does materialism claim that all things that exist somehow posses the trait of "physicalness" nor does materialism claim that "physicalness" is somehow different from "mentalness".


Your statement then implies that the empirical realm could well be mental. This will still be materialism if our consciousnesses or perceivers can be reduced to this mental realm.

If reality is wholly mental, then the perception of that reality would therefore seem to be a vital ingredient in establishing and defining its existence. In which case the perceiving of things can make things exist, even under materialism. This of course creates the vicious ontological loop.

I think that therefore materialism under your definition ie "If you can't percieve 'it' or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist" is unadvisable. You need to augment it by asserting that the material world also exists in abstraction from being perceived.

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
I believe that UE likes to bring up Kant but is closer to the stated essays of Hume. He seems to almost be suggesting that Kant does not believe in objective reality, when Kant was one of the biggest supporters of such a view.

Actually my true philosophical position is closer to that of Schopenhauer or Hegel, and is really derived from Berkeley. I use Kant as an example because he frames the problem most succinctly and clearly. Schopenhaeur and Hegel were much closer to the truth, but also far more contraversial, since both of them start from an acceptance of idealism as an inevitable truth.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Hans :

Sure, it is based on information contained within the physcial world. I am suggesting that the physical world itself is composed of information existing in a mental realm which encompasses all things.


Then how is this "mental realm" any different from the "physical realm"?


I mean science has not explained why consciousness exists at all. Consciousness is just 'tacked on' to the physical world, as II puts it.


No one has proven conscoiusness exists in any meaningful way either.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans

Since materialism is based on observational evidence, it makes little sense for a materialist to consider idealism (as long as no evidence exists for it).
Hans

There is no evidence, observational or otherwise, for materialism. The materialist metaphysic is moreover unintelligible.

Q:


I am trying to understand UCE's point of view.

I am assuming that if he is right, then there shoudn't be any interaction between the physical and mental states. If there is an interaction, then we have the right to apply the scientific method to explain that phenomenon. Ultimately, it is having an effect on the physical world.


Again - it depends what you mean by 'interact'. Take the example of Schroedingers cat - it is entirely possible that the cat is both dead and alive till it is observed. The observation forces the 'collapse of the wave-function' and the cat ends up either dead or alive. There has been an interaction here, but the nature of the interaction is such that physics cannot investigate it because it is a metaphysical interaction rather than a physical one.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
So it is agreed then, that the definition of materialism that is being discussed here is:



quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Philosophical materialism (aka physicalism) :

Philosophical materialism (physicalism) is the metaphysical view that there is only one substance in the universe and that substance is physical, empirical or material.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



And that the definition of materialism popular discussed in philosophical journals, being:


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"If you can't percieve 'it' or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Is not being addressed?


As I have argued, materialism must involve more than this. It must have the additional condition that the ontological character of the empirical realm is not mental.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot


Then how is this "mental realm" any different from the "physical realm"?

No one has proven conscoiusness exists in any meaningful way either.

Try this. *I* think. Is that physical or mental? THAT is the question.

Robot boy :


I am curious, though, can you support the position that we should believe that the world exists only subjectively (whether that be in our "minds" or some other way)? I mean, I can offer a lot of anecdotal evidence, but can you?


I just told you that the physical world is undeniably objective, provided we agree to reject solipsism. My argument is that the physical world is a subset of the mental world, rather than the other way around. We only exist in the mind of God, as Berkeley put it.


Then how is this "mental realm" any different from the "physical realm"?


It is the metaphysical environment which the physical realm exists within. It is the place where the information which the 'physical world' is really composed of resides. Think about things like Bells 'non-locality' and 'quantum entanglement'. These phenomena tell us that the Universe is non-local - that particles seperates by vast distances are somehow directly connected at a deeper level of reality. Materialists look at this evidence and just feel confused. "It is a mystery" said Stimpson J Cat. Well, not to me it isn't. If the physical world is composed of information residing in a 'metamind' then quantum entanglement and non-locality are standard fare. It is the materialists insistence on the self-existence of the physical world and their rejection of non-locality that causes them to be mystified [NB Bells theorem is mathematical FACT, and entanglement has been experimentally demonstrated - the materialists just scratch their heads]. You will find if you go deeper into this that the sort of metaphysical model I am describing provides answers to all sorts of other 'mysteries' as well. :)


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I mean science has not explained why consciousness exists at all. Consciousness is just 'tacked on' to the physical world, as II puts it.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No one has proven conscoiusness exists in any meaningful way either.


Me Tarzan. You Zombie. :D

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans


As for materialism being the working conclusion for consciousness, I will insist. While we do not quite understand how consciousness emerges in what is essentially a powerfull computer, all evidence points to this. This evidence has already been discussed in various contexts on this board, but we might sum up:

1) If the brain is disabled, temporarily or permanently, consciousness disappears, respectively temporarily or permanently.

2) If brain function is chemically interfered with, consciousness functions erratically.

3) Interference with brain function, be it from chemicals, age, trauma, or disease may radically alter personality.



Non-mateiralists need not deny that brain states effect mental states whilst we subsist in this empirical reality.

But this does not at all entail that given particular physical states consciousness is logically entailed. Perhaps consciousness only naturally arises from physical processes. In other words perhaps epiphenomenalism is correct, in other words consciousness is to the brain as, roughly, a shadow is to a body casting that shadow.

Or one could argue that the brain isn't the source of consciousness, but merely acts as a "filter". The brain has a subduing effect on consciousness, and when it is not functioning 100% it may have an even greater subduing effect. This subduing effect ensures that we are not constantly experiencing other realities, but ensures that we experience just this reality so we can operate proficiently whilst subsisting in this empirical reality.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Robot boy :



I just told you that the physical world is undeniably objective, provided we agree to reject solipsism. My argument is that the physical world is a subset of the mental world, rather than the other way around. We only exist in the mind of God, as Berkeley put it.



Why do you feel the need to reply to an old post with "I just told you"? Are you feeling insecure?

How is anything made any different in the materialism I have put forward by this dualism? We still appear to be subject to the laws of physics. I am not talking about the physicalism that has been the subject of discussion in the past, I am talking about the materialism I put forward.

(Things that exist can be percieved. If they cannot be percieved then they do not exist)


It is the metaphysical environment which the physical realm exists within. It is the place where the information which the 'physical world' is really composed of resides. Think about things like Bells 'non-locality' and 'quantum entanglement'. These phenomena tell us that the Universe is non-local - that particles seperates by vast distances are somehow directly connected at a deeper level of reality. Materialists look at this evidence and just feel confused. "It is a mystery" said Stimpson J Cat. Well, not to me it isn't. If the physical world is composed of information residing in a 'metamind' then quantum entanglement and non-locality are standard fare. It is the materialists insistence on the self-existence of the physical world and their rejection of non-locality that causes them to be mystified [NB Bells theorem is mathematical FACT, and entanglement has been experimentally demonstrated - the materialists just scratch their heads]. You will find if you go deeper into this that the sort of metaphysical model I am describing provides answers to all sorts of other 'mysteries' as well. :)



Me Tarzan. You Zombie. :D

These constant insults really make you look secure.
I'm only vaguely familiar with this non-locality but still, it has nothing to do with materialism! It is, however, anecdotal evidence of a subjective reality.

This can be interesting. I would like to hear what you have to say. Is it possible that we can have this discussion civily? I apoligize whole-heartedly for any insults I passed onto you earlier. I will not do so again.

What else is there to suggest this subjective reality, and what would you propose this means?

Rusty


Materialism doesn't need to answer this question, it is outside the scope of the premises.


Yep, but every time you claim consciousness arises from the brain you are depending on materialistic assumptions rather than scientific evidence.


There is no boundary between science and philosophy. Philosophy tries to figure out certain questions to ask, but it cannot answer them.


Can't it? ;)

Perhaps you just don't like some of the answers.


You still do not understand what materialism is.


I wondered how long it would be till that accusation turned up.....


You are not talking about materialism, you are talking about subjective existence. YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT SUBJECTIVE EXISTENCE. If I yell perhaps you will hear me.

Materialists are talking about objective existence.


Actually I am talking about both, and their relationship.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The whole concept of 'beginning' and 'ending' with linear time in between is associated with metaphysical materialism. In fact Kant also proved that time is a means of human perception - something we impose on the "real world". From the point of view of consciousness (i.e. idealism) there is no beginning and there is no end, there is only NOW.

This is a bit of a simplistic way of looking at it. Idealism can provide a means of looking at all four dimensions of space-time in the same way - both extend potentially infinitely in both directions away from any one point. The Universe is limited to that which has been observed, both in terms of space and time, but further observations can extend infinitely.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Materialism would say that we know time is real because we can percieve it. KANT AGREES. You are very confused! KANT AGREES WITH THE MATERIALIST.

Hume is the one who disagreed!

Yes, we only understand time (and anything) through our subjective perceptions but they exist objectively! This is objective reality! Kant argued for objectively reality!

ARGH.


The physical world behaves objectively.

And I'm not really a Kantian, as I said before. I just like to bring up Kant because he is a good place to start from. My own metaphysics are closer to those of Schopenhauer with a seasoning of idealistic Hegelian dialectic. The deeper understanding is that materialism and idealism are inter-related like Yin and Yang - they are both half-truths. But how can I expect a dumb materialist to understand this? ;)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
If non-physical existents have a location shouldn't they be defined as physical? Thus the Universe cannot contain non-physical existents. Thus your definition of the Universe simply presupposes the correctness of materialism. Given that it is logically possible for materialism to be false this would be an inadvisable definition of the Universe.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I didn't define the universe,



You supplied a definition of the Universe. Are you claiming you disagree with the definition you quoted? In that case why did you quote it?



I put a clause on the definition of the universe.



Yes, basically the clause being that reality is wholly material. How do you justify this position?



This is one of the 'weaker' points of the argument but you gave an invalid argument.



What is wrong with my argument?? Details please. Otherwise I might suspect you're talking out of your a*se.



The clause put on the definition of the universe says that it has to be such that it contains everything that exists.



In other words, as I have explained, it presupposes the correctness of the materialist metaphysic.


It says nothing about this "physicalness". So if something is "non-physical" and exists then it still exists, and that is what we care about.


But if a non-physical thing has a location why isn't it simply deemed to be physical?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot


The subjective perception vs. objective reality argument is rather boring and the only people who seem to argue (really argue) the subjective perception side are the heavy drug-using population like my idiot brother. [/B]

What's wrong with taking drugs? Not that I do so apart from drinking alcohol. Just curious.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot


But just to let you know, we assume that the world is an objective reality that we percieve (not a subjective perception that we create) because it is the most effective belief as proven by science. [/B]

It is very clear that we do create objective reality to a very great extent. Just consider optical illusions. Elementary psychology my boy. All our perceptions are moulded by an implicit, perhaps subconscious, theory about the world. We cannot perceive the world from an atheoretical context.

Edited to add: Perhaps I should have said "Elementary psychology my robot boy" LOL

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


But if a non-physical thing has a location why isn't it simply deemed to be physical?

The restatement of why dualism is tough to defend.

So again, the questions are:

Matter makes consciousness,

or

Consciousness makes matter.

followed by *I* think, the single indisputable data point ;)

Rusty:


I am not talking about the physicalism that has been the subject of discussion in the past, I am talking about the materialism I put forward.

(Things that exist can be percieved. If they cannot be percieved then they do not exist)


Well, it isn't really materialism.....it is generic monism.


These constant insults really make you look secure.


I'm sorry Rusty. 18 months and 3000 posts on this board have led me to treat a certain brand of naive materialism with disdain. It is eady to forget newbies haven't been round this merry-go-round before.


I'm only vaguely familiar with this non-locality but still, it has nothing to do with materialism! It is, however, anecdotal evidence of a subjective reality.

This can be interesting. I would like to hear what you have to say. Is it possible that we can have this discussion civily? I apoligize whole-heartedly for any insults I passed onto you earlier. I will not do so again.


OK. I'll try not to insult you. I'm only doing it jokingly though.....

as for non-locality....

John Bell mathematically proved that all the seperate bits of the Universe are in fact directly connected together. Alain Aspect then proved this experimentally by 'entangling' two particles and then demonstrating that measuring the state of one of them in one place instantly affected the state of the other, no matter how far away it was. These faster-than-light connections have no local materialistic explanation which doesn't defy relativity.

Consciousness and Modern Science:

http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/dp5/con-sci.htm


What else is there to suggest this subjective reality, and what would you propose this means?


In addition to non-locality, and entanglement, and the Hard Problem of consciousness?

Well....there's also the nature of time, the problem of apparent engineering of physical constants in the cosmos, the schroedingers cat paradox, the ontological status of mathematical objects and the relevance of Steven Wolframs contraversial book last year which claimed everything in the physical world could be explained in terms of simple algorithms.....

Did you check this out :

http://www.mythical.net/cgi-bin/ubbcgi/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=2&t=000122

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
Originally posted by Interesting Ian


I'm curious as to what you mean by "physicalness"? Materialism by definition is the assertion that all that exists is physical. So your claim is simply false by definition.

Perhaps you would be good enough to adumbrate UCE's argument and how you feel your contribution refutes it. I've read the link that UCE provided and as far as I can see the arguments on that page are sound.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------




No, here are the definitions:


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Philosophical materialism (aka physicalism) :

Philosophical materialism (physicalism) is the metaphysical view that there is only one substance in the universe and that substance is physical, empirical or material.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



It is nonsensical to define a substance as empirical :rolleyes:



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Materialism
"If you can't percieve 'it' or reduce 'it' to something you can, then 'it' does not exist"

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



You are mistaken. Physicalism speaks about a phsycial substance in the universe, materialism speaks about everything is percievable.



I did not say that sentence! I most certainly wouldn't define materialism that way. That's your definition of materialism, not mine!

Oh yes, and you got your response a*seside first.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
Well they would still say perceivers can be reduced to that which is perceived which is incoherent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The boy robot said:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
So if you see yourself in the mirror does your head explode?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Huh?? WTF are you talking about?? If you believe that perceivers can be reduced to that which is perceived, then explain how!



What happens when I percieve myself?


You don't perceive yourself.

Perhaps I can throw some more light on this....

What we are really discussing here, to borrow a term from computing, is how do you bootstrap Reality?.

This isn't just cosmology or particle physics - it is a deeply philosophical question - the ultimate question, or at least part of it. And ontology and the nature of time figure as part of the answer. Both naive materialism and naive theism suffer from the same problem. They both start with "In the beginning...."

In the Beginning there was God, and he created the physical world.....
In the Beginning there was a Big Bang.......

Unfortunately both of these myths involve a metaphysical assumption about the absoluteness of the passage of time. If we want to figure out how this physical Reality actually came into existence we may have to be a bit smarter. My suggestion is that it didn't really happen either of these ways, and that the problem is that just like we think of the material world as the environment which gave rise to our experiences, we also like to think of linear time as being similarly fixed. However, this conception of time is also dependent on materialistic metaphysics. From the point of view of idealism it is just always NOW, always has been, and always will be. Now I ask again....how do you bootstrap Reality?

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Now that I understand what the argument is, and understand that the materialism I have read about (in relation to free will and the self) is different from the materialism you are speaking of. I find no argument to put forth.

I suppose I could continue claiming that your argument doesn't have anything to do with materialism, but we wouldn't be talking about the same thing.

Thank you for the links.

Now to go home and take care of the wife. :D

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot


Ah I stupidly missed this until just now.

So this is the discussion! Well I cannot prove to you that the world exists objectively!

There is anecdotal evidence that suggests the world exists objectively.

We all seem to share certain experiences and those experiences appear to be repeatable (i.e. if you drop a ball it falls down), but of cource I cannot prove that this is truly happening.

This is more of an epistomological argument, which is not my area of expertise.

I am curious, though, can you support the position that we should believe that the world exists only subjectively (whether that be in our "minds" or some other way)? I mean, I can offer a lot of anecdotal evidence, but can you?

I am utterly confused by what you mean by "objective". Could you in very clear terms explain what you mean by both the hypothesis that the world exists objectively, and the hypothesis that the world exists subjectively? Is a consensus of subjectivity objective? Thanks.

BTW where do you come from? How long have you been studying English?

All I can say is that according to the skeptics dictionary, my definition of materialism is the correct one. Your definition isn't materialism - it is ontological monism. Where did it come from?

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Hans :

(I said the universe seems perfectly able to function without me observing it)

Erm...I think Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schroedinger may disagree with you on this one. ;)

I think not. Obviously, most of the universe functions perfectly well without being observed. Of course you may claim that God is observing, but then don't appeal to Heisenberg and Schroedinger.

Sure, it is based on information contained within the physcial world. I am suggesting that the physical world itself is composed of information existing in a mental realm which encompasses all things.

Well, but that will be a suggestion based entirely in faith. And an unparsimonious suggestion, since it does not cast light on any of the unanswered questions. It merely adds a new "mysterious force".

I mean science has not explained why consciousness exists at all. Consciousness is just 'tacked on' to the physical world, as II puts it.

Why consciousness exists? Consciousness is one terrific survival parameter. The why is simple Darwinism. HOW is the question. We do not understand how a large biological computer can be conscious. On the other hand we have no indication that this should not be the case; there is no evidence against consciousness being a property of the brain.

http://www.faragher.freeserve.co.uk/thingdef1.htm

Oh, my familiarity with Kant did cover that. And?

Nope. It is just wrong. I never once stated there was not a very close correlation between mind and brain. I am interested in the thing which makes them different (since being correlates there must be a difference - else they would be the same thing....)

And they may well be that. The reason we talk about correlation is that we are still recearching this. And of course the mind does not equal the brain; the mind is a product of the brain. The brain has other products, and a brain can exist without a consciousness (here using mind and consciousness interchangeably, which is perhaps not quite appropriate).

Hans

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by robot boy
Do you know what an argument is? Here is a link for you www.m-w.com, try looking up that word.


I do indeed know what an argument is. It is equally clear that you don't.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I've never heard of "physical materialism". I very much doubt there is any such thing since non-physical materialism is an oxymoron. Physicalism was a term coined due to the recognition that the notion of material substance is incoherent.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Then you, obviously, have not read this thread. With each of your posts I read your ignorance and refusal to learn become more and more apparent.



Trust me when I say that you are sadly deluded if you think that I could learn from a moron like you.




You are the second person to be placed on my ignore list.

Good day,



My god you didn't last long did you? Another materialist felled by Interesting Ian's trusty sword! :D

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by the_boy_robot


Materialism doesn't need to answer this question, it is outside the scope of the premises.



There is no boundary between science and philosophy. Philosophy tries to figure out certain questions to ask, but it cannot answer them.




You still do not understand what materialism is. You are not talking about materialism, you are talking about subjective existence. YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT SUBJECTIVE EXISTENCE. If I yell perhaps you will hear me.

Materialists are talking about objective existence.




Materialism would say that we know time is real because we can percieve it. KANT AGREES. You are very confused! KANT AGREES WITH THE MATERIALIST.

Hume is the one who disagreed!

Yes, we only understand time (and anything) through our subjective perceptions but they exist objectively! This is objective reality! Kant argued for objectively reality!

ARGH. [/B]

You really are a complete moron aren't you? Why don't you ever try to define anything? What does it mean to say reality is objective or subjective?? What does "SUBJECTIVE EXISTENCE" mean?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot


Why do you feel the need to reply to an old post with "I just told you"? Are you feeling insecure?

How is anything made any different in the materialism I have put forward by this dualism? We still appear to be subject to the laws of physics. I am not talking about the physicalism that has been the subject of discussion in the past, I am talking about the materialism I put forward.

(Things that exist can be percieved. If they cannot be percieved then they do not exist)



These constant insults really make you look secure.
I'm only vaguely familiar with this non-locality but still, it has nothing to do with materialism! It is, however, anecdotal evidence of a subjective reality.

This can be interesting. I would like to hear what you have to say. Is it possible that we can have this discussion civily? I apoligize whole-heartedly for any insults I passed onto you earlier. I will not do so again.

What else is there to suggest this subjective reality, and what would you propose this means?

What the hell does this subjective reality mean??? :mad: :mad: :mad:

No-ones even proposing the existence of a "subjective reality"!

Hey, you're a waste of space!

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
All I can say is that according to the skeptics dictionary, my definition of materialism is the correct one. Your definition isn't materialism - it is ontological monism. Where did it come from?

I've got to get away from this forum, it's like an addiction or something :eek: . And I've only been posting for two days!

My definition came from several papers I read several years ago. I could dig them up but I've got to get back to so-called "real life".

Out of curiousity what is the definition of 'physical' that the materialist is using?

Interesting Ian, I blocked you at the begining of the last page. If you truly have something interesting to add and can get over your flaming tendancies please register a new username so I can see your posts.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot


Interesting Ian, I blocked you at the begining of the last page. If you truly have something interesting to add and can get over your flaming tendancies please register a new username so I can see your posts. [/B]

I don't care if you've blocked me or not. You're mistaken if you think that I'm going to let you get away with the crap you spew forth.

Hans :

Darwinism doesn't explain consciousness at all. Darwinism works perfectly well for zombies. Consciousness is entirely unneccesary.

Rusty :


I've got to get away from this forum, it's like an addiction or something.


Too late. You can check out any time you like, but you can never leave.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
UCE
Erm...I think Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schroedinger may disagree with you on this one.
HANS
I think not. Obviously, most of the universe functions perfectly well without being observed.



Yea, but the wave function won't have collapsed.




UCE
I mean science has not explained why consciousness exists at all. Consciousness is just 'tacked on' to the physical world, as II puts it.
HANS
Why consciousness exists? Consciousness is one terrific survival parameter. The why is simple Darwinism.



Darwinism cannot explain phenomenal consciousness. Or at least it could only do so if given certain physical facts, phenomenal consciousness is logically entailed. But if it is logically entailed you need to demonstrate that it is. Saying Darwinism explains why consciousness exists simply begs the question.




And of course the mind does not equal the brain; the mind is a product of the brain. The brain has other products, and a brain can exist without a consciousness (here using mind and consciousness interchangeably, which is perhaps not quite appropriate).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


But the crucial question here is whether you are maintaining that mind is logically necessitated once we have particular physical processes, or is it only a natural consequence? In other words does consciousness arise because of the particular way the world is (physical laws or whatever), or would it be that case that in all logically possible Universes that consciousness would arise given certain physical facts??

BTW you don't have me on ignore as well do you?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
[B]Hans :

Darwinism doesn't explain consciousness at all. Darwinism works perfectly well for zombies. Consciousness is entirely unneccesary.



You beat me to it! :mad:

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

Given that those five statements cannot all be true, under any logical framework, the above is clearly false.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I maintain that some sort of mentalism, linked to above, provides a solution which allows all 5 theses to be true at the same time.

Impossible. One of the five must give. Under Idealism, I would say that the one that gives is the assertion that people are made of atoms. Since a person's consciousness is clearly a part of their "make-up", and Idealism holds that consciousness is not "made of atoms", it fallows that Idealists do not agree that people are (entirely) made of atoms.

Indeed, Idealists would say that Reality itself is made of consciousness. They would therefore argue that people are not made of atoms, but rather of consciousness, and that only a part of the person (their physical body) is made up of that subset of consciousness that we call "atoms".

Well, that rather depends who asks the question. I can't be bothered to refute Stimpson claiming that "People are made of atoms" is wrong. It is a rather pathetic claim made by someone who should know better, but also knows there is no better way of refuting the proof. I realise some other people haven't been through this a hundred times already.

Excuse me? When did I claim that people are not made of atoms? The statement I reject is either number 5, or number 4 (depending on how you define "mental").


Ian,

From Website
5. No statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from any set of purely physical descriptions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stimp
As for number 5 being a natural consequence of linguistic dualism, that is only true if you are using a dualistic definition of "mental", in which case a materialist would argue that number 4 is false, and number 5 is thus meaningless.

Dr. Stupid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5 cannot be meaningless. It's meaning is perfectly self-evident and clear. Either mental facts can be derived from physical facts or they can't be. What conceivable meaning could there be in ascribing it as meaningless?

As I said, if number 4 is false, and mental states, as defined, do not exist, then number 5 is meaningless, because it is an assertion about something which does not exist. It would be like me saying that unicorns cannot fly. The meaning of statement 5 is only self-evident and clear if we agree that mental states exist. If the term "mental" is defined in a dualistic way, then we do not agree on that point.

As to the other points that have been made since my last post, since neither UCE or Ian are saying anything that I haven't already responded to a dozen times, I am not even going to bother. This is just the same old metaphysical speculation combined with strawman attacks against materialism that they have been spewing all over these boards for more than a year now. :rolleyes:

Dr. Stupid

Stimpson :


Impossible. One of the five must give.


Fascinating. What if I can demonstrate there is a system where all five can be true?


Under Idealism, I would say that the one that gives is the assertion that people are made of atoms. Since a person's consciousness is clearly a part of their "make-up", and Idealism holds that consciousness is not "made of atoms", it fallows that Idealists do not agree that people are (entirely) made of atoms.


Well this is just part of your continual failure to understand the model being put forward. Peoples bodies are made of atoms, because everything in the material world is made of atoms. What you are saying would only hold if we claim that the material world does not exist. I am not claiming this. I am claiming it exists subordinate to consciousness. Surely you understand the difference between these two claims?

Your response is a classic strawman. You have tried to refute a position I do not hold.


Indeed, Idealists would say that Reality itself is made of consciousness. They would therefore argue that people are not made of atoms, but rather of consciousness, and that only a part of the person (their physical body) is made up of that subset of consciousness that we call "atoms".


Again, this problem disappears when it is explained what is meant by "people". People are indeed made of atoms. It is the ontological status of the atoms themselves which alters under idealism. The entire physical world still exists, and still behaves as it does under materialism, it just doesn't self-exist all on its ownsome - it exists in the form of information in a higher Mental Reality. People are made of atoms.


This is just the same old metaphysical speculation combined with strawman attacks against materialism that they have been spewing all over these boards for more than a year now.


:D

Well, you see, we aren't entirely convinced your refutations ever stood up to logical examination.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

One of the five must give. Under Idealism, I would say that the one that gives is the assertion that people are made of atoms. Since a person's consciousness is clearly a part of their "make-up", and Idealism holds that consciousness is not "made of atoms", it fallows that Idealists do not agree that people are (entirely) made of atoms.

Indeed, Idealists would say that Reality itself is made of consciousness. They would therefore argue that people are not made of atoms, but rather of consciousness, and that only a part of the person (their physical body) is made up of that subset of consciousness that we call "atoms".


Although an Idealist might argue that *me* -- the perceived/sensory bag-o-bones is indeed atoms, and the real question is "what are atoms?".

As one more closely examines via perception an "atom", there becomes less and less 'matter' and more and more 'nothing that could be called "material". Assuming dualism is nonsense -- which I do -- which monism is more certain? *I* of course think. ;)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat



Ian,



As I said, if number 4 is false, and mental states, as defined, do not exist, then number 5 is meaningless, because it is an assertion about something which does not exist. It would be like me saying that unicorns cannot fly. The meaning of statement 5 is only self-evident and clear if we agree that mental states exist. If the term "mental" is defined in a dualistic way, then we do not agree on that point.



ok sorry about that. My error.



As to the other points that have been made since my last post, since neither UCE or Ian are saying anything that I haven't already responded to a dozen times, I am not even going to bother. This is just the same old metaphysical speculation combined with strawman attacks against materialism that they have been spewing all over these boards for more than a year now. :rolleyes:



No need for you to respond Stimpy. After all no-one was addressing you! LOL BTW I'm pretty sure it's still less than a year for me.

[Q-Source]

Q
Can the mind arise from other thing besides the brain?

UCE
Perhaps it doesn't 'arise' from anything at all. Perhaps it is the thing that everything else is made of.

