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31st March 2003, 06:01 PM
Is the mind the same as the brain, or different?

fishbob
31st March 2003, 06:13 PM
My understanding:
The brain is the organic lumpy squishy stuff between your ears.

The mind is thought, and understanding, and decision making. These things happen to occur in the brain. If the mind were located somewhere else, the brain would still be there, maybe in a different configuration, performing its autonomic nervous system functions, sensory functions, etc.

I refuse to make any computer analogies about this subject.

chance
31st March 2003, 06:17 PM
I would suspect that a common interpretation would be that the Brain is the physical organ, while the mind is the result of the brain functioning.

Mercutio
31st March 2003, 06:20 PM
Different. The brain is an immensely complicated physical organ, the mind is an emergent property inferred from our behavior. As such, "the mind" does not exist as an entity, but as a useful abstraction.

We speak of "changing our minds," "making up our minds," "being mindful," "minding our manners," "having half a mind to do something," "going out of our mind." None of these things works quite right if we just substitute "brain" for "mind." And it is more than just semantics. In each of these sense, "mind" is a convenient stand-in for some aspect of our behavior--that is, what the whole person is doing, not just the brain.

My 2 cents.

Gebeker
31st March 2003, 07:11 PM
Originally posted by chance
I would suspect that a common interpretation would be that the Brain is the physical organ, while the mind is the result of the brain functioning.

That's the way I would say it.

Interesting Ian
1st April 2003, 05:14 AM
Originally posted by fishbob
[B]My understanding:
The brain is the organic lumpy squishy stuff between your ears.

The mind is thought, and understanding, and decision making. These things happen to occur in the brain.



Rubbish. You are presupposing the correctness of the materialist metaphysic.

Interesting Ian
1st April 2003, 05:20 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
[B]Different. The brain is an immensely complicated physical organ, the mind is an emergent property inferred from our behavior. As such, "the mind" does not exist as an entity, but as a useful abstraction.



What a load of f*cking sh*t.

BillyJoe
1st April 2003, 05:55 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
What a load of f*cking sh*t. I'm glad you've used up that compliment on someone else.....leaves me with the courage to say......

The mind is an illusion created by the brain.

:D

Mercutio
1st April 2003, 05:57 AM
[QUOTE]
What a load of f*cking sh*t.

What a helpful contribution to the debate. If it weren't April Fool's Day, I'd take offense.

Oh, I missed the part where you actually stated your own view.

M

Interesting Ian
1st April 2003, 06:19 AM
Originally posted by BillyJoe
I'm glad you've used up that compliment on someone else.....leaves me with the courage to say......

The mind is an illusion created by the brain.

:D

Sorry BillieJoe, but I think it's meaningless to describe the mind as an illusion. The mind exists by virtue of the fact that it is the term used to encapsulate our mental lives. As such the mind exists by virtue of the fact we have mental lives. Of course the ultimate ontological status of the mind is another issue.

garys_2k
1st April 2003, 06:22 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian


What a load of f*cking sh*t.
Ah, the cogent, pithy and rapier wit that we've come to expect once again delivers a stunning intellectual blow on the side of the angels.

Thank you, now I understand! I really do.

Gebeker
1st April 2003, 06:33 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Rubbish. You are presupposing the correctness of the materialist metaphysic.

It's not rubbish at all. In fact, there is a huge amount of scientific literature that supports the idea that activity in the brain is responsible for consciousness.

1. Damage to specific areas of the brain causes predictable effects on "mind".

2. Electrical stimulation of specific areas also affects the mind.

3. fMRI shows predictable patterns of brain activity associated with higher cognitive functions.

4. Pharmacological agents that affect the brain through known biochemical processes have fairly predictable effects on various aspects of "mind", including depression, anxiety, and others.

5. Recording from single neurons in primates shows clear relationships between the activity of brain cells and various cognitive functions.

Specific references available on request to support all of the above...

There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that anything OTHER than the brain is necessary for consciousness.


The mind exists by virtue of the fact that it is the term used to encapsulate our mental lives. As such the mind exists by virtue of the fact we have mental lives. Of course the ultimate ontological status of the mind is another issue.

In my opinion, this is not helpful. It does nothing to advance the discussion (and it's somewhat circular) to say that the mind exists by virtue of the fact that we have mental lives.

Edit: corrected an error in the quotes.

Mercutio
1st April 2003, 06:37 AM
Sorry BillieJoe, but I think it's meaningless to describe the mind as an illusion. The mind exists by virtue of
the fact that it is the term used to encapsulate our mental lives. As such the mind exists by virtue of the
fact we have mental lives. Of course the ultimate ontological status of the mind is another issue.

I come this close to agreeing with you. That the mind "is the term used to encapsulate our mental lives" is exactly what I said above {that you said was a steaming load, you recall}. But you circularly define mental lives. We do think (even you--insert predictable comment here)--that much is true. But is thinking something that our mind does? There is no evidence for a mind that does our thinking for us. You see thinking as evidence for a mind, simply because you believe that a mind is what does thinking. If I believed that rain was angel piss, I'd see evidence of angels every time it rained.

People think. They act. They remember. They feel. These are things we do, not things our minds do. That we refer to these things in mentalistic fashion is a product of our language, not of reality.

Mercutio
1st April 2003, 06:39 AM
sorry, I can't get my quotes to work right. :confused: (newbie)

Interesting Ian
1st April 2003, 07:01 AM
Originally posted by Gebeker
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Rubbish. You are presupposing the correctness of the materialist metaphysic.
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It's not rubbish at all. In fact, there is a huge amount of scientific literature that supports the idea that activity in the brain is responsible for consciousness.



Please be more accurate in your terminology. Are you saying that the brain is the origin of our mental lives?



1. Damage to specific areas of the brain causes predictable effects on "mind".

2. Electrical stimulation of specific areas also affects the mind.

3. fMRI shows predictable patterns of brain activity associated with higher cognitive functions.

4. Pharmacological agents that affect the brain through known biochemical processes have fairly predictable effects on various aspects of "mind", including depression, anxiety, and others.

5. Recording from single neurons in primates shows clear relationships between the activity of brain cells and various cognitive functions.

Specific references available on request to support all of the above...



All of which demonstrates a correlation between physical process in the brain and various aspects of our mental lives. I've said these things before and I'll repeat them here.

The fact that states of "A" may be correlated with "particular states of "B", means neither that "A" and "B" are one and the same thing, nor does it entail that "B" originates from "A", or indeed "A" from "B". It could be that both "A" and "B" both independently are generated by "C". Or it could be the case that although states of "B" are modified by states of "A", "B" ultimately originates from "C".

Now I have no particular problems with describing the mind as being caused by the brain. But this needn't have any implications that the mind has its origin in the brain. The picture on a television set is caused by its internal components. This of course doesn't mean to say that the origin of the storylines of the tv programmes being shown have their origin in the tv sets internal components! Indeed it would be preposterous to suppose they do! I believe a partial analogy can be drawn here in that it is equally ludicrous, if not more so, that the richness of our mental lives is somehow mysterious created ex nihilo by physical processes.


There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that anything OTHER than the brain is necessary for consciousness.


Well apart from the fact that the onus is upon you to provide evidence to support your position, there is a great deal of evidence. What about all the evidence suggestive of survival (life after death) for example??




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The mind exists by virtue of the fact that it is the term used to encapsulate our mental lives. As such the mind exists by virtue of the fact we have mental lives. Of course the ultimate ontological status of the mind is another issue.
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In my opinion, this is not helpful. It does nothing to advance the discussion (and it's somewhat circular) to say that the mind exists by virtue of the fact that we have mental lives.



Be more precise. Are you stating it does nothing whatsoever to address the question of whether our minds are an illusion?

If so you are effectively asserting that my contention that it is vacuous to describe the mind is an illusion, is in turn vacuous itself.

Is this your stance?

BillHoyt
1st April 2003, 07:34 AM
Only 1 April and already we have a nomination!

Cheers,

Gebeker
1st April 2003, 08:57 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Please be more accurate in your terminology. Are you saying that the brain is the originof our mental lives?

Yes.


All of which demonstrates a correlation between physical process in the brain and various aspects of our mental lives. I've said these things before and I'll repeat them here.


Here, I would ask you to be more accurate in your terminology. The term “correlation” is inappropriate when describing things such as the effects of lesions, pharmacological agents, and electrical stimulation.


The fact that states of "A" may be correlated with "particular states of "B", means neither that "A" and "B" are one and the same thing, nor does it entail that "B" originates from "A", or indeed "A" from "B". It could be that both "A" and "B" both independently are generated by "C". Or it could be the case that although states of "B" are modified by states of "A", "B" ultimately originates from "C".

This is the standard criticism of correlational studies. However, as I pointed out, most of the evidence I’ve cited is not correlational . For example, let’s substitute the actual terms I used into your paragraph and see if it makes any sense:

“The fact that states of [an improvement in depression] may be correlated with [the taking of anti-depressant medications], means neither that [an improvement in depression] and [the taking of anti-depressants] are one and the same thing, nor does it entail that [the taking of anti-depressants] originates from [an improvement in depression], or indeed [an improvement in depression] from [the taking of anti-depressants]. It could be that both [the taking of anti-depressants] and [an improvement in depression] both are independently generated by “C”.

As you can see, substituting the actual terms into your paragraph makes it sound like nonsense. People take anti-depressants in response to the advise of a doctor. To argue that getting advise from a doctor improves depression is essentially a claim that anti-depressants only work through the placebo effect. However, a huge number of studies have controlled for the placebo effect and have clearly shown that many antidepressants actually work, and are not just placebo effects.

Now, let’s take your final sentence in that paragraph:
“Or it could be the case that although [depression] is modified by [antidepressants], [emotions] ultimately originate from “C”. Again, I would challenge you to provide any evidence to support this claim. I have provided evidence to show that activity in the brain is both necessary [lesion studies] and sufficient [stimulation studies] to produce specific cognitive activity. If you want to claim that something else is also necessary, you need to provide evidence to support that claim. Otherwise, your hypothesis can be dismissed by Occam’s razor.


