What materialists must believe.

[Interesting Ian]

I contend that materialists must either reject the existence of consciousness, or alternatively conclude that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. Do you agree?

I should explain what I mean by consciousness. Basically I'm referring to phenomenology. That is to say that by consciousness I mean its subjective qualitative character. What it is like to taste ice cream; what it is like to be experiencing toothache; what it is like to experience a warm summer's day and to feel that all is right with the world, etc.

And that is all I mean by consciousness. Even if certain bodily behaviour is associated with consciousness, what I mean by consciousness is this subjective qualitative nature.

I should also explain what I mean by materialism. By materialism I mean that only the physical exists. Thus in oder for materialism to be true, then subjective qualitative states must also be physical. But what is physical? By physical I mean all that which plays some causal role (i.e fruitful role) in some scientific theory describing the world. In other words, if somethings exists, yet is not susceptible to being incorporated into some scientific theory, then it is not physical.

Further, if consciousness is taken to be basic -- that is to say that if it cannot be explained by reference to other physical entities (subatomic particles or whatever), then it is not physical. This is so even if one concludes that consciousness is created by certain physical processes. As I said consciousness must play a fruitful role in some scientific theory describing reality, or part of it. If consciousness is not causally efficacious (i.e does not play a fruitful role in some scientific theory), then consciousness is an epiphenomenon.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

There are more alternatives. Some of us have tried to explain some of them to you. Please consider reading something about "Folk Psychology".

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
There are more alternatives. Some of us have tried to explain some of them to you. Please consider reading something about "Folk Psychology".

Name those alternatives.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I should also explain what I mean by materialism. By materialism I mean that only the physical exists. Thus in oder for materialism to be true, then subjective qualitative states must also be physical. But what is physical? By physical I mean all that which plays some causal role (i.e fruitful role) in some scientific theory describing the world. In other words, if somethings exists, yet is not susceptible to being incorporated into some scientific theory, then it is not physical. One point of concern: I don't see how a materialist as you defined here could possibly believe in the existence of epiphenomena, since an epiphenomenon would be distinctly unphysical.
This leaves me with the assertion that if I am this specific kind of materialist, I cannot believe that tasting ice cream is like something (or like anything for that matter).
I don't agree with this, but it's possibly a question of what your definition of consciousness is. (I remember from the appropriately named thread (http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870584739#post1870584739), that such a definition does not exist according to you. I'm not sure if this is still the case though, since I too have done a lot of thinking because of that thread since then and evaluated and adjusted my idea of consciousness).

Edited for silly sentence structure

[Iacchus]

What the heck is an epiphenomenon?

[rharbers]

Consciousness is the faculty that percievers what exists. You canot be aware of something without someting to be aware of. Consciousness requires and is dependent on existence. Only after a consciousness is aware of something external can it identify itself.

Epiphenomenon. Consciousness, a secondary phenomenon accompanying another and caused by it? No. Consciousness is awareness.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Name those alternatives.

No! :p You always want everything pre-digested. In the last thread I pointed you to a problem, yet, you asked for reasons for my possition. Well, they were on my previous post. Sometimes you just ignore what contradicts what you believe, and you also turn around things in order for your position to remain "intact".

Not anymore Ian. I bet you can do your own homework!

[Interesting Ian]

By saying consciousness is an epiphenomenon it is meant that consciousness is caused or is a result of other processes, but that consciousness in its turn is completely causally inefficacious.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
One point of concern: I don't see how a materialist as you defined here could possibly believe in the existence of epiphenomena, since an epiphenomenon would be distinctly unphysical.


That's right. If one believes consciousness is an epiphenomenon then they are not strictly speaking a materialist.

Epiphenomenalism has formidable problems. For instance if consciousness doesn't affect anything physical, then how can we refer to it at all?

[Interesting Ian]

Let me try to make my point more clear. Consider the Earth as it orbits around the Sun. Is the Earth conscious? Does it orbit the Sun because of a desire on its part?

Presumably materialists would say not. If the Earth were conscious then this consciousness would be an epiphenomenon. This is because the Earth's behaviour can be completely described using physical laws. In other words, if the Earth is conscious, then there is no input that its consciousness is making since physical laws completely describe its behaviour. Thus if the Earth is conscious such consciousness must be an epiphenomenon.

Now consider human beings. Our behaviour -- the materialist must hold -- is completely explainable by events occurring in the brain. The events follow physical laws just as much as the Earth orbiting the Sun follows physical laws. Thus the same reasoning applies here as it does for the Earth. That is to say if human beings are conscious, then there is no input this consciousness is making. Thus if human beings are conscious such consciousness must be an epiphenomenon.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
...Now consider human beings. Our behaviour -- the materialist must hold -- is completely explainable by events occurring in the brain. The events follow physical laws just as much as the Earth orbiting the Sun follows physical laws. Thus the same reasoning applies here as it does for the Earth. That is to say if human beings are conscious, then there is no input this consciousness is making. Thus if human beings are conscious such consciousness must be an epiphenomenon. I'm not sure you realise this, but that last part states the following:

"...That is to say if human beings are both physical and conscious, then there's no non-physical input this consciousness is making, Thus if human beings are non-physically conscious, then non-physical consciousness must be an epiphenomenon."(underlines mine)

In other words, you have erected a staw man called 'epiphenomenalism' and demonstrated beyond doubt that it is indeed different from materialism.

More constructively, I get the feeling that by "input", you mean, "input uncaused by physical events". Together with this argument this means you state that deterministic consciousness is by definition not consciousness. Why? How would you tell the difference?

Edited for missing verb and cosmetics

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
I'm not sure you realise this, but that last part states the following:

"...That is to say if human beings are both physical and conscious, then there's no non-physical input this consciousness is making,



Meaning if we are physical beings, then we are not non-physical. WOW! Very profound I'm sure :rolleyes: You have a serious reading comprehension problem if you imagine I said that.



Thus if human beings are non-physically conscious, then non-physical consciousness must be an epiphenomenon."(underlines mine)



Here you are saying materialism and epiphenomenalism exhaust all the postions on the mind/body problem. Apart from being laughably absurdly wrong, you are in absolute error in imagining I said anything like this.



So no I did not say what your paragraph said. Indeed I said absolutely nothing like that. And note I also made no reference to either physicality nor non-physicality. You've even underlined them!

Your paragraph is literally gobbledegook. You've understood nothing of my post.





In other words, you have erected a staw man called 'epiphenomenalism' and demonstrated beyond doubt that it is indeed different from materialism.



You are profoundly mistaken if you believe that I invented this position. And it is different from materialism by definition. But I've already said this. Why must I continually repeat myself all the time???





More constructively, I get the feeling that by "input", you mean, "input uncaused by physical events".



I mean what I said; namely input by consciousness.



Together with this argument this means you state that deterministic consciousness is by definition not consciousness. Why? How would you tell the difference?



"Deterministic consciousness" conveys nothing to me.

You have completrely failed to address my argument. Read my argument again, and this time please try to understand it.

[Mojo]

So, not content with constructing strawmen, Ian is now demanding that people subscribe to them?

[H'ethetheth]

I'm sorry if I've misread your argument, but I'm fairly sure I did not. Let's start at the beginning:

Basically the OP states: As a materialist one must either reject consciousness (as defined by Ian), or face epiphenomenalism.
We've established that epiphenomenalism and materialism are mutually exclusive, therefore the above directly translates to:

"Materialists have no choice but to reject consciousness as defined by Ian."

If you disagree with the above interpretation, something is seriously wrong with either of us.
Now If I look in the OP, I can't find any informative indication of what you think consciousness is, other than that eating ice cream feels like exactly that.

Ah, but further down you state that Our behaviour -- the materialist must hold -- is completely explainable by events occurring in the brain.[...] Thus [...] if human beings are conscious, then there is no input this consciousness is making.So, if a person's behaviour is governed exclusively by phyisics, consciousness is not the thing that is causing this person's behaviour because physics are already doing this. Thus if this person is nevertheless conscious, she must be 'epiphenomenally' conscious.

Have I quoted you wrongly? If I've still not got this right, could somebody please tell me where my reading comprehension is lacking?

If I have got it right, this conveys to me that the kind of consciousness that is, on one hand, incompatible with physics, yet compatible with epiphenomenalism, as well as dualism and idealism, must be rejected by me, if I desire to keep my reputation of intellectual integrity when telling someone I am in fact a materialist.

Grrrrreat.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
I'm sorry if I've misread your argument, but I'm fairly sure I did not. Let's start at the beginning:

Basically the OP states: As a materialist one must either reject consciousness (as defined by Ian), or face epiphenomenalism.
We've established that epiphenomenalism and materialism are mutually exclusive, therefore the above directly translates to:

"Materialists have no choice but to reject consciousness as defined by Ian."

If you disagree with the above interpretation, something is seriously wrong with either of us.
Now If I look in the OP, I can't find any informative indication of what you think consciousness is, other than that eating ice cream feels like exactly that.

Ah, but further down you state that So, if a person's behaviour is governed exclusively by phyisics, consciousness is not the thing that is causing this person's behaviour because physics are already doing this. Thus if this person is nevertheless conscious, she must be 'epiphenomenally' conscious.

Have I quoted you wrongly? If I've still not got this right, could somebody please tell me where my reading comprehension is lacking?

If I have got it right, this conveys to me that the kind of consciousness that is, on one hand, incompatible with physics, yet compatible with epiphenomenalism, as well as dualism and idealism, must be rejected by me, if I desire to keep my reputation of intellectual integrity when telling someone I am in fact a materialist.

Grrrrreat.

All that seems to be fine, yes.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mojo
So, not content with constructing strawmen, Ian is now demanding that people subscribe to them?

What strawman have I constructed? I am asking people what they believe. I am asking if they agree with me. This has nothing whatsoever to do with strawmen.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
All that seems to be fine, yes. Well, then I voted wrongly. :D
I fully agree with your argument, although I thoroughly disagree with your idea of consciousness, which, as we've just established, I should.

[Mojo]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
What strawman have I constructed? I am asking people what they believe. I am asking if they agree with me. This has nothing whatsoever to do with strawmen. I strongly suspect that your entire definition of "materialism" is a strawman.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mojo
I strongly suspect that your entire definition of "materialsm" is a strawman.

Well, it's the kind of materialism that people tend to subscribe to nowadays; especially scientists. There's a more old fashioned type of materialism which includes the notion of material substance, but this type of materialism has no advantages over modern materialism and indeed simply creates additional difficulties.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Mojo
I strongly suspect that your entire definition of "materialism" is a strawman. Actually, Ian recently threw a summary of his idea of materialism (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&threadid=55283&highlight=materialism) before the lions here, to check before he'd incorporate it into his forthcoming(?) website. Check it out if you want to know, it's a long read though.

[Robin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Well, it's the kind of materialism that people tend to subscribe to nowadays; especially scientists.
I have yet to come across any scientist that subscribes to any materialism.

Not Stephen Hawking, who says that it is meaningless to ask if a scientific model corresponds to reality, only if it corresponds to the observation.

Not Einstein who says that we may as well replace the word 'real' with 'cock-a-doodle-doo' for all the meaning it has.

Not Ernst Mach (as in speed of sound) who says that it does not matter to science that all of reality is a dream, just so long as it is a consistent dream.

I have put this type of question to just about anybody I have met who works in science or medicine and I have never come across an out and out materialist. Well perhaps there are some, like Crick, but they appear to be a fairly small minority.

The only question you need to ask is "is consciousness random?". Well naturally the answer is no. So consciousness is due to some underlying order to our existence.

Consciousness may be partially described by some existing scientific model, some model yet to be devised or completed, or it may never be described by a scientific model - I don't really know.

I do know that materialism has nothing to do with the case, and whatever alternate (as yet unspecified) position that you hold will not answer any question or solve any problem that could not (at least potentially) be answered or solved by a scientific approach.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
Actually, Ian recently threw a summary of his idea of materialism (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&threadid=55283&highlight=materialism) before the lions here, to check before he'd incorporate it into his forthcoming(?) website. Check it out if you want to know, it's a long read though.