My question is: can an individual consciousness arise from something else besides the brain?

I know the materialistic answer, I want yours.



No. We should start by assuming nothing.

Don't you think it is impossible to understand something without a frame of reference. I am trying to think according to your assumptions.


Q
...the problem arises when people claim that paranormal events interact with the physical world. So, I think that materialists have the right to examine and explain those events.

UCE
They do, but they must also remember that when they are examining reports of such events that materialism may not be true.

Is there any other reliable method that we should use instead?
I am serious, besides the scientific method, is there any other method that we could apply to understand those events.

Or maybe we all should do what Peter Lloyd does: rely on anecdotal evidence.

I really cannot accept that those events should remain "unexplained" just because you think that Science has nothing to do with them.


The problem is that materialism renders all such events impossible, so the materialist assumes that all the evidence is bogus and discounts it without taking it seriously.

Wasn't it you who was arguing that assumption is not the same as conclusion? :rolleyes:

Materialists do not assume that those events are false. They conclude that they are false because the empirical evidence says so.

You keep repeating that materialists have predetermined conclusions, but your repetition does not make it true, Geoff.

Q-S

Q:


My question is: can an individual consciousness arise from something else besides the brain?

I know the materialistic answer, I want yours.


Consciousness doesn't 'arise' at all. Consciousness is everything that is. Everything which exists arises from consciousness.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No. We should start by assuming nothing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Don't you think it is impossible to understand something without a frame of reference. I am trying to think according to your assumptions.


I start from the observation that I am conscious, and that mathematical objects can exist requiring only Zero and logic. Neither of these things are assumptions. I can provide an entirely self-consistent model for metaphysics based on these observations, provided consciousness gives rise to matter rather than the other way around.



Is there any other reliable method that we should use instead?
I am serious, besides the scientific method, is there any other method that we could apply to understand those events.

Or maybe we all should do what Peter Lloyd does: rely on anecdotal evidence.

I really cannot accept that those events should remain "unexplained" just because you think that Science has nothing to do with them.


Well, it depends which events you mean. Anecdotal evidence is of use to a person who wishes to search for repeating patterns within that anecdotal evidence. Then you can look at both the patterns in the anecdotal evidence, and the metaphysical model, and try to make sense of them both.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The problem is that materialism renders all such events impossible, so the materialist assumes that all the evidence is bogus and discounts it without taking it seriously.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wasn't it you who was arguing that assumption is not the same as conclusion?

Materialists do not assume that those events are false. They conclude that they are false because the empirical evidence says so.


Well, the people at PEAR disagree.

G

[Q-Source]

Q-Source
I am assuming that if he is right, then there shoudn't be any interaction between the physical and mental states. If there is an interaction, then we have the right to apply the scientific method to explain that phenomenon. Ultimately, it is having an effect on the physical world.

UndercoverElephant
Again - it depends what you mean by 'interact'. Take the example of Schroedingers cat - it is entirely possible that the cat is both dead and alive till it is observed. The observation forces the 'collapse of the wave-function' and the cat ends up either dead or alive. There has been an interaction here, but the nature of the interaction is such that physics cannot investigate it because it is a metaphysical interaction rather than a physical one.

Interact means to have an effect upon each other [from Oxford English Dictionary]

You just said that "The physical world behaves objectively." It means exactly that, no more no less.

However, in the next breath you claim that the mental realm can interfer or interact with the physical realm, i.e. paranormal events. How is it possible?
If this is the case, then it should not be a problem for any of you to prove that your "observations" force the cat to be dead or alive. Why can the mental realm just stay mental?, wouldn't it be the most logical conclusion?

Q-S

[Solitaire]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
1. For any system, every fact about the whole is a necessary consequence of the nature and relations of the parts.
Stare deeply into Pandoras' box...... ;)

This one generates deep ontological errors. Regardless of the system
there will be true facts that cannot be derived from the parts, likewise
there will also be false facts about the system that can not be proven
false by looking at the components. See: Gödel's Theorem.

[metacristi]

UCE

Yep, but every time you claim consciousness arises from the brain you are depending on materialistic assumptions rather than scientific evidence.


No intention to start a polemics I'm only trying to find the most rational position one could adopt in the problem of consciousness [and the relation with materialism/physicalism].

Materialism=the view that everything that actually exists is material.This definition is widely used but it is generally understood as implying the rejection of all metaphysical constructs [on this site too] .
Personally I think the most flexible definition of 'materialism' should encompass even constructs that are seen today as 'metaphysical'.Indeed no one has disproved yet vitalism [consciousness 'expanding' in 'other realms'-physical however-not probed yet by science] for example-the brain being only one component,a sort of 'co-processor' useful for action at our 'physical' level.

My personal position is that the usual definition of materialism [valid also for my definition] is an assumption,an axiom which fully deserves the label 'belief'.However given the actual success of science in explaining the observed facts it has epistemological privilege over all other views.It could [why not?] prove to be even correct.
The latest research in neurology and AI point out that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter which,moreover,seems to be computable.Even if reductionism at the laws of nature were impossible.
The creators of 'Deep Junior' [a chess computer program] for example,whilst recognizing that it's 'raw' power of analyze was well under that of 'Deep Blue',claimed that it could easily overcome this drawback in its match against Kasparov by playing 'more like a human'.A thing which Kasparov openly recognized afterward:the machine suprised him on more occasions by playing more 'intuitively' exactly as human players [sacrificing figures to obtain the initiative only without the prospect recapturing them immediately afterwad].
The conclusion that many specialists drew after this match Kasparov-Deep Junior [3-3] was that machines can think as humans [and it's not too far the time when a human grandmaster will have to 'fight ' hard to even snatch a draw]...
That in spite of the fact that in other games [go] the computers still play only at an average level.

Probably that had in mind those who said that science indicates that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter.I agree this is an acceptable argument for their position.
However only if eventually it will be proved that consciousness is computable I think we will have sufficient reasons to conclude that materialism [usual version] is correct and all other views [idealism included] can be [safely] discarded.
Only if...till then all other positions are as acceptable as materialism [usual definition],at the level of belief of course.
Personally,in the light of today's knowledge,I am not at all sure that materialism [usual definition] is the only possibility left open to our today's science...I remain open at all possibilities.In spite of having my beliefs [preferences based on 'subjective' evidence too].

Originally posted by Q-Source


Interact means to have an effect upon each other [from Oxford English Dictionary]

You just said that "The physical world behaves objectively." It means exactly that, no more no less.

However, in the next breath you claim that the mental realm can interfer or interact with the physical realm, i.e. paranormal events. How is it possible?
If this is the case, then it should not be a problem for any of you to prove that your "observations" force the cat to be dead or alive.

Q-S

You can't prove any of the interpretations of QM, which is why they remain interpretations. There is no way to established whether the unobserved cat is both dead and alive because the very act of observation collapses the wave function and stops the cat from being both dead and alive. The same is true of most of metaphysics, which is why it remains metaphysics. There are certain ways of investigating some of these phenomena, which is what PEAR tries to do with statistical anlysis of many experiments where 'will' is used to attempt to influence 'random' events but this just scratches the surface. The problems are caused by the fact that we are trying to observe observation itself. You could only do this "objectively" by extricating yourself from the system and taking a 'Gods-eye' view, which is not possible for physicists to do.


Why can the mental realm just stay mental?, wouldn't it be the most logical conclusion?


In a way it does, since everything is ultimately mental, but I guess you won't like that answer. The nature of your questions seem to indicate that you are thinking about this from more of a dualistic rather than idealistic viewpoint. Dualism suffers from the problem of 'interaction'. Idealism doesn't really, since everything is mental. But there are two different levels of effects going on. The laws of physics are effect of the 'algorithm' which operates 'autonomously' within the Metamind. The laws of metaphysics concern the relationship between the agent of 'will' and 'observation' and the algorithm the thing you call "I". You can visualise it as the physical world operating like a simple repetitive algorithm iterating at the Planck time, and the thing called "I" being an Infinity which by interfaces with the algorithm by altering its own value 'at will'. This is the best way I can think of to describe it.

G

Hello metacristi


My personal position is that the usual definition of materialism [valid also for my definition] is an assumption,an axiom which fully deserves the label 'belief'.However given the actual success of science in explaining the observed facts it has epistemological privilege over all other views.It could [why not?] prove to be even correct.


I understand this. But Chalmers 'Hard Problem' remains real, and causes us to be forced to make one exception to this rule when it comes to answering the quesiton of the fundamental relationship between mind and matter. Once you accept the Hard Problem exists then sciences epistemological privilege, with regard to this one specific question, must be forfeit. The Hard Problem renders materialistic science theoretically incapable of answering the question. Ever.


The latest research in neurology and AI point out that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter which,moreover,seems to be computable.


Often asserted. Never backed up. The Hard Problem remains, and it is no use trying to provide scientific responses to it. This is a question about the philosophy of science, not about science.


Even if reductionism at the laws of nature were impossible.
The creators of 'Deep Junior' [a chess computer program] for example,whilst recognizing that it's 'raw' power of analyze was well under that of 'Deep Blue',claimed that it could easily overcome this drawback in its match against Kasparov by playing 'more like a human'.


A human? Or an electronic p-zombie?


Probably that had in mind those who said that science indicates that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter.I agree this is an acceptable argument for their position.
However only if eventually it will be proved that consciousness is computable I think we will have sufficient reasons to conclude that materialism [usual version] is correct and all other views [idealism included] can be [safely] discarded.


But it is also theoretically impossible to ever prove that we have created artificial consciousness. We can never reach the point you speak of.


Only if...till then all other positions are as acceptable as materialism [usual definition],at the level of belief of course.
Personally,in the light of today's knowledge,I am not at all sure that materialism [usual definition] is the only possibility left open to our today's science...I remain open at all possibilities.In spite of having my beliefs [preferences based on 'subjective' evidence too].


Ultimately I think the answer is that materialism is correct, within its domain. The problem is that the scientific world has a tendency to treat it as the domain of 'everything'. The whole of materialistic science can be taken, intact, and placed within consciousness. Then you can see that from the two different perspectives both models can make sense. The answer to this question is the same as the answer to many other questions. You have X and Y which appear to be opposites but are in fact complementary halves of a deeper truth that can only be grasped by taking a step back. The relationship between idealism and materialism is similar to the relationship between 1 and -1.

http://www.swcp.com/~hswift/swc/swc.gif
SCIENCE WITHIN CONCIOUSNESS (http://www.swcp.com/~hswift/swc/)

From an article on the site :

http://www.swcp.com/~hswift/swc/vol07no1/lohrey71.htm


ABSTRACT
The proposal of this paper is that quantum physics is a science that is firstly, finding evidence of the conditions of consciousness and only secondly, discovering the nature of physics. The focus of the discussion is on the causal and architectural order of relations and how relations, not physical processes, are the self-causing building blocks of the physical world and of consciousness.


In 1982 Alan Aspect demonstrated, with the aid of a theorem of J. S. Bell, what others had previously proposed; a non-local order of reality existing at a quantum level (Bohm & Peat, 1989: 63 - 103). A non-local order is one that involves interconnection, that is, active information flows that are independent of time and space or the movement of particles at the speed of light.

Such an order of reality which by definition is a transcendent order, (transcendent of material reality) is highly controversial to most scientists and to what Goswami (1995) called in The Self-Aware Universe, the doctrine of material realism. This doctrine holds that everything is made of matter and matter can be reduced to elementary particles; the building blocks of the universe. This doctrine also accepts the principles of locality and separability. Locality is the principle that all interactions are mediated by signals traveling through space/time with nothing traveling faster than the speed of light. Separability is the injunction that particles are separate in space and time.

Contrast this conventional and classic view of the world with the growing body of evidence of a non-local order of reality, independent of space and time. Such a reality is metaphysical - beyond the physical. Such evidence presents classical science with the contentious prospect of a primary non-material order of reality that comes before, in a causal sense, the material universe. That prior non-material order, this ground state of the universe (Goswami says), is that of consciousness.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by metacristi


My personal position is that the usual definition of materialism [valid also for my definition] is an assumption,an axiom which fully deserves the label 'belief'.However given the actual success of science in explaining the observed facts it has epistemological privilege over all other views.It could [why not?] prove to be even correct.



Why do people keep repeating this idea that science somehow suggests or implies the correctness of materialism. It emphatically does not! Science does not vindicate materialism in any shape or form. Indeed science is vastly more consistent with idealism. I'm somewhat weary of repeating this point time after time after time.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by metacristi
[B]UCE

The latest research in neurology and AI point out that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter which,moreover,seems to be computable.



I think not.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

Impossible. One of the five must give.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fascinating. What if I can demonstrate there is a system where all five can be true?

You can't, but by all means, feel free to try.

Under Idealism, I would say that the one that gives is the assertion that people are made of atoms. Since a person's consciousness is clearly a part of their "make-up", and Idealism holds that consciousness is not "made of atoms", it fallows that Idealists do not agree that people are (entirely) made of atoms.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well this is just part of your continual failure to understand the model being put forward. Peoples bodies are made of atoms, because everything in the material world is made of atoms. What you are saying would only hold if we claim that the material world does not exist. I am not claiming this. I am claiming it exists subordinate to consciousness. Surely you understand the difference between these two claims?

Notice the above emphasis. You believe that people's physical bodies are made up of atoms, but you also believe that people have a non-physical mind. That means that you do not believe that people are made entirely of atoms.

Your response is a classic strawman. You have tried to refute a position I do not hold.

How is it a strawman? Do you believe that people are made entirely of atoms? If so, then you must either believe that consciousness is physical, or that people do not possess it.

Indeed, Idealists would say that Reality itself is made of consciousness. They would therefore argue that people are not made of atoms, but rather of consciousness, and that only a part of the person (their physical body) is made up of that subset of consciousness that we call "atoms".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Again, this problem disappears when it is explained what is meant by "people". People are indeed made of atoms. It is the ontological status of the atoms themselves which alters under idealism. The entire physical world still exists, and still behaves as it does under materialism, it just doesn't self-exist all on its ownsome - it exists in the form of information in a higher Mental Reality. People are made of atoms.

If you believe that mental states are non-physical, then you must assert that either people are not made entirely of atoms, or that people do not have mental states. No amount of word play is going to get you around this fact.

This is just the same old metaphysical speculation combined with strawman attacks against materialism that they have been spewing all over these boards for more than a year now.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well, you see, we aren't entirely convinced your refutations ever stood up to logical examination.

Perhaps if you tried reading up on formal logic, rather than wasting all your time with metaphysics, you would actually be able to logically examine my refutations.


hammegk,

One of the five must give. Under Idealism, I would say that the one that gives is the assertion that people are made of atoms. Since a person's consciousness is clearly a part of their "make-up", and Idealism holds that consciousness is not "made of atoms", it fallows that Idealists do not agree that people are (entirely) made of atoms.

Indeed, Idealists would say that Reality itself is made of consciousness. They would therefore argue that people are not made of atoms, but rather of consciousness, and that only a part of the person (their physical body) is made up of that subset of consciousness that we call "atoms".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Although an Idealist might argue that *me* -- the perceived/sensory bag-o-bones is indeed atoms, and the real question is "what are atoms?".

The question of what, exactly, atoms are, is secondary to the issue, as long as you agree with the listed premise that atoms are entirely physical.

As one more closely examines via perception an "atom", there becomes less and less 'matter' and more and more 'nothing that could be called "material".

That is only true if you insist on the outdated and incoherent notion of ontological materialism. Such a concept has no place in science.

Assuming dualism is nonsense -- which I do -- which monism is more certain? *I* of course think.

It is not a question of which is more certain, but rather which is a coherent and reliable model for describing reality. Idealism is neither coherent nor reliable.

Dr. Stupid

[Loki]

uce,

Darwinism doesn't explain consciousness at all.
Why not? If conciousness improves survivability, then it will be selected for, won't it?

Darwinism works perfectly well for zombies. Consciousness is entirely unneccesary.
I suspect that not even Chalmers would agree with this. The obvious problem is that no one really believes that p-zombies are physically possible. You can certainly use p-zombies to wander off into a discussion of "logical necessity" and "supervenience", but p-zombies say very little, if anything, about Darwinism.

[Loki]

Ian,

What does it mean to say reality is objective or subjective?? What does "SUBJECTIVE EXISTENCE" mean?
Having trouble keeping up, Ian?

"reality is objective" is a simple way of saying that if *all* consciousness in the universe was extinguished at midnight tonight, then the universe would still be there tomorrow morning.

"reality is subjective" (or "subjective existence") means that if all consciousness vanished, so would the universe.

Better now?

Stimpson


Notice the above emphasis. You believe that people's physical bodies are made up of atoms, but you also believe that people have a non-physical mind. That means that you do not believe that people are made entirely of atoms.


I am trying to describe two different conceptual levels. On a physical level people really are made of atoms, as is everything else. To say people are not entirely made of atoms is a dualistic way of thinking of it. The entire Universe, as you think of it, exists as a whole within consciousness. There isn't atoms AND consciousness. There is atoms WITHIN consciousness. Imagine an articifical world made of a certain sort of data structure. Entities within this world are made entirely of those data structures, but the structures themselves exist as a whole within a greater context.

Originally posted by Loki

Why not? If conciousness improves survivability, then it will be selected for, won't it?


The problem is that darwinism could produce a P-zombie without consciousness just as easily as a conscious human being. There does not need to be a subjective state. The objective brain process satisfies the needs of darwinism.


I suspect that not even Chalmers would agree with this. The obvious problem is that no one really believes that p-zombies are physically possible.


No-one? ;)

[slimshady2357]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
All I can say is that according to the skeptics dictionary, my definition of materialism is the correct one. Your definition isn't materialism - it is ontological monism. Where did it come from?

It's just physicalism.

Please, we don't have to go through this all the time, do we?

I have a neat trick that helps, I think you and Ian could benefit from it ;)

Everytime you see Stimpson or basically anyone else on this board use the word materialism, just say 'physicalism' in your mind when you read it :D

I understand and agree that using the term materialism is slightly misleading, but come on, it's been gone through too many times already.

Some people here do hold onto the old school ontological materialism, it's true. Just ignore them ;)

Adam

this post has been returned to its original state now April Fool's day is over

[Loki]

uce,

The problem is that darwinism could produce a P-zombie without consciousness just as easily as a conscious human being.
Could it? Unless we are using different conceptions of P-Zombie, then I've never heard this expressed before. Chalmers argues that P-Zombies are "logically possible" This is not intended to be the same thing as "physically possible". In fact, it seems to me that the physical possibility of P-Zombies is essentially dismissed as "irrelevant and misleading" in the Chalmers argument.

Perhaps I have that wrong - can you point me to any information you have from people who are arguing that P-Zombies are either (a) physically possible, or even (b) physically likely? In the absense of this, it seems that mixing P-Zombies and Darwinism is a failure to understand the thought experiment that P-Zombies represent.

(loki wrote) : The obvious problem is that no one really believes that p-zombies are physically possible.

(uce wrote) : No-one?
Well, no one that I've read who seems to understand the P-Zombie argument. I'm open to having you explain how you (or anyone else) has determined that P-Zombies are in fact physically possible. You've seen one?

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


The problem is that darwinism could produce a P-zombie without consciousness just as easily as a conscious human being. There does not need to be a subjective state. The objective brain process satisfies the needs of darwinism.

*snip*


This requires the premise that a complex biological brain and consciousness are discrete functions. I do not accept that premise. I hold it that consciousness is an objective brain process.

As for Darwinism, the adaptability and innovativity of Man could not exist without consciousness. And without these traits, Man could probably not have survived and certainly not become the dominant species on this planet.

Suppose you were a staff manager. Which kinds of job would you hire P-zombies for?

Hans

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Loki
Ian,


Having trouble keeping up, Ian?

"reality is objective" is a simple way of saying that if *all* consciousness in the universe was extinguished at midnight tonight, then the universe would still be there tomorrow morning.

"reality is subjective" (or "subjective existence") means that if all consciousness vanished, so would the universe.

Better now?

This is a curious definition! Stimpy wouldn't even agree with that. :eek:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Loki

UCE
Darwinism doesn't explain consciousness at all.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Loki
Why not? If conciousness improves survivability, then it will be selected for, won't it?



But are you disputing that Darwinism can only be said to explain consciousness once we assume a materialist based metaphysic?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by slimshady2357


Some people here do hold onto the old school ontological materialism, it's true. Just ignore them ;)



There is no distinction as I have already explained in this thread. Physicalists still have to believe in a reality in abstraction from consciousness otherwise their positions become incoherent. This of necessity introduces ontological suppositions of a dubious nature.

[Interesting Ian]

Why is everyone ignoring me??? :mad: I'm not going to contribute to these forums anymore if this continues.

Has everyone got me on ignore?? :mad:

Originally posted by Loki
uce,


Could it? Unless we are using different conceptions of P-Zombie, then I've never heard this expressed before. Chalmers argues that P-Zombies are "logically possible" This is not intended to be the same thing as "physically possible". In fact, it seems to me that the physical possibility of P-Zombies is essentially dismissed as "irrelevant and misleading" in the Chalmers argument.

Perhaps I have that wrong - can you point me to any information you have from people who are arguing that P-Zombies are either (a) physically possible, or even (b) physically likely? In the absense of this, it seems that mixing P-Zombies and Darwinism is a failure to understand the thought experiment that P-Zombies represent.


Well, no one that I've read who seems to understand the P-Zombie argument. I'm open to having you explain how you (or anyone else) has determined that P-Zombies are in fact physically possible. You've seen one?

For me, P-Zombies are a nonsense that are implied by materialism. They are logically possible. That is their only purpose. They do not need to actually exist, any more than Schroedingers cat.

Originally posted by MRC_Hans

This requires the premise that a complex biological brain and consciousness are discrete functions. I do not accept that premise. I hold it that consciousness is an objective brain process.


Well, with the greatest of respect, that is just materialistic dogma. It doesn't make any sense, there isn't any evidence. It is a neccesary consequence of some assumptions you have made that I think are demonstrably wrong.


As for Darwinism, the adaptability and innovativity of Man could not exist without consciousness.


Why not? Why do these things require a 1st-person subjective state as well as the 3rd-person objective physical process?


Suppose you were a staff manager. Which kinds of job would you hire P-zombies for?


ANY job.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Why is everyone ignoring me??? :mad: I'm not going to contribute to these forums anymore if this continues.

Has everyone got me on ignore?? :mad:

I'm not ignoring you, I just don't have a lot to disagree with.....

:)

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


For me, P-Zombies are a nonsense that are implied by materialism. They are logically possible. That is their only purpose. They do not need to actually exist, any more than Schroedingers cat. OH? You just used them as argument against the evolutionary argument for consciousness, and now you write them off? Is this a debate, or are we just lobbing ideas into space to see if they orbit?

And when I claimed that the universe exists without us observing it, you talked about Schroedinger's Cat, but now it is only a logical exercise? --- Not that I disagree on that, but I'm beginning to get this "wet soap" feeling about you :rolleyes:

Hans

Originally posted by MRC_Hans

OH? You just used them as argument against the evolutionary argument for consciousness, and now you write them off?


:D

I haven't 'written them off', Hans. I have simply looked at materialism and Darwinism and concluded that according to these two theoretical positions the product of physical evolution should have been a P-zombie. The fact that we are not P-zombies is the explanatory gap that remains for the materialistic Darwinist to explain. It's your metaphysics that makes P-zombies logical possibilities.


Is this a debate, or are we just lobbing ideas into space to see if they orbit?


Perhaps it's a bit of both. Personally I'm just trying to provoke people into thinking about conceptual problems in the hope they might go looking for conceptual solutions. :)


And when I claimed that the universe exists without us observing it, you talked about Schroedinger's Cat, but now it is only a logical exercise?


This is philosophy, Hans. Philosophy is a logical exercise!


Not that I disagree on that, but I'm beginning to get this "wet soap" feeling about you :rolleyes:


Well, it would be boring if I was an easy target, wouldn't it? ;)

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
I haven't 'written them off', Hans. I have simply looked at materialism and Darwinism and concluded that according to these two theoretical positions the product of physical evolution should have been a P-zombie. The fact that we are not P-zombies is the explanatory gap that remains for the materialistic Darwinist to explain. It's your metaphysics that makes P-zombies logical possibilities.

OK. Of course I accept that you change your mind after deliberation, after all what else would be the idea of debate?

Mmm, there is no metaphysics in materialism. P-zombies are a logical exercise, there is no explanation gap. Real life humans are conscious because they need to be.

Perhaps it's a bit of both. Personally I'm just trying to provoke people into thinking about conceptual problems in the hope they might go looking for conceptual solutions. :)

This is philosophy, Hans. Philosophy is a logical exercise!

Well, it would be boring if I was an easy target, wouldn't it? ;)

Oh, right.....

Mmm, there is no metaphisics in materialism.


:eek: :confused:


P-zombies are a logical exercise, there is no explanation gap.


Any chance of an explanation, or just an assertion?


Real life humans are conscious because thet need to be.


Why do they need to be?

[Peskanov]

UCE,

----
quote:
Real life humans are conscious because thet need to be.

quote:
Why do they need to be?
----


In this board conciousness it's always attached to awareness.
If you attach awareness to will, you get a reason for conciousness to exist.
So depending on your interpretation on conciousness, it will be unnecesary or a useful mechanism of animals.

The questions is: Does reckoning, interpretation and decision form part of conciousness?

[MRC_Hans]

Metaphysics. Are you the only one allowed provocational statements here? Materialism claims that everything is material, thus there is no metaphysical realm. Depends on the use of the word, of course. Our theoretical discussions are, of course, a form of metaphysics.

Any chance of an explanation, or just an assertion?

You are claiming that material Darwinism has an explanation gap because we need only be P-zombies. I challenge that claim on two grounds:

1) There is no such thing as P-zombies, it is a logical construct. (It seems we agree on this one).

2) Consciousness is an integral part of an advanced brain and a prerequisite for Mankind being what we (for better and worse) are today. (I would expect we disagree here)

Why do they need to be?

Because we could not function if we were not conscious. We would be just robots. The ability to deal with situations for which we are not prepared requires consciousness.

You, however, seem to assume that consciousness is not a survival factor. If so, then what is the purpose of it?

Hans

Originally posted by Peskanov

In this board conciousness it's always attached to awareness.
If you attach awareness to will, you get a reason for conciousness to exist.


Yes, these are things which are problematic for the materialist - awareness and will.


The questions is: Does reckoning, interpretation and decision form part of conciousness?

An unconcious algorithm does these things. They are things which occur within consciousness, but they aren't its defining features.

[Peskanov]

UCE,

----
quote:
Yes, these are things which are problematic for the materialist - awareness and will.
----

They are problematic in the same sense that DNA understanding is problematic. Work is going on...

----
quote:
An unconcious algorithm does these things. They are things which occur within consciousness, but they aren't its defining features.
----

I am not claiming that them are it's defining features, but that them are some of it's defining features. I don't think we have a full picture of conciousness. Not even idealism or solipsism.
Please, don't beg my question. Are interpretation and will functions of conciousness or not? Because, if they are, both are important for animals.

I think that the problem is that you are defining conciousness at you will to defy materialism. However, the original definition of conciousness doesn't come from materialism, but includes most features which materialism is currently embracing and defining from it's own POV.

Are interpretation and will functions of conciousness or not?


Define "consciousness", and I'll tell you......

Those aspects of consciousness that a P-zombie can do are just functions of the brain. Interpretation is a function of consciousness, but not a function that is relevant to the ontological debate. 'Will' is trickier - it depends exactly what you mean.

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans




Because we could not function if we were not conscious. We would be just robots. The ability to deal with situations for which we are not prepared requires consciousness.


Hans


Epiphenomenalists/weak dualists would take issue with this. On the other hand interactive dualists, idealists and materialists would all agree with this. Now for the materialist our behaviour is wholly a consequence of environmental stimuli and physical processes within the brain ie the world is physically closed. So how does the materialist reconcile this apparent paradox?