Now I have no particular problems with describing the mind as being caused by the brain. But this needn't have any implications that the mind has its origin in the brain. The picture on a television set is caused by its internal components. This of course doesn't mean to say that the origin of the storylines of the tv programmes being shown have their origin in the tv sets internal components!

The picture on a TV screen is not completely caused by its internal components. Something else (the signal) is necessary. Again, you seem to want to suggest that something other than the brain is necessary for consciousness. Again, I would challenge you to provide evidence to support this claim.


Well apart from the fact that the onus is upon you to provide evidence to support your position, there is a great deal of evidence. What about all the evidence suggestive of survival (life after death) for example??

First of all, I have already provided evidence to support my claim that the mind is the result of activity in the brain. You have provided no evidence at all to support your claims.
Second, even if you can show us scientific proof of the existence of life after death (and I don't think you can), it would do absolutely nothing to support your position. What reason do you have for assuming that the soul must be the same thing that we currently experience as mind?


Be more precise. Are you stating it does nothing whatsoever to address the question of whether our minds are an illusion?

If so you are effectively asserting that my contention that it is vacuous to describe the mind is an illusion, is in turn vacuous itself.

Is this your stance?

My stance is simply that there is a great deal of evidence supporting the idea that what we call “mind” is caused by activity in the brain. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that anything ELSE is necessary for “mind”.

Finally, I would ask you to clarify your position. What do you believe is the ultimate origin of "mind"?

RichardR
1st April 2003, 08:59 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Well apart from the fact that the onus is upon you to provide evidence to support your position, there is a great deal of evidence. What about all the evidence suggestive of survival (life after death) for example?? (I know I'm going to regret asking this, but) what evidence would that be?

Mercutio
1st April 2003, 10:19 AM
Any search for evidence of mind will be fruitless. "Mental entities" exist in language only. We think, but we say we "have thoughts." We remember, but we say we "have memories." We feel, but we say we "have feelings." In each case, the first is something we do, but the second is a metaphor. I don't have feelings in the same literal sense that I have a computer or 57 cents in change. I have feelings (& thoughts & memories) in the same sense that I have my own particular walk (limping on both legs, sorta) I don't have this walk separate from my walking, nor do I have thoughts separate from my thinking. We speak of mental entities as if they exist, not because they exist. It is a convenient use of language, not an actual thing ("mental" or physical)

BTW, this does not mean it is all in the brain. As just one small example, your adrenal glands contribute to your "feelings."

Gebeker
1st April 2003, 10:27 AM
Well, adrenal glands contribute to feelings only by acting on the brain.

metacristi
1st April 2003, 11:01 AM
Whodini

Unfortunately there is no definite scientific answer to answer this question,I can only present my subjective opinion.
It is true that neurology and AI research point out in the direction of an identity between mental states and brain states though I believe [based on some subjective,strictly personal,evidence] that mind is more than that.I see the brain as a sort of co-processor very useful to deal with the observed reality at our level,still interacting with 'something' extra let's name this 'soul';the result of this interaction being an emergent 'compound' personality.I am not at all sure that the 'soul' is fundamental to reality but in my view it carries out the bigger part of our personality having a much greater 'life expectancy'.
Sure this does not explain what is consciousness since the soul is seen only as a carrier of the biggest part of our usual consciousness.In fact the mind-matter problem is shifted at another level only,the soul is still 'material' interacting very faintly with usual matter.I am rather an agnostic with respect to the ultimate ground of reality though pan-protopsychism is the closest to me...
Some might name this dualism but no,at least in my acception.Even if the soul were the consciousness,fundamental to reality [matter and mind=the soul being the only two 'substances' existent at the fundamental level of reality] I see here only an 'extended materialism' since the two 'substances' are not totally different so that they can still interact.
Or to please even those who stick to the usual definition of dualism [two substances at the fundamental level of reality no matter whether they can interact or not] I would name it 'materialist dualism'.


Edit to add:

This is not incompatible with the possible existence of a God at the fundamental level of reality [or above at the 'soul level-my preference] who 'created' our universe by 'formatting' some [existing from eternity too] fundamental 'substances'.But even the omni-all type of God is a possibility...



Of course this is only my subjective point of view,my metaphysics,I claim nothing.I never forget to 'stick' this disclaimer when I present my subjective opinion.

Interesting Ian
1st April 2003, 11:08 AM
Originally posted by metacristi
I am rather an agnositc with respect to the ultimate ground of reality though pan-protopsychism is the closest to me...


{Nods wisely}

fishbob
1st April 2003, 11:29 AM
II sez: Rubbish. You are presupposing the correctness of the materialist metaphysic What the heck is that supposed to mean?

Then later II sez:
Well apart from the fact that the onus is upon you to provide evidence to support your position, there is a great deal of evidence. What about all the evidence suggestive of survival (life after death) for example?? There is no evidence of life after death for example.

Gebeker
1st April 2003, 11:41 AM
metacristi, thanks for your post.

I see the brain as a sort of co-processor very useful to deal with the observed reality at our level,still interacting with 'something' extra let's name this 'soul';the result of this interaction being an emergent 'compound' personality.

Again, the trouble is that there is no evidence of any kind to support this idea.

I am not at all sure that the 'soul' is fundamental to reality but in my view it carries out the bigger part of our personality having a much greater 'life expectancy'. Sure this does not explain what is consciousness since the soul is seen only as a carrier of the biggest part of our usual consciousness.

If this is true, then what happens when we go to sleep? Or if we are in a coma? When we are not conscious, does the soul somehow go away? Or does it temporarily sever its connection with the brain?

If consciousness mostly resides in the soul, then why is it that damage to the brain causes such highly specific and predictable effects on mind (Alzheimer's disease, for example)?

The activity of single neurons has been shown to be strongly related to higher cognitive functions, such as decision making. In fact, by recording the activity of single neurons in monkeys trained in decision-making tasks, it is possible to know what decision the monkey is going to make, several seconds before he reveals his choice by a behavioral response . (Shadlen, and Newsome, 1996. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA Vol 93, pp 628-633.; Romo and Salinas, 1999. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, vol 9. pp 487-493; Schall and Thompson, 1999. Annual Review of Neuroscience, vol 22. pp 241-260.)

IMHO, it's very hard to reconcile these observations with the idea that consciousness is mostly "soul". Sure, you can insist that something besides the brain is necessary, but I don't think there is any valid reason for believing that. I could just as easily insist that there is an invisible unicorn that follows me around all the time, and you can't disprove it. But, if I can't produce any evidence for my unicorn friend, then you would (quite rightly) dismiss my claim. ;) IMHO, the claim that something besides the brain is needed for consciousness is like that. No one can disprove it, but why on earth would anyone believe it?

c0rbin
1st April 2003, 11:49 AM
Whodini trolled and Interesting Iain bit.

Nice explanations from all else involved, though.

You can see how those who obfuscate want to live in the fantasy world where in their dreams they live forever. While those interested in the truth can bullet point the evidence that supports reality.



:rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

metacristi
1st April 2003, 12:16 PM
cOrbin

Whodini trolled and Interesting Iain bit.

Nice explanations from all else involved, though.

You can see how those who obfuscate want to live in the fantasy world where in their dreams they live forever. While those interested in the truth can bullet point the evidence that supports reality.


Are you sure that they are not interested by the real world?What makes you believe that only atheists or 'usual materialists' could find 'the truth' [whatever that might mean]?Are you sure that a simple belief [different from dogma!] could stop one to find 'the truth'?
After all one might genunely believe that they have in the pocket some money [because they vaguely remember that someone have put them there-for example]...till the moment of truth when they make the constatation that there is nothing...
I see no contradiction here,belief and 'finding the truth' are totally compatible as much as dogma is not brought forth.What do you think?
What if they are right?

Interesting Ian
1st April 2003, 04:18 PM
Originally posted by Gebeker
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All of which demonstrates a correlation between physical process in the brain and various aspects of our mental lives. I've said these things before and I'll repeat them here.

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Here, I would ask you to be more accurate in your terminology. The term “correlation” is inappropriate when describing things such as the effects of lesions, pharmacological agents, and electrical stimulation.



No I'm afraid it's the only word which is appropriate. We cannot declare a causal relationship. This is because the word "causal" ought only to be employed within the context of theories describing the world. Phenomenal consciousness is not implied by the totality of physical facts about the world. It is simply tacked on to the materialist metaphysic.



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The fact that states of "A" may be correlated with "particular states of "B", means neither that "A" and "B" are one and the same thing, nor does it entail that "B" originates from "A", or indeed "A" from "B". It could be that both "A" and "B" both independently are generated by "C". Or it could be the case that although states of "B" are modified by states of "A", "B" ultimately originates from "C".
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This is the standard criticism of correlational studies. However, as I pointed out, most of the evidence I’ve cited is not correlational .



As explained it is all correlational.



For example, let’s substitute the actual terms I used into your paragraph and see if it makes any sense:

“The fact that states of [an improvement in depression] may be correlated with [the taking of anti-depressant medications], means neither that [an improvement in depression] and [the taking of anti-depressants] are one and the same thing,



Obviously not. You wouldn't talk about the taking of anti-depressants though. It's the physical changes within the brain brought about by ant-depresants which is crucial. So the question then is whether certain physical processes in the brain is one and the same thing as being in a less depressed mood.





nor does it entail that [the taking of anti-depressants] originates from [an improvement in depression], or indeed [an improvement in depression] from [the taking of anti-depressants]. It could be that both [the taking of anti-depressants] and [an improvement in depression] both are independently generated by “C”.



Well you're not quoting what I said. This is ludicrous. Where's the bit I put about modification? The taking of anti depressants does lead to an alleviation of mood. This I do not deny.

What I am denying is that this somehow proves that the mind originates from the brain. I've already explained this. What is wrong with you??



Now, let’s take your final sentence in that paragraph:
“Or it could be the case that although [depression] is modified by [antidepressants], [emotions] ultimately originate from “C”. Again, I would challenge you to provide any evidence to support this claim.



