What kind of 'materialist' are you?

[UndercoverElephant]

I want to find out who is really a materialist, and who isn't. This is an offshoot from the 'materialism' thread.

It all boils down to one simple question :

Do qualia and brain processes differ?

First off...here is an explanation about two different sorts of knowledge - direct, subjective knowledge which comes to us in the form of qualia and internal experiences - and indirect, objective knowledge which come to us via our reasoning and have context of the physical model we have built.

Two different forms of knowledge :

------------------
Mental facts, including both experienincg qualia and the subjective experience described as "remembering qualia" come to us directly via phenomenal consciousness (directly into your mind like qualia and emotions).

Physical facts, including knowledge of brain states, come to us indirectly via means of reasoning and explanation concerning a group of related concepts we call physical reality. No physical facts ever come to us directly via phenomenal conscious - to us they are abstract concepts.

I hope we can agree on those definitions. We might also observe that we have an extremely clear cut division between subjective facts and objective facts here. The objective facts are objective for the simple reason that they exist within the context of a group of concepts (the physical model of the Universe) and that we all understand what those concepts are - they are shared and verifiable. The subjective facts are subjective for the simple reason that they come to us directly via phenomenal consciousness. Because they come us directly they cannot be specified in terms of the physical model because they are not abstract like the physical things - they just EXIST in their own right directly within our phenomenal consciousness.
------------------


Now - for the claims of physicalism :

physicalism claims that everything is physical, including the empirical (subjective) things gained directly via phenomenal consciousness. Unfortunately this doesn't work. Let's have a look at the "brain process"/qualia situation. "Brain processes" are objective, abstract non-empirical things which fit naturally into the abstract physical model we have made of the world. Qualia are subjective, non-abstract, empirical things which do not fit naturally into the abstract physical model we have made of the world. Materialism TRIES to claim that qualia fit into the abstract physical model, but suffers fatal problems as soon as it tries to do this. Here's why. We have four options when faced with qualia :

------------------------
Option 1 (Battle of Little Bighorn defence of materialism) :

Claim that qualia don't actually exist. This is Synaesthesias position, which allows materialism to remain standing, but at the cost of denying that qualia exist.

Option 2 EXAMINE THIS VERY CAREFULLY. :

Try to insert the qualia into the model with the statement "Qualia ARE brain processes". Materialism has a problem here because there is already something in the physical model taking the place where we would like to put the qualia. i.e. the brain process. So in order to claim that the qualia can go in the physical model the materialist must claim that the qualia and the brain process are the same thing. The trouble with this is that we already know that brain processes and qualia differ because knowledge of qualia can be gained directly and knowledge of brain processes cannot. ***Therefore brain processes and Qualia CANNOT be synonyms - they CANNOT 'be the same thing'***. In fact, if you want to claim that they are synonyms then the term 'qualia' is redundant and you are back to option 1. So option two is incoherent because it depends on a self-contradictory claim that brain process and qualia both differ and do not differ at the same time. If you think they do not differ then you are a (1). If you think they do differ but are both part of the 'physical' model then you are a (3). To be a (2) you must somehow claim they both differ and do not differ. This is of course impossible.

edit : There is no way around this. Even if you want to claim that 'they are the same thing viewed form different perspectives' or 'they are the same thing but knowledge about them is gained differently' then you still have to find two different 'slots' for them in your model to be able to explain the difference. As soon as you do this then you are a Property Dualist, even if you think you are a materialist.

Option 3 :

Option 3 is to recognise that brain processes and qualia differ, but also claim that they can both go in the physical model, kind of next-to-each-other in the 'slot' currently occupied by 'brain processes'. This is better than options 1 and 2 since it recognises qualia exist, recognises they differ and allows both to go in the model. However, it isn't materialism any more. It is Property Dualism.

Option 4 :

I am not a materialist.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

Try to insert the qualia into the model with the statement "Qualia ARE brain processes". Materialism has a problem here because there is already something in the physical model taking the place where we would like to put the qualia. i.e. the brain process. So in order to claim that the qualia can go in the physical model the materialist must claim that the qualia and the brain process are the same thing. The trouble with this is that we already know that brain processes and qualia differ because knowledge of qualia can be gained directly and knowledge of brain processes cannot.

This is a misrepresentation of the problem.

First of all, qualia are a type of brain process. Not all brain processes are qualia.

Secondly, we can have direct knowledge of qualia, and we can have indirect knowledge of qualia. We can also have direct knowledge of some brain processes. In fact, the only reason we refer to those brain processes we call qualia as qualia, is because they are the ones we have direct knowledge of.

So there is no contradiction. You have set up a false dichotomy, whereby you implicitly assume that the qualia are not brain processes, by asserting that we can only have direct knowledge of them, and not also indirect (abstract) knowledge of them.

***Therefore brain processes and Qualia CANNOT be synonyms - they CANNOT 'be the same thing'***.

You are begging the question. By asserting that qualia cannot be known indirectly, you are asserting that materialism is false, and then concluding from that premise that it is false.

In fact, if you want to claim that they are synonyms then the term 'qualia' is redundant and you are back to option 1. So option two is incoherent because it depends on a self-contradictory claim that brain process and qualia both differ and do not differ at the same time. If you think they do not differ then you are a (1). If you think they do differ but are both part of the 'physical' model then you are a (3). To be a (2) you must somehow claim they both differ and do not differ. This is of course impossible.

Actually, I answered 1 in your silly pole simply because you defined number 2 in a way that makes it incoherent. If you insist on defining qualia such that they cannot possibly be indirectly known, then of course I will claim that they do not exist.

But you see, I can use this same tactic on you, and assert that phenomenal experiences and qualia are not the same thing.

Experiences are brain processes. Whether or not qualia exist depends on how you define them. If you define them to be experiences, then they exist, and are brain processes. If you define qualia to be non-objective, or only directly knowable, then they do not exist, and are not our experiences.


As a side note, hasn't it become clear to you yet that you are not going to convince anybody that materialism is false, simply by using dualistic definitions that render any non-dualistic framework impossible to express accurately?

And why is it that you still insist on using dualistic arguments to falsify materialism, when you are not, yourself, a dualist? Do you not realize that these same sorts of arguments could be just as easily applied to mental monism?

Of course, they would be just as invalid there, and for exactly the same reasons. They all beg the question.

Dr. Stupid

[UndercoverElephant]

Stimp


First of all, qualia are a type of brain process. Not all brain processes are qualia.


Then you are claiming that they both differ and don't differ simultaneously. You are a type 2 (incoherent) materialist. You claim to have two slots in your model, but in fact you can only justify the existence of one.


Secondly, we can have direct knowledge of qualia, and we can have indirect knowledge of qualia.


Well, this is just nonsense. Qualia, by any definition that means anything, can only be known directly.


We can also have direct knowledge of some brain processes.


This is also nonsense. The term 'brain process' only has meaning within the context of the abstract physical model, we have no direct access to this knowledge.


In fact, the only reason we refer to those brain processes we call qualia as qualia, is because they are the ones we have direct knowledge of.


Materialist illogical spaghetti logic.


So there is no contradiction. You have set up a false dichotomy....


The dichotomy is real, and it is set up by your own admission that..."Nobody is disputing that we have two types of knowledge: Abstract knowledge, and empirical (or subjective) knowledge."

There is your dichotomy. I didn't set it up. It's real. :)


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
***Therefore brain processes and Qualia CANNOT be synonyms - they CANNOT 'be the same thing'***.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You are begging the question. By asserting that qualia cannot be known indirectly, you are asserting that materialism is false, and then concluding from that premise that it is false.


I am asserting that qualia cannot be known indirectly because otherwise the term in MEANINGLESS.


Actually, I answered 1 in your silly pole simply because you defined number 2 in a way that makes it incoherent. If you insist on defining qualia such that they cannot possibly be indirectly known, then of course I will claim that they do not exist.


Which is what you should have done in the first place if you understood your own belief system.


But you see, I can use this same tactic on you, and assert that phenomenal experiences and qualia are not the same thing.


Then you would be reduced to making yourself look like a gibbering idiot. If qualia exist, then they are phenomenal experiences - that is what "qualia" MEANS.


As a side note, hasn't it become clear to you yet that you are not going to convince anybody that materialism is false,


Erm...not really. When I first came here and claimed materialism could be demonstrated false I was shouted down and abused, just like I was before the secweb banned me. A year later, in that materialism thread, there were about 6 non-materialists in agreement that the proof stood, with only you and Paul still trying to defend it. One person even explained during the thread that he was now understanding the problem with a new clarity.


simply by using dualistic definitions that render any non-dualistic framework impossible to express accurately?


My definitions are the only ones that mean anything. If you want to avoid them then you must assert that qualia do not exist, as Synaesthesia has.


And why is it that you still insist on using dualistic arguments to falsify materialism, when you are not, yourself, a dualist?


Good question. I bet you can't figure out the answer. ;)


Do you not realize that these same sorts of arguments could be just as easily applied to mental monism?


Go on then...start that thread...demonstrate you can apply these arguments to my own position... you might find out why mental monism doesn't suffer from these problems.

[Jethro]

As best as I can decifer it, the term qualia describes the perception of experiences such as "seeing red" from the point of view of the person experiencing them.

If that is correct, what prevents them from being physical proceses in the brain?

If that is not correct, what am I missing?

[Jethro]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Then you are claiming that they both differ and don't differ simultaneously. You are a type 2 (incoherent) materialist. You claim to have two slots in your model, but in fact you can only justify the existence of one.Qualia are a member of the set of brain processes. If you don't understand this concept, go draw a few Venn diagrams.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

First of all, qualia are a type of brain process. Not all brain processes are qualia.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Then you are claiming that they both differ and don't differ simultaneously. You are a type 2 (incoherent) materialist.

I am not claiming they differ. In fact, I explicitly stated that they do not. Why should I bother answering your questions if you are going to ignore them and pretend I answered the obvious?

You claim to have two slots in your model, but in fact you can only justify the existence of one.

One slot, two names.

Secondly, we can have direct knowledge of qualia, and we can have indirect knowledge of qualia.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well, this is just nonsense. Qualia, by any definition that means anything, can only be known directly.

Then qualia do not exist, and experiences are not qualia. I am not going to play your word games, UCE. Any word that you insist must be defined in a way that presupposes dualism, cannot represent anything that actually exists.

We can also have direct knowledge of some brain processes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is also nonsense. The term 'brain process' only has meaning within the context of the abstract physical model, we have no direct access to this knowledge.

Maybe within some dualistic framework, this is true. I do not think it is true. And you certainly haven't demonstrated that it is true.

Furthermore, I have already explained to you that the brain process is not part of the abstract model. The brain process objectively exists in the real World. It can be described by the abstract model.

Within the materialistic paradigm, saying that I have direct access to my experiences is equivalent to saying that the part of my brain that thinks is connected to the part of my brain that experiences things. The experience is a brain process, and "I", meaning the part of my brain that thinks, have direct access to it.

In fact, the only reason we refer to those brain processes we call qualia as qualia, is because they are the ones we have direct knowledge of.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Materialist illogical spaghetti logic.

My, what a brilliant and comprehensive rebuttal to my argument. :rolleyes:

***Therefore brain processes and Qualia CANNOT be synonyms - they CANNOT 'be the same thing'***.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You are begging the question. By asserting that qualia cannot be known indirectly, you are asserting that materialism is false, and then concluding from that premise that it is false.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am asserting that qualia cannot be known indirectly because otherwise the term in MEANINGLESS.

Fine. The term is meaningless. Qualia do not exist. Experiences still exist, and they are still brain processes. I thought you defined qualia to mean experiences. I did not realize that you defined them in such a way as to be either meaningless or false.

Actually, I answered 1 in your silly pole simply because you defined number 2 in a way that makes it incoherent. If you insist on defining qualia such that they cannot possibly be indirectly known, then of course I will claim that they do not exist.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Which is what you should have done in the first place if you understood your own belief system.

Maybe you should have been more clear in your definitions? in fact, I still haven't seen you define what the word qualia means. I have seen you say that our experiences are qualia. I have also seen you claim that qualia are meaningless if they can be indirectly known. Right now, I have no idea what you mean by the term. I am inclined to suspect that you do not either.

But you see, I can use this same tactic on you, and assert that phenomenal experiences and qualia are not the same thing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Then you would be reduced to making yourself look like a gibbering idiot. If qualia exist, then they are phenomenal experiences - that is what "qualia" MEANS.

Make up your mind. If qualia means phenomenal experience, then you cannot claim that qualia cannot be indirectly known, unless you can demonstrate that phenomenal experiences are not brain processes. But you are offering your assertion that by definition, they cannot be indirectly known, as proof that they are not brain processes. This is classical circular reasoning.

As a side note, hasn't it become clear to you yet that you are not going to convince anybody that materialism is false,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Erm...not really. When I first came here and claimed materialism could be demonstrated false I was shouted down and abused, just like I was before the secweb banned me.

You have a very selective memory. You were by far the most abusive person in those discussions. In fact, you share the honor with Franko of being one of only two people on this board who I have ever stopped talking to simply because of your abusive behavior. And while I will concede that some people were abusive to you, as I said, you were by far the most abusive. And I personally was not abusive to you at all. That didn't stop you from hurling vulgar insults at me, and attacking my credibility as a scientist.

A year later, in that materialism thread, there were about 6 non-materialists in agreement that the proof stood, with only you and Paul still trying to defend it.

Once again, you have a very selective memory. Your so-called proof was the laughing stock of the board, and somehow you didn't even realize it. Even the person who wrote the argument agreed that it wasn't a disproof of materialism.

simply by using dualistic definitions that render any non-dualistic framework impossible to express accurately?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

My definitions are the only ones that mean anything.

Do you have any idea how dogmatically irrational that sounds?

If you want to avoid them then you must assert that qualia do not exist, as Synaesthesia has.

I am perfectly happy to do so. It doesn't change my position or argument one iota. What word you use to refer to phenomenal experience is just semantics.

And why is it that you still insist on using dualistic arguments to falsify materialism, when you are not, yourself, a dualist?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Good question. I bet you can't figure out the answer.

I can think of two possible answers:

1) You are really still a dualist, and claim to be an Idealist only to avoid having to address the incoherency of dualism.

2) You have a very poor grasp of logic.

I am inclined to think it is a little bit of both.

Do you not realize that these same sorts of arguments could be just as easily applied to mental monism?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Go on then...start that thread...demonstrate you can apply these arguments to my own position... you might find out why mental monism doesn't suffer from these problems.

I already know why it does not. For the same reason that materialism does not. The arguments are not valid.

Dr. Stupid

[Q-Source]

UCE,

where do qualia occur (or take place)?

how and where do we perceive our experiences?

[bjornart]

There's no way I'm taking this poll. It demonstrates perfectly how statistics can be twisted by manipulating the question. And it's not even subtle twisting.

[UndercoverElephant]

Originally posted by Jethro
As best as I can decifer it, the term qualia describes the perception of experiences such as "seeing red" from the point of view of the person experiencing them.

If that is correct, what prevents them from being physical proceses in the brain?

If that is not correct, what am I missing?

Did you actually read my opening post, Jethro?

If you did, then you should not need to ask me this question.

[UndercoverElephant]

Originally posted by Q-Source

where do qualia occur (or take place)?


That question equates to "Where is my mind?"

The answer is nowhere, because "where" refers to the physical model, and qualia can't be placed in the physical model. Qualia aren't anywhere at all.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant

That question equates to "Where is my mind?"

The answer is nowhere, because "where" refers to the physical model, and qualia can't be placed in the physical model. Qualia aren't anywhere at all.

Where do your experiences of colors, taste, pain occur? (don't say nowhere again)

How do your qualia take place?

What do qualia require to exist?

[metacristi]

UCE

My philosophical stance on the nature of consciousness is that qualia is a big problem for the structural approaches of mind represented by computational emergence.Though,even in the extreme case that this is right,I have no certitudes that qualia cannot be reduced at materialism.That's why I take very seriously in account the 'extended materialism' [at the level of QM] hypothesis for explaining mental processes.There are some very interesting proposals here,the most prominent being those of Stapp and Penrose.In Stapp's opinion the actual interpretations of QM are enough to explain the hard problem [the reduction of the wave function of the brain].Penrose goes even further claiming that we need a new physics for explaining consciousness,especially the 'hard' problem.His 'objective reduction' of the wave function in the brain [in microtubules] due to the gravitational field is credited with the capacity to produce qualia.As far as I know there is a very serious reasearch underway in 'quantum consciousness' field especially the studies of S. Hameroff.
Still I'm not at all sure this is enough,maybe qualia is a fundamental feature of reality merely accesed by the brain.
In my view from here on we should make the difference between 'qualia' being totally different from matter which imply property dualism or even substance dualism [in the modern acception that matter and mind cause each other without interaction by direct transformation] and 'qualia' being a sort of 'substance' (or more such substances) existing at some fundamental level of reality that can interact with usual matter,though very faible which is still 'extended materialism'.
Frankly speaking I am [as a matter of belief only] on the edge between extended materialism [in its multiple forms] and property dualism,it's very hard to make any difference.Though I,still,consider myself a supporter of the 'extended materialism' position.But only barely.

[UndercoverElephant]

Originally posted by bjornart
There's no way I'm taking this poll. It demonstrates perfectly how statistics can be twisted by manipulating the question. And it's not even subtle twisting.

What, PRECISELY, is wrong with the question, assuming you read my opening post.


Stimpson J Cat :


quote:
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You claim to have two slots in your model, but in fact you can only justify the existence of one.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

One slot, two names.


Then why the two names?

You have only one slot in your model, and brain processes beliing there. You don't want to deny that qualia exist so you stuff the square peg in the round hole that's already got a round peg in it. One hole. Two pegs. As soon as you admit the need for two holes you become a property dualist. As soon as you take away the extra peg you become an eliminative materialist. So you are left with two pegs, one hole and a logical mess instead of a belief system.



quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secondly, we can have direct knowledge of qualia, and we can have indirect knowledge of qualia.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well, this is just nonsense. Qualia, by any definition that means anything, can only be known directly.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Then qualia do not exist, and experiences are not qualia.


That is eliminative materialism, and it doesn't make sense because it can't define experiences. All it can do is say "They ARE brain processes." They are, and they aren't. Oops.


I am not going to play your word games, UCE. Any word that you insist must be defined in a way that presupposes dualism, cannot represent anything that actually exists.


And that is your usual baseline claim - all lines of logic that expose materialism as false must be deemed to have presupposed materialism. In fact all I have done is claimed that qualia exist, and that they differ from brain processes. Does this pre-suppose dualism? No. It does not. It just uses the dictionary definitions of words we all use to describe things we all know exist. The problem is that materialism is incompatible with reality, not any presuppositions of mine.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We can also have direct knowledge of some brain processes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is also nonsense. The term 'brain process' only has meaning within the context of the abstract physical model, we have no direct access to this knowledge.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maybe within some dualistic framework, this is true. I do not think it is true. And you certainly haven't demonstrated that it is true.


It is TRUE under ANY FRAMEWORK.

The term 'brain process' only has meaning within the context of the abstract physical model, we have no direct access to this knowledge.

Face REALITY Stimpson!

******************************************
The term 'brain process' only has meaning within the context of the abstract physical model, we have no direct access to this knowledge.
******************************************

You KNOW this is true. Stop claiming it isn't.


Fine. The term is meaningless. Qualia do not exist. Experiences still exist, and they are still brain processes. I thought you defined qualia to mean experiences. I did not realize that you defined them in such a way as to be either meaningless or false.


They are only meaningless or false under your illogical belief system, Stimpson. They aren't a problem for me because I know the difference between subjective and objective.

Mental = subjective = empirical = qualia
Physical = objective = abstract = brain process

It is you and your belief system that creates all the confusion.


Maybe you should have been more clear in your definitions?


My definitions were as clear as the mountain air. Yours are totally screwed up, self-contradictory and bear no resemblance to the definitions in the dictionary. Go figure.


in fact, I still haven't seen you define what the word qualia means.


Qualia are subjective, empirical sense impressions which come to us directly in our phenomenal consciousness (oops....are you going to say I have 'pre-supposed' materialism is false?... :D )


Make up your mind. If qualia means phenomenal experience, then you cannot claim that qualia cannot be indirectly known, unless you can demonstrate that phenomenal experiences are not brain processes.


I don't have to demonstrate that. All I have to do is open a dictionary. If you want to re-write the dictionary then the burden of proof is on YOU to defend that.


But you are offering your assertion that by definition, they cannot be indirectly known, as proof that they are not brain processes. This is classical circular reasoning.


WOW! This is coming from the man whose defence of materialism consists of :

1) Everything which exists is physical
2) Therefore minds and qualia are physical
3) Therefore materialism is true.

You are incredible!


Once again, you have a very selective memory. Your so-called proof was the laughing stock of the board, and somehow you didn't even realize it.


Maybe it is because a growing number of people accept the proof and are openly accusing the materialists of behaving like brainwashed mormons?


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you want to avoid them then you must assert that qualia do not exist, as Synaesthesia has.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am perfectly happy to do so. It doesn't change my position or argument one iota.


It exposes it for what it really is.

[UndercoverElephant]

Originally posted by Q-Source

Where do your experiences of colors, taste, pain occur? (don't say nowhere again)


Nowhere! :D

Experiences don't have a 'where'.


How do your qualia take place?


How?


What do qualia require to exist?


A mind.

[Lucifuge Rofocale]

UCE, as soon as you answer Stimpy's simple, clear, direct observation that Qualia is a subset of brain proccesses, I'll take your pool.

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat


I am not claiming they differ. In fact, I explicitly stated that they do not. Why should I bother answering your questions if you are going to ignore them and pretend I answered the obvious?

[Lucifuge Rofocale]

After posting I read your post UcE and in no way you are answering Stimpy. What is a Lexus? A car? but not all car are Lexus....so they aren't the same. But a Lexus IS a car.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant

Experiences don't have a 'where'.



I am going to restate my question again, could you describe the mechanism that occurs in order to get qualia?

It doesn't exist in a vaccum, does it?

[UndercoverElephant]

Originally posted by Lucifuge Rofocale
After posting I read your post UcE and in no way you are answering Stimpy. What is a Lexus? A car? but not all car are Lexus....so they aren't the same. But a Lexus IS a car.

It is easy to defend the claim that a lexus belongs to the category of things we call 'cars'. The same is not true of qualia and brain processes because of the two different ways we have of knowing about these things. Information about qualia are only known directly (subjectively). Informtaition about brain processes can only be known indirectly (objectively) within the context of our physical model. So when Stimpson claims that qualia are a subset of brain processes he sets up as logical clash with my original definitions. The crux of the problem is that my definitions are dictionary-friendly, clear, easily defended and match our experiences of reality. Stimpson therefore tries to challenge my definitions and ends up talking idiotic gibberish like "subjective things are actually also objective" and "qualia can be known indirectly (objectively)" and "brain processes can be known directly (subjectively". These bastardised definitions may serve to rescue materialism in the mind of a brainwashed materialist, but anyone looking at them with a free mind can immediately recognise them as complete nonsense. You are welcome to challenge my definitions. Read my opening post.

http://www.2think.org/2think.shtml


People tend to create their own conclusion boxes. They then make statements that can't be logically defended--but can help solidify the box they are living in. The assumptions that make up the box are not carefully evaluated.

....

An example of this from a fundamentalist Christian viewpoint can be found in the August 12, 1996 issue of Christianity Today. On page 64, Charles Colson, writing about what Christians must do to defend their beliefs against evolution, insists that "Christians must come together, craft a credible apologetic, and then refuse to back down". The author doesn't ask that the evidence be examined or that the Truth be sought. Similar statements have also been made by Mormon leaders.

The author Matt Berry states, "[The search for] Truth does not begin with an answer on behalf of which all questions must constantly rearrange themselves. The [search for] Truth begins with fearless questions." This all seems so basic and self-evident, but large segments of the population haven't been able to (or don't want to) grasp this fundamental Truth.


In other words, Stimpson is behaving like the mormon. He has started with a conclusion that materialism is true and insists on re-arranging all the questions and all the definitions so that materialism cannot be proven false. If a person takes normal, sensible definitions he accuses them of pre-supposing materialism is false. His own definitions are upside-down dictionary-incompatible and blatant nonsense, but they help to defend materialism. Think about his definitions and think about mine. Which ones are correct?

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant

Nowhere! :D

Experiences don't have a 'where'.

Interesting assertion. Why not?

[cmaz]

Hmm...this may be a smaller, semantic issue, but I'd like to ask UCE to clarify something for me:

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Mental = subjective = empirical = qualia
Physical = objective = abstract = brain process


In what way do brain processes equal abstractness? We can observe brain processes (by which I mean the operation of neurons) through fMRI; my understanding of "empirical" (i.e.; verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment) is such that brain processes qualify as such.

If you could perhaps expand on that difference a bit (or point out where you think my definitions are inappropriate), I think it would help me better understand your argument.

C--

[UndercoverElephant]

Originally posted by Q-Source


I am going to restate my question again, could you describe the mechanism that occurs in order to get qualia?

It doesn't exist in a vaccum, does it?

Do you not think it is possible for something to exist, but not have a location?

Even 'mechanism' implies materialism. I'm not sure that the term 'non-physical mechanism' makes sense. Mechanisms, like locations, are physical concepts. I'm not trying to be awkward, I just can't answer your question within the context you are asking it - it's like asking what is outside the Universe or what happened before the Big Bang.

[UndercoverElephant]

Originally posted by CWL


Interesting assertion. Why not?

Because 'where' can only refer to things which exist in the physical world. This is another problem for materialism. A dualist or an idealist can simply state that qualia do not exist in the physical world and therefore the term 'where' simply does not apply to them. The materialist claims everything exists in the physical world, and thus is obliged to answer the question "Where is my mind?". He can't, of course......

Where is my Mind (The Pixies)

Stop!

With your feet on the air and your head on the ground
Try this trick and spin it, yeah
Your head will collapse if there's nothing in it
And you'll ask yourself

Where is my mind?
Where is my mind?
Where is my mind?
Way out in the water, see it swimming......

;)

[UndercoverElephant]

Originally posted by cmaz
[B]Hmm...this may be a smaller, semantic issue, but I'd like to ask UCE to clarify something for me:

In what way do brain processes equal abstractness?


It's all in the opening post. The words we use refer to concepts. Some of those concepts are a collection of related concepts which we believe refers to a collective objective reality we call the physical world. We never actually see this real physical world - all we see is our subjective impressions of it - but we presume it exists and we have a whole enormous edifice of related concepts starting with atoms/waves/energy and ending up with tables, bodies and brain processes. When I say it is 'abstract' I mean than the whole bunch of concepts we call 'the physical world' is an abstract model, and all facts and information we ever learn about the physical world are slotted into that model. Without that abstract model we cannot make sense of physical facts. "I see red" makes sense directly - it needs no context. "The brain process that correlates to me seeing red" only has meaning in terms of the abstract physical model - it requires reasoning and understanding in a way that sense impressions themselves do not.

Is that clearer?

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Do you not think it is possible for something to exist, but not have a location?

It is possible that we cannot determine its location, but it is still there and it still follows a mechanism of (lets say) generation.


Even 'mechanism' implies materialism. I'm not sure that the term 'non-physical mechanism' makes sense. Mechanisms, like locations, are physical concepts. I'm not trying to be awkward, I just can't answer your question within the context you are asking it - it's like asking what is outside the Universe or what happened before the Big Bang.

I am not asking you for a specific location, I am just asking what is the mechanism that you follow to acquire experiences (qualia).

Lets say that you experience colours, taste, pain directly... how does it happen? what is it involved in this process?

Q-S

[UndercoverElephant]

Q:


I am not asking you for a specific location, I am just asking what is the mechanism that you follow to acquire experiences (qualia).

Lets say that you experience colours, taste, pain directly... how does it happen? what is it involved in this process?


I can't give you a concise answer to this question any more than a materialist can. I could give you a long, idealistic answer involving a metamind and exchange of information with metamental objects. There is a continual 'dialogue' going on involving your will, and the machinations of the metamental algorithm behind the physical world. When circumstances dictate that your mind comes into contact with information about the external world then the Metamind orchestrates an exchange of information between your mind and the metamental object underlying the physical object, but this is also affected by the status of your physical brain. I am a bit worried about giving you answers like this because they will sound vague to you. A detailed model is available. Do you want to borrow my Peter Lloyd books? ;)

Basically the metamind acts as the physical medium would.

[ChuckieR]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Mental facts, including both experienincg qualia and the subjective experience described as "remembering qualia" come to us directly via phenomenal consciousness (directly into your mind like qualia and emotions).
Geoff,

The problem is that in order to be able to differentiate between different subjective "qualia" (I'm not sure I like that term, but that is irrelevant to make this point), our brain must have specific, physical, objective wiring. This is where the subjective meets the objective. Exposure to different qualia is (at least in part) what causes the brain to create/change its wiring.

Please see my post (http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&postid=414939#post414939) in the Materialism thread that addresses this in the context of the "Colorblind Scientist" thought experiment.

I you patch a baby's eye throughout its early development phase, it will be blind in that eye as an adult. The adult will simply not have any subjective experience at all when "viewing" through that eye because her brain does not have the proper wiring to interpret the stimulus. This can sadly happen inadvertently if a child with "lazy eye" (eye muscles not moving eye properly) is not treated early - the brain ignores input from that eye and the child is effectively blind it that eye.

I hope we can agree on those definitions. We might also observe that we have an extremely clear cut division between subjective facts and objective facts here.
I'm not a philosopher, so I'm not going to argue your definitions, but it should be obvious that the situation is not so clear cut as you have stated it.

Just so I can leave a single, simple quotable statement: The ability to "perceive" "qualia" only comes about after exposure to those qualia allow the brain to wire itself so that it can distinguish between them. "Qualia" and "physical" are not inseperable.

[UndercoverElephant]

Chuckie :


The problem is that in order to be able to differentiate between different subjective "qualia" (I'm not sure I like that term....


It is the bane of materialism.


...., but that is irrelevant to make this point), our brain must have specific, physical, objective wiring. This is where the subjective meets the objective. Exposure to different qualia is (at least in part) what causes the brain to create/change its wiring.

Please see my post in the Materialism thread that addresses this in the context of the "Colorblind Scientist" thought experiment.