That's more like a traditional definition of materialism. But I intend to introduce "what science says exists" later on in the paper. It's best to take it step by step, otherwise I'll confuse my readers.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Robin
I have yet to come across any scientist that subscribes to any materialism.I actually do think I'm a materialist, though I know it doesn't matter whether stuff is matter, I just think it's only practical to call it matter.
Does that make me a physicalist?

Should we be talking about physicalism in stead?

(Luckily, I don't think this would matter to either the validity or the uninformativeness of Ian's argument.)

Anyway, please elaborate, I want to know these things.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Robin
I have yet to come across any scientist that subscribes to any materialism.

Not Stephen Hawking, who says that it is meaningless to ask if a scientific model corresponds to reality, only if it corresponds to the observation.



Ah yes, but does materialism entail scientific realism? You see the definition of materialism keeps changing. It keeps making less and less assertions as time goes by. In particular a modern minimalist materialism would declare that consciousness is of a similar type of existent to all other existents. A minimal materialism need simply claim that consciousness is susceptible to being included in our scientific theories.



Not Einstein who says that we may as well replace the word 'real' with 'cock-a-doodle-doo' for all the meaning it has.



If he did, then he's wrong. Scientific realism certainly has meaning, even if false.




Not Ernst Mach (as in speed of sound) who says that it does not matter to science that all of reality is a dream, just so long as it is a consistent dream.



That is true. Mach basically subscribed to Berkeleyianism without God. Not that he'd read about Berkeley's ideas before expounding his philosophy (or so it is believed).



I have put this type of question to just about anybody I have met who works in science or medicine and I have never come across an out and out materialist. Well perhaps there are some, like Crick, but they appear to be a fairly small minority.


WOW! You've met Crick?? :eek:



The only question you need to ask is "is consciousness random?". Well naturally the answer is no. So consciousness is due to some underlying order to our existence.



You mean like random thoughts and random emotions and random sensory experiences? Be careful here. It may not be due to some underlying order, but simply be self-imposed order.



Consciousness may be partially described by some existing scientific model, some model yet to be devised or completed, or it may never be described by a scientific model - I don't really know.



I've given my argument. Consciousness needs to be causally efficacious. But if it is then examining the physical processes in the brain and the inputs will not be sufficient to explain behaviour since consciousness also plays some role in determining our behaviour. But since consciousness cannot be known objectively (eg my emotions can never be experienced by anyone else, they are always inferred from my behaviour including spoken behaviour), it seems that going along this route simply leads to interactive dualism (although you should be aware that "interactive dualists" need not deny that consciousness has its genesis in the brain).

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
I actually do think I'm a materialist, though I know it doesn't matter whether stuff is matter, I just think it's only practical to call it matter.
Does that make me a physicalist?

Should we be talking about physicalism in stead?

(Luckily, I don't think this would matter to either the validity or the uninformativeness of Ian's argument.)

Anyway, please elaborate, I want to know these things.

You've misspelt informativeness.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
That's more like a traditional definition of materialism. But I intend to introduce "what science says exists" later on in the paper. It's best to take it step by step, otherwise I'll confuse my readers. That's physicalism right? I'm beginning to think, after also checking wikipedia on the subjects, that I am in fact a physicalist, not so much a materialist. (though wikipedia says they're almost the same). I think the difference would be ontology, right?

You've misspelt informativeness.
Yeah, sorry about that.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
That's physicalism right? I'm beginning to think, after also checking wikipedia on the subjects, that I am in fact a physicalist, not so much a materialist. (though wikipedia says they're almost the same). I think the difference would be ontology, right?


Yeah, sorry about that.

It genuinely was a mistake?? LOL

Physicalism, materialism? People use the words to mean the same thing. Really I should say physicalism rather than materialism. It's not really important though.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I've given my argument. Consciousness needs to be causally efficacious.

Sorry, it is not an argument because you lack a working model. Your theory about consciousness is what is called naive (or folk) psychology. You are not alone, of course, there are no working definitions on the word "consciousness", and of course we lack a working model of the brain. Until we do, it is absurd to discuss the topic as if we could get some real answers.

All we have is speculative.

And no, there is nothing in those speculations that leads to any form of PSI (which I guess is your ultimate goal, to demonstrate the causal efficacy of consciousness to later jump to tell that that is why PSI should be real.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
That's physicalism right? I'm beginning to think, after also checking wikipedia on the subjects, that I am in fact a physicalist, not so much a materialist. (though wikipedia says they're almost the same). I think the difference would be ontology, right?

I have argued extensibly about physicalism as a better view than materialism, with some self assumed materialists of this forum. I believe Ian is fighting a ghost, I know no materialists, well, other than some of the members of this forum. ;)

[Robin]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
I actually do think I'm a materialist, though I know it doesn't matter whether stuff is matter, I just think it's only practical to call it matter.
Does that make me a physicalist?

Should we be talking about physicalism in stead?

(Luckily, I don't think this would matter to either the validity or the uninformativeness of Ian's argument.)

Anyway, please elaborate, I want to know these things.
But what do you mean by physical? According to Ian:
But what is physical? By physical I mean all that which plays some causal role (i.e fruitful role) in some scientific theory describing the world. In other words, if somethings exists, yet is not susceptible to being incorporated into some scientific theory, then it is not physical.
The first problem is that nobody pretends that scientific theories are equal to reality. They are an approximation of some underlying order. So is that it? Is a non-physical thing something that has no underlying order - ie completely random? It is hard to imagine something that is completely without any order. How would you know about it?

The second is that anything that is at least indirectly observable is susceptible to being incorporated into some scientific theory - which would clearly include consciousness. On the other hand how can we be sure that something not observable might not be physical?

Might it not be better to give an example of something that is not physical. A mathematically described curve for example is not physical. Is that it? Consciousness is abstract? It does not sound right. You might say a thought is not physical - but that would be to assume the conclusion of the debate.

I actually doubt that anybody really knows what is meant by materialism, physicalism or for that matter realism.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
...I've given my argument. Consciousness needs to be causally efficacious...
Not at all. Merely stating it proves nothing.
According to Radical Behaviorists, nothing could be further from the truth.

[Iacchus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Epiphenomenalism has formidable problems. For instance if consciousness doesn't affect anything physical, then how can we refer to it at all? Enough said.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
I should explain what I mean by consciousness. Basically I'm referring to phenomenology. That is to say that by consciousness I mean its subjective qualitative character. What it is like to taste ice cream; what it is like to be experiencing toothache; what it is like to experience a warm summer's day and to feel that all is right with the world, etc.
...
By physical I mean all that which plays some causal role (i.e fruitful role) in some scientific theory describing the world. In other words, if somethings exists, yet is not susceptible to being incorporated into some scientific theory, then it is not physical.
...
As I said consciousness must play a fruitful role in some scientific theory describing reality, or part of it.
Are you suggesting here that it is impossible, in principle, for "what it is like to taste ice cream" to play a fruitful role in a scientific theory?

~~ Paul

[Jeff Corey]

Early psychologists of the 19th century defined psychology as the study of the structure or function of consciousness, or the mind.
They got nowhere with introspection and their lasting contributions were seen in the studies where they manipulated independent variables and carefully measured changes in behavior.
Charpentier's Illusion, demonstrated at TAM2, dates back to that time.
My point is that Ian has not presented any definition of consciousness that wouldn't provoke sniggers, giggles and titters (and an occasional "HONK?") in this 19th century group of people statistically significantly smarter than Flipper.
Or a potato.

[lifegazer]

Yes I agree with this and I am a materialist 3 20.00%
Yes I agree with this and I am not a materialist 3 20.00%
No I disagree with this and I am a materialist 5 33.33%
No I disagree with this and I am not a materialist 3 20.00%
Not sure 1 6.67%

The vote saddens me. It would be amusing if this wasn't so serious.
How can 20% of materialists (1st vote) agree with Ian and keep their beliefs?!!!!!!

How a materialist cannot see the distinction between the sense/awareness of a thing and that thing in itself (3rd vote), will bemuse me for the rest of my life!

How non-materialists can disagree with Ian (4th vote) is the biggest puzzle of them all!! LOL

Ironic that only one voter (at this point) is "not sure"!! In truth, either you know God [First-Cause] exists OR you cannot be sure of anything! Without 'God', there are no absolutes - no sureties!

I think you're flogging a dead-horse Ian. Not your ideas - the voters.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
... I should explain what I mean by consciousness. Basically I'm referring to phenomenology. That is to say that by consciousness I mean its subjective qualitative character. What it is like to taste ice cream; what it is like to be experiencing toothache; what it is like to experience a warm summer's day and to feel that all is right with the world, etc.

And that is all I mean by consciousness... It just seems to me that "what it is like" springs from an evolutionary process. An amoeba makes an assessment of a salty environment and knows it is not like the unsalty environment he experienced moments ago. Behaviorally he recoils everytime he meets something like a salty envioronment. It seems very much an affirmation of the physicality of the "consciousness" of like.

I agree with Robin's posts. The experience of the physical world is very real. That experience includes my own emotions and thoughts. It is not important to me to deny the physical universe because I can think about it.

If forced to choose, I would always come down on the physical side of the argument. I'm convinced that I am in the world's subset. I seem to manipulate a tiny facsimle of part of existence in what is my consciousness.

How is it possible? Details aren't known. It happens though. Like flipping the electric switch. I don't have to know about power generation to appreciate that I have light.

My guess is that the physical electro-chemical brain state required a feedback mechanism to "know" if this moment is like the previous moment. Up from the amoeba, to aid in survival, better and better feedback mechanisms emerged.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by lifegazer
[ ...I think you're flogging a dead-horse Ian. Not your ideas - the voters.
You are accusing him of being a sadistic, bestialistic necrophile?
Make it a foal, you can add a pedophile to the list.
Just horsing around.
(What's Up, Liger Tilly)

[Robin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Ah yes, but does materialism entail scientific realism?
Well since my point was that scientists are not, in general, materialists then the question is not rrelevant.
If he did, then he's wrong. Scientific realism certainly has meaning, even if false.
So what do you think that 'real' means? Can you give an example of something that is not real. A dream? An artificial flower? Santa Claus? If you think about it, the things that science studies must be real, if reality has any meaning at all. Hawking thinks it has no meaning. Einstien thought it had no meaning outside of a purely pragmatic one - which is probably what most scientists mean by scientific realism.
That is true. Mach basically subscribed to Berkeleyianism without God. Not that he'd read about Berkeley's ideas before expounding his philosophy (or so it is believed).
He didn't subscribe to any Idealist philosophy, merely pointed out that if it were so it would not concern science one way or another. In fact his ideas are pretty much the forerunner to modern philosophies of science, which might loosely be described as positivist (or maybe structuralist).
You mean like random thoughts and random emotions and random sensory experiences?
No, I am merely pointing out that random consciousness is a contradiction. We could not think unless there were some kind of order underlying our thought processes. 'Random thought' is a figure of speech, but a literally random thought is an impossibility
Be careful here. It may not be due to some underlying order, but simply be self-imposed order.
I don't know what you are saying here. Is it possible for thought to precede order? That a thought can exist on nothing, or on chaos and impose order on itself? I suppose anything is possible but it would seem a more likely scenario that thought was dependent on order and not vice-versa. If that is what you are saying then you are simply interchanging the meanings of 'thought' and 'order'.
I've given my argument. Consciousness needs to be causally efficacious. But if it is then examining the physical processes in the brain and the inputs will not be sufficient to explain behaviour since consciousness also plays some role in determining our behaviour. But since consciousness cannot be known objectively (eg my emotions can never be experienced by anyone else, they are always inferred from my behaviour including spoken behaviour), it seems that going along this route simply leads to interactive dualism (although you should be aware that "interactive dualists" need not deny that consciousness has its genesis in the brain).
But if consciousness cannot be known objectively and everything is known through consciousness then nothing can be known objectively. We believe in the objective world because that is the (very reasonable) conclusion our consciousness comes to. So consciousness cannot be said to be in a different class to anything else that is studied by science. Science often studies things that cannot be directly observed - for example the past is not directly observable, but science can tell us about things that happened a million years ago. Consciousness is indirectly observable which brings it into the purview of science.