It is not clear to me why it should be I who is required to provide evidence that the self and emotions are not identical or a property of physical processes. I'm taking the default sensible position that emotions are a manifestation of the self, and that this self is not identical to, or is a property of the physical. I mentioned all the evidence for survival. But really it's not a question of evidence because what we need to consider are competing metaphysical hypotheses. Does it make sense to suppose emotions are identical to, or are entailed by physical processes for example? These are the type of questions you need to address to see if your materialism is intelligible.



I have provided evidence to show that activity in the brain is both necessary [lesion studies] and sufficient [stimulation studies] to produce specific cognitive activity.



Yes and it's irrelevant because my metaphysical hypotheses equally accounts for such correlations. Namely the soul operates through the brain, but is appropriately "filtered" by the brain, depending upon its condition, thereby resulting in the mind.


If you want to claim that something else is also necessary, you need to provide evidence to support that claim. Otherwise, your hypothesis can be dismissed by Occam’s razor.


Appealing to Occams razor is vacuous because materialists always define the most simple position as the one in accordance with their metaphysic, ie materialism. If you applied Occams razor to TV sets you would conclude that the story line of a TV programme has its origin in the TV set's internal components! As I said, you need to consider the overall intelligibility of your position.



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Now I have no particular problems with describing the mind as being caused by the brain. But this needn't have any implications that the mind has its origin in the brain. The picture on a television set is caused by its internal components. This of course doesn't mean to say that the origin of the storylines of the tv programmes being shown have their origin in the tv sets internal components!
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The picture on a TV screen is not completely caused by its internal components. Something else (the signal) is necessary. Again, you seem to want to suggest that something other than the brain is necessary for consciousness. Again, I would challenge you to provide evidence to support this claim.


Answered this above and in previous post.



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Well apart from the fact that the onus is upon you to provide evidence to support your position, there is a great deal of evidence. What about all the evidence suggestive of survival (life after death) for example??
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First of all, I have already provided evidence to support my claim that the mind is the result of activity in the brain. You have provided no evidence at all to support your claims.



I could argue that correlations are equal evidence for my hypothesis. We need the brain to filter out certain perceptions and realities, otherwise I hazard a guess that we wouldn't be able to operate proficiently in this empirical reality.



Second, even if you can show us scientific proof of the existence of life after death (and I don't think you can),



You need to understand what "scientific proof" means. It's impossible to have scientific proof for survival. For scientific proof to work you need a theory. A theory which has predictions which subsequent experimentation either fullfills or falsifies.


it would do absolutely nothing to support your position. What reason do you have for assuming that the soul must be the same thing that we currently experience as mind?


The soul can't be identified with the mind because the mind changes all the time whilst presumably the soul would be unchanging. Think about what your mind is now compared to when you were 5 years old. The soul is that which makes you the very same person now, as when you were 5, or drunk, or suffering from Alzheimers etc.



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Be more precise. Are you stating it does nothing whatsoever to address the question of whether our minds are an illusion?

If so you are effectively asserting that my contention that it is vacuous to describe the mind is an illusion, is in turn vacuous itself.

Is this your stance?
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My stance is simply that there is a great deal of evidence supporting the idea that what we call “mind” is caused by activity in the brain. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that anything ELSE is necessary for “mind”.



But even if materialism is correct, that doesn't mean the mind is an illusion now does it??



Finally, I would ask you to clarify your position. What do you believe is the ultimate origin of "mind"?


I believe the self is ontologically self-subsistent.

Kiri
1st April 2003, 04:31 PM
"My brain hurts!"

"OOH! It'll have to come out!"

(Sorry, this should be in the Python thread)

I'd have to agree with the brain-as-hardware folks. The mind may be more than just neural activity, but it seems grounded in the squishy stuff to me.

1st April 2003, 04:38 PM
----
Whodini trolled and Interesting Iain bit.
----


Corbin,


I asked a question that I was interested in. If you equate that with trolling, you obviously misunderstand the idea of a discussion board.

chance
1st April 2003, 09:50 PM
Interesting Ian Are you proposing that the mind is a product of a Brain that is only acting as a sort of tuning device? How would you propose to test this idea?

saddam
1st April 2003, 10:55 PM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
{Nods wisely}
HAHAHAHAHA! Self-congratulation is a wise thing to do?

Then I am the wisest wise guy yet!

UnrepentantSinner
2nd April 2003, 04:34 AM
Originally posted by Whodini
Is the mind the same as the brain, or different?

Obviously is a product of the brain. Movement is the product of my muscles or speech is the sproduct of my vocal cords.

BillyJoe
2nd April 2003, 05:31 AM
The user illusion.....

The brain produces a representation of itself within itself.
The brain endows this representation of itself with the illusion of selfhood.
The "self" feels itself to be an entity separate from and in control of the brain.
In so doing, the "self" merely fiulfills the "purpose" for which the brain produced it.

metacristi
2nd April 2003, 07:03 AM
Gebeker

I could just as easily insist that there is an invisible unicorn that follows me around all the time, and you can't disprove it. But, if I can't produce any evidence for my unicorn friend, then you would (quite rightly) dismiss my claim. IMHO, the claim that something besides the brain is needed for consciousness is like that. No one can disprove it, but why on earth would anyone believe it?


Gebeker there is a marked distinction between belief and 'objective knowledge'.It's clear from my posts that I haven't made any claims that I have objective knowledge for my position.In fact I am agnostic in what knowledge [regarding the nature of consciusness] is concerned:I do not know the how consciousness arise.Exactly how does science,at least now,by the way.Unfortunately we do not have objective knowledge explaining how conscious experience arise yet...only some 'hints'...which are not enough to claim having knowledge beyond all reasonable doubt='objective knowledge'=provisional 'truth'.
Secondly,once clarified this,the problem is that there is no need to justify to you or to another one my belief since I claim nothing to others.If one wants to believe in your unicorn that's their problem,I have nothing against that,they can believe even that a stick created the universe...I am happy with that as much as no claim of having 'objective knowledge' is made.Only that,in my subjective system of values,I assign a very low probability to your unicorn to exist and therefore I choose not to believe in it.Conversely you are free to not believe in my metaphysics.It's as simple as that.
Still,since I consider myself a rational person,I must respect the rules of logic,never believe something without a reason.To justify a belief [different from creating new religions or dogmas] suffices to have even a 'subjective',strictly personal,'evidence' derived [preferably] from 'first hand' experiences.
And that's exactly what I do have,nonwithstanding the accusations of 'subjectivism' and lack of intersubjectivity.
This is enough to justify a belief if no claim of having 'objective knowledge' is made.No need to 'prove' my belief then with 'objective knowledge' (this subject was one of my main sources of polemics with some atheists on this site).
But note I haven't believed first and only after I tried to find a justification for my belief no,first were the 'experiences' (subjective indeed I agree) and only after that I chose to believe.
Simply believing in a certain hypothesis [having a preference when there is no objective knowledge which to settle clearly a certain problem-as the nature of consciousness for example or whether there exist a God-defined merely as the creator of the universe] is allowed by logic as much as one has a logical reason for that.
Besides this does not imply having certitudes that this prefered hypothesis is correct,in fact I remain open to the possibility to make the constatation later that it is wrong.Believing in it does not mean having certitudes,only that,in my subjective system of values,it is the most probable to be 'true' [at least as a 'provisional truth'] from all existing,valid logically,proposals.Nothing more I am open to all other logically valid proposals.I simply believe [in the existence of a soul as I defined it above] exactly how for example some atheists simply lack belief [in God].If this hypothesis will become 'objective knowledge' or not is entirely the task of science and of the scientific method to find out...

2nd April 2003, 08:32 AM
Originally posted by UnrepentantSinner


Obviously is a product of the brain. Movement is the product of my muscles or speech is the sproduct of my vocal cords.


You can say "product" all you want, but you still haven't proven anything.

Diogenes
2nd April 2003, 08:44 AM
Originally posted by Whodini

You can say "product" all you want, but you still haven't proven anything.

Show us someone without a brain who has a mind..

2nd April 2003, 09:15 AM
Originally posted by Diogenes


Show us someone without a brain who has a mind..


You don't endorse the concept of 'mind', so if I present an argument, how could you recognize it as right or wrong?

One can have a computer without a processor. It won't be a very effective computer though.

Diogenes
2nd April 2003, 09:25 AM
Originally posted by Whodini



You don't endorse the concept of 'mind', so if I present an argument, how could you recognize it as right or wrong?

Show me the mind without a brain, and then we will deal with my ability to recognize it.

One can have a computer without a processor. It won't be a very effective computer though.

I would suggest a " computer without a processor ", would by definition, no longer be a computer.

On the other hand, I can imagine that you have a computer without a processor.. Hmmmmm.. Confusing...

2nd April 2003, 09:52 AM
----
Show me the mind without a brain, and then we will deal with my ability to recognize it.
----


Minds are packaged with brains, and nervous systems.


----
I would suggest a " computer without a processor ", would by definition, no longer be a computer.
----


Ok, how about a computer without a power source is still a computer.

Diogenes
2nd April 2003, 10:08 AM
Originally posted by Whodini
----
Show me the mind without a brain, and then we will deal with my ability to recognize it.
----


Minds are packaged with brains, and nervous systems.

Sounds like you agree that a mind cannot exist in the absence of a brain. If so, then we agree on that..


----
I would suggest a " computer without a processor ", would by definition, no longer be a computer.
----


Ok, how about a computer without a power source is still a computer.

O.K... It wouldn't do any ' computing ' though. So, is a computer that can't compute, still a computer?..

Mercutio
2nd April 2003, 10:26 AM
I'm a little surprised, on this site, that more people aren't questioning the existence of "mind" itself. I'm looking for the specific reference, but I've seen cognitive psychology [one version of the study of the study of the mind] termed "the new spiritualism." Evidence of "mind" is not really different from evidence of "soul" or "spirit" if we take "mind" as any sort of causal but non-physical entity. Minds, and souls, are simply assumed to exist, because we have always thought so, despite an absence of any evidence.