I you patch a baby's eye throughout its early development phase, it will be blind in that eye as an adult. The adult will simply not have any subjective experience at all when "viewing" through that eye because her brain does not have the proper wiring to interpret the stimulus. This can sadly happen inadvertently if a child with "lazy eye" (eye muscles not moving eye properly) is not treated early - the brain ignores input from that eye and the child is effectively blind it that eye.


I understand all this. What I don't understand is how it effects the thought experiment in anything other than a practical way - and thought experiments aren't supposed to be practical. Perhaps I need you to explain what you mean by "where subjective meets objective". They might meet, but we already know that brain processes and qualia are close correlates - there is nothing new here. There's only one thing I would accept as being both subjective and objective but that comes much later in the discussion. We aren't there yet. Brain processes and qualia are easy to place into the different categories, even if some 'interactions' seem to involve both.


I'm not a philosopher, so I'm not going to argue your definitions, but it should be obvious that the situation is not so clear cut as you have stated it.


It is to me, but then maybe I've been thinking about it too long.....


Just so I can leave a single, simple quotable statement: The ability to "perceive" "qualia" only comes about after exposure to those qualia allow the brain to wire itself so that it can distinguish between them. "Qualia" and "physical" are not inseperable.


I assume you meant "Not seperable"?

Yes, it is fully accepted that there is some sort of deep relationship between "qualia" and the brain processes that correlate with them. They are almost like two different sides of a coin. All I am claiming is that there are indeed two different sides to the coin, however inseperable they may be.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

You claim to have two slots in your model, but in fact you can only justify the existence of one.
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One slot, two names.
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Then why the two names?

Why not? Lots of things have multiple names. Particularly when different aspects of those things are initially thought to be completely different things.

You have only one slot in your model, and brain processes beliing there. You don't want to deny that qualia exist so you stuff the square peg in the round hole that's already got a round peg in it. One hole. Two pegs. As soon as you admit the need for two holes you become a property dualist. As soon as you take away the extra peg you become an eliminative materialist. So you are left with two pegs, one hole and a logical mess instead of a belief system.

I have one hole and one peg. I guess that makes me an eliminative materialist. I have never heard that name before though. Is that anything like a reductionist materialist? You already knew I was one of those.

Secondly, we can have direct knowledge of qualia, and we can have indirect knowledge of qualia.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well, this is just nonsense. Qualia, by any definition that means anything, can only be known directly.
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Then qualia do not exist, and experiences are not qualia.
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That is eliminative materialism, and it doesn't make sense because it can't define experiences.

It can, and does. Just because you don't agree with that definition doesn't make it wrong.

All it can do is say "They ARE brain processes." They are, and they aren't. Oops.

In what sense are they not brain processes? Evidence please, not just assertions.

I am not going to play your word games, UCE. Any word that you insist must be defined in a way that presupposes dualism, cannot represent anything that actually exists.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And that is your usual baseline claim - all lines of logic that expose materialism as false must be deemed to have presupposed materialism.

Huh? Did you misspeak here? That doesn't make any sense.

In fact all I have done is claimed that qualia exist, and that they differ from brain processes.

You have defined qualia in such a way that there existence is impossible under materialism. Thus your claim that they exist presupposes that materialism is false.

Does this pre-suppose dualism? No. It does not. It just uses the dictionary definitions of words we all use to describe things we all know exist.

Apparently we do not all know that qualia exist. We all know that experiences exist, but we do not all agree that experiences have specific characteristics you have attached to qualia.

And if you plan on giving us your proof by dictionary crap again, let me know no so that I can stop wasting my time trying to have a rational conversation with you.

The problem is that materialism is incompatible with reality, not any presuppositions of mine.

You have asserted this, not demonstrated it. Semantic arguments and word games have nothing to do with the nature of reality.

This is also nonsense. The term 'brain process' only has meaning within the context of the abstract physical model, we have no direct access to this knowledge.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maybe within some dualistic framework, this is true. I do not think it is true. And you certainly haven't demonstrated that it is true.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

It is TRUE under ANY FRAMEWORK.

The term 'brain process' only has meaning within the context of the abstract physical model, we have no direct access to this knowledge.

The term "brain process" refers to a part of objective reality. We can have direct access to the brain process. We don't need direct access to the abstract description of the brain process in order to have direct access to the brain process.

Why do you keep insisting that physical reality is an abstract description, and not something that objectively exists? Don't you realize that by doing so you are begging the question that materialism is false?

Fine. The term is meaningless. Qualia do not exist. Experiences still exist, and they are still brain processes. I thought you defined qualia to mean experiences. I did not realize that you defined them in such a way as to be either meaningless or false.
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They are only meaningless or false under your illogical belief system, Stimpson.

You have not demonstrated that materialism is illogical.

They aren't a problem for me because I know the difference between subjective and objective.

Irrelevant. We are not talking about your belief system here.

in fact, I still haven't seen you define what the word qualia means.
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Qualia are subjective, empirical sense impressions which come to us directly in our phenomenal consciousness (oops....are you going to say I have 'pre-supposed' materialism is false?... )

No, but given the way you define "subjective", the assertion that qualia exist is clearly a presupposition that materialism is false.

Make up your mind. If qualia means phenomenal experience, then you cannot claim that qualia cannot be indirectly known, unless you can demonstrate that phenomenal experiences are not brain processes.
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I don't have to demonstrate that. All I have to do is open a dictionary. If you want to re-write the dictionary then the burden of proof is on YOU to defend that.

The dictionary does not tell us what the nature of reality is. If the dictionary says that phenomenal experiences cannot possibly be brain processes, then the dictionary is wrong.

But you are offering your assertion that by definition, they cannot be indirectly known, as proof that they are not brain processes. This is classical circular reasoning.
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WOW! This is coming from the man whose defence of materialism consists of :

1) Everything which exists is physical
2) Therefore minds and qualia are physical
3) Therefore materialism is true.

You are incredible!

You are, once again, deliberately misrepresenting my position.


Let me reiterate once again. You cannot use the way the dictionary defines words as evidence that materialism is false. This has got to be by far the most irrational argument you have ever attempted to present. I am not even going to argue with you about it again. If you still honestly believe that such an argument is valid, then you are clearly too irrational for me to hope to have an intelligent discussion with anyway.


Dr. Stupid

[BillyTK]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Because 'where' can only refer to things which exist in the physical world. This is another problem for materialism. A dualist or an idealist can simply state that qualia do not exist in the physical world and therefore the term 'where' simply does not apply to them. The materialist claims everything exists in the physical world, and thus is obliged to answer the question "Where is my mind?". He can't, of course......

Where is my Mind (The Pixies)

Stop!

With your feet on the air and your head on the ground
Try this trick and spin it, yeah
Your head will collapse if there's nothing in it
And you'll ask yourself

Where is my mind?
Where is my mind?
Where is my mind?
Way out in the water, see it swimming......

;)

I'm still not convinced that qualia exist, or of the need for them... could I have

Option 5--I am a marshmallow?

Great choice in music though!

[specious_reasons]

Most forms of cotton, denim primarily. I like rayon, but it's too hard to keep wrinkle free for my casual clothes handling.

[UndercoverElephant]

Originally posted by Q-Source


It is possible that we cannot determine its location, but it is still there and it still follows a mechanism of (lets say) generation.



I am not asking you for a specific location, I am just asking what is the mechanism that you follow to acquire experiences (qualia).

Lets say that you experience colours, taste, pain directly... how does it happen? what is it involved in this process?

Q-S

Q,

I would say experiencing qualia is a natural aspect of the self. Neither the self or its perceptual experiences have any location because they are not physical. I mean if an existent had a location wouldn't it necessarily be physical?

I believe the brain serves to limit our qualia or perceptual experiences. This is backed up both by evidence suggesting mind states are influenced by brain states, in addition to being backed up by research into NDE's, especially with blind people and congenitally blind people.

[Win]

I have to quibble a bit with your categories, UCE.

An eliminative materialist would say that qualia don't exist, not that they do not differ from brain processes. Under the eliminativist position, once you've explained a p-zombie, you've explained everything there is to explain. "Qualia" doesn't refer to anything, and strictly speaking, nobody is conscious in the sense of having them.

Plus, there are other "coherent" materialist positions, like various forms of reductive materialism, metaphysical materialism, and others.

So, you're being a little hard on the materialists, offering them the choice between the most extreme form of materialism and "incoherence."

That being said, of course materialism is false. In fact, materialism is inconceivable.

I think everybody knows how I voted.

[UndercoverElephant]

Stimpson


Why not? Lots of things have multiple names.


Yep, and we then have to decide whether they are synonyms. If they aren't then there must be some way of defining them as different from each other. As soon as you accept that brain processes and qualia are not synonymous then you are in trouble.


I have one hole and one peg. I guess that makes me an eliminative materialist. I have never heard that name before though. Is that anything like a reductionist materialist? You already knew I was one of those.


Then you should just accept that qualia are meaningless under your philosophy, as does Synaesthesia. I have been telling you for months that true materialism has no place for qualia.


It can, and does. Just because you don't agree with that definition doesn't make it wrong.


I don't agree with it, the dictionary doesn't agree with it, in fact it is the diametric opposite of the dictionary def, and it doesn't make sense. You can define "Up" as "well, Down, actually" if you like. I can call it nonsense.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All it can do is say "They ARE brain processes." They are, and they aren't. Oops.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In what sense are they not brain processes? Evidence please, not just assertions.


since when did you ever provide any evidence?

You expect to make assertions that totally contradict both the dictionary and common sense and do not feel the need to provide evidence.

Then when all I do is take the definitions straight out of the f**k*ng dictionary you demand I provide you with evidence to back them up! WAKE UP STIMPSON.

Qualia are not brain processes because THAT IS WHAT THE WORD MEANS. Qualia refers SPECIFICALLY to the experience itself, NOT the thing which gave rise to the experience! ****I do not have to back this up with evidence**** I am simply using a word to mean what that word HAS ALWAYS MEANT!

Somebody please put him out of his misery! :rolleyes: :(


quote:
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In fact all I have done is claimed that qualia exist, and that they differ from brain processes.
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You have defined qualia in such a way that there existence is impossible under materialism. Thus your claim that they exist presupposes that materialism is false.


ARGHHHHHH!

I didn't define qualia like that! Philosophers defined it specifically so we could have a different word for the subjective experience than we have for the objective process! They did not 'presuppose' materialism was false when they did that! THEY JUST NEEDED A WORD TO DESCRIBE THE EXPERIENCE BUT NOT THE PROCESS! I am just using the word they defined! If you recognise that qualia exist then materialism is false!

READ THE ABOVE PARAGRAPH AGAIN. AND AGAIN. AND AGAIN. ANG THEN AGAIN.

Do you understand it now? :(


Why do you keep insisting that physical reality is an abstract description, and not something that objectively exists?


Because the words we use to describe physical reality refer to an abstract model for something which we only KNOW exists by indirect reasoning.


Don't you realize that by doing so you are begging the question that materialism is false?


Stimpson, in your deluded fantasy-land you think everything that threatens materialism is based on an assumption that materialism is false. The true situation is that you are TOTALLY INCAPABLE of thinking outside the materialistic box regardless of the nonsense-rating of what you type into your computer. All you ever do is garble every definition under the sun in order to defend a pre-supposition of materialism whilst simultaneously accusing other people, using ungarbled definitions, of presupposing materialism is false! What astonishes me is you actually don't realise you are doing this!


************************************************
It's simple :

I can defend my position without using garbled, nonsensical, self-refuting definitions and you call that 'presupposing materialism is false'

In order to defend your position you have to turn dictionary definitions on their heads because you have presupposed materialism is true, but you don't think this is a problem.

WAKE UP!





quote:
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They aren't a problem for me because I know the difference between subjective and objective.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Irrelevant. We are not talking about your belief system here.


No, we are talking about MEANINGFUL definitions of subjective and objective as they are found in any dictionary you care to name

You believe that subjective things "can actually be objective" even though this runs contrary to normal definitions, contrary to common sense, cannot be defended, cannot be explained and can only be justified by a presupposition of materialism being true. Then you accuse me of presupposing materialism is false when I reject your definitions!



No, but given the way you define "subjective", the assertion that qualia exist is clearly a presupposition that materialism is false.


Somebody give me a pan-galactic gargleblaster. :rolleyes:


You are, once again, deliberately misrepresenting my position.

Let me reiterate once again. You cannot use the way the dictionary defines words as evidence that materialism is false.


No, but I can use them as evidence that in order to defend your position you have to REVERSE the dictionary definitions! You don't just "tweak" them. You REVERSE them.

WAKE UP!

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I believe the brain serves to limit our qualia or perceptual experiences. This is backed up both by evidence suggesting mind states are influenced by brain states, in addition to being backed up by research into NDE's, especially with blind people and congenitally blind people.

Citations, please? You know the drill.

Cheers,

[ChuckieR]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Chuckie :
I understand all this. What I don't understand is how it effects the thought experiment in anything other than a practical way - and thought experiments aren't supposed to be practical.But in order to be interesting, they should have some bearing on the real world. As stated, this thought experiment has nothing to say about the real world. If you want to say that "Mary is not exposed to different colors as a child" and also that "Mary will be able to distinguish between colors when she leaves the room", then you can say it, but it has no relevance to how the brain actually works, so it isn't very interesting. This particular thought experiment remains completely in the non-practical realm and is in no way a refutation of materialism because it does not acknowledge how the brain actually works.

Perhaps I need you to explain what you mean by "where subjective meets objective". They might meet, but we already know that brain processes and qualia are close correlates - there is nothing new here."Where subjective meets objective" is where we can point to the physical structures in the brain that are required for you to have your subjective experiences. Without these structures, you do not have the experiences. In order to obtain these structures, you must be exposed to the stimuli. This is the heart of the my objection to this particlar thought experiment (not against the Knowledge Argument altogether, which I will leave to the more philosophically adept).

me:
"Qualia" and "physical" are not inseperable.
UCE:
I assume you meant "Not seperable"?Yes, sorry.

Yes, it is fully accepted that there is some sort of deep relationship between "qualia" and the brain processes that correlate with them.And that relationship is formed when exposure to the qualia cause the brain to wire itself so that it can distinguish between those qualia in the future.

I have to be careful here because I know I am not using "relationship" and "is" and "is the same as", etc. in a very rigorous, philosophical way. But I want to state as clearly as possible that we cannot have these subjective, "qualitative" "experiences" without the proper physical brain wiring.

They are almost like two different sides of a coin. All I am claiming is that there are indeed two different sides to the coin, however inseperable they may be.Yes, that is the heart of the philosophical discussion. But the colorblind scientist thought experiment does not address this directly in a way that has anything to do with how human brains work.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Somebody give me a pan-galactic gargleblaster. :rolleyes:



No, but I can use them as evidence that in order to defend your position you have to REVERSE the dictionary definitions! You don't just "tweak" them. You REVERSE them.

WAKE UP!

Learn to control your temper.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

I have one hole and one peg. I guess that makes me an eliminative materialist. I have never heard that name before though. Is that anything like a reductionist materialist? You already knew I was one of those.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Then you should just accept that qualia are meaningless under your philosophy, as does Synaesthesia.

Didn't I just do that?

I have been telling you for months that true materialism has no place for qualia.

Sure, we have been through all of this many times before. You say that qualia is our phenomenal experiences. I say that this means qualia is a brain process. You say qualia cannot possibly be a brain process.I ask why not. You say that qualia are defined to be non-objective. I say that then qualia do not exist. You reply by claiming that I am denying the existence of phenomenal experiences.

It is the same old nonsense. It is a purely semantic argument, with no real meaning, and no relevance to the way the real world actually is.

It can, and does. Just because you don't agree with that definition doesn't make it wrong.
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I don't agree with it,

Don't care...

the dictionary doesn't agree with it,

Don't care...

in fact it is the diametric opposite of the dictionary def,

Don't care...

and it doesn't make sense.

Sure it does. And you have offered no argument for why it doesn't make sense, other than to assert that it does not, and dogmatically assert that your own definitions are the only ones that could possibly make sense.

You can define "Up" as "well, Down, actually" if you like. I can call it nonsense.

The only difference between my definition of "experience" and yours is that I do not make the a-priori assumption that experiences are non-objective. Why does that not make sense?

In what sense are they not brain processes? Evidence please, not just assertions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

since when did you ever provide any evidence?

There is plenty of scientific evidence to support my position. You just refuse to acknowledge any of it, because your preconceived beliefs about consciousness dogmatically assert that no matter how much science tells us about consciousness, whatever it has explained isn't consciousness. Consciousness is just whatever is left.

You expect to make assertions that totally contradict both the dictionary and common sense and do not feel the need to provide evidence.

Not true.

Then when all I do is take the definitions straight out of the f**k*ng dictionary you demand I provide you with evidence to back them up! WAKE UP STIMPSON.

What does the dictionary have to do with any of this?

Qualia are not brain processes because THAT IS WHAT THE WORD MEANS. Qualia refers SPECIFICALLY to the experience itself, NOT the thing which gave rise to the experience!

How convenient. Now no matter how much we learn about the experience, you can assert that it is not the experience, but just the thing that gives rise to it.

Your definition presumes dualism. you are begging the question.

****I do not have to back this up with evidence**** I am simply using a word to mean what that word HAS ALWAYS MEANT!

Then the word doesn't refer to anything that actually exists. Next issue?

What, am I supposed to invent a whole new language to describe my position, just because you refuse to allow me to use words in a slightly different way than you do? Are you not aware that your precious dictionaries provide multiple, often contradictory, meanings for words, and that different dictionaries give different meanings?

The word "experience" has always meant different things to different people. It means whatever the person using the word defines it to mean. I define the word differently than you do. Acknowledge this and move on.

You have defined qualia in such a way that there existence is impossible under materialism. Thus your claim that they exist presupposes that materialism is false.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGHHHHHH!

I didn't define qualia like that! Philosophers defined it specifically so we could have a different word for the subjective experience than we have for the objective process! They did not 'presuppose' materialism was false when they did that! THEY JUST NEEDED A WORD TO DESCRIBE THE EXPERIENCE BUT NOT THE PROCESS!

And in doing so they assumed that the experience is not the process. They made the a-priori assumption that materialism is false. Isn't this trivially obvious?

I am just using the word they defined! If you recognise that qualia exist then materialism is false!

Now all you have to do is demonstrate that qualia, as you have defined them, exist.

READ THE ABOVE PARAGRAPH AGAIN. AND AGAIN. AND AGAIN. ANG THEN AGAIN.

Do you understand it now?

Of course I understand it. Qualia is defined in such a way that if materialism is true, they cannot exist. So what?

Why do you keep insisting that physical reality is an abstract description, and not something that objectively exists?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because the words we use to describe physical reality refer to an abstract model for something which we only KNOW exists by indirect reasoning.

And???? How does this imply that physical reality is an abstract description?

This may come as a shock to you, but the words you use to describe your mental reality also refer to an abstract model that you only think exists by indirect reasoning.

All words refer to abstract models. That is because words are the tools we use to construct abstract models, and abstract models are the tools we use to describe things.

Don't you realize that by doing so you are begging the question that materialism is false?
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Stmpson, in your deluded fantasy-land you think everything that threatens materialism is based on an assumption that materialism is false.

I have clearly and explicitly explained how your arguments beg the question that materialism is false. Can you address those arguments, or not?

The situation is that you are TOTALLY INCAPABLE of thinking outside the materialistic box regardless of the nonsense-rating of what you type into your computer.

Bullsh*t.

All you ever do is garble every definition under the sun in order to defend a pre-supposition of materialism whilst simultaneously accusing other people, using ungarbled definitions, of presupposing materialism is false! What astonishes me is you actually don't realise you are doing this!

What astonishes me is that you don't realize that all of your arguments amount to semantics.

You take everything I say, and demand that it be interpreted with your dualistic definitions, in spite of the fact that I provide clear definitions for those terms, and then point out how your blatant misrepresentation of my position is incoherent.

It's simple :

I can defend my position without using garbled, nonsensical, self-refuting definitions and you call that 'presupposing materialism is false'

In order to defend your position you have to turn dictionary definitions on their heads because you have presupposed materialism is true, but you don't think this is a problem.

WAKE UP!

I am sorry, UCE, but it is not possible to describe my position using definitions of words that presuppose dualism. I have to provide my own definitions. If you can't deal with that, then that is your problem, not mine.

They aren't a problem for me because I know the difference between subjective and objective.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Irrelevant. We are not talking about your belief system here.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No, we are talking about MEANINGFUL definitions of subjective and objective as they are found in any dictionary you care to name

What if none of those dictionaries provide definitions that accurately describe the concepts I am trying to describe? Why can't I provide my own definitions?

Indeed, I must do so. Definitions in dictionaries are not formal definitions. They are vague, poorly defined, and often times, contraditorally defined.

The first thing you have to do in a logical discussion is provide formal definitions for your terms. I have done so, but you reject them because they disagree with your precious dictionary definitions.

The fact is that your own unwillingness to use formal definitions in a discussion just illustrates that you don't understand logic or philosophy at all.

You believe that subjective things "can actually be objective" even though this runs contrary to normal definitions, contrary to common sense, cannot be defended, cannot be explained and can only be justified by a presupposition of materialism being true. Then you accuse me of presupposing materialism is false when I reject your definitions!

More assertions. I can, and have, defended my claims. You reject my arguments because I won't use your definitions. You have never actually provided a logical refutation of my actual arguments.

Until such time as you provide an argument that does not amount to "you are wrong because my dictionary says so", consider this discussion concluded.

Dr. Stupid

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I would say experiencing qualia is a natural aspect of the self. Neither the self or its perceptual experiences have any location because they are not physical. I mean if an existent had a location wouldn't it necessarily be physical?

Nobody is saying otherwise. But those experiences require certain conditions to exist, they need to have an origin, don't they?


I believe the brain serves to limit our qualia or perceptual experiences. This is backed up both by evidence suggesting mind states are influenced by brain states, in addition to being backed up by research into NDE's, especially with blind people and congenitally blind people.

I am just asking what is the mechanism that you follow to acquire experiences (qualia)?

Do you endorse UCE's response to this question?

[UndercoverElephant]

ChuckieR :


But in order to be interesting, they should have some bearing on the real world.


True, and I think it does.


As stated, this thought experiment has nothing to say about the real world. If you want to say that "Mary is not exposed to different colors as a child" and also that "Mary will be able to distinguish between colors when she leaves the room", then you can say it, but it has no relevance to how the brain actually works, so it isn't very interesting. This particular thought experiment remains completely in the non-practical realm and is in no way a refutation of materialism because it does not acknowledge how the brain actually works.


Well....I don't think it actually matters how the brain works. I think we can treat the brain as a 'black box'. All that matters is what it does, and now it exists, not how it does it.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yes, it is fully accepted that there is some sort of deep relationship between "qualia" and the brain processes that correlate with them.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And that relationship is formed when exposure to the qualia cause the brain to wire itself so that it can distinguish between those qualia in the future.

I have to be careful here because I know I am not using "relationship" and "is" and "is the same as", etc. in a very rigorous, philosophical way. But I want to state as clearly as possible that we cannot have these subjective, "qualitative" "experiences" without the proper physical brain wiring.


I think I can accept that without it affecting the outcome.

As for "how brains actually work" I would say that science has a very long way to go in providing hard answers. Not that this in itself has got anything to do with materialism being true or false. If the brain was acting as a 'reciever' of consciousness rather than a 'generator' then I'm not sure we would even know. I'm not saying this is the truth, just pointing out how little we can say for sure.

[UndercoverElephant]

Stimpson


Didn't I just do that?


Yes, and it helps. If you are arguing that qualia do not exist then I can't refute your position. I am happy to let it fall over on its own. :)


--------------------------
I don't agree with it
----------------------------

Don't care.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
the dictionary doesn't agree with it,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Don't care...


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
in fact it is the diametric opposite of the dictionary def,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Don't care...


:D


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
and it doesn't make sense.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sure it does. And you have offered no argument for why it doesn't make sense, other than to assert that it does not, and dogmatically assert that your own definitions are the only ones that could possibly make sense.


NOT TRUE

I provided a very clear set of reasons why I use the definitions I do in the opening post of this thread. You have not attempted to refute them. I DID NOT 'dogmatically assert them'! That is what YOU do. I actually explained WHY I use them. You just asserted that since they lead to a disproof of materialism that they must be wrong. Tell me why they are wrong!


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
You can define "Up" as "well, Down, actually" if you like. I can call it nonsense.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The only difference between my definition of "experience" and yours is that I do not make the a-priori assumption that experiences are non-objective. Why does that not make sense?


Because experiences ARE subjective. That's what they are, Stimp! Please refer to the reasons I gave in my opening post.


There is plenty of scientific evidence to support my position.


There is no scientific evidence to support materialism. NONE.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Then when all I do is take the definitions straight out of the f**k*ng dictionary you demand I provide you with evidence to back them up! WAKE UP STIMPSON.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What does the dictionary have to do with any of this?


All your attempts to refute the proof depend on taking one dictionary definition or other and reversing it so it means the opposite of what it is normally understood to mean. This should set off MASSIVE ALARM BELLS. You don't hear them.



quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
****I do not have to back this up with evidence**** I am simply using a word to mean what that word HAS ALWAYS MEANT!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Then the word doesn't refer to anything that actually exists. Next issue?

What, am I supposed to invent a whole new language to describe my position, just because you refuse to allow me to use words in a slightly different way than you do?


You REVERSE them.


Are you not aware that your precious dictionaries provide multiple, often contradictory, meanings for words, and that different dictionaries give different meanings?


You will find no dictionary that accepts subjective as being a subset of objective. You will find most dictionaries define them as mutually exclusive opposites. You INSIST they cannot be. I have explained in my opening post why they MUST be. You have not explained what is wrong with that opening post.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
You have defined qualia in such a way that there existence is impossible under materialism. Thus your claim that they exist presupposes that materialism is false.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGHHHHHH!

I didn't define qualia like that! Philosophers defined it specifically so we could have a different word for the subjective experience than we have for the objective process! They did not 'presuppose' materialism was false when they did that! THEY JUST NEEDED A WORD TO DESCRIBE THE EXPERIENCE BUT NOT THE PROCESS!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And in doing so they assumed that the experience is not the process. They made the a-priori assumption that materialism is false. Isn't this trivially obvious?


The problem, Stimp, is that everybody including the mentally retarded know what the difference is between the experience of seeing red and the brain process responsible for it. We have two different concepts. Therefore, in order to refer to these two different concepts we must give them names. At no point do we even need to think materialism or dualism. We are just labelling concepts with names. Unfortunatley for materialism if we give seperate names to a subjective experience and a physical brain process then it is possible to refute materialism.

DINGALINGALINGALINGALINGALINGALINGALING!


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why do you keep insisting that physical reality is an abstract description, and not something that objectively exists?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because the words we use to describe physical reality refer to an abstract model for something which we only KNOW exists by indirect reasoning.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And???? How does this imply that physical reality is an abstract description?


Every time you REFER to 'physical reality' you refer to an abstract concept. All you ever actually know directly are your phenomenal experiences. So when you see a table there are two different meanings you can apply. There is the table which is part of your phenomenal experiences and there is the real table which exists in a noumenal world you can never know actually exists. So when we speak about 'the physical world' we are actually speaking about an abstract concept we have created to describe a noumenal world which we have reasoned exists. You do not see a table. You see a subjective image of a table. You can only think of it as a table because you have created in your mind an abstract concept of an external world. All physical facts actually refer to that abstract model of a proposed external world. If you cannot fit them into the abstract model then they are not physical facts. Phenomenal experiences do not fit into the model because you do not need to reason that they exist - the exist DIRECTLY in your mind.


This may come as a shock to you, but the words you use to describe your mental reality also refer to an abstract model that you only think exists by indirect reasoning.


It isn't true. When I say "I see red" I do not need to 'reason' that I see red, and the redness does not exist with respect to an abstract model. IT ACTUALLY EXISTS DIRECTLY IN MY MIND. We may be making progress here, but I might be being over-optimistic.


I have clearly and explicitly explained how your arguments beg the question that materialism is false. Can you address those arguments, or not?


What arguments? All you do is refuse to accept any definitions that lead to materialism being proved false. That isn't an argument. It is just a blind assumption.


What astonishes me is that you don't realize that all of your arguments amount to semantics.


Hey man, this is philosophy.

rest of post not saying anything new.....

[bjornart]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant

What, PRECISELY, is wrong with the question, assuming you read my opening post.

I'm sorry, I meant there was something wrong with the options, I was thinking of the poll as a whole, but refered to it as a question.

Your options assume you are right. You can refer to your opening post all you want, but fact is, this is obviously a contentious issue. Putting such obvious bias into the poll options turns it from valid statistics into worthless 'support' for your 'truth'.

[Q-Source]

UCE:
The problem, Stimp, is that everybody including the mentally retarded know what the difference is between the experience of seeing red and the brain process responsible for it.

Just to make things clear (this is related to my previous question). We all know that brain process =/= experience

So, from the above quote, you accept that the brain process is responsible for the experience of seeing red (qualia)?

Yes or no?

[Win]

Q:

Just to make things clear (this is related to my previous question). We all know that brain process =/= experience

Just for clarifications sake, are you saying that every materialist here knows that phenomenal experience isn't a brain process?

So, from the above quote, you accept that the brain process is responsible for the experience of seeing red (qualia)?

I think he might just have been imprecise. Maybe he meant: the brain process correlated with the experience of seeing red.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Win

Just for clarifications sake, are you saying that every materialist here knows that phenomenal experience isn't a brain process?

Are you being ironic? or is it a serious question?


I think he might just have been imprecise. Maybe he meant: the brain process correlated with the experience of seeing red.

He was very clear. He has repeated many times this idea:

everybody including the mentally retarded know what the difference is between the experience of seeing red and the brain process responsible for it.

However, when I ask him directly how this mechanism of experiencing red happens, instead of recognising that it happens thanks to a brain process, he gives an incomprehensible answer. He does not include any correlation at all between a brain process and the experience (see his response to my question above).

Originally posted by bjornart


I'm sorry, I meant there was something wrong with the options, I was thinking of the poll as a whole, but refered to it as a question.

Your options assume you are right. You can refer to your opening post all you want, but fact is, this is obviously a contentious issue. Putting such obvious bias into the poll options turns it from valid statistics into worthless 'support' for your 'truth'.

