[Ed.] Why do we "need" to believe? [Archive]

Suggestologist

29th March 2005, 09:02 AM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
NOTE, the title of the thread should be "WHY do we need to believe" Sorry.
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I used to think that an observation was behind our beliefs, later I found that some people believe because people they admire (in some way) believe.

Belief induced by emotional feeling of social connection.

Anyway, a question that has intrigued me since a long time is:

Why the persistence of some believers to continue with their belief when all the evidence points in a different way?

Proposal: 1) Perceptions are difficult to ignore.

Their model of evidence is different from yours? The way they weigh and balance evidence is different than yours?

Also, people do not update prior judgements based on evidence that becomes questionable or even determined to be inaccurate by the person at a later time. People have to effortfully think through such prior judgements, often there are a number of layers of such judgements that have to be thought through before current attitudes become congruent with current evaluations of first-order evidence.

People don't update their judgements in real time. They may never come to the point where they realize it would be of benefit to themselves to do so.

What I mean is that if someone has seen what he/she believe is a "ghost", no power of rationality will convince him/her on the contrary.

What they need, in addition to the evidence, is a strong conceptual framework in which "ghosts" are not possible. Only then they might begin to understand.

How does one come to such a conceptual framework? The skeptic should not come to absolutist frameworks, but to the understanding that ghosts are extremely unlikely. Based on knowledge of people's misperception and rationalization processes, as well as lack of first-order evidence.

So, to 1) one have to adhere a consistent conceptual framework. Not with what we believe, but with all that science knows.

But science is undoubtedly wrong about many things that will be corrected in future. To believe in all that science knows is to preclude future alterations and questioning of "all that science knows" now. And then you will have layered upon science a religion-like epistemological framework.

Why science? Without entering in details, because it works. We are here, writing and reading in our monitors because of science, not because PSI or ghosts.

Religion can work too -- it can give people hope, get them to become socially involved in their communities, etc. The idea that only science "works", does not work.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

29th March 2005, 09:49 AM

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Their model of evidence is different from yours?

Their model to interpret the evidence is different. So, what they "see", its different.

Thats exactly my point.

Suggestologist

29th March 2005, 10:03 AM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Their model to interpret the evidence is different. So, what they "see", its different.

Thats exactly my point.

Hmmm, what is the structure of your model? Is it a probabilistic hypergraph?

Could the structure of their model work differently than yours?

What they "see" -- I think you mean, the grid of their conceptual framework cuts their sensory-data perceptions into different punctuations and (higher-layer hierarchic) categories than yours.

What about, what they "feel", "hear", "propriocept"? The direction their enteric nervous system takes them?

Throg

29th March 2005, 10:37 AM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
[B]
I used to think that an observation was behind our beliefs, later I found that some people believe because people they admire (in some way) believe.

We are social animals and to a great take a great number of cues for how we should behave from those around us. I think the famous Kitty Genovese murder is still the best example of just how strong the tendency to conform is in us. When dozens of bystanders can remain bystanders to a preventable murder apparently purely because nobody else was doing anything should is it a great surprise that we tend to conform to the beliefs of those around us?

To some extent, this is a very necessary human trait. We begin our lives learning much of what we learn by imitation and we can and do learn a great deal that way. Much of what we learn is useful and, if not always correct, is close enough for practical purposes. Some of what we learn is neither. Back when all our anscestors had to learn was "run away from that", "eat this", "don't eat that" learning by uncritical imitation had great survival value. Our world is more complicated than that of our ancestors and we have more concerns than mere survival. At some point in the learning process of a modern human, learning by uncritical imitation becomes counter-productive (even when it was productive it was prone to error). Unfortunately, even knowing that learning by imitation is deeply flawed we have a tendency to do so. We evolved to do so. That doesn't mean we should accept the intellectual limitation with which we have been saddled by evolution but it does mean it is a struggle to overcome it.

Throg

29th March 2005, 10:40 AM

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Religion can work too -- it can give people hope, get them to become socially involved in their communities, etc.

It can do these things as well as some pretty awful things but these are quite separate issues as to whether or not it provides a truthful or accurate view of the world. It is hardly a revelation that you can get people to do good things by lying to them. The question is whether or not, in the long run, this is the best way to get them to do good things.

Suggestologist

29th March 2005, 10:56 AM

Originally posted by Throg
It can do these things as well as some pretty awful things

As can science.

but these are quite separate issues as to whether or not it provides a truthful or accurate view of the world. It is hardly a revelation that you can get people to do good things by lying to them. The question is whether or not, in the long run, this is the best way to get them to do good things.

All models of reality are lies. There is no perfectly true model. Models are analyses of the past, that allow prediction of the future, and such prediction allows people to select and create their future, through choice of behavior. Science is a pack of lies, but some are useful lies.

I don't know that "doing good things" is the ultimate goal of people.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

29th March 2005, 11:11 AM

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Hmmm, what is the structure of your model? Is it a probabilistic hypergraph?

Could the structure of their model work differently than yours?

What they "see" -- I think you mean, the grid of their conceptual framework cuts their sensory-data perceptions into different punctuations and (higher-layer hierarchic) categories than yours.

What about, what they "feel", "hear", "propriocept"? The direction their enteric nervous system takes them?

I dont see the relevance of a mathematical concept in the discussion, I would say, simply, that the structure of my beliefs is based on the concepts Im willing to accept as correct.

Yes, every model works different, because they are not based on the same assumptions. For example, a Christian fundamentalist will base every concept on the (proved or unproved, depending from "where" you see it) assumption that "the bible is the absolute truth of god". If anything contradicts this point, its is untrue, by definition (for them of course).

Every believer "sees" in this sense, a different world. Someone sees a ghost, I see an artifact in the picture (their "proof").

We see different meanings on the same things based on our conceptual models.

Oh, and I mean "see" not in the sense of sight, to answer your last question.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

29th March 2005, 11:12 AM

Throg

29th March 2005, 12:10 PM

Originally posted by Suggestologist

All models of reality are lies. There is no perfectly true model. Models are analyses of the past, that allow prediction of the future, and such prediction allows people to select and create their future, through choice of behavior.
I don't know that "doing good things" is the ultimate goal of people.

Not at all. A model is an attempt to represent truth. A lie is quite the opposite. Imperfection is not what makes a statement a lie, deception is.

I suspect that you have understood me to be taking the position that religion is necessarily deceitful, which I am not. It is a terrible thing to use religion to deceive and cause people to do bad things and it is bad to use a terrible thing to use science this way.

Perhaps, I expressed myself clumsily. My point was that just because religion can be beneficial does not mean it always is and even where it is beneficial in terms of the way it motivates people that is not necessarily enough. Here is one crucial difference between religion and science: science is not motivational. Science provides information which we gives makes us more effective while religion tells us how to act. Science never tells us to act badly and it never tells us to act well. When science is used for bad, or for good it is not because science tells us to use it this way that is the province of ideology and ideology is an inextricable part of every religion with which I am familiar. There is a danger in your sources of information, of truth and of ideology all being the same. If one is corrupted (and please understand I know nothing of your faith, I am talking in general terms) they are all corrupted. Perhaps, there should be a separation of powers analogous to the legislative, executive and judicial branches of many governments.