We know (much more than is commonly believed) the processes by which the brain works. We still do not know how the brain interacts with the mind, or which direction (or neither or both) is causal. How can a non-physical entity interact with a physical one, without violating TLOP (and winning a million bucks?)? Nobody can point to the mind, nearly 400 years after Descartes suggested the pineal gland. Such a long search with so little in the way of results? Sounds like parapsychology.

Diogenes
2nd April 2003, 10:36 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
I'm a little surprised, on this site, that more people aren't questioning the existence of "mind" itself.

I'll see if I can find you a couple of threads..


Rest assured, it has been questioned, extensively...

Mercutio
2nd April 2003, 10:39 AM
Thanks.(......I'm such a newbie...):p

Diogenes
2nd April 2003, 11:00 AM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Thanks.(......I'm such a newbie...):p

These should keep you busy for a while..

Materialism (http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&threadid=16168&highlight=conciousness)

Where does the soul go? (http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&threadid=16168&highlight=conciousness)

Pascals Wager (http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&threadid=9494&highlight=conciousness)

Gebeker
2nd April 2003, 12:37 PM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No I'm afraid it's the only word which is appropriate. We cannot declare a causal relationship. This is because the word "causal" ought only to be employed within the context of theories describing the world. Phenomenal consciousness is not implied by the totality of physical facts about the world. It is simply tacked on to the materialist metaphysic.

I don't think you understand what the word “correlational” means. The data I’ve cited is EXPERIMENTAL in nature, ***NOT*** correlational. A correlational study is one in which the researcher looks for relationships between variables that are not under experimental control. Application of pharmacological agents, lesion studies, and electrical stimulation are under the direct control of the experimenter. As such, we can infer causality from such studies. The word “causal” should be applied any time the experimental design is one that allows one to infer causality.

Suppose I conduct a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study of an antidepressant and find that depressed patients show significant improvement in mood when compared with the control group. In this case, the ONLY difference between the two groups is that one had the real drug and the other had the placebo. The whole point of such a rigorous design is to allow the researcher to determine causal relationships.

I would encourage you to take a course on research design. Anyone that is at all familiar with research design will tell you that such studies are experimental, NOT correlational.


As explained it is all correlational.


As explained above, you are mistaken.


Obviously not. You wouldn't talk about the taking of anti-depressants though. It's the physical changes within the brain brought about by anti-depresants which is crucial. So the question then is whether certain physical processes in the brain is one and the same thing as being in a less depressed mood.


Your argument seems to be the following:
1. All things that are physical in nature are (at least in theory) observable.

2. “Mind” is something that isn’t observable, even in theory.

3. Therefore, it must be nonphysical.

4. Physical processes alone cannot give rise to nonphysical phenomena.

5. If mind is nonphysical, then it cannot be solely the result of physical processes.

6. Therefore, consciousness must involve something like a soul.

There are several problems with this argument. First of all, the second premise assumes that the mind is not an illusion. That’s a point that many would disagree with (BillyJoe explained this idea pretty well with his “user illusion” post). So, if you want to “win” with philosophy here, you need to defeat this argument somehow.

Secondly, your fourth premise is clearly wrong if you accept the definition of “physical” given in your first premise. Take something like “mathematical ability”. Does it exist? Sure. Can you directly observe it? Nope. You can observe its effects, of course, just as you can observe the effects of “mind”. But you can’t really observe “mathematical ability”. Does this mean that mathematical ability requires something nonphysical? (Be careful before you say yes, here. Do you really want to have to argue that your calculator only works through some mystical, magical, nonphysical “something”?)


Well you're not quoting what I said. This is ludicrous. Where's the bit I put about modification? The taking of anti depressants does lead to an alleviation of mood. This I do not deny.

Yes, you did deny it. You denied it in this very post, where you claimed (incorrectly) that we can’t infer causality from such studies because they are correlational in nature. If you accept that antidepressants lead to an elevation of mood, then you also must accept that the brain plays a fundamental role in consciousness. So, if we both agree on that, then our only disagreement lies in the fact that you want to claim that something nonphysical is also necessary, whereas I claim that there is no reason to believe that. Thus, the burden of proof is on you here, because your “theory” of mind requires the existence of unproven entities, and mine does not.


What I am denying is that this somehow proves that the mind originates from the brain. I've already explained this. What is wrong with you??


What I am saying is that we have a great deal of evidence showing that the brain plays a fundamental role in consciousness. You have no evidence at all to suggest that anything nonphysical is necessary. I notice that you still have no evidence to show us.


It is not clear to me why it should be I who is required to provide evidence that the self and emotions are not identical or a property of physical processes. I'm taking the default sensible position that emotions are a manifestation of the self, and that this self is not identical to, or is a property of the physical.

As I said above, if you accept that antidepressants elevate mood by acting on the physical structure of the brain, then we both agree that the brain plays a role in consciousness. Thus, my theory of mind involves one entity: brain. Yours requires brain+[unproven nonphysical something]. Logically, the burden of proof should be on you here, because your "theory" of mind requires the existence of unproven entities and mine does not.


I mentioned all the evidence for survival. But really it's not a question of evidence because what we need to consider are competing metaphysical hypotheses. Does it make sense to suppose emotions are identical to, or are entailed by physical processes for example? These are the type of questions you need to address to see if your materialism is intelligible.

I have addressed these questions by citing evidence that clearly shows that the brain plays a very fundamental role in consciousness. I have repeatedly asked you for evidence showing us that consciousness requires something nonphysical, and you have no such evidence to offer.


Yes and it's irrelevant because my metaphysical hypotheses equally accounts for such correlations. Namely the soul operates through the brain, but is appropriately "filtered" by the brain, depending upon its condition, thereby resulting in the mind.

Your hypothesis does not account equally well for such observations. (THEY ARE NOT CORRELATIONS!!!!) My explanation requires only known phenomena (the brain). Your explanation requires the existence of a soul that is necessary for consciousness. Yet, you have offered us absolutely no evidence at all to support this idea. (Remember: even if you are completely convinced that the soul exists, that does nothing to support your position. You hypothesis requires a soul that plays a crucial role in human consciousness . So, you have to not only show us that the soul exists, but you need to also show us evidence that the soul is necessary for consciousness. Good luck on that one, my friend. :) )


Appealing to Occams razor is vacuous because materialists always define the most simple position as the one in accordance with their metaphysic, ie materialism.

I don’t think you understand Occam’s razor. Occam’s razor simply says that, if you have two competing explanations for a given observation, the one that is most likely to be right (all else being equal) is the one that requires the fewest unproven elements. My explanation for consciousness requires only the brain – an element that we both know exists and we both know plays a role in consciousness. So, my theory of mind requires zero unproven elements. Yours requires at least one (the undefined, nonphysical “something” that you seem so reluctant to tell us anything about).


If you applied Occams razor to TV sets you would conclude that the story line of a TV programme has its origin in the TV set's internal components!

Nonsense. If I apply Occam’s razor to TV sets, I conclude that the function of the TV can be explained using known phenomena. Again, you are misunderstanding Occam’s razor. It does **NOT** say that “the simplest explanation is the right one”.


Answered this above and in previous post.


Where? Where have you shown us any evidence at all to support your assertion that consciousness requires something nonphysical?


I could argue that correlations are equal evidence for my hypothesis. We need the brain to filter out certain perceptions and realities, otherwise I hazard a guess that we wouldn't be able to operate proficiently in this empirical reality.

The evidence I've cited is designed to show that the brain is necessary for consciousness, and that there is a very strong relationship between brain activity and consciousness. You want to add something nonphysical. I'm simply challenging you to justify that claim.


You need to understand what "scientific proof" means. It's impossible to have scientific proof for survival. For scientific proof to work you need a theory. A theory which has predictions which subsequent experimentation either fullfills or falsifies.

If you have no theory and no testable predictions, then on what grounds do you expect us to accept your assertion that consciousness requires something nonphysical? Suppose I decide that human consciousness is really a computer program running on some alien machine somewhere, with a little touch of magic thrown in by an alien wizard named Bob. This absurd “theory” of mind can explain all of the available data, too. (i.e. we think we have physical bodies and brains, but that’s just because the computer program fools us with tricky input) If I can’t provide any evidence to support this silly idea, why should anyone take it seriously?

By the same token, if you can't provide any evidence to support your assertion that consciousness requires something nonphysical, then why should we take that idea seriously?


The soul can't be identified with the mind because the mind changes all the time whilst presumably the soul would be unchanging. Think about what your mind is now compared to when you were 5 years old. The soul is that which makes you the very same person now, as when you were 5, or drunk, or suffering from Alzheimers etc.

Ok, so if the mind is not equal to soul, then you have to explain the basis for your assumption that the soul must play a role in human consciousness. Why couldn’t a religious person believe that he has a soul that contributes nothing at all to what he currently experiences as “mind”?


But even if materialism is correct, that doesn't mean the mind is an illusion now does it??


Can you prove to us that the mind is NOT an illusion (as described by BillyJoe)?


I believe the self is ontologically self-subsistent.

Do I understand you correctly? Are you saying that our minds have no ultimate origin?

Gebeker
2nd April 2003, 12:54 PM
Originally posted by metacristi


Gebeker there is a marked distinction between belief and 'objective knowledge'.It's clear from my posts that I haven't made any claims that I have objective knowledge for my position.In fact I am agnostic in what knowledge [regarding the nature of consciusness] is concerned:I do not know the how consciousness arise.

Well, no one can give a complete explanation for consciousness. At this point, all we can do is make statements about which ideas are most likely to be right. We **KNOW** that the brain is necessary for human consciousness, and we KNOW that there is a very strong relationship between brain activity and consciousness. However, we have no evidence at all that anything nonphysical is required. Therefore, the materialistic view of mind is more likely to be right than dualism.

Secondly,once clarified this,the problem is that there is no need to justify to you or to another one my belief since I claim nothing to others.If one wants to believe in your unicorn that's their problem,I have nothing against that,they can believe even that a stick created the universe...I am happy with that as much as no claim of having 'objective knowledge' is made.Only that,in my subjective system of values,I assign a very low probability to your unicorn to exist and therefore I choose not to believe in it.Conversely you are free to not believe in my metaphysics.It's as simple as that.