So if 'physical' means something that can be incorporated into a scientific theory, and science deals with any phenomena that are at least indirectly observable - then by your own definition consciousness is physical.

But I know a great deal about what you don't believe - I don't think I have ever heard what you do believe.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by Robin
..

No, I am merely pointing out that random consciousness is a contradiction. We could not think unless there were some kind of order underlying our thought processes. 'Random thought' is a figure of speech, but a literally random thought is an impossibility...
Maybe yes/ maybe no.

But if consciousness cannot be known objectively and everything is known through consciousness then nothing can be known objectively. .
Hello Bruce. G'Day.
First day here at the Philosophy Department at the University of Woolamaroo?
I bleve you're in the Anomalies and Silly Things Department, right down the hall.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Robin

The first problem is that nobody pretends that scientific theories are equal to reality.



This is not relevant to my argument.

I don't know how to address this because your very point suggests that you've understood nothing of my points. The same goes for you too Bodhi Dharma Zen.

It doesn't matter whether our theories are reality itself, a map of reality, or simply instruments to predict the patterns in our qualia. Whatever ontological status such entities may have that are employed in our scientific theories, consciousness needs to have the same ontological status in order to be considered physical.

And that's it. Is consciousness the same characteristic ontological thing/process as tables, trees, electrons, higgs bosons or up quarks etc etc?

(and BTW, I suspect the eliminitivist materialists say that consciousness is a theory which does not really exist, in the same sense that instrumentalists say that elementary particles do not really exist even though such particles play fruitful roles in our theories. I don't KNOW if this is their position though. I'm just guessing. I can't be bothered to read such nonsense)



They are an approximation of some underlying order.



Not according to your scientist heroes whom you quoted.




So is that it? Is a non-physical thing something that has no underlying order - ie completely random?



No, as I keep repeating, a non-physical thing is that whose reality is not wholly constituted by the causal role it plays in some scientific theory.




The second is that anything that is at least indirectly observable is susceptible to being incorporated into some scientific theory - which would clearly include consciousness. On the other hand how can we be sure that something not observable might not be physical?




There really is no such thing as indirectly observable. All observation is of the same status. If you look through a glass window at an object, are you indirectly observing it?

I'm not going to go through the whole of the philosophy of science. It's an extremely complex and involved subject. Really, if you wish to discuss such things you really should get some nodding acquaintance with it.

I'll just say this. All physical things are either wholly defined by some scientific theory or some possible scientific theory. Scientific theories are purely concerned with chains of physical causes and effects, and a link, or a pattern of links, in the chain of causes and effects is labelled some entity or other. But phenomenology is specifically not understood by its causal power. My experience of greenness for example is not constituted by any causal power it may have, even if it is causally efficacious.

I have little hope of being understood here!



Might it not be better to give an example of something that is not physical.



Only consciousness and its properties are not physical (and selves as well of course).



A mathematically described curve for example is not physical.



Either its a curve you're describing which exists in reality -- in which case it is physical, or it is nothing more than mathematics.




Is that it? Consciousness is abstract?



No it's not.



It does not sound right. You might say a thought is not physical - but that would be to assume the conclusion of the debate.



But I have provided an argument which justifies this. I am not stating it as a premise!

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Robin
[Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Ah yes, but does materialism entail scientific realism?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Robin
Well since my point was that scientists are not, in general, materialists then the question is not rrelevant.


But you justified them not being materialists by saying they are not scientific realists! So how can me saying that materialism and a denial of scientific realism are not mutually exclusive possibly be irrelevant??

Arrrgh!

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Are you suggesting here that it is impossible, in principle, for "what it is like to taste ice cream" to play a fruitful role in a scientific theory?

~~ Paul

That's right.

Or even an ice creamy role.

[Robin]

[/i]Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos [/i]
Are you suggesting here that it is impossible, in principle, for "what it is like to taste ice cream" to play a fruitful role in a scientific theory?

~~ Paul
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
That's right.

Or even an ice creamy role.
So is this written in stone somewhere, or maybe in a big old book, what science may or may not study?

Or is it just II's say so?

[Robin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No, as I keep repeating, a non-physical thing is that whose reality is not wholly constituted by the causal role it plays in some scientific theory.
Can you name something whose reality is wholly constituted by the causal role it plays in some scientific theory? Lifegazer, feel free to chip in and help.

So by this definition (which seems to be evolving) nothing that we know of is physical and again consciousness cannot be said to be of a different class to anything else science studies.

[Robin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
But you justified them not being materialists by saying they are not scientific realists! So how can me saying that materialism and a denial of scientific realism are not mutually exclusive possibly be irrelevant??

Arrrgh!
Actually I didn't mention scientific realism, which is something else. Very loosely it is to accept 'reality' as a working definition (although there appear to be a number of usages out there).

Two of the scientists mentioned simply questioned that reality was a meaningful concept. I don't see how you can be a materialist (of any type) when you question the validity of the concept of reality.

And the third I mentioned referred directly to the philosophy of idealism.

The full Einstein quote was:
Albert Einstein, letter to Moritz Schlick 1918, quoted in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"The physical world is real." That is supposed to be the fundamental hypothesis. What does "hypothesis" mean here? For me, a hypothesis is a statement, whose truth must be assumed for the moment, but whose meaning must be raised above all ambiguity. The above statement appears to me, however, to be, in itself, meaningless, as if one said: "The physical world is cock-a-doodle-doo." It appears to me that the "real" is an intrinsically empty, meaningless category (pigeon hole), whose monstrous importance lies only in the fact that I can do certain things in it and not certain others. This division is, to be sure, not an arbitrary one, but instead ….
I concede that the natural sciences concern the "real," but I am still not a realist.
So a scientific realist, but not a realist.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Robin
Can you name something whose reality is wholly constituted by the causal role it plays in some scientific theory? Lifegazer, feel free to chip in and help.

So by this definition (which seems to be evolving) nothing that we know of is physical and again consciousness cannot be said to be of a different class to anything else science studies.

If something is not wholly constituted by its causal role, then you are saying there are aspects to it which are not causally efficacious. But if they are not causally efficacious they cannot therefore affect the world. If they do not at all affect the world, then we could never know about such aspects.

[Robin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If something is not wholly constituted by its causal role, then you are saying there are aspects to it which are not causally efficacious. But if they are not causally efficacious they cannot therefore affect the world. If they do not at all affect the world, then we could never know about such aspects.
Ah, bait and switch! Let me quote your original definition:
Originally posted by Interesting Ian (my italics)
No, as I keep repeating, a non-physical thing is that whose reality is not wholly constituted by the causal role it plays in some scientific theory.
Somehow that very key phrase "in some scientific theory" got lost. Again (as I keep repeating), a scientific model is not reality, it is simply a mathematical model that matches certain observations. So let me correct your statement to put the phrase back:
If something is not wholly constituted by its causal role in some scientific theory, then you are saying there are aspects to it which are not causally efficacious in that scientific theory.
But your next sentence does not make sense in the light of your original definition:
But if they are not causally efficacious in some scientific theory they cannot therefore affect the world.
Not so, if something has aspects that are not fully described in some scientific theory then they might still affect the world. It is just that the scientific theory is not complete (and none so far is).

If you mean that a non-physical thing is that whose reality could never be wholly constituted by a causal role in any possible scientific theory then I would have to say that you are in no position to say what might or might not be eventually described by science. As I have said consciousness is indirectly observable as many things in science are, so it falls within the purview of science.

[Robin]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
Hello Bruce. G'Day.
First day here at the Philosophy Department at the University of Woolamaroo?
I bleve you're in the Anomalies and Silly Things Department, right down the hall.
If you mean the University of Woolloomooloo I'm in charge of Logical Positivism. However to address your quote:
Originally posted by Jeff Corey
I bleve ... in ... Silly Things ... right.
You're definitely in the right place then.

[Jeff Corey]

It might not be, it could be just another next to the other place.
Firesign Theatre, Anyone?
"Oh, Dick, look at that."
"Nancy?"

[jay gw]

If this is the definition of Epiphenomenalism in a nutshell:

It is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process.

...then how can anyone be morally responsible for their actions?

[Robin]

Originally posted by jay gw
If this is the definition of Epiphenomenalism in a nutshell:

It is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process.

...then how can anyone be morally responsible for their actions?
I'm sorry, who was this addressed to? Are there any epiphenomalists here?

[Robin]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
It might not be, it could be just another next to the other place.
Firesign Theatre, Anyone?
"Oh, Dick, look at that."
"Nancy?"
(blank look)

[Loki]

I believe that Ian is epiphenomenial to this Forum ...

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
It might not be, it could be just another next to the other place.
Firesign Theatre, Anyone?
"Oh, Dick, look at that."
"Nancy?" Originally posted by Robin
(blank look)
Nancy?

The thoughts came rushing back like the hot kiss at the end of a wet fist.
<blockquote>"Oh Tom, Tom look at it spin - It's going in and out like anything."

"And to think, all I had to do was put the balls on the other side."

"Oh Tom, Those balls will mean your fortune."

"I think I'll patent it and name it after Nancy."

"What?? You mean pushover?"

"Yes! Because that's what she does!"</blockquote>

:) My favorite quotes about Nancy :)

[Robin]

Originally posted by Atlas

Nancy?

The thoughts came rushing back like the hot kiss at the end of a wet fist.
<blockquote>"Oh Tom, Tom look at it spin - It's going in and out like anything."

"And to think, all I had to do was put the balls on the other side."

"Oh Tom, Those balls will mean your fortune."

"I think I'll patent it and name it after Nancy."

"What?? You mean pushover?"

"Yes! Because that's what she does!"<blockquote>

:) My favorite quotes about Nancy :)
(same blank look)

[Jeff Corey]

Nick Danger, Third Eye.
"Hello, Mr. Danger."
"Rocky Rococo! What the hay!"
"Actually, that's straw. The last straw. Now let me show you this."
"A pickle?"

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It genuinely was a mistake?? LOLI was attempting humour, as I assumed you were.

Robin Said:
I actually doubt that anybody really knows what is meant by materialism, physicalism or for that matter realism.God! Why do these people make it so complicated?

Lifegazer added
The vote saddens me. It would be amusing if this wasn't so serious.
How can 20% of materialists (1st vote) agree with Ian and keep their beliefs?!!!!!!As I agreed with Ian, His statement boiled down to: "As a materialist or physicalist (or whatever the term is at Woolloomooloo), it is impossible to believe in consciousness that is incompatible with physical causation of behaviour." This, needless to say (I hope), is very true, and very uninteresting.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I said:
Are you suggesting here that it is impossible, in principle, for "what it is like to taste ice cream" to play a fruitful role in a scientific theory?
Ian said:
That's right.
Interesting. How about "what it is like to feel so angry that you want to kill someone"? Can that play a fruitful role in a scientific theory?

Perhaps what you are saying is that "being so angry ..." can play a fruitful role, but that "feeling so angry ..." does not. If so, what is the difference between anger and feeling angry?

~~ Paul

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by jay gw
...then how can anyone be morally responsible for their actions?

Thats easy. No one is. The "responsability" is a religious concept, that made it to the courts. It should dissapear very soon, as neurosciences demonstrate how the brain works.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Interesting. How about "what it is like to feel so angry that you want to kill someone"? Can that play a fruitful role in a scientific theory?

Perhaps what you are saying is that "being so angry ..." can play a fruitful role, but that "feeling so angry ..." does not. If so, what is the difference between anger and feeling angry?

~~ Paul

No, as I keep saying our consciousnesses cannot play any role in a scientific theory. If consciousness is causally efficacious then we have to retreat to interactive dualism at a minimum.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No, as I keep saying our consciousnesses cannot play any role in a scientific theory. If consciousness is causally efficacious then we have to retreat to interactive dualism at a minimum.
Yes and no.
A scientific theory of behavior exists without appeal to mentalistic concepts such as consciousness, intent, will, etc.
So there is no need for any kind of idealism at all.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If something is not wholly constituted by its causal role, then you are saying there are aspects to it which are not causally efficacious. But if they are not causally efficacious they cannot therefore affect the world. If they do not at all affect the world, then we could never know about such aspects.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Ah, bait and switch!