Science is a pack of lies

And your justification for this assertion is?

I don't know that "doing good things" is the ultimate goal of people

Which is exactly the point I was making. Well one of them.

Suggestologist

29th March 2005, 02:31 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
I dont see the relevance of a mathematical concept in the discussion, I would say, simply, that the structure of my beliefs is based on the concepts Im willing to accept as correct.

I would say that this does not describe the structure, only the base concepts. Not the (metaphorical) structural relationships between concepts. And the (metaphorical) scaffolding system of concepts.

Yes, every model works different, because they are not based on the same assumptions. For example, a Christian fundamentalist will base every concept on the (proved or unproved, depending from "where" you see it) assumption that "the bible is the absolute truth of god". If anything contradicts this point, its is untrue, by definition (for them of course).

And I would say that the reason you "see" a base is because the concept is below the layer of re-analysis from first-order information. In other words, people do not think that reanalyzing and updating that layer with new information will be useful to themselves. They may even identify such layers as parts of their self-identity.

Every believer "sees" in this sense, a different world. Someone sees a ghost, I see an artifact in the picture (their "proof").

We see different meanings on the same things based on our conceptual models.

Oh, and I mean "see" not in the sense of sight, to answer your last question.

You mean sense, not see?

I would say all models are incomplete, but that doesnt stop some models to work more congruently with what we call "reality" and allow us to predict repeatable observations.

Well. Some scientific study says that A is 20% likely and that B is 80% likely - as an exclusive-or pair of opposite outcomes for some process. But the "fact" is that either the outcome will be 100% A or 100% B. The 20%/80% split is a lie, useful as it may be, that covers up our lack of certain knowledge of the future. It allows us to be more right more often. But it does not allow actual knowledge (of reality - whatever that is).

I which sense is science "a pack of lies"?

Science provides a fit with reality, not an epistemologically verifiable description of the really real.

Suggestologist

29th March 2005, 02:56 PM

Originally posted by Throg
[B]Not at all. A model is an attempt to represent truth. A lie is quite the opposite. Imperfection is not what makes a statement a lie, deception is.

Hmmmm, holy books are not an attempt to represent truth? Therefore they are (not) lies?

I suspect that you have understood me to be taking the position that religion is necessarily deceitful, which I am not. It is a terrible thing to use religion to deceive and cause people to do bad things and it is bad to use a terrible thing to use science this way.

Perhaps, I expressed myself clumsily. My point was that just because religion can be beneficial does not mean it always is and even where it is beneficial in terms of the way it motivates people that is not necessarily enough.

As a NLPer, I must point out that "not necessarily enough" contains a deletion. Not necessarily enough for... ? Not necessarily enough to... ? The thought is incomplete.

Here is one crucial difference between religion and science: science is not motivational. Science provides information which we gives makes us more effective while religion tells us how to act.

More effective toward what ends? You see? What does science (scientists) focus its limited energies and resources upon? Doesn't the (scientific and religious) information tell us how to act to be more effective toward some end?

Science never tells us to act badly and it never tells us to act well. When science is used for bad, or for good it is not because science tells us to use it this way that is the province of ideology and ideology is an inextricable part of every religion with which I am familiar.

I pause to respond here because I don't know which aspect of ideology you are thinking of. And different aspects will lead to different responses.

Scientists never tell us what to do? Stop smoking? Stop drinking, you'll destroy your liver? Eat more fruits and vegetables?

There is a danger in your sources of information, of truth and of ideology all being the same. If one is corrupted (and please understand I know nothing of your faith,

None. I'm a nontheist.

I am talking in general terms) they are all corrupted. Perhaps, there should be a separation of powers analogous to the legislative, executive and judicial branches of many governments.

I don't follow the analogy.

And your justification for this assertion is?

Obvious.

hammegk

29th March 2005, 04:15 PM

I liked the original question as to 'what' must be believed.

That one is easy. I must believe that none of you, or I, is The Solipsist.

Throg

29th March 2005, 04:45 PM

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Hmmmm, holy books are not an attempt to represent truth? Therefore they are (not) lies?

Where do I suggest that they are not? You are getting defensive before I have given you any reason to think you are under attack.

As a NLPer, I must point out that "not necessarily enough" contains a deletion. Not necessarily enough for... ? Not necessarily enough to... ? The thought is incomplete.

No it doesn't. You can make it not enough, an equivalent to the sentence you are having trouble with would be: "My point was that just because religion can be beneficial does not mean it always is and it is not necessarily enough for it to be beneficial in terms of the way it movitates people, even where that is the case." My original formulation was perfectly gramatically correct and, in my opinion, more elegant. It seems that you are more intent on trying to read what is not there than what it is ther. Unfortunately - as you should know if you have studied NLP - when you fill in the gaps you perceive you fill them in with yourself.

More effective toward what ends?

That is precisely the point. Science is not concerned with the ends only with the provision of knowledge.

Doesn't the (scientific and religious) information tell us how to act to be more effective toward some end?

Arguably yes, but science makes no attempt to say what the ends should be.

Scientists never tell us what to do? Stop smoking? Stop drinking, you'll destroy your liver? Eat more fruits and vegetables?

Scientists do not tell us this. They tell us "smoking is likely to cause a large number of debillitating ilnesses", "drinking excessive amounts of alcohol damages your liver" and, "there is generally a lack of micronutrients in our diets which can easily be corrected by eating enough fruit." Really, when was the last time you heard a scientist tell you that you must do any of those things. I have heard government spokespersons simplify the science but I have never even heard one of these say you must do any of those things.

None. I'm a nontheist

Nontheism merely implies that you do not believe in a God, not that you do not have a faith. Not that I am asking about your faith, it is none of my business and utterly irrelevant to the discussion.

I don't follow the analogy

The separation of political powers is designed to prevent (or more reallistically limit) the executive mis-using the law for political and ideological purposes. I am suggesting that there should be a separation between one's ideologies and one's sources of truth to prevent ideology distorting truth.

Obvious

Not to me. It's always a mistake to assume that just because something seems obvious to you that it is obvious to everyone else. Please justify.

Suggestologist

29th March 2005, 05:20 PM

Originally posted by Throg
Where do I suggest that they are not? You are getting defensive before I have given you any reason to think you are under attack.

It can be a mistake to mind-read, especially over the internet. I was merely eliciting information about your model of ... the world.

No it doesn't. You can make it not enough, an equivalent to the sentence you are having trouble with would be: "My point was that just because religion can be beneficial does not mean it always is and it is not necessarily enough for it to be beneficial in terms of the way it movitates people, even where that is the case." My original formulation was perfectly gramatically correct and, in my opinion, more elegant. It seems that you are more intent on trying to read what is not there than what it is ther. Unfortunately - as you should know if you have studied NLP - when you fill in the gaps you perceive you fill them in with yourself.