It's not quite that simple. To understand why, I would ask you this: why do you assign a very low probability to my unicorn hypothesis? I assign a very low probability to dualism for the same reason.


Still,since I consider myself a rational person,I must respect the rules of logic,never believe something without a reason.To justify a belief [different from creating new religions or dogmas] suffices to have even a 'subjective',strictly personal,'evidence' derived [preferably] from 'first hand' experiences.


I would respond by saying that our subjective intuitions are extremely unreliable, particularly when considering issues that are very far removed from normal experience.

The brain has many billions of neurons. Each one of those neurons is a tiny processor that can encode a surprising amount of information. Each one of those neurons makes connections with thousands of others. This is a level of processing power that absolutely defies human comprehension. When faced with something like that, our subjective impressions are highly unreliable. Consider some of the discoveries of relativity or quantum mechanics. The real world can be wildly different from what our subjective impressions tell us.

Diogenes
2nd April 2003, 01:22 PM
Originally posted by Gebeker:Can you prove to us that the mind is NOT an illusion (as described by BillyJoe)?

Just want to hold on to this thought.. And perhaps state the obvious.

If the mind is an illusion, then it is an illusion that everyone with a mind is experiencing, and therefore indistinquishable from what we choose to call reality.

Soapy Sam
2nd April 2003, 01:33 PM
There is an object. The object supports a number of processes. There is feedback between the processes and the object, which allow some restructuring of the object.
Illusion may be one of the outputs, but there is nothing illusory about either object or process.
fishbob was careful to avoid hardware/software analogies , but the metaphor has some value- for example noone would suggest the process of a running program is an illusion. It may not be REAL in some senses, but it exists all right.

Gebeker
2nd April 2003, 03:25 PM
Originally posted by Diogenes
Originally posted by Gebeker:

Just want to hold on to this thought.. And perhaps state the obvious.

If the mind is an illusion, then it is an illusion that everyone with a mind is experiencing, and therefore indistinquishable from what we choose to call reality.

Well, to some extent this is a matter of semantics. If you read BillyJoe's post, I don't think he means to say that we don't have a mind. I interpreted his post to mean that the mind doesn't exist in the same way that a brain exists, and it doesn't exist in the way that some people believe a soul exists. According to this idea the mind is real, but the illusion is the introspective impression that "mind" is an entity separate from the functions of the brain.

Does "mathematical ability" exist? Sure. Does it exist as a nonphysical entity, with some sort of supernatural component? Nah. A calculator certainly has mathematical ability. Yet, it would be really bizarre to imagine that its mathematical ability is an entity, beyond just being something that comes from a functioning calculator.

chance
2nd April 2003, 06:52 PM
mercutio How can a non-physical entity interact with a physical one, without violating TLOP (and winning a million bucks?)? Nobody can point to the mind, nearly 400 years after Descartes suggested the pineal gland I think that is what is being argued here, that the mind is not some non-physical entity, rather the product of X number of neurons reaching some critical mass that results in consciousness.

Mercutio
2nd April 2003, 07:24 PM
quote:
I think that is what is being argued here, that the mind is not some non-physical entity, rather the product of X number of neurons reaching some critical mass that results in consciousness.


ok, now define consciousness in a non-mentalistic manner. :cool:

seriously, whether you use the term mind or consciousness, I get the feeling that the going opinion is that it exists in a literal sense. Maybe I'm just used to hearing that argument. Oh, and I don't think it is a particular number of neurons reaching a metaphorical critical mass--rather, it is the development of a language complex enough to speak metaphorically. (bet you saw that coming.)

2nd April 2003, 08:42 PM
Originally posted by Mercutio
Thanks.(......I'm such a newbie...):p


It is ok. So is Diogenes.

2nd April 2003, 08:44 PM
The brain perhaps is a function of the 'mind'.

BillyJoe
3rd April 2003, 03:58 AM
Originally posted by Whodini
The brain perhaps is a function of the 'mind'. Good one Whodini :D :D :D
But I saw that sheep in your avatar ;) You can't fool me :cool:

Interesting Ian
3rd April 2003, 05:53 AM
Gebeker
I don't think you understand what the word “correlational” means. The data I’ve cited is EXPERIMENTAL in nature, ***NOT*** correlational. A correlational study is one in which the researcher looks for relationships between variables that are not under experimental control. Application of pharmacological agents, lesion studies, and electrical stimulation are under the direct control of the experimenter. As such, we can infer causality from such studies. The word “causal” should be applied any time the experimental design is one that allows one to infer causality.

Suppose I conduct a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study of an antidepressant and find that depressed patients show significant improvement in mood when compared with the control group. In this case, the ONLY difference between the two groups is that one had the real drug and the other had the placebo. The whole point of such a rigorous design is to allow the researcher to determine causal relationships.

I would encourage you to take a course on research design. Anyone that is at all familiar with research design will tell you that such studies are experimental, NOT correlational.



First things first. I want to make it clear that I have absolutely zero interest in research design, nor have I any interest in correlational studies. Get it through your head that this is a philosophical problem, and not at all a scientific problem, although science may give us clues. I have informed you the relationship between brain events and mental events is correlational rather than causal. Nevertheless you want to describe the relationship as causal. Well fine. But bear in mind that even if a one to one correlation is dicovered between all mental events and brain events, this will not have explained the existence of consciousness whatsoever.

To explain consciousness from the perspective of a materialist based metaphysic, you need to either of one of two things.

a) If you are a reductionist materialist, then you hold that (phenomenal) consciousness is identical to, or is logically entailed by physical facts. Thus you must demonstrate this to be so. Clearly demonstrating correlations or a "causal" relationship between the mental and physical does not do this.

b) You are not a reductionist materialist, in which case, in a suitable sense, you suppose consciousness exists in its own right, although it is ontologically dependent on the physical. In this case you need to explain (phenomenal) consciousness by it being an essential element in some overarching theory. Given that phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficacious (otherwise the physical world isn't closed), I fail to see how it could be so conbsidered to be an essential element.

I suggest to you that it is in principle impossible to account for the existence of consciouness.

Now I'll answer the rest of your post if and when I have time.

BillHoyt
3rd April 2003, 06:24 AM
Get it through your head that this is a philosophical problem, and not at all a scientific problem, although science may give us clues. I have informed you the relationship between brain events and mental events is correlational rather than causal.

Nobody is going to accept this, Ian. You have set up the ground rules for yourself so that science doesn't apply when you don't like the results, but can give you clues when you do like the results. You've set up that you can use 'correlational' and 'causal' when it suits you, cherry-pick scientific research when it suits you, and dismiss science when it doesn't.

And you wonder why you're number 3 or so on the "Most Likely to be on an Ignore List" list. :rolleyes:

Cheers,

BillyJoe
3rd April 2003, 06:28 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Get it through your head that this is a philosophical problem, and not at all a scientific problem. Better tell Whodini who dini this in the Science forum.

Hal (my dear friend)......
Piss this thread off out of our Science forum will you?
Dump it in that garbage disposal unit euphemistically called R&P.


Done.


Thanks Hal (mate).

Stimpson J. Cat
3rd April 2003, 06:37 AM
Ian,

To explain consciousness from the perspective of a materialist based metaphysic, you need to either of one of two things.

a) If you are a reductionist materialist, then you hold that (phenomenal) consciousness is identical to, or is logically entailed by physical facts. Thus you must demonstrate this to be so. Clearly demonstrating correlations or a "causal" relationship between the mental and physical does not do this.

Clearly, as a reductionist materialist, I think that phenomenal consciousness can, at least in principle, be shown to be logically entailed by physical facts. What I don't understand is why you are so certain that this is not possible.

A couple of points:

1) You have made it clear that nothing short of being able to formally deduce the existence of phenomenal consciousness from physical facts will convince you that the materialists are correct. Do you really believe that such a deduction is not, even in principle, possible? If not, why not? Where is your evidence that this cannot be done. I remind you that the fact that it has not yet been done does not constitute such evidence, particularly when you consider that we still only know a tiny fraction of the relevant physical facts.

2) Are you aware that consciousness is not unique in this regard? For example, we cannot logically deduce chemical properties from quantum mechanics (yet). would you argue that this somehow implies that chemistry is not reducible to physics?

3) You have asserted, repeatedly, that this is a philosophical issue, and not a scientific one. How do you know? Unless you can prove that phenomenal consciousness can not, even in principle, be reduced to physical facts, you cannot claim that it is not a scientific issue.

It sounds to me like you are asserting that materialism is false, demanding that it be proven true, and then citing the fact that we cannot prove it true as evidence that it is false. Do you not realize that this is a fallacy?

Dr. Stupid

Interesting Ian
3rd April 2003, 07:34 AM
Originally posted by Gebeker


Your argument seems to be the following:
1. All things that are physical in nature are (at least in theory) observable.



Observable in the sense they play a fruitful role in some successful theory. All our observations, even of everyday mundane objects, implicitly incorporate low level theory.



2. “Mind” is something that isn’t observable, even in theory.



Consciousness or mental events, not mind! Anyway, only if consciousness is not identical, or is a logical necessary function of certain physical processes.



3. Therefore, it must be nonphysical.

4. Physical processes alone cannot give rise to nonphysical phenomena.



Where have I stated "4"?



5. If mind is nonphysical, then it cannot be solely the result of physical processes.



No I haven't stated this. :rolleyes:



6. Therefore, consciousness must involve something like a soul.



I haven't stated this. What I've stated is that it's the best hypothesis given the evidence and overall intelligibility.



There are several problems with this argument. First of all, the second premise assumes that the mind is not an illusion. That’s a point that many would disagree with (BillyJoe explained this idea pretty well with his “user illusion” post). So, if you want to “win” with philosophy here, you need to defeat this argument somehow.