He does so by claiming that consciousness is either to be identified with such physical processes, or that consciousness is a logical consequence of such physical processes. Thus the problem is then solved and materialists can claim that consciousness is necessary for behaviour, and of course conversely p-zombies are logically impossible i.e they are no logically possible Universes where p-zombies exist.

So, given our initial presumption that we are wholly material creatures living in a wholly material world, we can then say Darwinism explains why consciousness arose. But what it does not do is vindicate materialism in any shape or form.

Are you in agreement with this?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

Notice the above emphasis. You believe that people's physical bodies are made up of atoms, but you also believe that people have a non-physical mind. That means that you do not believe that people are made entirely of atoms.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am trying to describe two different conceptual levels. On a physical level people really are made of atoms, as is everything else. To say people are not entirely made of atoms is a dualistic way of thinking of it. The entire Universe, as you think of it, exists as a whole within consciousness. There isn't atoms AND consciousness. There is atoms WITHIN consciousness. Imagine an articifical world made of a certain sort of data structure. Entities within this world are made entirely of those data structures, but the structures themselves exist as a whole within a greater context.

There is nothing dualistic about it. When you say that atoms exist within consciousness, that is equivalent to saying that atoms are a subset of consciousness. That's fine.

When you claim that people have mental states (4), and that mental states cannot be described in terms of interactions between atoms (5), you are claiming that people possess characteristics which are not attributable to things made up completely of atoms. You are thus negating that people are made of atoms (2).

To put it another way, if you claim that people are made of atoms, and that atoms are purely physical, then this implies that any property or characteristic that people possess can be described in terms of purely physical characteristics.

In order to make all 5 statements consistent with each other under Idealism, you must alter number 2 to say "People's bodies are made of atoms", allowing for people to have other characteristics not attributable to atoms or to atomic interactions.

For me, P-Zombies are a nonsense that are implied by materialism. They are logically possible. That is their only purpose. They do not need to actually exist, any more than Schroedingers cat.

This is clearly false. P-Zombies are not implied by materialism. On the contrary, P-Zombies are logically inconsistent with materialism.


Ian,

Originally posted by Loki
Ian,

Having trouble keeping up, Ian?

"reality is objective" is a simple way of saying that if *all* consciousness in the universe was extinguished at midnight tonight, then the universe would still be there tomorrow morning.

"reality is subjective" (or "subjective existence") means that if all consciousness vanished, so would the universe.

Better now?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is a curious definition! Stimpy wouldn't even agree with that.

Of course I would. Although, I wouldn't call it a definition. It is a description. There is a difference. A description is a set of statements which are logically implied by the definition.

For example, the statement "everything that exists is physical" is a true statement under materialism, but it is not the definition of materialism. It is not a definition at all.


Dr. Stupid

[Q-Source]

Consciousness doesn't 'arise' at all. Consciousness is everything that is. Everything which exists arises from consciousness.

Of course, there is no way to prove that a Metamind is generating this physical reality.
It is just a matter of faith, isn't it?


I start from the observation that I am conscious, and that mathematical objects can exist requiring only Zero and logic. Neither of these things are assumptions. I can provide an entirely self-consistent model for metaphysics based on these observations, provided consciousness gives rise to matter rather than the other way around.

Funny, you are capable of providing a whole self-consistent model for methaphyics but you or any of the mystics haven’t provided any consistent explanation so far.

Anecdotal evidence is of use to a person who wishes to search for repeating patterns within that anecdotal evidence. Then you can look at both the patterns in the anecdotal evidence, and the metaphysical model, and try to make sense of them both.

Does anecdotal evidence satisfy your intellectual curiosity? Or is it the only way to reaffirm your preconceptions?


You can't prove any of the interpretations of QM, which is why they remain interpretations. There is no way to established whether the unobserved cat is both dead and alive because the very act of observation collapses the wave function and stops the cat from being both dead and alive. The same is true of most of metaphysics, which is why it remains metaphysics.

No, it is not true of most of metaphysics. The point is that most (all) of paranormal events claim to affect the physical world through mental channels (observations). Some of them make it at will, as you said.

There are certain ways of investigating some of these phenomena, which is what PEAR tries to do with statistical anlysis of many experiments where 'will' is used to attempt to influence 'random' events but this just scratches the surface. The problems are caused by the fact that we are trying to observe observation itself. You could only do this "objectively" by extricating yourself from the system and taking a 'Gods-eye' view, which is not possible for physicists to do.
I don’t think so, let’s leave the observations and the observers alone. Skeptics and scientists are trying to investigate the effects that those observations cause on the physical world, because this is what the observers claim.


In a way it does, since everything is ultimately mental, but I guess you won't like that answer. The nature of your questions seem to indicate that you are thinking about this from more of a dualistic rather than idealistic viewpoint. Dualism suffers from the problem of 'interaction'. Idealism doesn't really, since everything is mental.

I guess that taking as a fact that everything is mental (instead of assuming that it is mental) is the easiest way to solve all the metaphysical problems.

Q

Q


Of course, there is no way to prove that a Metamind is generating this physical reality.
It is just a matter of faith, isn't it?


Not for me it isn't.... ;)


Funny, you are capable of providing a whole self-consistent model for methaphyics but you or any of the mystics haven’t provided any consistent explanation so far.


Methaphysics? Does it make you go blind? :D

I would contest this. I would say the mystics have provided a very clear explanation, dating as far back as the Upanishads.


Does anecdotal evidence satisfy your intellectual curiosity?


Nothing satisfies my intellectual curiosity.


Or is it the only way to reaffirm your preconceptions?


Which preconceptions? I do not think I have any preconceptions.


I guess that taking as a fact that everything is mental (instead of assuming that it is mental) is the easiest way to solve all the metaphysical problems.


It's the only way to solve them. That is why it isn't really 'faith'. :)

G

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by The One called Neo

So, given our initial presumption that we are wholly material creatures living in a wholly material world, we can then say Darwinism explains why consciousness arose. But what it does not do is vindicate materialism in any shape or form.

Are you in agreement with this?

Hello Neo,

had't seen you long time ago ;)

Which methodogical framework does Darwinism rely on?


Q

[Peskanov]

----
quote:
Are interpretation and will functions of conciousness or not?

quote:
Define "consciousness", and I'll tell you......
----

Why should I? I am asking about your definition...
I think you are trying to build a concept similar to the "God of the gaps". We could call "consciousness of the gaps", because whenever someone identifies or proposes an aspect of consciousness, you say: "this is not consciousness; it is the remaining...".
Is this your definition of consciousness? The part of the mind which can not be described in any formal way?

----
quote:
Those aspects of consciousness that a P-zombie can do are just functions of the brain. Interpretation is a function of consciousness, but not a function that is relevant to the ontological debate. 'Will' is trickier - it depends exactly what you mean.
----

I don't see will as something so trickier. It's the system which makes decissions. My only assumption here is that it is a system, and this assumption is based on the fact that the will present both complexity and coherence(sometimes) in his decissions.
I will define it e-primed if you want, but there will not be any difference...

Stimp


There is nothing dualistic about it.


There is if you are worried about the 'interaction'.


When you say that atoms exist within consciousness, that is equivalent to saying that atoms are a subset of consciousness. That's fine.


You ignored the example I gave. I will give it again :

----------
Imagine an articifical world made of a certain sort of data structure. Entities within this world are made entirely of those data structures, but the structures themselves exist as a whole within a greater context.
---------

Those data structures are not a 'subset' of the computer they exist within. That is a misconception. Entities composed of those data structures are entirely composed of those data structures. They are not composed partly of the data structures and partly of the computer. A person who thinks they are part of each is doing so because he doesn't understand the relationship. People are made of atoms. Peoples 'minds' aren't 'made' of anything.

http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=make

"To bring into existence by shaping, modifying, or putting together material"

i.e. You are still thinking like a materialist - you are imposing things like location and material constituents on the mind. A mind isn't 'made' of anything. Therefore "Peoples bodies are made of atoms" = "People are made of atoms". All the bits of a person which are 'made' of anything at all are made of atoms.

:)


When you claim that people have mental states (4), and that mental states cannot be described in terms of interactions between atoms (5), you are claiming that people possess characteristics which are not attributable to things made up completely of atoms. You are thus negating that people are made of atoms (2).


OK....the problem here is that "people have mental states" refers to the mind, whereas "people are made of atoms" refers to the body. The solution to this conundrum lies in clearer specification at to what is meant by 'people'. The solution lies in figuring out what is meant by "I". What is the "I" that has the mental state?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Loki
Ian,

Having trouble keeping up, Ian?

"reality is objective" is a simple way of saying that if *all* consciousness in the universe was extinguished at midnight tonight, then the universe would still be there tomorrow morning.

"reality is subjective" (or "subjective existence") means that if all consciousness vanished, so would the universe.

Better now?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is a curious definition! Stimpy wouldn't even agree with that.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Of course I would. Although, I wouldn't call it a definition. It is a description. There is a difference. A description is a set of statements which are logically implied by the definition.

For example, the statement "everything that exists is physical" is a true statement under materialism, but it is not the definition of materialism. It is not a definition at all.


This is not what you've said before! I'm pleased though you're now being sensible about it. So you now concede that materialism entails that reality exists in abstraction from our perception of it. Good! :)

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

When you say that atoms exist within consciousness, that is equivalent to saying that atoms are a subset of consciousness. That's fine.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You ignored the example I gave. I will give it again :

----------
Imagine an articifical world made of a certain sort of data structure. Entities within this world are made entirely of those data structures, but the structures themselves exist as a whole within a greater context.
---------

Those data structures are not a 'subset' of the computer they exist within. That is a misconception. Entities composed of those data structures are entirely composed of those data structures. They are not composed partly of the data structures and partly of the computer. A person who thinks they are part of each is doing so because he doesn't understand the relationship. People are made of atoms. Peoples 'minds' aren't 'made' of anything.

Then you are denying that people have mental states. You are essentially saying that mental states exist, but that they are not a property or characteristic of the person. You are defining the person to be only the physical body, but the very next moment asserting that the person possesses mental states.

I will make it very simple for you. If people are entirely physical (made of atoms), and mental states are non-physical, then people can not possibly possess mental states!

i.e. You are still thinking like a materialist - you are imposing things like location and material constituents on the mind. A mind isn't 'made' of anything. Therefore "Peoples bodies are made of atoms" = "People are made of atoms". All the bits of a person which are 'made' of anything at all are made of atoms.

No, I am not. Look, saying that a person has bits which "aren't made of anything" does not change the fact that the person is made up of both atoms, and those mysterious bits.

When you claim that people have mental states (4), and that mental states cannot be described in terms of interactions between atoms (5), you are claiming that people possess characteristics which are not attributable to things made up completely of atoms. You are thus negating that people are made of atoms (2).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OK....the problem here is that "people have mental states" refers to the mind, whereas "people are made of atoms" refers to the body. The solution to this conundrum lies in clearer specification at to what is meant by 'people'. The solution lies in figuring out what is meant by "I". What is the "I" that has the mental state?

I rest my case. The only way you can come up with to make those 5 statements not be mutually exclusive, is to define the terms used within those statements differently within the different statements.

You have essentially modified your "proof" to be:


1. For any system, every fact about the whole is a necessary consequence of the nature and relations of the parts.

2. People's physical bodies are made of atoms.

3. Atoms are purely physical objects, with nothing but physical properties and physical relations to one another.

4. People's non-physical minds have mental states.

5. No statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from any set of purely physical descriptions.


Having done so, you are begging the question of materialism being false. You can no longer argue that all 5 statements are clearly true, because statement 4 is only meaningful if you assume that the mind is non-physical.

As I stated before, under materialism, statement 4 is false, and statement 5 is meaningless.


Ian,

This is not what you've said before! I'm pleased though you're now being sensible about it. So you now concede that materialism entails that reality exists in abstraction from our perception of it. Good!

Of course it does! Good grief man, have you never once listened to single word I have said! Materialism holds that reality is what we perceive, and not our perceptions itself. How many times have I told you this?

Dr. Stupid

Stimpson :


Then you are denying that people have mental states. You are essentially saying that mental states exist, but that they are not a property or characteristic of the person.


In a very fundamental way this is precisely what I am saying. Atman=Brahman, remember? The individual mind is an illusion. There is only one consiousness. The mental states, if you look at it like this, are not a characteristic of the person. This only makes sense if minds are unified but bodies are seperate.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

Then you are denying that people have mental states. You are essentially saying that mental states exist, but that they are not a property or characteristic of the person.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In a very fundamental way this is precisely what I am saying. Atman=Brahman, remember? The individual mind is an illusion. There is only one consiousness. The mental states, if you look at it like this, are not a characteristic of the person. This only makes sense if minds are unified but bodies are seperate.

Once again, I rest my case. The five statements can only all be true if statements 2 and 4 use completely different meanings for the term "person". And if you do use the specific meanings that allow the statements to be consistent under Idealism, then the claim that all 5 statements are true, begs the question of materialism being false.

Dr. Stupid

[c4ts]

Now come: that thou mayst able be to know
That minds and the light souls of all that live
Have mortal birth and death, I will go on
Verses to build meet for thy rule of life,
Sought after long, discovered with sweet toil.
But under one name I'd have thee yoke them both;
And when, for instance, I shall speak of soul,
Teaching the same to be but mortal, think
Thereby I'm speaking also of the mind-
Since both are one, a substance interjoined.

First, then, since I have taught how soul exists
A subtle fabric, of particles minute,
Made up from atoms smaller much than those
Of water's liquid damp, or fog, or smoke,
So in mobility it far excels,
More prone to move, though strook by lighter cause
Even moved by images of smoke or fog-
As where we view, when in our sleeps we're lulled,
The altars exhaling steam and smoke aloft-
For, beyond doubt, these apparitions come
To us from outward. Now, then, since thou seest,
Their liquids depart, their waters flow away,
When jars are shivered, and since fog and smoke
Depart into the winds away, believe
The soul no less is shed abroad and dies
More quickly far, more quickly is dissolved
Back to its primal bodies, when withdrawn
From out man's members it has gone away.
For, sure, if body (container of the same
Like as a jar), when shivered from some cause,
And rarefied by loss of blood from veins,
Cannot for longer hold the soul, how then
Thinkst thou it can be held by any air-
A stuff much rarer than our bodies be?

Besides we feel that mind to being comes
Along with body, with body grows and ages.
For just as children totter round about
With frames infirm and tender, so there follows
A weakling wisdom in their minds; and then,
Where years have ripened into robust powers,
Counsel is also greater, more increased
The power of mind; thereafter, where already
The body's shattered by master-powers of eld,
And fallen the frame with its enfeebled powers,
Thought hobbles, tongue wanders, and the mind gives way;
All fails, all's lacking at the selfsame time.
Therefore it suits that even the soul's dissolved,
Like smoke, into the lofty winds of air;
Since we behold the same to being come
Along with body and grow, and, as I've taught,
Crumble and crack, therewith outworn by eld.

Then, too, we see, that, just as body takes
Monstrous diseases and the dreadful pain,
So mind its bitter cares, the grief, the fear;
Wherefore it tallies that the mind no less
Partaker is of death; for pain and disease
Are both artificers of death,- as well
We've learned by the passing of many a man ere now.
Nay, too, in diseases of body, often the mind
Wanders afield; for 'tis beside itself,
And crazed it speaks, or many a time it sinks,
With eyelids closing and a drooping nod,
In heavy drowse, on to eternal sleep;
From whence nor hears it any voices more,
Nor able is to know the faces here
Of those about him standing with wet cheeks
Who vainly call him back to light and life.
Wherefore mind too, confess we must, dissolves,
Seeing, indeed, contagions of disease
Enter into the same. Again, O why,
When the strong wine has entered into man,
And its diffused fire gone round the veins,
Why follows then a heaviness of limbs,
A tangle of the legs as round he reels,
A stuttering tongue, an intellect besoaked,
Eyes all aswim, and hiccups, shouts, and brawls
And whatso else is of that ilk?- Why this?-
If not that violent and impetuous wine
Is wont to confound the soul within the body?
But whatso can confounded be and balked,
Gives proof, that if a hardier cause got in,
'Twould hap that it would perish then, bereaved
Of any life thereafter. And, moreover,
Often will some one in a sudden fit,
As if by stroke of lightning, tumble down
Before our eyes, and sputter foam, and grunt,
Blither, and twist about with sinews taut,
Gasp up in starts, and weary out his limbs
With tossing round. No marvel, since distract
Through frame by violence of disease.

Confounds, he foams, as if to vomit soul,
As on the salt sea boil the billows round
Under the master might of winds. And now
A groan's forced out, because his limbs are griped
But, in the main, because the seeds of voice
Are driven forth and carried in a mass
Outwards by mouth, where they are wont to go,
And have a builded highway. He becomes
Mere fool, since energy of mind and soul
Confounded is, and, as I've shown, to-riven,
Asunder thrown, and torn to pieces all
By the same venom. But, again, where cause
Of that disease has faced about, and back
Retreats sharp poison of corrupted frame
Into its shadowy lairs, the man at first
Arises reeling, and gradually comes back
To all his senses and recovers soul.
Thus, since within the body itself of man
The mind and soul are by such great diseases
Shaken, so miserably in labour distraught,
Why, then, believe that in the open air,
Without a body, they can pass their life,
Immortal, battling with the master winds?
And, since we mark the mind itself is cured,
Like the sick body, and restored can be
By medicine, this is forewarning to
That mortal lives the mind. For proper it is
That whosoe'er begins and undertakes
To alter the mind, or meditates to change
Any another nature soever, should add
New parts, or readjust the order given,
Or from the sum remove at least a bit.
But what's immortal willeth for itself
Its parts be nor increased, nor rearranged,
Nor any bit soever flow away:
For change of anything from out its bounds
Means instant death of that which was before.
Ergo, the mind, whether in sickness fallen,
Or by the medicine restored, gives signs,
As I have taught, of its mortality.
So surely will a fact of truth make head
'Gainst errors' theories all, and so shut off
All refuge from the adversary, and rout
Error by two-edged confutation.

And since the mind is of a man one part,
Which in one fixed place remains, like ears,
And eyes, and every sense which pilots life;
And just as hand, or eye, or nose, apart,
Severed from us, can neither feel nor be,
But in the least of time is left to rot,
Thus mind alone can never be, without
The body and the man himself, which seems,
As 'twere the vessel of the same- or aught
Whate'er thou'lt feign as yet more closely joined:
Since body cleaves to mind by surest bonds.

Again, the body's and the mind's live powers
Only in union prosper and enjoy;
For neither can nature of mind, alone of itself
Sans body, give the vital motions forth;
Nor, then, can body, wanting soul, endure
And use the senses. Verily, as the eye,
Alone, up-rended from its roots, apart
From all the body, can peer about at naught,
So soul and mind it seems are nothing able,
When by themselves. No marvel, because, commixed
Through veins and inwards, and through bones and thews,
Their elements primordial are confined
By all the body, and own no power free
To bound around through interspaces big,
Thus, shut within these confines, they take on
Motions of sense, which, after death, thrown out
Beyond the body to the winds of air,
Take on they cannot- and on this account,
Because no more in such a way confined.
For air will be a body, be alive,
If in that air the soul can keep itself,
And in that air enclose those motions all
Which in the thews and in the body itself
A while ago 'twas making. So for this,
Again, again, I say confess we must,
That, when the body's wrappings are unwound,
And when the vital breath is forced without,
The soul, the senses of the mind dissolve,-
Since for the twain the cause and ground of life
Is in the fact of their conjoined estate.

Once more, since body's unable to sustain
Division from the soul, without decay
And obscene stench, how canst thou doubt but that
The soul, uprisen from the body's deeps,
Has filtered away, wide-drifted like a smoke,
Or that the changed body crumbling fell
With ruin so entire, because, indeed,
Its deep foundations have been moved from place,
The soul out-filtering even through the frame,
And through the body's every winding way
And orifice? And so by many means
Thou'rt free to learn that nature of the soul
Hath passed in fragments out along the frame,
And that 'twas shivered in the very body
Ere ever it slipped abroad and swam away
Into the winds of air. For never a man
Dying appears to feel the soul go forth
As one sure whole from all his body at once,
Nor first come up the throat and into mouth;
But feels it failing in a certain spot,
Even as he knows the senses too dissolve
Each in its own location in the frame.
But were this mind of ours immortal mind,
Dying 'twould scarce bewail a dissolution,
But rather the going, the leaving of its coat,
Like to a snake. Wherefore, when once the body
Hath passed away, admit we must that soul,
Shivered in all that body, perished too.
Nay, even when moving in the bounds of life,
Often the soul, now tottering from some cause,
Craves to go out, and from the frame entire
Loosened to be; the countenance becomes
Flaccid, as if the supreme hour were there;
And flabbily collapse the members all
Against the bloodless trunk- the kind of case
We see when we remark in common phrase,
"That man's quite gone," or "fainted dead away";
And where there's now a bustle of alarm,
And all are eager to get some hold upon
The man's last link of life. For then the mind
And all the power of soul are shook so sore,
And these so totter along with all the frame,
That any cause a little stronger might
Dissolve them altogether.- Why, then, doubt
That soul, when once without the body thrust,
There in the open, an enfeebled thing,
Its wrappings stripped away, cannot endure
Not only through no everlasting age,
But even, indeed, through not the least of time?

Then, too, why never is the intellect,
The counselling mind, begotten in the head,
The feet, the hands, instead of cleaving still
To one sole seat, to one fixed haunt, the breast,
If not that fixed places be assigned
For each thing's birth, where each, when 'tis create,
Is able to endure, and that our frames
Have such complex adjustments that no shift
In order of our members may appear?
To that degree effect succeeds to cause,
Nor is the flame once wont to be create
In flowing streams, nor cold begot in fire.
Besides, if nature of soul immortal be,
And able to feel, when from our frame disjoined,
The same, I fancy, must be thought to be
Endowed with senses five,- nor is there way
But this whereby to image to ourselves
How under-souls may roam in Acheron.
Thus painters and the elder race of bards
Have pictured souls with senses so endowed.
But neither eyes, nor nose, nor hand, alone
Apart from body can exist for soul,
Nor tongue nor ears apart. And hence indeed
Alone by self they can nor feel nor be.

And since we mark the vital sense to be
In the whole body, all one living thing,
If of a sudden a force with rapid stroke
Should slice it down the middle and cleave in twain,
Beyond a doubt likewise the soul itself,
Divided, dissevered, asunder will be flung
Along with body. But what severed is
And into sundry parts divides, indeed
Admits it owns no everlasting nature.
We hear how chariots of war, areek
With hurly slaughter, lop with flashing scythes
The limbs away so suddenly that there,
Fallen from the trunk, they quiver on the earth,
The while the mind and powers of the man
Can feel no pain, for swiftness of his hurt,
And sheer abandon in the zest of battle:
With the remainder of his frame he seeks
Anew the battle and the slaughter, nor marks
How the swift wheels and scythes of ravin have dragged
Off with the horses his left arm and shield;
Nor other how his right has dropped away,
Mounting again and on. A third attempts
With leg dismembered to arise and stand,
Whilst, on the ground hard by, the dying foot
Twitches its spreading toes. And even the head,
When from the warm and living trunk lopped off,
Keeps on the ground the vital countenance
And open eyes, until 't has rendered up
All remnants of the soul. Nay, once again:
If, when a serpent's darting forth its tongue,
And lashing its tail, thou gettest chance to hew
With axe its length of trunk to many parts,
Thou'lt see each severed fragment writhing round
With its fresh wound, and spattering up the sod,
And there the fore-part seeking with the jaws
After the hinder, with bite to stop the pain.
So shall we say that these be souls entire
In all those fractions?- but from that 'twould follow
One creature'd have in body many souls.
Therefore, the soul, which was indeed but one,
Has been divided with the body too:
Each is but mortal, since alike is each
Hewn into many parts. Again, how often
We view our fellow going by degrees,
And losing limb by limb the vital sense;
First nails and fingers of the feet turn blue,
Next die the feet and legs, then o'er the rest
Slow crawl the certain footsteps of cold death.
And since this nature of the soul is torn,
Nor mounts away, as at one time, entire,
We needs must hold it mortal. But perchance
If thou supposest that the soul itself
Can inward draw along the frame, and bring
Its parts together to one place, and so
From all the members draw the sense away,
Why, then, that place in which such stock of soul
Collected is, should greater seem in sense.
But since such place is nowhere, for a fact,
As said before, 'tis rent and scattered forth,
And so goes under. Or again, if now
I please to grant the false, and say that soul
Can thus be lumped within the frames of those
Who leave the sunshine, dying bit by bit,
Still must the soul as mortal be confessed;
Nor aught it matters whether to wrack it go,
Dispersed in the winds, or, gathered in a mass
From all its parts, sink down to brutish death,
Since more and more in every region sense
Fails the whole man, and less and less of life
In every region lingers.
And besides,
If soul immortal is, and winds its way
Into the body at the birth of man,
Why can we not remember something, then,
Of life-time spent before? why keep we not
Some footprints of the things we did of, old?
But if so changed hath been the power of mind,
That every recollection of things done
Is fallen away, at no o'erlong remove
Is that, I trow, from what we mean by death.
Wherefore 'tis sure that what hath been before
Hath died, and what now is is now create.
Moreover, if after the body hath been built
Our mind's live powers are wont to be put in,
Just at the moment that we come to birth,
And cross the sills of life, 'twould scarcely fit
For them to live as if they seemed to grow
Along with limbs and frame, even in the blood,
But rather as in a cavern all alone.
(Yet all the body duly throngs with sense.)
But public fact declares against all this:
For soul is so entwined through the veins,
The flesh, the thews, the bones, that even the teeth
Share in sensation, as proven by dull ache,
By twinge from icy water, or grating crunch
Upon a stone that got in mouth with bread.
Wherefore, again, again, souls must be thought
Nor void of birth, nor free from law of death;
Nor, if, from outward, in they wound their way,
Could they be thought as able so to cleave
To these our frames, nor, since so interwove,
Appears it that they're able to go forth
Unhurt and whole and loose themselves unscathed
From all the thews, articulations, bones.
But, if perchance thou thinkest that the soul,
From outward winding in its way, is wont
To seep and soak along these members ours,
Then all the more 'twill perish, being thus
With body fused- for what will seep and soak
Will be dissolved and will therefore die.
For just as food, dispersed through all the pores
Of body, and passed through limbs and all the frame,
Perishes, supplying from itself the stuff
For other nature, thus the soul and mind,
Though whole and new into a body going,
Are yet, by seeping in, dissolved away,
Whilst, as through pores, to all the frame there pass
Those particles from which created is
This nature of mind, now ruler of our body,
Born from that soul which perished, when divided
Along the frame. Wherefore it seems that soul
Hath both a natal and funeral hour.
Besides are seeds of soul there left behind
In the breathless body, or not? If there they are,
It cannot justly be immortal deemed,
Since, shorn of some parts lost, 'thas gone away:
But if, borne off with members uncorrupt,
'Thas fled so absolutely all away
It leaves not one remainder of itself
Behind in body, whence do cadavers, then,
From out their putrid flesh exhale the worms,
And whence does such a mass of living things,
Boneless and bloodless, o'er the bloated frame
Bubble and swarm? But if perchance thou thinkest
That souls from outward into worms can wind,
And each into a separate body come,
And reckonest not why many thousand souls
Collect where only one has gone away,
Here is a point, in sooth, that seems to need
Inquiry and a putting to the test:
Whether the souls go on a hunt for seeds
Of worms wherewith to build their dwelling places,
Or enter bodies ready-made, as 'twere.
But why themselves they thus should do and toil
'Tis hard to say, since, being free of body,
They flit around, harassed by no disease,
Nor cold nor famine; for the body labours
By more of kinship to these flaws of life,
And mind by contact with that body suffers
So many ills. But grant it be for them
However useful to construct a body
To which to enter in, 'tis plain they can't.
Then, souls for self no frames nor bodies make,
Nor is there how they once might enter in
To bodies ready-made- for they cannot
Be nicely interwoven with the same,
And there'll be formed no interplay of sense
Common to each.
Again, why is't there goes
Impetuous rage with lion's breed morose,
And cunning with foxes, and to deer why given
The ancestral fear and tendency to flee,
And why in short do all the rest of traits
Engender from the very start of life
In the members and mentality, if not
Because one certain power of mind that came
From its own seed and breed waxes the same
Along with all the body? But were mind
Immortal, were it wont to change its bodies,
How topsy-turvy would earth's creatures act!
The Hyrcan hound would flee the onset oft
Of antlered stag, the scurrying hawk would quake
Along the winds of air at the coming dove,
And men would dote, and savage beasts be wise;
For false the reasoning of those that say
Immortal mind is changed by change of body-
For what is changed dissolves, and therefore dies.
For parts are re-disposed and leave their order;
Wherefore they must be also capable
Of dissolution through the frame at last,
That they along with body perish all.
But should some say that always souls of men
Go into human bodies, I will ask:
How can a wise become a dullard soul?
And why is never a child's a prudent soul?
And the mare's filly why not trained so well
As sturdy strength of steed? We may be sure
They'll take their refuge in the thought that mind
Becomes a weakling in a weakling frame.
Yet be this so, 'tis needful to confess
The soul but mortal, since, so altered now
Throughout the frame, it loses the life and sense
It had before. Or how can mind wax strong
Co-equally with body and attain
The craved flower of life, unless it be
The body's colleague in its origins?
Or what's the purport of its going forth
From aged limbs?- fears it, perhaps, to stay,
Pent in a crumbled body? Or lest its house,
Outworn by venerable length of days,
May topple down upon it? But indeed
For an immortal, perils are there none.