Which is why one asks for clarifications.

religion can be beneficial: Modal Operator of Possibility
not always: Universal (negation)

not necessarily enough: Modal Operator of Necessity (negation)
beneficial in terms of motivation method: Internal Process

It still reads as a lost comparative to me.

To-What are you comparing the beneficiality of the method of motivation? Such that it does not meet the standard? And thus is labeled "not enough"? What is the standard of comparison? "Not Enough" compared to what? Not Enough on what scale? What would be enough? [All of these questions are asking for the same answer.]

That is precisely the point. Science is not concerned with the ends only with the provision of knowledge.

But scientists are concerned with the ends. Otherwise they would not be motivated to be scientists.

Arguably yes, but science makes no attempt to say what the ends should be.

Scientists do not tell us this. They tell us "smoking is likely to cause a large number of debillitating ilnesses", "drinking excessive amounts of alcohol damages your liver" and, "there is generally a lack of micronutrients in our diets which can easily be corrected by eating enough fruit." Really, when was the last time you heard a scientist tell you that you must do any of those things. I have heard government spokespersons simplify the science but I have never even heard one of these say you must do any of those things.

I think it's clear that they are saying you must do these things to be more healthy (an implied goal, an end). Just as religious folk will say you must do these meditations to reach nirvana; or you must believe X to go to heaven and avoid hell.

The separation of political powers is designed to prevent (or more reallistically limit) the executive mis-using the law for political and ideological purposes. I am suggesting that there should be a separation between one's ideologies and one's sources of truth to prevent ideology distorting truth.

And can you describe how this can be accomplished?

Not to me. It's always a mistake to assume that just because something seems obvious to you that it is obvious to everyone else. Please justify.

Science does not describe what it wants to say it describes. Otherwise it could describe why A will be the outcome in one case or why B will be an outcome in another case. Statistical solutions only make obvious that science does not have a proper model of the underlying mechanism. I think Einstein said something similar about quantum mechanics.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

29th March 2005, 10:01 PM

Originally posted by Suggestologist
I would say that this does not describe the structure, only the base concepts. Not the (metaphorical) structural relationships between concepts. And the (metaphorical) scaffolding system of concepts.

Interesting, but it has nothing to do with my point. What a human believe is delimited by his conceptual structure. We are not discussing the complexity of such structure.

Originally posted by Suggestologist
And I would say that the reason you "see" a base is because the concept is below the layer of re-analysis from first-order information. In other words, people do not think that reanalyzing and updating that layer with new information will be useful to themselves. They may even identify such layers as parts of their self-identity.

Yes, and the question is: What can make someone re analyze his conceptual structure? Something that is not explained by it. At least, it should.

Originally posted by Suggestologist
You mean sense, not see?

Exactly.

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Well. Some scientific study says that A is 20% likely and that B is 80% likely - as an exclusive-or pair of opposite outcomes for some process. But the "fact" is that either the outcome will be 100% A or 100% B. The 20%/80% split is a lie, useful as it may be, that covers up our lack of certain knowledge of the future. It allows us to be more right more often. But it does not allow actual knowledge (of reality - whatever that is).

How about the science that let you boot your computer? is it not exact enough?

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Science provides a fit with reality, not an epistemologically verifiable description of the really real.

What would be this "really real" that science refer to?

Throg

30th March 2005, 02:29 AM

Originally posted by Suggestologist
It can be a mistake to mind-read, especially over the internet. I was merely eliciting information about your model of ... the world.

Eliciting suggests a far more powerful information gathering process than you used. You guessed. Wrongly.

not always: Universal (negation)

Of course, the negation of a universal position is not a universal position.

It still reads as a lost comparative to me

I'm terribly sorry you lost the comparison.

But scientists are concerned with the ends. Otherwise they would not be motivated to be scientists

I do not says scientists are not concernded with the ends, I say that science is not. You seem to rather arbitrarily change the precision with which you analyse language. In any case, I think you are being deliberately obtuse here: science and by extension scientists engaged in scientific endeavor are not concerned with the ends towards which the information they elicit will be used. There are of course scientists who hold all sorts of ideological beliefs, including many scientists who are also religious. Where they allow their ideological and religious beliefs to affect their scientific endeavors they are no longer acting purely as scientists.

I think it's clear that they are saying you must do these things to be more healthy (an implied goal, an end)

They are saying this as a contingent not as an imperative. Your use of "must" in your sentence is deceptive, seeming to imply that scientists decided that smoking is bad for your health rather than merely discovering that it is the case.

Just as religious folk will say you must do these meditations to reach nirvana; or you must believe X to go to heaven and avoid hell

False comparison in the second case. There is usually a moral imperative here (in Christianity, for example, this is certainly the case). Beyond this the big difference is that, generally, we go to hell or heaven because the object of worship in X decrees it so, not because it is a natural consequence.

And can you describe how this can be accomplished?

Is that an attempt to discredit my suggestion by asking me to write a several-hundred page thesis in a forum? I know my posts tend to be long but that would be ridiculous. Perhaps we could avoid rhetoric in future?

Statistical solutions only make obvious that science does not have a proper model of the underlying mechanism. I think Einstein said something similar about quantum mechanics

Statistical solutions often show precisely that science does have a proper model of the underlying mechanism, including the fact that a statistical model is the best possible model for a particular mechanism. There is no point pretending that one cans say A will always be the outcome when this is not case. Einstein rather famously didn't really understand quantum mechanics very well so you have chosen a poor authority figure to suppor your case but an appeal to authority is never particularly relevant to any argument.

None of that supports your assertion that "science is a pack of lies". Even if I accepted your arguments, the most it would show is that science is misguided or inaccurate.

Suggestologist

30th March 2005, 09:21 AM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Interesting, but it has nothing to do with my point. What a human believe is delimited by his conceptual structure. We are not discussing the complexity of such structure.

I think structure has something to do with it.

Yes, and the question is: What can make someone re analyze his conceptual structure? Something that is not explained by it. At least, it should.

Perhaps having a structural model can help one get someone else to do so.

How about the science that let you boot your computer? is it not exact enough?

If someone told you that your computer will fail to boot about 0.5% of the time... is that useful, does that tell you what is going on when that happens. Not really.

What would be this "really real" that science refer to?

Who knows.

Suggestologist

30th March 2005, 09:50 AM

Originally posted by Throg
Eliciting suggests a far more powerful information gathering process than you used. You guessed. Wrongly.

You're not familiar with Frank Farrely's Provocative approach? It was one of the NLP therapeutic modelees.

I'm terribly sorry you lost the comparison.

Well "enough" implies a comparison against some standard of enough-ness. A comparison requires at least two things to compare. I only saw one, thus the other was a comparative that was lost, a lost (or deleted) comparative.

I do not says scientists are not concernded with the ends, I say that science is not.

Of course not, science isn't a person, just a concept. But without scientists, there would be no science.

You seem to rather arbitrarily change the precision with which you analyse language. In any case, I think you are being deliberately obtuse here: science and by extension scientists engaged in scientific endeavor are not concerned with the ends towards which the information they elicit will be used.

And that is why there are as many scientists studying cancer as are studying warts? I think it's plainly wrong to say that scientists are not looking toward specific ends (elimination of cancer, elimination of warts).