Please be more specific. Are you talking about minds or consciousnesses? If the latter then it's easy to refute your position. In order to declare something is an illusion we must be in a position to declare what it would be like if it were real. For example, if I witness a visual illusion I know that it is an illusion because I would not receive a tactile sensation on attempting to touch it. But what does it mean to say that consciousness is an illusion? An illusion compared to what? The point is we experience things. We experience redness, hope, despair, pain or whatever. What meaning can be attached in saying all these experiences are illusions? And if you're maintaining that these experiences are real, but the mind is an illusion, then again I would say this is meaningless because the mind is just the author or experiencer of all these experiences.

It seems that the only way you can say that minds/consciousnesses are an iullusion would be to deny that people actually have any experiences. No-one ever feels hope, depair, redness etc. Metphysical behaviourists/eliminative materialists hold this position as far as I am able to understand these things. Do you also hold this position?



Secondly, your fourth premise is clearly wrong if you accept the definition of “physical” given in your first premise. Take something like “mathematical ability”. Does it exist? Sure. Can you directly observe it? Nope. You can observe its effects, of course, just as you can observe the effects of “mind”. But you can’t really observe “mathematical ability”. Does this mean that mathematical ability requires something nonphysical? (Be careful before you say yes, here. Do you really want to have to argue that your calculator only works through some mystical, magical, nonphysical “something”?)


What is this nonsense?? :eek: You either are implicitly invoking consciousness when you use the term "mathematical ability", in which case you are simply begging the question, or you're simply referring to a step by step procedure where such step is a logically necessary consequence of the previous step. Your mention of the calculater implies the latter. But one can see this process go on. Just imagine a mechanical computer with cogs and wheels and what not!

Gebeker
3rd April 2003, 08:29 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
First things first. I want to make it clear that I have absolutely zero interest in research design, nor have I any interest in correlational studies.


If you have no interest in research design, then why criticize the conclusions of research?


Get it through your head that this is a philosophical problem, and not at all a scientific problem, although science may give us clues.

I have never disputed that philosophy plays a very important role in this question. My point has always been that science gives us some very important clues.


I have informed you the relationship between brain events and mental events is correlational rather than causal. Nevertheless you want to describe the relationship as causal. Well fine. But bear in mind that even if a one to one correlation is dicovered between all mental events and brain events, this will not have explained the existence of consciousness whatsoever.

You continue to misunderstand the meaning of the term “correlational”, and I suspect that the reason why is that you have no interest in research design (by your own admission). If you have no interest in research design, why is it so hard to believe that you may be misunderstanding the design and conclusions drawn from the scientific studies I’ve cited?

Correlational: Did you know that, if you take a random sample of the population, you will discover that tall people are more likely to get prostate cancer than short people? Thus, there is a correlation between height and risk of prostate cancer. However, this is not because being tall makes you get cancer. The correlation exists because of a third factor (being male). Only males get prostate cancer, and males are taller than females (on the average). In other words, you can’t conclude that a causal relationship exists just because of a correlation.

*NOT* correlational: You give newly discover ed drug “X” to 200 people and a placebo to another 200 people in a randomized, double blind, controlled study. People that took drug X have 5 times the incidence of prostate cancer as people that got the placebo. In this case, we have learned something about the ***CAUSAL*** relationship between drug X and prostate cancer.

Now, when I say that antidepressants ***CAUSE*** a change in people’s mental states, I am quite justified in saying that there is a causal relationship there. Similarly, when a brain surgeon removes specific portions of a person’s brain, and the person shows specific (and predictable) effects on “mind”, I am quite justified in saying that there is a causal relationship there, as well. These observations (plus the others I’ve mentioned) tell us that there is a very strong relationship between brain activity and mental states, and that the brain is necessary for consciousness. Does this absolutely prove that the brain alone is sufficient? No, and I have never claimed that these data provide proof that a materialistic view of mind is correct.

My point is, was, and will continue to be this: We have solid evidence that the brain is necessary for consciousness, and we have strong evidence that there is a (VERY strong) relationship between brain activity and conscious mental states. A great many mental activities (including such higher functions as decision making) are so strongly related to neural activity that they can (under certain conditions, at least) be unfailingly predicted by observing the activity of a single neuron. This tells me that the brain plays an extremely important role in consciousness. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that anything other than the brain is necessary for consciousness. Therefore, Occam’s razor tells us that a materialistic theory of mind is more likely to be right than dualism.

In the rest of your post, you seem to want to shift the burden of proof to me. This is inappropriate, because I have never claimed that we have proof that a materialistic theory of mind is correct. My claim has always been that materialistic theories of mind are more likely to be right (for reasons that I’ve explained repeatedly). In short, dualism is like my invisible unicorn theory. No one can disprove it, but why on earth would anyone believe in it?


I suggest to you that it is in principle impossible to account for the existence of consciouness.


Yes, and that is all you have done: suggest it. You’ve provided no reason at all why we should accept your “suggestion”. :)

Interesting Ian
3rd April 2003, 08:30 AM
Originally posted by BillHoyt


Nobody is going to accept this, Ian. You have set up the ground rules for yourself so that science doesn't apply when you don't like the results, but can give you clues when you do like the results. You've set up that you can use 'correlational' and 'causal' when it suits you,



If any scientist in this forum disagrees that it would strictly speaking be illegitimate to describe the relationship between brain events and mental events as a causal relationship, when we merely have correlations between brain events and mental events, then let him speak up and say so.

Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event A and event B to be logically distinct, and A is inevitably followed by B, but there is a lack of any theories accounting for this, would this be technically speaking a causal relationship? Or would it merely be an interesting correlation which might turn out to be causal? Stimpy?



cherry-pick scientific research when it suits you, and dismiss science when it doesn't.



I dismiss nothing of science. I am a huge fan of science. But maybe I dismiss what some scientists may assert. I do not believe science can solve the mind/body problem. I do not believe that our scientific description of reality characterises our reality per se. I do not believe it has any particular metaphysical implications apart from being suggestive of a "God" (and possibly QM may hint at the vacuousness of the idea of a reality existing in abstraction from our sensory experiences although I don't know), but nevertheless I think science is great.



And you wonder why you're number 3 or so on the "Most Likely to be on an Ignore List" list. :rolleyes:



Where is this list? If what you're saying is true this is absolutely appalling and doesn't say much for the people who contribute to these forums.

Interesting Ian
3rd April 2003, 08:34 AM
Originally posted by Gebeker


If you have no interest in research design, then why criticize the conclusions of research?


Because the conclusion does not follow from the research.

Gebeker
3rd April 2003, 09:04 AM
I’m not going to address most of your responses to the formal argument I discussed. The argument I gave, and refuted, was an attempt to guess the specifics of your reasoning, since you seem to be completely unwilling to give us any specifics about your theory of mind. (That’s good debate strategy, but it’s bad science and bad philosophy.)

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It seems that the only way you can say that minds/consciousnesses are an iullusion would be to deny that people actually have any experiences. No-one ever feels hope, depair, redness etc. Metphysical behaviourists/eliminative materialists hold this position as far as I am able to understand these things. Do you also hold this position?
What some people (including me) are suggesting is this:
Our introspective impression is that our consciousness is an entity in its own right, apart from the functions of the brain. However, this is an illusion. I’m not denying that we have minds, and I’m not denying that we have consciousness. What I am saying is that there is no reason to suppose that minds or consciousness exist as independent entities, in the way that rocks, trees, and automobiles exist, or in the way that some people believe that souls exist as entities.


What is this nonsense?? You either are implicitly invoking consciousness when you use the term "mathematical ability", in which case you are simply begging the question, or you're simply referring to a step by step procedure where such step is a logically necessary consequence of the previous step.

Using the term “mathematical ability” does not implicitly consciousness. Do you think that your calculator has consciousness?


Your mention of the calculater implies the latter. But one can see this process go on. Just imagine a mechanical computer with cogs and wheels and what not!

Ok, let’s imagine your mechanical computer with cogs and wheels: what is it that we actually observe? We actually observe the movements of the cogs and wheels and we observe the output (the answer). In the same way, what do we observe in a brain? We observe the activity of single neurons, groups of neurons, and distinct areas of the brain. And, we observe the output. Other than the fact that the observation is much harder to do in the case of a brain, what is the difference? My point is simply that you seem to want to believe* that consciousness is an entity that somehow exists independently of the brain, whereas I would say that consciousness is simply what you get when you have an appropriately wired brain. You assert that something other than a materialistic view of mind is more likely to be right than materialism, yet you give us no evidence or logical argument to justify that position.

*I’m guessing here, because you have been extremely reluctant to give us any details concerning your own theory of mind, or by what line of reasoning you arrived at it.

Gebeker
3rd April 2003, 09:15 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If any scientist in this forum disagrees that it would strictly speaking be illegitimate to describe the relationship between brain events and mental events as a causal relationship, when we merely have correlations between brain events and mental events, then let him speak up and say so.

I am a scientist, and I have spoken up already and said so. I have tried my best to explain to you why. We can exert experimental control over those brain events. Thus, it is inappropriate to describe the results of such studies as "correlational".


Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event A and event B to be logically distinct, and A is inevitably followed by B, but there is a lack of any theories accounting for this, would this be technically speaking a causal relationship? Or would it merely be an interesting correlation which [b]might turn out to be causal? Stimpy?


Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event B to be CAUSED by event A, and we can do the following:

1. Experimentally alter event A and observe the effects on event B. We then observe consistent, reliable effects on event B.

2. Experimentally remove event A. When we do this, we observe that event B goes away.

3. Measure event A very precisely, and show that event B can be predicted with great accuracy based on event A.

4. Find a case where event B is absent, and restore it by altering event A.

Given all of the above, we are quite justified in concluding that event A causes event B. We may not have proof that event B is *ONLY* caused by event A, but we've shown that it is quite reasonable to believe that event B is solely caused by event A when there is no evidence at all to suggest that anything other than event A is necessary to have event B.

Interesting Ian
3rd April 2003, 09:33 AM
Originally posted by Gebeker

If any scientist in this forum disagrees that it would strictly speaking be illegitimate to describe the relationship between brain events and mental events as a causal relationship, when we merely have correlations between brain events and mental events, then let him speak up and say so.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I am a scientist, and I have spoken up already and said so. I have tried my best to explain to you why. We can exert experimental control over those brain events. Thus, it is inappropriate to describe the results of such studies as "correlational".