Maybe true, but I am trying to make a point. We can ignore the poll.

:)

Originally posted by Q-Source


Just to make things clear (this is related to my previous question). We all know that brain process =/= experience

So, from the above quote, you accept that the brain process is responsible for the experience of seeing red (qualia)?

Yes or no?

Responsbile?

No. I was just being materialist-friendly. They 'correlate'. They happen at the same time. Brain processes do not 'cause' qualia. They accompany them.

[bjornart]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Maybe true, but I am trying to make a point. We can ignore the poll.

:)

Which is exactly what my original post was all about. ;)

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Because 'where' can only refer to things which exist in the physical world. This is another problem for materialism. A dualist or an idealist can simply state that qualia do not exist in the physical world and therefore the term 'where' simply does not apply to them.

UCE,

It seems to me you are merely toying with words here. The mere fact that you could assume the viewpoint that "qualia do not exist in the physical world" does not constitue sufficient evidence that qualia is not caused by the physical world.

You will have to do better than that.

Q :

Okay, now I understand why you asked.

Why do brain processes correlate with qualia under idealism?

Because the brain process is the interface with the rest of the physical world. By 'interface' I am not refering to the BP/qualia relationship but the relationship between the brain process and the rest of external reality. Brain processes form a snapshot of, among other things, what is going on in the outside world. We need them or we can't be human consciousnesses.

[Mercutio]

quote:"As soon as you accept that brain processes and qualia are not synonymous then you are in trouble."

Ok, I'm in trouble. They are absolutely not synonymous. Brain processes exist, qualia are an explanatory fiction. "Qualia" is a noun, treated in this thread like either a physical or metaphorical object (or process, but bear with me for a bit). We experience stuff, but we say we "have experiences". We see things, or "have sights (or visions, but we get in trouble when we use 2 words for the same thing in this thread.). We remember, and say we "have memories." It is simply a handy way of expressing stuff. As UCE would say, it's dictionary friendly.

Sadly, dictionary friendly, and commonsensical, and "everybody knows" does not mean this is how it is. The sunrise I saw this morning does not imply a geocentric solar system no matter what I call it. Some like the word Qualia--I do not. It implies there is some "thing" there (where? nowhere, of course) when in fact this thing is just our language getting wrapped around a process.

[bjornart]

Throw in an option with what Mercutio just said and I'll vote as well.

Originally posted by CWL


UCE,

It seems to me you are merely toying with words here. The mere fact that you could assume the viewpoint that "qualia do not exist in the physical world" does not constitue sufficient evidence that qualia is not caused by the physical world.



Of course not. But it is the lynch-pin in the argument, even though the materiaist don't usualy see this. Synasthesia saw it. I wish he was here so he could tell you.

Originally posted by Mercutio
quote:"As soon as you accept that brain processes and qualia are not synonymous then you are in trouble."

Ok, I'm in trouble. They are absolutely not synonymous. Brain processes exist, qualia are an explanatory fiction. "Qualia" is a noun, treated in this thread like either a physical or metaphorical object (or process, but bear with me for a bit). We experience stuff, but we say we "have experiences". We see things, or "have sights (or visions, but we get in trouble when we use 2 words for the same thing in this thread.). We remember, and say we "have memories." It is simply a handy way of expressing stuff. As UCE would say, it's dictionary friendly.

Sadly, dictionary friendly, and commonsensical, and "everybody knows" does not mean this is how it is. The sunrise I saw this morning does not imply a geocentric solar system no matter what I call it. Some like the word Qualia--I do not. It implies there is some "thing" there (where? nowhere, of course) when in fact this thing is just our language getting wrapped around a process.

Language is central to the whole caboodle because it is language we use to communicate and language we use to think and language we use to construct our worldview. If your view is that qualia are fictional and the physical world is 'real' then I have to direct you here :

The Physical Word is a Fiction (http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~ursa/philos/phinow3.htm)


1. Introduction
2. Illustration of the Argument
2.1 The Four-Sided Pinkel Triangle
2.2 The Pinkel Triangle is Indistinguishable from a Fiction
2.3 The Underlying Logic
3. Application of the Argument
3.1 Disembodied Minds
3.2 How Can You Tell You're Not a Disembodied Mind?
3.3 The Sense of Touch is Not Authoritative
3.4 The Physical World is Indistinguishable from a Fiction
4. Surely This is a Joke?
4.1 Is the Argument Credible?
4.2 Academic Exercise or Serious Suggestion?
5. Mental Monism is not Solipsist
6. Mental Monism is not Heartless
7. Mental Monists Cannot Walk Through Walls
8. So What?
8.1What Difference Does it Make?
8.2 Toward a Science of Mind
8.3 Mental Science Cannot be Based on Physics
8.4 Mental Science Must be Based on Monism

The proposition that appears in the title of this article may seem odd. And the reader will be entitled to demand, "What on Earth do you mean by this? Surely you can't mean it literally?" Before getting on to this weird proposition, however, I need to prepare some ground. I must try to persuade you that the foundations are sound, before asking you to consider what is built on them. Therefore I shall illustrate the argument that I shall use to support this weird stuff, by applying it in an uncontentious case.

[Win]

Q:

Are you being ironic? or is it a serious question?

It was a serious question. I read =/= as "is not."

I guess you meant, we all know that you think that experience is not a brain process.

As to the "responsible" thing, I think UCE has anwered that question.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
I believe the brain serves to limit our qualia or perceptual experiences. This is backed up both by evidence suggesting mind states are influenced by brain states, in addition to being backed up by research into NDE's, especially with blind people and congenitally blind people.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Citations, please? You know the drill.


Mindsight by Kenneth Ring and Sharon Cooper

[Mercutio]

THanks for the site. I need some time to actually read it.

Meanwhile, just a quick comment:

quote:"Language is central to the whole caboodle because it is language we use to communicate and language we use to think and language we use to construct our worldview. "

Agreed, but with the caveat that language is itself a slippery subject. Some will argue that "meanings" of words have some sort of existence of their own--I side with others (see later Wittgenstein for one example, or even Skinner) who see meaning as simply an agreed-upon usage of a particular word. Thus the same word, in different contexts, may have vastly different meanings. THat is part of the problem here. The dictionary friendly common uses are not the same as more technical ones. That is not a problem for the meaning-is-use crowd, but has the others engaging in verbal gymnastics.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Mindsight by Kenneth Ring and Sharon Cooper

I guess you don't know the drill. You cite a book that contains a collection of case studies when I ask for citations? And one that claims the blind can see during NDE that you somehow thinks supports your claim of the brain being a limiting factor?

Cheers,

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Q-Source
I would say experiencing qualia is a natural aspect of the self. Neither the self or its perceptual experiences have any location because they are not physical. I mean if an existent had a location wouldn't it necessarily be physical?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Nobody is saying otherwise. But those experiences require certain conditions to exist, they need to have an origin, don't they?



Umm . . well yes, experiences have their origin in an experiencer. Got a feeling that answer won't satisfy you though! ;) But that's the correct answer. Of course the experiences are influenced by the brain, although they have their origin with the experiencer.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I believe the brain serves to limit our qualia or perceptual experiences. This is backed up both by evidence suggesting mind states are influenced by brain states, in addition to being backed up by research into NDE's, especially with blind people and congenitally blind people.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I am just asking what is the mechanism that you follow to acquire experiences (qualia)?



Mechanism? Why does there need to be a mechanism?



Do you endorse UCE's response to this question?



Can't remember what he put precisely. I agree with about 95% of everything he says though and I don't recall disagreeing with any of his responses to you.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


I guess you don't know the drill. You cite a book that contains a collection of case studies when I ask for citations? And one that claims the blind can see during NDE that you somehow thinks supports your claim of the brain being a limiting factor?

Cheers,

I assumed you wanted to read up on research about the nature of vision in those who have experienced an NDE? If not I'm sure the materialists will supply lots of citations to support the idea that the brain influences mind states. If the brain is not the source of the self then it seems to me that the brain must therefore limit the self in appropriate ways, otherwise why is there the correlation?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Mercutio
....verbal gymnastics.

Is selecting one of the 2 possible choices:

"Matter makes consciousness"

or

"Consciousness makes matter"

a "verbal gymnastic"?


BTW, the indisputable fact that *I* think seems to me the most absolute, Objective, thing I can know. I've wondered why is it described as being "subjective". ;)

Originally posted by Mercutio
[B]THanks for the site. I need some time to actually read it.

Meanwhile, just a quick comment:

quote:"Language is central to the whole caboodle because it is language we use to communicate and language we use to think and language we use to construct our worldview. "

Agreed, but with the caveat that language is itself a slippery subject. Some will argue that "meanings" of words have some sort of existence of their own--I side with others (see later Wittgenstein for one example, or even Skinner) who see meaning as simply an agreed-upon usage of a particular word.
Thus the same word, in different contexts, may have vastly different meanings. THat is part of the problem here. The dictionary friendly common uses are not the same as more technical ones. That is not a problem for the meaning-is-use crowd, but has the others engaging in verbal gymnastics.


Well, if you're into Wittgenstein then you should like the site. It is a Wittgensteinian attack on materialism.

[Jethro]

Relatively early on I have a few problems.

Suppose I were to put a Pinkel Triangle on the table in front of you. How could you tell whether this was a real one or an imaginary one? You couldn't! Since you cannot perceive or detect either a Pinkel Triangle or an imaginary triangle, there simply is no difference between them. "Huh?" the reader might interject, "Surely there is one big difference - namely the fact that one is real and the other imaginary.Actually, my interjection would be "Where the f*ck did you get a Pinkel Triangle when a Pinkel Triangle cannot exist?"

[list=1]
It is intrinsically inconceivable that we can ever perform any experiment or observation to detect the presence of X.
Therefore any X is indistinguishable from a fiction.
Therefore any X is a fiction.
[/list=1]
If you disagree with this scheme, then I must ask you for a counter-example, or a contrary proof.I disagree with the first statement. I would say it's not sufficient for X to be undetectable, I would say that it has to be logically impossible for it to exist for us to continue down that path.

And say we just took the stated argument as is, then all we are left with is solipsism. He argues that since our mind exists we know that minds can exist. But there is no experiment or observation we can make to determine if they do exist. By his logic, since we cannot determine whether those apparant minds do exist, we must reject the existence of other minds, and mental monism, as fiction.

And while we're at it, how do we know that we aren't all p-zombies? Maybe there isn't a concious being among the lot of us. Well, since there's no experiment we can do, absolutely everything is fiction.

Or maybe the author of your paper has too loose a definition of fiction.

Jethro,


Actually, my interjection would be "Where the f*ck did you get a Pinkel Triangle when a Pinkel Triangle cannot exist?"


Think of it like a Zen Koan, followed by the xplanation of the Koan, which is more than you ever get with a Zen Koan. :)

I think you need to read all of it.....


And say we just took the stated argument as is, then all we are left with is solipsism


from the paper :


5. Mental Monism is not Solipsist



You continue :


He argues that since our mind exists we know that minds can exist. But there is no experiment or observation we can make to determine if they do exist.


Think about this. Do you actually need to do an experiment to find out if your mind exists? Or do you just know?

This question lies at the heart of philosophy.

[Jethro]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
I think you need to read all of it.....
I did, don't worry.from the paper :
5. Mental Monism is not SolipsistYes, I know he asserts that Mental Monism is not Solipsist, but as I said, merely knowing that other minds CAN exist does not mean they DO exist. And since there is no experiment that can prove those other minds exist, Mental Monism is fiction, according to the criteria of fiction he provided above.Think about this. Do you actually need to do an experiment to find out if your mind exists? Or do you just know?

This question lies at the heart of philosophy. Of course I know my mind exists. But if I were a p-zombie wouldn't I simply think my mind existed when it really didn't? If not, why not?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Jethro
But if I were a p-zombie wouldn't I simply think my mind existed when it really didn't? If not, why not?

Interesting that the one incontrovertible fact -- you -- absolutely KNOW is that *you* think; yet, you are willing to ignore that fact to postulate some objective, existent, physical reality that your body/brain perceives (as your thinking mechanism interprets it) as being the real cause.

[Mercutio]

quote:"BTW, the indisputable fact that *I* think seems to me the most absolute, Objective, thing I can know. I've wondered why is it described as being "subjective". "

I hope you note that I absolutely agree that you think. (looking back, I did not state this specifically. The sentence would have been: "we think, but we say we 'have thoughts'."). As for the subjective/objective distinction, it honestly isn't a big deal for me. Whether something is observable by one person or by many, it is observable. The first we call subjective, the second objective, but it is not a terribly useful distinction. Of course the fact that you think is indisputable (without the use of verbal gymnastics, I mean).

Ok, I read the link. Not terribly impressed. If this is Wittgenstein, it must be early stuff--tractatus, perhaps--but I don't recognise the arguments. Not that it is important whether or not W or somebody else makes an argument. My first reaction is that it seems a solipsist without cojones. (Other bodies don't exist, but other minds may? May? whaaaa?). Personally, I have always thought that if one accepts the "reality" of mental entities, the only tenable position is solipsism. But seeing as how "mental entities" are much more easily explained as the product of our language, I have given up solipsism (despite its obvious attractions) for...ok, you can give it a label, I've heard at least three during this thread, but I just think it's the proper view.

[Jethro]

Originally posted by hammegk


Interesting that the one incontrovertible fact -- you -- absolutely KNOW is that *you* think; yet, you are willing to ignore that fact to postulate some objective, existent, physical reality that your body/brain perceives (as your thinking mechanism interprets it) as being the real cause. While I am perfectly willing to ignore this incontrovertable fact when attempting to expose what I believe to be the ridiculousness of the linked paper, I am not willing to do so when describing what I believe to be reality. I see no conflict.

I suppose I find it interesting that you have such difficulty with the postulate that the universe appears much as one might expect an objective, existent, physical reality to behave because it does because it is an objective, existent, physical reality.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Mercutio
The first we call subjective, the second objective, but it is not a terribly useful distinction.
OK. :)

Of course the fact that you think is indisputable (without the use of verbal gymnastics, I mean).
The verbal gymnastic thought is not about whether or not we think. Is it verbal gymnastics to select either "matter makes consciousness" or "consciousness makes matter"?

....I have given up solipsism .....

I'd like to hear your proof. The best I can do is reach a gentlemens' agreement, ok, both of us think.

Originally posted by Jethro
I suppose I find it interesting that you have such difficulty with the postulate that the universe appears much as one might expect an objective, existent, physical reality to behave because it does because it is an objective, existent, physical reality.
The world of perception -- my bag-o-bones *me* provides perception for the thinking *I* -- and the scientific descriptions thereof is a given for me too. I find it even more interesting that the physical constants of the universe appear more & more carefully balanced as analysis proceeds.

The problem is your answer to the Matter first, or Consciousness first, question. ;)



Again, my thanks to Stimpy for the logic that denies any possibility of dualism. (Well, Win may disagree. :( )

[c4ts]

http://host.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&threadid=17304

[Win]

hamm:

Again, my thanks to Stimpy for the logic that denies any possibility of dualism. (Well, Win may disagree. :()

I do indeed. ;)

I assure you that epiphenomenal dualism, while highly counter-intuitive, has no "logical flaw," as it were.

But, no need to frown.

[Loki]

Win,

That being said, of course materialism is false. In fact, materialism is inconceivable
Do I see a "conceivability crisis" on the horizon? Of course, conceivability doesn't force physically possible ... does it?

[Mercutio]

inconceivable?

From "The Princess Bride":
VIZZINI
He didn't fall? Inconceivable!!
INIGO
(whirling on Vizzini)
You keep using that word -- I do not think it means what you think it means.

;)

[Win]

Loki:

Do I see a "conceivability crisis" on the horizon?

Don't know. Do you?

Of course, conceivability doesn't force physically possible ... does it?

Not necessarily. If we're just looking at this universe, there are lots of things that are conceivable that aren't so, as far as we know. Faster than light travel, for example, or Al Gore being the current president of the United States.

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Of course not. But it is the lynch-pin in the argument, even though the materiaist don't usualy see this. Synasthesia saw it. I wish he was here so he could tell you.

Well Synasthesia isn't around and I don't get it. Just why is it so unthinkable that qualia - although qualia may arguably be qualified as being "non-physical " - may be the result of a physical process?

Originally posted by Jethro

Yes, I know he asserts that Mental Monism is not Solipsist, but as I said, merely knowing that other minds CAN exist does not mean they DO exist. And since there is no experiment that can prove those other minds exist, Mental Monism is fiction, according to the criteria of fiction he provided above.


Well, mental monism is a metaphysical theory, so, yes...it is a fiction. That does not mean that mental monism isn't the correct metaphysical model for reality.

As far the solipsism thing goes - people often respond to this with "but that means solipsism is true". It doesn't. Solipsism remains a possibility - it just isn't neccesarily true if mental monism is true.


Of course I know my mind exists. But if I were a p-zombie wouldn't I simply think my mind existed when it really didn't? If not, why not?


If you were a P-zombie your brain might think that, but your mind wouldn't exist at all. Other people would experience you claiming your mind existed, but you wouldn't be around to witness it.

CWL :


Well Synasthesia isn't around and I don't get it. Just why is it so unthinkable that qualia - although qualia may arguably be qualified as being "non-physical " - may be the result of a physical process?


We have two natural categories of 'things' - physical things and mental things. Everybody knows what we mean when we use these terms. However, materialism defines everything to be 'physical' so it ends up having to defend the notion that all the mental things, even though they appear to be so different from the physical things, are actually physical things also. The problem is brought to its zenith with qualia, because qualia are a direct mental correlate of something already existing in the physical realm - you cannot posit that qualia are physical without the word 'qualia' becoming synonymous with 'brain process'. If they are synonyms then 'qualia' is a redundant term. If they are not then there must be both a physical and mental realm and materialism is false. Therefore, materialism implies that qualia do not exist if it is to remain coherent - as soon as it admits they do exist and that they are not synonymous with brain processes then it's dead in the water. Synasthesia chose denial of the existence of qualia rather than accepting that materialism is false.

http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&threadid=12492&perpage=40&highlight=qualia&pagenumber=7


PixyMisa:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you are talking about purely physiological brain processes, the lowest level of the brain process as a whole, then it is simply true that qualia arise from the physiological brain processes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Win :
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course, you mean "that qualia are brain processes." Don't you?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Synaesthesia :
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualia don't exist. Brain Processes, human behaviour, consciousness and intelligence manifestly do exist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------





If you need any more reasons, check out the logical quagmire that PixyMisa found himself in on that page/thread trying to explain how brain processes and qualia were both physical and yet still different to each other. It was painful to watch. Synaesthesia was trying to put him out of his logical misery.

[MRC_Hans]

UcE, you behave nicely and have a cultured language. This makes it tempting to try and engage in serious debate with you. However, besides your eloquence, there seems really little substance to distinguish you from types like Franko. A short analysis of your arguments seem to disclose a full hand of standard logical fallacies:

We have two natural categories of 'things' - physical things and mental things.

Straw man. This is far from established knowledge. Actually, this question is the core of this debate, making this also a circular argumentation: You base your argumentation on your conclusion.

Everybody knows what we mean when we use these terms.

Appeal to popularity. And false: The meanings of those terms are hotly debated.

However, materialism defines everything to be 'physical' so it ends up having to defend the notion that all the mental things, even though they appear to be so different from the physical things, are actually physical things also.

Double straw man. Materialism claims that everything is at least indirectly observable. There is no disparity between objective physical phenomenons and mental ones, from a materialist POV.

The problem is brought to its zenith with qualia, because qualia are a direct mental correlate of something already existing in the physical realm - you cannot posit that qualia are physical without the word 'qualia' becoming synonymous with 'brain process'.

False conclusion on behalf of meterialism. Qualia are not synonymous with brain processes, they are a product of them.

If they are synonyms then 'qualia' is a redundant term.

Irrelevant. They are not, and anyhow, how does your pointing out a possible redundancy in language prove your point?

If they are not then there must be both a physical and mental realm and materialism is false.

Non-sequiteur. Just because qualia do not entirely encompass thought processes, it does not follow that they exist in a different realm.

Therefore, materialism implies that qualia do not exist if it is to remain coherent - as soon as it admits they do exist and that they are not synonymous with brain processes then it's dead in the water.

Poisoning the well. You claim a ridicolous position of the opponent, but it does not exist.

Synasthesia chose denial of the existence of qualia rather than accepting that materialism is false.

Personal attack. You try to ridicule your oppponent, while his sole offence is disagreeing with you.



Hans

Hans :



We have two natural categories of 'things' - physical things and mental things.

Straw man. This is far from established knowledge. Actually, this question is the core of this debate, making this also a circular argumentation: You base your argumentation on your conclusion.


Well, that's not actually true. If you read my opening post in this thread I very clearly explain why these two categories of things exist - one of them comes to us direct via phenomenal consicousness and the other is the result of abstract reasoning. How is that basing my argument on my conclusion? How is it a straw man? I'm not just asserting it, am I?



The problem is brought to its zenith with qualia, because qualia are a direct mental correlate of something already existing in the physical realm - you cannot posit that qualia are physical without the word 'qualia' becoming synonymous with 'brain process'.

False conclusion on behalf of meterialism. Qualia are not synonymous with brain processes, they are a product of them.


But if they are a product of them then they are not the same as them. And that means you have 'two sorts of things' where the physicalist model only has a place for one. If Qualia 'are a product of brain processes' then you can't be a materialist - you have to be a property dualist.

:)


If they are synonyms then 'qualia' is a redundant term.

Irrelevant. They are not, and anyhow, how does your pointing out a possible redundancy in language prove your point?


I already explained that...

--------------------
because qualia are a direct mental correlate of something already existing in the physical realm - you cannot posit that qualia are physical without the word 'qualia' becoming synonymous with 'brain process'. If they are synonyms then 'qualia' is a redundant term.
-------------------

The ONLY difference between qualia and brain processes is that the former is the mental correlate of the latter. So if you do not recognise the mental realm and the physical realm as seperate things you have no meaning for the word 'qualia' over and above the meaning of the term 'brain process'. i.e. under materialism there is no difference in the meaning, but in real life there IS a difference.



Personal attack. You try to ridicule your oppponent, while his sole offence is disagreeing with you.


It's not a personal attack! I'm not attacking Syn. I am just telling you what his position is! I think all forms of materialism are ridiculous. Synasthesia actually takes the only position within materialism which is logically defendable. It just isn't existentially defendable.

Geoff

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Win

I do indeed. ;)

I assure you that epiphenomenal dualism, while highly counter-intuitive, has no "logical flaw," as it were.

But, no need to frown.

http://www.hku.hk/philodep/courses/max/phil2022/2220dilemma.html

The "intuitive" problem is what as yet I can't overcome. Logic is no more important than the choice of axioms as I see it yet, and in the choice of mind or matter that remains *I* think is mind.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Win

It was a serious question. I read =/= as "is not."

I guess you meant, we all know that you think that experience is not a brain process.

No, I meant that we all know that there is a difference between a brain process and qualia.

Who are "we"? you might ask.

"Materialists" is my answer. Why saying that qualia arises from a physical brain process could be incoherent with materialism?


As to the "responsible" thing, I think UCE has anwered that question.

It does not change anything. Causation is a subset of correlation.

Q


Why saying that qualia arises from a physical brain process could be incoherent with materialism?


The only 'difference' between BPs and qualia is that the former is objective and the latter is subjective. BPs are the objective/physical form of qualia. Qualia are the subjective/mental form of BPs. Materialism claims that only the physical things exist. If only physical things exist then what does it mean to say that qualia are the mental form of brain processes? If the only difference between BPs and qualia are that qualia are mental and BPs are physical then how does one define qualia in a philosophy that insists that only the physical things exist? If you claim that BPs and Qualia both exist and are both physical but are still different then it has stopped being materialism and started being a form of property dualism.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant

The only 'difference' between BPs and qualia is that the former is objective and the latter is subjective.

good


BPs are the objective/physical form of qualia. Qualia are the subjective/mental form of BPs.

Now it is YOU who is claiming that qualia and BP are synonymous!

Can't you be consistent with your definitions?


Materialism claims that only the physical things exist.

Materialism also claims that everything is a product of material processes.

If we say that qualia are a by-product of a BS, then where is the incoherence?


If only physical things exist then what does it mean to say that qualia are the mental form of brain processes? If the only difference between BPs and qualia are that qualia are mental and BPs are physical then how does one define qualia in a philosophy that insists that only the physical things exist?

If only physical things exist then you could be right, but Materialism says that the interaction of physical matter are responsible or are correlated to non physical forms.


If you claim that BPs and Qualia both exist and are both physical but are still different then it has stopped being materialism and started being a form of property dualism.

Qualia are not physical, they are a by-product of a physical process and it is still Materialism.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant

Why do brain processes correlate with qualia under idealism?

Because the brain process is the interface with the rest of the physical world. By 'interface' I am not refering to the BP/qualia relationship but the relationship between the brain process and the rest of external reality. Brain processes form a snapshot of, among other things, what is going on in the outside world. We need them or we can't be human consciousnesses.

Well, this is a better response than the Metamental object-Metamind-You answer you gave before.

It also does not differ from the response that you could get from a materialist. As you said, we need a BS in order to connect the external reality with our minds.

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Well, that's not actually true. If you read my opening post in this thread I very clearly explain why these two categories of things exist - one of them comes to us direct via phenomenal consicousness and the other is the result of abstract reasoning. How is that basing my argument on my conclusion? How is it a straw man? I'm not just asserting it, am I?

The straw man is that you try to introduce a totally arbitrary classification as an axiom. There is not a sharp distinction between phenomenal experience and the more abstract qualia. Of course, your definition can be different from mine (English is not my first language), but in my dictionary, qualia are abstract, general properties like white, hot, brittle, nice, etc.

These range from simple extrapolations of previous experience to total abstract considerations. There is no sharp border, where things are either phenomenal or abstract.

But if they are a product of them then they are not the same as them. And that means you have 'two sorts of things' where the physicalist model only has a place for one. If Qualia 'are a product of brain processes' then you can't be a materialist - you have to be a property dualist.

:)

I said they were not synonmous. Do avoid telling me what I am, thanks.[


I already explained that...

--------------------
because qualia are a direct mental correlate of something already existing in the physical realm - you cannot posit that qualia are physical without the word 'qualia' becoming synonymous with 'brain process'. If they are synonyms then 'qualia' is a redundant term.
-------------------

The ONLY difference between qualia and brain processes is that the former is the mental correlate of the latter. So if you do not recognise the mental realm and the physical realm as seperate things you have no meaning for the word 'qualia' over and above the meaning of the term 'brain process'. i.e. under materialism there is no difference in the meaning, but in real life there IS a difference.

I have no absolutely discrete meaning of qualia. If I have lifted two stones and found scorpions under both, I' gonna be very careful about the third. I have an almost phenomenal qualia: "there are scorpions under stones here". Or I can have a wholly abstract idea of beauty and harmony. And anything in between.


It's not a personal attack! I'm not attacking Syn. I am just telling you what his position is! I think all forms of materialism are ridiculous. Synasthesia actually takes the only position within materialism which is logically defendable. It just isn't existentially defendable.

Mmmm, I'd say your choice of words were less than flattering, but OK, accepted.

I notice, and have noticed for long, one other difference between you and "some people": You dont take offence when people disagree, actually you seem to like it. Thats a debater's spirit :)

Hans

Q :


Now it is YOU who is claiming that qualia and BP are synonymous!


I didn't! They are different things with different meanings. Synonyms are interchangeable words. Brain processes and qualia are correlates, not synonyms.


If we say that qualia are a by-product of a BS, then where is the incoherence?


You then have both brain states and qualia where the physical model dictates only brain states. This is dualism, not monism.


Qualia are not physical, they are a by-product of a physical process and it is still Materialism.


Then you have a brain process and a by-product of a brain process, which isn't a brain process. If qualia are anything more than brain processes then you cannot be a materialist.

Hans :


There is no sharp border, where things are either phenomenal or abstract.


There is a sharp border between things which directly exist in your mind (phenomenen) and things which you have reasoned exist outside your mind. That distinction is absolute.


I said they were not synonmous. Do avoid telling me what I am, thanks.


Sorry.....I don't kniow what else to do. If your position is that qualia and brain processes both exist and aren't the same then I do not believe you can justify calling yourself a materialist.


Mmmm, I'd say your choice of words were less than flattering, but OK, accepted.


This has been my problem ever since I claimed that I could logically disprove materialism. It is hard to make that claim and not offend materialists. I certainly don't want to offend anyone.

[Q-Source]

me
Qualia are not physical, they are a by-product of a physical process and it is still Materialism.

you
Then you have a brain process and a by-product of a brain process, which isn't a brain process. If qualia are anything more than brain processes then you cannot be a materialist.

Why not?

Unless these definitions are wrong, Materialism is...

A metaphysical thesis that asserts that everything that exists is material or a product of material processes.
meta-library (http://www.meta-library.net/gengloss/mater-body.html)

another...


1 a : a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter
m-w.com (http://www.m-w.com)

Qualia (among other non-physical by-products) can be conceived as a manifestation of a material process and materialism still holds.

Q,


Qualia (among other non-physical by-products) can be conceived as a manifestation of a material process and materialism still holds.


That is just defence of materialism by defining it to be true. Yes - materialism says that qualia must be a byproduct of physical things. But when we try to define how qualia could be a by-product of matter we run into all the logical problems. We have to redefine English to make the descriptions work. Specifically we have to reverse the meaning of one term, judging by Stimpsons redefinitions. e.g. claiming subjective things are actually objective.

[Win]

Q:

No, I meant that we all know that there is a difference between a brain process and qualia

Who are "we"? you might ask.

"Materialists" is my answer. Why saying that qualia arises from a physical brain process could be incoherent with materialism?

Well, I'll have to disagree.

First of all, not all materialists "know" this, which is to say believe it to be so. Some would argue that qualia just are brain processes. Others would argue that qualia don't exist.

The problem with saying that qualia "arise" from brain processes is that I have no idea what you mean. If you mean that they are reducible to brain processes, well aren't they brain processes then? If you mean that they exist as higher-order phenomena which are irreducible to brain processes, I'd like to hear more.

It does not change anything. Causation is a subset of correlation.