There are of course scientists who hold all sorts of ideological beliefs, including many scientists who are also religious. Where they allow their ideological and religious beliefs to affect their scientific endeavors they are no longer acting purely as scientists.

There is no such thing as a pure scientist. And notice the ideological implications of the "purity" concept you are using.

They are saying this as a contingent not as an imperative. Your use of "must" in your sentence is deceptive, seeming to imply that scientists decided that smoking is bad for your health rather than merely discovering that it is the case.

If they were ideologically pure, they would not care about people being healthy. They would not have studied the subject to begin with. The ideology is one of health, some religions actually oppose this, since God must want you to suffer if you are experiencing pain -- according to some.

False comparison in the second case. There is usually a moral imperative here (in Christianity, for example, this is certainly the case). Beyond this the big difference is that, generally, we go to hell or heaven because the object of worship in X decrees it so, not because it is a natural consequence.

I think it seems that a natural consequence of proper worship is a place in wonderland, for some.

Is that an attempt to discredit my suggestion by asking me to write a several-hundred page thesis in a forum? I know my posts tend to be long but that would be ridiculous. Perhaps we could avoid rhetoric in future?

A synopsis perhaps.

Statistical solutions often show precisely that science does have a proper model of the underlying mechanism, including the fact that a statistical model is the best possible model for a particular mechanism.

I don't disagree that it may be the best model, but it is still a model. And future models always have the possibility of being better.

There is no point pretending that one cans say A will always be the outcome when this is not case.

One may have to add qualifications to tell people where to look and what to look for to determine when A will always happen.

Einstein rather famously didn't really understand quantum mechanics very well

Sure. But I still agree with the general formulation.

so you have chosen a poor authority figure to suppor your case but an appeal to authority is never particularly relevant to any argument.

An appeal to science? is never particularly relevant? Is science not a concept of authority?

None of that supports your assertion that "science is a pack of lies". Even if I accepted your arguments, the most it would show is that science is misguided or inaccurate.

Misguided and inaccurate are close enough to lies, especially when people appeal to the absolute authoritativeness of scientific processes.

Throg

30th March 2005, 10:21 AM

Originally posted by Suggestologist
You're not familiar with Frank Farrely's Provocative approach? It was one of the NLP therapeutic modelees
Trying to control the responses of your partner in a discussion is a poor way to conduct a debate and just plain rude. Oh, and you are still making wrong assumptions, or will you convince yourself that you intended to provoke this response also. A much simpler way to influence responses, if that is more important to you than rational discussion, is the outright lie. I would not stoop to using that particular method either.

And that is why there are as many scientists studying cancer as are studying warts? I think it's plainly wrong to say that scientists are not looking toward specific ends (elimination of cancer, elimination of warts)

You really must get the hang of this context thing. NLP texts talk about context a lot, so it should not be an unfamiliar concept to you.

If they were ideologically pure, they would not care about people being healthy. They would not have studied the subject to begin with. The ideology is one of health, some religions actually oppose this, since God must want you to suffer if you are experiencing pain -- according to some

Are you reading every third word or something? I did not suggest scientists were ideologically pure, I merely stated that while they are acting purely as scientists (as opposed to acting in ways consistent with the aspects of their personalities expressed in other areas of their life), ideology is irrelevant. One does not have to attach any ideological importance to health to study matters relating to health any more than one has to attach ideological importance to insects in order to be an entomologist.

And that is why there are as many scientists studying cancer as are studying warts? I think it's plainly wrong to say that scientists are not looking toward specific ends (elimination of cancer, elimination of warts)

Cancer is more interesting than warts to many scientists and more funding is available to study them. There are relatively few gentleman scientists who can fund their own research into areas reflecting their personal ideologies.

There is no such thing as a pure scientist. And notice the ideological implications of the "purity" concept you are using

Really, it's poor form to change my words, draw conclusions from you're altered form of words and then ascribe them to me. I did not suggest there was any such thing as a pure scientist. The word "purity" has different meanings depending on the context. There was no ideological implication to the word in the context I used it. This is all rhetorical to you isn't it?

I think it seems that a natural consequence of proper worship is a place in wonderland, for some

That is simply to misuse the word 'natural'.

One may have to add qualifications to tell people where to look and what to look for to determine when A will always happen

There are simply cases where it is impossible to determin when A will happen with any certainty. Chaos theory and quantum mechanics show this at a macro and quantum level respectively.

Sure. But I still agree with the general formulation

I'm happy that you agree but what bearing does your agreement with yourself have on the discussion?

An appeal to science? is never particularly relevant? Is science not a concept of authority

If I a at any point suggested a thing was true because science said it was true (as opposed to because methodologically sound studies had showed it to be true, or logic showed it to be true) that would be an apeal to authority. I have done no such thing. Even had I done so, it would justify you only in criticising me for doing so, not in doing so yourself.

Misguided and inaccurate are close enough to lies, especially when people appeal to the absolute authoritativeness of scientific processes

They are only close enough if you are interested in rhetoric rather than rational discussion.

Suggestologist

30th March 2005, 11:05 AM

Originally posted by Throg
[B]Trying to control the responses of your partner in a discussion is a poor way to conduct a debate and just plain rude. Oh, and you are still making wrong assumptions, or will you convince yourself that you intended to provoke this response also.

Controlling the responses of your partner in a communication-binding context is inevitable.

A much simpler way to influence responses, if that is more important to you than rational discussion, is the outright lie. I would not stoop to using that particular method either.

I don't agree that lies are simpler influencers. The "web we weave" and resulting complexities, and so on. The presuppositional form in your above sentences is also pretty clumsy. The key presupposition is: Rational discussion is unimportant to me -- I think I've been rational here. I've asked for clarifications and you seem to have mind-read something into those requests.

You really must get the hang of this context thing. NLP texts talk about context a lot, so it should not be an unfamiliar concept to you.

You must be thinking of Natural Language Processing. They do talk about context a lot. But I thought we'd established that we were talking about the other NLP.

Are you reading every third word or something? I did not suggest scientists were ideologically pure, I merely stated that while they are acting purely as scientists (as opposed to acting in ways consistent with the aspects of their personalities expressed in other areas of their life), ideology is irrelevant. One does not have to attach any ideological importance to health to study matters relating to health any more than one has to attach ideological importance to insects in order to be an entomologist.

Are you suggesting that there is no motivational component while someone is engaged in scientific investigations, that links back to the individual scientist's perceived importance of the subject being studied? Or are you saying that it is not necessary - but would agree that most scientists do have such motivational linkage?

Cancer is more interesting than warts to many scientists

Why do you think that is? More potential to improve health? No?

and more funding is available to study them. There are relatively few gentleman scientists who can fund their own research into areas reflecting their personal ideologies.

So scientists, NIH scientists, scientists who write letters to congress, university science department directors, have no say in what gets research money? Look at the stem cell situation, did scientists write letters, did scientists petition congress and P. Bush for funding?