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event A and event B to be logically distinct, and A is inevitably followed by B, but there is a lack of any theories accounting for this, would this be technically speaking a causal relationship? Or would it merely be an interesting correlation which [b]might turn out to be causal? Stimpy?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event B to be CAUSED by event A, and we can do the following:

1. Experimentally alter event A and observe the effects on event B. We then observe consistent, reliable effects on event B.

2. Experimentally remove event A. When we do this, we observe that event B goes away.

3. Measure event A very precisely, and show that event B can be predicted with great accuracy based on event A.

4. Find a case where event B is absent, and restore it by altering event A.

Given all of the above, we are quite justified in concluding that event A causes event B. We may not have proof that event B is *ONLY* caused by event A, but we've shown that it is quite reasonable to believe that event B is solely caused by event A when there is no evidence at all to suggest that anything other than event A is



Gebeker. I am quite happy with your definition of causality since I believe it is up to scientists to define what it means. Well, as long as they don't indulge in stupidities such as declaring that causality represents an innate power in nature!

It seems that there are 2 meanings to causality then, the one i gave and the one you've provided. I think your definition of causality is highly dodgy though, and it certainly doesn't help you one iota in claiming that the brain is the origin of consciousness. No need for you to respond at this juncture though because you've already given your arguments which I have yet to respond to. I'm afraid I won't be able to get round to responding to you today though.

Edited to add:

Oh just one thing I feel it might be useful to correct. I am not a dualist. I am a subjective idealist. I believe that what we refer to as "material reality" is a manifestion of mind or minds (its existence is ontologically dependent on minds).

BillHoyt
3rd April 2003, 09:36 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If any scientist in this forum disagrees that it would strictly speaking be illegitimate to describe the relationship between brain events and mental events as a causal relationship, when we merely have correlations between brain events and mental events, then let him speak up and say so.

Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event A and event B to be logically distinct, and A is inevitably followed by B, but there is a lack of any theories accounting for this, would this be technically speaking a causal relationship? Or would it merely be an interesting correlation which might turn out to be causal? Stimpy?

II,

Knowledge of causation does not require either theory or knowledge of mechanism. John Stuart Mills long ago established the basic rules that move us from correlation to causation. They are:


1. The cause and effect have to be related,

2. The cause has to precede the effect in time; and

3. No plausible alternative explanation of the effect is reasonable.


To elaborate on number 3, Mills established these basic methods, at the heart of so much modern science:

1. Method of Agreement - the effect is present when the cause is present,

2. Method of Differences - the effect is absent absent the cause; and

3. Method of Concomitant Variation - when both 1 and 2 (above) are observed, causal inference is strengthened because certain other interpretations of the covariation between cause and effect can be ruled out.

With Mills now in mind, go back over Gebecker's last post.

Cheers,

Gebeker
3rd April 2003, 09:52 AM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Oh just one thing I feel it might be useful to correct. I am not a dualist. I am a subjective idealist. I believe that what we refer to as "material reality" is a manifestion of mind or minds (its existence is ontologically dependent on minds).

Thanks, Ian. This is helpful. I've been thinking that you were a dualist. When you have time, could I get you to give me (preferably in a formal argument) what you think the arguments are in favor of subjective idealism? I'm somewhat familiar with such arguments already, but I don't want to waste your time by refuting a formal argument that you wouldn't make. ;)

Take your time. I've been spending more time on this than I should, so I may be away from the thread for a day or two anyway. :)

Stimpson J. Cat
3rd April 2003, 10:19 AM
Ian,

Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event A and event B to be logically distinct, and A is inevitably followed by B, but there is a lack of any theories accounting for this, would this be technically speaking a causal relationship? Or would it merely be an interesting correlation which might turn out to be causal? Stimpy?

In your hypothetical example, I would say that is correlation which could be causal. But I do not think that this is a reasonable characterization of the current state of research with respect to consciousness.

If you have no interest in research design, then why criticize the conclusions of research?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because the conclusion does not follow from the research.

How would you know?

You have flat out stated that you "have absolutely zero interest in research design", and "have no interest in correlational studies". This would suggest to me that you are poorly qualified to be making assessments about the scientific research in this, or any other area of research. On one hand you are asserting that you have no interest in the kind of research that people are claiming shows a causal relationship between brain activity and consciousness, but on the other hand you are confidently asserting that there is no causal relationship, and that the research does not indicate such a relationship, even when people who are knowledgable about the research say otherwise.

There is nothing wrong with having an opinion about something. But boldly asserting that opinion when you don't have the knowledge to back it up is pretty presumptuous. And stating that you have no interest in learning about it, in spite of your insistence on authoritatively stating your opinion about it, is just plain willful ignorance.

Dr. Stupid

metacristi
3rd April 2003, 10:27 AM
Gebeker



Well, no one can give a complete explanation for consciousness. At this point, all we can do is make statements about which ideas are most likely to be right.


Well the problem is that this 'no one' include the materialistic approach as a whole too of how consciousness arise not only individuals.The reality is that we do not know,no hypothesis really has the edge.Nothing disprove yet conclusively the 'extended materialism' position for example [the soul is seen as material too but interacting very faintly with 'usual' matter we can 'measure'].Even dualism is a strong contender.So that we [you and me] can make safely contradictory statements which are however totally compatible with the observed reality as a matter of belief.The fact that you prefer tradition to nonconformism is irrelevant in such cases.Tradition is never a proof.



We **KNOW** that the brain is necessary for human consciousness, and we KNOW that there is a very strong relationship between brain activity and consciousness.


Yes we know.So what?This does not 'confirm' materialism as being superior to the other approaches nor can it qualify as an experimental falsification of dualism or of 'extended materialism'.
At most you could try to prove that dualism or the extended materialist positions are incoherent logically [not the case] or that they are incompatible with the observed facts [which you tried in fact].

All hypotheses have 'holes' in understanding the conscious experience.In fact nothing makes materialism superior to other acceptable positions in the key problems regarding consciousness,in the light of known facts.The most important for me at least [apart from 'qualia'] is why should emergent properties due to computational complexity produce consciousness?From all evidence we have no emergent phenomenon that becomes conscious:water for example is an emergent phenomenon:its properties cannot be deduced from the properties of H and O atoms,in fact all matter at macroscopic level is an emergent phenomenon of quantum level and so on.
In fact the materialistic approach is prefered as the main 'working hypothesis' in the virtue of the parsimony principle and yes of tradition [materialism has always worked so far].Or we all know very well that Ockham's Razor or the tradition argument cannot count as proofs.At most they indicate the order of preferences in the frame of reference given by the scientific method.
Still all other coherent hypotheses,compatible with all observed facts,are not proved inferior.The assumption that materialism can explain consciousness is still only an axiom in spite of 'confirming' it everyday in a wide range of physical domains...




However, we have no evidence at all that anything nonphysical is required. Therefore, the materialistic view of mind is more likely to be right than dualism.


The absence of evidence does not mean the evidence of absence.To think otherwise means to commit the Ad Ignorantiam fallacy.For example a system of axioms containing God [defined merely as the creator of universe] as an extra axiom beyond those of science is not at all inferior in spite of the fact that 'God hypothesis' plays no fruitful role in our scientific theories...or that it could virtually 'explain' everything...they are equally valid.

Your conclusion is hasty.Why is materialism 'more likely' to be right?I see no reason to assume that apart from tradition.You should be very careful here,to prove that materialism is superior you should prove false all other competing hypotheses,idealism on the first place-in fact this is a problem for the science as a whole.You lose your time by trying in vain to prove them incompatible with current evidence regarding consciousness,one can easily find such arguments for materialism itself...



It's not quite that simple. To understand why, I would ask you this: why do you assign a very low probability to my unicorn hypothesis? I assign a very low probability to dualism for the same reason.


I don't understand.What 'same reason'?There is no necessary connection between let's say the 'God hypothesis' and the 'unicorn hypothesis'.Besides there is an abyss between a simple opinion and a positive claim.
What you did was to assume that all alternative hypotheses attempting to explain consciousness were already proved inferior to materialism based on observed evidence.Not a valid inference as I argued above.
You made an positive statement,[U]a claim,of having 'objective knowledge' or I presented only a subjective opinion witohut claiming anything.You assigned an 'objective' probability,I only a 'subjective' probability.A huge difference.

Interesting Ian
3rd April 2003, 10:43 AM
Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you have no interest in research design, then why criticize the conclusions of research?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because the conclusion does not follow from the research.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



How would you know?



Because scientific research cannot acheive the miraculous. In supposing it can you are misunderstanding the nature of science; what its legimate area of concern is. There is nothing, nor could there ever be anything about the physical facts of the world (ie those facts discernable from a third person perspective) which suggest or imply phenomenal consciousness. I''m afraid that scientific research is simply not relevant pal.



You have flat out stated that you "have absolutely zero interest in research design", and "have no interest in correlational studies". This would suggest to me that you are poorly qualified to be making assessments about the scientific research in this, or any other area of research.



I do not need to make an assessment of the scientific research since it cannot acheive that which is impossible.




On one hand you are asserting that you have no interest in the kind of research that people are claiming shows a causal relationship between brain activity and consciousness,




Such a "causal" relationship, in the sense that Gebeker has defined it, is an irrelevance.



but on the other hand you are confidently asserting that there is no causal relationship, and that the research does not indicate such a relationship, even when people who are knowledgable about the research say otherwise.


If there is a causal relationship as the physicist would define it then this is completely different. But I would assert that such a causal relationship is in principle impossible. How can any scientific research get around that which is in principle impossible?? If phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficaceous, then how can it play a fruitful role in any theory? If on the other hand phenomenal consciousness is logically entailed by third person physical processes, then this isn't a causal relationship. For A to cause B, A and B can neither be numerically identical, nor can A logically entail B. A causal relationship betweeen "A" and "B" implies a natural relationship rather than a logical relationship.