{sighs}





Let me quote your original definition:



Are there any others?



quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian (my italics)
No, as I keep repeating, a non-physical thing is that whose reality is not wholly constituted by the causal role it plays in some scientific theory.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Somehow that very key phrase "in some scientific theory" got lost. Again (as I keep repeating), a scientific model is not reality, it is simply a mathematical model that matches certain observations. So let me correct your statement to put the phrase back:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If something is not wholly constituted by its causal role in some scientific theory, then you are saying there are aspects to it which are not causally efficacious in that scientific theory.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


But your next sentence does not make sense in the light of your original definition:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
But if they are not causally efficacious in some scientific theory they cannot therefore affect the world.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Not so, if something has aspects that are not fully described in some scientific theory then they might still affect the world. It is just that the scientific theory is not complete (and none so far is).



No no no no no. Consciousness cannot be accommodated by any scientific theory because consciousness is not exclusively constituted by its causal role.



If you mean that a non-physical thing is that whose reality could never be wholly constituted by a causal role in any possible scientific theory then I would have to say that you are in no position to say what might or might not be eventually described by science.



But we are in a position to say it can never be accommodated by science because science is exclusively concerned with function i.e causal chains. But consciousness is not understood exclusively by any causal role it may have.

This thread has also turned into a complete waste of time.

I just keep repeating myself all the time. Time after time after time. like I always do.

Anyone want to ask me anymore questions then please refer to the my previous posts. Nobody ever seems to raise objections to my arguments in any thread which I have not already comprehensively addressed in the first page of the relevant thread.

[Robin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
This thread has also turned into a complete waste of time.

I just keep repeating myself all the time. Time after time after time. like I always do.
For once we are in complete agreement. Instead of taking time to read and understand the objections you just keep repeating yourself all the time. Time after time. Like you always do.

For example:
No no no no no. Consciousness cannot be accommodated by any scientific theory because consciousness is not exclusively constituted by its causal role.
But as I keep asking time after time, where is it written what can or cannot be accommodated by a scientific theory? The only test of this is whether or not someone can accommodate it in a scientific theory.

But here is an idea. Instead of endlessly telling us what you don't believe. Tell us what you do believe. For example, what is the mind, if it is not the result of electro-chemical activity in the brain.

[Robin]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
God! Why do these people make it so complicated?
Actually it simplifies everything a great deal when you realise that there is no precise definition for material and physical.

But you tell me, what is the simple definition for physical that you use?
As I agreed with Ian, His statement boiled down to: "As a materialist or physicalist (or whatever the term is at Woolloomooloo), it is impossible to believe in consciousness that is incompatible with physical causation of behaviour." This, needless to say (I hope), is very true, and very uninteresting.
Actually I thought Ian was saying the opposite - I thought he was saying that a materialist must either believe there is no consciousness or consciousness does not cause behaviour.

By the way you wanted to use the terms materialist and physicalist so don't drag Woolloomooloo into it where we don't think they have any meaning.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Ok, you asked for it. You should note that you repeat yourself because you do not want to advance, and you do not want to be aware of the flaws on your reasoning. Or do you honestly believe that no one here can understand you because we are "less intelligent"? (I do not want to believe that you are as arrogant as lg).

What is the meaning of the word "existence"? How do you know if something "exists"? Are there any requisites?

Lets consider one thing that "exists" and yet is "not susceptible" of being incorporated in some crude materialist theory:

Value.

Whats the value of a coin?

Wouldnt you agree in that the concept is absurd if there are no complex organisms living in large societies that need some form of economy?

I would say that consciousness is like value, something that only have meaning (and existence) in complex societies. No there is nothing like "a soul" and nothing like the value of a coin if there are no humans around.

Think about it.

[Loki]

Bodhi Dharma Zen,

(jay gw wrote):...then how can anyone be morally responsible for their actions?

(Zen wrote):Thats easy. No one is. The "responsability" is a religious concept, that made it to the courts. It should dissapear very soon, as neurosciences demonstrate how the brain works.

Actually, responsibility is only possible if you abandon Ian's concept of 'Self'. It's Ian's assertion that at the moment he has to make a decision whether to rob or not rob that little old lady standing in front of him he is "free" to choose, unencumbered by the past. That nothing he has done in his life before has any effect on what his decision will be, and that he can truly decide either way. In what sense then can the decision, whatever it is, be said to "reflect Ian"? To be HIS, the decision must be part of him, yet he insists that such a decision can be made in either direction free from any constraint or mechanistic behaviour.

Responsibility comes from the ability to say "only that person, with that history, makes that decision". There is no responsibilty if Ian's inexplicable and incomprenhensible "Will/Self" exists.

[Robin]

It really all seems quite simple to me. We have consciousness if for no other reason than consciousness is the word coined to describe what we have. Consciousness is one of the causes of behaviour, otherwise why do we have it? No point in the monitor without a keyboard or mouse.

We don't fully understand consciousness, may never understand it, scientifically or otherwise, but that does not have any profound philosophical implications.

Materialism is meaningless - as Ian says it keeps changing meaning. Basically because science keeps changing - so if you define physical in terms of science you have to accept it as a moving target.

And physicalism means something again - go look up A.J Ayers 'Philosophy in the 20th Century" - there is a whole chapter on it. You may be surprised that it doesn't mean what it sounds like it should mean.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
any[/i] scientific theory because consciousness is not exclusively constituted by its causal role. Probability seems scientific. Marketing research pays close attention to peoples behaviors based on underlying assumptions of consciousness.

The choices of packaging colors are made to be pleasing to the majority of consumers.

Advertising pitches are made to people who are not in comas.

TV commercials are made to get your attention so that you will be receptive to their message. They are targeted toward audiences they believe are awake.

I think these marketing researchers believe they are engaged in science. What makes you belive they don't care, or cannot consider whether, or don't hypothesize when their audience is conscious.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Atlas
Probability seems scientific. Marketing research pays close attention to peoples behaviors based on underlying assumptions of consciousness.

The choices of packaging colors are made to be pleasing to the majority of consumers.

Advertising pitches are made to people who are not in comas.

TV commercials are made to get your attention so that you will be receptive to their message. They are targeted toward audiences they believe are awake.

I think these marketing researchers believe they are engaged in science. What makes you belive they don't care, or cannot consider whether, or don't hypothesize when their audience is conscious.

Sorry I meant science in its original sense. Reductionist science. Obviously the soft sciences start of by assuming the existence of consciousness and so they are irrelevant to the question we are discussing here. The question being asked is whether consciousness can be derived from physical processes. For materialism to be true consciousness would seem to be have to be reducible to physics. Unless anyone can name any phenomena other than consciousness which is genuinely emergent?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Loki
[B]Bodhi Dharma Zen,



Actually, responsibility is only possible if you abandon Ian's concept of 'Self'. It's Ian's assertion that at the moment he has to make a decision whether to rob or not rob that little old lady standing in front of him he is "free" to choose, unencumbered by the past. That nothing he has done in his life before has any effect on what his decision will be, and that he can truly decide either way.



The latter is true, the former certainly not. The decision depends on many many factors, and it would be absurd to suggest that former experiences have no influence on ones decision. Moreover to a being who knew me sufficiently well, my actions might well be wholly predictable. I'm afraid though that this gives no hope to those who suppose we are mere machines behaving according to physical laws.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Robin


But as I keep asking time after time, where is it written what can or cannot be accommodated by a scientific theory? The only test of this is whether or not someone can accommodate it in a scientific theory.

[/B]

Let's suppose for the sake of argument that a boulder rolling down a hill is conscious. How do you imagine any scientific theory could explain its consciousness?

It's the same for human beings.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Moreover to a being who knew me sufficiently well, my actions might well be wholly predictable. I'm afraid though that this gives no hope to those who suppose we are mere machines behaving according to physical laws.

Nonsense!!

I can predict, with more than reasonable accuracy, that you will continue to post here, furthermore, that you will persist in believing in PSI. :D So, did you noticed how easy is to predict you?

BTW, does this makes me a candidate for the million?

[Robin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Sorry I meant science in its original sense. Reductionist science. ... For materialism to be true consciousness would seem to be have to be reducible to physics. Unless anyone can name any phenomena other than consciousness which is genuinely emergent?
Is there a way to even get you to even to question your ingrained assumption about science? If I try then I am only repeating myself.

Science does not take something we observe and reduce it to what we already know. Science tries to expand what we know in order to understand what we observe.

If there is something that is not reducible to physics, then clearly physics is inadequate and must be expanded. And it is expanded all the time.

If consciousness has this property that you call emergence which makes it different from any other phenomena then that would seem to be a good reason to study it, rather than a reason not to study it.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
... The question being asked is whether consciousness can be derived from physical processes. For materialism to be true consciousness would seem to be have to be reducible to physics. Unless anyone can name any phenomena other than consciousness which is genuinely emergent? You don't deny that a brain surgeon could in a single or 5 separate operations eliminate your senses of touch, taste, hearing, smell, and sight.

Even without eliminating the senses a surgeon could render someone unconscious by physical invasion of the brain without bringing death.

I think a scientific theory of the way the brain works medically contains a theory of consciousness in the sense of it being a condition of a healthy brain that can be affected with surgery or drugs.

I know your question isn't looking in that direction but how do you get around the fact that these physical manipulations cause these affects?

[Loki]

Ian,

The decision depends on many many factors, and it would be absurd to suggest that former experiences have no influence on ones decision.
Glad to see you've admited this...

Moreover to a being who knew me sufficiently well, my actions might well be wholly predictable
By "wholly predictable" do you mean "100% guaranteed to be correct, without possibility of failure?". Does this predicatability only apply to "big issues" like robbing old ladies, or could a 'sufficiently informed' person extend this predictability into all decisions you make?

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Robin
Actually it simplifies everything a great deal when you realise that there is no precise definition for material and physical.

But you tell me, what is the simple definition for physical that you use? Errr, good question...

I'd say the physical to me means the...

the...

...I need to think about this.

God! Why are these things so complicated?:hit:

Actually I thought Ian was saying the opposite - I thought he was saying that a materialist must either believe there is no consciousness or consciousness does not cause behaviour.Certainly not the opposite. I admit I did use two negatives in that sentence, but you'll see it's mostly the same. Let me explain:
In my first reply I asked Ian if it was really an "either or question", because epiphenomenalism could be discarded beforehand in my opinion. This left only the option to not believe in consciousness-as-defined-by-Ian, which turned out to be a kind of consciousness that was incompatible with physical causation of behaviour. So in effect, and I asked him if this was really what he was saying, Ian states that materialists cannot possibly believe in consciousness as he thinks of it, namely that it is incompatible with physical causation of behaviour.

I'd guess he's right.

By the way you wanted to use the terms materialist and physicalist so don't drag Woolloomooloo into it where we don't think they have any meaning. I was assuming they had a clear definition, and never really worried about the precise definition and thought it might serve as a nice handle for conversation.
Then you come along and ask nasty questions just after I've watched Armageddon, possibly the dumbest film I've ever seen (and I've seen 'Godzilla vs. Space Godzilla').
I'll readily admit I'm in over my head here. A little patience please, I'm just an engineer, so this kind of thing takes time. I think maybe tomorrow I will have thought about this enough to write down something vaguely coherent.

Thanks though, and good night.

Edited to specify reference to Ian

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Robin
Science does not take something we observe and reduce it to what we already know. Science tries to expand what we know in order to understand what we observe.

In the end, what Ian wants (IMO) is to introduce a doubt regarding the "impossibility" of science to deal with PSI, and he needs to "prove" that PSI is real because its the way to "prove" a soul, who is causally efficacious, even when its "immaterial".

[Robin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Let's suppose for the sake of argument that a boulder rolling down a hill is conscious. How do you imagine any scientific theory could explain its consciousness?