I did not suggest there was any such thing as a pure scientist. The word "purity" has different meanings depending on the context. There was no ideological implication to the word in the context I used it. This is all rhetorical to you isn't it?

The words you use reveal ideological concepts you are using, but perhaps don't yet recognize as ideological.

That is simply to misuse the word 'natural'.

In your conceptual set that may be true. For others, nature and god have a different relationship.

There are simply cases where it is impossible to determin when A will happen with any certainty. Chaos theory and quantum mechanics show this at a macro and quantum level respectively.

And other models may come about that show inaccuracies in these models (chaos theory, quantum mechanics).

If I a at any point suggested a thing was true because science said it was true (as opposed to because methodologically sound studies had showed it to be true, or logic showed it to be true) that would be an apeal to authority. I have done no such thing. Even had I done so, it would justify you only in criticising me for doing so, not in doing so yourself.

Science is routinely used as authority, often not even explained as to methodology. I'm not singling you out.

Throg

30th March 2005, 01:55 PM

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Controlling the responses of your partner in a communication-binding context is inevitable.

You are either using the word controlling or the word inevitable in a very unusual way.

The presuppositional form in your above sentences is also pretty clumsy. The key presupposition is: Rational discussion is unimportant to me

This was not a presupposition based on your apparent desire to use NLP techniques and plain old-fashioned rhetoric to distort our dialog.

You must be thinking of Natural Language Processing. They do talk about context a lot. But I thought we'd established that we were talking about the other NLP

Are you suggesting context is no longer crucial in neurolinguistic programming. It's changed a great deal since I studied it.

Are you suggesting that there is no motivational component while someone is engaged in scientific investigations, that links back to the individual scientist's perceived importance of the subject being studied?

No. I accept that this is going to be present at the level of bias which is why rigorous controls are crucial.

Or are you saying that it is not necessary - but would agree that most scientists do have such motivational linkage?

I would certainly say that it is not a logical necessity. I am simply not able to say wether most scientists have such motivaitonal linkage since there is no evidence one way or the other.

Why do you think that is?

Why that is varies from scientist to scientist. We each have things that interest us and things that don't. I cannot imagine finding dentistry at all interesting as a career but I know people who find it fascinating. There is no dentite ideology implicated (to borrow a term from Seinfeld.)

So scientists, NIH scientists, scientists who write letters to congress, university science department directors, have no say in what gets research money? Look at the stem cell situation, did scientists write letters, did scientists petition congress and P. Bush for funding?

I have no figures to determine whether or not this had a significant impact. I doubt that President Bush bases his ideological decisions on what scientists think.

The words you use reveal ideological concepts you are using, but perhaps don't yet recognize as ideological

Or is it merely the case that your model of discourse causes you to erroneously infer ideological content from my words. Perhaps you don't yet realise that your model is flawed?

In your conceptual set that may be true. For others, nature and god have a different relationship

I think you are confusing nature meaning an abstraction of the natural world and nature meaning the state of. It's that context thing again.

And other models may come about that show inaccuracies in these models (chaos theory, quantum mechanics)

They may. Since they have not it is irrelevant to the limits of current scientific theory that they may.

Science is routinely used as authority

I try never to be routine in my thinking.

Incidentally, whether or not we are getting anywhere, I do enjoy your wordplay.

FreeChile

30th March 2005, 02:20 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
NOTE, the title of the thread should be "WHY do we need to believe" Sorry.
_______________________

I used to think that an observation was behind our beliefs, later I found that some people believe because people they admire (in some way) believe.

Anyway, a question that has intrigued me since a long time is:

Why the persistence of some believers to continue with their belief when all the evidence points in a different way?

Proposal: 1) Perceptions are difficult to ignore.

What I mean is that if someone has seen what he/she believe is a "ghost", no power of rationality will convince him/her on the contrary.

What they need, in addition to the evidence, is a strong conceptual framework in which "ghosts" are not possible. Only then they might begin to understand.

So, to 1) one have to adhere a consistent conceptual framework. Not with what we believe, but with all that science knows.

Why science? Without entering in details, because it works. We are here, writing and reading in our monitors because of science, not because PSI or ghosts. You have partially answered your own question. It has nothing to do with perception. It has more to do with identification. A person who sees a ghost can be easily convinced that the ghost was not real if the person does not identify with the ghost. But if the person believes the ghost is one of his ancestors and that personâ€™s entire belief system says that ancestors can visit you from the afterlife this way, then itâ€™s a totally different story. Destroying the belief in the ghost in this sense is equivalent to destroying himselfâ€”everything that person thinks himself to be.

It is the fear of being left with nothing that causes us to believe.

This applies to all other beliefs as wellâ€”including the belief in science, in democracy, in communism, â€¦

Bodhi Dharma Zen

30th March 2005, 03:02 PM

Originally posted by FreeChile
Destroying the belief in the ghost in this sense is equivalent to destroying himselfâ€”everything that person thinks himself to be.

It is the fear of being left with nothing that causes us to believe.

This applies to all other beliefs as wellâ€”including the belief in science, in democracy, in communism, â€¦

Ok, I like that. I would extend it to a fear to not be what we are accustomed to be anymore, loosing our identity. Yes, that should be scaring.

Our belief system appears to be an integral part of what is to be human. We have to believe. What do we believe is another matter.

But a question remains, why some people will choose to believe in woo, instead of a more rational account of what we call "reality"?

FreeChile

30th March 2005, 03:18 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Ok, I like that. I would extend it to a fear to not be what we are accustomed to be anymore, loosing our identity. Yes, that should be scaring.

Our belief system appears to be an integral part of what is to be human. We have to believe. What do we believe is another matter.

But a question remains, why some people will choose to believe in woo, instead of a more rational account of what we call "reality"? No we don't have to believe. We are conditioned to believe. Children don't believe in anything initially. This is one of the reasons they keep asking "Why?" They also keep saying "No"? They are constantly questioning our wisdom in these things.

Jyera

30th March 2005, 10:12 PM

Originally posted by FreeChile
No we don't have to believe. We are conditioned to believe. Children don't believe in anything initially. This is one of the reasons they keep asking "Why?" They also keep saying "No"? They are constantly questioning our wisdom in these things.

We are "designed" to believe.
Children don't know anything initially. I agree.

But I think they can easily conditioned to believe in anything.
They usually do not ask "Why", unless there is a conflict of their original belief, or unless they have been trained to question.

In real life, many society and group attempt to get the very first opportunity to impress upon the young minds.

Jyera

30th March 2005, 10:17 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
..snipe...
But a question remains, why some people will choose to believe in woo, instead of a more rational account of what we call "reality"?

We need to define what is "woo" and "rational".

Isn't it perfectly "rational" to adopt the belief of a person whom we admire? If we so desire to become more like a person we admire, it makes perfect sense to immitate that person.

Throg

31st March 2005, 03:25 AM

Originally posted by FreeChile
No we don't have to believe. We are conditioned to believe. Children don't believe in anything initially. This is one of the reasons they keep asking "Why?" They also keep saying "No"? They are constantly questioning our wisdom in these things.