Ah, but, while I'm hesitant about putting words in UCE's mouth, I'm fairly confident that he'd argue that qualia, while correlated with brain processes, are not caused by them.

For you to have a point here, correlation would have to be a subset of causation.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Q-Source
It does not change anything. Causation is a subset of correlation.

All the naysaying notwithstanding, Q, this is exactly right. Causation is a proper subset (Venn diagram point-of-view) of correlation. There can be no causation without correlation.

There can, however, be correlations that many may mistake as causation. This is the reason the philosopher John Stuart Mills worked out his methods in the 19th century. From a previous post on another thread:

John Stuart Mills long ago established the basic rules that move us from correlation to causation. They are:


1. The cause and effect have to be related,

2. The cause has to precede the effect in time; and

3. No plausible alternative explanation of the effect is reasonable.


To elaborate on number 3, Mills established these basic methods, at the heart of so much modern science:

1. Method of Agreement - the effect is present when the cause is present,

2. Method of Differences - the effect is absent absent the cause; and

3. Method of Concomitant Variation - when both 1 and 2 (above) are observed, causal inference is strengthened because certain other interpretations of the covariation between cause and effect can be ruled out.

Sadly, the deus ex machina-ists refuse to acknowledge the long retreat they have been on over the course of the past 50+years. They used to maintain that memory, emotions, sensations, etc. were all clearly not correlated with the brain. Research into psychosurgery, physiology and anatomy has radically eroded this position. We know now that love, hate, envy and eroticsim are biochemical in nature. We know now that memory can be mapped to specific areas of the brain. We know now that personality and morals can be dramatically altered by altering segments of the brain or by altering brain chemistry. In each of these cases we have fulfilled Mills' methods of agreement, differences and concomitant variation. So now the retreat is to consciousness, and the nature of the claims focus on god-of-the-gaps arguments and arguments from ignorance.

For a good summary of the state of affairs back in the 1950s, I highly recommend Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind in which he outlines the dualist retreat already underway back then.


Cheers,.

[Q-Source]

Thank you Bill,

I was also thinking about bringing that post. ;)

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Win

First of all, not all materialists "know" this, which is to say believe it to be so. Some would argue that qualia just are brain processes. Others would argue that qualia don't exist.

We are talking about what Materialism is, not about what Materialists think it is. Just like atheists that believe in life after death :rolleyes:


If you mean that they are reducible to brain processes, well aren't they brain processes then?

No, a process is a mechanism and qualia are a byproduct of that mechanism.


If you mean that they exist as higher-order phenomena which are irreducible to brain processes, I'd like to hear more.

do you think it is possible to reduce pain to a brain process? Materialism does not claim such thing.


Ah, but, while I'm hesitant about putting words in UCE's mouth, I'm fairly confident that he'd argue that qualia, while correlated with brain processes, are not caused by them.

We still don't know whether or not qualia are caused by a brain process, however correlation implies the possibility that this might be the case. On the other hand, UCE cannot assert that qualia are not caused by a BP.


For you to have a point here, correlation would have to be a subset of causation.

No, causation is a subset of correlation.

[Win]

Q:

We are talking about what Materialism is, not about what Materialists think it is. Just like atheists that believe in life after death

Well, now I'm really confused. "Materialism" has a meaning independent of what "Materialists" think that meaning is?

Or are you saying that your particular definition is the correct definition, all others thinking that they are proponents of materialism, who define it differently, being misguided?

And what would prevent someone who didn't believe in god from believing in life after death? I can think of lots of mechanisms that would allow it.

And why the rolled eyes?

No, a process is a mechanism and qualia are a byproduct of that mechanism.

In what sense of the word "by-product?"

do you think it is possible to reduce pain to a brain process? Materialism does not claim such thing.

I, of course, don't think it's possible to reduce the experience of pain to a brain process, but I'm not a materialist.

And I assure you, many forms of materialism do claim such a thing, including eliminative materialism and reductive materialism.

We still don't know whether or not qualia are caused by a brain process, however correlation implies the possibility that this might be the case. On the other hand, UCE cannot assert that qualia are not caused by a BP.

Well, I think we do. The answer is no.

In any event, I think that UCE does, in fact, assert this, and you'll notice that I definitely do, so, you see, someone can assert that qualia are not caused by a brain process.

No, causation is a subset of correlation.

Yes, I understand that. My point is that you have been arguing that, as a consequence of this, it makes no difference to assert that there is only a correlation. It does make a difference.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


They used to maintain that memory, emotions, sensations, etc. were all clearly not correlated with the brain. Research into psychosurgery, physiology and anatomy has radically eroded this position. We know now that love, hate, envy and eroticsim are biochemical in nature.



I have absolutely no idea what it could possibly mean to say various emotions are physical, nevermind that you know this. I'm sure that you must simply mean that love hate etc are influenced by physical processes, not that they are the very same thing.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


I have absolutely no idea what it could possibly mean to say various emotions are physical, nevermind that you know this. I'm sure that you must simply mean that love hate etc are influenced by physical processes, not that they are the very same thing.

No, I don't. I mean that the ANS and limbic systems create the brain states corresponding to those emotions. I also mean that without the appropriate nerve connections or the appropriate chemcial receptors, an individual does not and cannot experience those emotions. What I mean, sir, follows from the context of my discussion of Mills, correlation and causation.

Cheers,

[hammegk]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


....I also mean that without the appropriate nerve connections or the appropriate chemcial receptors, an individual does not and cannot experience those emotions. ...

But I thought materialists don't have any "experience" of anything, being just complex, algorithmic, machines responding to stimuli. Where have I gone wrong, again? :(

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


No, I don't. I mean that the ANS and limbic systems create the brain states corresponding to those emotions. I also mean that without the appropriate nerve connections or the appropriate chemcial receptors, an individual does not and cannot experience those emotions. What I mean, sir, follows from the context of my discussion of Mills, correlation and causation.

Cheers,

Cannot experience these emotions? Not even in an afterlife? Surely sir must be joking.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by hammegk


But I thought materialists don't have any "experience" of anything, being just complex, algorithmic, machines responding to stimuli. Where have I gone wrong, again? :(

I am a scientist. It is you who insist I am a materialist and an atheist, etc., etc.

Cheers,

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Cannot experience these emotions? Not even in an afterlife? Surely sir must be joking.

Would you care to give us real citations, from peer-reviewed journal articles, supporting emotions that occur without an intact, functioning nervous system or without the necessary biochemicals and functional receptor sites?

Cheers,

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant

There is a sharp border between things which directly exist in your mind (phenomenen) and things which you have reasoned exist outside your mind. That distinction is absolute.

Mmmm - see below..

Sorry.....I don't kniow what else to do. If your position is that qualia and brain processes both exist and aren't the same then I do not believe you can justify calling yourself a materialist.

Oh, fine. I have no need to justify calling mysef a materialist, or any other -ist for that matter. Look, I'm not a philosopher, I am a pragmatic, an engineer; I figure things out as I go along, I try to weigh evidence objectively and form an educated opinion.

This has been my problem ever since I claimed that I could logically disprove materialism. It is hard to make that claim and not offend materialists. I certainly don't want to offend anyone.

No problem.

Now, I need to get this qualia thing straight, since it seems so important for this debate. I hope somebody can help me out. An example:

At some point in my life, I touched a wasp and got stung. A phenomenal experience. Now I have the information "wasps can hurt you". I can apply this to any wasp I see without having to touch it. I can tell it to my kids. I can even tell it to somebody who have never seen a wasp (I'd then also have to explain what a wasp looks like). Is "wasps can hurt you" qualia?

Hans

(edited for typos)

[Win]

Hans:

At some point in my life, I touched a wasp and got stung. A phenomenal experience. Now I have the infomation "wasps can hurt you". I can apply this to eny wasp I see without having to touch it. I can tell it to my kids. I can even tell it to somebofy who have never seen a wasp (I'd then also have to explain what a wasp looks like). Is "wasps can hurt you" qualia?

Getting stung by the wasp was an event. Part of the event was your phenomenal experience of the event, which is to say the qualia associated with the pain, the fear, the thoughts going through your head.

Now you have a memory of the event. That memory is phsyically encoded in your brain. Related to that memory are patterns of reaction (avoid wasps, tell your kids wasps can hurt them, and so on), also physically encoded in your brain.

Associated with the memory is your phenomenal experience of the memory, what it's like to be having the memory. The "raw feels" of your experience of the memory are qualia.

[MRC_Hans]

Associated with the memory is your phenomenal experience of the memory, what it's like to be having the memory. The "raw feels" of your experience of the memory are qualia. Mmmmmm, and how is that different from the memory itself?

You could also say I have some information. Including the information that I have the information. And since I realize I have the information about the information then ...... turtles, turtles.. ;)

But: "Wasps can hurt you" is iformation that does not require an intelligent mind to store and use. Birds will avoid wasps.

And it doesn't even require a brain. Or an individual. Hoverflies have evolved to mimicry wasps, so that birds will avoid them.

But all information is stored physically somewhere in the physical world.

Hans

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by Q-Source


We are talking about what Materialism is, not about what Materialists think it is. Just like atheists that believe in life after death :rolleyes:



No, a process is a mechanism and qualia are a byproduct of that mechanism.



do you think it is possible to reduce pain to a brain process? Materialism does not claim such thing.



We still don't know whether or not qualia are caused by a brain process, however correlation implies the possibility that this might be the case. On the other hand, UCE cannot assert that qualia are not caused by a BP.



No, causation is a subset of correlation.

Hi Q,

In my opinon the various forms of materialism and property dualism are confusing and people tend to be very careless with these terms. I admit I have a far from perfectly understanding, and I'll need to do some reading, but this is my own interpretation so far.

As far as I am able to understand these things, it seems that astonishingly there are some people who maintain that conscious experiences do not exist! These people are termed eliminitivist materialists. If you're wondering how anyone can deny the existence of conscious experiences, then join the club! However most materialists would reject eliminitivist materialism. Rather they would embrace either reductive materialism or functionalism, both of which are very similar.

Now a reductionist materialist would either say that brain states and mind states are one and the same thing, or that mental states can be reduced to physical states. To say that they are one and the same thing is arguably not self-evidently absurd. For example, think about a pen you might hold in your hand. If you look at it lengthways, it will look completely different from looking at it end on. But nevertheless you are still looking at one and the same object! Alternatively they subscribe to the idea that mind is reducible to matter, in much the same way that water is really H2O, or heat is really only molecular motion , or light is really only electromagnetic radiation, and so on. Thus a glass of water just is, i.e. is identical with, a very great number of hydrogen and oxygen atoms composed into H2O molecules, and silicon and oxygen atoms composed into glass-molecules.

Now property dualism of which I think epiphenomenalism is the most popular sub-branch, maintains that the mind is to the body, as roughly a shadow is to an object casting that shadow. When physical matter is organized into a brain, it develops emergent properties, ie the mind, that cannot be explained by physical science . The mind is dependent on the brain, and it couldn't exist without a brain, but nevertheless it can't be explained by science. All we have is a correlation between brain states and mental states. But no explanation is possible to scientifically explain the existence of the mind in the same way we can explain and show that water is nothing but H2O.

Of course I reject all these positions as I emphatically reject the idea that consciousness requires a brain ;) But I hope that my explanations were of some use. And I certainly don't know if I got it all right . . after all I'm giving definitions of positions in the mind/body problem, all of which I think are ludicrous! But anyway :)

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


Would you care to give us real citations, from peer-reviewed journal articles, supporting emotions that occur without an intact, functioning nervous system or without the necessary biochemicals and functional receptor sites?

Cheers,

I think Interesting Ian was expressing surprise at your insinuation that it was impossible to experience emotions without the accompanying physical processes. I believe the onus is upon you to vindicate that claim. Seems to me that in order to do so you would need to prove that there is no life after death. Or if there is a life after death to prove we would subsist in emotionless states. Could be quite a task you've saddled yourself with here! Oh well, good luck ;)

[Jethro]

Originally posted by The One called Neo
I believe the onus is upon you to vindicate that claim. Seems to me that in order to do so you would need to prove that there is no life after death.o_O
Do the phrases "can't prove a negative" and "extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof" hold any meaning for you?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by The One called Neo


I think Interesting Ian was expressing surprise at your insinuation that it was impossible to experience emotions without the accompanying physical processes. I believe the onus is upon you to vindicate that claim. Seems to me that in order to do so you would need to prove that there is no life after death. Or if there is a life after death to prove we would subsist in emotionless states. Could be quite a task you've saddled yourself with here! Oh well, good luck ;)
"Neo",

o the topic was not afterlife; that was an II red herring
o given that the existence of an afterlife is an extraordinary claim, that claim demands extraordinary evidence

Back on topic, please. The topic was the evidence for a chemical and neurological basis for emotions. Care to trot out the citations that this isn't true? Standard drill, articles from peer-reviewed journals.

Cheers,

[Loki]

Win,

(Neo wrote) : Now property dualism of which I think epiphenomenalism is the most popular sub-branch, maintains that the mind is to the body, as roughly a shadow is to an object casting that shadow.
I *still* don't get this (and we've been here before). We have an object (the action) and a shadow (the experience) - but your consciousness can percieve both? Therefore the model consists of three parts - the brain processes, the qualia, and the mind? Is that it? The brain process is physical, the qualia is phenomenal, and the mind is...???

[Jethro]

Originally posted by Loki
Win,


I *still* don't get this (and we've been here before). We have an object (the action) and a shadow (the experience) - but your consciousness can percieve both? Therefore the model consists of three parts - the brain processes, the qualia, and the mind? Is that it? The brain process is physical, the qualia is phenomenal, and the mind is...??? Maybe he meant property trialism?

[Win]

Loki:

I *still* don't get this (and we've been here before). We have an object (the action) and a shadow (the experience) - but your consciousness can percieve both? Therefore the model consists of three parts - the brain processes, the qualia, and the mind? Is that it? The brain process is physical, the qualia is phenomenal, and the mind is...???

The physical world exists. Our phenomenal experiences exist. That's it.

It's not that "your consciousness" can perceive both. Rather, "your consciousness" is a combination of your brain's physical properties and its phenomenal properties.

As I've said before, I think the idea of a perceiver is, at best, derivative. There is no "consciousness" doing the observing of the phenomenal, a disembodied you, as it were, floating above the onging events and having them projected to it.

[Loki]

Win,

As I've said before, I think the idea of a perceiver is, at best, derivative. There is no "consciousness" doing the observing of the phenomenal, a disembodied you, as it were, floating above the onging events and having them projected to it.
Well, that's kind of what I though - but then what does "you have direct accces to qualia" mean? What is the "you" that Mary has that can "notice" the "experience" of seeing red as she leaves the B&W room, and remark "gee, that's something I've never seen/preceived/experienced before".

Rather, "your consciousness" is a combination of your brain's physical properties and its phenomenal properties.

Again, if "my consciousness" is just the sum of my physical and phenomenal properties, then which bit - the physical or the phenomenal - thinks "yes, thats what it's like to be me"?

Let me put it this way - you talk of "direct access to qualia". Unless this is a highly misleading phrase, then it seems to state fairly plainly that there is a replationship between "qualia" at one end and 'X' at the other end, and that this relationship is one in which 'X' has access to qualia.


'X' has direct access to qualia.

'X' can observe, ponder, and comment on qualia.

'X' is not qualia.

'X' is physical or phenomenal?

If 'X' is physical, then epiphenomenalism falls doesn't it?

If 'X' is not physical, and not qualia, then what is it?

[Win]

Loki:

Well, that's kind of what I though - but then what does "you have direct accces to qualia" mean? What is the "you" that Mary has that can "notice" the "experience" of seeing red as she leaves the B&W room, and remark "gee, that's something I've never seen/preceived/experienced before".

Using terms like "you" is an artifact of language. If I had to avoid the terms, and replace them with, strictly speaking, more accurate expressons, my prose would be so stilted at to be unreadable.

When I write "you have direct access to qualia," you can take that to mean: "You" are a construct of the self-referential nature of the information architecture of your brain, and the qualia that are associated with that architecture; because "you" are a combination of physical and phenomenal properties, "you" have direct access to the existence of qualia; indeed, it is because of the fact that "you" are, in part, qualia, that "you" can be said to have access to the fact of its existence.

As to Mary, the thing that does the remarking is her body, and the remark is caused by her brain. Zombie Mary would make the same remark, based on the same belief. Only she'd be mistaken.

Again, if "my consciousness" is just the sum of my physical and phenomenal properties, then which bit - the physical or the phenomenal - thinks "yes, thats what it's like to be me"?

The physical bit does the thinking, the phenomenal bit has the experience, or perhaps better, is the experience of the thought.

Let me put it this way - you talk of "direct access to qualia". Unless this is a highly misleading phrase, then it seems to state fairly plainly that there is a replationship between "qualia" at one end and 'X' at the other end, and that this relationship is one in which 'X' has access to qualia.

Well, I suppose it can be a misleading phrase. But that's natural language for you. I don't think that there is a realtionship such that phenomenal experience is "had" by any other thing. Rather, it might be more accurate to say you are, in part, phenomenal experience.

'X' has direct access to qualia.

Natural language shorthand that allows me to avoid stilted constructions. See above.

'X' can observe, ponder, and comment on qualia.

No, our brains and bodies do the pondering and commenting. There is no X that "observes" qualia.

'X' is not qualia.

There is no "X," in the sense that you mean.

'X' is physical or phenomenal?

If "X" is "you," it's both.

If 'X' is physical, then epiphenomenalism falls doesn't it?

Again, "you" are both physical and phenomenal.

If 'X' is not physical, and not qualia, then what is it?

See above.

[MRC_Hans]

Hey! As far as I can decode your post, I agree with you, Win.

Hans

[Loki]

Win,

Sorry to drag you (and the conversation) over such fundament ground.

As to Mary, the thing that does the remarking is her body, and the remark is caused by her brain. Zombie Mary would make the same remark, based on the same belief. Only she'd be mistaken.
Yes, but I though we had agreed that when we take poor color-blind P-Zombie Mary and run her through the "DeZombifer" (thus miraculously granting her true/real "direct acess to qualia") she would gasp "Ah! Now I understand! I always thought I had qualia, but now I perceive the difference!". Doesn't this clearly show that qualia really do impact on the physical?

P-Zombie Mary:

consciousness = physical + NoQualia
comment = "I have direct access to qualia"

Now, the *only* thing that can influence/direct/make this comment is her consciousness, which (by definition) *has no qualia*. SO this comment comes entirely from the physical ('cos that's all there is)

Regular Mary:

consciousness = physical + Qualia
comment = "I have direct access to qualia"

Resumably, the thing making this comment is the "physical", just like P-Zombie Mary. If the qualia is *in any way* affecting the physical, then epiphenomenalism just collapsed (didn't it?).

P-Zombie Mary following successful DeZombification:

consciousness = physical + Qualia
comment = "I have direct access to qualia - and I *know* this because I can perceive the difference between 'pre' and 'post' me!"

Now, the thing making this comment is the "physical", just like P-Zombie Mary and Regular Mary. SO how come the physical is aware of the qualia?

-----------------------------------

And that's about as far as I can go with this - perhaps I'm doomed (or Fated?) to just "not get it" :confused:

[Win]

Loki:

Sorry to drag you (and the conversation) over such fundament ground.

Not at all. My pleasure.

Yes, but I though we had agreed that when we take poor color-blind P-Zombie Mary and run her through the "DeZombifer" (thus miraculously granting her true/real "direct acess to qualia") she would gasp "Ah! Now I understand! I always thought I had qualia, but now I perceive the difference!". Doesn't this clearly show that qualia really do impact on the physical?

No. At least I didn't agree to that. Remember that in the original Mary thought experiment, Mary isn't a p-zombie. She just lacks the phenomenal experience of color. And it's not her reaction that's important; it's that she's learned a new fact. To complicate the thought experiment now, p-zombie Mary would believe she'd learned a new fact, but she would be mistaken.

If we had all been p-zombies up until now, and phenomenal consciousness just turned on in the universe a second ago, we wouldn't know the difference.

Now, the *only* thing that can influence/direct/make this comment is her consciousness, which (by definition) *has no qualia*. SO this comment comes entirely from the physical ('cos that's all there is)

This as to p-zombie Mary.

Yes.

Resumably, the thing making this comment is the "physical", just like P-Zombie Mary. If the qualia is *in any way* affecting the physical, then epiphenomenalism just collapsed (didn't it?).

This as to regular Mary.

Yes.

comment = "I have direct access to qualia - and I *know* this because I can perceive the difference between 'pre' and 'post' me!"

This as to de-zombified Mary.

No. See above.

Now, the thing making this comment is the "physical", just like P-Zombie Mary and Regular Mary. SO how come the physical is aware of the qualia?

The physical isn't, and de-zombified Mary wouldn't make that comment.

If you think about it, you don't have any access to your phenomenal states of a second ago, or before. All you have access to is your phenomenal consciousness now. We could all have been p-zombies a second ago. I don't think we were, but that's a conclusion, not something I know from direct access.

Loki :

Instead of thinking of Mary, think of two computers. Now - I don't believe that computers can have an internal subjective state, but for the purposes of this discussion we imagine this is possible. Plus it is easy to imagine a neural net that doesn't have qualia.


P-Zombie Computer:

consciousness = physical + NoQualia
comment = "I have direct access to qualia"

Now, the *only* thing that can influence/direct/make this comment is her consciousness, which (by definition) *has no qualia*. SO this comment comes entirely from the physical ('cos that's all there is)


The word "consciousness" is problematic now. The comment come from the analytical processing power of the net - the physical thing.


Computer with qualia:

consciousness = physical + Qualia
comment = "I have direct access to qualia"

Resumably, the thing making this comment is the "physical", just like P-Zombie Mary. If the qualia is *in any way* affecting the physical, then epiphenomenalism just collapsed (didn't it?).


The presence of the qualia only makes the difference that the computer now has a mind whilst it makes the statement. The qualia does not have to affect the physical. However - the P-Zombie computer indisputably has no free will. If the computer with qualia has got free will, and the free will can affect the qualia then the 'agent' can affect the physical. It isn't the qualia that are affecting the physical. What the computer has gained is an "I" that it didn't have before. It is this "I" that turns the physical process into the qualia. The qualia can be thought of as the relationship between the "I" and the physical. I would argue that with the introduction of this "I" the qualiafied computer gains not only qualia but a theoretical agent of free will. Whether free will and epiphenomenalism are incompatible is a question Win will have to answer.


P-Zombie Computer following successful DeZombification....(well in my version this is now a dumb consciousnessless computer which has magically gained an internal state, and with it access to memories lain down in the physical before it had the internal state):

consciousness = physical + Qualia
comment = "I have direct access to qualia - and I *know* this because I can perceive the difference between 'pre' and 'post' me!"


I'm not sure this computer will be able to tell the difference between its pre and post state. It will feel like it had just popped into existence with a load of memories. Will it 'know' that when those memories were laid down that it wasn't conscious? I'm not sure it would. I think it may be lulled into believing it had been conscious all along. In fact, I think it would be a very confused computer deserving a lot of sympathy... :D


And that's about as far as I can go with this - perhaps I'm doomed (or Fated?) to just "not get it"


Well, there seems to be an outbreak of improved understanding on this board so stick with it....

Geoff.

:)

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
But if they are a product of them then they are not the same as them. And that means you have 'two sorts of things' where the physicalist model only has a place for one. If Qualia 'are a product of brain processes' then you can't be a materialist - you have to be a property dualist.

:)

That's all good and well UCE. You may define the term "property dualist" that way without any objections on my behalf.

However, such a definition per se provides no support whatsoever for the contention that qualia are not caused by physical processes.

IMO our old friend Ockham and his barber's utensil would on the contrary lead us to assume that qualia are caused by observable physical processes. The question is rather why we should assume otherwise. What is your particular reason (bearing in mind that the mere fact that "two categories" can be said to exist is not enough)?

Originally posted by CWL


That's all good and well UCE. You may define the term "property dualist" that way without any objections on my behalf.

However, such a definition per se provides no support whatsoever for the contention that qualia are not caused by physical processes.

IMO our old friend Ockham and his barber's utensil would on the contrary lead us to assume that qualia are caused by observable physical processes. The question is rather why we should assume otherwise. What is your particular reason (bearing in mind that the mere fact that "two categories" can be said to exist is not enough)?

'Causation' is completely the wrong term. Brain processes and qualia happen at the same time - exactly the same time. They are not cause-and-effect. If they were cause-and-effect then the whole thing becomes incoherent again because you have to explain the relationship between the brain process and the qualia you are proposing they 'cause'. I don't care whether you call this an incoherent form of materialism or a form of dualism, either way you are left with a nasty case of the binding problem. Occams razor isn't going to help you here. Brain process and qualia are correlates, not cause-and-effect.

The real question is why should we assume anything?

;)

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
'Causation' is completely the wrong term. Brain processes and qualia happen at the same time - exactly the same time. They are not cause-and-effect. If they were cause-and-effect then the whole thing becomes incoherent again because you have to explain the relationship between the brain process and the qualia you are proposing they 'cause'. I don't care whether you call this an incoherent form of materialism or a form of dualism, either way you are left with a nasty case of the binding problem. Occams razor isn't going to help you here. Brain process and qualia are correlates, not cause-and-effect.
How do you know this to be true? Is there any conclusive evidence that supports your contention that "Brain process and qualia are correlates, not cause-and-effect"?

The real question is why should we assume anything?

;)
Fair enough, that is the fundamental question. But if we do not assume anything we will be stuck on our own little solipsistic island. The question is therefore rather what is it reasonable to assume? Good old Occam ("Ockham" is Swedish spelling, sorry) provides us with one important tool here. Again, why do you exclude the possibility that brain processes and qualia are a "cause-and-effect" phenomenon?

CWL,


How do you know this to be true? Is there any conclusive evidence that supports your contention that "Brain process and qualia are correlates, not cause-and-effect"?


Well....there is logic, yes. Such a contention is the only route out of the logical problems that dog materialism. You can either deny the existence of qualia, or you can accept them. If you accept them, but say that brain processes cause them then you are left to explain how something physical 'causes' something non-physical (the binding problem). So the only way out of the logical problem is to define brain processes and qualia to be correlates, not cause-and-effect.



quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The real question is why should we assume anything?


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fair enough, that is the fundamental question. But if we do not assume anything we will be stuck on our own little solipsistic island.


Well, yes this is true. So we assume solipsism is false or we'll go mad. Why assume anything else? :)


The question is therefore rather what is it reasonable to assume? Good old Occam ("Ockham" is Swedish spelling, sorry) provides us with one important tool here. Again, why do you exclude the possibility that brain processes and qualia are a "cause-and-effect" phenomenon?


Because it doesn't make sense!

All the evidence suggests that brain processes and qualia are two different perspectives on the same thing. They are like two views on a cloud - one from the ground and one from the air. One cloud, two views. You wouldn't say that one view 'causes' the other. You would say they are correlates. You certainly wouldn't say that one view IS the other view. You might say that they are both views of the same cloud, but neither view is the cloud itself. This seems to me to be the kind of situation we have, but it doesn't make sense if you are going to insist on materialism - because materialism only recognises the existence of the cloud, doesn't think about 'views' at all, and when dualists say "there are two things going on here", the materialists can't find the right words to explain what the two things are within their monism, and the harder you push them to define what they mean, the more difficulty they have explaining it.

Do you follow?

[MRC_Hans]

Well, I certainly dont. :(

Hans

[metacristi]

Jethro


Do the phrases "can't prove a negative" and "extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof" hold any meaning for you?


The reality is that the statement 'mind states and brain states are correlated therefore brain and mind are identical' IS itself an extraordinary claim having as backup only tradition.Or tradition is never a proof.Some might claim that incomplete induction is widespread in science.Correct only that here induction is applied on totally different things,indeed there is no logical necessity that correlation should imply identity even in consciousness' case.

Also is debatable that we really 'can't prove a negative'.This is a favorite argument of 'weak' atheists in the quest to better defend their position and probably that's why is so commonly taken as being always true.But proving a negative might be entirely possible.Nonwithstanding our actual possible inability to do that.For example if in Irak will not be found WMD then we could conclude that Saddam's claim [before the war] that 'Irak has no WMD' is true therefore we would prove a negative.
To prove that superstrings do not exist amounts to have access at Planck's level and to make the constatation that superstrings as we defined them simply do not exist.Valid also in the case of quarks and so on.To state that we can't have now access at Planck's level changes nothing for who can state beyond all reasonable doubt that this will ever be the case?
But even if I conceded that we cannot prove a negative in the consciousness' case the problem is that neither would we have the right to claim having 'proof beyond all reasonable doubt' that mind can be totally reduced at brain processes,as I argued above.'Present objective knowledge' might be not enough...
At most the claim that correlation implies identity is a 'working hypothesis',the most succesful at explaining the observed phenomena now and therefore [supposedly] the most promising of being true.Still this does not mean yet it is correct beyond all reasonable doubt.
And indeed very few scientists claim [making a positive statement] that consciusness can be totally explained by the actual structural approach of computational emergence.At most they present this as being their philosophical view in the light of all objective knowledge we have at our disposal.A position totally supported by logic and present 'objective knowledge'.

[CWL]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
Well, I certainly dont. :(

Hans

Me neither. I still don't see why it is so impossible for qualia to be caused by physical brain processes. I don't understand why the "binding problem" must with necessity be accepted as a problem. As far as we know it could be purely fictitious. Why assume that there is a watertight bulkhead between physical and "non-physical" phenomena? There is obviously interaction going on, so why rule out cause and effect?

Originally posted by CWL


Me neither. I still don't see why it is so impossible for qualia to be caused by physical brain processes. I don't understand why the "binding problem" must with necessity be accepted as a problem. As far as we know it could be purely fictitious. Why assume that there is a watertight bulkhead between physical and "non-physical" phenomena? There is obviously interaction going on, so why rule out cause and effect?

If you believe there is a cause-effect interaction going on between physical and non-physical phenomena then you are a dualist. The point of this thread was to get people to think about whether their position was really materialism or actually dualistic. Right now you are arguing dualism. I have a policy of not challenging dualism.

:)

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


If you believe there is a cause-effect interaction going on between physical and non-physical phenomena then you are a dualist. The point of this thread was to get people to think about whether their position was really materialism or actually dualistic. Right now you are arguing dualism. I have a policy of not challenging dualism.