It's the same for human beings.
If it's consciousness was undetectable then science could not study it, and that is entirely consistent with what I have said.

But our consciousness is not undetectable, we are not boulders rolling down a hill. Consciousness is a causal factor in behaviour and science often studies the effects of things that cannot be directly observed (events in the past for example) in order to draw conclusions about the thing itself. And part of that behaviour is that people can answer questions about their own consciousness. That alone would be enough for science to study it, but we have one huge advantage - we can each observe our own consciousness. It is not an unreasonable inference that another person's experience of consciousness is broadly similar to our own.

And as I said, if our current physics turns out to be inadequate to explain consciousness physicists will seek to expand physics as they do every time physics turns out to be inadequate to explain something.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
No, as I keep saying our consciousnesses cannot play any role in a scientific theory. If consciousness is causally efficacious then we have to retreat to interactive dualism at a minimum.
Interesting. Therefore, if I feel so angry that I want to kill someone and then do, it is not because I was feeling angry.

What is the difference between anger and feeling angry?

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
Sorry I meant science in its original sense. Reductionist science. Obviously the soft sciences start of by assuming the existence of consciousness and so they are irrelevant to the question we are discussing here. The question being asked is whether consciousness can be derived from physical processes. For materialism to be true consciousness would seem to be have to be reducible to physics. Unless anyone can name any phenomena other than consciousness which is genuinely emergent?
This is silly. If I say that weather is an emergent property of physics and chemistry, you will say "Oh no, I can imagine how we'd reduce weather to those things." But if I say the same thing about the pile of brain activities that we call consciousness, you'll say "I cannot imagine how we can reduce consciousness to physics." You expect us to agree to define the idea of an emergent property based on the limitations of your imagination.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Atlas
You don't deny that a brain surgeon could in a single or 5 separate operations eliminate your senses of touch, taste, hearing, smell, and sight.

Even without eliminating the senses a surgeon could render someone unconscious by physical invasion of the brain without bringing death.

I think a scientific theory of the way the brain works medically contains a theory of consciousness in the sense of it being a condition of a healthy brain that can be affected with surgery or drugs.

I know your question isn't looking in that direction but how do you get around the fact that these physical manipulations cause these affects?

Are you saying that consciousness is physical or not? If you're just talking about a one way action ie brain states affect conscious states, and never conscious states affect brain states, then this is epiphenomenalism.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Let's suppose for the sake of argument that a boulder rolling down a hill is conscious. How do you imagine any scientific theory could explain its consciousness?

It's the same for human beings.
So far as I can tell, no one has ever picked up on the point you make with this statement, or if they have, they've gone on to ignore it. ;)

[Robin]

Originally posted by hammegk
So far as I can tell, no one has ever picked up on the point you make with this statement, or if they have, they've gone on to ignore it. ;)
I did not ignore it. My response is on the previous page, just after Ian posted this.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Robin
....
But our consciousness is not undetectable, we are not boulders rolling down a hill. ....
II agrees, and so do I. If you are not a not-materialist, how can you agree?

[Mojo]

Originally posted by hammegk
So far as I can tell, no one has ever picked up on the point you make with this statement, or if they have, they've gone on to ignore it. ;) So far as I can tell, no one has ever picked up on any point you have ever made, or if they have, they've gone on to ignore it. ;)

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Let's suppose for the sake of argument that a boulder rolling down a hill is conscious. How do you imagine any scientific theory could explain its consciousness?

It's the same for human beings. I think this is true.

So far as I know there is no theory of consciousness postulated by science concerning dead humans rolling down hills.

I wonder why science doesn't look into the consciousness of the dead. Oh yah, They're dead. Science assumes consciousness inhabits living entities and does not inhabit dead rolling things.

ETA: Do Idealists (Subjective or Objective) explain/assume unliving material consciousness.

I suppose you believe in ghosts (immaterial consciousness) - the ghosts of dead humans anyway. What about the ghosts of insects. Weren't the living insects conscious according to Ian's OP. Don't flys like ice cream?

I also assume you cannot be animists. You cannot believe the mountain is conscious (material consciousness) because of your idea of the physical world in general.

Isn't the rolling boulder problematic for Idealists?

I'm asking. I'd like to know the answer.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Are you saying that consciousness is physical or not? If you're just talking about a one way action ie brain states affect conscious states, and never conscious states affect brain states, then this is epiphenomenalism. In this post (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870959499#post1870959499) on page 1 I dealt directly with the question of consciousness as described in your opening post.

It's a fascinating question for me. I've adopted a pragmatic posture that frees me from these labels I admit I do not understand.

I assume consciousness is an evolutionary product. I don't fully understand how my liver and my spleen work. That my brain pumps a different fluid, thought, is something I've come to accept.

I admit that IDEA and consciousness are pretty interesting but what about urine. Doesn't it kinda disappear without causing too much. The body creates it, focusses it, promotes it, and then it's gone. For you, as a subjective idealist isn't it illusionary. Isn't dream and urine made of the same stuff to you?

[Robin]

Originally posted by hammegk
II agrees, and so do I. If you are not a not-materialist, how can you agree?
The important thing appears to be, not whether consciousness is a partial cause of behaviour, but whether something else in turn is causing consciousness.

I find it difficult to believe that this complex system of thought, decision, model building, emoting etc... somehow exists on ... absolutely nothing!

I am sorry, I find it hard to believe - when I see structure I look for infrastructure - some underlying order at least. So even if the mind is not ultimately dependent on the laws of physics (whatever they might turn out to be) it seems impossible that it is not dependent on the laws of something.

I have made this point a number of times and the not-materialists have either ignored it, dodged it, or somehow twisted it to mean something else. Maybe I am not expressing myself well but that is the best I can put it.

But it demonstrates (to me at least) that the problem has nothing whatsoever to do with materialism. A conscious decision can be a cause of behaviour, but what does it mean to say that the decision itself is uncaused?

[pmurray]

Originally posted by jay gw
If this is the definition of Epiphenomenalism in a nutshell:

It is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process.

...then how can anyone be morally responsible for their actions?

That is not my understanding. I woulds say that "neurons buzzing" and "me thinking" are different ways of saying the same thing; just like "a sequence of IP packets", "a TCP connection", "and FTP session", "a download of 'The Rights of Man'" are different ways of saying the same thing. There is not a temporal cause and effect, but a formal one (in the sense of Aristotle's four causes).

Perhaps the materialis POV, in this sense, is the denial of "final" causes. That neurons do not fire in order that we might think.

[pmurray]

I can build a machine that can add two numbers to produce the sum. It does not have to be electronic - we can make it out of paddle-pop sticks, rubber bands, and baling twine if you like. It undeniably produces an addition - the binary sum of two binary numbers.

Now, where dose this faculty of "being able to add" reside? Is it a separate thing from the device? Is it off in some platonic or spiritual "dimension"? Is it prior to the device itself?

If a boulder, to use your analogy, could perform a sixteen-bit binary addition, would we need to resort to a nonmaterial explanation of it?

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Let's suppose for the sake of argument that a boulder rolling down a hill is conscious. How do you imagine any scientific theory could explain its consciousness?

It's the same for human beings. I think the only trouble in describing people as boulders rolling down a hill may be that, if they do so, they do so in a stupefyingly complicated way. But I do not see where one would get the knowledge to dismiss beforehand that they are doing exactly that.

Edited to add: And of course, if they are doing exactly that, consciousness might be scientifically defined as the physical process that makes us not roll down hill quite like one might expect from a bag of organs.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Robin
Actually it simplifies everything a great deal when you realise that there is no precise definition for material and physical.

But you tell me, what is the simple definition for physical that you use? I must admit that, overnight, I've only been able to come up with slightly circular and/or slightly vague definitions.
I'm pretty sure I don't want it to mean "whatever current scientific theory says", so I ended up with things like: 'All things that scientific theory may conceivably ever encompass'. Which is admittedly very vague.

That'll learn me!

Also, when re-reading your reaction on my comment of why "these people make this so complicated", it occurred to me you may have taken it the wrong way. I didn't want to imply that I had a simple answer, but more to make someone please explain to me what the hell I'm talking about and what I should have been talking about.

But you've probably figured that out by now.

Edited for cosmetics

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Robin
Actually it simplifies everything a great deal when you realise that there is no precise definition for material and physical.



Of course there is!

Existence that is physical is defined by logical quantitative relationships. If there is a type of existence that does not posses logical relationships, it is not physical.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Robin


If there is something that is not reducible to physics, then clearly physics is inadequate and must be expanded. And it is expanded all the time.

Can you name a time when physics was expanded to include concepts that are not defined by logical relationships?

[H'ethetheth]

I'm just going to sit back and learn for a while if you don't mind.

Carry on.:D

[P.S.A.]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Let's suppose for the sake of argument that a boulder rolling down a hill is conscious. How do you imagine any scientific theory could explain its consciousness?

It's the same for human beings.

<hammegk/Iacchus mode ON> Let's suppose for the sake of argument that all the arguments of the immaterialists always resolve down to being a simple quest to feel themselves more important than rocks... ;) <hammegk/Iacchus mode OFF>

Honestly, what a ridiculous argument: it's literally the Pink Unicorn argument, dressed up in one's own sense of self importance. "I can imagine a pink unicorn, so how would science explain that?". Well, show us a clearly pink horse with a horn, and Science will start tackling the question, obviously... It might take a while, some questions it may never answer, and some answers it may give may not be the ones you want, but Science tries to explain what is there, not what you can imagine might be. And until you provide that unicorn or conscious stone, your comments about what Science might say are worthless. It says nothing, and won't, until there's something to talk about

Am I being a bit completely dismissive of this supposedly brilliant argument? Damn right, and with good reason. Because Ian is monsterously hypocritical in making it. Observe: He wants to argue that it might be possible for something to be conscious, but which we cannot observe. How do we know that boulder isn't thinking to itself as it rolls down to the hill, but is unable to express this to us in any way?

Well, quite apart from the fact that this goes against Ian's own argument, which is that Free Will is required before something can be classed as truly conscious, thus the boulder CANNOT be conscious in the way he means anyway, there's an even better example he could have used, but he didn't because of his own prejudices.

Remember when he made a prejudicial assumption about my own attitudes to animal cruelty, but then tried to justify his own eating of fish by claiming they were a lower order of animal? Yet fish exhibit the same basic choice making ability as mankind, maybe not as markedly so, but clearly externally expressed enough to seperate them from Ian's boulder. They can feel pain, and react to avoid it... indeed, they disobey what the boulder cannot every time they simply choose to swim up or swim down. According to Ian's own logic, this should make them moral entities, at least far more so than his imaginary boulder: But if those conscious entities are on special offer, woe betide them, it's chomping time as far as Ian is concerned. He'll simply ignore his own observations, and he instead goes at the issue with knife and fork.

And of course, fish are observable. They exist, we can see them, indeed some of us even choose to eat them. And Science has come out with a theory for why fish, with their specific material existance, can exhibit orders of consciousness. It may not be the right theory, or a complete one yet, but science CAN offer an explanation for this better example. It's one based upon an observable difference between the material a fish is made of, an Ian's imaginary boulder. The fish has an identifiable brain. And this theory leads towards a theory of human consciousness too, as they have the same organ, just magnitudes more complex... But this theory is not one which makes Ian feel spiritually special. And it gets in the way of his eating the tasty, tasty flesh of his fellow sentient beings. So he ignores that explanation, those examples of consciousness above and beyond his rocks entirely... and tells us to imagine non existant conscious boulders instead. Which science can't explain! Well no, it can't. They don't exist.

But would you eat them if they did, Ian?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by pmurray
I can build a machine that can add two numbers to produce the sum. It does not have to be electronic - we can make it out of paddle-pop sticks, rubber bands, and baling twine if you like. It undeniably produces an addition - the binary sum of two binary numbers.

Now, where dose this faculty of "being able to add" reside? Is it a separate thing from the device? Is it off in some platonic or spiritual "dimension"? Is it prior to the device itself?