Yes, but the very fact that they always (absent developmental problems) show a marked decrease in this behaviour and do come to believe things strongly suggests that we do have to believe. That's not to say we can't continue to question our beliefs but it would be impossible to interact with the world without belief. The trick is to try and make sure those beliefs are the best possible model of reality.

Throg

31st March 2005, 03:31 AM

Originally posted by Jyera

They usually do not ask "Why", unless there is a conflict of their original belief, or unless they have been trained to question.

I am interested to know whether you have any evidence to support this assertion. It seems to me that all of the young children I have never known have asked "why". This is a purely subjective obervation on my part but I wonder if your observation is objective either? In the absence of objective data I would tentatively suggest that there is a distinct survival advantage in asking "why" at an early stage in development such that it would be the expected default behaviour rather than unquestioning acceptance. Objective data, of course, may indicate otherwise.

Suggestologist

31st March 2005, 09:20 AM

Originally posted by Throg
[B]You are either using the word controlling or the word inevitable in a very unusual way.

Calibrated loops....

Are you suggesting context is no longer crucial in neurolinguistic programming. It's changed a great deal since I studied it.

It's not an organizing principle, no. If you look at a basic intro book to NLP, well here's Joseph O'Connor & John Seymour's Introducing NLP book. The index has 3 references to context:

p. 17: If the words are the content of the message, then postures, gestures, expressions, and voice tonality are the context in which the message is embedded, and together they make the meaning of the communication.

p. 67-69: The content and the context of a communication combine to make the meaning. The context is the total setting, the whole system that enfolds it. [...] What does a musical note mean? Very little on its own, it depends how it relates to the notes around it, how high or low it is, and how long it lasts. The same note can sound quite different if the notes around it change.

p. 129: Nearly all behaviors are useful somewhere. There are very few which do not have value and purpose in some context. [...] Boring your audience in a seminar is not recommended, but the ability is useful for getting rid of unwelcome guests.

No. I accept that this is going to be present at the level of bias which is why rigorous controls are crucial.

I would certainly say that it is not a logical necessity. I am simply not able to say wether most scientists have such motivaitonal linkage since there is no evidence one way or the other.

Why that is varies from scientist to scientist. We each have things that interest us and things that don't. I cannot imagine finding dentistry at all interesting as a career but I know people who find it fascinating. There is no dentite ideology implicated (to borrow a term from Seinfeld.)

The health of teeth? The ability to eat without difficulty? The attractiveness of teeth? These are ideologies - a dentist could not attract many patients without at least one of them.

Or is it merely the case that your model of discourse causes you to erroneously infer ideological content from my words. Perhaps you don't yet realise that your model is flawed?

Perhaps it's not a matter of a model being flawed but that our models do not correspond.

I think you are confusing nature meaning an abstraction of the natural world and nature meaning the state of. It's that context thing again.

I don't find much difference between the two.

They may. Since they have not it is irrelevant to the limits of current scientific theory that they may.

It is relevant to scientific development how highly we hold models -- as the real, as the true.

Throg

31st March 2005, 10:02 AM

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Calibrated loops....

You're going to have to explain. If you are suggesting that we are "victims" of calibrated loops in this discussion then there is no control, if not then there is no inevitability.

It's not an organizing principle, no. If you look at a basic intro book to NLP, well here's Joseph O'Connor & John Seymour's Introducing NLP book. The index has 3 references to context:

That's a very poor attempt to wriggle out of the essential role context plays in NLP. I have read the book thanks and probably still have it around somewhere. The number of references in the index shows precisely what, beyond the fact that you should be familiar with the importance of context? The second quote you provide from the book makes my point rather well, don't you think?

The health of teeth? The ability to eat without difficulty? The attractiveness of teeth? These are ideologies

Ah, I see that you are using your own personal definition of ideology now.

Perhaps it's not a matter of a model being flawed but that our models do not correspond

Since we are diametrically opposed as to the ideological content of my words then if I am right you are wrong.

I don't find much difference between the two
You need to look harder.

It is relevant to scientific development how highly we hold models -- as the real, as the true
Since no good scientist holds his models to be real (a contradiction in terms) or true this is as irrelevant as your earlier statement re. scientific models.

Incidentally, it might be fun to look through our posts from my first reply onwards to see if any NLP techniques have been succesfully used to influence your responses. Just a thought.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

31st March 2005, 11:07 AM

Originally posted by Suggestologist
It is relevant to scientific development how highly we hold models -- as the real, as the true.

How can you measure the "accuracy" of a model?

FreeChile

31st March 2005, 01:23 PM

Originally posted by Throg
I am interested to know whether you have any evidence to support this assertion. It seems to me that all of the young children I have never known have asked "why". This is a purely subjective obervation on my part but I wonder if your observation is objective either? In the absence of objective data I would tentatively suggest that there is a distinct survival advantage in asking "why" at an early stage in development such that it would be the expected default behaviour rather than unquestioning acceptance. Objective data, of course, may indicate otherwise. Asking â€œwhyâ€ has nothing to do with acceptance at that stage. By the way I am talking about the â€œwhyâ€ stage in the development of a child, which is around 3-5 years old or perhaps younger. This is the time when they constantly ask why or some questions; sometimes regardless of how many answers you give them.

The interesting thing is that children in the â€œwhyâ€ stage, cannot themselves answer why the â€œrightâ€ way. Some times they say they donâ€™t know or give random and inconsistent reasons for something, even when they have the necessary information to answer correctly. This is because â€œwhyâ€ does not mean the same to them as it does to us. It takes children some time to reach our meaning of â€œwhy.â€

â€œWhyâ€, in the way we mean it, implies that a cause-and-effect thinking structure has been developed. This also implies that a concept of time has been developed. Believing also implies cause-and-effect and time. It would be difficult to prove that such a structure exists at that stage.

We ask â€œwhyâ€ out of curiosity or a desire to know. We also ask why out of physical necessity. Also, the lines between desire and need are gray and sometimes they are even in conflict. I wouldnâ€™t say that a child is curious or feels any particular emotions, like love, during very early stages. We may say that a child learns, but not that it wants to learn. Learning is necessary for independent survival.

Also, I would not say that it is a survival advantage or disadvantage to ask â€œwhyâ€ without asking â€œhow so?â€ or â€œin what way?â€ Communication in general is necessary for survival and this is not confined to humans. So asking â€œwhyâ€ to a child is no different from crying in that sense; and in both cases we donâ€™t know the reason for the childâ€™s behavior.

Throg

31st March 2005, 02:39 PM

Originally posted by FreeChile
Asking â€œwhyâ€ has nothing to do with acceptance at that stage. By the way I am talking about the â€œwhyâ€ stage in the development of a child, which is around 3-5 years old or perhaps younger. This is the time when they constantly ask why or some questions; sometimes regardless of how many answers you give them.

Indeed, I sudied developmental psychology myself, which is why I found Jyera's assertion that children only ask "why" if they have been trained to question. and why I asked him if he had evidence to support this assertion. I am not sure how your post answers mine in this respect.