Again, at parturitions of the wild
And at the rites of Love, that souls should stand
Ready hard by seems ludicrous enough-
Immortals waiting for their mortal limbs
In numbers innumerable, contending madly
Which shall be first and chief to enter in!-
Unless perchance among the souls there be
Such treaties stablished that the first to come
Flying along, shall enter in the first,
And that they make no rivalries of strength!

Again, in ether can't exist a tree,
Nor clouds in ocean deeps, nor in the fields
Can fishes live, nor blood in timber be,
Nor sap in boulders: fixed and arranged
Where everything may grow and have its place.
Thus nature of mind cannot arise alone
Without the body, nor exist afar
From thews and blood. But if 'twere possible,
Much rather might this very power of mind
Be in the head, the shoulders or the heels,
And, born in any part soever, yet
In the same man, in the same vessel abide.
But since within this body even of ours
Stands fixed and appears arranged sure
Where soul and mind can each exist and grow,
Deny we must the more that they can have
Duration and birth, wholly outside the frame.
For, verily, the mortal to conjoin
With the eternal, and to feign they feel
Together, and can function each with each,
Is but to dote: for what can be conceived
Of more unlike, discrepant, ill-assorted,
Than something mortal in a union joined
With an immortal and a secular
To bear the outrageous tempests?
Then, again,
Whatever abides eternal must indeed
Either repel all strokes, because 'tis made
Of solid body, and permit no entrance
Of aught with power to sunder from within
The parts compact- as are those seeds of stuff
Whose nature we've exhibited before;
Or else be able to endure through time
For this: because they are from blows exempt,
As is the void, the which abides untouched,
Unsmit by any stroke; or else because
There is no room around, whereto things can,
As 'twere, depart in dissolution all,-
Even as the sum of sums eternal is,
Without or place beyond whereto things may
Asunder fly, or bodies which can smite,
And thus dissolve them by the blows of might.
But if perchance the soul's to be adjudged
Immortal, mainly on ground 'tis kept secure
In vital forces- either because there come
Never at all things hostile to its weal,
Or else because what come somehow retire,
Repelled or ere we feel the harm they work,

For, lo, besides that, when the frame's diseased,
Soul sickens too, there cometh, many a time,
That which torments it with the things to be,
Keeps it in dread, and wearies it with cares;
And even when evil acts are of the past,
Still gnaw the old transgressions bitterly.
Add, too, that frenzy, peculiar to the mind,
And that oblivion of the things that were;
Add its submergence in the murky waves
Of drowse and torpor.


http://classics.mit.edu/Carus/nature_things.3.iii.html

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is not what you've said before! I'm pleased though you're now being sensible about it. So you now concede that materialism entails that reality exists in abstraction from our perception of it. Good!
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Of course it does! Good grief man, have you never once listened to single word I have said!



In fact listening to you is precisely the problem! You contradict yourself time after time after time!



Materialism holds that reality is what we perceive, and not our perceptions itself. How many times have I told you this?



OK, 3 points. What is wrong with my definition of objective reality which you were quite happy to accept before? Namely where an objective reality simply means the idea that people with appropriate unimpaired senses, or appropriate instruments, will sensorily experience pretty much the same as each other in the same situation. Why do you need to introduce the idea of a reality existing independently of our perceptions in order to define objective reality?

Secondly, what is the nature of this reality existing independently of our perceptions? Does redness as experienced rather than a particular wavelength exist independently of our perceptions? Bear in mind that what we see is very heavily moulded by our minds. Indeed I would suggest that what we sensorily experience is inevitably moulded by low level theory and that the theoretical lens which we view the world constitutes reality. You, on the other hand, subscribe to a reality existing in abstraction from our theories (as the Universe would still exist in a full-blooded sense even if all consciousnesses ceased to be). So how can we talk about a reality existing in abstraction from such theories?? Tell me what it is like man!

Thirdly, doesn't this admission by you that reality exists in abstraction from our perceptions, and indeed reality would still exist in a "full-blooded" sense even though all consciousnesses in the Universe were to cease to exist, make a nonsense of your claim that your materialism makes no ontological claims? Is it not the fact that in essence your materialism is not significantly different from the materialism of 100 years ago??

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Materialism holds that reality is what we perceive, and not our perceptions itself. How many times have I told you this?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OK, 3 points. What is wrong with my definition of objective reality which you were quite happy to accept before? Namely where an objective reality simply means the idea that people with appropriate unimpaired senses, or appropriate instruments, will sensorily experience pretty much the same as each other in the same situation.

I never agreed to that definition. In fact, it is nonsensical. For one thing, it requires that you have already accepted that other people objectively exist. How can I define the term "objective existence" in such a way that its own definition refers to itself? Can you say circular?

The conception of objective reality must be defined independently of other people. Only once it is defined is it even meaningful to say that other people exist.

Why do you need to introduce the idea of a reality existing independently of our perceptions in order to define objective reality?

I don't I. Materialism does not claim that reality exists independently of our perceptions, but rather that our perceptions are a part of reality. Specifically, I am a subset of reality (I exist), and my perceptions are the interaction between me and the rest of reality.

Secondly, what is the nature of this reality existing independently of our perceptions?

Since it does not exist independently of my perceptions, the question is meaningless. The nature of reality can be determined by analyzing how it interacts with me.

Does redness as experienced rather than a particular wavelength exist independently of our perceptions?

Of course not. You have just defined it to be "as experienced", so how could it possibly exist independently of the process of experiencing it (perception)?

Bear in mind that what we see is very heavily moulded by our minds.

Which is exactly why reality cannot be both objective, and also our perceptions.

Indeed I would suggest that what we sensorily experience is inevitably moulded by low level theory and that the theoretical lens which we view the world constitutes reality.

Yes. That is exactly why we need the scientific method. The only way to learn anything about the actual objective reality, is to take into account the subjective bias inherent in our perceptions.

You, on the other hand, subscribe to a reality existing in abstraction from our theories (as the Universe would still exist in a full-blooded sense even if all consciousnesses ceased to be). So how can we talk about a reality existing in abstraction from such theories?? Tell me what it is like man!

What do you mean? Our observations give us information about reality. Since our observations are our only source of information about it, we must describe it in terms of them. The non-existence of our minds would not change the way things work, though. It would just mean that there is nobody there to observe it. So what?

Thirdly, doesn't this admission by you that reality exists in abstraction from our perceptions, and indeed reality would still exist in a "full-blooded" sense even though all consciousnesses in the Universe were to cease to exist, make a nonsense of your claim that your materialism makes no ontological claims?

No. As I have stated many times before, the individual axioms of materialism, of which that is one, are not individually falsifiable, but the complete framework is. This means that materialism as a whole is not a metaphysical hypothesis, but a falsifiable theory, for which it is possible to accumulate supporting evidence.

Remember that through the application of the scientific method, I can conclude not only that other people exist, but that they are fundamentally no different than me. I can observe that when they die, their own perceptions of reality cease, as evidenced by the fact that the mechanism by which they make those perceptions, is non-functional. I can therefore conclude that when my own perceptions cease, that reality will continue to exist. This is an epistemological claim, not an ontological one.

Is it not the fact that in essence your materialism is not significantly different from the materialism of 100 years ago??

The difference is that it is not based on an incoherent notion of ontological reality, but rather on a definition of reality as being me, plus anything that interacts with me, plus anything that interacts with that, and so on.

It is very simple. I define existence as follows:

1) I exist.

2) Anything that interacts with something that exists, also exists.

Given that, if I were to cease to exist, that does not imply that everything else that currently exists would no longer exist. That is just silly.

Just because I describe reality in terms of my observations, does not mean that I believe that reality is somehow dependent on my observations for its very existence.

Dr. Stupid

[Solitaire]

Originally posted by Q-Source
In Economics we always make the following assumptions:
there is perfect information among consumers and producers,
goods are homogeneous, agents are rationals, there is free entry
to the market, etc.

Wow! :eek:
No wonder it's called the dismal science.
You could never make a prediction because
every one of those assumptions is wrong.

[metacristi]

Hello UCE

I understand this. But Chalmers 'Hard Problem' remains real, and causes us to be forced to make one exception to this rule when it comes to answering the quesiton of the fundamental relationship between mind and matter. Once you accept the Hard Problem exists then sciences epistemological privilege, with regard to this one specific question, must be forfeit. The Hard Problem renders materialistic science theoretically incapable of answering the question. Ever.


Indeed but there are possible interpretations that are very close to an 'extended materialism' as I defined it above.Chalmers for example is a panprotopsychist,he believes that what we name qualia is 'embedded' at a fundamental level of Reality [Planck level] with what we name matter [possible in the form of superstrings for example],that's why we cannot explain it.No need to introduce a metamind.Some might name this 'idealism' in the virtue of the usual definition of materialism but if 'qualia' does indeed exist at the ultimate level of reality then by extension I can include it in the 'physical objects' category.
Penrose refined further this position by introducing it in the frame of QM.Qualia is a fundamental aspect of reality which our mind 'access';conscious experience is seen as an emergent propriety created by computable processes and non computable platonic influences existing at the fundamental level of reality in a superposition of states.Microtubules in the brain are thought to produce the 'wave collapse' of the fundamental influences.




But it is also theoretically impossible to ever prove that we have created artificial consciousness. We can never reach the point you speak of.


Chalmers proposed an imaginary ,for the moment only,experiment that could falsify at least strong AI.If after replacing all neurones of a human being with a special kind of relays we would obtain the same consciusness as before then we can conclude that mind is computable-therefore strong AI is correct:machines can become conscious once a certain threshold of neuronal-like complexity is reached.




Ultimately I think the answer is that materialism is correct, within its domain. The problem is that the scientific world has a tendency to treat it as the domain of 'everything'. The whole of materialistic science can be taken, intact, and placed within consciousness. Then you can see that from the two different perspectives both models can make sense. The answer to this question is the same as the answer to many other questions. You have X and Y which appear to be opposites but are in fact complementary halves of a deeper truth that can only be grasped by taking a step back. The relationship between idealism and materialism is similar to the relationship between 1 and -1.


I understand your point but we must be aware of the fact that even this metamind could very well be at a level that it is not the fundamental level of reality.Even if you are correct that a metamind exist we cannot assess that this metamind is fundamental.Nonwithstanding that some might name this metamind God. Ultimately it is very possible that even this metamind can be reduced at some 'building blocks' of matter at an ultimate level of reality which are 'mindless'.Materialism could still hold then.
My personal point of view is close to that of Russell or Bohm:what we name mind and matter are effects of something fundamental which is both of them and though neither of them...

[Loki]

Neo,

So, given our initial presumption that we are wholly material creatures living in a wholly material world, we can then say Darwinism explains why consciousness arose. But what it does not do is vindicate materialism in any shape or form.
But the point being made by uce is that it invalidates materialism - which it doesn't, as far as I can see.

[metacristi]

UCE




From the ABSTRACT

A non-local order is one that involves interconnection, that is, active information flows that are independent of time and space or the movement of particles at the speed of light.


Unfortunately it was proved fairly recently [in the mid 1990-th] that we cannot use nonlocality to send information with ultraluminal speeds.This gives sufficient reason,for the moment, to not accept the claim of many that science proved that all our minds are interconnected being the 'projections' of a supermind.
Note I do not claim that this is impossible but only that for the moment this claim does not follows directly from scientific facts.Indeed the 'supermind' theory is still a possibility even in an 'extended materialism' frame.Incidentaly I am a supporter of the metamind theory in the extended materialism frame but as a matter of belief only.I am open to all logically acceptable possibilities compatible with the observed reality.

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by The One called Neo



Epiphenomenalists/weak dualists would take issue with this. On the other hand interactive dualists, idealists and materialists would all agree with this. Now for the materialist our behaviour is wholly a consequence of environmental stimuli and physical processes within the brain ie the world is physically closed. So how does the materialist reconcile this apparent paradox?

He does so by claiming that consciousness is either to be identified with such physical processes, or that consciousness is a logical consequence of such physical processes. Thus the problem is then solved and materialists can claim that consciousness is necessary for behaviour, and of course conversely p-zombies are logically impossible i.e they are no logically possible Universes where p-zombies exist.

So, given our initial presumption that we are wholly material creatures living in a wholly material world, we can then say Darwinism explains why consciousness arose. But what it does not do is vindicate materialism in any shape or form.

Are you in agreement with this? Jesh, this thread moves fast! I dont really give a d*mn about 'isms of any kind. What matters to me is that the world appears to be real, it appears to follow rules, I must act as if I make choices, and all speculations of a non-physical realm are, while interesting, just that: Speculations.

Hans

[metacristi]

Ian


My personal position is that the usual definition of materialism [valid also for my definition] is an assumption,an axiom which fully deserves the label 'belief'.However given the actual success of science in explaining the observed facts it has epistemological privilege over all other views.It could [why not?] prove to be even correct.


Why do people keep repeating this idea that science somehow suggests or implies the correctness of materialism. It emphatically does not! Science does not vindicate materialism in any shape or form. Indeed science is vastly more consistent with idealism. I'm somewhat weary of repeating this point time after time after time.


It's clear that we must have a reference point preferably the one which makes sense in a parsimonious manner by the observed reality:consequently science is 'pragmatic' using the least number of axioms.
I've never implied that science vindicated [usual] materialism but only that in the virtue of the parsimony principle [usual] materialism is the easiest way to make sense of the observed reality.It 'works for all our practical purposes' at least now.I consider that usual materialism [=the privileged working assumption] is rather an axiom [in spite of the fact that we 'confirm it' everyday] 'raised' at the 'power' of 'fallible objective truth'.That's all.
Given that science bases its assumptions on a certain number of axioms and moreover is fallible this does not imply that [usual definition of] materialism is true.


The latest research in neurology and AI point out that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter which,moreover,seems to be computable.

I think not.




I did not imply that science prove that but only that it tends toward that based on some inductive inferences.This simply means that the 'usual materialism' hypothesis should be checked first.But it still remain a hypothesis for the moment nothing more.

Inductive inferences are widely used in science.In this case scientists observed that some of the 'inputs' appearing in both AI [like some chess programs for example] and human consciousness [mechanical relays-firing neurons] produce the same 'output'-an 'intuitive' type of thinking.Hence the belief that usual materialism should be checked first,being the most promising 'working hypothesis'.
This neither implies that usual materialism has been proved correct nor that we should believe that usual materialism is correct.

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant

Again, this problem disappears when it is explained what is meant by "people". People are indeed made of atoms. It is the ontological status of the atoms themselves which alters under idealism. The entire physical world still exists, and still behaves as it does under materialism, it just doesn't self-exist all on its ownsome - it exists in the form of information in a higher Mental Reality. People are made of atoms.



UCE,

This statement is internally inconsistent; it is self-contradictory.

Your description of the material world is such that it is a subset of a larger world--the Metamind, as you call it. You might as well call it "God." There is no practical difference.

As Q-Source has already indicated, your supposition that such a Metamind exists is based on nothing but faith. There is absolutely no evidence that a Metamind or collective consciousness exists. Your inference that it does exist because of the "spooky action at a distance," as Einstein called it--non-locality and instantaneous transmittal of information--is unfounded. Simply because such apparently instantaneous transmittal occurs between related pairs of particles, recently discovered, cannot be explained within a relativistic paradigm, does not yield the result that idealism is the inevitable conclusion.

Instead, you "explain" away certain apparent mysteries observed in science by declaring them to be metaphysical. How convenient! There are no hard problems of consciousness or physical mysteries at all if it's all just a meta-thought!

The contradiction arises from the fact that materialism holds that the physical world is all there is. Everything that exists is physical matter or a resultant property of the physical. Thus, a Metamind which exists outside this physical world, as a greater set containing the subset of material world must, is incoherent. It contradicts your assertion that a physical world which behaves as it does under materialism exists within it.

Essentially, your paradigm is little more than an assertion that we are merely players in God's daydream. The joke is on us, of course, as we don't know that we're just p-zombies.

Sorry, but your brand of idealism/materialism being yin and yang isn't very satisfying intellectually, despite your attempts to dress it up with references to various esteemed philosophers and physicists.

It's still just mysticism or idealism under any other name.

I do give you points for creativity, however, and also for being well-versed in the subject matter.

AS

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by AmateurScientist


As Q-Source has already indicated, your supposition that such a Metamind exists is based on nothing but faith. There is absolutely no evidence that a Metamind or collective consciousness exists.


I can't speak for UCE but I can assure you that my belief in a metamind is not a faith. It would be more accurate to say that the materialists base their belief system on faith. Haven't got time to expand at the moment though cos going out soon and will be out all day.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Stimpy
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Materialism holds that reality is what we perceive, and not our perceptions itself. How many times have I told you this?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II
OK, 3 points. What is wrong with my definition of objective reality which you were quite happy to accept before? Namely where an objective reality simply means the idea that people with appropriate unimpaired senses, or appropriate instruments, will sensorily experience pretty much the same as each other in the same situation.
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Stimpy
I never agreed to that definition. In fact, it is nonsensical. For one thing, it requires that you have already accepted that other people objectively exist. How can I define the term "objective existence" in such a way that its own definition refers to itself? Can you say circular?


People do exist. We can see them. touch them, hear them etc. Whether they are p-zombies or not is irrelevant.



The conception of objective reality must be defined independently of other people. Only once it is defined is it even meaningful to say that other people exist.



Rubbish. Objective reality must be defined in terms of a consensus in what people actually experience. Got to go now, will finish this post later.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by John Lockard

Wow!
No wonder it's called the dismal science.
You could never make a prediction because
every one of those assumptions is wrong.

Actually, Economists can make very accurate predictions.
They start by assuming that there are perfect conditions in order to explain what is an ideal scenario. Thanks to that, it is possible to alter the assumptions and see what happens in reality.

I don't see what is wrong with that. It is not exclusive of Economic Science and it is the only possible way to understand what's going on.

Q-S

[MRC_Hans]

That is correct, and it is the way to do things scientifically: If a parameter cannot be established, that is, its probable range is unknown, it must be assumed ideal. Of course, if too many parameters are set that way, the confidence level of the result becomes low, but it would be even worse if those parameters were given an arbitrary range because the result would now contain imaginary figures.

So, while it may seem counterintuitive, the most correct result is actually reached by assuming unknown parameters ideal.

Hans

[Q-Source]

For the first time, you agree with me. ;)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Q-Source
For the first time, you agree with me. ;)

Wouldn't you prefer to study philosophy?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I never agreed to that definition. In fact, it is nonsensical. For one thing, it requires that you have already accepted that other people objectively exist. How can I define the term "objective existence" in such a way that its own definition refers to itself? Can you say circular?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

People do exist. We can see them. touch them, hear them etc. Whether they are p-zombies or not is irrelevant.

This argument is only valid once you have accepted that reality objectively exists. To use the existence of said humans in your definition of "objective reality" is therefore nonsensical.

The conception of objective reality must be defined independently of other people. Only once it is defined is it even meaningful to say that other people exist.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rubbish. Objective reality must be defined in terms of a consensus in what people actually experience. Got to go now, will finish this post later.

Must be? Why? What is wrong with the definition I gave? And once again, how can objective reality be defined in terms of a consensus of what people experience, when the very idea that other people do exist, depends on reality being objective?

In order for there to be a consensus of people's experiences, those people must objectively exist.

Dr. Stupid

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by Q-Source
For the first time, you agree with me. ;) Not at all, I agree with you often, but this being a debate forum, the tendency is to post only if we disagree ;) .

(Not, of course, that you can take silence as acceptance :D )

Cheers,
Hans :cool:

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


For me, P-Zombies are a nonsense that are implied by materialism. They are logically possible. That is their only purpose. They do not need to actually exist, any more than Schroedingers cat.

But this is precisely what the materialist must dispute. He cannot agree to your declaration here, otherwise materialism is refuted. The logical possibility of P-zombies are implied by the idea that the world is physically closed. Obviously materialism holds the world is physically closed. But the materialists avoids the p-zombie conclusion by asserting that once we have certain physical processes, such as that which obtains in brains, then it is logically necessary that we also have consciousness. This means that even in absolutely totally different Universes where there are different physical laws of nature, or indeed no physical laws at all, experiences must accompany certain given physical processes. At least this was my understanding although I've never read any of David Chalmers arguments.

It does seem to me though that the onus is on the materialist to demonstrate that consciousness is logically entailed by certain given physical processes (as opposed to naturally entailed by physical laws).

[Yahzi]

Neo
But the materialists avoids the p-zombie conclusion by asserting that once we have certain physical processes, such as that which obtains in brains, then it is logically necessary that we also have consciousness.
But the materialists avoids the hot water without heat conclusion by asserting that once we have Brownian motion, such as that which obtains in hot water, then it is logically necessary that we also have temperature.

Does my variation of your argument strike you as at all problematic?

If not, then why would substituting "temperature" for "consciousness" make a difference?

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by Yahzi
Neo

But the materialists avoids the hot water without heat conclusion by asserting that once we have Brownian motion, such as that which obtains in hot water, then it is logically necessary that we also have temperature.

Does my variation of your argument strike you as at all problematic?

If not, then why would substituting "temperature" for "consciousness" make a difference?

Agreed. The p-zombie argument put forth by dualists is silly for several reasons, one of which is that the way philosophers define p-zombies--responding to questions, going to work, playing basketball, eating, doing everything humans do except for having the experience of those things--is absurd on its face. It should be obvious to anyone that any being capable of engaging in such activities to the extent that it is indistinguishable from a human being is in fact a human being. P-zombies are defined in such a way that they are logically impossible--if a p-zombie is indistinguishable from a human, then he is not a p-zombie, but is in fact a human. If it walks like a duck and talks like a duck....

AS

Originally posted by AmateurScientist
one of which is that the way philosophers define p-zombies--responding to questions, going to work, playing basketball, eating, doing everything humans do except for having the experience of those things--is absurd on its face.


Totally false. I see no reason why a powerful-enough neural net running on a computer could not do all these things, and I see no reason at all why such a machine should be conscious. Everything humans do (with the possible exception of total altruism) could be replicated by a non-conscious machine.


It should be obvious to anyone that any being capable of engaging in such activities to the extent that it is indistinguishable from a human being is in fact a human being


WHY? :confused:


P-zombies are defined in such a way that they are logically impossible--if a p-zombie is indistinguishable from a human, then he is not a p-zombie, but is in fact a human. If it walks like a duck and talks like a duck....


....it might be a machine programmed to walk like a duck and talk like a duck. :rolleyes: :D

P-zombies are not logically impossible. They are used to demonstrate a logical argument. You cannot argue with a logical argument by saying...."well look at it....that's silly...."

We know it's silly! :)

edited :

This is part of the problem. To me, materialism itself looks precisely as silly as you think a p-zombies are. That is because p-zombies are implied by materialism! There are no p-zombies in idealism.

[Lord Kenneth]

If a machine would be made to process exactly like a brain (or create an artificial brain), it would be concious.

Materialism doesn't imply p-zombies, you goof. It implies conciousness isn't supernatural, or are physical in some way.

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by Dark Cobra
If a machine would be made to process exactly like a brain (or create an artificial brain), it would be concious.

Materialism doesn't imply p-zombies, you goof. It implies conciousness isn't supernatural, or are physical in some way.

Exactly. That's the whole point of a materialist explanation of consciousness. The mind is the brain, or if you prefer, it is an emergent property of it.

The implication from this is that a machine which could exactly, not nearly, replicate all of the functions of the brain would necessarily be conscious. UCE fails to acknowledge this. BTW, despite what science fiction novels and movies like to suggest, we are nowhere near being anywhere close to being able to construct neural networks which can replicate even a tiny fraction of what human brains do every day. Many AI researchers believe that there is no forseeable time in the future in which we could replicate human brain function in toto, or that it is even possible.

Agreed also that materialism in no way implies p-zombies. P-zombies are logically impossible because of the way they are defined. It is no different from supposing that we could have a man who was identical in every way to a regular man, except that he was pregnant! That's logically impossible because of the distinguishing characteristics of being male. Male humans cannot become pregnant. A pregnant man wouldn't be a man at all. P-zombies are no less silly.

AS

[Lord Kenneth]

Pregnant man, you say? (http://www.malepregnancy.com/)

Yes, I know it's fake.

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Totally false. I see no reason why a powerful-enough neural net running on a computer could not do all these things, and I see no reason at all why such a machine should be conscious. Everything humans do (with the possible exception of total altruism) could be replicated by a non-conscious machine.



WHY? :confused:



Really? Could a machine be programmed to have fun? To fall in love with a beautiful woman? To create soulful improvised jazz music? To cry in spontaneous response to a sad story?




....it might be a machine programmed to walk like a duck and talk like a duck. :rolleyes: :D


But then any human baby, and nearly any higher mammal would be able to distinguish it from a real duck after close inspection. A machine programmed to walk and talk like a duck is manifestly not indistinguishable from a real duck.



P-zombies are not logically impossible. They are used to demonstrate a logical argument. You cannot argue with a logical argument by saying...."well look at it....that's silly...."


The very definition of a p-zombie is flawed, which makes the supposition of their existence silly. A p-zombie which is indistinguishable from and which behaves exactly like a human is in fact a human. The "indistinguishable from and which behaves exactly like" is the part which is a cheat. That is how we define categories of beings. If A is indistinguishable from and behaves exactly like B, then A=B.

Suggesting then, that A is not = B is then silly and a logical impossibility, given the parameters defining B.


This is part of the problem. To me, materialism itself looks precisely as silly as you think a p-zombies are. That is because p-zombies are implied by materialism! There are no p-zombies in idealism.

Sorry, but they're not. See above.

AS

Originally posted by Dark Cobra

If a machine would be made to process exactly like a brain (or create an artificial brain), it would be concious.


LISTEN TO YOURSELF! :rolleyes:

You have just made a statement with total certainty based on nothing but FAITH!