If a boulder, to use your analogy, could perform a sixteen-bit binary addition, would we need to resort to a nonmaterial explanation of it?

No. And also the answer is no if you had asked whether we need to resort to consciousness. If we do not need to resort to consciousness to expalin its behaviour, then a fortiori we do not need to resort to a non-material consciousness.

And this raises other questions. What if we built an android? It acts exactly like a human being. From the exterior it looks exactly like a human being. But its functioning can be explained by examining its parts and how they inter-relate. What role would any consciousness play?

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
What if we built an android? It acts exactly like a human being. From the exterior it looks exactly like a human being. But its functioning can be explained by examining its parts and how they inter-relate. What role would any consciousness play?
If I would succeed in building such a thing I would then conclude that it is very well possible that whatever passes for consciousness in this android actually is consciousness, and that if I examined my own parts and their inter-relations with this level of knowledge, I might find what passes for consciousness in humans.

[Kevin_Lowe]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Of course there is!

Existence that is physical is defined by logical quantitative relationships. If there is a type of existence that does not posses logical relationships, it is not physical.

Your definition is false, so your conclusion does not follow.

Suppose that it just happened that every now and then a hand would appear out of nowhere and slap people with absolutely no rhyme or reason. Fortunately for those of us who don't like being slapped this doesn't occur very often if at all. However if it did happen, if would clearly be physical and it would also not be defined by logical quantitative relationships.

So far every physical thing we have poked at has turned out to have patterns of behaviour we can predict logically and quantitatively, but that's not a logical proof that illogical physical phenomena cannot exist. So as a definition of what is it to be physical, "defined by logical quantitative relationships" is not much good.

It's like defining horses as things that like carrots - the horses I have met all like carrots, but if I met a horse that didn't I would not therefore conclude that it wasn't a horse.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
If I would succeed in building such a thing I would then conclude that it is very well possible that whatever passes for consciousness in this android actually is consciousness, and that if I examined my own parts and their inter-relations with this level of knowledge, I might find what passes for consciousness in humans.

Which leaves you with the problem of subjective privacy.

In these circumstances would you find it meaningful to ask why you possess your experiences but are unable to experience the androids?

If the answer is yes then you must have identified something more than your own brain processes that are absent when you examine the android's circuitry.

Some may say that this is because your own brain processes are the same thing as your own subjective experiences but this just raises the explanatory gap between your own brain processes and your own subjective experience, and we're back to square one!

If the answer is no then can you explain why?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Kevin_Lowe
Your definition is false, so your conclusion does not follow.

Suppose that it just happened that every now and then a hand would appear out of nowhere and slap people with absolutely no rhyme or reason. Fortunately for those of us who don't like being slapped this doesn't occur very often if at all. However if it did happen, if would clearly be physical and it would also not be defined by logical quantitative relationships.


The slapping hand would "clearly be physical" for what reason?

I say because the characteristics that constitute a "hand" and "slapping" being physical are their logical quantitative relationships. For example, the observation that a "hand" has dimensions and mass, and the observation that "slapping" has velocity etc. These are all logical quantitative relationships. That the "slapping hand" appears out of no-where is also a description of a logical relationship, namely the observation of it's location in spacetime. Try again.


So far every physical thing we have poked at has turned out to have patterns of behaviour we can predict logically and quantitatively, but that's not a logical proof that illogical physical phenomena cannot exist. So as a definition of what is it to be physical, "defined by logical quantitative relationships" is not much good. [/B]


You've just used precisely the same definition of physical as I have. You first say that all the "physical" things we have ever defined behave in a logical quantitative manner. Then you go on to claim that this doesn't mean illogical physical things cannot exist. Well yes it does actually, by definition, and I've helped you spot your oxymoron with italics.



It's like defining horses as things that like carrots - the horses I have met all like carrots, but if I met a horse that didn't I would not therefore conclude that it wasn't a horse. [/B]

You should if you are to be consistent with your definition! If you concluded that your carrot-hating thing was still a horse you would be defining what you mean by a "horse" by a completely different definition to your first definition. In this example you are getting fooled by your familiarity with how you usually define a horse (large animal, long neck, hooves etc).

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Which leaves you with the problem of subjective privacy.

In these circumstances would you find it meaningful to ask why you possess your experiences but are unable to experience the androids?

If the answer is yes then you must have identified something more than your own brain processes that are absent when you examine the android's circuitry.

Some may say that this is because your own brain processes are the same thing as your own subjective experiences but this just raises the explanatory gap between your own brain processes and your own subjective experience, and we're back to square one!

If the answer is no then can you explain why? My answer would be no, and will try to explain why, though I'm sure I will raise more questions. I do think of my experiences as being just my brain processes. The fact that, to me, they are different from your brain processes, is simply due to the fact that they take place in my body. My body, having been wired so that brain processes influence other brain processes and most other things in my body, this enormous feedback cascade changes me every moment of time.
The specific way it changes me is dependent on the environment and my current configuration. Billions of years of evolution have made sure that this dependency is exploited behaviour-wise to facilitate my survival, creating meaning as a sort of byproduct.

That's how I look at it.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Atlas
It's a fascinating question for me. I've adopted a pragmatic posture that frees me from these labels I admit I do not understand.

I would call that "intellectual honesty", something that doesnt abound. I firmly believe that, unless we have working models, its better to not state anything as "truth".

Furthermore, even having a working model one should never employ the word (or concept) "truth". To put it simple, Ptolomeus had a working model of the solar system.

[Z]

IMO, if a thing has senses, the means to process those senses, and some means of being aware of its own existence and states of being, then that thing is conscious.

Ergo, there are no conscious rocks, unless they possess senses and data-processing the likes of which we do not understand.

Conversely, if we created Ian's 'android', it would be conscious. End of story.

As for D.S.'s consciousness question, that makes as much sense as asking about another person's consciousness. Since I can't experience your consciousness directly, how do I know it even exists at all? But that leans us dangerously close to solipsism. So, logically, it is more reasonable to assume that other things with senses, thought-processes, and introspective awareness are also conscious. Consciousness is merely a property of brain states, after all, so why should a fish, or an android, or my computer not be conscious?

The simple reason is, that there is an implied concept of soul in the average person's definition of conscious. And that machines cannot have souls - this, after all, would violate the special relationship between God the Creator and Man the Created, wouldn't it? Ergo, no machine - no matter how complex, no matter how like unto Man it ever became - could ever be conscious, by common definitions.

The same mode of thought applies, in part, to animals - that, the lower on the evolutionary chain you go, the less 'soul' there is, and therefore the less conscious they are. Some even go so far as to claim that animals have no consciousness at all.

To me, this is an absurd claim, and horribly humanicentric. Certainly animals are conscious. They have senses, brains, and introspective awareness. "That's just survival instinct!" some claim, but even survival instinct is a mode of introspective awareness.

But rocks do not possess these things. Ian's conscious boulder is just exactly like the 'unliftable rock' in the classic omnipotence argument. It is a non-existent and illogical thing tossed out to throw the issue. Ian cannot face the observations that absolutely require consciousness to be properties of physical brains, so he invents an argument that suggests conciousness could exist without what he understands to be a brain.

Sadly, without brains, consciousness has never been reliably reported to exist. Now, granted, the only consciousness we can ever be 100% sure exists at all is our own; but pushing solipsism aside, all other instances of 'consciousness' that we have reports of, which are at all reliable and trustworthy, show that consciousness is a property of a properly-functioning brain.

This, of course, ruins most of what Ian would like to have us believe - which is precisely why he clutches at the 'radio receiver' argument so vehemently. But as analogies go, that particular one borders on absolute incoherence.

Much like the rest of his arguments.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Atlas

Isn't the rolling boulder problematic for Idealists?


No, an idealist should have no problem seeing the difference between what we perceive as a boulder rolling down hill and what we perceive as a sentient entity.

Could you replace the rolling boulder with a Turing machine?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
IMO, if a thing has senses, the means to process those senses, and some means of being aware of its own existence and states of being, then that thing is conscious.

Ergo, there are no conscious rocks, unless they possess senses and data-processing the likes of which we do not understand.



A sense is either just a physical process just like a rolling boulder is a physical process, or it is an aspect of consciousness. The latter begs the question. The former fails to differentiate us from rolling boulders or any other physical process in the Universe.

Moreover either the word "aware" is synonymous with conscious, or it is not. If it is you beg the question. If it isn't then introducing it is irrelevant.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
If I would succeed in building such a thing I would then conclude that it is very well possible that whatever passes for consciousness in this android actually is consciousness, and that if I examined my own parts and their inter-relations with this level of knowledge, I might find what passes for consciousness in humans.

If the most popular materialist position functionalism is correct, then the android would be conscious by definition. If it behaves identically to a human being then it is conscious.

Functionalism has basically replaced identity theory in recent times. Functionalism is clearly superior to identity theory.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
My answer would be no, and will try to explain why, though I'm sure I will raise more questions. I do think of my experiences as being just my brain processes. The fact that, to me, they are different from your brain processes, is simply due to the fact that they take place in my body. My body, having been wired so that brain processes influence other brain processes and most other things in my body, this enormous feedback cascade changes me every moment of time.
The specific way it changes me is dependent on the environment and my current configuration. Billions of years of evolution have made sure that this dependency is exploited behaviour-wise to facilitate my survival, creating meaning as a sort of byproduct.

That's how I look at it.

I can see that as an explanation of privacy but I think that privacy becomes a problem only when the androids consciousness and your own consciousness are described in terms of the same type of physical process. When you address this problem in the manner you have done by making an ontological distinction between the processes occuring in the android and your own brain then the real problem surfaces. Thus:

Statement A) both the android's brain processes and my brain processes are the same thing as experience

Problem - why can't you experience the android's brain processes?
Answer - because they are not your brain processes

Problem: - why do you experience your own brain processes?
Answer - because your own brain processes are your own brain processes! They are not someone elses brain processes or an androids processes!

The answer to the new second problem is not really an explanation at all. This is why I focussed the issue of privacy because I think that it's a superficial problem. It just hides the real problem of why any brain processes should be experiential at all

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If the most popular materialist position functionalism is correct, then the android would be conscious by definition. If it behaves identically to a human being then it is conscious.

Functionalism has basically replaced identity theory in recent times. Functionalism is clearly superior to identity theory. By by your definition it would not. The OP states it should like ice cream and warm summer days or whatever it likes.
That was all you meant.

The rolling boulder had to like rolling or sitting still. Even if it could not like anything else or think or dream anything else it would be conscious while rolling perhaps and asleep otherwise.

I stated my problem with scientific recognition in that currently science recognizes consciousnmess in living things only. If a rock vibrates in the sun because it likes it we'd make up a new scientific term for that activity.

Tell me about the ghosts and insects. If you don't believe in a material world then there are no insects.

If one exists, like I know mine does, I'd like to understand this not in terms of a rolling boulder, but of a tree.

A tree is alive and that's my main requirement for consciousness. It has no brain, however. But it is seemingly capable of likeing and likening. That is, if it likes a spot it will grow season after season. If it does not, it will "go away", die and go back into the ground again. Likewise, it seems able to discern day from night and season from season.

Here is consciousness as you've defined it existing without brains but science has pretty good understandings of the processes and a scientific theory of evolution appears to be in play furthering the development of lower forms of consciousness and higher forms.

[Z]

Christ, I'm getting some major forum lag!

Anyway, I wanted to consider David's points for a moment, and also clarify something that may have sounded ambiguous in my post.

Second things first: I realized not long after I posted it that by saying that 'awareness of self' was a requisite for 'consciousness', some would pick that as a circular definition. However, let me elaborate.

Some computers have sensory input and the means to process that data; however, they are not aware of themselves in any way. They lack any differentiation whatsoever to allow them to recognize themselves. These computers are not self-aware, and are not conscious. By that, of course, it may be argued that some humans suffering certain types of brain damage are not conscious - and I agree totally.

Other computers possess sensors and programming which differentiate them from external things: temperature sensors, internal monitoring programs, specific data allowing a microphone to recognize noises made by the computer itself as distinct from other noises; very primitive self-awareness, but self-awareness nonetheless.