â€œWhyâ€, in the way we mean it, implies that a cause-and-effect thinking structure has been developed. This also implies that a concept of time has been developed. Believing also implies cause-and-effect and time. It would be difficult to prove that such a structure exists at that stage

I disagree almost entirely if only for the reason that one can meaningfully ask the question "why should I believe that there is any validity to the concept of cause and effect"; I have seen a number of people ask that specific question quite meaningfully on this board.

We ask â€œwhyâ€ out of curiosity or a desire to know. We also ask why out of physical necessity. Also, the lines between desire and need are gray and sometimes they are even in conflict. I wouldnâ€™t say that a child is curious or feels any particular emotions, like love, during very early stages.

I have not made any statement one way or the other whether or not a child wants or desires to learn, or, in fact, anything about need or desire. Whether or not a child feels any particular emotions during very early states depends upon exactly what you mean by very early stages. Certainly by the "why" stage there can be little doubt that they children do feel particular emotions.

We may say that a child learns, but not that it wants to learn.

I don't know if you intended this to come across as extraordinary arrogant but your use of "we may say" implies that "we may not say otherwise" and that you consider your position is unassailable. It is certainly a plausible position to hold that children want to learn and one held by many psychologists.

Learning is necessary for independent survival
This not true. Many organisms survive without the ability to learn. If you mean in the specific case of human children, how are we to judge the veracity of this statement? With whom would we compare the children who are capable of learning? Anencephalic children?

Also, I would not say that it is a survival advantage or disadvantage to ask â€œwhyâ€ without asking â€œhow so?â€ or â€œin what way?â€

You are assuming a rather limited aspect to the question why and to the range of responses people give to that particular inetrrogative. It is a highly context dependent word. I could elicit all of the information suceptible to "how so" and of "what way" in everyday circumstances merely with repeated use of "why?"

So asking â€œwhyâ€ to a child is no different from crying in that sense
They are quite different. Crying elicits a comforting response, "why" elicits an explanation. Of course, there are circumstances where either one would elicit a "shut up!" response.

and in both cases we donâ€™t know the reason for the childâ€™s behavior

We don't know the reason for an adult's behaviour. We infer reason based on a history of apparently correct and incorrect prior inferences based on behaviour exhibited both by a particular adult and by a range of adults. Sometimes we appear to be wrong, more often we appear to be right. That there are differences both in the way children think and behave at various stages in development makes such inferences no less valid so long as one is aware of those differences.

FreeChile

1st April 2005, 02:10 PM

Originally Posted by Throg:

Indeed, I studied developmental psychology myself, which is why I found Jyera's assertion that children only ask "why" if they have been trained to question and why I asked him if he had evidence to support this assertion.

I am not sure how your post answers mine in this respect.I would say that a child who has learned to question is closer to an adultâ€™s meaning of â€œwhyâ€ than one who has not learned questioning. Another problem with Jyeraâ€™s statements is saying that the child may have â€œoriginal beliefsâ€. However, her biggest problem is the same one you are having, which is taking â€œwhyâ€ to have similar meaning to a child as it does to an adult.I disagree almost entirely if only for the reason that one can meaningfully ask the question "why should I believe that there is any validity to the concept of cause and effect"; I have seen a number of people ask that specific question quite meaningfully on this board.

I have not made any statement one way or the other whether or not a child wants or desires to learn, or, in fact, anything about need or desire. Whether or not a child feels any particular emotions during very early states depends upon exactly what you mean by very early stages. Certainly by the "why" stage there can be little doubt that they children do feel particular emotions.This was meant to address Jyera's position that a child can have original beliefs. I tried to address your statements as well as Jyera's on a single post. I should have quoted Jyera's statement also in that post or separated the posts, therefore lessening the confusion.

Your question about "cause and effect is indeed a significant one. In fact, I have been one to argue that time is nothing but a human concept elsewhere on this site; yet some people come to think it is something as tangible as matter. This is why I used the phrases "cause-and-effect thinking" and "concept of time". However, I don't see how this invalidates what I have said, which is that the "why" of a child has a different meaning than the "why" of the adult. So statements made about the child which carry the meaning of that word for the adult, are meaningless. We cannot say that the child asks why for the same reasons that the adult asks why. You and I seem to agree on this, partially.I don't know if you intended this to come across as extraordinary arrogant but your use of "we may say" implies that "we may not say otherwise" and that you consider your position is unassailable. Using "may" this way is simply a habit that in my case results from reading too much philosophy. It is not at all an arrogant statementâ€”especially if you keep it in the context of the paragraph it was in.
It is certainly a plausible position to hold that children want to learn and one held by many psychologists.
Learning used this way is limited to learning by self or teacher directed instruction. If you say that a child wants to learn, you are again stuck with wanting to be in the childâ€™s mind. How do you know that the child doesnâ€™t simply want to be with someone? Or has simply inherited certain things? Or wants to be accepted by you? Or is using learning to get something else? The list of needs and wants in connection with that are many.
This not true. Many organisms survive without the ability to learn. If you mean in the specific case of human children, how are we to judge the veracity of this statement? With whom would we compare the children who are capable of learning? Anencephalic children?Learning to me includes the training of the nervous system. Without such training, you could not walk, catch pray, speak, or interact with the environment.You are assuming a rather limited aspect to the question why and to the range of responses people give to that particular interrogative. It is a highly context dependent word.This is precisely where the statement I made takes us, to a semantic question. In what way do you mean to say that asking â€œwhyâ€ for a child is a survival advantage?I could elicit all of the information susceptible to "how so" and of "what way" in everyday circumstances merely with repeated use of "why?"Without having done so, can you safely conclude that it is or isnâ€™t a survival advantage?They are quite different. Crying elicits a comforting response, "why" elicits an explanation. Of course, there are circumstances where either one would elicit a "shut up!" response.OK. So here you present one possible â€œaspect to the question whyâ€œ? How do you know that the â€œwhyâ€ of a child elicits an explanation? We went over this before by questioning whether or not a child at that stage has a concept of time and cause-and-effect.We don't know the reason for an adult's behaviour. We infer reason based on a history of apparently correct and incorrect prior inferences based on behaviour exhibited both by a particular adult and by a range of adults. Sometimes we appear to be wrong, more often we appear to be right.However, the difference between two adults or between an adult and an older child is significantly less than the difference between an adult and a two or three-year old child.That there are differences both in the way children think and behave at various stages in development makes such inferences no less valid so long as one is aware of those differences.Yes. This is why the statements both you and Jyera presented do not make sense because you do not know the differences between the â€œwhyâ€ of a child and that of an adult. For example, my two-year old has 2 model dolls of two cartoon characters and she keeps using one of the names to refer to both. We have been trying to make her call the right doll by the right name for at least 4 months now. This is in spite of her ability to bring the right doll to us when we use that dollâ€™s name. Likewise, when my son was three he would tell me things he wanted to do tomorrow when asked â€œWhat did you do today?â€, in spite of him been able to use past tense and future tense in his sentences. Also, from time to time, he just gets â€œplayfulâ€ with this question, asking it again and again.

Janice

1st April 2005, 10:32 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen

I used to think that an observation was behind our beliefs, later I found that some people believe because people they admire (in some way) believe.