How do you know that such a machine would be conscious?
How would you test it?
What EVIDENCE could you supply?
What LOGIC supports your position?

Faith, faith, faith, dogma and more faith. :(


Materialism doesn't imply p-zombies, you goof.


Nice argument. It's called "ad hominem".


It implies conciousness isn't supernatural, or are physical in some way.


No DC, it imples P-ZOMBIES. :(


. It implies conciousness isn't supernatural, or are physical in some way.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Exactly. That's the whole point of a materialist explanation of consciousness. The mind is the brain, or if you prefer, it is an emergent property of it.


That isn't an "explanation" any more than "God made the world in seven days" is an "explanation". It is a bald, unsubstantiated assertion. As for "the mind is the brain" - that is just prima facie incomprehensible gibberish. You can say "Snow is Fidel Castros beard.". Does it make sense? NO! And neither does "mind is brain". You say it for one reason only : materialism required it to be true.


The implication from this is that a machine which could exactly, not nearly, replicate all of the functions of the brain would necessarily be conscious. UCE fails to acknowledge this.


I fail to acknowledge it

1) because there is no evidence
2) because it is logically backwards

Your argument is :

If materialism is true then the mind is the brain therefore P-zombies can't exist and machines can be conscious therefore materialism is true. Get rid of the initial "if materialism is true" and the entire argument collapses like the wicked witch of the west under Dorothys bucket of water. It is no better than "If the bible is true then Darwinism must be false".


P-zombies are logically impossible because of the way they are defined. It is no different from supposing that we could have a man who was identical in every way to a regular man, except that he was pregnant!


Why? WHY? WHY WHY WHY :rolleyes:

You just assert things. No evidence. No logic. :(


Really? Could a machine be programmed to have fun?


Unknown. No evidence available. Why not?


To fall in love with a beautiful woman?


No, because it requires human hormones.


To create soulful improvised jazz music?


Unknown. No evidence available. Why not?


To cry in spontaneous response to a sad story?


Unknown. Presumably not since understand sadness may also requre human physicality.

None of the above is evidence for anything. It depends on subjective guesses and pre-formed dogma.



quote:
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....it might be a machine programmed to walk like a duck and talk like a duck.

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But then any human baby, and nearly any higher mammal would be able to distinguish it from a real duck after close inspection.


HOW?

WHY?

You are assuming it is a poor replica. That is just a limitation of current android technology!


A machine programmed to walk and talk like a duck is manifestly not indistinguishable from a real duck.


WHY? :rolleyes:

Do you have anything to offer but your own guesses, biases and dogma? You aren't even trying to offer any evidence or logic. Your argument is pure arm-waving!


quote:
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P-zombies are not logically impossible. They are used to demonstrate a logical argument. You cannot argue with a logical argument by saying...."well look at it....that's silly...."

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The very definition of a p-zombie is flawed, which makes the supposition of their existence silly.

You HAVE NOT explained why. All you have done is arm-waved.


A p-zombie which is indistinguishable from and which behaves exactly like a human is in fact a human.


WHY?


The "indistinguishable from and which behaves exactly like" is the part which is a cheat. That is how we define categories of beings. If A is indistinguishable from and behaves exactly like B, then A=B.


Nonsense!

Two utterly identical twins are the same person?

Furthermore, just because you CANNOT detect consciousness objectively this does not entitled you to ASSUME that everything which behaves as if it is conscious is conscious. You call that "science"?. I call it nonsense.


Suggesting then, that A is not = B is then silly and a logical impossibility, given the parameters defining B.


You use the word "silly" very liberally. Don't pretend it is an argument.

Want to try again, this time without faith, guesswork, ad hominems and blind assertions? :rolleyes:

It seems to me that you are insistent on evidence and logic when you want to reject something, but when it comes down to supplying evidence and logic to defend your own belief system you are quite happy to resort to arm-waving and claims that the alternative are "silly". If YOU demand evidence, then YOU must supply EVIDENCE.

[UnrepentantSinner]

AS wrote: The "indistinguishable from and which behaves exactly like" is the part which is a cheat. That is how we define categories of beings. If A is indistinguishable from and behaves exactly like B, then A=B.

UCE replied: Nonsense!

Hey AS, looks like UCE needs to send some e-mails to all the biology departments in the world. Apparently phyologeny and claudistics or nonsense...

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by Yahzi
Neo

But the materialists avoids the hot water without heat conclusion by asserting that once we have Brownian motion, such as that which obtains in hot water, then it is logically necessary that we also have temperature.

Does my variation of your argument strike you as at all problematic?

If not, then why would substituting "temperature" for "consciousness" make a difference?

Are you talking about temperature as in the phenomenological quality? That is to say are you talking about the actual feeling of warmth or pain of a particular temperature? If so this is just a specific instance of the more general question which I raised. In this case we need to ask if the feeling of warmth or pain is logically necessitated.

Originally posted by UnrepentantSinner
AS wrote: The "indistinguishable from and which behaves exactly like" is the part which is a cheat. That is how we define categories of beings. If A is indistinguishable from and behaves exactly like B, then A=B.

UCE replied: Nonsense!

Hey AS, looks like UCE needs to send some e-mails to all the biology departments in the world. Apparently phyologeny and claudistics or nonsense...

Do you understand the debate, UnrepentantSinner? Methinks not. Let me help you out. We are currently discussing whether P-zombies are logically possible. A P-Zombie is a thing which looks and behaves exactly like a human being but has no internal subjective state. It is a fundamental FACT that objective science has no way of determining whether or not a thing, either organic or computer, has an internal conscious state. That is why the 'Turing test' was invented, even though it relies on subjective judgement.

So AS is arguing that "Because a human is indistinguishable from a P-Zombie the idea of a P-zombie is 'silly'" (he also likes to claim it is illogical but he has not shown why).

The argument then boils down to : "Because science cannot distinguish between a human and a P-zombie we should assume that everything that mimics consciousness is conscious".

Go have a cup of coffee and a little think to yourself, dear. Do you think this argument is based on logic and evidence or do you think it is based on blind faith and guesswork?

NB : If you want me to avoid this sort of dismissive post try addressing me directly instead of publicly making snide comments about me to other people about subjects you don't understand. :(

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by AmateurScientist

Originally posted by Yahzi
Neo

But the materialists avoids the hot water without heat conclusion by asserting that once we have Brownian motion, such as that which obtains in hot water, then it is logically necessary that we also have temperature.

Does my variation of your argument strike you as at all problematic?

If not, then why would substituting "temperature" for "consciousness" make a difference?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Amateur Scientist

Agreed. The p-zombie argument put forth by dualists is silly for several reasons, one of which is that the way philosophers define p-zombies--responding to questions, going to work, playing basketball, eating, doing everything humans do except for having the experience of those things--is absurd on its face.


Yes everyone feels that it is.




It should be obvious to anyone that any being capable of engaging in such activities to the extent that it is indistinguishable from a human being is in fact a human being. P-zombies are defined in such a way that they are logically impossible--if a p-zombie is indistinguishable from a human, then he is not a p-zombie, but is in fact a human. If it walks like a duck and talks like a duck....



You're appealing to our feelings here in order to convince us that we are all material creatures living in a material world. But most non-materilists would emphatically agree with you in your sentiments.

The problem for the materialist is that given his belief that the physical world is closed, that is to say given that everything that happens is due to prior physical causes, then we must say that a talking and walking duck does so entirely as a result of physical causes. More generally the entirety of human behavior is due to physical causes. Thus a p-zombie which is physically identical to a human being would act exactly the same as a human being. The only way to get around this would be to assert that p-zombies are logically impossible. This is equivalent to maintaining that physical processes within the brain logically necessitate the qualitative feel of consciousness. But obviously you need to provide reasons for supposing this to be so.

Moreover, if we are to take your feelings seriously, shouldn't we also take peoples feelings that love, hope, despair etc are not numerically identical to a series of neurons firing? In which case the feelings you have expressed ought to compel us not to adopt materialism, but rather interactive dualism or idealism.

[Peskanov]

UCE,

----
quote:
We are currently discussing whether P-zombies are logically possible . A P-Zombie is a thing which looks and behaves exactly like a human being but has no internal subjective state.
----

Which is a impossible concept under the knowledge of modern science and materialism. Science is working on the hypothesis that the subjective is a subset of the objective.
You are not going to find a single materialist neurologist believing that such a concept ( behaving exactly like a human being but having no internal subjective state) is possible.

----
quote:
It is a fundamental FACT that objective science has no way of determining whether or not a thing, either organic or computer, has an internal conscious state.
----

This is fact?
As usual, you are underrating the whole neuroscience field.
There is a lot known about consciousness, is your choose to ignore it.
If this is a fact, present the proofs; and don't bring on the Qualia thing, because it has been answered tons of times...There is a place for Qualia in materialism, and it is a good one.

----
quote:
That is why the 'Turing test' was invented, even though it relies on subjective judgement.
----

Not true; the 'Turing test' was invented to measure intelligence.
Is commonly accepted that a high degree of intelligence can be reached without most propierties of the human mind, including consciousness.

[Lord Kenneth]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


LISTEN TO YOURSELF! :rolleyes:

You have just made a statement with total certainty based on nothing but FAITH!

How do you know that such a machine would be conscious?
How would you test it?
What EVIDENCE could you supply?
What LOGIC supports your position?

Faith, faith, faith, dogma and more faith. :(



Nice argument. It's called "ad hominem".



No DC, it imples P-ZOMBIES. :(

[/B]

1. Why? Because it would function the same as a human brain.

2. I didn't dismiss your argument by calling you a goof. I simply called you a goof. I didn't say you were wrong because you were a goof. It's no ad hom. Nice try, though.

3. No, it doesn't, and it doesn't become true if you keep on repeating it. I know my position more than some idiot on a message board does, thanks.

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by Peskanov

Elephant
It is a fundamental FACT that objective science has no way of determining whether or not a thing, either organic or computer, has an internal conscious state.
----
Pesk
This is fact?
As usual, you are underrating the whole neuroscience field.



It might well seem to be a fact because first of all no arguments demonstrating that certain physical process logically necessitate consciousness have been forthcoming. Secondly it is difficult to envisage what shape or form such an argument could conceivably take.

Neuroscience could only ever aspire to a causal relationship between processes within the brain and consciousness, surely? It cannot demonstrate that the latter is a logically necessary consequence of the former.

Originally posted by Peskanov
UCE,

----
quote:
We are currently discussing whether P-zombies are logically possible . A P-Zombie is a thing which looks and behaves exactly like a human being but has no internal subjective state.
----

Which is a impossible concept under the knowledge of modern science and materialism. Science is working on the hypothesis that the subjective is a subset of the objective.
You are not going to find a single materialist neurologist believing that such a concept ( behaving exactly like a human being but having no internal subjective state) is possible.


Of course I'm not going to find a materialist who believes this. If they did, then they'd have to admit materialism is false. Turkeys don't vote for Christmas. The hypothesis that the subjective is a subset of the objective is forced upon materialists by their belief system, just as 7-day creationism is forced upon biblical literalists. In neither case am I interested in their beliefs. I am interested in logic and facts. I see no logical reason why a brain should have an associated mind. All I see is arm-waving and unsubstantiated assertions.



----
quote:
It is a fundamental FACT that objective science has no way of determining whether or not a thing, either organic or computer, has an internal conscious state.
----

This is fact?


YES, if is a FACT. An absolute, undeniable, logically inevitable FACT. There is no objective means of determining whether a physical entity has a subjective internal state. It is logically impossible. If it was not logically impossible then it would be possible to logically eliminate solipsism. It is not logically possible to eliminate solipsism.


As usual, you are underrating the whole neuroscience field.


Neuroscience has nothing whatsoever to do with it. All the neuroscience in the world cannot escape the logical FACT that it is impossible to eliminate solipsism.


There is a lot known about consciousness, is your choose to ignore it.


I am not ignoring it. It is irrelevant to this specific question. Please explain how you think neuroscience can eliminate solipsism.


If this is a fact, present the proofs; and don't bring on the Qualia thing, because it has been answered tons of times...There is a place for Qualia in materialism, and it is a good one.


The proof is here : How can you ever prove anything exists at all except for the contents of your own mind?

As soon as you accept that you cannot eliminate the possibility that anything exists except the content of your own mind you must also accept that you cannot prove that the entities you percieve as other human beings have an internal state. If you want me to elaborate further I can do so, but you are an intelligent person and I think you know this is true anyway.


----
quote:
That is why the 'Turing test' was invented, even though it relies on subjective judgement.
----

Not true; the 'Turing test' was invented to measure intelligence.
Is commonly accepted that a high degree of intelligence can be reached without most propierties of the human mind, including consciousness.

How does one detect consciousness in another physical entity?

How can you tell the difference between an extremely intelligent machine mimicking consciousness and an extremely intelligent machine which is actually conscious?

If you cannot, and you cannot, then the debate has nowhere to go. P-Zombies are not logically impossible. Once you accept that they are logically possible, then materialism cannot be convincingly defended.

Geoff.



Cobra :

I asked you :


How do you know that such a machine would be conscious?
How would you test it?
What EVIDENCE could you supply?
What LOGIC supports your position?


Your response :


1. Why? Because it would function the same as a human brain.


I asked you for EVIDENCE. I asked you for LOGIC. You have supplied none. Your response only works if materialism is true. But we are here discussing whether or not P-zombies are logically possible in order to examine the logical soundness of materialism. Therefore, you cannot and MUST NOT use an assumption of materialism in order to defend your position. Surely you understand this! I fully understand that if materialism is true, and you build a machine that totally mimics a human brain, that one would expect it to produce consciousness. However - even then you STILL don't actually have any EVIDENCE - all you have is something which logically follows from an assumption that materialism is true.

****But if materialism is NOT TRUE, then your argument collapses.****

Do you understand why you cannot use an assumption of materialism in order to logically defend materialism?

I've heard this so many times from materialists. It boils down to "If materialism is true then the mind is a brain process, therefore there is no such thing as a p-zombie, therefore materialism is true."

Whoopee-doo. Please don't call that a logical defence of materialism. :(


3. No, it doesn't, and it doesn't become true if you keep on repeating it. I know my position more than some idiot on a message board does, thanks.


I am talking logic and evidence. So far, you aren't.

[UnrepentantSinner]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Do you understand the debate, UnrepentantSinner? Methinks not. Let me help you out. We are currently discussing whether P-zombies are logically possible. A P-Zombie is a thing which looks and behaves exactly like a human being but has no internal subjective state. It is a fundamental FACT that objective science has no way of determining whether or not a thing, either organic or computer, has an internal conscious state. That is why the 'Turing test' was invented, even though it relies on subjective judgement.

So AS is arguing that "Because a human is indistinguishable from a P-Zombie the idea of a P-zombie is 'silly'" (he also likes to claim it is illogical but he has not shown why).

The argument then boils down to : "Because science cannot distinguish between a human and a P-zombie we should assume that everything that mimics consciousness is conscious".

Go have a cup of coffee and a little think to yourself, dear. Do you think this argument is based on logic and evidence or do you think it is based on blind faith and guesswork?

NB : If you want me to avoid this sort of dismissive post try addressing me directly instead of publicly making snide comments about me to other people about subjects you don't understand. :(



Please spare me the patronization.

You have stated, in the middle of your P-zombie theoretical debate a simple stated fact.

If A is utterly undistinguisable from B then A does not = B.

If that case is so, then Claudistics and Phylogeny need to be thrown out the window as the entire premise of those two areas of Biology are based on the premise that:

If A is utterly undistingishable from B then A=B.

Or perhaps it was you who lacked some understanding of Claudistics and Phylogeny?

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant



So AS is arguing that "Because a human is indistinguishable from a P-Zombie the idea of a P-zombie is 'silly'" (he also likes to claim it is illogical but he has not shown why).



Geoff,

3 Things:

1) In a post above, you chastised me for supposedly using an ad hominem against you. I have not in this thread. Please review it again; you will see that it was Dark Cobra who called you a goof, not I. I am trying to debate this issue on the merits alone.

2) I'm responding to this before work, so I must be short and cannot get to the many other points, including Neo's, until later. I'll do my best then.

3) As to your remark above, I have indeed shown you why p-zombies are illogical under the materialist paradigm. Remember, you claim that materialism implies p-zombies. I was directly refuting that assertion.

You cannot conveniently dismiss my refutation as arm-waving with your insistence that I am assuming materialism to be true. Of course I am assuming materialism to be true. To do otherwise would fail to consider how materialism might or might not imply p-zombies. You made the claim about materialism implying p-zombies; I was directly refuting your claim. To do that, I have to assume that materialism is true.

How's this for an analogy about humans and p-zombies being indistinguishable and doing exactly the same things, except for p-zombies lacking the ability to experience things?

Suppose we examine the number 5. Now, also suppose we examine another number, call it Zork. Zork behaves exactly like 5 in all arithmetic calculations. Zork times 6 is 30. 8 minus Zork is 3. Zork squared is 25. Zork is exactly like 5, except for it lacks the essential 5-ness of 5. Therefore, Zorks are logically possible.

See how stupid that argument is? I have defined Zork so that it is indistinguishable from 5, behaves exactly like 5, but it somehow lacks 5-ness. There's the cheat. If Zork is indistinguishable from and behaves like 5, then by definition, Zork is 5.

P-zombie advocates try to get around how we define things by convention by appending a little cheat at the end of the definition--namely, but lack the experience.

Under the materialist paradigm, then, experience is a necessary consequence of having a fully functioning brain, which is assumed in the definition of p-zombie.

In short, p-zombie advocates cannot have it both ways--either p-zombies are in fact distinguishable from humans, or they aren't p-zombies at all and are in fact humans.

Enough said about p-zombies. It is a cheat, plain and simple. I don't care how esteemed David Chalmers is among his groupies. He's wrong and not nearly as clever as he and his followers like to think he is.

AS

Originally posted by UnrepentantSinner

Please spare me the patronization.


Then leave off making sarcastic comments about me, but not addressed to me. :(


You have stated, in the middle of your P-zombie theoretical debate a simple stated fact.

If A is utterly undistinguisable from B then A does not = B.


I made no such statement.

I said that if A is indistinguishable from B then A does not neccesarily = B. And anyway that is a generalisation you are attempting to apply to a specific situation where it does not apply. You cannot distinguish between a real UCE and a zombie UCE. That does not mean that a zombie UCE is conscious. It simply does not follow.


If A is utterly undistingishable from B then A=B.


So there is no difference between a computer mimicking consciousness and a computer which is actually conscious? :rolleyes:

If you want me to spare you the patronisation then stop making idiotic statements. You cannot declare that any computer which has the appearance of being conscious is conscious. Just because objective materialism is incapable of telling the difference between these things does not mean there is no difference between them!

A) Computer which mimicks consciousness.
B) Computer which is actually conscious.

A is utterly indistinguishable from B.
A is nevertheless different from B.

Do you understand yet or do I have to explain it again? :(

[UnrepentantSinner]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
A is utterly indistinguishable from B.
A is nevertheless different from B.

Do you understand yet or do I have to explain it again? :(

Ugh, it must be the Brit in you...

Look, it's simple.

Phylogeny is based on the principle that:

If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B.

Claudistics is based on the principle that:

If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B.

Both are core principles of Biology. If your premise that A is indistinguishable from B then A does not necessarily = B is true, then both areas of study must be abandoned and Biology loses one of it's most important tools for studying the fossil record and the DNA evidence of interrelationships of species.

As I stated, In my admittedly tangental premise, the simple fact that if we accept your if A is utterly undistinguishable from B, A still =/= B, and those two tools must be rejected.

Can you not put your tea and crumpets down long enough to understand the ramifications of your assertion?

- edited to add, spare me the navel gazing crap about p-zombies, do you deny that your assertion re: A=/=B invalidates Phylogeny and Claudistics?

AS :


1) In a post above, you chastised me for supposedly using an ad hominem against you. I have not in this thread. Please review it again; you will see that it was Dark Cobra who called you a goof, not I. I am trying to debate this issue on the merits alone.


I am sorry. Mistaken identity.


2) I'm responding to this before work, so I must be short and cannot get to the many other points, including Neo's, until later. I'll do my best then.


Fair enough.


3) As to your remark above, I have indeed shown you why p-zombies are illogical under the materialist paradigm.


Arghhh!

Materialism, by definition, cannot even define what 1st-person consciousness is, so how can it be expected to understand the difference between a human and a zombie?

That does not mean there is no difference between a human and a zombie. All it means is that under materialism the difference between a human and a zombie is logically incomprehensible. You are now attempting to use materialisms own shortcomings to defend materialism! Arghhh! :rolleyes:


Remember, you claim that materialism implies p-zombies. I was directly refuting that assertion.


Materialism cannot tell the difference between a P-zombie and a human. It does not logically follow that there really is no difference between a P-zombie and a human. Is that better?


Suppose we examine the number 5. Now, also suppose we examine another number, call it Zork. Zork behaves exactly like 5 in all arithmetic calculations. Zork times 6 is 30. 8 minus Zork is 3. Zork squared is 25. Zork is exactly like 5, except for it lacks the essential 5-ness of 5. Therefore, Zorks are logically possible.

See how stupid that argument is? I have defined Zork so that it is indistinguishable from 5, behaves exactly like 5, but it somehow lacks 5-ness.


Yep, the argument is stupid. It is stupid because there is only one '5'. There is no brain-5 and mind-5. Your analogy would only work if you yourself were a P-zombie i.e. there was only a brain and no mind. The reason the P-zombie argument is not the same is that each of us is aware of the existence of precisely 1 mind - our own. We have a mind and we have a brain. You have taken an object which is ontologically different to either physical things or mental things - you have taken a number. Numbers do not have two different perspectives. YOU DO. So it is an entirely false analogy. I know I am conscious! I am not making it up. I really am conscious. If the number 5 is conscious, neither of us know about it.


There's the cheat. If Zork is indistinguishable from and behaves like 5, then by definition, Zork is 5.


You really believe this nonsense don't you? :(

Do you know the difference between your brain and your mind?

If so, there is a difference between a brain with an internal state and a brain without an internal state. One is your brain. The other is your brain and your mind.


P-zombie advocates try to get around how we define things by convention by appending a little cheat at the end of the definition--namely, but lack the experience.


Why is that a 'cheat', exactly?


Under the materialist paradigm, then, experience is a necessary consequence of having a fully functioning brain, which is assumed in the definition of p-zombie.


Great. This is materialist dogma, proudly repeated as materialist dogma. I am aware of materialist dogma, thankyou.


In short, p-zombie advocates cannot have it both ways--either p-zombies are in fact distinguishable from humans, or they aren't p-zombies at all and are in fact humans.


The fact that p-zombies are indistinguishable from humans is a limitation of the scientific method, not any logical or ontological limitations. The entire subjective realm is inaccessible to science, and undefinable to materialism. As far as materialism is concerned it might just as well not exist. That is the materialists problem, not mine!

Your argument now boils down to "All this stuff about P-zombies doesn't make sense to materialists, because materialism can't define what 1st-person consciousness is. Therefore we will just assume that 1st-person consciousness exists in anything that we subjectively assess to be the sort of thing likely to have it."

Do you really think this stands up? :eek:

That isn't a defence of materialism. It is damning exposure of its inate inability to cope with concepts required for understanding consciousness.


Enough said about p-zombies. It is a cheat, plain and simple.


Not enough said, AS. I am sure the cretinists would like the Darwinists to go away and leave them and their belief-system alone. It isn't going to happen, and the P-zombie argument isn't going away either. Scientistic Materialism is doomed.

Geoff.

Unrepentant Sinner


Ugh, it must be the Brit in you...

Look, it's simple.

Phylogeny is based on the principle that:

If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B.

Claudistics is based on the principle that:

If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B.

Both are core principles of Biology. If your premise that A is indistinguishable from B then A does not necessarily = B is true, then both areas of study must be abandoned and Biology loses one of it's most important tools for studying the fossil record and the DNA evidence of interrelationships of species.


Right...the problem here is that you are taking an example of things which occurs entirely in the physical world and trying to apply it to something which crosses the divide between the physical world and the mental world. Your are trying to argue that consciousness is not a special case and that the same techniques that can be applied to physical science can be applied to the study of the ontological question about the relationship between mind and matter. It is a straightforward attempt to use scientific principles to apply to a metaphysical/ontological question, followed by a complaint that if I insist on a philosophical answer to this philosophical question that I somehow invalidate the original scientific disciplines that work perfectly well within the physical world. Science does not fall in a heap and collapse because it admits that metaphysics isn't physics! :rolleyes:


As I stated, In my admittedly tangental premise, the simple fact that if we accept your if A is utterly undistinguishable from B, A still =/= B, and those two tools must be rejected.


Wrong. You are trying to apply a scientific tool to a philosophical question and then trying to claim that if I do not let you get away with that that it somehow invalidates those scentific tools. Do you understand the difference between science and philosophy?


Can you not put your tea and crumpets down long enough to understand the ramifications of your assertion?


Now you sound like Stimpson.

It makes no difference at all to any other question than the Hard Problem itself. Consciousness really is a special case. This is not the science forum. This is the philosophy forum. The Mind/Body problem is, by definition, a philosophical problem. Admitting it is a philosophical problem has no ramifications on science whatsoever, apart from that science is spared the task of trying to answer a question it has always been logically incapable of answering.


- edited to add, spare me the navel gazing crap about p-zombies, do you deny that your assertion re: A=/=B invalidates Phylogeny and Claudistics?


Phylogeny and Claudistics are totally unaffected by this.

[Yahzi]

Neo
Are you talking about temperature as in the phenomenological quality?
I am presenting temperature as an allegory for phenomenology.

Temperature is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like temperature: they are neither hot nor cold. However, they possess Brownian motion, and this energy, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call temperature.

Conciousness is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like phenomoneology: they neither feel nor think. However, they possess organization, and this organization, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call conciousness.

Your phenomenology is exactly like temperature: it is a handy way of describing what a statistically significant collection of atoms do. That is all it is: and the phenomena of phenomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by Yahzi
Neo

I am presenting temperature as an allegory for phenomenology.

Temperature is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like temperature: they are neither hot nor cold. However, they possess Brownian motion, and this energy, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call temperature.

Conciousness is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like phenomoneology: they neither feel nor think. However, they possess organization, and this organization, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call conciousness.

Your phenomenology is exactly like temperature: it is a handy way of describing what a statistically significant collection of atoms do. That is all it is: and the phenomena of phenomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.

Excellent analogy Yahzi. Thanks. That provides me with a new way of thinking about consciousness.

AS

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Yahzi

That is all it is: and the phenomena of henomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.

The King of Reductionism !

It makes me feel reduced to nothing :(

[Loki]

uce,

(Dark Cobra wrote ) : It implies conciousness isn't supernatural, or are physical in some way.
...
(uce wrote) : No DC, it imples P-ZOMBIES.

It doesn't imply P-Zombies - materialism currently doesn't require or eliminate P-Zombies, it's happy to work with both (and yes, you make this point also!)

(Dark Cobra wrote) : P-zombies are logically impossible because of the way they are defined.
...
(uce wrote) : Why? WHY? WHY WHY WHY
You just assert things. No evidence. No logic.
I agree with you on this uce - P-Zombies are not logically impossible. They may in fact be impossible, but I can't find any logic chain that eliminates them.

An absolute, undeniable, logically inevitable FACT. There is no objective means of determining whether a physical entity has a subjective internal state. It is logically impossible.
I'd agree with this also (!!!)

The fact that p-zombies are indistinguishable from humans is a limitation of the scientific method, not any logical or ontological limitations.
Finally, a disagreement! To me, this is where you go too far. Even if true, this is the heart of the "concievability implies logical possibility". P-Zombies are just a thought experiment. As such, they tell us something about what "might be". They do not, and cannot as far as I can see, force us to conclude that something "must be".