:)

Again, you are of course free to define "dualism" any way you like. I however find it hard to understand this particular definition of yours.

Although I agree that one can argue that there are "two categories" I am not saying that this statement should be accepted without reservations. Saying that "non-physical" phenomena are (or may be) caused by physical phenomena is nothing like the traditional definition of dualism which presupposes that there are two separate "worlds" which exist individually and independently of each other. Our physical world and the world of ideas (or qualia if you will). I am saying nothing of the sort.

If "non-physical" phenomena are caused by physical processes they cannot exist independently of or separately from the physical world - without the physical world they have no meaning, no existence. The same cannot be said about the physical world. It exists whether or not there is a consciousness there to percevie it. Or do you belive that "consciousness makes matter"?

Saying that "non-physical" phenomena are caused by physical processes is in no way affirming a dualistic stance, nor is it a refutation of materialism.

[Jethro]

Originally posted by metacristi
The reality is that the statement 'mind states and brain states are correlated therefore brain and mind are identical' IS itself an extraordinary claim having as backup only tradition.Well, I'd say the correlation is very strong. There are no known instances of mind states occurring without the associated brain states. Very similar brain states occur in other creatures without said mind (as in, octopuses see red, but they do not have concious minds in the same sense humans do). Tasks which are very much associated with the mind, as in abstract thought, have areas of the brain associated with them. Is it really that much of a leap to take Occams razor and slice away a non-physical mind? Maybe.Or tradition is never a proof.Some might claim that incomplete induction is widespread in science.Correct only that here induction is applied on totally different things,indeed there is no logical necessity that correlation should imply identity even in consciousness' case.

Also is debatable that we really 'can't prove a negative'.This is a favorite argument of 'weak' atheists in the quest to better defend their position and probably that's why is so commonly taken as being always true.But proving a negative might be entirely possible.Nonwithstanding our actual possible inability to do that.For example if in Irak will not be found WMD then we could conclude that Saddam's claim [before the war] that 'Irak has no WMD' is true therefore we would prove a negative.
To prove that superstrings do not exist amounts to have access at Planck's level and to make the constatation that superstrings as we defined them simply do not exist.Valid also in the case of quarks and so on.To state that we can't have now access at Planck's level changes nothing for who can state beyond all reasonable doubt that this will ever be the case?
But even if I conceded that we cannot prove a negative in the consciousness' case the problem is that neither would we have the right to claim having 'proof beyond all reasonable doubt' that mind can be totally reduced at brain processes,as I argued above.'Present objective knowledge' might be not enough...Okay, I'll agree that proving a negative is sometimes possible, but proving the afterlife does not exist falls is not one of those times. It is in the same category as proving there is no immaterial, invisible unicorn in my living room.
At most the claim that correlation implies identity is a 'working hypothesis',the most succesful at explaining the observed phenomena now and therefore [supposedly] the most promising of being true.Still this does not mean yet it is correct beyond all reasonable doubt.
And indeed very few scientists claim [making a positive statement] that consciusness can be totally explained by the actual structural approach of computational emergence.At most they present this as being their philosophical view in the light of all objective knowledge we have at our disposal.A position totally supported by logic and present 'objective knowledge'. Okay.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by CWL

....do you belive that "consciousness makes matter"?
Not "human" consciousness, certainly. Now if we could just define "consciousness"....

Saying that "non-physical" phenomena are caused by physical processes is in no way affirming a dualistic stance, nor is it a refutation of materialism.

Actually it is. :)

[CWL]

Originally posted by hammegk
Not "human" consciousness, certainly. Now if we could just define "consciousness"....
I'm glad we sorted that out. Now if we could just provide evidence of any other "consciousness" besides "human" consciousness...

Actually it is. :)
Allright, how so?

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


If you believe there is a cause-effect interaction going on between physical and non-physical phenomena then you are a dualist. The point of this thread was to get people to think about whether their position was really materialism or actually dualistic. Right now you are arguing dualism. I have a policy of not challenging dualism.

:) ...... So you choose to smack a new label on, and since it is not your policy to debate that particular label, you no longer need to present arguments or answer questions. Great! I retract what I said about you being a debater. Deja vú again.
:rolleyes:

Hans

Originally posted by CWL

Or do you belive that "consciousness makes matter"?


That is precisely what I believe.

[Mercutio]

So, if we have a machine, some physical widget-maker, and it makes widgets (duh), or "does the work of widget-making", then what is the nature of the "work" it does? We can point to the machine, we can point to the growing pile of widgets, but can we point to the "work"? Not really; the work is a process. We can talk about "work" like it is a noun, like, oh, I dunno...."qualia" or something. Is "work" non-materialistic because I can't point to it? It seems some definitions on this thread would say so. Others would not, as it is the result of physical processes.

Please forgive any misuse of some technical definition of "work" that differs from the use I have above--I think, in context, it is the work I'm looking for. I'm just trying to get a grasp on the arguments going on on this thread. Does my analogy work, or is there something desparately wrong with it?

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
...... So you choose to smack a new label on, and since it is not your policy to debate that particular label, you no longer need to present arguments or answer questions. Great! I retract what I said about you being a debater. Deja vú again.
:rolleyes:

Hans

I am trying to provoke people to think about paradoxes instead of just pretending they aren't there. I am not here to spoon-feed the solutions to the problems. I think it is neccessary for people to think about the problems and figure out the answers themselves, not least because they are very hard to explain if somebody isn't willing to think about it themselves. The materialistic stance I have seen on this board amounts to a failure to confront unavoidable problems. I think dualism is wrong. But it might serve as a neccesary staging-post whilst people think about a better answer.

Originally posted by Mercutio
So, if we have a machine, some physical widget-maker, and it makes widgets (duh), or "does the work of widget-making", then what is the nature of the "work" it does? We can point to the machine, we can point to the growing pile of widgets, but can we point to the "work"? Not really; the work is a process. We can talk about "work" like it is a noun, like, oh, I dunno...."qualia" or something. Is "work" non-materialistic because I can't point to it? It seems some definitions on this thread would say so. Others would not, as it is the result of physical processes.

Please forgive any misuse of some technical definition of "work" that differs from the use I have above--I think, in context, it is the work I'm looking for. I'm just trying to get a grasp on the arguments going on on this thread. Does my analogy work, or is there something desparately wrong with it?

It's double-dutch to me. Whose side of the debate are you on? :D

[Mercutio]

I try to look at it from any side that gives me a view. Thus far, what makes most sense to me is a physical monist (or whichever of half a dozen labels I've seen in this debate) view, that there is nothing about qualia that cannot be most easily explained materialistically. But, like I said elsewhere, I'd be glad to be shown wrong--it's how we learn. And I was wrong once before...years ago....:D

[Mercutio]

Of course, there's also James's Pragmatism philosophy, which says that if there is not practical difference (that is, useful difference, one that allows one side to be a more useful explanatory framwork) between 2 views, then it is a pseudo-question to begin with, and not something worth arguing over. Spend your time on problems that actually have solutions.

So, on James's behalf--what practical difference is there between the sides in this debate?

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


That is precisely what I believe.

In which way do you believe that "consciousness makes matter". Which "consciousness" and how?

What evidence leads you to conclude that "consciousness makes matter"?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by CWL

I'm glad we sorted that out. Now if we could just provide evidence of any other "consciousness" besides "human" consciousness...
Try all life. Then decide where the split is between life & non-life. :)


Allright, how so?
Well, I am unaware of any non-physical activities provided by "matter", although we indeed are discussing whether *I* is more basic than *me*, or viceversa.

Can you provide some other example, please, that you deem "non-physical" caused by "physical"?

Originally posted by Mercutio
[B]I try to look at it from any side that gives me a view. Thus far, what makes most sense to me is a physical monist (or whichever of half a dozen labels I've seen in this debate) view, that there is nothing about qualia that cannot be most easily explained materialistically.


...apart from their very existence. The materialists problem is in explaining why they exist at all, not stuff 'about them'.


.... like I said elsewhere, I'd be glad to be shown wrong--it's how we learn. And I was wrong once before...years ago....:D

I've heard a lot of materialist lip-service to how they would love to be shown wrong, but I think it may be influenced by an inner certainty that it isn't ever going to happen, which makes it hard to recognise the evidence when it arrives.

I was a materialist for 25 years.

[CWL]

Originally posted by hammegk
Try all life. Then decide where the split is between life & non-life. :)
So you agree there is no direct evidence for any such non-human (greater) consciousness? Why then assume that "consciousness makes matter"?

Well, I am unaware of any non-physical activities provided by "matter", although we indeed are discussing whether *I* is more basic than *me*, or viceversa.

Can you provide some other example, please, that you deem "non-physical" caused by "physical"?
How about the information conveyed through physical letters (e.g. ink on paper)?

Originally posted by CWL


In which way do you believe that "consciousness makes matter". Which "consciousness" and how?

What evidence leads you to conclude that "consciousness makes matter"?

Participatory Anthropic Principle (http://home.btclick.com/scimah/anthropism.htm)

...plus all the other reasons I have been saying for the past three days over these threads. I have spent hours on-line making my case. Are you asking me to start again from the beginning?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by CWL

So you agree there is no direct evidence for any such non-human (greater) consciousness? Why then assume that "consciousness makes matter"?
Or we could just assume "consciousness" IS "consciousness".


How about the information conveyed through physical letters (e.g. ink on paper)?
How about photons?

If ESP were to be demonstrated, materialists would have a problem, although we still don't know much about 11 dim space, Higgs Fields, & that kind of stuff. Strings, anyone?

[BillHoyt]

The reality is that the statement 'mind states and brain states are correlated therefore brain and mind are identical' IS itself an extraordinary claim having as backup only tradition.Or tradition is never a proof.Some might claim that incomplete induction is widespread in science.Correct only that here induction is applied on totally different things,indeed there is no logical necessity that correlation should imply identity even in consciousness' case.
I, for one, did not equate brain with mind. The brain is the physical object from which mind emerges as a set of processes. Please spare us the "incomplete induction" argument. Science departed from philosophy several hundred years ago. The chief problem was the realization that deduction offered no new knowledge, and yet induction offered no clear proof. Scientists rolled up our sleeves and began to test our ideas and let nature lead us to the right conclusions.

Godel's Incompleteness Theorem demonstrates that any consistent axiomatic system must include propositions whose truth is undecidable within that system. This renders any system's consistency unprovable within that system. This should have been the end to arguments about incomplete induction and about unprovable assumptions. Alas, however, many philosophical types insist on continuing to be militantly ignorant.

There is no available rational system without a set of unprovable assertions. That means we can't think our way to truth. We can only work to minimize the set of axioms (science's are down to about 5), and to continue to test them at every turn. We build all other hypotheses and theories on that axiomatic framework. Then we subject each hypothesis to reality therapy and let nature tell us what is probably true.

Let us take just one example: "love". The best available model comes from Emory University's Insel. Prairie voles fall in love and pair off for life. This pairing normally occurs after mating. But Insel's team found they could make female voles fall in love for life simply by injecting oxytocin into them while they were in the presence of a male vole.

vole potion number 9 (http://www.emory.edu/WHSC/HSNEWS/PUB/EM/EMSum98/vole.html)

Does this work demonstrate incomplete induction? No. Female prairie vole oxytocin levels increase after mating. In other voles, these levels don't increase so dramatically. In female prairie voles, mating usually results in life-long pairing. In the other moles, it usually doesn't it. So now we have a correlation, and part of Mills rules have been followed. The next step is to control the experiment by injecting oxytocin without the fun part. The females still fall in love.

Talk about "chemistry".

Cheers,

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Participatory Anthropic Principle (http://home.btclick.com/scimah/anthropism.htm)

...plus all the other reasons I have been saying for the past three days over these threads. I have spent hours on-line making my case. Are you asking me to start again from the beginning?

Once again, UcE, when skeptics ask for "evidence" they generally are asking for research, not somebody's religious or philosophical musings.

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Participatory Anthropic Principle (http://home.btclick.com/scimah/anthropism.htm)

...plus all the other reasons I have been saying for the past three days over these threads. I have spent hours on-line making my case. Are you asking me to start again from the beginning?

I will politely direct you to BillyHoyt's reply above.

Ok lads....

The past three days have seen intense posting by myself, win, paul and Stimpy where the evidence you are asking for has been being examined very closely indeed. This thread is full of it. If you can't see it, then you can't see it.

What kind of materialist are you, then?

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Ok lads....

The past three days have seen intense posting by myself, win, paul and Stimpy where the evidence you are asking for has been being examined very closely indeed. This thread is full of it. If you can't see it, then you can't see it.

What kind of materialist are you, then?

A dimwitted materialist?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Ok lads....

The past three days have seen intense posting by myself, win, paul and Stimpy where the evidence you are asking for has been being examined very closely indeed. This thread is full of it. If you can't see it, then you can't see it.

What kind of materialist are you, then?

UcE,

There is no "evidence" here from your side of the debate. There are merely philosophical arguments.

I am not a materialist. I am a scientist. I am sorry you cannot understand what that means, but I will try once again to explain it to you. To date, after hundreds of years of reality therapy, we have found no evidence that suggests there is anything here other than matter and energy. This is not a metaphysical position. This is the sum of the evidence at hand.

If, tomorrow, compelling evidence were marshalled suggesting something outside of the known universe could interfere with the known universe, then I would have to accept there is some third thing out there.

That is the meaning of provisional truth. I realize that concept is anathema to philosophers and theologians. But it is the pragmatic approach. It is the approach that has resulted in an explosion of our knowledge about reality. It is the approach that works.

Cheers,

[cmaz]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


There is no "evidence" here from your side of the debate. There are merely philosophical arguments.



Umm...this is the philosophy forum. If I remember accurately from my undergraduate days, the "evidence" philosophy uses is not the same type of evidence that science demands (i.e.; observable or potentially observable stuff). Although I'm not easily following the arguments, it does seem like UcE is offering the type of reasoning that is counted as evidence in philosophy, while you, Bill, are asking for scientific evidence; evidence that, in UcE's view, cannot be provided because the nature of scientific evidence excludes the non-physical, which is an inherent part of UcE's contentions.

Is this an accurate portrayl of the situation, or am I still a bit lost?

C--

[Mercutio]

UCE:"I've heard a lot of materialist lip-service to how they would love to be shown wrong, but I think it may be influenced by an inner certainty that it isn't ever going to happen, which makes it hard to recognise the evidence when it arrives.

I was a materialist for 25 years."


I'm confused--25 yrs a materialist, then shown wrong and changed your views, so naturally you are skeptical that a materialist would do what you did?

I'm doing the best I can here, but it seems that something that would cause a sea-change in 25 years worth of momentum would be more obvious--or if not obvious, more strong. I won't ask you to start from the beginning, because I read it all. I think I even understand it. I simply don't find it convincing. That's why I'm still looking at this thread--something that is enough to change your views after 25 years, by all rights, ought to be important enough for me to really get.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by cmaz
Umm...this is the philosophy forum. If I remember accurately from my undergraduate days, the "evidence" philosophy uses is not the same type of evidence that science demands (i.e.; observable or potentially observable stuff). Although I'm not easily following the arguments, it does seem like UcE is offering the type of reasoning that is counted as evidence in philosophy, while you, Bill, are asking for scientific evidence; evidence that, in UcE's view, cannot be provided because the nature of scientific evidence excludes the non-physical, which is an inherent part of UcE's contentions.

Is this an accurate portrayl of the situation, or am I still a bit lost?

C--

The nature of scientific evidence does not exclude the non-physical. I have tried to make that abundantly clear. UcE wishes to portray science as presuming materialism. It does not presume materialism! It has concluded that everything is either matter or energy and will change that conclusion if sufficient evidence to the contrary is provided.

We're waiting.

Cheers,

[metacristi]

Jethro

Okay, I'll agree that proving a negative is sometimes possible, but proving the afterlife does not exist falls is not one of those times. It is in the same category as proving there is no immaterial, invisible unicorn in my living room.


Still we so not have the right to conclude that consciousness cannot continue to exist beyond what we name 'death'.What certitudes,or at least reason beyond all reasonable doubt do we have for that now?The postulate that consciousness is entirely an emergent phenomenon of matter-more specifically the computational emergence of consciousness in the brain hypothesis?I'm not at all sure this is enough.
Note I only affirm that we do not have the right to discard this possibility,now at least,not that we have the right to use it in our scientific hypotheses!


You talk of observed evidence,well not too many scientists would have the courage to claim that the sentence 'consciousness can be entirely explained by the structural approach in the form of computational emergence' is already 'provisional objective truth' as some claim emphatically.Not even neurologists.After all we only observed some correlations,we've not explained consciousness yet.
Even if I agreed with those who claim that 'consciousness is explained by computational emergence approach' is a scientific 'provisional truth' the reality is that consciousness is poorly understood now,it would be no surprise to make the constatation later that computational emergence 'theory' is not enough.An 'extended materialism' trying to explain consciousness using QM is still an entirely valid alternative,at least as a first further step ahead.
Moreover even if dualism,for example,might be not falsifiable in the light of current objective knowledge we cannot draw the conclusion that it is false.Not even that it is less probable than materialism.

[metacristi]

I, for one, did not equate brain with mind. The brain is the physical object from which mind emerges as a set of processes. Please spare us the "incomplete induction" argument. Science departed from philosophy several hundred years ago. The chief problem was the realization that deduction offered no new knowledge, and yet induction offered no clear proof. Scientists rolled up our sleeves and began to test our ideas and let nature lead us to the right conclusions.


I was reffering specifically at the the computational emergentist approach prefered by the majority in the scientific community now:mind is identical with some processes in the brain.If you agree that this approach is only a 'working hypothesis' I have nothing against but if you insist that it is already 'fallible provisional truth' beyond reasonable doubt I think we need much more evidence...Indeed not too many scientists say now that we have sufficient reason to claim that consciousness is explained by the structuralist approach conclusively.Of course I counted here only the unbiased scientists and not those dogmatic atheists who try to 'seize' science for their cause.
Anyway even if I agreed with you that the computationalist approach is already 'fallible scientific truth' I don't think it will be a big surprise to make the constatation that our allegedly 'provisional truth' is false.We only 'scratched the surface' in the case of consciousness...


Godel's Incompleteness Theorem demonstrates that any consistent axiomatic system must include propositions whose truth is undecidable within that system. This renders any system's consistency unprovable within that system. This should have been the end to arguments about incomplete induction and about unprovable assumptions. Alas, however, many philosophical types insist on continuing to be militantly ignorant.

There is no available rational system without a set of unprovable assertions. That means we can't think our way to truth. We can only work to minimize the set of axioms (science's are down to about 5), and to continue to test them at every turn. We build all other hypotheses and theories on that axiomatic framework. Then we subject each hypothesis to reality therapy and let nature tell us what is probably true.



It's not clear what you want to prove here.For me this is enough to strengthen my conclusion that science is fallible and moreover that some entities that plays no role in our succesfull scientific theories [like God defined as the creator of the universe] are not impossible to exist.Not even less probable.
Besides I could use Godel's second incompleteness theorem as an argument that mind is not computable,as Penrose did.This does not mean that mind cannot be entirely material but at least the strong AI position would be rendered less probable.Anyway all other alternatives ['QM consciousness', property dualism and so on] will remain still valid possibilities.

[BillHoyt]

I was reffering specifically at the the computational emergentist approach prefered by the majority of the scientific community now:mind is identical with some processes in the brain.If you agree that this approach is only a 'working hypothesis' I have nothing against but if you insist that it is already 'fallible provisional truth' beyond reasonable doubt I think we need much more evidence...Indeed not too many scientists say now that we have sufficient reason to claim that consciousness is explained by the structuralist approach in its entirety.Of course I counted here only the unbiased scientists and not those dogmatic atheists who try to 'seize' science for their cause.
Anyway even if I agreed with you that the computationalist approach is already 'fallible scientific truth' I don't think it will be a big surprise to make the constatation that our allegedly 'provisional truth' is false.We only 'scratched the surface' in the case of consciousness...

"Provisional truth" is much beyond "reasonable doubt". BTW, you are conflating scientific and legal concepts. On what scientific evidence do you claim the provisional truth is either simply "alleged" or "false"?
It's not clear what you want to prove here.For me this is enough to strengthen my conlcusion that science is fallible and moreover that some entities that plays no role in our succesfull scientific theories [like God defined as the creator of the universe] are not impossible to exist.Not even less probable.
Besides I could use Godel's second incompleteness theorem as an argument that mind is not computable,as Penrose did.This does not mean that mind cannot be entirely material but at least the strong AI position would be rendered less probable.Anyway all other alternatives ['QM consciousness', property dualism and so on] will remain still valid possibilities.
If this is the conclusion you draw from Godel, then you have misunderstood. Go back and read my post. No system of logic exists without axioms that are unprovable within that system. This applies to all philosophy, all mathematics, all logic. My point is clearly outlined in the post: the only way to truth about the universe is through the pragmatic, scientific approach.

Is there something you don't understand about the fact that there are only two types of logic, deduction and induction? Or that deduction yields no new information and that inductions yields no certain information? Do you have another logic system to proffer?

Cheers,

[edit: corrected typo - bh]

[metacristi]

"Provisional truth" is much beyond "reasonable doubt". BTW, you are conflating scientific and legal concepts. On what scientific evidence do you claim the provisional truth is either simply "alleged" or "false"?


'Provisional scientific truth' is still fallible.It is neither true nor false.A scientific hypothesis becomes provisional truth when we have sufficient reason [evidence beyond reasonable doubt] in its favor in the form of a certain number of conclusive 'confirmations'.We do not have such conclusive confirmations yet in the case of consciousness.And definitely we have no reason to conclude that 'consciousness=some processes in the brain' is a true statement.


If this is the conclusion you draw from Godel, then you have misunderstood. Go back and read my post. No system of logic exists without axioms that are unprovable within science. This applies to all philosophy, all mathematics, all logic.....
Is there something you don't understand about the fact that there are only two types of logic, deduction and induction? Or that deduction yields no new information and that inductions yields no certain information? Do you have another logic system to proffer?


As I see you like to play with statements always presented as being true.First of all you should read some info regarding Godel's second incompleteness theorem,it reffers entirely at arithmetics.But I do not really oppose the possibility that such a theorem is valid in other cases.
Secondly the 'no system of logic exists without axioms that are unprovable within science.' makes me laugh and explains many things.'No system of logic...'?
Probably you meant that all imaginable systems of premises contain axioms that are unprovable within science.So what?How can that disprove or make less probable the existence of God,for example?


My point is clearly outlined in the post: the only way to truth about the universe is through the pragmatic, scientific approach.


Which I do not contest.Still dualism,for example,is not disproved or made less probable by that.Nor the existence of God,of aliens and so on...
It's not yet clear for me what you want to prove here.There is no contradiction between the affirmation that science has epistemological privilege and the possible existence of a God,or a life after death etc.
At most Godel's theorem can be seen as a proof that science cannot give us absolute answers,that pragmatism does not necessarilly imply 'truth'.

[BillHoyt]

'Provisional scientific truth' is still fallible.It is neither true nor false.A scientific hypothesis becomes provisional truth when we have sufficient reason [evidence beyond reasonable doubt] in its favor in the form of a certain number of conclusive 'confirmations'.We do not have such conclusive confirmations yet in the case of consciousness.Moreover we have no reason to conclude that 'consciousness=some processes in the brain' is a true statement.
We have every reason to suppose it, as I have outlined before. First and foremost are the scientific axioms which have yet to be violated. If one wishes to posit a deus ex machina one must be able to distinguish its functioning from a rational, consistent universe. One needs to demonstrate a cause outside of the body or brain that results in an effect in the consciousness. No such
As I see you like to play with statements always presented as being true.First of all you should read some info regarding Godel's second incompleteness theorem,it reffers entirely at arithmetics.But I do not really oppose the possibility that such a theorem is valid in other cases.
Secondly the 'no system of logic exists without axioms that are unprovable within science.' makes me laugh and explains many things.'No system of logic...'?
Probably you meant that all imaginable systems of premises contain axioms that are unprovable within science.So what?How can that disprove or make less probable the existence of God,for example?
I will chalk this one up to you looking at an old copy of the web page. I had corrected the typo quite a while before you posted.

Godel's theorem applies to any axiomatic system. It is you who need to do some reading.

Which I do not contest.Still dualism,for example,is not disproved or made less probable by that.Nor the existence of God,of aliens and so on...
It's not yet clear for me what you want to prove here.There is no contradiction between the affirmation that science has epistemological privilege and the possible existence of a God,or a life after death etc. At most Godel's theorem can be seen as a proof that science cannot give us absolute answers,that pragmatism does not necessarilly imply 'truth'.
I never said science refuted God. Stop with the straw man. I said science clearly disputes the deus ex machina.

Cheers,

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

cmaz said:Umm...this is the philosophy forum. If I remember accurately from my undergraduate days, the "evidence" philosophy uses is not the same type of evidence that science demands (i.e.; observable or potentially observable stuff). Although I'm not easily following the arguments, it does seem like UcE is offering the type of reasoning that is counted as evidence in philosophy, while you, Bill, are asking for scientific evidence; evidence that, in UcE's view, cannot be provided because the nature of scientific evidence excludes the non-physical, which is an inherent part of UcE's contentions.
But you may also remember that a logic course was taught in the philosophy department.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Jethro
o_O
Do the phrases "can't prove a negative" and "extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof" hold any meaning for you?

By describing "life after death" as an extraordinary claim, it is quite clear you have already decided that materialism is prima facie more likely to be correct than any other interpretation of reality. Ever consider you're talking out of your ********??

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


By describing "life after death" as an extraordinary claim, it is quite clear you have already decided that materialism is prima facie more likely to be correct than any other interpretation of reality. Ever consider you're talking out of your ********??

Malarcky! You and your ilk keep wanting to foist a presumption of materialsim upon anybody who abides by scientific standards. There is no compelling evidence for life after death. From the philosophy of science, one needs only appeal to Occam's razor to say you are unnecessarily multiplying entities. So far, all evidence points to matter and energy. If you want to introduce X, where X is neither matter nor energy, you must make a compelling, evidentiary case for the existence of X. You must demonstrate that whatever effect you claim only happens when X is present and that the effect is clearly absent when X is absent.

Feel free to do so at any time.

Cheers,

[c4ts]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


So why the F--K is logic not taught in science courses????

Moderators, come quickly! See what Ian has posted!

[c4ts]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Yes yes yes!! Please ban me. As long as I never have to f--king talk to a daft f--king scientist tw@t on these forums ever again I'll be happy!!

You know, Hal took down the swearing rules because he believed the people on this board were mature enough to be on their best behavior, and not use them needlessly or excessively. I see you've succeeded in proving him wrong.

{Sorry Guys-S}

[Jethro]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


By describing "life after death" as an extraordinary claim, it is quite clear you have already decided that materialism is prima facie more likely to be correct than any other interpretation of reality. Ever consider you're talking out of your ********?? Okay. Then how about "claims of any sort need any sort of non-annecdotal evidence." I still don't see anything supporting "life after death."

[Yahzi]

metacristi
.And definitely we have no reason to conclude that 'consciousness=some processes in the brain' is a true statement.
Um. We observe that all conscious people have brains. We observe that removing their brains invariably stops the behaviours we interpret as conscious.

That seems like pretty good evidence for the statement. What evidence do you have against the statement?

And please, don't tell me it might be true because it hasn't been proven false. We might all be jellyfish dreaming we are human - that hasn't been proven false yet, so it's just as probable as your notion that conciousness != some processes in the brain.

[metacristi]

We have every reason to suppose it, as I have outlined before. First and foremost are the scientific axioms which have yet to be violated. If one wishes to posit a deus ex machina one must be able to distinguish its functioning from a rational, consistent universe. One needs to demonstrate a cause outside of the body or brain that results in an effect in the consciousness. No such


No one want to posit a deus ex machina.Not me at least.All that I affirmed was that alternative logical hypotheses as 'quantum consciousness' or dualism are still valid.I don't share your optimism that science has already proved beyond all reasonable doubt that consciousness is explained by the computational emergentist hypothesis,that's all.
If you believe otherwise that's your problem.But spare me by your pronouncements,disguised in scientific clothes.The hard fact is that science has not understood yet how consciousness really works.Your inference,using induction,from current objective evidence is subjective and can qualify only as your belief.Your only chance to defend it logically is to accept it as your philosophical view.



Godel's theorem applies to any axiomatic system. It is you who need to do some reading

I do not know what popularization books you read,they often misinterpret the meaning of some scientific concepts.Some even use Godel's theorem to prove that the Bible is necessarilly inconsistent!
The reality is that Godel demonstrated his theorem for the case of any formal system of arithmetics.But,as I've already admitted,I believe that this is also valid for other axiomatic systems.


never said science refuted God. Stop with the straw man. I said science clearly disputes the deus ex machina.

Neither did I discard the possibility that materialism is in fact true.I am open to all possibilities.



Remember that what you attacked initially was my stance that mind and 'some brain processes' are not identical.My argument was that the correlation of brain states and mental states can be seen,from logic's point of view,at most as demonstrating causation but not identity.My reason for doing that was that tradition is never a proof.Here you brought about the induction in science topic [quite inopportune].I'm not sure you really understood my point of view.
A scientific hypothesis make some predictions deduced from a set of internally coherent premises,pressuposed true.If some of those predictions are conclusively 'confirmed' by well conducted experiments it becomes a scientific theory,giving us 'objective provisional truth'.Only now come induction into play because the scientific method assumes that this is valid also for all locations in a certain domain of definition and at all times.
But from here you do not have the right to claim that from the fact that,for example,heat is only the average molecular kinetic energy,carbon dioxide is only CO2 and so on necessarilly results that consciousness is identical with some processes in the brain.By doing so you use induction on different things,not allowed by the scientific method.Indeed if this were allowed then we could conclude that from the fact that Newton's inverse square gravitational law is 'fallible objective knowledge' we could infere,using incomplete induction,that an inverse square law is valid also for electromagnetic forces.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

metacristi,

The reality is that Godel demonstrated his theorem for the case of any formal system of arithmetics.But,as I've already admitted,I believe that this is also valid for other axiomatic systems.

Actually, what the two theorems state is that any logical system sufficiently complicated to support arithmetic will be either incomplete or inconsistent.