Anyway, a question that has intrigued me since a long time is:

Why the persistence of some believers to continue with their belief when all the evidence points in a different way?

Tradition?

We grow up in societies following different religeons, and from a young age we are introduced to these faiths. Albeit, the Christian faith does not support mediumship, but it talks of the afterlife? People grow up to form their own opinions about religeon, but they are greatly influenced by what they learnt whilst growing up.

Dr Adequate

1st April 2005, 10:58 PM

I've just read the OP, and I'm going to dive in.

BDZ: You start: 'Why do we "need" to believe'.

Why not: ''Why do we need to believe'...

wthout the quotation marks, around "need", but that would be more of a statement, or then again:

'Why do we believe',

... but then you'd be admiting that people believe for reasons other than some psychological "need to believe", how many times have I said this?

Also then the word "we" would become embarrassing.

... or maybe what you really mean is 'why don't they disbelieve'?

'Cos that's what's leaving you shaking your head in, er, disbelief.

I am just a simple pedant, but I'd like to know what we're talking about.

Throg

2nd April 2005, 02:46 AM

Originally posted by FreeChile
However, her biggest problem is the same one you are having, which is taking â€œwhyâ€ to have similar meaning to a child as it does to an adult.

What on earth leads you to believe I have made this inference. Please point this out to me.

This is why I used the phrases "cause-and-effect thinking" and "concept of time". However, I don't see how this invalidates what I have said, which is that the "why" of a child has a different meaning than the "why" of the adult

Your useage of "cause-and-effect thinking" then, appears to be highly personal and ill-defined to the point of uselessness. This invalidates that particular argument in establishing the difference between the "why" of a child and the "why" of an adult. Since I do not contend that the two are the same, it's not an argument I would have with you. That your conclusion is sound does not mean that unsound en passant assertions which are unsound.

Using "may" this way is simply a habit that in my case results from reading too much philosophy

I have read an awful lot of philosophy too and would never use may this way. My philosophy professors would have been outraged had I done so.

Learning used this way is limited to learning by self or teacher directed instruction. If you say that a child wants to learn, you are again stuck with wanting to be in the childâ€™s mind

Saying that a child does not want is a position no more supported by evidence than saying that a child does want. If you wish to take the sceptical position that one simply does not know whether or not a child wants, that is justifiable. The position that we know that a child does not want is not.

Learning to me includes the training of the nervous system. Without such training, you could not walk, catch pray, speak, or interact with the environment

This does not answer my question.

This is precisely where the statement I made takes us, to a semantic question. In what way do you mean to say that asking â€œwhyâ€ for a child is a survival advantage?

In the ordinary sense of making the sound "why" in connection with an assertion that may be questioned. How would you justify beginning a discussion assuming an out-of-the-ordinary definition of why?

Without having done so, can you safely conclude that it is or isnâ€™t a survival advantage?

I am not sure what you are asking here. I have conducted informal experiments using "why" in place of more specific interrogatives in the past with the success I described. I have not done so in a wide range of circumstances but I really can't answer your question without further clarification. Are you suggesting that there are everyday situations in which asking "why" rather than "how so" might plausibly reduce my survival chances?

OK. So here you present one possible â€œaspect to the question whyâ€œ? How do you know that the â€œwhyâ€ of a child elicits an explanation?

I "know" it in virtue of precisely the same inferences that apply to "knowing" what an adult means by why (or are you taking it to be the case that there is complete homogeity of meaning across adults and contexts when using the word?). How do you know that "why" does not elicit an explanation or that "crying" elicits any sort of response at all. By the way, are you confusing the words "elicit" and "solicit"?

However, the difference between two adults or between an adult and an older child is significantly less than the difference between an adult and a two or three-year old child

This is not particularly useful in the context of the argument but does require evidenciary justification rather than a blank assertion.

Yes. This is why the statements both you and Jyera presented do not make sense because you do not know the differences between the â€œwhyâ€ of a child and that of an adult

You really must justify this insulting and extraordinarily arrogant statement. What makes you think that I do not understand the differences (I will not attempt to speak for Jyera because of the similar arrogance that would be required on my part.)

For example, my two-year old has 2 model dolls of two cartoon characters and she keeps using one of the names to refer to both. We have been trying to make her call the right doll by the right name for at least 4 months now. This is in spite of her ability to bring the right doll to us when we use that dollâ€™s name. Likewise, when my son was three he would tell me things he wanted to do tomorrow when asked â€œWhat did you do today?â€, in spite of him been able to use past tense and future tense in his sentences. Also, from time to time, he just gets â€œplayfulâ€ with this question, asking it again and again

Apart from the fact that this anecdote has no clear connection to what we were discussing it is, as well as being an actual anecdote, anecdotal evidence. I have no way of knowing how representative the behaviour of your children is of children in general. If playfulness is the crux of your argument, I would point out that many intelligent people are often playful with language and concepts they undertand very well and are quite capable of using in a conventionally correct way.

Throg

2nd April 2005, 03:06 AM

Originally posted by Dr Adequate
I've just read the OP, and I'm going to dive in.

BDZ: You start: 'Why do we "need" to believe'.

Why not: ''Why do we need to believe'...

wthout the quotation marks, around "need", but that would be more of a statement, or then again:

'Why do we believe',

... but then you'd be admiting that people believe for reasons other than some psychological "need to believe", how many times have I said this?

Also then the word "we" would become embarrassing.

... or maybe what you really mean is 'why don't they disbelieve'?

'Cos that's what's leaving you shaking your head in, er, disbelief.

I am just a simple pedant, but I'd like to know what we're talking about.

I don't think you are being a simple pedant. A pedant, perhaps but not a simple one and pedantry (I prefer a term like rigour, myelf) is absolutely essential at times. It is implicit in the question that there is something counter-productive in unsubstantiated belief but I don't think that it is particularly difficult to justify on the basis that a world model based in pure belief is less likely to agree with reality than a model based in rational investigation. At a pragmatic level, one is less likely to be effective in a belief-based model. Some sort of need/drive based explanation seems to be necessary for what, on the face of it, would seem to be unproductive even anti-productive behaviour. It would, of course, be intriguing to hear plausible alternative explanations if you can think of any.

wthout the quotation marks, around "need", but that would be more of a statement, or then again: 'Why do we believe'

I take the quotation marks around "need" to allow for discussion of need and need-like mechanisms (need, desire, drive). I don't see the basis on which you move from removing the quotation marks around need to "why do we believe" which is a different and much more general question, though it would almost certainly include a discussion of "need" along the way.

but then you'd be admiting that people believe for reasons other than some psychological "need to believe"

This does not appear to follow at all. Perhaps you could expand on the reasoning behind this assertion.

or maybe what you really mean is 'why don't they disbelieve'?

I don't see whyt "why don't they disbelieve?" would be more correct that "why do they believe?". Disblief, head-shaking aside, seems merely to be the absence of belief in this context. While this may be useful in terms of a Sartrean "being of absence" type of analysis, I don't see what it adds in terms of explaining why people believe without justification in the first place.