[Lord Kenneth]

Please note that you misquoted me, I did not say p-zombies are impossible.

Although, I do agree with that.

Why are p-zombies impossible?

Well, if a "p-zombie" is indistinguishable (this includes internal organs INCLUDING the brain) from a human, then it is a human. It, having the same brain or near same brain it is indeed concious just like the human is.

[Lord Kenneth]

UCE, it has already been explained to you.

1. All things I (and others) have observed as being concious are living things.

2. With no brain activity, there is no conciousness, at least none observed. During sleep or other periods of reduced brain activity, there is LESS consiousness.

3. Thinking ability is in the brain. And, basically, conciousness IS thinking.

Let me ask you a question, UCE... what DOES a brain do?

If someone is knocked unconcious, is he concious?

[billydkid]

Originally posted by Q-Source


The King of Reductionism !

It makes me feel reduced to nothing :(

It has precisely the opposite effect on me. Don't you find it fantastically amazing that the universe can organize itself into such incredible creatures as ourselves? Honestly, I can not imagine why anyone would feel diminished by this. It doesn't make us any less exotic or amazing. In fact, it makes us more so. This is the miraculous aspect of the universe and nature - that it can and does "create" out of its own accord "beings" and beings such as us. That is can create consciousness of itself.

[billydkid]

Originally posted by Yahzi
Neo

I am presenting temperature as an allegory for phenomenology.

Temperature is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like temperature: they are neither hot nor cold. However, they possess Brownian motion, and this energy, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call temperature.

Conciousness is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like phenomoneology: they neither feel nor think. However, they possess organization, and this organization, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call conciousness.

Your phenomenology is exactly like temperature: it is a handy way of describing what a statistically significant collection of atoms do. That is all it is: and the phenomena of phenomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.

Simple, elegant, meaningful, logical. Couldn't ask for more.

[ebola]

UCE:

1) Are there, or are there not p-zombies?

2) How do you know?

3) If ( from your point of view ), from a hypothetical materialistic standpoint, there are p-zombies, is there no way to distinguish them from humans?

4) How do you know?

5) If you cannot distinguish p-zombies from humans, then are they not identical to humans?

6) How do you know?

7) If p-zombies are identical to humans, how are they not humans?

8) Do you agree that "identical to" and "indistinguishable from" are synonymous?

Eric

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by The One called Neo


Amateur Scientist

Agreed. The p-zombie argument put forth by dualists is silly for several reasons, one of which is that the way philosophers define p-zombies--responding to questions, going to work, playing basketball, eating, doing everything humans do except for having the experience of those things--is absurd on its face.


Yes everyone feels that it is.

[/QUOTE]

It's more than a feeling (with apologies to Boston). It is true because of how we define objects or beings. If an object has all the characteristics of A, and behaves exactly like A, and is indistinguishable from A, then it is A.

The materialist paradigm insists that a p-zombie that has a fully functioning brain identical to a human's will by definition experience the same things a human will. Thus, the p-zombie will be a human.

Remember, the p-zombie argument is supposed to be a proof of the falsity of materialism. It isn't.


You're appealing to our feelings here in order to convince us that we are all material creatures living in a material world. But most non-materilists would emphatically agree with you in your sentiments.


I'm not trying to appeal to anyone's feelings. I'm trying to use rational arguments and critiques of others' arguments.


The problem for the materialist is that given his belief that the physical world is closed, that is to say given that everything that happens is due to prior physical causes, then we must say that a talking and walking duck does so entirely as a result of physical causes. More generally the entirety of human behavior is due to physical causes. Thus a p-zombie which is physically identical to a human being would act exactly the same as a human being. The only way to get around this would be to assert that p-zombies are logically impossible. This is equivalent to maintaining that physical processes within the brain logically necessitate the qualitative feel of consciousness. But obviously you need to provide reasons for supposing this to be so.




You keep trying to shift the burden of proof onto my shoulders. I believe the idealists or dualists of any stripe bear the burden of proving why we shouldn't adopt a materialist paradigm.

We are confident materialism is true because there is no credible, reliable evidence to suggest otherwise. Subjective impressions of a metamind are just that.

Research in neuroscience suggests that consciousness is a mere byproduct of the brain's inner workings. Plenty of empirical data suggest that our conscious awareness of a volitional bodily movement, for instance, arises approximately .5 to .8 second after the neuronal activity corresponding with the decision to engage that part of the body in movement occurs. What does that fact suggest to you? To any reasonable person it should suggest that the brain activity occurs first, and then the "mind" becomes aware of it.

It is incorrect to suggest that this implies interactive dualism. That merely begs the question of how matter might interact with "mind." That is terribly messy and non-parsimonious. Once again, no one has ever found any evidence of any interactive mechanism or other kind of "mind stuff."



Moreover, if we are to take your feelings seriously, shouldn't we also take peoples feelings that love, hope, despair etc are not numerically identical to a series of neurons firing? In which case the feelings you have expressed ought to compel us not to adopt materialism, but rather interactive dualism or idealism.

Once again, it's not my "feelings" that suggest p-zombies cannot exist. It's the way they are defined.

Plenty of scientific research suggests that indeed emotions are the result of chemical and hormonal reactions to stimuli and the neuronal activity resulting from them. This is perfectly consistent with a materialistic view. It does not suggest interactive dualism of idealism. I don't have any romantic notions about emotions coming from the heart or anywhere else other than the brain and its interactions with the endocrine system, or with foreign substances introduced into the body (e.g., drugs). I'm not at all concerned with others' "feelings" about where emotions might come from. "Feelings" do not determine physical truth. Science is not a democratic process.

AS

[Yahzi]

P-zombies are logically impossible because of the way they are defined.
P-Zombies are incoherent.

Image that a duck is defined as a bird that swims. Now imagine a duck that can't swim. What have you got? Because I just got a headache.

Once you can do that, then you can imagine mental processes that are exactly like mental processes in all ways, except they lack an attribute that defines them as mental processess.

What this boils down to is: imagine a duck that is exactly like a duck in all ways, except it isn't a duck.

You can't posit the results of mental states without positing the mental states. And you can't separate the qualia of mental states from the definition of mental states anymore than you can separate swimming from the definition of a duck.

Qualia aren't useless baggage of the mental states, they are the mechanism by which the mental states interact with each other. How can you imagine mental states interacting with each other to produce the effects of thought without imagining the mechanism by which the mental states interact with each other?

If you separate qualia by defining them to not be crucial to the interaction of mental states, then yes, you can create p-zombies, but you have also just determined that everyone is a p-zombie, because you have defined qualia to be meaningless supernumaries to thought.

Qualia either matter - in which case they cannot logically be absent - or they don't matter - in which case, it doesn't matter!

Originally posted by Dark Cobra
Please note that you misquoted me, I did not say p-zombies are impossible.

Although, I do agree with that.

Why are p-zombies impossible?

Well, if a "p-zombie" is indistinguishable (this includes internal organs INCLUDING the brain) from a human, then it is a human. It, having the same brain or near same brain it is indeed concious just like the human is.

Dark Cobra :

With the greatest respect, you do not appear to understand the argument, judging from your response. The reason the p-zombie is 'indistinguishable' is because there is no practical means of making the distinction. There is no way to objectify the subjective. YOU CANNOT THEN SAY THAT THE SUBJECTIVE DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS YOU YOURSELF LACK A SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT. YOU can tell that YOU are not a zombie because YOU are conscious. You can 'assume' that anything which is externally indistinguishable from a human is internally indistinguishable for a human, and it might even be a reasonable assumption, BUT IT REMAINS AN ASSUMPTION!

***You cannot base a claim of 'impossibility', logical or otherwise, ON AN ASSUMPTION, however reasonable.***

This is not complicated. Why are you having such difficulty accepting it?

You are currently providing the best example I have seen since PixyMisa of a person who appears completeley incapable of following a logical argument when their belief system is challenged.

NB : try responding to the logical argument I have posted instead of attempting to redefine the problem in order to avoid the logic.

[UnrepentantSinner]

O.k. UCE, I can do is offer my willingness to agree to disagree.

I need to use the time to figure out where this p-kinkajoo fits on the phylogenetic tree. ;)

[Solitaire]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Robot boy
Again - it depends what you mean by 'interact'. Take the example of Schroedingers cat - it is entirely possible that the cat is both dead and alive till it is observed. The observation forces the 'collapse of the wave-function' and the cat ends up either dead or alive. There has been an interaction here, but the nature of the interaction is such that physics cannot investigate it because it is a metaphysical interaction rather than a physical one.

Pretty good, but be carefull. The observer that collapses the wavefunction
of the system is not a person, not a cat, not even a bacterium. A molecule,
even more an atom, or even better still a subatomic particle can re-entangle
the cats state with the rest of the universe.

Think about things like Bells 'non-locality' and 'quantum entanglement'.
These phenomena tell us that the Universe is non-local - that particles
seperates by vast distances are somehow directly connected at a deeper
level of reality. Materialists look at this evidence and just feel confused.
"It is a mystery" said Stimpson J Cat. Well, not to me it isn't. If the physical
world is composed of information residing in a 'metamind' then quantum
entanglement and non-locality are standard fare. It is the materialists
insistence on the self-existence of the physical world and their rejection
of non-locality that causes them to be mystified [NB Bells theorem is
mathematical FACT, and entanglement has been experimentally
demonstrated - the materialists just scratch their heads].
[/B]
Oh dear an error. You cannot transfer information, only entropy -
as in pure randomness. Another way to state it is: all noise, no signal.
It's really not a mystery, just conservation of momentum, I think. :)

[Peskanov]

UCE,

-----
quote:
Of course I'm not going to find a materialist who believes this. If they did, then they'd have to admit materialism is false. Turkeys don't vote for Christmas. The hypothesis that the subjective is a subset of the objective is forced upon materialists by their belief system, just as 7-day creationism is forced upon biblical literalists. In neither case am I interested in their beliefs. I am interested in logic and facts.
----

The only real fact is your own existence, and you know it. For the rest, you must work with whatever your senses bring. And materialism is both logic and evident, as far as I can see.

----
quote:
I see no logical reason why a brain should have an associated mind. All I see is arm-waving and unsubstantiated assertions.
----

You see no logical reason? Let's look one of many possible.
You directly perceive an internal discurse, and also memories. You can recall how you got a big part of your language you use in your thinking, but you don't know the residence of all this information or its nature. You also ignore it's limitations (how many words can I remenber?).
Study of the brain provides explanations for all those parts of your mind; what you perceive and what you not. Are you denying memory is part of your mind?
And the relation goes in the other way too: what is the function of the brain? Is the brain providing a memory mechanism just remenber how to move the muscles to scratch your nose? What is that big area of the brain which shows activity when you use language in your mind?
Is this arm-waving? You are rejecting what your senses told of the brain and the whole evolution behind it labelling them as sophisticated illusions! Im my view, this is unsubstantiated assertions unless you provide evidence.

-----
quote:
YES, if is a FACT. An absolute, undeniable, logically inevitable FACT. There is no objective means of determining whether a physical entity has a subjective internal state. It is logically impossible. If it was not logically impossible then it would be possible to logically eliminate solipsism. It is not logically possible to eliminate solipsism.
----

I said nothing about solipsism, not even imply it. As I said before, I know the only possible fact that can be determined is my own existence. For the assumtions we made, probability is the our best resource.
I am defending materialism. Can be a subjective internal state be detected in materialism? Yes, under materialist definitions. To disprove materialism you have to show these definitons are wrong, which you didn't.

----
quote:
I am not ignoring it. It is irrelevant to this specific question. Please explain how you think neuroscience can eliminate solipsism.
----

It does not; and all this has nothing to do with declaring materialism false.

----
quote:
The proof is here : How can you ever prove anything exists at all except for the contents of your own mind?
-----

What? Not proving materialism is not equal to disproving it. What kind of proof is this?
It's like saying "I can't prove tomorrow will rain. So, tomorrow will not rain"

----
quote:
As soon as you accept that you cannot eliminate the possibility that anything exists except the content of your own mind you must also accept that you cannot prove that the entities you percieve as other human beings have an internal state. If you want me to elaborate further I can do so, but you are an intelligent person and I think you know this is true anyway.
----

You keep forgetting that is YOU who is disproving materialism. I am not trying to prove it, I perfectly know it's not possible to prove anything outside my existence and logics.
I am debatting here to show that the materialist definitions addressing the mind are good, coherent, and that they can not be used for materialism refutal.

----
quote:
How does one detect consciousness in another physical entity?
----

Under materialism definitions?
1st step. Look for a brain. The external signs that we associate with our internal mind are only found in animals having an advanced brain.
2nd step. Finding consciousness; Instead of explaining it for myself (it's long), Google for the next words and make your own idea: consciousness 40 hz

----
quote:
How can you tell the difference between an extremely intelligent machine mimicking consciousness and an extremely intelligent machine which is actually conscious?
----

The question does not make sense in materialism. Materialism is telling you the contrary history. BTW, in materialism is assumed life & mechanism are not exclusive.

----
quote:
If you cannot, and you cannot , then the debate has nowhere to go. P-Zombies are not logically impossible. Once you accept that they are logically possible, then materialism cannot be convincingly defended.
----

I can not and I have not to. It has been told many times. In materialism P-Zombies are logically impossible.
Current materialist hypothesis about mind says consciousness is part of it; your behaviour depends on it as well as in the other functions of the mind. You can not replicate this mechanism without all his parts.

Peskanov


How can you tell the difference between an extremely intelligent machine mimicking consciousness and an extremely intelligent machine which is actually conscious?
----

The question does not make sense in materialism.


Then I rest my case. I rest my case because this question does make sense, and is extremely important. You are correct - materialism cannot even get to grips with the question, let alone have any hope of providing an answer.

edited :

This has been the problem all along. Every time that someone says "P-zombies are indistinguishable from humans" it is because "distinguishable" mean "objectively/scientifically distinguishable" and this in turn depends on materialism. My whole complaint about materialism is that it cannot touch subjective consicousness - it cannot define it, cannot observe it, cannot comprehend it - it might as well not exist. So it is a bit backwards for the materialists to then say "because our metaphysical system cannot comprehend subjective consciousness we will define entities which are conscious (1st person) and entities which are not conscious as "the same thing". I find it qute astonishing that the supposedly intelligent people here continue to peddle this line of 'reasoning'. It is roughly equivalent to a biblical literalist responding to big bang theory with "According to Biblical literalism there was no history of the Earth prior to 12,000 years ago, therefore there is no difference between biblical history and cosmological history. We can't make sense of your question."


What is it like to be a bat? (http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/Nagel_Bat.html)


Apart from its own interest, a phenomenology that is in this sense objective may permit questions about the physically basis of experience to assume a more intelligible form. Aspects of subjective experience that admitted this kind of objective description might be better candidates for objective explanations of a more familiar sort. But whether or not this guess is correct, it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it.


The materialist side-step is alive and well and living at JREF.

:)

[metacristi]

AmateurScientist

Enough said about p-zombies. It is a cheat, plain and simple. I don't care how esteemed David Chalmers is among his groupies. He's wrong and not nearly as clever as he and his followers like to think he is.


You are harsh with Chalmers,in fact he is not a supporter of functional P-zombies.Here is an excerpt from his page dedicated to Zombies:


The first is that of a functional zombie, a non-conscious system physically different from but functionally isomorphic to a normal human. For example, a system with silicon chips instead of neurons. (This idea also goes by the more prosaic name of "absent qualia".) Some use the logical possibility of such a functional zombie to argue against reductive functionalist theories of consciousness (which hold that consciousness = functioning). Some go further and argue that functional zombies might even exist in the actual world, suggesting that any form of functionalism or artificial intelligence is doomed. Others (like me) deny that functional zombies could actually exist, so that AI is not threatened.

The other related idea is that of the zombie within, which has recently gotten some play in psychology and neuroscience. It turns out that quite a lot of human activity can be accomplished unconsciously -- e.g. unconscious perception, memory, and learning. And some (notably Milner and Goodale) have argued that there are major neural pathways devoted to unconscious processing of visual inputs that leads directly to motor action. This has led some to suggest that each of us contains a "zombie within" that unconsciously produces many of our motor responses, without our realizing it.

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/zombies.html


Prcactically he agrees that a human having all the neurons changed with a special type of silicon chips [mechanical relays] should have the same personality,qualia and self awareness included.Functional P-zombies are less probable in his view.

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by metacristi
AmateurScientist




You are harsh with Chalmers,in fact he is not a supporter of functional P-zombies.Here is an excerpt from his page dedicated to Zombies:



I understand that Chalmers is perhaps the most vocal modern proponent of the idea that p-zombies play a large role in dealing what he considers a fatal blow to materialism. Chalmers postulates hypothetical p-zombies, not real zombies, as a means of suggesting that dualism is an inevitable result of their conceivability.

It's wrong.

What I find so astonishing is that Chalmers has been so widely embraced for just this message. He is quite the darling of many young philosophers. His message is apparently quite seductive. It is wrong, nontheless.

AS

AS :

Just out of interest.....

I know you believe that Chalmers is wrong. But what would be the implications and consequences, as you see them, if he was correct?

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
AS :

Just out of interest.....

I know you believe that Chalmers is wrong. But what would be the implications and consequences, as you see them, if he was correct?

What if ducks are really secret agents from another planet? What are the implications?

I needn't trouble with them, because they aren't.

I cannot reach any conclusions from supposing Chalmers' p-zombie argument is correct, because it is inherently flawed. As Yahzi correctly states, p-zombies are incoherent (I apologize if I have stated the notion of them is "illogical." Incoherent is the correct term). What conclusions can any reasonable person draw from an incoherent concept, true or not? None, as far as I can tell.

Now, if you were to ask me, what if dualism is true, what would the implications be, then my answer would be different. Nevertheless, I see little difference in this question and one along the lines of, "What if the earth had no sun or comparable star to revolve around?"

Well, the world would be very different from how it is, wouldn't it?

What relevance does this have to whether materialism implies p-zombies?

AS

[metacristi]

AmateurScientist

I understand that Chalmers is perhaps the most vocal modern proponent of the idea that p-zombies play a large role in dealing what he considers a fatal blow to materialism. Chalmers postulates hypothetical p-zombies, not real zombies, as a means of suggesting that dualism is an inevitable result of their conceivability.

It's wrong.

What I find so astonishing is that Chalmers has been so widely embraced for just this message. He is quite the darling of many young philosophers. His message is apparently quite seductive. It is wrong, nontheless.


As far as I know Chalmers is not a dualist,the technical term used to label his view is pan-protopsychism.All he claim [as a personal,philosophical,preference not as a certitude] is that materialism as we understand it today is not enough to explain consciousness but the actual data gathered by neuroscience is a valuable part to understand it.
Here is an excerpt from an interview given by Chalmers [I downloaded it once from the net but I do not remember from where]:

You argue in your work that neuroscience will not be able to give a complete theory of consciousness. Do you think that current scientific work on consciousness is misguided?

Chalmers: Sometimes the sort of non-materialist view I put forward is seen as anti-scientific, but I don't see it that way at all. I argue that neuroscience alone isn't enough to explain consciousness, but I think it will be a major part of an eventual theory. We just need to add something else, some new fundamental principles, to bridge the gap between neuroscience and subjective experience. Actually, I think my view is compatible with much of the work going on now in neuroscience and psychology, where people are studying the relationship of consciousness to neural and cognitive processes without really trying to reduce it to those processes. We are just getting much more detailed knowledge of the associations and correlations between them. Things are still in early stages, but one can imagine that as we build up and systematize our theories of these associations, and try to boil them down to their core, the result might point us toward the sort of fundamental principles I advocate. Of course that's a long way off yet.

Compelling,I think.

[Win]

AS:

I understand that Chalmers is perhaps the most vocal modern proponent of the idea that p-zombies play a large role in dealing what he considers a fatal blow to materialism. Chalmers postulates hypothetical p-zombies, not real zombies, as a means of suggesting that dualism is an inevitable result of their conceivability.

Your understanding is imperfect. The conceivability of p-zombies is just one arrow in the property dualist quiver. Take that argument away, and the non-supervenience of consciousness on the physical is still demonstrable.

And it is not the case that Chalmers ever suggests that property dualism is an "inevitable result" of the conceivability of p-zombies. The only result of the conceivability of p-zombies is the falsity of materialism.

It's wrong.

Your straw man is. But I've yet to read anything from you that might suggest either that p-zombies are not conceivable, or that their conceivability doesn't necessarily entail the falsity of materialism, beyond bare assertion.

What I find so astonishing is that Chalmers has been so widely embraced for just this message. He is quite the darling of many young philosophers. His message is apparently quite seductive. It is wrong, nontheless.

What I find astonshing, frankly, is that you have such a strong opinion regarding Chalmers when you pretty clearly haven't read much of his work, or if you have, haven't understood it too well. Otherwise, why would you be misrepresenting his position so completely?

Although I guess it could be just for polemic's sake.

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by Yahzi
Neo

Are you talking about temperature as in the phenomenological quality?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


I am presenting temperature as an allegory for phenomenology.

Temperature is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like temperature: they are neither hot nor cold. However, they possess Brownian motion, and this energy, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call temperature.

Conciousness is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like phenomoneology: they neither feel nor think. However, they possess organization, and this organization, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call conciousness.

Your phenomenology is exactly like temperature: it is a handy way of describing what a statistically significant collection of atoms do. That is all it is: and the phenomena of phenomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.



If we're talking about the qualitative experience associated with temperature, a feeling of warmth, coldness or whatever, then this is simply a specific instance of the more general case of the "hard problem" of consciousness (as Chalmers terms it). Obviously the qualitative experience of a given temperature is just as mysterious or non-mysterious as any other aspect of experiential consciousness.

But perhaps you have in mind the scientific definition of temperature? That is to say a particular measurement, such as provided by a thermometer, representing the degree of hotness. But I don't think this helps you either because I don't think such measurements are a logical consequence of the brownian motion of molecules. It would simply be a necessary consequence due to the existing physical laws of nature. It would seem that it is at least logically possible that there could exist a Universe where ostensibly temperature, both as measured and experienced, were exactly as in this world, but where temperature was not identical or brought about by the brownian motion of molecules. Do you not think?

Actually your analogy did get me thinking though. I might do some reading up on this so as to gain a better understanding of the fundamental issues. Anyway, just did a quick search on google and found this web page http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html

quote
"Such analogies are (famously) inapplicable to the M/BP (Nagel 1974, 1986): There is no problem about seeing two sets of empirical observations as "aspects" of the same thing, given a causal model that unifies them. But there is no such causal model in the case of the M/BP. For, unlike all other empirical observations, such as lightning/electricity (or water/H2O, heat/molecular-motion, life/biogenetic-function, matter/energy, etc.), in the special case of M/B, the correlated phenomena are not of the same KIND. And that's precisely what makes this particular set of "correlations" different, and problematic. So the forecast that M/B will simply turn out to be yet another set of correlations like the rest is unpromising".
unquote

I've only skimmed through the page but seems pertinent to our debate. Now to do some reading! :) That is if I can discover the meaning of words such as supererogatory! :mad:

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Dark Cobra :

With the greatest respect, you do not appear to understand the argument, judging from your response. The reason the p-zombie is 'indistinguishable' is because there is no practical means of making the distinction. There is no way to objectify the subjective.

UCE,

I think I have spotted part of the problem in communicating or debating about p-zombies.

You mention that there is no practical means of distinguishing between a human and p-zombie. In a sense, this correct. We cannot peer into one's skull and determine what one is experiencing, or indeed whether one is experiencing anything at all.

I don't think you can mix and match hypothetical concepts like p-zombies with practical means.

If p-zombies are hypothetical, then does it make any sense to speak of there being no practical means to establish whether or not they have subjective experience? If we can conceive of p-zombies, then why shouldn't we be allowed to conceive of a hypothetical test for subjective experience?

Not allowed, you say. That is why p-zombies, even the merely hypothetical ones, are incoherent. They are no less incoherent than a conceivable (hypothetical) test for identifying or measuring subjective experience. Does such a test seem coherent to you?

It shouldn't. "Subjective" by definition means it cannot be detected objectively, yet I have conceived of a test for detecting it. This is the realm of conceivability, after all.

AS

[Lord Kenneth]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Dark Cobra :

With the greatest respect, you do not appear to understand the argument, judging from your response. The reason the p-zombie is 'indistinguishable' is because there is no practical means of making the distinction. There is no way to objectify the subjective. YOU CANNOT THEN SAY THAT THE SUBJECTIVE DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS YOU YOURSELF LACK A SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT. YOU can tell that YOU are not a zombie because YOU are conscious. You can 'assume' that anything which is externally indistinguishable from a human is internally indistinguishable for a human, and it might even be a reasonable assumption, BUT IT REMAINS AN ASSUMPTION!

***You cannot base a claim of 'impossibility', logical or otherwise, ON AN ASSUMPTION, however reasonable.***

This is not complicated. Why are you having such difficulty accepting it?

You are currently providing the best example I have seen since PixyMisa of a person who appears completeley incapable of following a logical argument when their belief system is challenged.

NB : try responding to the logical argument I have posted instead of attempting to redefine the problem in order to avoid the logic.


Ok, Einstein (note the sarcasm), let's look up "indistinguishable".

in·dis·tin·guish·a·ble

adj. Not distinguishable, especially:Impossible to differentiate or tell apart: indistinguishable twins; markings that make a moth indistinguishable from its background.
Impossible to discern; imperceptible: a sound that was indistinguishable to the human ear.

Difficult to understand or make out; vague: indistinguishable speech._(nd-stnggw-sh-bl)

If a person is a p-zombie, then his brain is abnormal, and he therefore differs from a normal human.

But how do I know this? Thoughts, feelings, etc, are the RESULT OF chemicals and brain processes! Take scientific study of love, as in a recent Discover magazine, scientists can induce and observe the direct results of feeling of attachment. That is one example.

When chemicals, such as oxytocin (an example from Discover magazine, are at similar levels in each person who reports the same emotion, and when playing around with said chemical you are able to play around with the bonds they form...



You always take on each argument and ignore previous arguments. Perhaps I should dig up Stimpson J. Cat's argument that is relevant to this...

Also, you ignored my questions. Gee, I wondered why...

:rolleyes:

..oh yeah... and talk about BASELESS ASSUMPTIONS...

There is no way to objectify the subjective. YOU CANNOT THEN SAY THAT THE SUBJECTIVE DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS YOU YOURSELF LACK A SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT.

[Lord Kenneth]

How about this...

Are what we see on computer screens the result of the computer's processes?

Can computer processes be observed, in action?

Do computers have a subjective viewpoint?

Are computer processes objective?

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by Win
AS:



Your understanding is imperfect. The conceivability of p-zombies is just one arrow in the property dualist quiver. Take that argument away, and the non-supervenience of consciousness on the physical is still demonstrable.



Well, honestly, most of my understanding, as it were, came from reading your many posts about his arguments. I have read some snippets of his material on the web, and I have been to his website several times. If my understanding is imperfect, which of course it is, you are partly to blame, Professor.

:D


And it is not the case that Chalmers ever suggests that property dualism is an "inevitable result" of the conceivability of p-zombies. The only result of the conceivability of p-zombies is the falsity of materialism.



My mistake. It was a false dichotomy, as there exist other possibilities for worldviews, such as idealism.

I never said anything about whether it implied property dualism.



Your straw man is. But I've yet to read anything from you that might suggest either that p-zombies are not conceivable, or that their conceivability doesn't necessarily entail the falsity of materialism, beyond bare assertion.


Snippy tone noted. I have yet to read anything by you that could get around the fact that p-zombies are an incoherent concept and thus their alleged "conceivability" implies nothing.


What I find astonshing, frankly, is that you have such a strong opinion regarding Chalmers when you pretty clearly haven't read much of his work, or if you have, haven't understood it too well. Otherwise, why would you be misrepresenting his position so completely?