BillHoyt
3rd April 2003, 10:50 AM
If there is a causal relationship as the physicist would define it then this is completely different. I would assert that such a causal relationship is in principle impossible. How can any scientific research get around that which is in principle impossible?? If phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficaceous, then how can it play a fruitful role in any theory? If on the other hand phenomenal consciousness is logically entailed by third person physical processes, then this isn't a causal relationship. For A to cause B, A and B can neither be numerically identical, nor can A logically entail B. A causal relationship betweeen "A" and "B" implies a natural relationship rather than a logical relationship.

Pretzel logic. You need to toss in some salt, II. If there is a causal relationship you would assert it is, in principle, impossible? Let's see now, how twisted can we get on epistemology here?

"No! No, I will not look through the telescope. That is the devil's instrument. I don't care if you think you see another planet out there!"

"No! No, I will not acknowledge scientifc findings that demonstrate a causal relationship between mind and brain. It is only a correlation! A causal relationship is, in principle, impossible."

Anybody else here done with this twit? Or does the twit wish to re-work his "logic?"

Cheers,

Interesting Ian
3rd April 2003, 10:57 AM
II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If there is a causal relationship as the physicist would define it then this is completely different. I would assert that such a causal relationship is in principle impossible. How can any scientific research get around that which is in principle impossible?? If phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficaceous, then how can it play a fruitful role in any theory? If on the other hand phenomenal consciousness is logically entailed by third person physical processes, then this isn't a causal relationship. For A to cause B, A and B can neither be numerically identical, nor can A logically entail B. A causal relationship betweeen "A" and "B" implies a natural relationship rather than a logical relationship.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


BillHoyt
Pretzel logic. You need to toss in some salt, II. If there is a causal relationship you would assert it is, in principle, impossible? Let's see now, how twisted can we get on epistemology here?

"No! No, I will not look through the telescope. That is the devil's instrument. I don't care if you think you see another planet out there!"

"No! No, I will not acknowledge scientifc findings that demonstrate a causal relationship between mind and brain. It is only a correlation! A causal relationship is, in principle, impossible."

Anybody else here done with this twit? Or does the twit wish to re-work his "logic?"



If there is some error in the paragraph of mine you have quoted above, then please state what it is rather than go off on a tangent.

Edited to add: Maybe you're misunderstanding what I'm saying. Try putting a "But" at the start of my second sentence sa that it now says:

"But I would assert that such a causal relationship is in principle impossible". ( I shall edit my original post)

Stimpson J. Cat
3rd April 2003, 11:27 AM
Ian,

Because the conclusion does not follow from the research.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

How would you know?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because scientific research cannot acheive the miraculous. In supposing it can you are misunderstanding the nature of science;

Nobody is suggesting that science can accomplish the miraculous.

what its legimate area of concern is. There is nothing, nor could there ever be anything about the physical facts of the world (ie those facts discernable from a third person perspective) which suggest or imply phenomenal consciousness. I''m afraid that scientific research is simply not relevant pal.

You have claimed this many, many times. What you have never done is given any good reason why anybody should believe it is true, much less any actual evidence that it is true. What, are we just supposed to take your word for it?

You have flat out stated that you "have absolutely zero interest in research design", and "have no interest in correlational studies". This would suggest to me that you are poorly qualified to be making assessments about the scientific research in this, or any other area of research.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I do not need to make an assessment of the scientific research since it cannot acheive that which is impossible.

This is nothing more than a metaphysical assumption you have made. Which makes more sense? To assume that a particular endeavor is impossible, and never even try, or to assume that it is possible until such time as it is demonstrated not to be?

Give us a good reason to believe it is impossible. I am not so pessimistic as to simply assume it is a-priori.

On one hand you are asserting that you have no interest in the kind of research that people are claiming shows a causal relationship between brain activity and consciousness,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Such a "causal" relationship, in the sense that Gebeker has defined it, is an irrelevance.

How so? You apparently want to hold research on consciousness to a higher (and impossible) standard than other things. Why? Do you not realize that it is, in general, impossible to prove causation in the strict sense? The best we can do is show that a causal relationship is the most parsimonious explanation for the observed correlations. In the case of consciousness, the scientific evidence, which you so blissfully ignore, clearly demonstrates that a causal relationship between brain activity and phenomenal consciousness is the most parsimonious explanation for the observed correlations. That is how science works.

but on the other hand you are confidently asserting that there is no causal relationship, and that the research does not indicate such a relationship, even when people who are knowledgable about the research say otherwise.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If there is a causal relationship as the physicist would define it then this is completely different.

I am puzzled as to what you think a physicists definition of causality would be. Although the definition Gebeker provided was a bit oversimplified, it is essentially the standard used throughout science. The conditions he outlined are exactly the type of conditions under which a causal relationship is the most parsimonious explanation.

I would assert that such a causal relationship is in principle impossible. How can any scientific research get around that which is in principle impossible??

You can assert that until you are blue in the face. Can't you wrap your mind around the fact that many very intelligent and knowledgable people simply don't agree with this assertion?

If phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficaceous, then how can it play a fruitful role in any theory?

It can't. But since it clearly is causally efficacious, as evidenced by the fact that its very existence has caused us to be having this discussion, the point is moot.

If on the other hand phenomenal consciousness is logically entailed by third person physical processes, then this isn't a causal relationship. For A to cause B, A and B can neither be numerically identical, nor can A logically entail B. A causal relationship betweeen "A" and "B" implies a natural relationship rather than a logical relationship.

What's your point? The hypothesis supported by materialists is that consciousness is a physical process of the brain. The causal relationship being posited is not "brain causes mind", but rather "alterations to the brain cause effects on mental states". The causal relationships are evidence in support of the theory. They constitute such supporting evidence because the existence of such causal relationships is predicted by the theory, and because the theory is falsifiable.

Thus according to the theory, consciousness is logically entailed by physical brain activity, and a causal relationship exists between physical influences on the brain and changes to mental states.

Now why, exactly, do you claim that this scenario is impossible? Other than the fact that you believe it is?

Dr. Stupid

BillHoyt
3rd April 2003, 11:33 AM
Ian: "If there is some error in the paragraph of mine you have quoted above, then please state what it is rather than go off on a tangent."

Stimpy: "I am puzzled as to what you think a physicists definition of causality would be. Although the definition Gebeker provided was a bit oversimplified, it is essentially the standard used throughout science. The conditions he outlined are exactly the type of conditions under which a causal relationship is the most parsimonious explanation."

I'll also cite my post on Mills as well as Gebeker's description of the same. It is time, Ian, for you to do some reading. Go back through what Gebeker, Stimpy and I have written.

Cheers,

Interesting Ian
3rd April 2003, 12:25 PM
Haven't got time to respond to people at this moment, but could we get rid of a source of confusion?

All the materialists are conflating the 2 distinct definitions of causation that have been given, namely my own and Gebeker's.

Now what I require to know is if the materialists are denying there is any such distinction?

To remind you of the notion of causality that I provided. I mentioned that an event or existent is causally efficaceous if it plays a fruitful role in some successful theory describing the world or part of the world.

However Gebeker prvided what I consider a different definition of causality. He said that causal relationship between event A and event B pertains if:


1. Experimentally alter event A and observe the effects on event B. We then observe consistent, reliable effects on event B.

2. Experimentally remove event A. When we do this, we observe that event B goes away.

3. Measure event A very precisely, and show that event B can be predicted with great accuracy based on event A.

4. Find a case where event B is absent, and restore it by altering event A.



Now note I am not quarrrelling with his definition of causality. I do however maintain it is different from my own. Are people denying there is any such distinction?

Thanks.

BillHoyt
3rd April 2003, 12:36 PM
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Haven't got time to respond to people at this moment, but could we get rid of a source of confusion?

All the materialists are conflating the 2 distinct definitions of causation that have been given, namely my own and Gebeker's.

Now what I require to know is if the materialists are denying there is any such distinction?

To remind you of the notion of causality that I provided. I mentioned that an event or existent is causally efficaceous if it plays a fruitful role in some successful theory describing the world or part of the world.

However Gebeker prvided what I consider a different definition of causality. He said that causal relationship between event A and event B pertains if:



Now note I am not quarrrelling with his definition of causality. I do however maintain it is different from my own. Are people denying there is any such distinction?

Thanks.

Gebeker described causation in scientific terms. You are trying to run us down the epiphenomenality road.

Cheers,

Stimpson J. Cat
3rd April 2003, 12:43 PM
Ian,

To remind you of the notion of causality that I provided. I mentioned that an event or existent is causally efficaceous if it plays a fruitful role in some successful theory describing the world or part of the world.

However Gebeker prvided what I consider a different definition of causality. He said that causal relationship between event A and event B pertains if:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Experimentally alter event A and observe the effects on event B. We then observe consistent, reliable effects on event B.

2. Experimentally remove event A. When we do this, we observe that event B goes away.

3. Measure event A very precisely, and show that event B can be predicted with great accuracy based on event A.

4. Find a case where event B is absent, and restore it by altering event A.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Now note I am not quarrrelling with his definition of causality. I do however maintain it is different from my own. Are people denying there is any such distinction?

I recognize that there is a distinction. I also recognize that you are talking about two different things.

First there is the issue of whether scientific research demonstrates that there is a causal relationship between brain activity and mental states. According to both definitions, there is.

Second, there is the question of whether phenomenal consciousness is causally efficacious. With respect to that, I have a couple of points.

1) We know that phenomenal consciousness exist.

2) The very fact that we know it exists demonstrates that it is causally efficacious.

What you listed is essentially the criteria necessary for us to say that A causes B. That is more specific than just saying that A is causally efficacious. Likewise, what Gedeker listed is simply the criteria by which the criteria you listed are met.

We know that some sort of causal relationship exists between phenomenal consciousness and brain activity exists. Furthermore, we know that phenomenal consciousness does have some sort of causal effect on the brain. At this point it is simply a question of determining what those relationships are. In other words, producing a complete theory to describe the phenomena. Pretending that phenomen