Since consciousness is a property of the condition of having senses, thought processing, and self-awareness - indeed, we could reduce this to simply 'self-awareness', since you cannot have self awareness without senses and thought processing - then it may seem circular, but it is the very definition as I see it.

A rock is not self-aware. It lacks senses. It lacks thought processes. Hence, it cannot be self-aware, and therefore cannot be conscious.

Just wanted to clarify that.

First things second:

Statement A) both the android's brain processes and my brain processes are the same thing as experience

Problem - why can't you experience the android's brain processes?
Answer - because they are not your brain processes

Problem: - why do you experience your own brain processes?
Answer - because your own brain processes are your own brain processes! They are not someone elses brain processes or an androids processes!

Not tackled very eloquently... but hey.

Why can't you experience the android's brain processes? Why can't you experience your sister's brain processes? Why can you experience only your own brain processes?

Because 'experience' is a property of a given brain... and it can only 'experience' itself.

Why can't a temperature circuit experience another temperature circuit's sensations?

The question borders on moronic, frankly. It's irrelevant and childish.

Why can't fish A be rock D? Why can't a cloud write Shakespearean sonnets?

The brain is a closed system; so you cannot share those brain functions between brains. Simple answer - poorly worded.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
IMO, if a thing has senses, the means to process those senses, and some means of being aware of its own existence and states of being, then that thing is conscious.

By "being aware of its states of being" I assume you mean experience. Just stating this is processing information is not an explanation to me.


Ergo, there are no conscious rocks, unless they possess senses and data-processing the likes of which we do not understand.

Can you tell me in what way any physical process is not information processing?


As for D.S.'s consciousness question, that makes as much sense as asking about another person's consciousness. Since I can't experience your consciousness directly, how do I know it even exists at all? But that leans us dangerously close to solipsism. So, logically, it is more reasonable to assume that other things with senses, thought-processes, and introspective awareness are also conscious. Consciousness is merely a property of brain states, after all, so why should a fish, or an android, or my computer not be conscious?

I don't understand what you are saying. We don't know if any other being is conscious or not. This raises the issue of privacy, i.e., why do I experience my brain processes but not someone elses. If you make an ontological distinction between someone elses brain processes and your own brain processes in order to explain privacy you reveal the underlying fundamental problem which is why any brain processes should be conscious at all. Also, to add, its interesting that the issue of privacy implicity identifies something more than brain processes.

[Z]

Originally posted by Atlas
By by your definition it would not. The OP states it should like ice cream and warm summer days or whatever it likes.
That was all you meant.

The rolling boulder had to like rolling or sitting still. Even if it could not like anything else or think or dream anything else it would be conscious while rolling perhaps and asleep otherwise.

I stated my problem with scientific recognition in that currently science recognizes consciousnmess in living things only. If a rock vibrates in the sun because it likes it we'd make up a new scientific term for that activity.

Tell me about the ghosts and insects. If you don't believe in a material world then there are no insects.

If one exists, like I know mine does, I'd like to understand this not in terms of a rolling boulder, but of a tree.

A tree is alive and that's my main requirement for consciousness. It has no brain, however. But it is seemingly capable of likeing and likening. That is, if it likes a spot it will grow season after season. If it does not, it will "go away", die and go back into the ground again. Likewise, it seems able to discern day from night and season from season.

Here is consciousness as you've defined it existing without brains but science has pretty good understandings of the processes and a scientific theory of evolution appears to be in play furthering the development of lower forms of consciousness and higher forms.

You know, I've never given plants much thought in the consciousness issue. I'll really have to think about this. But I think initially, that I have always considered plants to be alive but not conscious. However, it is true that plants (generally) are aware of seasons, the time of day, the presence of hostile insects, etc. There even appears to be communication between plants.

It is possible that they do possess a 'brain' of a sort we have no means of currently comprehending... I'll have to really think hard about this one.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon


Not tackled very eloquently... but hey.

Why can't you experience the android's brain processes? Why can't you experience your sister's brain processes? Why can you experience only your own brain processes?

Because 'experience' is a property of a given brain... and it can only 'experience' itself.

Why can't a temperature circuit experience another temperature circuit's sensations?

The question borders on moronic, frankly. It's irrelevant and childish.

Why can't fish A be rock D? Why can't a cloud write Shakespearean sonnets?

The brain is a closed system; so you cannot share those brain functions between brains. Simple answer - poorly worded.


Well, it may seem a childish question to you but it is a question that must be asked in the face of privacy. I also wanted to show that the type of answer to the question, which you have given, only serves to reveal the real problem of consciousness and shift the focus onto why your own brain processes should be regarded as a particular qualitative experience.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
No, an idealist should have no problem seeing the difference between what we perceive as a boulder rolling down hill and what we perceive as a sentient entity. Thanks, this brings up another puzzle though. Why do you? Why make the same distinctions in your daily life as materialists do? That is, if you would rush to pull a child indoors during a storm why don't you do that with the rocks in your yard. You don't see them as sentient but why not? Does it have something to do with the Idealists mistrust of the material world? Why save the child?

ETA: As I reread your answer, I'm thinking I may have inferred the exact opposite of what you intended. I'm easily confused by your posts. If that's the case, how would an Idealist account for the sentient boulder when a materialist, to your way of thinking, cannot.
Could you replace the rolling boulder with a Turing machine? I'd have to ask Ian first.

[Z]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Can you tell me in what way any physical process is not information processing?

Information processing, at some point, involves sensation, and an environment in which physical processes and patterns have relationship values and symbolic meanings. A firing neuron is just a firing neuron; but add a million or more to it, and a firing neuron is now a thinking neuron.

Might as well ask why a silicon chip in a computer can process data, but a lump of silicon in nature can not.

I don't understand what you are saying. We don't know if any other being is conscious or not. This raises the issue of privacy, i.e., why do I experience my brain processes but not someone elses. If you make an ontological distinction between someone elses brain processes and your own brain processes in order to explain privacy you reveal the underlying fundamental problem which is why any brain processes should be conscious at all. Also, to add, its interesting that the issue of privacy implicity identifies something more than brain processes.

The issue of privacy is, frankly, absurdly unimportant. Why is the boulder rolling down the east face of the hill not the rock on top of the hill, or the boulder over on the side of the hill? Because it's not. Because they are not interconnected things. Why do I experience my brain processes, but nobody else's? Because I'm not connected to any other brains. Because I am my brain, and no other. A star can't radiate light from another star; a heating coil in Brussels can't generate heat from a coil in Austin. The question is insensible.

Now, I admit I'm not up on all this philosophical terminology; what is the meaning of 'ontological distinction'? But why any brain process should be conscious at all is, at least on the face of it, a purely metaphysical question. Why should light be generated by stimulated molecules at all? Why should water have one type of coherence, and another type of adherence?

And for the last - I completely disagree. The issue of privacy is irrelevant and meaningless. One set of brain processes only has access to those processes which it is. Set A can only ever include members of Set A. Simple. There is nothing about privacy that implies more than brain processes.

[Z]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Well, it may seem a childish question to you but it is a question that must be asked in the face of privacy. I also wanted to show that the type of answer to the question, which you have given, only serves to reveal the real problem of consciousness and shift the focus onto why your own brain processes should be regarded as a particular qualitative experience.

Why must it be asked? It's meaningless.

And the answer reveals nothing of the sort.

I'm afraid it's akin to peering in dark corners hoping to find something amazing, when you're in a room full of wonders.

If you want to ponder 'why', there's a million such questions that could be asked - with no point at all. Why does an electron have a negative charge? Why are blue objects not red? Why don't two solid objects pass through each other? Some things have answers - some don't. And, in a few cases, even the questions are meaningless. Why don't stars swim? Why don't lemons make clay pots? Why doesn't glass sing soprano? Meaningless.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If the most popular materialist position functionalism is correct, then the android would be conscious by definition. If it behaves identically to a human being then it is conscious.

Functionalism has basically replaced identity theory in recent times. Functionalism is clearly superior to identity theory. As you'll understand, I'm steering clear of -isms for now, but yes: I agree. This is indeed what I was driving at.

The conclusion to be drawn from this was supposed to be:
I dont see how you can be so sure that consciousness "cannot play any role in a scientific theory". I agree in that it's a possibility, but one for which there is no evidence but the lack of a theory at the moment. And I'm an optimist.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Well, it may seem a childish question to you but it is a question that must be asked in the face of privacy. I also wanted to show that the type of answer to the question, which you have given, only serves to reveal the real problem of consciousness and shift the focus onto why your own brain processes should be regarded as a particular qualitative experience. Where are you going with this anyway? For the physicalist, entities have their attributes. The attributes don't bleed over into other entities - normally.

If consciousness is imposed from an external source it would seem like it would be less inclined to be private. It would seem likely that occasionall multiple entites would channel the same consciousness. That would lend creedence to an externally imposed consciousness driver, like a god.

Where do you stand on this. Idealist/Deist?

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Problem: - why do you experience your own brain processes?
Answer - because your own brain processes are your own brain processes! They are not someone elses brain processes or an androids processes!

The answer to the new second problem is not really an explanation at all. This is why I focussed the issue of privacy because I think that it's a superficial problem. It just hides the real problem of why any brain processes should be experiential at all I cannot think of another answer than that my genes need me to make sense of my environment. Apparently, this is what making sense of your environment is.
I am a bag full of sensors and wiring and signals going around, why would I not notice these things? Apparently it feels a certain way, and it feels like ice creamy roll, or doing boring math problems. I don't see why experiencing is supposed to be somehow special or different from being the stuff that signals travel through.

[Kevin_Lowe]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
The slapping hand would "clearly be physical" for what reason?

I say because the characteristics that constitute a "hand" and "slapping" being physical are their logical quantitative relationships. For example, the observation that a "hand" has dimensions and mass, and the observation that "slapping" has velocity etc. These are all logical quantitative relationships. That the "slapping hand" appears out of no-where is also a description of a logical relationship, namely the observation of it's location in spacetime. Try again.


No, sorry, appearing out of nowhere without rhyme or reason is not behaviour that is logical or quantifiable. It's physical because it's physical, you can feel it slapping you. Thus it is conceivable that a physical thing that is not logical and quantifiable might exist. So as a rigorous definition, yours doesn't work.


You've just used precisely the same definition of physical as I have. You first say that all the "physical" things we have ever defined behave in a logical quantitative manner. Then you go on to claim that this doesn't mean illogical physical things cannot exist. Well yes it does actually, by definition, and I've helped you spot your oxymoron with italics.


You are muddling observation with necessity. All the horses I have observed like carrots. This is not justification to claim that it is true by definition that all horses like carrots. In the same way the observation that physical phenomena can be modeled quantitatively and logically is not proof that it is true by definition that all physical phenomena can be so modeled.


You should if you are to be consistent with your definition! If you concluded that your carrot-hating thing was still a horse you would be defining what you mean by a "horse" by a completely different definition to your first definition. In this example you are getting fooled by your familiarity with how you usually define a horse (large animal, long neck, hooves etc).

The point was that such a definition would be illogical and stupid. If I tried to "be consistent with that definition" in the face of a horse that didn't like carrots I would be an idiot. The correct response is to realise that my "definition" of what it is to be a horse was fundamentally wrong-headed, not to soldier on with it regardless.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
You know, I've never given plants much thought in the consciousness issue. I'll really have to think about this. But I think initially, that I have always considered plants to be alive but not conscious. However, it is true that plants (generally) are aware of seasons, the time of day, the presence of hostile insects, etc. There even appears to be communication between plants.

It is possible that they do possess a 'brain' of a sort we have no means of currently comprehending... I'll have to really think hard about this one. It doesn't come up much in the consciousness debate. But I certainly think it is more relevant than rolling boulders.

It certainly is a different kind of consciousness but in terms of Ian's OP it fits the definition. I think it does anyway. At the very least plants have awareness - they behave and respond to environmental changes in predictable patterns.

There awareness seems to be bound at the cellular level. You can cut a leaf from many plants and regenerate a complete plant from that tiny cutting.