Win, you sound quite defensive here. I haven't read his work. I am presently reading Dan Dennett's Consciousness Explained,, and I find his arguments and his presentation of them quite compelling.

I am not attempting to misrepresent Chalmers' work. I qualified my statement that it was my understanding of his p-zombie argument. I made not other representations about his work as a whole, or even about his beliefs. I said he is wrong about p-zombies. Don't generalize that comment to include any supposed remark or belief about his work as a whole. I make no representations or claims that I am familiar at all with the rest of his work or beliefs.

Does that mean I can't comment on his p-zombie argument as I've seen or heard it presented? If so, then I can scarcely comment upon or hold opinions about much of anything or anyone. I have hardly read all the works of Scott Fitzgerald, yet I feel quite entitled to hold an opinion about The Great Gatsby, as I have indeed read and studied it.


Although I guess it could be just for polemic's sake.

Second snide remark noted. Why is this necessary, oh champion of civility?

AS

[Win]

A general note on what it means for a p-zombie to be "indistinguishable" from a person.

I am incapable of distinguishing whether any given individual I might meet is a p-zombie or a person. On the other hand, I know I'm not a p-zombie. Therefore a p-zombie and a person are not indistinguishable in principle, because I can tell the difference as regards myself. And so can you.

AS:

Well, honestly, most of my understanding, as it were, came from reading your many posts about his arguments. I have read some snippets of his material on the web, and I have been to his website several times. If my understanding is imperfect, which of course it is, you are partly to blame, Professor.

I will try my best to bring greater clarity to my expositions of Chalmers's work in future. ;)

Second snide remark noted. Why is this necessary, oh champion of civility?

You're right, of course. I apologize. I'll try to do better in the future. :o

I never said anything about whether it implied property dualism.

Except for this:

Chalmers postulates hypothetical p-zombies, not real zombies, as a means of suggesting that dualism is an inevitable result of their conceivability.

I have yet to read anything by you that could get around the fact that p-zombies are an incoherent concept and thus their alleged "conceivability" implies nothing.

In what way is the concept "incoherent?" What could you mean by that? Or is the burden on me to demonstrate the "coherence" of the concept?

I am presently reading Dan Dennett's Consciousness Explained,, and I find his arguments and his presentation of them quite compelling.

Eek.

I am not attempting to misrepresent Chalmers' work. I qualified my statement that it was my understanding of his p-zombie argument. I made not other representations about his work as a whole, or even about his beliefs. I said he is wrong about p-zombies. Don't generalize that comment to include any supposed remark or belief about his work as a whole. I make no representations or claims that I am familiar at all with the rest of his work or beliefs.

And I retract any representations I may have made, other than that you have misrepresented Chalmers's position with regard to p-zombies.

Does that mean I can't comment on his p-zombie argument as I've seen or heard it presented? If so, then I can scarcely comment upon or hold opinions about much of anything or anyone. I have hardly read all the works of Scott Fitzgerald, yet I feel quite entitled to hold an opinion about The Great Gatsby, as I have indeed read and studied it.

Fair enough. By way of analogy, you don't understand The Great Gatsby. ;)

Note to all :

I am suffering from intense boredom of ontology. I will not convince the believers that materialism is false. I rather suspect that impartial on-lookers will have come to their own conclusions by now. I pass the baton to Win and Neo.

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by UnrepentantSinner


Ugh, it must be the Brit in you...

Look, it's simple.

Phylogeny is based on the principle that:

If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B.

Claudistics is based on the principle that:

If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B.



You would think so wouldn't you? But this is what is so strange about about experiential consciousness in that it does not appear to be detectable by any means whatsoever! If we could be certain of your statement then solipsism wouldn't be a live issue. But this seems a strange stance to adopt given that I know I have awareness and yet it is conceivable, and therefore arguably logically possible, that other people amount to no more than what one can gleam from public accessible objective facts.

In short then I think the statement "If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B" begs the question. After all, what you are really saying here is that "If A, by virtue of publically accessible objective facts, is indistinguishable from B then A=B. But of course one might be able to argue that B is distinguished from A by other than publically accessible objective facts.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by billydkid


It has precisely the opposite effect on me. Don't you find it fantastically amazing that the universe can organize itself into such incredible creatures as ourselves? Honestly, I can not imagine why anyone would feel diminished by this. It doesn't make us any less exotic or amazing. In fact, it makes us more so. This is the miraculous aspect of the universe and nature - that it can and does "create" out of its own accord "beings" and beings such as us. That is can create consciousness of itself.

Yes, it is amazing that a system of organised atoms is capable of creating consciousness. However, it is even more amazing that consciousness can exercise introspection.

I like Yahzi's reasoning, I am not making any objection. I was rather referring to the discussion that philosophers and common men have had about consciousness for hundreds of years. What for?, just to end with an answer like Yahzi's?.

Of course, most of them won't accept such answer, so the discussion will continue.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Note to all :
I am suffering from intense boredom of ontology. I will not convince the believers that materialism is false. I rather suspect that impartial on-lookers will have come to their own conclusions by now. I pass the baton to Win and Neo.

Oh, you were trying to convince somebody? :eek:

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by billydkid


It has precisely the opposite effect on me. Don't you find it fantastically amazing that the universe can organize itself into such incredible creatures as ourselves? Honestly, I can not imagine why anyone would feel diminished by this.

You truly can't imagine? :confused: :confused: :(

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by billydkid
Originally posted by Yahzi


I am presenting temperature as an allegory for phenomenology.

Temperature is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like temperature: they are neither hot nor cold. However, they possess Brownian motion, and this energy, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call temperature.

Conciousness is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like phenomoneology: they neither feel nor think. However, they possess organization, and this organization, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call conciousness.

Your phenomenology is exactly like temperature: it is a handy way of describing what a statistically significant collection of atoms do. That is all it is: and the phenomena of phenomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Simple, elegant, meaningful, logical. Couldn't ask for more.



Hmmm . . .take a look at my response to Yahzi and have a look at this web page http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Note to all :

I am suffering from intense boredom of ontology. I will not convince the believers that materialism is false. I rather suspect that impartial on-lookers will have come to their own conclusions by now. I pass the baton to Win and Neo.

Not to knock you, Geoff, as I intend no genuine disrespect by this, but does anyone else see the irony and humor in UCE's leaving this thread because others are too persistent for him?

(To relative newcomers, I'm referring to his former incarnation's unfortunate habit of dogging every materialist within reach, relentlessly pounding the same points and arguments. Many left out of frustration, or as UCE puts it, "boredom of ontology.")

This is rich.

AS

Originally posted by AmateurScientist

Not to knock you, Geoff, as I intend no genuine disrespect by this, but does anyone else see the irony and humor in UCE's leaving this thread because others are too persistent for him?


No, I am genuinely bored. The argument against materialism is so blatant that demonstrating it involved endless repetition. The materialists just 'refuse' to see it. I am sure that anyone with no beliefs to defend will already have understood it. There is no point in me repeating it any more. I could spend the rest of my life typing in the same things over and over again. I have better things to do.

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by AmateurScientist
It's more than a feeling (with apologies to Boston). It is true because of how we define objects or beings. If an object has all the characteristics of A, and behaves exactly like A, and is indistinguishable from A, then it is A.

See my reply to another poster regarding this assertion (posted earlier today).



The materialist paradigm insists that a p-zombie that has a fully functioning brain identical to a human's will by definition experience the same things a human will. Thus, the p-zombie will be a human.


Remember, the p-zombie argument is supposed to be a proof of the falsity of materialism. It isn't.


It would be if they are logically possible.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You're appealing to our feelings here in order to convince us that we are all material creatures living in a material world. But most non-materilists would emphatically agree with you in your sentiments.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I'm not trying to appeal to anyone's feelings. I'm trying to use rational arguments and critiques of others' arguments.



I'm afraid I'm compelled to agree with Win that you have said nothing beyond bare assertion.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The problem for the materialist is that given his belief that the physical world is closed, that is to say given that everything that happens is due to prior physical causes, then we must say that a talking and walking duck does so entirely as a result of physical causes. More generally the entirety of human behavior is due to physical causes. Thus a p-zombie which is physically identical to a human being would act exactly the same as a human being. The only way to get around this would be to assert that p-zombies are logically impossible. This is equivalent to maintaining that physical processes within the brain logically necessitate the qualitative feel of consciousness. But obviously you need to provide reasons for supposing this to be so.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



You keep trying to shift the burden of proof onto my shoulders.



Are you denying that you need to provide some justification for the idea that consciousness is logically necessitated by physical processes?



I believe the idealists or dualists of any stripe bear the burden of proving why we shouldn't adopt a materialist paradigm.


I find that most unreasonable. Normally when someone asserts something to be true they are required to give at least some justification for their position.


We are confident materialism is true because there is no credible, reliable evidence to suggest otherwise. Subjective impressions of a metamind are just that.


It really isn't a question of evidence though is it? The question is being able to dream up the best interpretation of the ultimate nature of reality. Any "evidence" will already be implicit in the particular intepretation we choose to subscribe to. The pertinent question is looking at the competing merits and problems of each intepretation. It seems to be that the materialists claim that consciousness is logically necessitated is a fatal one.



Research in neuroscience suggests that consciousness is a mere byproduct of the brain's inner workings.



Which research is this?



Plenty of empirical data suggest that our conscious awareness of a volitional bodily movement, for instance, arises approximately .5 to .8 second after the neuronal activity corresponding with the decision to engage that part of the body in movement occurs. What does that fact suggest to you?



Well I'm afraid I don't believe it :)




It is incorrect to suggest that this implies interactive dualism. That merely begs the question of how matter might interact with "mind." That is terribly messy and non-parsimonious. Once again, no one has ever found any evidence of any interactive mechanism or other kind of "mind stuff."



What attempts have been made to find "mind stuff"?




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Moreover, if we are to take your feelings seriously, shouldn't we also take peoples feelings that love, hope, despair etc are not numerically identical to a series of neurons firing? In which case the feelings you have expressed ought to compel us not to adopt materialism, but rather interactive dualism or idealism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Once again, it's not my "feelings" that suggest p-zombies cannot exist. It's the way they are defined.

Plenty of scientific research suggests that indeed emotions are the result of chemical and hormonal reactions to stimuli



Wouldn't emotions sometimes be partially a result of something happening in your personnel life?

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by Win
A general note on what it means for a p-zombie to be "indistinguishable" from a person.

I am incapable of distinguishing whether any given individual I might meet is a p-zombie or a person. On the other hand, I know I'm not a p-zombie. Therefore a p-zombie and a person are not indistinguishable in principle, because I can tell the difference as regards myself. And so can you.



Win,

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I seem to recall that you or someone else has said that a p-zombie would be a p-zombie but wouldn't know it. If so, then how do you know you're not a p-zombie?

I suspect your response, if my premise is correct, is that because you see the visual field right there in front of you. Well, that gives you first-person justification for believing it. Everyone else could simply be lying about having first person subjective feel. Right? Couldn't you be the only human on a planet of p-zombies? Yep, in principle. Yet, you don't operate on this principle, I presume. Why not? Is it because p-zombies are silly? Is it because you are a pragmatist deep down, as am I?

Are there really any practicing dualists?




I will try my best to bring greater clarity to my expositions of Chalmers's work in future. ;)



Yes, you wouldn't want a bunch of fuzzy thinking students misquoting you, would you?


In what way is the concept "incoherent?" What could you mean by that? Or is the burden on me to demonstrate the "coherence" of the concept?


Well, as I understand it, p-zombies are used to demonstrate the falsity of materialism. If so, then we have to suppose at the beginning that materialism is true. Therefore, we are working from a materialistic framework.

Within a materialistic framework, p-zombies are incoherent by their very definition. As I understand it, a p-zombie is exactly like a human in every physical way, down to the last detail within his brain, and he walks and talks exactly like a human, except for one crucial distinction: a p-zombie lacks the first-person subjective experience, or "feel" that every human presumably has.

Within a materialistic framework, consciousness must be a necessary consequence of the physical brain processes and its structure. Yes, of course this is a bare assertion without definition proof. It is implied by the very notion of materialism.

Remember, we have assumed materialism to be true in our p-zombie proof. If consciousness, meaning the first-person subjective "feel," is a necessary consequence of the fully functioning human brain, then the p-zombie is also conscious. He cannot lack that which is a necessary consequence of having a fully functioning brain simply because we declare that he lacks it. That is the bit of incoherence inherent in the definition of p-zombie. He cannot lack what he must have.

Is that a bootstrap argument for materialism? Sure it is. What it is not, however, is a demonstrable proof that materialism is false, as I understand it is asserted to be.

*********

Now, switch to a dualist framework, be it property or interactive dualism. Now, p-zombies can be defined and still be coherent. If consciousness resides elsewhere from the purely physical, material brain--either in "mind" stuff, that special property of mind matter, or in a mental realm which is somehow connected with the material realm through a mysterious interaction process--then p-zombies can be exactly like humans, only without the mind stuff or connection to the mental realm. Now, p-zombies make perfect sense.

There is nothing wrong with p-zombies, given a dualist paradigm. In order for p-zombies to be coherent, however, one has to dispense with a materialist worldview. Because of that fact, p-zombies can never have anything to say about materialism itself.

********

If you assert that p-zombies and their "conceivability" somehow disprove materialism, then indeed the burden falls on your shoulders to demonstrate why. Of course, you have done that to your satisfaction many, many times. I believe each time has relied upon assuming a dualistic framework in advance, however.




Eek.


I thought you might get a kick out of my reading Dennett. I truly am reading it.


And I retract any representations I may have made, other than that you have misrepresented Chalmers's position with regard to p-zombies.


Thanks.


Fair enough. By way of analogy, you don't understand The Great Gatsby. ;)

Don't I?

:D

AS

[AmateurScientist]

Neo,

Thanks for responding. I'll have to find my neurological research sources and get back to you later.

AS

[phobos]

Originally posted by AmateurScientist

Within a materialistic framework, p-zombies are incoherent by their very definition. As I understand it, a p-zombie is exactly like a human in every physical way, down to the last detail within his brain, and he walks and talks exactly like a human, except for one crucial distinction: a p-zombie lacks the first-person subjective experience, or "feel" that every human presumably has.

(snip)

Remember, we have assumed materialism to be true in our p-zombie proof. If consciousness, meaning the first-person subjective "feel," is a necessary consequence of the fully functioning human brain, then the p-zombie is also conscious. He cannot lack that which is a necessary consequence of having a fully functioning brain simply because we declare that he lacks it. That is the bit of incoherence inherent in the definition of p-zombie. He cannot lack what he must have.


Right. From a materialist point of view, zombies are certainly conceivable, they just don't exist. They're far from unique in this. It's conceivable that God exists. It's conceivable that magic works. It's conceivable that people have been to Mars. It just doesn't happen to be the case.

Is it conceivable that a man might have the power to teleport himself from New York to Tokyo instantly? Sure. Does that mean we have to revise physics? No - because nobody has shown that such a man actually exists.

I mean, this IS James Randi's forum, right? How many people have we heard of who claim to have kooky super powers? I believe there's a million dollars on offer for them. Are these powers conceivable? Sure. Do they exist? Do they heck.

Imagine if you will a zombike. It's exactly like an ordinary bicycle in every physical regard, right down to the last atom, except that when you turn the pedals the wheels don't move. Holy Moses! Does this mean that the ability of a bicycle to move is some mysterious non-material entity? Does this destroy materialism? Well, it would do, if you could produce such a bicycle...

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by phobos


Right. From a materialist point of view, zombies are certainly conceivable, they just don't exist. They're far from unique in this. It's conceivable that God exists. It's conceivable that magic works. It's conceivable that people have been to Mars. It just doesn't happen to be the case.

Is it conceivable that a man might have the power to teleport himself from New York to Tokyo instantly? Sure. Does that mean we have to revise physics? No - because nobody has shown that such a man actually exists.

I mean, this IS James Randi's forum, right? How many people have we heard of who claim to have kooky super powers? I believe there's a million dollars on offer for them. Are these powers conceivable? Sure. Do they exist? Do they heck.

Imagine if you will a zombike. It's exactly like an ordinary bicycle in every physical regard, right down to the last atom, except that when you turn the pedals the wheels don't move. Holy Moses! Does this mean that the ability of a bicycle to move is some mysterious non-material entity? Does this destroy materialism? Well, it would do, if you could produce such a bicycle...

Thanks for responding phobos, but I think you misunderstand the point of my post. Win asked me to demonstrate why I believe the p-zombie argument put forth by some dualists supposedly to prove materialism has to be false is incoherent. That is, Win knows I don't believe in p-zombies, that their conceivability is a viable argument against materialism, or their conceptually they are even coherent. He wants me to explain why I believe that.

You selectively quoted my post and by doing so misrepresent my meaning. I know very well p-zombies don't exist. I also think even conceiving of them the way dualist philosophers often define them is an incoherent concept--that is, their definition doesn't make sense and is internally inconsistent, as long as you accept a materialist worldview, as I do.

AS

[Win]

AS:

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I seem to recall that you or someone else has said that a p-zombie would be a p-zombie but wouldn't know it. If so, then how do you know you're not a p-zombie?

Well, someone else might have said it, but not me.

What I've said is that if I were a p-zombie I would behave exactly as if I weren't. In fact, I would believe that I wasn't a p-zombie. In my case, this is a true belief. In zombie Win's case, it's a false belief.

The existence of my phenomenal consciousness, to which I have direct access, renders my belief true. Of course, zombie Win would type that, too. But he'd be mistaken.

I suspect your response, if my premise is correct, is that because you see the visual field right there in front of you. Well, that gives you first-person justification for believing it. Everyone else could simply be lying about having first person subjective feel. Right? Couldn't you be the only human on a planet of p-zombies? Yep, in principle. Yet, you don't operate on this principle, I presume. Why not? Is it because p-zombies are silly? Is it because you are a pragmatist deep down, as am I?

First of all, I think you're equivocating between two sense of the word principle. That something may be so, in principle, doesn't render that state of affairs a principle to be followed.

That being said, knowing myself to have phenomenal consciousness, why should I conclude that no one else does, simply because it could be so, in principle? That conclusion isn't forced on me.

And again, p-zombies don't exist in the world. That a p-zombie is conceivable doesn't mean there are any. Their actual existence isn't a feature of the argument.

You seem to think that because it's "silly" to suppose that other people are really p-zombies, we can¡t draw any conclusions from their conceivability. That's just not so.

Are there really any practicing dualists?

Here, I think you're defining "practicing dualist" as someone who believes evryone else is a p-zombie.

I suppose there could be some of those around. I don't know any. Easier to be a solipsist.

There are practicing dualists, if you define that to be people who have a dualistic view on the question of phenomenal consciousness.

Yes, you wouldn't want a bunch of fuzzy thinking students misquoting you, would you?

Certainly not. ;)

Well, as I understand it, p-zombies are used to demonstrate the falsity of materialism. If so, then we have to suppose at the beginning that materialism is true. Therefore, we are working from a materialistic framework.

On the contrary, "assume the truth of materialism" appears nowhere in the conceivability argument that uses p-zombies.

Within a materialistic framework, p-zombies are incoherent by their very definition. As I understand it, a p-zombie is exactly like a human in every physical way, down to the last detail within his brain, and he walks and talks exactly like a human, except for one crucial distinction: a p-zombie lacks the first-person subjective experience, or "feel" that every human presumably has.

And if you have assumed the truth of materialism, an entity that is my physical duplicate must have all my properties, so must be conscious.

But only if you assume materialism is true.

Within a materialistic framework, consciousness must be a necessary consequence of the physical brain processes and its structure. Yes, of course this is a bare assertion without definition proof. It is implied by the very notion of materialism.

Not arguing with you here. Just pointing out that "assume materialism to be true" is an awfully convenient place from which to begin a defence of materialism.

Remember, we have assumed materialism to be true in our p-zombie proof.

No, we haven't. Nor have we assumed it to be false.

Is that a bootstrap argument for materialism? Sure it is. What it is not, however, is a demonstrable proof that materialism is false, as I understand it is asserted to be.

It's not a bootstrap argument. It's a question begging one.

Again, the argument from the conceivability of p-zombies that materialism is false doesn't begin by assuming materialism is true. I don't know where you got that idea.

Now, switch to a dualist framework, be it property or interactive dualism. Now, p-zombies can be defined and still be coherent. If consciousness resides elsewhere from the purely physical, material brain--either in "mind" stuff, that special property of mind matter, or in a mental realm which is somehow connected with the material realm through a mysterious interaction process--then p-zombies can be exactly like humans, only without the mind stuff or connection to the mental realm. Now, p-zombies make perfect sense.

Again, I think you misunderstand the way the argument from conceivabilty works. We don't start off by saying "assume materialism" or "assume dualism."

There is nothing wrong with p-zombies, given a dualist paradigm. In order for p-zombies to be coherent, however, one has to dispense with a materialist worldview. Because of that fact, p-zombies can never have anything to say about materialism itself.

Once again, I don't understand what you mean by "coherent."

If you assert that p-zombies and their "conceivability" somehow disprove materialism, then indeed the burden falls on your shoulders to demonstrate why. Of course, you have done that to your satisfaction many, many times. I believe each time has relied upon assuming a dualistic framework in advance, however.

No. I just haven't taken your "assume materialism to be true" stance. There is a difference between not assuming materialism to be true and assuming materialism to be false. You do see that, don't you?

I thought you might get a kick out of my reading Dennett. I truly am reading it.

Consciousness Explained is a good book. The only problem is that, taking consciousness to mean HPC, it isn't. All the other parts are fine.

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by Win
AS:

What I've said is that if I were a p-zombie I would behave exactly as if I weren't. In fact, I would believe that I wasn't a p-zombie. In my case, this is a true belief. In zombie Win's case, it's a false belief.

The existence of my phenomenal consciousness, to which I have direct access, renders my belief true. Of course, zombie Win would type that, too. But he'd be mistaken.



This is truly puzzling to me. If zombie Win would also believe he had phenomenal consciousness, then what makes you so confident that you're not a zombie?

Again, the visual field thing? If so, then why would zombie Win also type that? Why? Is he a liar or mistaken? How can he be mistaken if he has no visual field right there in front of him?


First of all, I think you're equivocating between two sense of the word principle. That something may be so, in principle, doesn't render that state of affairs a principle to be followed.



Yeah, I did do that, didn't I? Made for a nice segue, don't you think?


That being said, knowing myself to have phenomenal consciousness, why should I conclude that no one else does, simply because it could be so, in principle? That conclusion isn't forced on me.

And again, p-zombies don't exist in the world. That a p-zombie is conceivable doesn't mean there are any. Their actual existence isn't a feature of the argument.

You seem to think that because it's "silly" to suppose that other people are really p-zombies, we can¡t draw any conclusions from their conceivability. That's just not so.



I know that the actual existence of p-zombies isn't part of the argument. No, I don't think that it's silly just because they don't really exist, although, and I'm not telling you again, they don't really exist! LOL.

It's silly because it's incoherent. "Incoherent" means lacking internal consistency. The very definition of p-zombie seeks to have it both ways, under a materialist framework.

Look, you cannot use the conceivability of p-zombies to demonstrate the falsity of materialism unless you postulate a priori that materialism is false. Any thoughtful materialist can see that p-zombies cannot be exactly like humans physically, yet lack subjective feel, as materialism holds that subjective feel is a necessary consequence of having a fully functioning physical brain. Therefore, p-zombies can't be p-zombies--they're humans instead, given your definition of them.



Here, I think you're defining "practicing dualist" as someone who believes evryone else is a p-zombie.

I suppose there could be some of those around. I don't know any. Easier to be a solipsist.



I've often wondered about this. Exactly how would one go about being a practicing solipsist? Wouldn't you stay in bed all the time and not eat or get up? Why would you need to? Think about it.

I suppose a truly practicing dualist who believed in the conceivability that p-zombies could exist and there is no way he could ever be sure if anyone but himself were a p-zombie might venture to treat everyone else as if they were unconscious automatons. What difference would it make?

By "practicing" I mean someone who put his money where his mouth is.


On the contrary, "assume the truth of materialism" appears nowhere in the conceivability argument that uses p-zombies.



Then how can it possibly be used to demonstrate the supposed falsity of materialism?


And if you have assumed the truth of materialism, an entity that is my physical duplicate must have all my properties, so must be conscious.

But only if you assume materialism is true.


Of course. My point exactly. That is why I believe p-zombies are an incoherent concept.


Not arguing with you here. Just pointing out that "assume materialism to be true" is an awfully convenient place from which to begin a defence of materialism.


It's not just convenient. It's necessary if the conceivability of p-zombies has any bearing at all on whether materialism must be false.


No, we haven't. Nor have we assumed it to be false.


Again, then what relevance do they have to materialism?


No. I just haven't taken your "assume materialism to be true" stance. There is a difference between not assuming materialism to be true and assuming materialism to be false. You do see that, don't you?


Ah, but Grasshopper, I do see the difference.

What you fail to grasp is what I thought was implicit. I and many others assume materialism as a default state. Why? Given how we observe science to work in all other matters--save quantum mechanics--consciousness has to arise from somewhere. If there is no there from which it can arise, then it must arise from within the only place it could--the brain. Your property dualism is nothing but speculation from the default perspective. We have looked at brains under eletron microscopes, and all we have seen are neurons and other cells. We have seen no "mind stuff" contained within brains.

Oh, we can't see it because it isn't physical? But even you admit it has to interact with or somehow be a property of the physical. If so, as Stimpy points out, then it must interact with the brain. How? There is no evidence, and there can be no evidence suseptible to empirical study, of such funky interaction. Therefore, either it's all just brains, or we can never know.

As Dennett contends, the dualist's position is essentially a surrender. We give up; we can never know. Why don't we just make up some stuff to explain it or give up looking?

What kind of defeatist nonsense is that?

I'm among the many who isn't willing to capitulate and declare that science cannot tell us, even in principle, where mind comes from. Many of us are pretty darn sure there is no "there" there. When we look at the brain, we are looking at the mind, unless it's not functioning sufficiently. It is indeed the result of the structure and process going on within it. Pretty cool, huh?

Just because it's somewhat mysterious as to the how, is no reason to dismiss it as untrue or impossible.

Consider how a new life is created, whether it's a human life or a maple tree. Until recently, no one had a clue where life came from, except to declare that it was outside the province of science and within that of religion. God gives us the miraculous gift of life.

Right. Now we accept that it's DNA and cell division. There's nothing "miraculous" about it. The truth is far more wondrous, however, than simply "God put it there."

I regard "mind" in an analogous fashion. It's not some miraculous mystery. It's neurons firing in concert.

Sure, studying "mind" is unique in that we have to use "mind" itself to study it. It doesn't make the subject matter a special case, however. It just presents unique difficulties.

Dualists are willing to concede that "mind" is an entirely unique kind of matter or interaction, unlike any elsewhere in nature. Given that we ultimately came from the process of nuclear fusion within massive stars, just as all other matter known to exist in the universe, I find it hard to swallow that there is a unique kind of matter found only within human brains, and nowhere else.



Consciousness Explained is a good book. The only problem is that, taking consciousness to mean HPC, it isn't. All the other parts are fine.

Too bad it was written before Chalmers' writings. It would be nice to see a direct rebuttal of Chalmers' arguments in it.

AS

[billydkid]

Originally posted by The One called Neo


You truly can't imagine? :confused: :confused: :(

Well, yeah, I can't imagine. I can imagine why might think they should feel diminished, but that they actually do, no I can't imagine. It is as though they feel their existance itself is somehow delegitimized by not having its significance validated through some sort of external, other worldly endorsement or something. It strikes me as fundamentally liberating to realize that we are truly the captains of our own ships.

[Lord Kenneth]

Oh, look, UCE cowers away! Leaving my questions unanswered...