It applies to any sufficiently complex logical system. Arithmetic is simply provided as an example of a sufficiently complex system. I do not think it is known exactly how complicated the system must be for this theorem to apply. In fact, I do not think there is any way to meaningfully quantify the complexity of a logical system with respect to this question. What we can say is that if the system is isomorphic to arithmetic, or contains a subset which is, then the theorem applies. In principle, this theorem could be proven (or disproven) on an individual basis for systems which are not comparable to arithmetic.

I would also like to remind people that the issue of whether a logical system must be based on axioms that are unprovable within that system has nothing to do with Godel's incompleteness theorem. That is a fundamental property of any logical system.


Ian,

So why the F*CK is logic not taught in science courses????

It is taught in both science and mathematics, at all but the most introductory levels. This would explain why you are unaware of this fact.

For example, I had three classes on logic as an undergraduate. One was taught as a Humanities course out of the philosophy department, and covered basic things like logical fallacies and terminology. The second course was taught as a Math course, and covered formal logical proofs, symbolic logic, set theory, and how different types of logic can be expressed in terms of each other. The third course was taught in the science department, and covered much of the same stuff that was covered in the philosophy course, but more rigorously, and with an emphasis on its relevance to the scientific method.

Yes yes yes!! Please ban me. As long as I never have to f*cking talk to a daft f*cking scientist tw*t on these forums ever again I'll be happy!!

Then why don't you just leave? Its not like anybody is forcing you to stick around here. Most of the people here are quite happy to have you around, even though we strongly disagree with you, as long as you are civil and respectful. Likewise you have every right to expect us to behave the same way. But if you really don't like being here, and like discussing things with the people here, then why do you waste your time doing so? Please don't trouble yourself for our sakes.

Or maybe you're just drunk again? If so, I would suggest apologizing after you sober up, and editing your posts, of course.

Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Jethro
Okay. Then how about "claims of any sort need any sort of non-annecdotal evidence." I still don't see anything supporting "life after death."

First of all "I" was drunk last night. So that wasn't me speaking above as I'm a different person when drunk. I must be because there is no "I" in abstraction from brain states.

OK, why do you think it's an issue of evidence rather than philosophical argumentation? In other words, in the absence of any evidence supporting survival, why do you think the idea that we cease to exist when we die is a more reasonable one?

Oh yes, and could you tell me what "non-anecdotal" evidence means, and also how much research you have done in order to reach the conclusion there is no non-anecdotal evidence? Also explain to me why anecdotal evidence does not in fact constitute any evidence at all to a putative phenomenon ie why is the term "anecdotal evidence" an oxymoron?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahzi
metacristi

And definitely we have no reason to conclude that 'consciousness=some processes in the brain' is a true statement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Um. We observe that all conscious people have brains. We observe that removing their brains invariably stops the behaviours we interpret as conscious.

That seems like pretty good evidence for the statement. What evidence do you have against the statement?

And please, don't tell me it might be true because it hasn't been proven false. We might all be jellyfish dreaming we are human - that hasn't been proven false yet, so it's just as probable as your notion that conciousness != some processes in the brain.



Stops the behaviours yes. But if consciousness is non-physical, then why is it reasonable to suppose it stops consciousness as well? The brain is necessary to interface with the body, therefore when brain processes cease our behaviour will also obviously cease. The point is if consciousness is non-physical (and I think any position denying this is unintelligible), then we do not have any evidence that consciousness ceases to exist when we die.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So why the F*CK is logic not taught in science courses????
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



It is taught in both science and mathematics, at all but the most introductory levels.


Which just confirms my suspicion that most education is a waste of time, otherwise what explains the fact that most scientists on here are both illogical and irrational? I have never been taught any logic, either formal or informal, and it doesn't seem to have done me any harm. I was certainly never taught logic in maths and physics, and I studied them up to the age of 18.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Hey! Mr Scientist sh...

Ian,

These kinds of posts are against the rules, utterly rude, and undeserving of responses other than to be reported to moderators. Grow up.

Originally posted by cmaz


Umm...this is the philosophy forum. If I remember accurately from my undergraduate days, the "evidence" philosophy uses is not the same type of evidence that science demands (i.e.; observable or potentially observable stuff). Although I'm not easily following the arguments, it does seem like UcE is offering the type of reasoning that is counted as evidence in philosophy, while you, Bill, are asking for scientific evidence; evidence that, in UcE's view, cannot be provided because the nature of scientific evidence excludes the non-physical, which is an inherent part of UcE's contentions.

Is this an accurate portrayl of the situation, or am I still a bit lost?

C--

Spot on.

:)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by BillHoyt


Ian,

These kinds of posts are against the rules, utterly rude, and undeserving of responses other than to be reported to moderators. Grow up.

I'm a rude person at the best of times. I always have been, and I always will be. I like being rude. But the posts I made last night went too far. So I've deleted them. At least the ones I've spotted.

Originally posted by Mercutio

I'm confused--25 yrs a materialist, then shown wrong and changed your views, so naturally you are skeptical that a materialist would do what you did?


I certainly understand what drives the resistance to accepting materialism might be provable wrong. People do not re-assess their belief systems easily, espeically so with materialistic scientism.


I'm doing the best I can here, but it seems that something that would cause a sea-change in 25 years worth of momentum would be more obvious--or if not obvious, more strong.


I think it is quite strong. You would think that the flat-earthers would see a boat disappearing over the horizon and realise that the Earth couldn't be flat. That is pretty strong evidence. But look at how hard it was to get people to accept it.


I won't ask you to start from the beginning, because I read it all. I think I even understand it. I simply don't find it convincing. That's why I'm still looking at this thread--something that is enough to change your views after 25 years, by all rights, ought to be important enough for me to really get.

My own process of accepting the evidence did not happen instantly. I had to reflect on it for many months. I had to figure out "How can this work?". I had to reconcile it with why materialism seems to be true.

[metacristi]

Stimpson


Actually, what the two theorems state is that any logical system sufficiently complicated to support arithmetic will be either incomplete or inconsistent....


I entirely agree with this part,the axiomatic systems must include arithmetics.But I am not at all sure that Godel's theorems apply beyond that,in the case of all conceivable systems of axioms,there is no proof for that.In fact there are enough counter examples as is Euclidian geometry.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

It is taught in both science and mathematics, at all but the most introductory levels.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Which just confirms my suspicion that most education is a waste of time, otherwise what explains the fact that most scientists on here are both illogical and irrational? I have never been taught any logic, either formal or informal, and it doesn't seem to have done me any harm. I was certainly never taught logic in maths and physics, and I studied them up to the age of 18.

You know, Ian... It is real hard to take you seriously when you say crap like this. You have never been taught any logic, formal or informal, and yet you presume to tell people who have studied it for the better part of a decade, and who use it in every aspect of their professional lives, that they are the ones who are illogical and irrational.

Did it ever occur to you that maybe, just maybe, the problem is with your own grasp of the principles of logic, and not with "most scientists here"?

I swear, it's almost as though you are deliberately trying to convince everybody that you are a willfully ignorant fool.

Dr. Stupid

[Stimpson J. Cat]

metacristi,

Actually, what the two theorems state is that any logical system sufficiently complicated to support arithmetic will be either incomplete or inconsistent....
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I entirely agree with this part,the axiomatic systems must include arithmetics.But I am not at all sure that Godel's theorems apply beyond that,in the case of all conceivable systems of axioms,there is no proof for that.

It does not apply to all systems of axioms. It only applies to sufficiently complex ones. You can easily construct simple axiomatic systems which can be shown to be both consistent and complete.

However, I think that a very strong argument can be made for the claim that if reality is isomorphic to a logical system, then that system is at least as complex as arithmetic.

Dr. Stupid

Mercutio.

Back to the flat/round Earth thing. After you understand that the world is a sphere, when you see the boat going over the horizon you can sum up in about two sentences why it is obvious the Earth isn't flat. It wouldn't convince the flat-Earther, but it would still be obviously correct to you.

The materialism question looks like that to me now, and I'd say it like this :

-------------------------------------------------------
Dualism doesn't work because two seperate realms cannot 'interact' and still be seperate. So we have to choose a monism. We all see a physical Universe. Materialism then say "We presume that this physical Universe we see is the basis of reality." But if you think about it this is backwards. If we have to choose which is real :

a) The physical Universe .

or

b) Our mental experiences.

...then the answer must be (b), because (a) denies reality to the only reality we ever know - our minds.
------------------------------------------------

[metacristi]

Yahzi


Um. We observe that all conscious people have brains. We observe that removing their brains invariably stops the behaviours we interpret as conscious.

That seems like pretty good evidence for the statement. What evidence do you have against the statement?

And please, don't tell me it might be true because it hasn't been proven false. We might all be jellyfish dreaming we are human - that hasn't been proven false yet, so it's just as probable as your notion that conciousness != some processes in the brain.


You misunderstood my argument I've never stated that currently existing objective evidence is not valid.
My point of view is that yes we have evidence but this is enough,for the moment at least,only to prove that the physical brain and the processes taking place there are necessary components of every would be succesfull scientific theory of mind.
However we do not have yet conclusive evidence that this is enough,sufficient to also produce conscious experience as we know it.
There are other very promising scientific hypotheses,some of them entirely materialistic,as those of Stapp or Penrose.Only that in their view the structural approach of computational emergentism is not enough,we should add 'something' vital.In Penrose's view the reduction of brain states in the microtubules are responsible also for conscious experience,in strong connection with the 'neural network' types of processes in the brain.Other materialist approaches are entirely possible in spite of the fact that for the moment there are no such hypotheses proposed.Moreover,I dare to say,not even dualist approaches have been soundly refuted.
I am open to all valid logical possibilities,we are rather at the beginning of our quest to understand consciousness.I plead for a cautious approach,this is entirely consistent with the observed facts,there is no need to make hasty [and clearly subjective] predictions presented as being 'provisional truth beyond all reasonable doubt'.No matter our final scientific conclusions,beyond doubt,regarding the nature of consciousness.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[b]Ian,



You know, Ian... It is real hard to take you seriously when you say crap like this. You have never been taught any logic, formal or informal, and yet you presume to tell people who have studied it for the better part of a decade, and who use it in every aspect of their professional lives, that they are the ones who are illogical and irrational.



As I said, this illustrates nicely the seeming futility of studying logic. I see no evidence that your logical processes are any better than mine. You continually contradict yourself and many of your viewpoints are of highly questionable intelligibility.

And despite the fact that I have never studied any logic in any shape or form, if you were honest you would admit I have never been illogical in any of my arguments.

[Mercutio]

UCE:"Dualism doesn't work because two seperate realms cannot 'interact' and still be seperate. So we have to choose a monism. We all see a physical Universe. Materialism then say "We presume that this physical Universe we see is the basis of reality." But if you think about it this is backwards. If we have to choose which is real :

a) The physical Universe .

or

b) Our mental experiences.

...then the answer must be (b), because (a) denies reality to the only reality we ever know - our minds."


This sounds an awful lot like the beginnings of psychology as a science, just breaking out of philosophy. The method was introspection, the subject matter was "consciousness." Watson, of course, challenged this for methodological reasons (importantly, not for logical reasons) and founded the first wave of behaviorism. It seems that most people who fight against a materialist view of consciousness are at odds with Watson (justifiably so), and dismiss much more relevant challenges to mentalism.

You (and, I would wager, just about everybody) see evidence for mind in virtually every experience you have. You have memories, thoughts, feelings, etc., and since we have always been told these things are mental, you believe that they must be evidence of mind. But, as I have argued earlier, it ain't necessarily so. "Thinking happens" is not the same as "thoughts exist."

I find myself repeating earlier stuff, so I'll stop for a bit. Oh, but let me recommend a book that you'll probably disagree with, but it's a fun read. "Music, the brain, and ecstasy" (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/038078209X/002-8477531-6721620?vi=glance) is written for the layperson, but examines the perception of music, from the physics of sound to the qualia of music, to the feeling of being moved by music. Arguably a very touchy-feely subject that might give pause to the stereotypical materialist, but Jourdain writes convincingly (again, at a layperson's level, so don't expect a logical proof) about the brain's processing of music being the perception--not leading to it, but being it. Anyway, it's a cool read.

Oh, and thank you for the civil tone of this exploration.

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

I haven't read this whole thing, just notice the "dualism cannot exist" bit.

It surely can. Things can interact as causes and as effects.

If something can cause but is not an effect then it is not "physical" (meaning a cause and effect) but it can cause.

Alternatively you may have something that ends causal chains. This thing is an effect but can never cause.

There may also be 'other' things that no one has thought of.

[BillHoyt]

Actually, what the two theorems state is that any logical system sufficiently complicated to support arithmetic will be either incomplete or inconsistent.
Stimpy,

I believe the second incompleteness theorem says the consistency is indeterminate, not that it is inconsistent.

Cheers,

[Stimpson J. Cat]

BillHoyt,

Actually, what the two theorems state is that any logical system sufficiently complicated to support arithmetic will be either incomplete or inconsistent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Stimpy,

I believe the second incompleteness theorem says the consistency is indeterminate, not that it is inconsistent.

Yes, that is exactly what it says. It may be possible to show that the system is inconsistent, but if not, then the system must be incomplete, which means that it is impossible to determine whether it is consistent or not.

This is also a profound statement with respect to the notion of positivism and the scientific method, because it means that sufficiently complex logical systems are very similar to the physical world. Falsification is possible, but positive proof is not.

In science, a theory cannot be proven true. It can only be proven false. Likewise, for a sufficiently complex logical system, the system itself cannot be proven to be consistent, but if it is inconsistent, then it may be possible to prove that it is. Thus we end up with a something analogous to the falsification principle.


Dr. Stupid

[BillHoyt]

Remember that what you attacked initially was my stance that mind and 'some brain processes' are not identical.My argument was that the correlation of brain states and mental states can be seen,from logic's point of view,at most as demonstrating causation but not identity.My reason for doing that was that tradition is never a proof.Here you brought about the induction in science topic [quite inopportune].I'm not sure you really understood my point of view.
I'm going to be charitable by assuming language is one of the problems here. Please go back to the original posts to see my very clear statement:
"I, for one, did not equate brain with mind."

It was you who brought up induction, sir:
"Some might claim that incomplete induction is widespread in science."

A scientific hypothesis make some predictions deduced from a set of internally coherent premises,pressuposed true.
An hypothesis is a prediction, based on previous research. It is often hunch, guesswork. If the chain of logic were complete, there would be no need for the research that tests the hypothesis. The test is done because its truth is not known. That simple fact alone should flag you that the hypothesis was not truly deduced. Give it some thought, sir: deduction yields no new information. If the hypothesis were truly deduced, the test was not necessary.

If some of those predictions are conclusively 'confirmed' by well conducted experiments it becomes a scientific theory,giving us 'objective provisional truth'.
No hypothesis becomes theory. The theory is built as a framework connecting together research already on record. Scientists then challenge that theory by creating other hypotheses and testing them. Some with the hope of confirming the theory, others with the hope of refuting it.
Only now come induction into play because the scientific method assumes that this is valid also for all locations in a certain domain of definition and at all times.
After exhaustive testing.

But from here you do not have the right to claim that from the fact that,for example,heat is only the average molecular kinetic energy,carbon dioxide is only CO2 and so on necessarilly results that consciousness is identical with some processes in the brain.By doing so you use induction on different things,not allowed by the scientific method.Indeed if this were allowed then we could conclude that from the fact that Newton's inverse square gravitational law is 'fallible objective knowledge' we could infere,using incomplete induction,that an inverse square law is valid also for electromagnetic forces.
I assume this is an attempt to explicate your comments about "tradition" which I certainly don't understand. I make no such claims. It is certainly another straw man to say I have said anything approximating your tripe about KE and consciousness. I can't take this paragraph seriously.

Please go back and read again my various posts. Pay particular attention to my posts concerning scientific progress on brain and mind. I have also commented on neurosurgery and emotional and personality effects as well as pychotropic drugs and moods. I further commented on voles and the biochemistry of love and pair-bonding, meaning it as just one example of research having gone well beyond the simple correlations some here are claiming. The evidence has been mounting for over a half-century now that much of what we've viewed as mind or mental states clearly have causation in the anatomy and physiology of the brain, ANS and CNS. This is not "tradition". This is not presumption. This is the evidence.

Cheers,

[BillHoyt]

An hypothesis is a prediction, based on previous research. It is often hunch, guesswork. If the chain of logic were complete, there would be no need for the research that tests the hypothesis. The test is done because its truth is not known. That simple fact alone should flag you that the hypothesis was not truly deduced. Give it some thought, sir: deduction yields no new information. If the hypothesis were truly deduced, the test was not necessary.
For anybody interested in this, I'm going to yak some more. Why? Because this seems to be one of the things behind the oft-heard claim that scientists and skeptics are dull, narrow-minded automatons. Most lab work is pure drudgery. Analyzing the data afterwards is yet more drudgery. But this point, the point of formulating the hypothesis is the first point where creativity comes in. (Depending on the nature of the question, the next big point of creativity is in the experimental design.)

Scientists are also artists, in part. When one reads a scientific paper, the art is lost because journals are not the forum to reveal that. You have to see it happen. You have to work in the lab to see the sweat that goes into getting the question right. You read dozens of papers, maybe hundreds. All trying to be first to get to an answer that is bugging your colleagues. You catch a hint from something you saw, or something said in a colloquium, something written in a paper. The art is to see that hint through to a testable hypothesis. It isn't deduced. It isn't induced either. It is sometimes inspired, sometimes just a bloody waste of time and money.

It is guesswork, combined with logic, knowledge of tools and techniques (how would I go about testing this? oh yeah, becker-smith did something similar to this with rodents, didn't he? where's his paper? maybe I can adapt that technique). It is being able to read between the lines in the papers, and to tease out the hints nature has been dropping. It is knowing whose papers look right or feel right or seem right.

Sometimes, it is just leaping to a conclusion. Then comes the drudgery. You can't just proclaim "this must be true" in science. You have to go through the experiment and get it published. Then you have to wait for the response. There are at least half a dozen other labs out there gunning for the same question. Your paper will spark creativity at all of those labs. Three will probably say "poppycock" and try to find your error, modify the experiment and publish. The other three will say "really? cool!" And then they'll modify the experiment and publish. The results will all depend on whether or not your original guess was correct and whether or not the various experiments were correctly designed and correctly analyzed. You could be correct, and still end up with two papers that say you weren't and five that say you were. And then another round of "find the errors and get it right" starts. Finally, the papers settle down because the various errors have been caught, and the papers converge on the solution. After several years, you finally find out if you were right or you were wrong. If you are lucky.

All that for one little question, one little hypothesis.

Cheers,

[Yahzi]

Cmaz
If I remember accurately from my undergraduate days, the "evidence" philosophy uses is not the same type of evidence that science demands
Law requires reasonable doubt.

Science requires replicability.

Philosophy seeks actual truth.

The standards for evidence for philosophy are higher than the standards for science. Not lower. Constructing a logical argument in a vaccum does not constitute philosophical evidence.

metacristi
However we do not have yet conclusive evidence that this is enough,sufficient to also produce conscious experience as we know it.
But we do - it's called Occam's Razor.

We could postulate an infinite number of possible entities that are necessary to make consciousness possible, but which are invisible and intangible. We could, but then Stimpson j. Cat would pick up Occam's Razor and slice us to bits with it.

Until we have actual evidence that what we have is insufficient, the rational position is that it is. As Sherlock Holmes said, once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains is the truth, however improbable. Invisible, intangible essences which cannot be detected by the same science that can count photons ONE AT A TIME, or detect a missing MOLECULE in a surface 2mm square, yet still have the power to interact with human neurons... are impossible.

[metacristi]

I'm going to be charitable by assuming language is one of the problems here. Please go back to the original posts to see my very clear statement:
"I, for one, did not equate brain with mind."

It was you who brought up induction, sir:
"Some might claim that incomplete induction is widespread in science."


I don't think is the case here.If I remember well I've explained enough well,in an intelligible manner,what I meant by 'mind=some processes brain' as being the current structural approach in cognitive sciences where mind is seen as being a computable emergent phenomenon entirely due to the neural complexity in the brain.
As for my affirmation I think I was enough clear what I meant.Sorry if you do not understand my point of view but in this case why did you choose to attack me?From all I know in these cases one is supposed to request clarifications first...




An hypothesis is a prediction, based on previous research. It is often hunch, guesswork. If the chain of logic were complete, there would be no need for the research that tests the hypothesis. The test is done because its truth is not known. That simple fact alone should flag you that the hypothesis was not truly deduced. Give it some thought, sir: deduction yields no new information. If the hypothesis were truly deduced, the test was not necessary.


???
Only you know what you want to prove with that.When have I said that a hypothesis is deduced???I have nothing against your desire to share your 'vast knowledge' with some potentital readers but spare me by your 'always true' statements.



No hypothesis becomes theory. The theory is built as a framework connecting together research already on record. Scientists then challenge that theory by creating other hypotheses and testing them. Some with the hope of confirming the theory, others with the hope of refuting it.



Conlcusive evidence of your 'vast knowledge'.Why shouldn't a particular hypothesis become part of a scientific theory?Why shouldn't a hypothesis composed of more noncontradictory particular hypotheses become scientific theory?

As far as I know the scientific method is based on:

a.observation/experiment
b.hypothesis.As someone put it 'hypothesis is
tentative; it's a kind of educated guess that must be tested further'.It doesn't really counts how we derive it,intuition is accepted too.All that count is coherence,conformity with the observed facts,predictions [potentially falsificable].
c.Scientific law.A hypothesis that is confirmed by many experiments,using induction,it is considered as representing a 'law' giving us 'objective knowledge' at least provisionally.If there are more succesful,competing,hypotheeis the most testable is chosen.If this is not enough the simpler 'gains'.Of course that does not mean it is superior in absolute;it is superior for the moment and in the frame of reference given by the scientific method only.
d.Scientific theory=a set of scientific laws coherent with each other whose components have been chosen as above,not disproved yet,accounting for a broader domain of reality.Considered as giving us 'objective knowledge',provisionally.When it not more sustained by all experiment ---> loop to b. and so on.


After exhaustive testing.


'Exhaustive testing'?It's not at all clear for me what do you mean here.If by exhaustive you mean complete my interpretation is that you claim that science can attain certitudes in some areas,but I could be wrong.
I do not claim that science cannot attain certainty,it could in some areas,but you should be aware that in physics [a key factor for the consciusness problem also] for example this just might not be possible.So that even if you 'confirm' a hypothesis a billion of times it still does not become true.
But as I said you might mean something different as a large number of tests for example.I'm sure you'll agree with me that we should do the same in the case of consciousness before proclaiming the structural computational emergentist hypothesis as being 'scientific truth beyond all reasonable doubt'.


I assume this is an attempt to explicate your comments about "tradition" which I certainly don't understand. I make no such claims. It is certainly another straw man to say I have said anything approximating your tripe about KE and consciousness. I can't take this paragraph seriously.


My point was that even if we observed that all our mental states would be connected with our brain's states [which far from being realized now] we do not have the right to claim that the computational approach of mind is correct 'beyond all reasonable doubt' and moreover that this is sufficient to produce our conscious experience as we know it.We should also have a good understanding of the complex processes inside the brain that allegedly create our conscious experience.Guesses such as ' Now what's happened in this patient? What we suggest is that maybe what's gone wrong is that the fusiform gyrus and all the visual areas are completely normal in this patient.' cannot qualify as sufficient evidence.Even if some of our conscious experience could be explained well by this apporach there is no guarantee yet that this could explain qualia as well.Capisci now?What is even sadder is that we do not even have sufficient reason to believe that all our mental states could be associated with some brain states and some processes in the brain.At the limit we could consider at most the structural computational emergentist apporach as being a promising scientific hypothesis,nothing more.



This is not "tradition". This is not presumption. This is the evidence.


...which is enough to base a belief but in any case to claim having 'reason beyond all reasonable doubt' that the emergentist [edit to correct the grammar mistakes] approach is true.Not even the right to proclaim it as representing 'provisional scientific truth'.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by metacristi
When have I said that a hypothesis is deduced???

HERE:
A scientific hypothesis make some predictions deduced from a set of internally coherent premises,pressuposed true.

If you care to acknowledge that you said this, I will continue. If you wish to rephrase it to get at whatever is was you were getting at, I may continue. If you continue to deny your own assertions or to twist mine, I have better things to do.

Your move,

[Q-Source]

Bill,

Originally posted by BillHoyt

I, for one, did not equate brain with mind. The brain is the physical object from which mind emerges as a set of processes.

I am trying to understand why materialism says that qualia=brain process. I was under the assumption that qualia =/= brain process was still a materialistic statement.

So, when you say that mind emerges from a physical brain is because under materialism it is possible to explain or decompose objectively every single element involve in this mechanism of emergent properties?.

To support this assertion, you mentioned the example Love.

Let us take just one example: "love". The best available model comes from Emory University's Insel. Prairie voles fall in love and pair off for life. This pairing normally occurs after mating. But Insel's team found they could make female voles fall in love for life simply by injecting oxytocin into them while they were in the presence of a male vole.


Am I correct in my interpretation?

If this is possible then you and Stimpy are saying that "mind", qualia and such do not exist as incorporeal properties but as pure physical interactions inside the brain. That's why Stimpson says that BP=qualia.

Q

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by CWL

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
Well, I certainly dont.

Hans

Me neither. I still don't see why it is so impossible for qualia to be caused by physical brain processes. I don't understand why the "binding problem" must with necessity be accepted as a problem. As far as we know it could be purely fictitious. Why assume that there is a watertight bulkhead between physical and "non-physical" phenomena? There is obviously interaction going on, so why rule out cause and effect?

Hans and CWL,

I think we are stuck in the same problem with Materialism :( :D

The problem seems to be that we recognise that there are physical and non physical phenomena and we know that there must be a connection between them. However, under materialism this is not possible because then we would be forced to concede that there is a non physical subjective phenomenon out there (which is a contradictory position).

Q

[Q-Source]

Win

Originally posted by Win


Well, now I'm really confused. "Materialism" has a meaning independent of what "Materialists" think that meaning is?

Or are you saying that your particular definition is the correct definition, all others thinking that they are proponents of materialism, who define it differently, being misguided?

The definition of Materialism states that the only reality is physical and all phenomena can be explained as a manifestation of matter. From this definition, it is clear that Materialism recognises the existence of qualia. Now, my own interpretation comes from the confusion about whether or not Materialism considers qualia as non-physical phenomena but still reducible to a physical process. :confused:



And what would prevent someone who didn't believe in god from believing in life after death? I can think of lots of mechanisms that would allow it.

Believing that there is no God implies the denial of any supernatural realm.


And why the rolled eyes?

Because it is an inconsistent position.


-------------------------------

The One Called Neo,

Thanks for the explanation. If your definition of property dualism is correct, then I think this is closer to what I understand my position is at the moment.

Now property dualism of which I think epiphenomenalism is the most popular sub-branch, maintains that the mind is to the body, as roughly a shadow is to an object casting that shadow. When physical matter is organized into a brain, it develops emergent properties, ie the mind, that cannot be explained by physical science . The mind is dependent on the brain, and it couldn't exist without a brain, but nevertheless it can't be explained by science. All we have is a correlation between brain states and mental states. But no explanation is possible to scientifically explain the existence of the mind in the same way we can explain and show that water is nothing but H2O.

The only question I have is whether or not science cannot explain what mind is and how conscious phenomena are generated. Bill gave an example that seems to refute this dualistic assertion.

Q-S

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Q-Source
I am trying to understand why materialism says that qualia=brain process. I was under the assumption that qualia =/= brain process was still a materialistic statement.

So, when you say that mind emerges from a physical brain is because under materialism it is possible to explain or decompose objectively every single element involve in this mechanism of emergent properties?.

To support this assertion, you mentioned the example Love.



Am I correct in my interpretation?

If this is possible then you and Stimpy are saying that "mind", qualia and such do not exist as incorporeal properties but as pure physical interactions inside the brain. That's why Stimpson says that BP=qualia.

Q
Q,

So there is no misunderstanding, I don't start from a materialist presumption. Therefore, I can't speak for materialists. I am a scientist, and speak from a scientific perspective. There is no reason to believe that mind does not emerge from the brain. There is no reason to believe that qualia are not simply brain processes.

I raised love as an example of an emotion that the various deus-ex-machina types had insisted science would never understand, would never reduce to physical things. Insel has done that with his discovery of oxytocin's significant role in vole-love. Work since has shown similar roles for oxytocin in other female animals and vasopressin in male animals.

Cheers,

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by BillHoyt
[B]
Q,

So there is no misunderstanding, I don't start from a materialist presumption. Therefore, I can't speak for materialists. I am a scientist, and speak from a scientific perspective. There is no reason to believe that mind does not emerge from the brain. There is no reason to believe that qualia are not simply brain processes.



Hi Bill,

Would you say that water emerges from H2O? That would surely be incorrect because once we know everything about water and H2O, we know they must refer to the very same thing. One is reducible to the other. Now if qualia are simply brain processes, then in my opinion it wouldn't be correct to say the mind emerges from the brain. Because then that implies that mind and brain are different things, even though the existence of one is wholly dependent on the other. Do you agree?

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by Q-Source
Thanks for the explanation. If your definition of property dualism is correct, then I think this is closer to what I understand my position is at the moment.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now property dualism of which I think epiphenomenalism is the most popular sub-branch, maintains that the mind is to the body, as roughly a shadow is to an object casting that shadow. When physical matter is organized into a brain, it develops emergent properties, ie the mind, that cannot be explained by physical science . The mind is dependent on the brain, and it couldn't exist without a brain, but nevertheless it can't be explained by science. All we have is a correlation between brain states and mental states. But no explanation is possible to scientifically explain the existence of the mind in the same way we can explain and show that water is nothing but H2O.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The only question I have is whether or not science cannot explain what mind is and how conscious phenomena are generated. Bill gave an example that seems to refute this dualistic assertion.



But what would be wrong with saying love is not identical or reducible to physical processes, but exists in its own right, notwithstanding the fact that it is wholly generated and dependent on physical processes?

Would such an emergent phenomenon be scientifically explicable? Well to my mind phenomenal consciousness or qualia is scientifically explicable if it can be either be reduced to physical processes, or it plays a causal role in a scientific theory. So if a scientist can show that mind is reducible to brain, in the same way as water is reducible to H2O, then that is fine :) On a personnal note it doesn't seem possible to me. Alternatively can phenomenal consciousness play a causal role? Well no, because everything about our behaviour can be understood in terms of our environment and the physical processes occurring in the brain. Therefore I do not believe that materialism can be maintained.

Now my opinion is that property dualism entails that phenomenal consciousness is scientifically inexplicable. This is so even if we establish a one to one correlation between all aspects of our mental lives and physical activity in the brain. For example, consider gravity. Before Newton came along, would it have made sense to say we have scientifically explained why a particular object falls down by asserting that all objects fall down without exception when released? No, Newton explained why objects fall down because he subsumed apparently disparate phenomena into one comprehensive theory. Namely the orbits of the planets, the motion of projectiles, objects falling straight down etc.

So to scientifically explain phenomenal consciousness we can either show it is deducible to the brain, or devise a comprehensive theory about the world incorporating phenomenal consciousness. I do not believe either of these approaches is possible. Therefore at a minimum we are constrained to accept property dualism, and perhaps a position even further removed from materialism.

[metacristi]

originally posted by BillHoyt

A scientific hypothesis make some predictions deduced from a set of internally coherent premises,pressuposed true.

If you care to acknowledge that you said this, I will continue. If you wish to rephrase it to get at whatever is was you were getting at, I may continue. If you continue to deny your own assertions or to twist mine, I have better things to do.


You should not forget that you attacked my position,frankly speaking I fail to see why,even now,you did not bother to enlighten me...be sure that I have also better things to do.
Yes I care to acknowledge that,moreover I maintain it though,I agree,it could be easily misinterpreted.
In what follows further I will treat only the case of newly observed phenomena that cannot be 'reduced' at the existing paradigm,at a certain moment of time.
In such cases a hypothesis appears first as a tentative to make sense of the newly observed processes [that cannot be accomodated by the old paradigm in a certain domain and the ontology it proposes,as I said] and must have explanatory power for those phenomena.This hypothesis might have a mathematical formalism attached to the ontology it proposes or not [for the moment],the essential fact is that,in order to become an acknowledged scientific hypothesis,it must make some predictions which are potentially falsifiable and [preferably] to have explanatory power for a wider range of phenomena.
The atomic hypothesis,for example,did not have,at the beginning,a mathematical formalism but it predicted the relative masses of the final products that should be obtained in chemical reactions from simple components,explaining well in the same time the experimentally known chemical reactions of the time [later the mathematical formalism of newtonian mechanics was added].

There are two possibilities now:

1.The old paradigm was disproved by the newly observed phenomenon.
2.The old paradigm was not disproved but it cannot explain the newly observed facts in spite of the numerous tries,over an enough long period of time,from the part of the brightest minds in the scientific field.

In the first case a new paradigm must be created [containing at least the particular hypothesis I talked about] which should also be confirmed in the case of all known experiments that backed the old paradigm,replacing it totally.
In the second case either a new paradigm containing the new hypothesis is created,totally replacing the old paradigm [as an alternative one or more particular laws in the old paradigm are discarded and the new hypothesis is added in their place],or the particular hypothesis is merely added at the old paradigm.

Returning now from this [absolutely neccessary however] digression here is my answer at your objections.
The predictions are obtained as deductions from the hypothesis' statements [including the possible mathematical formalism].However,though it might have appeared 'out of the blue',the hypothesis must respect also this important criterion:it must not contradict all previous knowledge that was not discarded [coherence].Moreover,this is not enough,it must forcefully use at least the basic axioms of science as premises for the predictions.
Practically,in the vast majority of cases,the newly added hypotheses use also some previous objective knowledge,not discarded at a certain time,presupposed true,not only the basic axioms of science.This means that they use this objective knowledge in their core [ontology+the possible mathematical formalism] as premises:many scientific theories are 'embedded'.
Sure this is not always valid,for example QM,though the important fact is that it uses as premises at least the basic axioms of science.

'Cheers'?If I remember well someone,posting on a certain forum,on a certain site,used to end almost al his posts with this 'greeting'...Have we 'met',by chance,on a.k.e.com?My personal stance is that there are very few chances for that,'cheers' is a too common word...but who knows,what if I am right?...

[metacristi]

Stimpson

It does not apply to all systems of axioms. It only applies to sufficiently complex ones.

A quick question [no intention to begin a polemics but I cannot believe that only because you give me your 'boy scouts' word];can you point out any serious resources backing your statement?
As far as I know there is no such demonstration apart for complex systems containing arithmetics.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by The One called Neo


Hi Bill,

Would you say that water emerges from H2O? That would surely be incorrect because once we know everything about water and H2O, we know they must refer to the very same thing. One is reducible to the other. Now if qualia are simply brain processes, then in my opinion it wouldn't be correct to say the mind emerges from the brain. Because then that implies that mind and brain are different things, even though the existence of one is wholly dependent on the other. Do you agree?

H₂O is water. They are the same. When sufficient water is gathered together in one body, on our planet, with our moon, tidal effects emerge. Water and tides are not the same. The tide is a process.

A brain in a jar does not have mind. The brain processes are no longer active. Brain and mind are not the same. Mind emerges from a living brain.

The fact that the existence of one depends wholly on another in no way means the two things are the same.

Cheers,

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by metacristi
You should not forget that you attacked my position,frankly speaking I fail to see why,even now,you did not bother to enlighten me...be sure that I have also better things to do.
Yes I care to acknowledge that,moreover I maintain it though,I agree,it could be easily misinterpreted.
Already, my hurts. First you say an hypothesis makes predictions that are deduced. Then you say you didn't say it. Now you say you acknowledge you did, and follow it with that last incomprehensible sentence.
In what follows further I will treat only the case of newly observed phenomena that cannot be 'reduced' at the existing paradigm,at a certain moment of time.
In such cases a hypothesis appears first as a tentative to make sense of the newly observed processes [that cannot be accomodated by the old paradigm in a certain domain and the ontology it proposes,as I said] and must have explanatory power for those phenomena.This hypothesis might have a mathematical formalism attached to the ontology it proposes or not [for the moment],the essential fact is that,in order to become an acknowledged scientific hypothesis,it must make some predictions which are potentially falsifiable and [preferably] to have explanatory power for a wider range of phenomena.
With your first sentence you step off on the wrong foot. You are confounding Kuhnian paradigm-shift bunk with basic hypotheses. There is no requirement that an hypothesis have anything to do with "new phenomena" or problems with "old paradigms". I believe you are greatly confused here.

There is also no requirement of "explanatory power" to an hypothesis. Here again you have confused hypothesis with theory.

An hypothesis furthermore need make no prediction. The hypothesis is simply an assertion to be tested. It can come from anywhere. It can be within any current paradigm. It is often flipped about so that the converse hypothesis is tested.
The atomic hypothesis,for example,did not have,at the beginning,a mathematical formalism but it predicted the relative masses of the final products that should be obtained in chemical reactions from simple components,explaining well in the same time the experimentally known chemical reactions of the time [later the mathematical formalism of newtonian mechanics was added].

There are two possibilities now:

1.The old paradigm was disproved by the newly observed phenomenon.
2.The old paradigm was not disproved but it cannot explain the newly observed facts in spite of the numerous tries,over an enough long period of time,from the part of the brightest minds in the scientific field.

In the first case a new paradigm must be created [containing at least the particular hypothesis I talked about] which should also be confirmed in the case of all known experiments that backed the old paradigm,replacing it totally.
In the second case either a new paradigm containing the new hypothesis is created,totally replacing the old paradigm [as an alternative one or more particular laws in the old paradigm are discarded and the new hypothesis is added in their place],or the particular hypothesis is merely added at the old paradigm.

Returning now from this [absolutely neccessary however] digression here is my answer at your objections.
The predictions are obtained as deductions from the hypothesis' statements [including the possible mathematical formalism].However,though it might have appeared 'out of the blue',the hypothesis must respect also this important criterion:it must not contradict all previous knowledge that was not discarded [coherence].Moreover,this is not enough,it must forcefully use at least the basic axioms of science as premises for the predictions.
Practically,in the vast majority of cases,the newly added hypotheses use also some previous objective knowledge,not discarded at a certain time,presupposed true,not only the basic axioms of science.This means that they use this objective knowledge in their core [ontology+the possible mathematical formalism] as premises:many scientific theories are 'embedded'.
Sure this is not always valid,for example QM,though the important fact is that it uses as premises at least the basic axioms of science.
An hypothesis most certainly can contradict previous knowledge. *sigh* An hypothesis is simply an assertion to be tested.

Cheers,

[edit: corrected vB code - bh]

[Stimpson J. Cat]

metacristi,

It does not apply to all systems of axioms. It only applies to sufficiently complex ones.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A quick question [no intention to begin a polemics but I cannot believe that only because you give me your 'boy scouts' word];can you point out any serious resources backing your statement?

I can refer you to the proof itself. I do not have a link, because I do not know of any off hand, and you can do a search as easy as me. I learned these things from books, myself.

I obviously won't describe the proof in full here, but basically it goes like this.

Consider a system with a finite number of axioms. For any such system, a symbolic language can be constructed that makes reference only to those axioms, and with which any meaningful statement within the system can be constructed.

Godel showed a couple of things. First, he showed that such a symbolic language can always be constructed. Second, he showed that the number of statements that can be constructed in such a symbolic language can be finite, countably infinite, or uncountably infinite, depending on the complexity of the axioms. Third, he showed that the number of statements whose truth or falsehood can be logically derived from the axioms, is either finite, or a countable infinity.

That is where the incompleteness theorem comes in. If the number of possible statements is an uncountable infinity, and the number of statements whose truth value is derivable is a countable infinity, then there must be statements whose truth value cannot be derived.

This proof says nothing about arithmetic specifically. Arithmetic is simply the example he cited as such a sufficiently complex system.

As far as I know there is no such demonstration apart for complex systems containing arithmetics.

I don't know of any either. This is probably because all complex logical frameworks I know of are based on the framework of arithmetic.

It may even be that all such frameworks must contain arithmetic, or something logically isomorphic to it. But this has not been proven, and it is certainly not a part of Godel's proof.

Anyway, I think this is highly tangential to the point of this discussion, since we can be pretty certain that any logical system capable of serving as a model for reality must contain arithmetic.

Dr. Stupid

[metacristi]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

An hypothesis most certainly can contradict previous knowledge. *sigh* An hypothesis is simply an assertion to be tested.

hypothesis=A tentative explanation for an observation, phenomenon,or scientific problem that can be tested by further investigation.
Are you aware that we are talking here about scientific hypotheses and not about the linguistic meaning of 'hypothesis'?I can construct for example the hypothesis that all universe is an 'atom' on the surface of a 'fooball ball' on a 'field' in a metauniverse.Sure this is possible to be true though science has nothing to say here now,I cannot have certitudes [that's why in my subjective systems of values I a assign a subjective probability of being true greater than 0] but clearly it does not represent a scientific hypothesis at least in the light of actual knowledge and of the actual requirements of the scientific method.At most it can become a belief if some have subjective evidence in favor of that,of course without claiming anything to others...given that there is no way,at least now,to give an objective proof for that.

I've never claimed that a scientific hypothesis cannot contradict previous knowledge [in some predictions not yet tested].Only that this would be generally useless as much as the old paradigm has not been disproved,has no misterious,unsolved,problems and the new hypothesis is not superior [proved experimentally] to the old theories...It only makes sense to create hypotheses that are at least equally supported experimentally as the old theories,indeed Occam's Razor cannot count as a proof that the simpler theory is really superior.And if the new hypothesis is disproved by the already existing experiments there where it contradicts the old paradigm...
In science the area of 'movement' is highly restrained...




Already, my hurts. First you say an hypothesis makes predictions that are deduced. Then you say you didn't say it. Now you say you acknowledge you did, and follow it with that last incomprehensible sentence.


Look,I don't like to be rude,but when I see too much arrogance,in spite of the manifest ignorance...I often forget to be polite...I thought you have some basic idea of how the scientific method works.
A tentative scientific hypothesis is also a set of statements describing [and explaining in some cases] an observed phenomenon [or more different phenomena],at this set a mathematical formalism might be added.These statements+the possible mathematical formalism+[possible] the statements of other,still not disproved,scientific theories used [possible] by the hypothesis in its statements or in the mathematical formalism+[necessarilly] the basic axioms of science make up a set of premises from which by deduction we obtain the predictions of the hypothsesis.
The predictions made by a hypothesis are deduced from the above set of premises.
Induction comes only later when a hypothesis is convincingly 'confirmed'-becoming a scientific theory that gives us 'provisional objective knowledge'-by assuming that it's statements and predictions are valid also for all places [on a specified domain of definition] and at all times.
The existing practical applications of electrotechnics,electronics,mechanics for example,are deduced from physics' succesfull scientific theories and count in fact as predictions of those theories in spite of the fact that we sometimes discover practically some phenomena first and only later 'explain' them [accomodate them with the current 'paradigm'].

When we observe a phenomenon that cannot be explained by the existing scientific theories [my sense of the word 'paradigm'-a broad series of scientific theories that are 'linked',when their ontology falls all 'linked' theories fall also] or an experiment 'disprove' the existing 'paradigm' it's clear that a shift in 'paradigm' is needed,the first step being the conception of a new paradigm [a new hypothesis] which in majority of practical cases is made up from more particular hypothesis [a single equation in a theory of everything might be as elusive as the Holy Grail].



With your first sentence you step off on the wrong foot. You are confounding Kuhnian paradigm-shift bunk with basic hypotheses. There is no requirement that an hypothesis have anything to do with "new phenomena" or problems with "old paradigms".I believe you are greatly confused here.

There is also no requirement of "explanatory power" to an hypothesis. Here again you have confused hypothesis with theory.

An hypothesis furthermore need make no prediction. The hypothesis is simply an assertion to be tested. It can come from anywhere. It can be within any current paradigm. It is often flipped about so that the converse hypothesis is tested.




There is not too much to comment,you continue to amaze me with your really 'broad knowledge'.Did you read with attention my first phrase?I simply treated only that case,nothing more,because it is relevant for science.I've explained above why is useless,in the case of science only,to make alternative hypotheses that are not at least equal experimentally [the possible difference between them is within the range of error of the best existing measurement devices] with the old theories,at a certain moment of time.
Who told you that the 'paradigm' idea is 'bunk'?Sorry but this has nothing to do with Kuhn's idea of 'incommensurability'...which by the way has its merits (though I do not agree entirely with it).

[cmaz]

metacristi,

Originally posted by metacristi

The predictions made by a hypothesis are deduced from the above set of premises.


I believe what BillHoyt is getting at is that (according to my understanding of deductive logic) conclusions necessarily follow from premises. The premises are assumed to be true at the outset. The only issue is if the conclusion is warranted given the relationship(s) posited between the premises, and you don't need experimentation for that. You only need an understanding of the rules of logic.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by cmaz
I believe what BillHoyt is getting at is that (according to my understanding of deductive logic) conclusions necessarily follow from premises. The premises are assumed to be true at the outset. The only issue is if the conclusion is warranted given the relationship(s) posited between the premises, and you don't need experimentation for that. You only need an understanding of the rules of logic.

Exactly. Thank you.

Cheers,

[metacristi]

cmaz


I believe what BillHoyt is getting at is that (according to my understanding of deductive logic) conclusions necessarily follow from premises. The premises are assumed to be true at the outset. The only issue is if the conclusion is warranted given the relationship(s) posited between the premises, and you don't need experimentation for that. You only need an understanding of the rules of logic.


A scientific hypothesis is a tentative to describe [or to explain in some cases] an observed phenomenon [or more] respecting the general requirements of the scientific method.Usually the phenomenon is a particular one,not explained yet,as it was,for example,the case of chemical reactions in the case of the atomic hypothesis in 19-th century.
Though this hypothesis might explain well (theoretically) that particular phenomenon in order to consider it a promising scientific hypothesis it is needed a certain number of at least 'theoretical confirmations not only for that particular phenomenon but also in the case of other phenomena:indeed ad hoc hypotheses are not very reliable.However neither have we the right ot discard them,in fact the atomic hypothesis was one of them initially.
Useful to explain [theoretically] initially the relative masses of reactives in the known chemical reactions it would prove very succesfully to explain [also theoretically] the brownian movement,to deduce the laws of gases using the statistical approach upon atoms and many others.These facts qualified it definively as being a strong scientific hypothesis.Still these 'confirmations' were not conclusive enough.Only when Thomson and later Rutherford proved experimentally [indirectly indeed but conclusively] that atoms really exists did the atomic theory become an accepted scientific theory,considered as giving us 'provisional objective truth'.Provisional indeed,in spite the fact that we have reason beyond all reasonable doubt to conclude that a particle named electron does exist,because we cannot be sure that the current attributes we assign to the electron are real.
Other hypotheses did not proposed any ontology,the standard QM's case,only a mathematical formalism.Initially very succesfull to describe the statistical distribution in the case of the two-slit experiment it's predictions were 'confirmed' in the case of a wide range of phenomena [in fact it was not disproved yet] becoming scientific theory=objective knowledge=fallible 'truth'.

The statements of a scientific hypothesis are presupposed true and it's predictions [derived as I explained in one of my above posts] are subjected to experimental disconfirmation.Even the particular phenomenon that was explained initially can count as a prediction that was 'confirmed' by experiment.This is how experimental method works,a scientific theory is considered as giving us 'fallible objective knowledge' until the moment when it is diproved by a well conducted experiment [but as practice proved this is notoriously hard to obtain in many cases-this brought the label 'naive' to the popperian simple falsification].

All this approach has a logical base [the so called modus tollens] based on the notion of implication [->]:

Let [a -> b]=[~a \/ b]} (1)

with {non[a] OR b}=[~a \/ b]}

where a are the premises and b are the predictions.

As far the predictions are supported by experiments b=TRUE but we cannot say something about the truth status of the premises [of course only the statements of the hypothesis itself-both a=TRUE or a=FALSE could lead to b=TRUE-in other words metaphysics still could lead to very succesfull scientific theories].
But when b=FALSE by applying the modus tollens 'a' must be forcefully false a=FALSE.The hypothesis is falsified,soundly disproved then.This logical assimetry is one of the basis for the 'falsifiabilist' approach.
The scientific theories are fallible,their 'truth status' is not 'set in stone' generally,though in some particular situations science can attain certitudes.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by metacristi
cmaz

A scientific hypothesis is a tentative to describe [or to explain in some cases] an observed phenomenon [or more] respecting the general requirements of the scientific method...

You still fail to recognize you are confusing hypothesis with theory. Re-read your own post. You are using hypothesis in the sense of a tentative theory. This is NOT the general definition!

I have been trying to communicate this to you in numerous posts, but you stolidly insist on this definition!

The general definition of hypothesis is as I laid it out. It can be this small: "Great herons lay more eggs per clutch than blue herons." That's it. No other reasoning behind it. It may have resulted from the biologist observing the nests and thinking he saw more eggs in great heron nests.

He then inverts the hypothesis to a "null hypothesis": "Great herons lay no more eggs per clutch than blue herons." He then designs the experiment. He will need to examine at least n clutches of great herons and blue herons, count and record the eggs in each and then analyze the results to see if they are significantly different.

If the differences are not significant, the null hypothesis stands and he cannot claim his original hypothesis confirmed. If they are significantly different, he has refuted the null hypothesis and can claim confirmation of his original hypothesis.

Cheers,

[metacristi]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

You are using hypothesis in the sense of a tentative theory.This is NOT the general definition!


hypothesis='a general principle,tentatively put forward for the purposes of scientific explanation and subject to disconfirmation by empirical evidence.'

There are definitions of 'hypothesis' which agrees with my point of view.Moreover,as I've explained in one of my previous posts,it must respect the approach given by the scientific method.Otherwise it is pure philosophy,metaphysics,nonwithstanding it's reference at some phenomena that interests also the science.
Anyway if you do not like that approach then simple replace hypothesis with tentative theory.That will not change the way of how scientific method works,as I've presented it before.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by metacristi



hypothesis='a general principle,tentatively put forward for the purposes of scientific explanation and subject to disconfirmation by empirical evidence.'

There are definitions of 'hypothesis' which agrees with my point of view.Moreover,as I've explained in one of my previous posts,it must respect the approach given by the scientific method.Otherwise it is pure philosophy,metaphysics,nonwithstanding it's reference at some phenomena that interests also the science.
Anyway if you do not like that approach then simple replace hypothesis with tentative theory.That will not change the way of how scientific method works,as I've presented it before.

It most assuredly does change how the method works. The hypothesis need not respect either scientific method or previous evidence. It need only be falsifiable. I can test the hypothesis that there are unicorns living in London. The fact that science hasn't hitherto known about unicorns is irrelevant.

Cheers,

[metacristi]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

It most assuredly does change how the method works. The hypothesis need not respect either scientific method or previous evidence. It need only be falsifiable. I can test the hypothesis that there are unicorns living in London. The fact that science hasn't hitherto known about unicorns is irrelevant.


The method remains the same.Only that you are not able to see that a tentative theory that posit in its premises an additional,empirically unknown entity,and a tentative theory that do not do that are in fact following the same epistemological procedures.
Your 'tentative theory' makes the prediction [identical with its statements] that 'there are living unicorns in London';the basic axioms of science must also be [forcefully] added in the premises.If a 'tentative theory' is [potentially] falsifiable it is scientific.I'm not sure yours is falsifiable.Maybe the unicorn is out of London in all days when all londoners and probably an important number of people from outside London [you alone cannot solve this task] are trying to find her...the fact that you find nothnig in a certain day proves nothing.Even if londoners were doing that continuously for all let's say 100 years I still could suppose that the unicorn has not yet returned...
Still you might be aware that in the case that an unicorn is found in London this does not contradicts the old knowledge,in fact the existence of unicorns merely becomes 'scientific objective knowledge' and is added at the previous objective knowledge.

'Cheers'

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by metacristi



The method remains the same.Only that you are not able to see that a tentative theory that posit in its premises an additional,empirically unknown entity,and a tentative theory that do not do that are in fact following the same epistemological procedures.
Your 'tentative theory' makes the prediction [identical with its statements] that 'there are living unicorns in London';the basic axioms of science must also be [forcefully] added in the premises. If a 'tentative theory' is [potentially] falsifiable it is scientific.I'm not sure yours is falsifiable.
Uh.. no, the basic axioms need not be added! My hypothesis could easily be "it is possible for Sylvia Brown to predict the future". That violates our current understanding of causality and time's arrow. The hypothesis is falsifiable.

I'm not sure yours is falsifiable.Maybe the unicorn is out of London in all days when all londoners and probably an important number of people from outside London [you alone cannot solve this task] are trying to find her...the fact that you find nothnig in a certain day proves nothing.Even if londoners were doing that continuously for all let's say 100 years I still could suppose that the unicorn has not yet returned...
Still you might be aware that in the case that an unicorn is found in London this does not contradicts the old knowledge,in fact the existence of unicorns merely becomes 'scientific objective knowledge' and is added at the previous objective knowledge.

'Cheers'
I never said my not finding unicorns in any given day proved anything other than that I did not find unicorns in London that day. Now you are broaching on the topics of intersubjective validation, peer review and follow-on research.

But you haven't yet demonstrated you understand the basics...

Cheers

[cmaz]

metacristi--
Originally posted by metacristi
cmaz
The statements of a scientific hypothesis are presupposed true and it's predictions [derived as I explained in one of my above posts] are subjected to experimental disconfirmation.
Ah! This was something I probably should have addressed in my earlier post. I agree with you in a certain sense, but disagree in another. Scientists may believe their premises to be true, and operate on the assumption that they are when it comes to making predictions, but this belief is not inviolate.

As a scientist, if my prediction is not supported, what am I to think? I can consider that my premises were appropriate, but that I made an incorrect prediction. Yet, I can also question the approrpiateness of my premises. I don't believe that pure deductive logic allows you to do that; it simply focuses on whether the relationships between the premises are valid.

I'll go back over your older posts, and pay particular attention to your new ones to see if I can better grasp your points.

And also, I apologize for getting a bit off-topic. Just got carried away. Back to materialism, then?

C--

[Janus]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
If we have to choose which is real :

a) The physical Universe .

or

b) Our mental experiences.

...then the answer must be (b), because (a) denies reality to the only reality we ever know - our minds.
[/B]

Seeing as the debate has wandered a bit can I ask a question, Why (B)?

Every time the physical universe and my mental experiences have disagreed, the physical Universe has won.

I was going to post some examples from my own experience, however this showed up on k5 (http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2003/4/14/154022/753)

I consider my self normal (more so compared with that guy), but between experiences with optical illusions, disorientation, partial waking states and so on I can't personally say I consider my mind 100% infallible. That’s not to say my mind is often wrong, however there is a margin of error – especially in unusual circumstances.

It would interest me to know if there is correlation between peoples confidence in their “mental experiences” and their opinion on the nature of “qualia”, but I think I know the answer.

[scribble]

Originally posted by Janus

Seeing as the debate has wandered a bit can I ask a question,

Janus, for being a relative new poster that was a brilliant and insightful post. No matter what other ******** gets said here.

-Chris

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Janus


Seeing as the debate has wandered a bit can I ask a question, Why (B)?

Every time the physical universe and my mental experiences have disagreed, the physical Universe has won.

I was going to post some examples from my own experience, however this showed up on k5 (http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2003/4/14/154022/753)

I consider my self normal (more so compared with that guy), but between experiences with optical illusions, disorientation, partial waking states and so on I can't personally say I consider my mind 100% infallible. That’s not to say my mind is often wrong, however there is a margin of error – especially in unusual circumstances.

It would interest me to know if there is correlation between peoples confidence in their “mental experiences” and their opinion on the nature of “qualia”, but I think I know the answer.

Scribble thinks your post is brilliant, but I'm utterly baffled by it. As my mental experiences are the physical universe, then how can the physical universe win??? :confused:

Also regarding that link. Is it supposed that these voices are somehow not real? If so then why?

[Jethro]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Scribble thinks your post is brilliant, but I'm utterly baffled by it. As my mental experiences are the physical universe, then how can the physical universe win??? :confused:Have you ever thought you saw something that wasn't actually there? Have you ever read something too quickly and thought it said something it didn't? Are you suggesting that the physical universe changes simply because one reads a little more carefully?Also regarding that link. Is it supposed that these voices are somehow not real? If so then why? Because there is no apparant source for these voices. Surely you aren't suggesting that people with chemical imbalances in their brain hearing disembodied voices is proof of idealism?

[Janus]

My bad Grammar and Scribbles rapier wit aside.

WRT the voices: The question is if mind makes matter, why did he hear voices in the first place. Perhaps I've over simplified - but ether his mind lied to him about the origins of the voices or a brain defect influenced his mind with out his consent or knowledge; both of these seem very odd if the mind is responsible for reality in the first place.

The question I really want answered is why, if our minds are responsible for reality (wait a sec, did we agree that everybody else is not a figment of my imagination?) then why do we impose this reality on our selves. The shared experience that we call the real world encodes all kinds of limitations that we wouldn't have knowing requested. Limitations that are indicative of binding constraints that are unyielding.

Somewhere, some powerful or large group of entities is wishing slower than light travel, cancer and flatulence upon us and I want them held accountable.

[Loki]

Janus,

Somewhere, some powerful or large group of entities is wishing slower than light travel, cancer and flatulence upon us and I want them held accountable.
That would the Logical Goddess you are referring to. Anway, you'll have your accounting in 2012 - just 9 more years before the meta-truth is revealed! (for more info - ask uce).

Originally posted by Janus

Uce wrote :
----------------------------
If we have to choose which is real :

a) The physical Universe .

or

b) Our mental experiences.

...then the answer must be (b), because (a) denies reality to the only reality we ever know - our minds.
----------------------------

Seeing as the debate has wandered a bit can I ask a question, Why (B)?


Why? Isn't it obvious? If you have to CHOOSE which ONE is real then there can be only one answer to that question. If you choose (a) then you are denying the existence of your own subjective consciousness! You can do this if you like, but it is the equivalent to issuing a bankruptcy order on materialism. What use is a philosophy that denies the existence of the only thing we know exists? :confused:

You continue....


Every time the physical universe and my mental experiences have disagreed, the physical Universe has won.


What does this mean?

All you have ever known is your mental experiences of a physical Universe. To you the physical Universe itself is just a hypothesis. You've never even actually seen it!


I consider my self normal (more so compared with that guy), but between experiences with optical illusions, disorientation, partial waking states and so on I can't personally say I consider my mind 100% infallible. That’s not to say my mind is often wrong, however there is a margin of error – especially in unusual circumstances.


Well, if you are going to answer (a) then why are you even talking about 'your mind'? You just proposed it doesn't exist! If your mind is capable of being fallible then it MUST EXIST. If your mind DOES EXIST and you have to CHOOSE (a) or (b) then you MUST choose (b). It's that simple.

Originally posted by scribble


Janus, for being a relative new poster that was a brilliant and insightful post. No matter what other ******** gets said here.

-Chris

Can I assume that means you too are joining the 'my mind does not exist' brigade? :D

Originally posted by Janus
My bad Grammar and Scribbles rapier wit aside.

The question I really want answered is why, if our minds are responsible for reality (wait a sec, did we agree that everybody else is not a figment of my imagination?) then why do we impose this reality on our selves. The shared experience that we call the real world encodes all kinds of limitations that we wouldn't have knowing requested. Limitations that are indicative of binding constraints that are unyielding.

Somewhere, some powerful or large group of entities is wishing slower than light travel, cancer and flatulence upon us and I want them held accountable.

Janus,

I am not suggesting that the physical Universe has no existence. I am saying that it's existence must ultimately be mental i.e. it takes the form of information existing with a higher realm of mind to which each of us has access. This leaves materialism working just as before as far as the behaviour of the physical Universe goes. The explanations for cancer and flatulence remain the same evolutionary reasons that were there before. Physical evolution remains the origin of our body design. All that has changed is that the physical world is no longer considered to be a self-existing physical substrate which is actually 'out there' - instead it is a pool of information in a Mind.