If you take a p-zombie to mean "a human that appears to be normal but doesn't have conciousness", nothing is proved. The point is moot. Materialism explains that for it to be a p-zombie, it would not have the same brain components/structure/whatever as a normal human.

A computer does operations based on its hardware. A computer can't, say, scan a picture without a scanner or something with a scanning ability. Human brains cannot intepret emotions or things our brains have no component or ability to handle.

Dualists assume you can't verify whether something has conciousness or not, because they assume that the "mind" is in another world-type thing.

[c4ts]

I was just thinking... wouldn't the existence of p-zombies render things like morality completely moot? Sure, they're screaming a lot and acting like they're in pain, but they don't feel anything because they're p-zombies and are incapable of percieving pain.

[Loki]

Win,

The existence of my phenomenal consciousness, to which I have direct access, renders my belief true.
If Win is a P-Zombie...

then you're convinced you have access to qualia,

and you can conceive of P-Zombies which don't have access to qualia,

and you know you're not one of them because you have this internal direct access that you can depend upon.

Except you're wrong.

So, tell me again exactly how you know you're not a P-Zombie??

[Lord Kenneth]

Originally posted by c4ts
I was just thinking... wouldn't the existence of p-zombies render things like morality completely moot? Sure, they're screaming a lot and acting like they're in pain, but they don't feel anything because they're p-zombies and are incapable of percieving pain.

In that case, killing such a p-zombie would be no different then killing a biological robot. Well, that's with all things, concious or not... but a biological robot without the same brain processes of a human that only emulates human responses.

[INRM]

Originally posted by Yahzi


Why should they be? What problems does it solve, other than a few linguistic condrums?

Idealism that is indistinguishable from materalism is pointless. Idealism that can be distinguished from materialism is false (as Randi's million demonstrates).

It is not that we defend our belief system; it is that we reject unnecessary beliefs. In this we are entitled to be dogmatic to the extreme, since what we are defending is the very basis of Reason itself.

All that intensity you feel is merely the sharp edge of Occam's Razor.

Um, Occam's Razor doesn't always work.

-INRM

[Lord Kenneth]

Originally posted by INRM


Um, Occam's Razor doesn't always work.

-INRM

No one denies that Occam's Razor can lead us to the wrong answer.

However, it leads us to what is most probably the correct answer with the information currently given.

[Win]

AS:

This is truly puzzling to me. If zombie Win would also believe he had phenomenal consciousness, then what makes you so confident that you're not a zombie?

My direct access to the fact of the existence of phenomenal consciousness.

It's silly because it's incoherent. "Incoherent" means lacking internal consistency. The very definition of p-zombie seeks to have it both ways, under a materialist framework.

Incoherent means lacking consitency with something else. If what you're trying to get at is that, were materialism to be true, p-zombies would be impossible, I agree.

But again, you're begging the question.

Look, you cannot use the conceivability of p-zombies to demonstrate the falsity of materialism unless you postulate a priori that materialism is false.

Not so. I guess you really are having a hard time with the difference between "assume matrialism is false" and "not assume materialism is true."

I suppose a truly practicing dualist who believed in the conceivability that p-zombies could exist and there is no way he could ever be sure if anyone but himself were a p-zombie might venture to treat everyone else as if they were unconscious automatons. What difference would it make?

Again, no dualist that I know of (and in particular me) believes that p-zombies are naturally possible, in that sense of "could exist." Dualists believe that everyone is conscious, AS. To suggest that dualism requires the belief that others "could" be p-zombies is just a straw man.

Then how can it possibly be used to demonstrate the supposed falsity of materialism?

If an argument that uses p-zombies doesn't begin by assuming materialism is true, how can it demonstrate the falsity of materialism? Are you really asking this?

The argument isn't a reductio.

Dualists are willing to concede that "mind" is an entirely unique kind of matter or interaction, unlike any elsewhere in nature. Given that we ultimately came from the process of nuclear fusion within massive stars, just as all other matter known to exist in the universe, I find it hard to swallow that there is a unique kind of matter found only within human brains, and nowhere else.

Again, you really haven't put the time into understanding the position. Nobody is a substance dualist these days. I suggest you do a lot more reading, and try to engage with the ideas rather than attack them. You'll learn more.

As Dennett contends, the dualist's position is essentially a surrender. We give up; we can never know. Why don't we just make up some stuff to explain it or give up looking?

Frankly, if dualism is true, and a consequence of that is that we'll just never be able to understand consciousness, well, that's reality for you. There are lots of things that we'll never know. Denying reality so that you can feel better about never surrendering doen't strike me as too sensible.

I don't think dualism requires our ignorance however.

Loki:

So, tell me again exactly how you know you're not a P-Zombie??

By virtue of my direct access to my own phenomenal consciousness.

[c4ts]

Originally posted by INRM


Um, Occam's Razor doesn't always work.

-INRM

In this particular case, I think it does.

[AmateurScientist]

Win,

I'll try to respond to all of your points at a later time, but at the moment I'm tired and only wish to ask this one thing.

AS:

quote:This is truly puzzling to me. If zombie Win would also believe he had phenomenal consciousness, then what makes you so confident that you're not a zombie?

Win:

My direct access to the fact of the existence of phenomenal consciousness.

OK, since I'm not satisfied with that answer, as I believe my question--taken in context with the surrounding remarks which you did not address--recognized that as implicit, I'll ask it another way and perhaps this time you'll understand me more clearly.

Why would zombie Win also answer that he is not a zombie (or put another way, why would he believe he had access to consciousness as well, given that he cannot)?

I genuinely do not understand how. I am not trying to lead you down the path only to spring a trap on you, as I have accused you (and still suspect :) ) you of doing in the past.

BTW, Loki asked you essentially the same question and you gave him the same glib response.

AS

[c4ts]

The way I understand it, if Win is a p-zombie, Win cannot percieve his own lack of consciousness, nor the fact that he is a zombie. Thus, the triggered response would be to deny that he is a p-zombie, since there is no p-zombie stimulus to respond to. If Win figures out that he is a p-zombie, then he can't really be one, because he would have to, in some way, consciously percieve a lack of consciousness, which is impossible from a standpoint where there can't be consciousness. You can only tell you were unconscious after you wake up, not during that time.

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by c4ts
The way I understand it, if Win is a p-zombie, Win cannot percieve his own lack of consciousness, nor the fact that he is a zombie. Thus, the triggered response would be to deny that he is a p-zombie, since there is no p-zombie stimulus to respond to. If Win figures out that he is a p-zombie, then he can't really be one, because he would have to, in some way, consciously percieve a lack of consciousness, which is impossible from a standpoint where there can't be consciousness. You can only tell you were unconscious after you wake up, not during that time.

First, thanks for responding.

Well, this sounds a lot like "How do you know whether or not you're dreaming?"

I don't doubt that this is the "correct" answer, but I don't think I buy it as an intellectually satisfying answer.

If I explained to the p-zombie Win what first-person consciousness is, and feels like, then why can't he figure out that he isn't experiencing what I am describing? He is supposed to be just as smart as regular Win. He has the same capacity to understand concepts as regular Win. Why can't p-zombie Win understand the same concepts Win can?

I don't care whether or not he is programmed to deny his p-zombieness. After sufficient explanation from me, he should be able to tell whether or not he has it.

Alternatively, after attempting to explain the concept of first-person consciousness to p-zombie Win, then I should be able to tell that he either doesn't get it or doesn't have it. That would be an objective test for first person consciousness, and thus p-zombie Win cannot be conceived of because by definition he can't be.

The argument fails either way.

AS

[c4ts]

I think the problem is that I misunderstood the concept of a p-zombie. I had thought p-zombie Win would behave exactly like regular Win in any given situation.

[Loki]

Win,

By virtue of my direct access to my own phenomenal consciousness.
But P-Zombie Win says the same thing. As far as he's concerned, he *has* direct access to phenomenal consciousness. He certainly thinks he does - he's as sure of that fact as you are. How can he be so certain he has something (access to qualia) if he hasn't? What makes him think he does?

In case it's not obvious, I'm confused....

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by c4ts
I think the problem is that I misunderstood the concept of a p-zombie. I had thought p-zombie Win would behave exactly like regular Win in any given situation.

Well, I think there are usually defined such that they behave just like regular Win.

If so, then Zombie Win should should be able to comprehend the notion of first-person consciousness as I describe it, regardless of whether he has ever experienced it. If he can comprehend it, then he can tell me whether or not he has ever experienced it.

If he truthfully says he has not experienced first-person consciousness, then we have an objective test for detecting such consciousness in others.

If he answers that he has experienced it, then we are left with two choices:

1) He's lying (but if he would lie about it, then so would regular Win);

2) He really has experienced it, and thus he isn't a p-zombie.

Now, consider this. If Zombie Win cannot comprehend the concept of first -person consciousness, then I would argue that he is not functionally equivalent to regular Win except for having HPC, because he now lacks the same level of comprehension and capacity for imagination that Win does.

Isn't this a problem for the conceivability of p-zombies argument?

AS

[Yahzi]

Neo
Universe where ostensibly temperature, both as measured and experienced, were exactly as in this world, but where temperature was not identical or brought about by the brownian motion of molecules.
But - temperature is simply the name we give to many instances of Brownian motion!

So no, I don't think it is ostensible.

in the special case of M/B, the correlated phenomena are not of the same KIND.
I found this unconvincing.

That is if I can discover the meaning of words such as supererogatory!
And supervenince, and supernumary. I got a frickin' degree in philosophy without ever once using the word "supervenince," but it seems to be all the philosophical rage these days.

Fashion. :rolleyes:

[c4ts]

Originally posted by AmateurScientist


Well, I think there are usually defined such that they behave just like regular Win.

If so, then Zombie Win should should be able to comprehend the notion of first-person consciousness as I describe it, regardless of whether he has ever experienced it. If he can comprehend it, then he can tell me whether or not he has ever experienced it.

If he truthfully says he has not experienced first-person consciousness, then we have an objective test for detecting such consciousness in others.

There is also the possibility that your description isn't correct for some reason (poor writing skills, for example, or inadequacies in the english language), and if you are testing for p-zombies, you cannot eliminate the possibility that you could be a p-zombie yourself. If that is so, then you would not be describing first-person consciousness, but either the illusion of it, or a programmed response given the demand to describe it. If you are a p-zombie and Win is not, then what you describe may not be what Win percieves, but a false paradigm. Thus Win would truthfully answer that he has not experienced it.

If he answers that he has experienced it, then we are left with two choices:

1) He's lying (but if he would lie about it, then so would regular Win);

You could be presenting a false dillema here. It seems you are dismissing the possibility that he could behave in a way identical to telling the truth without actually doing so. In other words, he would tell an indetectible lie. The very idea of p-zombie behavior seems to be based on this kind of thing.

2) He really has experienced it, and thus he isn't a p-zombie.

Now, consider this. If Zombie Win cannot comprehend the concept of first -person consciousness, then I would argue that he is not functionally equivalent to regular Win except for having HPC, because he now lacks the same level of comprehension and capacity for imagination that Win does.

Isn't this a problem for the conceivability of p-zombies argument?

AS

It would certainly appear so, given that your paradigm is correct, and that p-zombie Win would behave differently than regular Win under particular circumstances like this one.

[AmateurScientist]

Win,

If you'll indulge me, it looks like I may be getting to the rest of your comments piecemeal, if that's OK with you. If you do not care to address them all, just say so. That's OK.

Now, onto this:


AS:

Dualists are willing to concede that "mind" is an entirely unique kind of matter or interaction, unlike any elsewhere in nature. Given that we ultimately came from the process of nuclear fusion within massive stars, just as all other matter known to exist in the universe, I find it hard to swallow that there is a unique kind of matter found only within human brains, and nowhere else.

Win:

Again, you really haven't put the time into understanding the position. Nobody is a substance dualist these days. I suggest you do a lot more reading, and try to engage with the ideas rather than attack them. You'll learn more.


OK, pardon my sloppiness. Look at my paragraph above and substitute "has unique properties" for "is a unique kind of matter." Same result.

Your response, the same kind of which you have provided me in the past, is one I take as at least somewhat patronizing or condescending. I'll grant you that I most likely have not spent near the amount of time wrestling with the concepts as I presume you have. Nor is it likely that I have read or studied a fraction of the material I presume you have. I do not have a post-graduate or even undergraduate degree in philosophy. Nevertheless, I have done a substantial amount of reading here, particularly about the p-zombie business, and your suggestion is that if I just could understand your arguments, I would accept them.

Sorry, Win, but there remains the possibility that I can grasp what you are getting at, but it just doesn't pass muster with me. That there is a huge divide among professional philosophers as to materialism vs. dualism should be sufficient proof that learned, intelligent persons can disagree.

Now, as to your suggestion that I "engage with" the ideas rather than "attack" them, I must scratch my head. Please do not misunderstand that I somehow equate "attacking" with an automatic response to any idea put forth by another.

As to my thought process, when presented with any new radical concept, my approach is to try to examine it, walk around it, peer under it, and to "test" it. By "testing," I mean looking for possible flaws or weaknesses. That's just how I think. It's not necessarily a measure of hostility, despite what you may think of me and my presumed approach. I simply know of no other effective way for me to "engage with" a radical new idea for me.

The very definition of a p-zombie is one of those radical new ideas for me. It is not something I have grown familiar with over the years, as you may have. I first heard of it from you, nearly a year ago. It still troubles me and appears to be incoherent with principles of materialism. I get that you agree that it is inconsistent with materialism.

As I have tried to explain, I view materialism as the default worldview. To me, it must be so, unless there is a compelling reason to accept another. I don't see p-zombies as I understand them to be that compelling reason.

You keep trying to insist that not assuming materialism to be true is distinct from assuming materialism to be false. When you reduce this to formal logic and subsitute symbols, I can understand it. Applying it practically, however, I cannot.

Practically, if I do not assume materialism to be true, then because we are discussing a worldview--or a way of thinking itself, if you will--then in effect am I not assuming that materialism is false? Can you understand that distinguishing between the two is hardly obvious, given that it concerns a way of thinking about the world itself, not just assuming A or not-A? If there is a real distinction, please explain it to me. Otherwise, I will contend that it is a distinction without a difference.

Thanks.

AS

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by c4ts


There is also the possibility that your description isn't correct for some reason (poor writing skills, for example, or inadequacies in the english language), and if you are testing for p-zombies, you cannot eliminate the possibility that you could be a p-zombie yourself. If that is so, then you would not be describing first-person consciousness, but either the illusion of it, or a programmed response given the demand to describe it. If you are a p-zombie and Win is not, then what you describe may not be what Win percieves, but a false paradigm. Thus Win would truthfully answer that he has not experienced it.


Interesting. OK, try this. Let regular Win explain first-person consciousness to p-zombie Win. Win does know what it is, because he is confident he has it and it's right there in front of him. I trust Win's verbal skills to adequately explain it in English to p-zombie Win (he has adequately explained the notion of first-person consciousness to me to the degree necessary for me to test for it and conclude with the same confidence Win has that I have it too).

Now, with regular Win as the mentor and p-zombie Win as the protege, why can't p-zombie Win tell?


You could be presenting a false dillema here. It seems you are dismissing the possibility that he could behave in a way identical to telling the truth without actually doing so. In other words, he would tell an indetectible lie. The very idea of p-zombie behavior seems to be based on this kind of thing.


That's just devious and wicked as hell. I don't think I like p-zombies at all. :D

Again, I would argue that if p-zombie Win lies this effectively, then so does regular Win (maybe he really does). :D

He would have to, if his behavior is exactly like Win's.


It would certainly appear so, given that your paradigm is correct, and that p-zombie Win would behave differently than regular Win under particular circumstances like this one.

Again, I've always understood p-zombie Win to be defined so that he would behave exactly the same as Win. The only difference would be the subjective feel he lacks. No one would ever be able to tell. I don't get how p-zombie couldn't tell.

If he can't, then isn't he human?

If not, then why is the real Win so confident that he is?

AS

[c4ts]

Originally posted by AmateurScientist


Interesting. OK, try this. Let regular Win explain first-person consciousness to p-zombie Win. Win does know what it is, because he is confident he has it and it's right there in front of him. I trust Win's verbal skills to adequately explain it in English to p-zombie Win (he has adequately explained the notion of first-person consciousness to me to the degree necessary for me to test for it and conclude with the same confidence Win has that I have it too).

Now, with regular Win as the mentor and p-zombie Win as the protege, why can't p-zombie Win tell?



That's just devious and wicked as hell. I don't think I like p-zombies at all. :D

Again, I would argue that if p-zombie Win lies this effectively, then so does regular Win (maybe he really does). :D

He would have to, if his behavior is exactly like Win's.



Again, I've always understood p-zombie Win to be defined so that he would behave exactly the same as Win. The only difference would be the subjective feel he lacks. No one would ever be able to tell. I don't get how p-zombie couldn't tell.

If he can't, then isn't he human?

If not, then why is the real Win so confident that he is?

AS
I don't know why the real Win is so confident. I don't think I really can know, either.

I think I've been going about this the wrong way. You seem to indicate that a p-zombie Win is more of a simulacrum of Win than a replacement. Supposedly, the p-zombie could tell he was a p-zombie, but you'd never know. But the way I envisioned a p-zombie would be something that was exactly like Win in every way, except for the fact that it wasn't really Win. This would mean that p-zombie Win could not exist at the same time as regular Win, because the only way it could exist requires it to occupy the same place as Win, at the same time, at all times, which I find inconcievable. P-zombie Win would lie as effectively as regular Win, given your test, because p-zombie Win is doing the exact same thing regular Win is doing in terms of physical motion, with the exception of a slight difference in brain activity, which you could discover without the simultaneous existence of regular Win, which I dismissed as inconcievable. There should be nothing regular Win will do that p-zombie Win will not also do.

I think it makes no difference to p-zombie Win that he is lying, because p-zombie Win is lying using the same motions as truth-telling Win when he responds to your test. You make a good point, because it would be paradoxical that p-zombie Win lies about being a p-zombie. Regular Win, who is not a p-zombie, would respond accordingly to your test, therefore making p-zombie Win a much better liar than regular Win. However since it produces the same reaction given the same situation, I do not understand how that goes against the concievability of p-zombies. The best way to resolve the issue is to ignore the possibility that Win is a p-zombie in the first place, because it makes no difference whether he is or isn't.

[AmateurScientist]

Originally posted by c4ts

I don't know why the real Win is so confident. I don't think I really can know, either.


I don't think I can either.


I think I've been going about this the wrong way. You seem to indicate that a p-zombie Win is more of a simulacrum of Win than a replacement. Supposedly, the p-zombie could tell he was a p-zombie, but you'd never know. But the way I envisioned a p-zombie would be something that was exactly like Win in every way, except for the fact that it wasn't really Win. This would mean that p-zombie Win could not exist at the same time as regular Win, because the only way it could exist requires it to occupy the same place as Win, at the same time, at all times, which I find inconcievable.


I won't presume my way is any "righter" than yours. I could be missing something crucial here--and I guess we'll have to defer for the moment to Win when he arrives on the matter to explain it better or correct us. Nevertheless, I have always taken it as given that both Wins could exist simultaneously. If not, then I think conceivability fails, as I can't conceive of p-zombies. As I have stated repeatedly, given my mode of thinking of the world, they are incoherent. I see no reason, even for the sake of argument, to abandon my mode of thinking of the world in materialistic terms in order to conceive of something which is supposed to demonstrate that my mode of thinking is wrong. I find fault with the entire approach to the conceivability argument.

Perhaps the real question here is why should I assume materialism is not true (whatever that means in practice, as I cannot really tell) in order to conceive of the existence of p-zombies? Win may be onto something in his last response to me, as I am having a disconnect here.


P-zombie Win would lie as effectively as regular Win, given your test, because p-zombie Win is doing the exact same thing regular Win is doing in terms of physical motion, with the exception of a slight difference in brain activity, which you could discover without the simultaneous existence of regular Win, which I dismissed as inconcievable. There should be nothing regular Win will do that p-zombie Win will not also do.


I agree entirely with this analysis, given my understanding of the conceivability argument.


I think it makes no difference to p-zombie Win that he is lying, because p-zombie Win is lying using the same motions as truth-telling Win when he responds to your test. You make a good point, because it would be paradoxical that p-zombie Win lies about being a p-zombie. Regular Win, who is not a p-zombie, would respond accordingly to your test, therefore making p-zombie Win a much better liar than regular Win. However since it produces the same reaction given the same situation, I do not understand how that goes against the concievability of p-zombies.


Because I take "behaves exactly like Win" to mean that p-zombie Win has exactly the same mental capacity to understand concepts described objectively to him that Win does. I don't think it's necessary to have subjective feel in order to have some understanding of a description of it. Can't you at least partly comprehend a concept you've never felt?

I've never experienced the death of a child, but I can understand at least partly that this would be devastating to all but the most uncaring of parents. I don't even have any children, but I can understand the intense grief at least in part. I can do so by simulating those feelings within myself.

Oh, but p-zombie Win doesn't experience emotions, so how could he empathize? Well, if he can't then he isn't exactly like Win in his behaviors and I could tell he is not human. If he goes through the motions of empathy convincingly, then where does he get the knowledge of how emotions feel without having ever experienced any emotions at all?

This kind of empathy is possible only through facsimile. I can empathize with a parent who has lost a child only by drawing upon emotions I have experienced myself and those I have observed exhibited by others, and using them to synthesize feelings of grief over the death of my hypothetical child so I gain a first-hand subjective "feel" of the pain.

How could a being who has never experienced "feel" or emotion empathize? If he can, then he has knowledge of those emotions. If he has such knowledge, then how could he not tell that he has never experienced any of them at all? In other words, p-zombie could indeed tell whether he is in fact a p-zombie.

That, I find, is a telling gap in p-zombie Win's capacity for intellectual understanding, and not the same as his lack of merely subjective experience.



The best way to resolve the issue is to ignore the possibility that Win is a p-zombie in the first place, because it makes no difference whether he is or isn't.

Then why does conceivability as an argument against the truth of materialism matter at all?

AS

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by AmateurScientist


If I explained to the p-zombie Win what first-person consciousness is, and feels like, then why can't he figure out that he isn't experiencing what I am describing?

AS,

We can only understand first person consciousness by experiencing it for ourselves. It is not possible to define it.

You also said:

Why would zombie Win also answer that he is not a zombie (or put another way, why would he believe he had access to consciousness as well, given that he cannot)?


P-zombie Win would respond he is not a p-zombie because he is physically identical. The same physical laws which determine all our behaviour is the same for both Win and p-zombie Win. P-Win "believes" he is not a p-zombie only in the sense of the appropriate behaviour. He doesn't actually have the mental belief, that is to say the qualitative phenomenological feel that he is not a p-zombie. This phenomenological feel is only present with the real Win. The actual qualitative phenomenological knowing that he has a mental life is only present with the real Win. That's the way I see it anyway.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by The One called Neo

AS,

We can only understand first person consciousness by experiencing it for ourselves. It is not possible to define it.

You also said:


P-zombie Win would respond he is not a p-zombie because he is physically identical. The same physical laws which determine all our behaviour is the same for both Win and p-zombie Win. P-Win "believes" he is not a p-zombie only in the sense of the appropriate behaviour. He doesn't actually have the mental belief, that is to say the qualitative phenomenological feel that he is not a p-zombie. This phenomenological feel is only present with the real Win. The actual qualitative phenomenological knowing that he has a mental life is only present with the real Win. That's the way I see it anyway.

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/goldman.html

In particular, he (Alvin Goldman), argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations.

I added the italics.

It is not a isomorphic in a physical sense, only a functional sense.

Dennett:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/unzombie.htm

It all seems rather boooooring. :o

[Win]

AS:

I'm going to be in and out today, 'cause I'm working on something else, but I will try to address all your points eventually.

First off, I'm sorry that I get snarky with you. I really will try harder not to do that.

Now then:

Practically, if I do not assume materialism to be true, then because we are discussing a worldview--or a way of thinking itself, if you will--then in effect am I not assuming that materialism is false? Can you understand that distinguishing between the two is hardly obvious, given that it concerns a way of thinking about the world itself, not just assuming A or not-A? If there is a real distinction, please explain it to me. Otherwise, I will contend that it is a distinction without a difference.

Again, I think you're equivocating. Materialism, dualism, idealism are all ways of thinking about the world. They are not preconditions for thinking at all.

So, since you don't have to commit yourself to the truth of any of these positions to think about the world, just think of yourself as a sceptic: You've suspended judgement.

Does that make it easier to see how to "not assume materialism is true."

As to my thought process, when presented with any new radical concept, my approach is to try to examine it, walk around it, peer under it, and to "test" it. By "testing," I mean looking for possible flaws or weaknesses. That's just how I think. It's not necessarily a measure of hostility, despite what you may think of me and my presumed approach. I simply know of no other effective way for me to "engage with" a radical new idea for me.

Kicking on the tires and looking under the hood, as it were, are good ideas. But hopping in and taking her for a spin is also a good idea.

What I don't like very much is standing in the lot, looking at the car and saying, "that car will never run."

See what I mean?

Moving on, zombie Win has all the beliefs that Win does. What differs between zombie Win and Win is the truth value of their beliefs. And it's the state of the world, not the state of Win that determines those truth values. Zombie Win lives in zombie world. Win lives here.

It's unproductive, I think, to talk about Win having a discussion with zombie Win, because if zombie Win lived in this world, he wouldn't be a zombie.

It's a natural fact about this world that people are conscious.

Oh, but p-zombie Win doesn't experience emotions, so how could he empathize?

But zombie Win has emotions, and he can form a model of zombie you and your zombie emotions, so he can empathize.

Loki:

But P-Zombie Win says the same thing. As far as he's concerned, he *has* direct access to phenomenal consciousness. He certainly thinks he does - he's as sure of that fact as you are. How can he be so certain he has something (access to qualia) if he hasn't? What makes him think he does?

What make zombie Win think hes has phenomenal consciousness is the same thing that makes me think I have phenomenal consciousness, briefly, a recursive self-modelling mental architecture. Why isn't that sufficient to explain consciousness? Again briefly, because that doesn't explain, can't explain, the phenomenal aspects of consciousness.

In zombie world, they'd reach the same conclusions. Only they'd be mistaken. In zombie world, ironically, the dualist zombie philosophers would be convinced that something was missing from their discription of the world, when nothing really was. The zombie materialist philosophers would insist that nothing is missing, and they'd be right. Here, the situations are reversed.

Again, I think it's important to note that the truth of our beliefs is determined by the state of the world.

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot
AS,

We can only understand first person consciousness by experiencing it for ourselves. It is not possible to define it.

You also said:


P-zombie Win would respond he is not a p-zombie because he is physically identical. The same physical laws which determine all our behaviour is the same for both Win and p-zombie Win. P-Win "believes" he is not a p-zombie only in the sense of the appropriate behaviour. He doesn't actually have the mental belief, that is to say the qualitative phenomenological feel that he is not a p-zombie. This phenomenological feel is only present with the real Win. The actual qualitative phenomenological knowing that he has a mental life is only present with the real Win. That's the way I see it anyway.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/goldman.html


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In particular, he (Alvin Goldman), argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I added the italics.

It is not a isomorphic in a physical sense, only a functional sense.


Then replace the word physical in my first sentence with the word functional. Do you still have any reservations with what I said?

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Originally posted by The One called Neo


Then replace the word physical in my first sentence with the word functional. Do you still have any reservations with what I said?

Nope, just trying to keep things clear with AS. It seems that one of the problems that keeps coming back up is that people will say these 'p-zombies' if they are physically identical and qualia arise from physical and beliefs arise from qualia then no wonder 'p-zombie' still has beliefs that are just as true!

I'm not trying to be an *******, just trying to help eliminate the miscommunications that can plague the argument. :)