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


Why? Isn't it obvious? If you have to CHOOSE which ONE is real then there can be only one answer to that question. If you choose (a) then you are denying the existence of your own subjective consciousness! You can do this if you like, but it is the equivalent to issuing a bankruptcy order on materialism. What use is a philosophy that denies the existence of the only thing we know exists? :confused:

You continue....



What does this mean?

All you have ever known is your mental experiences of a physical Universe. To you the physical Universe itself is just a hypothesis. You've never even actually seen it!



Well, if you are going to answer (a) then why are you even talking about 'your mind'? You just proposed it doesn't exist! If your mind is capable of being fallible then it MUST EXIST. If your mind DOES EXIST and you have to CHOOSE (a) or (b) then you MUST choose (b). It's that simple. Excuse me, but while I know you have explained your standpoint before, I still don't get it. How does the recognition of a physical universe rule out the mind?

Just what is the evidence that the mind cannot be a part of the physical universe? ----- And if that is asking the proof of a negative, I'll rephrase: What is the evidence that the mind is something other than part of the physical universe?

Hans

Originally posted by MRC_Hans

Excuse me, but while I know you have explained your standpoint before, I still don't get it. How does the recognition of a physical universe rule out the mind?


If I am going to thank logical positivism for anything then it would be for making it very clear that dualism doesn't work. That includes the naive dualism held by the majority of the people here who call themselves materialists but actually recognise that qualia and brain processes differ (although they cannot explain the difference). So we have to make a choice about which monism can be made to work. Mentalism allows everything to be mental provided that the physical Universe can exist in the form of information. Materialism cannot provide a similar mechanism for the support of mind - it is easy for mind to create the illusion of matter but impossible for matter to create the illusion of mind. Basically you can recognise the physical Universe as self-existing if you like, but doing so leaves you with a choice about whether you define qualia or not. As soon as you admit qualia exist, and aren't brain processes, then you have dualism.


Just what is the evidence that the mind cannot be a part of the physical universe? ----- And if that is asking the proof of a negative, I'll rephrase: What is the evidence that the mind is something other than part of the physical universe?


We've been through this.....

Qualia appear to be a mental 'perspective' on brain processes. If you admit their existence then you have to say whether or not they differ from brain processes. If you answer NO then there is no point in defining the word 'qualia'. If you answer YES then you aren't a materialist, because you have acknowledged the existence of the same 'thing' in both a physical and mental realm. i.e. the only difference between brain processes and qualia is the difference between physical and mental. It is not the difference between physical-1 and physical-2. If you are trying to claims that 'physical' and 'mental' are 'really just two types of physical' then your position is incoherent - it is not materialism, because it isn't monist.

[MRC_Hans]

I know we have been through it, but I dont get it. Pardon me for being slow.

Qualia are, the way I understand it, simply one level of abstraction in our understanding of things. It is a brain process, like all the rest, distinguished only by its particular position in the hierachy of abstraction. I simply don't see what is special about it.

Hans

Originally posted by MRC_Hans

Qualia are, the way I understand it, simply one level of abstraction in our understanding of things. It is a brain process, like all the rest, distinguished only by its particular position in the hierachy of abstraction. I simply don't see what is special about it.



I don't understand what you are actually trying to say. Materialists are forced into a position of either denying the existence of qualia, or recognising their existence and somehow reducing them to brain processes at the same time. Thus it is an incoherent mixture of dualism and monism. What does "simply one level of abstraction in our understanding of things" actually mean? Are they brain processes or aren't they? What does it mean to have 'two layers of abstraction within brain processes'? Like most of the materialistic 'explanations' of what qualia are it seems to be nothing more than a string of words with no discernible meaning. How does 'going up the hierarchy of abstraction' turn a 650nm wavelength into a subjective experience of redness? How is this NOT dualistic?

Do you understand the difference between direct knowledge and indirect knowledge?

[Janus]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
[B]

Why? Isn't it obvious? If you have to CHOOSE which ONE is real then there can be only one answer to that question. If you choose (a) then you are denying the existence of your own subjective consciousness! You can do this if you like, but it is the equivalent to issuing a bankruptcy order on materialism. What use is a philosophy that denies the existence of the only thing we know exists? :confused:


I see from your later post that my line of reasoning was not applicable, but I'll elaborate anyway:

My line of thinking was this:
1. Personal experience and anecdotal evidence from others suggests that minds are fallible.
2. Personal experience and anecdotal evidenced suggest that the physical universe is not fallible.
3 .In your model, a large pool of fallible minds creates a infallible universe.
I realize that this isn't necessary impossible - but I find the alternative, an infallible universe creates fallible minds to be more safe (for want of a better word).
Anyway my point was that your reasoning give me the impression that infallibility of mind was a assumption underlying your ideas, and I wanted to know if this was intentional/unintentional or imagined.


I am not suggesting that the physical Universe has no existence. I am saying that it's existence must ultimately be mental i.e. it takes the form of information existing with a higher realm of mind to which each of us has access. This leaves materialism working just as before as far as the behavior of the physical Universe goes. The explanations for cancer and flatulence remain the same evolutionary reasons that were there before. Physical evolution remains the origin of our body design. All that has changed is that the physical world is no longer considered to be a self-existing physical substrate which is actually 'out there' - instead it is a pool of information in a Mind.


So our minds are connected to another mind which immerses us, leaving us with no knowledge of the wider context, and limiting our actions to a (I can only assume) arbitrary, consistently enforced set of rules. Kinda makes threads on freewill rather redundant.

Actually this required clarification : how involved is the mind in the continuation of existence. I mean dose it roll all the dice or has merely imposed the rule that the dice must be rolled?

Originally posted by Janus

So our minds are connected to another mind which immerses us, leaving us with no knowledge of the wider context, and limiting our actions to a (I can only assume) arbitrary, consistently enforced set of rules. Kinda makes threads on freewill rather redundant.


The reverse is true. Threads on free will are redundant with any other model. This model actually provides us with some sort of way forward for understanding free will. Free Will is a meaningless concept for the materialists.


Actually this required clarification : how involved is the mind in the continuation of existence. I mean dose it roll all the dice or has merely imposed the rule that the dice must be rolled?


Which mind are you refering to? Your mind? The Metamind? Both? Mind IS existence. As for who is rolling the dice - the answers lie in the role of the observer in quantum mechanics and the possibility of Free Will. Who decides whether Schroedingers cat lives or dies? When is the decision taken? Was it a dice-roll?

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant

I don't understand what you are actually trying to say.

Well, in a way we are communicating, then ;)

Materialists are forced into a position of either denying the existence of qualia, or recognising their existence and somehow reducing them to brain processes at the same time.

The way I see it, YOU are trying to force materialists into one of these positions. But it is you who have claimed that qualia are something different from brain processes.

Thus it is an incoherent mixture of dualism and monism.

isms, shmisms. You know, just because you cannot readily cram some viewpoint into some established ism, it doent mean that it cannot be valid.

What does "simply one level of abstraction in our understanding of things" actually mean? Are they brain processes or aren't they? What does it mean to have 'two layers of abstraction within brain processes'? Like most of the materialistic 'explanations' of what qualia are it seems to be nothing more than a string of words with no discernible meaning. How does 'going up the hierarchy of abstraction' turn a 650nm wavelength into a subjective experience of redness? How is this NOT dualistic?

They are all brain processes. But our brain is able to percieve and process various abstraction levels. Surely I need not explain that to somebody like you?

However, let's take your color red; light in that particular part of the spectrum falling on your retina creates a certain type of stimulus to your brain. We can prove experimentally that this is for all practical purposes identical for all persons with normal sight. That is the basic level.

If you speak english, you call this impression "red". That is one level of abstraction, because "red" does not only refer to the experience at hand, but to a wide range of visual experiences both past and future.

The color red has a symbolic value, actually it has several. For example, it does make a difference whether you present somebody with red roses or yellow roses. This is a new level of abstraction that does not have any direct connection with any actual visual experiences. For instance, you could teach the symbolism of red to a blind person.

Now, where in this range of abstraction is it you claim that brain action stops and something different takes over? And what is it you claim is taking over?

Hans

Hans :

Let me try to explain it one more time. We are condemned to experience nothing but our minds. We can only assume that solipsism is false and that an external world exists. We do this by analogy - we observe actions in others and by analogy we guess they must exist and must be conscious like ourselves. But nevertheless there is a fundamental, absolute and undeniable dualism of knowledge here - we have one sort of knowledge that we know directly (qualia) and one sort of knowledge that we only ever know indirectly (brain processes). Brain processes, like the whole of physical world are only known to us via abstract reasoning.

Now you have three options.

1) You can just acknowledge the existence of two realms to account for this dualism of knowledge - a mental realm and a physical realm.

2) You can declare that everything which exists is ultimately mental, and suggest that what we call 'the physical world' is simply a metamental information structure. This requires a complete rethink of many things but is logically coherent.

3) You can declare that everything exists is ultimately physical. The problem is then to explain how the mental things we know directly are really physical without reverting to dualism and it must be fairly obvious by now that this is logically impossible. Denying that qualia exist is ridiculous, since they clearly do exist. Claiming that qualia are 'nothing more than brain processes' renders the word 'qualia' meaningless and thus is no different to claiming that qualia do not exist. Which leaves only an incoherent position where the materialist attempts to find someway of defining qualia to be both 'brain processes' and 'not brain processes' at the same time. Write this in C and you get :

if (A == B) && ( A != B)) then materialism = TRUE.

The killer problem is defining how brain process and qualia relate. Science has already shown us that these things are very close correlates - there is no physical difference between them - only one of 1st-person/3rd-person perspective. But if you admit that this is the case then you cannot provide a purely physical explanation for the difference because you already know that the only difference is between physical and mental. The materialists actually confirm this proposition every time the try to claim that qualia ARE brain processes.

Therefore there can be no 'materialistic monism'. It is a philosophical position which cannot be logically defended.

Hans



UCE wrote :

Materialists are forced into a position of either denying the existence of qualia, or recognising their existence and somehow reducing them to brain processes at the same time.

Hans replied :

The way I see it, YOU are trying to force materialists into one of these positions. But it is you who have claimed that qualia are something different from brain processes.


Well, yes.....I am trying to force the materialists to look at what it is they are actually saying. I am trying to prevent them from claiming two contradictory things at the same time. Is there anything wrong with that?



UCE wrote :

Thus it is an incoherent mixture of dualism and monism.

Hans replied :

isms, shmisms. You know, just because you cannot readily cram some viewpoint into some established ism, it doent mean that it cannot be valid.


If the viewpoint you are 'trying to cram in' is our own existential viewpoint and the 'ism' you are trying to cram it into is materialism, and it won't go, then that means that materialism cannot be a valid explanation of existence. That is exactly what it means.



UCE wrote :

How is this NOT dualistic?

Hans :

They are all brain processes. But our brain is able to percieve and process various abstraction levels. Surely I need not explain that to somebody like you?


I still don't really know what you mean - I don't understand how this helps to get materialism out of jail.


However, let's take your color red; light in that particular part of the spectrum falling on your retina creates a certain type of stimulus to your brain. We can prove experimentally that this is for all practical purposes identical for all persons with normal sight. That is the basic level.


OK - this is all just physical, and it all refers to concepts that are abstract.


If you speak english, you call this impression "red". That is one level of abstraction, because "red" does not only refer to the experience at hand, but to a wide range of visual experiences both past and future.

The color red has a symbolic value, actually it has several. For example, it does make a difference whether you present somebody with red roses or yellow roses. This is a new level of abstraction that does not have any direct connection with any actual visual experiences. For instance, you could teach the symbolism of red to a blind person.

Now, where in this range of abstraction is it you claim that brain action stops and something different takes over? And what is it you claim is taking over?


I'm not. I'm not a dualist. The whole physical world is an abstraction. Qualia are not an abstraction - they are actual reality.

I'm trying to understand what you are saying but there is still a contextual problem. I still don't understand how you derive the direct knowledge from the indirect knowledge. The cold stark truth is that we do this the other way around. We always derive physical knowledge from mental knowledge. We never derive mental knowledge from physical knowledge. If what you were saying was true then this would be the other way around.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans

The way I see it, YOU are trying to force materialists into one of these positions. But it is you who have claimed that qualia are something different from brain processes.




Hans,

UCE is right. It is not him who is trying to force materialists into one of both positions, it is materialism who forces you to accept that qualia are nothing more than a brain process.

If you cannot accept this, it means that you are NOT a materialist. You are a dualist. I found difficult to understand this, I think that the main problem is that most of us do not know exactly what Materialism means and implies (its principles).

Q

[MRC_Hans]

Once you start reflecting about reality philosophically, it starts as a mental process, and goes "down" in order to relate to physical experiences, but I do not agree that you can expand the top down view from that. In my opinion, the complex, abstract thought processes stem from simple physical stimuli. An infant has to learn to see, to use his eyes (or at least his senses) before he can develop language, abstract thought, philosophy. Once you have aquired the means of communication, you can learn about abstract concepts; we all have a fair idea of how Earth looks from space, but only those who have actualy seen it know for real.

Then, of course, there are other creatures than humans. As far as we can deduce, a fly lives entirely on the physical stimuli level, without any mental states to speak of, yet it lives quite successfully.

I understand the difference between your philosophy and mine, but I can't spot where mine is incoherent. What I see you do is take YOUR premises and apply them to MY philosophy. This, of course makes for incoherence, but the fallacy is yours.

Hans

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by Q-Source



Hans,

UCE is right. It is not him who is trying to force materialists into one of both positions, it is materialism who forces you to accept that qualia are nothing more than a brain process.

If you cannot accept this, it means that you are NOT a materialist. You are a dualist. I found difficult to understand this, I think that the main problem is that most of us do not know exactly what Materialism means and implies (its principles).

Q I think he does. Like I said above, he is applying his premises, then finding that materialism does not fit them, he asks materialists to clear the problem. But I may misunderstand him.

I dont know if I'm a materialist. I claim that the physical world exists, and I observe that so far everything around us can be explained in terms of the physical world. If that makes me a materialist, fine, then I'm a materialist, if not, then thats fine too. You can call me (almost ;) )anything you will, but don't try to tell me what I think.

Hans

[Janus]

UCE,
I don't see how this improves the situation wrt free will. We've reduced the situation to a black box which exerts will up on it self.

My question with the dice was an attempt to probe your understanding of the meta-mind. A better question (since you introduced the term) is what is the meta-mind? If it separate from other minds, it sound inconstant with your original proposal. If the meta mind is an amalgam of all minds then how can the rules be in-forced with out us having knowledge of them? Alternatively, if the meta-mind gives rise to the sub-minds, whats with the partitioning of knowledge?

The real place I want to get to though is if you have mind, why do you need matter?
Entertainment? too strange, far too immerse.
Experiment? very excessive for a though experiment.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
I think he does. Like I said above, he is applying his premises, then finding that materialism does not fit them, he asks materialists to clear the problem. But I may misunderstand him.

You are misunderstanding what Materialism is and holds.


I dont know if I'm a materialist.

This is the whole point of discussion. If you want to call yourself materialist then you cannot say that qualia exist.


I claim that the physical world exists, and I observe that so far everything around us can be explained in terms of the physical world. If that makes me a materialist, fine, then I'm a materialist, if not, then thats fine too. You can call me (almost ;) )anything you will, but don't try to tell me what I think.


Maybe everything can be explained in terms of the physical.

If qualia can be reduced to a brain process (Billhoyt provided some evidence of this) then UCE cannot assert that Materialism is false.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
Once you start reflecting about reality philosophically, it starts as a mental process, and goes "down" in order to relate to physical experiences, ....
Try thinking about the other direction; first think of matter becoming "life". Recall that as "matter" is examined more & more closely by science, the less & less of it there actually is. What is energy?

Which brand of monism best describes the universe? Dumb luck, or "what is" striving to better order itself?

Is higher & higher "consciousness" a function of complex structure, or does "consciousness" just express itself better with more complex structures to work with?

Then, of course, there are other creatures than humans. As far as we can deduce, a fly lives entirely on the physical stimuli level, without any mental states to speak of, yet it lives quite successfully.
At what stage in the assembly of "matter" does life-sentience-consciousness "emerge"? Why there?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Jethro
Scribble thinks your post is brilliant, but I'm utterly baffled by it. As my mental experiences are the physical universe, then how can the physical universe win???
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Have you ever thought you saw something that wasn't actually there? Have you ever read something too quickly and thought it said something it didn't?



If you mean if I have thought I saw something which wasn't there on a more careful apraisal, then yes. This provides no difficulty whatsoever though for idealism.



Are you suggesting that the physical universe changes simply because one reads a little more carefully?



Here you presuppose your position. The physical world is defined in terms of our perceptions.




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also regarding that link. Is it supposed that these voices are somehow not real? If so then why?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because there is no apparant source for these voices.



{shrugs} So what?



Surely you aren't suggesting that people with chemical imbalances in their brain hearing disembodied voices is proof of idealism?



No. Remember you referred to the link as supposed proof of a non-mind ontologically self-subsistant reality.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Janus
[B]My bad Grammar and Scribbles rapier wit aside.

WRT the voices: The question is if mind makes matter, why did he hear voices in the first place. Perhaps I've over simplified - but ether his mind lied to him about the origins of the voices or a brain defect influenced his mind with out his consent or knowledge; both of these seem very odd if the mind is responsible for reality in the first place.



I don't like your choice of words. Responsible? Seems you're trying to drive a wedge between reality as perceived and as it is in itself. You keep presupposing your position. Physical reality is an aspect of mind.

Let's imagine that these voices are entirely a creation of the mind., Now I would simply ask, if they are entirely a creation of the mind, then how could this conceivably be incompatible with idealism!? :eek:



The question I really want answered is why, if our minds are responsible for reality (wait a sec, did we agree that everybody else is not a figment of my imagination?) then why do we impose this reality on our selves. The shared experience that we call the real world encodes all kinds of limitations that we wouldn't have knowing requested. Limitations that are indicative of binding constraints that are unyielding.



Saying that physical reality is an aspect of mind doesn't require we have stupendious powers. Why should it?

Originally posted by MRC_Hans

Once you start reflecting about reality philosophically, it starts as a mental process, and goes "down" in order to relate to physical experiences, but I do not agree that you can expand the top down view from that.


Why not?

I think if you try to do it then you will find it is perfectly possible. You just don't like it.


In my opinion, the complex, abstract thought processes stem from simple physical stimuli. An infant has to learn to see, to use his eyes (or at least his senses) before he can develop language, abstract thought, philosophy. Once you have aquired the means of communication, you can learn about abstract concepts; we all have a fair idea of how Earth looks from space, but only those who have actualy seen it know for real.


Actually - even those who have actually seen it have still only seen it. They don't know the Earth itself. Only its image.


I understand the difference between your philosophy and mine, but I can't spot where mine is incoherent. What I see you do is take YOUR premises and apply them to MY philosophy. This, of course makes for incoherence, but the fallacy is yours.


But Hans - what you call "my premises" are an accurate evaluation of our true existential state. I haven't just pulled them out of thin air. By contrast your premises involve an assumption. When that assumption is tested against our true existential state then it is found to be incompatible. Materialism is either internally incoherent or incapable of explaining existence as we experience it. Either way it is false. I don't make any assumptions at all - I just start with the world as we experience it and provide a logical explanation as to how the bits fit together.

You do not need to assume idealism. You merely need to recognise the cold hard fact that the only existence we know to be real is a mental existence. Do you understand why materialism relies on an assumption and idealism does not?

Originally posted by Janus

My question with the dice was an attempt to probe your understanding of the meta-mind. A better question (since you introduced the term) is what is the meta-mind?


It is the root mind from which all other minds are a subset. It is ALL mind.


If it separate from other minds, it sound inconstant with your original proposal.


The seperation is illusory. A neccesary illusion, but one that it is theoretically impossible to overcome. However, having overcome it you will never be able to objectively prove this to anyone else.


If the meta mind is an amalgam of all minds then how can the rules be in-forced with out us having knowledge of them? Alternatively, if the meta-mind gives rise to the sub-minds, whats with the partitioning of knowledge?


That is a deep question, and goes beyond the scope of this thread. There are answers, but I don't want to get into them here and now because it will take this thread off-course. And answers I give you will just prompt a whole set of new questions. I can certainly recommend some books to anyone interested in this line of questioning. We are approaching a framework for trying to answer the fundamental question about the meaning of life - it goes way beyond ontology.


The real place I want to get to though is if you have mind, why do you need matter?
Entertainment? too strange, far too immerse.
Experiment? very excessive for a though experiment.


Because otherwise there would be NOTHING AT ALL.

Remember a Howard Jones song called 'Hide and Seek'?


There was a time when there was nothing at all
Nothing at all, just a distant hum
There was a being and he lived on his own
He had no one to talk to, and nothing to do
He drew up the plans, learnt to work with his hands
A million years passed by and his work was done
And his words were these...

Hope you find it in everything, everything that you see
Hope you find it in everything, everything that you see
Hope you find it, hope you find it
Hope you find me in you

So she had built her elaborate home
With it's ups and it's downs, its rains and its sun
She decided that her work was done, time to have fun
and she found a game to play


Then as part of the game
She completely forgot where she'd hidden herself
And she spent the rest of her time
Trying to find the parts


I'd like to say that I don't say things like this lightly. If what I am saying is true then there are many implications, and they need to be thought through carefully, and by individuals themselves.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Q-Source


You are misunderstanding what Materialism is and holds.



This is the whole point of discussion. If you want to call yourself materialist then you cannot say that qualia exist.



Maybe everything can be explained in terms of the physical.

If qualia can be reduced to a brain process (Billhoyt provided some evidence of this) then UCE cannot assert that Materialism is false.

Q,

If you assert that qualia don't exist then I think this would make you an eliminative materialist. But if you hold that qualia are reducible to a brain process then qualia still exist, just as much water still exists even though it can be reduced to H2O (how do I do a small 2?)

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
I'd like to say that I don't say things like this lightly. If what I am saying is true then there are many implications, and they need to be thought through carefully, and by individuals themselves.
UcE,

Thank you for finally coming out of the woodwork again. That's right, UcE, we're all part of an uber-mind that forgot parts of itself and it/we is/are now playing a great big hide-and-seek game.

Sometimes it/we/they find you, like with the psychic CIA that contacted you a while back. Nobody else knows about them, of course, because they/we/it are/are/is playing hide and seek.

Sometimes it/we/they make web sites suddenly appear backwards in time. It couldn't have anything to do with you not understanding how search engines work. It must be this child-like uber-mind at play again.

And now, of course, you will call me rude. Simply because I have called the attention of others to past claims of yours. Sorry, i/we/it have called the attention of me/them/you/it to past/present/does-time-really-matter claims of yours/ours/his. But then you/we/it are calling it/me/you rude. And they rude. And we are all together. Ha ha ha. Ho ho ho. He he he. See how they run like pigs from a gun. See how they fly. I 'm crying.


Cheers,

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
It is the root mind from which all other minds are a subset. It is ALL mind.

Then what in the heck is "mind"? This "other stuff" you talk about? Where did it come from? What is it made of?

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by BillHoyt

UcE,

Thank you for finally coming out of the woodwork again. That's right, UcE, we're all part of an uber-mind that forgot parts of itself and it/we is/are now playing a great big hide-and-seek game.

Sometimes it/we/they find you, like with the psychic CIA that contacted you a while back. Nobody else knows about them, of course, because they/we/it are/are/is playing hide and seek.

Sometimes it/we/they make web sites suddenly appear backwards in time. It couldn't have anything to do with you not understanding how search engines work. It must be this child-like uber-mind at play again.

And now, of course, you will call me rude. Simply because I have called the attention of others to past claims of yours. Sorry, i/we/it have called the attention of me/them/you/it to past/present/does-time-really-matter claims of yours/ours/his. But then you/we/it are calling it/me/you rude. And they rude. And we are all together. Ha ha ha. Ho ho ho. He he he. See how they run like pigs from a gun. See how they fly. I 'm crying.



Why is this relevant for the discussion?

:rolleyes:

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

If you assert that qualia don't exist then I think this would make you an eliminative materialist.

O.K.


But if you hold that qualia are reducible to a brain process then qualia still exist, just as much water still exists even though it can be reduced to H2O

....and that makes to be you a ...... what?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Q-Source


Why is this relevant for the discussion?

:rolleyes:

Q,

I think you should ask UcE. If you buy into his delusions, he and I are one, aren't we, and he should know, shouldn't he? It probably has something to do with karma and a lesson he needs to learn. Who knows? The universe is his oyster once he jumps out of reality and into the delusion. I just added the hot sauce.

Get a beer and enjoy the show...

Cheers,

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Q-Source

If you assert that qualia don't exist then I think this would make you an eliminative materialist.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



O.K.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

But if you hold that qualia are reducible to a brain process then qualia still exist, just as much water still exists even though it can be reduced to H2O
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



....and that makes to be you a ...... what?



Well my position is vey close to UCE's. I utterly reject all materialist positions :) I don't believe that mind can be so reduced to any physical processes. To suppose it can is to misunderstand the nature of mind.

[Q-Source]

Bill,

Get a beer and enjoy the show...

I still don't see why an ad-hom is relevant for the discussion about materialism . Anyway, the show is over. :)

Originally posted by CWL

Then what in the heck is "mind"? This "other stuff" you talk about? Where did it come from? What is it made of?


It isn't made of anything. It didn't come from anywhere. It just is. You could look at these questions as a reason to learn more about philosophy. Many people have offered different answers for different reasons. If you haven't read it I would recommend you get a copy of Sophie's World by Jostein Gaarder. I am a bit worried about providing simplistic answers where entire books are more appropriate.

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by Q-Source
Bill,



I still don't see why an ad-hom is relevant for the discussion about materialism . Anyway, the show is over. :)

What? Just when it starts getting good? C'mon, he finally got to the uber-mind that is so powerful it forgot! So connected that we can't understand one another half the time! The uber-mind so great it created the universe and all our brains and erased its own memory so that we can trip over stones and fall into potholes because we forgot where we put them. What fun!

And yet somehow this uber-alzheimer-mind manages to change web sites with backward causation! And to create mini-minds in people that contact UcE out of the blue to tell him everything he is thinking and has been doing. Somehow, the uber-alzheimer-mind can't manage to warn us about the pothole but can tell us we had fish-and-chips for dinner.

Q, these claims are the same tripe Randi works to eradicate from the planet. You call my post ad hom, and, yes, the tone reeked of sarcasm. But the content was an amalgamation of UcE claims, past and present. It is perfectly relevant to the claim of the uber-alzheimer-mind.

This uber-alzheimer-mind is a convenient delusion. It explains everything and nothing. When it suits, it is all-powerful. When it suits, it is all-forgetful. When it suits, it is playing child-like games. When it suits, it is your senile grandmother who can't remember your name or gender and still wants to slip you the tongue when you kiss her.

This would be hilarious if it weren't so uber-sad.

Cheers,

[Jethro]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
The killer problem is defining how brain process and qualia relate. Science has already shown us that these things are very close correlates - there is no physical difference between them - only one of 1st-person/3rd-person perspective. But if you admit that this is the case then you cannot provide a purely physical explanation for the difference because you already know that the only difference is between physical and mental. The materialists actually confirm this proposition every time the try to claim that qualia ARE brain processes.

Therefore there can be no 'materialistic monism'. It is a philosophical position which cannot be logically defended. Ahhhhh. I finally get it.

But why couldn't there be a physical part of the brain responsible for consciousness?

Originally posted by Jethro
[B]Ahhhhh. I finally get it.

But why couldn't there be a physical part of the brain responsible for consciousness?



What do you mean by this?

Are you saying that qualia are non-physical, but caused by a physical part of the brain?

If so, then we have the problem of how a physical thing can cause a non-physical thing, even though they seem to occur simultaneously. We end up with all of the problems that have long been associated with dualism, which while not so serious as the problems associated with materialism are still problematic. You find yourself in a position where you have to reject materialism and decide whether you are some sort of dualist or preserve monism by switching to mentalism.

[Jethro]

Okay, let us suppose that there is a part of the brain responsible for consciousness. It is the processes of this part of the brain, along with the processes of our sensory inputs, which give rise to the experiences of qualia.

So yes, the only difference between "qualia" and "brain processes" are that we experience one and look at the other with fMRI and PET scans, but this is not a problem because there is a part of the brain which is responsible for our ability to subjectively experience said qualia.

Why would this not solve the problem? Or am I missing something entirely?

Originally posted by Jethro

Okay, let us suppose that there is a part of the brain responsible for consciousness. It is the processes of this part of the brain, along with the processes of our sensory inputs, which give rise to the experiences of qualia.


OK. So you have 'brain processes' and you have something else which these physical processes "give rise to".


So yes, the only difference between "qualia" and "brain processes" are that we experience one and look at the other with fMRI and PET scans, but this is not a problem because there is a part of the brain which is responsible for our ability to subjectively experience said qualia.


This is still just a correlation between brain process and qualia. You seem to be muddling up two different 'differences'.

a) The difference between the qualia-generating-brain-part and the non-qualia-generating-brain part.

b) The difference between the qualia-generating-brain-part and the qualia themselves.

If you are talking about (a) then everything is physical, but there are still no qualia. If you are talking about (b) then qualia are back in the model, but it's dualism because you now have three entities - main-brain, qualia-generating-sub-brain, and qualia.


Why would this not solve the problem? Or am I missing something entirely?


It seems to have made the problem worse, not better. Your proposed solution is very similar to the one often proposed by materialists when they are first introduced to the mind-body problem which is to claim that qualia are simply processes and thus mixing up :

a) The difference between the brain and the brain process
b) The difference between the brain process and the qualia.

This suffers from exactly the same problem.

Qualia aren't brain processes at all. They are qualia.

Geoff.

[CWL]

Originally posted by UndercoverElephant


It isn't made of anything. It didn't come from anywhere. It just is. You could look at these questions as a reason to learn more about philosophy. Many people have offered different answers for different reasons. If you haven't read it I would recommend you get a copy of Sophie's World by Jostein Gaarder. I am a bit worried about providing simplistic answers where entire books are more appropriate.

Hmmm... you know UCE, special pleading always makes me rather suspicious.

Why do you assume that I know so little about philosophy?

[BillHoyt]

Originally posted by CWL


Hmmm... you know UCE, special pleading always makes me rather suspicious.

You too? That makes two of us. Oops, one of us. Or would that be three of us, counting the uber-alzheimer-mind.

Cheers,