I mentioned an amoeba's awareness in an earlier post. It likes unsalty environments and recoils from salty ones. So plants and primitive animals seem to possess a cellular awareness and consciousness.

Heth was more terse and articulate than me, as usual, in expressing the idea that consciousness naturally evolves. But this discussion using Ian's OP definition seems to reinforce the idea, IMO.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Kevin_Lowe
No, sorry, appearing out of nowhere without rhyme or reason is not behaviour that is logical or quantifiable. Would a quantum physicist disagree?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
... why should a fish, or an android, or my computer not be conscious?

I agree, this is a good question. I have said and I repeat that what Ian wants to do is to "prove" that souls exists and are causually efficacious. But I dont see how his ideas would be compatible with an android being consciouss.

Well, because I wont go as far as to say that a computer, or a thermometer have consciousness! There must be a boundary or limit, if it is an emergent property. Now, Im not implying, by any means, that consciousness should be "material", nor "immaterial". I find both concepts as obsolete. We should move forward.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Atlas
Heth was more terse and articulate than me, as usual, in expressing the idea that consciousness naturally evolves. But this discussion using Ian's OP definition seems to reinforce the idea, IMO. A good post, that.
If I recall correctly, it was completely ignored twice.
As it came up again, and because I agree completely, I thought I'd fling it into the fray again.

And thanks.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
A sense is either just a physical process just like a rolling boulder is a physical process, or it is an aspect of consciousness. The latter begs the question. The former fails to differentiate us from rolling boulders or any other physical process in the Universe.

Moreover either the word "aware" is synonymous with conscious, or it is not. If it is you beg the question. If it isn't then introducing it is irrelevant.

So, lets get back to thermometers. Does it sense the environment? Yes. Is it a physical process? Yes. Is it an aspect of consciousness? Yes.

I would say that Cog, the robot, is aware of his surroundings. So, whats the conclusion?

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
I agree, this is a good question. I have said and I repeat that what Ian wants to do is to "prove" that souls exists and are causually efficacious. But I dont see how his ideas would be compatible with an android being consciouss.

Well, because I wont go as far as to say that a computer, or a thermometer have consciousness! There must be a boundary or limit, if it is an emergent property. Now, Im not implying, by any means, that consciousness should be "material", nor "immaterial". I find both concepts as obsolete. We should move forward. Actually, I would go as far as to call my computer conscious. I view consciousness as being on a scale of interactiveness with an environment. So I guess the lower boundary for consciousness in my view would be something like a simple feedback loop. Mind you, that would be "next to unconscious", and No, I don't talk to my thermostat, so don't give me any of that particular crap.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Why can't you experience the android's brain processes? Why can't you experience your sister's brain processes? Why can you experience only your own brain processes?

Because 'experience' is a property of a given brain... and it can only 'experience' itself.

Why can't a temperature circuit experience another temperature circuit's sensations?

The question borders on moronic, frankly. It's irrelevant and childish.

I have to disagree. I believe its a good question. Forget about properties, it cant because it doesnt have access to the same sensory input. Give me a link to your senses and memories and I will experience Zaayrdragon's world!

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
There is nothing about privacy that implies more than brain processes.

Who says this? ;)

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
So, lets get back to thermometers. Does it sense the environment? Yes. Is it a physical process? Yes. Is it an aspect of consciousness? Yes. Ah, but here I definitely disagree. A thermometer does not sense the environment, It simply reacts to the environment, as does a rock. A thermometer can however be used to make sense of the environment, for instance in your thermostat. For sensing I would require the information that can be obtained from a sensor to be put to use to some extent.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
Ah, but here I definitely disagree. A thermometer does not sense the environment, It simply reacts to the environment, as does a rock. A thermometer can however be used to make sense of the environment, for instance in your thermostat. For sensing I would require the information that can be obtained from a sensor to be put to use to some extent.

Good that we are not in a LG's thread! ;) we would be facing "an internal environment".

Everything reacts, its correct, but a thermometer has also a sensor, and in a way it stores the information. Not to say that what you mention about the use is not interesting.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Good that we are not in a LG's thread! ;) we would be facing "an internal environment".

Everything reacts, its correct, but a thermometer has also a sensor, and in a way it stores the information. Not to say that what you mention about the use is not interesting. It's nitpicking, but what I mean is: A thermometer is basically just something that gets bigger if you heat it. I dont call that sensing. It's exploiting this specific property and putting the resulting information to use that makes it sensing in my opinion.
So I would call an airconditioned house conscious of its internal temperature, but not the thermometer.

But do carry on. :D

[Iacchus]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
For sensing I would require the information that can be obtained from a sensor to be put to use to some extent. To be put to use by "whom?" The house certainly has no need for an air conditioner, only the people who "live" in the house do.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Iacchus
To be put to use by "whom?" The house certainly has no need for an air conditioner, only the people who "live" in the house do. I don't think we have to answer that. You sometimes represent a consciousness that is not being used. :p

Let's say that science builds an android like Data from Star Trek. And let's say that he outlasts humankind. He was proved to be a conscious life form in one of the episodes by a court of law. Would he cease to be conscious just because no humans existed for him to serve.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Iacchus
To be put to use by "whom?" The house certainly has no need for an air conditioner, only the people who "live" in the house do. You see, that's why I never talk to my thermostat.

Seriously though, the house doesn't know it's keeping the temperature at a desirable level; it does so because it was designed to do so by and for its occupants.
It has been given an innate desire to keep the temperature at a certain level. It doesn't know why or in whose interest it is, but this doesn't matter.
Does a sunflower know that it follows the sun because that will help its chances to survive?
Does a dog know that she has to pant, because otherwise she might overheat?
Would it matter if they did?

Edited for words

[Atlas]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
...Seriously though, the house doesn't know it's keeping the temperature at a desirable level; it does so because it was designed to do so by and for its occupants.
It has been given an innate desire to keep the temperature at a certain level. It doesn't know why or in whose interest it is, but this doesn't matter. It is through our ability to personify virtually anything that we can imagine thermostats, amoebas, trees, dogs and the gods as being conscious according to Ian's OP.

I just think we should strive to include more references to ice cream in these posts. I think that's what first got us interested in this thread.

I guess what I'm really wondering is what would be God's favorite ice cream? The one He knew He consciously liked more than all the others.

[Iacchus]

Originally posted by Atlas
I don't think we have to answer that. You sometimes represent a consciousness that is not being used. :p

Let's say that science builds an android like Data from Star Trek. And let's say that he outlasts humankind. He was proved to be a conscious life form in one of the episodes by a court of law. Would he cease to be conscious just because no humans existed for him to serve. Yes, it's amazing how many sub-routines my computer can run, however, it's still not a conscious entity which exhibits free will.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Iacchus
Yes, it's amazing how many sub-routines my computer can run, however, it's still not a conscious entity which exhibits free will. Are you free to like ice cream?

[Z]

Actually, I wouldn't call a thermostat 'conscious' or even aware. It's an extremely simple physical device that reacts without knowledge - that is, no stored patterns or material to compare/contrast the thermostat to.

On the other hand, there are self-aware, computer-controlled houses which are essentially large robots. I would call them 'conscious'.

Here's an even more interesting question, though: what constitutes 'alive'? Can a thing be conscious but not alive? Can it be alive but not conscious? (and I don't mean asleep or comatose, either)

[Iacchus]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
Are you free to like ice cream? I don't know, did you feel free enough to ask me about it? If not, then what is driving you to type these words on the screen?

[Robin]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Of course there is!

Existence that is physical is defined by logical quantitative relationships. If there is a type of existence that does not posses logical relationships, it is not physical.
Well it is different to the definitions so far (I am not sure that everything that is defined by logical quantititave relationships is physical - mathematical concepts for example).

But if there is a type of existence that does not possess logical quantitative relationships could science not study them?

Or would they be queueing up to attempt to study such a unique phenomenom?

So if the physical is defined by whether or not there is some scientific model then we could not be absolutely certain that nobody could find a way to model such a phenomena.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Iacchus
Yes, it's amazing how many sub-routines my computer can run, however, it's still not a conscious entity which exhibits free will. You're switching definitions of consciousness. According to Ian's OP we aren't considering free will. This is much more about ice cream and sunny days - liking them, that is.

Now if Data or your computer ran a subroutine that allowed it to appreciate the flavors of ice cream and came away "liking" one more than another for any reason it had - like the most chemicals involved (and told you so) - even though it was different than your appreciation - would it not meet the definition of consciousness we're directed to consider from the OP.

Furthermore, as to your original question, if you granted it consciousness because it had some measure of appreciation of it's environment, would it cease to be conscious after you died and it didn't have anyone to use it anymore (if it hadn't been shut down, of course.

[Robin]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Can you name a time when physics was expanded to include concepts that are not defined by logical relationships?
No, but then I never said it was. I said that if current physics proves inadequate to describe consciousness then it would be expanded. I don't say it will be expanded, I believe that current physical models will prove sufficient. But if it had to be, it would.

I have in mind the type of shift that happened for relativity and quantum physics, and that string theorists are hinting will need to happen in order to unify these fields.

I am not sure exactly what the 'immaterialists' here are proposing but I gather that they think that the mind exists in some non-physical domain.

But I have been saying for some time that this other domain, whatever it might be, must be defined by logical relationships (otherwise how could we think) and so it would just be an alternate physical domain.

In which case all the mechanistic and free will problems that caused people to think up such ideas would still exist.

And, as I have also been saying for some time, a normal physical explanation would be just as good.

[Iacchus]

So, with all the mechanisms of feedback fully in place, at what point does the "it" know that it's aware?

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Iacchus
I don't know, did you feel free enough to ask me about it? If not, then what is driving you to type these words on the screen? I don't know, It's possibly not free will.

[Iacchus]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
Are you free to like ice cream? Agreed, I might be predisposed to liking certain things, but I can always "choose" to override those things.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Actually, I wouldn't call a thermostat 'conscious' or even aware. It's an extremely simple physical device that reacts without knowledge - that is, no stored patterns or material to compare/contrast the thermostat to. We can argue about this for some time, but remember the feedback loop was my of proposal for the lower boundary of the scale of consciousness (i.e. next to unconscious).

And I disagree on the information part. A thermostat stores at least one piece of information: the desired temperature. This bit of information and the current temperature are all the knowledge it needs to interact with its environment.

So it uses information from its environment, posesses some knowledge (though "innate") and interacts with its environment.
I would call that a fair lower bound for consciousness.
Do you have a different proposal?

Here's an even more interesting question, though: what constitutes 'alive'? Can a thing be conscious but not alive? Can it be alive but not conscious? (and I don't mean asleep or comatose, either) I'm not touching that first one, because that will take a lot of reading and thinking.
The second one would, under my definition be a yes, the third one probably a no, because self-reproduction already sounds loopy to me.
I have to think about that though.

Edited for words

[Correa Neto]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Actually, I wouldn't call a thermostat 'conscious' or even aware. It's an extremely simple physical device that reacts without knowledge - that is, no stored patterns or material to compare/contrast the thermostat to.

On the other hand, there are self-aware, computer-controlled houses which are essentially large robots. I would call them 'conscious'.

Here's an even more interesting question, though: what constitutes 'alive'? Can a thing be conscious but not alive? Can it be alive but not conscious? (and I don't mean asleep or comatose, either)

What is a "living" being? Common answer (minimum requisites):

-Has some sort of metabolism;
-Can reproduce itself;
-Tries to somehow obtain what it needs to preserve itself, maintain its metabolism and to reproduce itself. This implies in interaction with its surroundings - to receive and process external stimulae.

Note that "carbon-based chemistry" was left out.

Now, I think that we call consiousness has several degrees of sophistication. Perhaps one of the ways to describe or qualitatively measure consiousness of an individual or species is the degree of interaction with the environment and other individuals.

A plant receives external stimulae and proccess them, acting accordind to its own limitations. A fish basically does the same, with more sophistication, and also we do the same, with even more sophistication.

I guess that the answer is that living beings need a minimal ammount of this ability to receive and proccess external stimulae, that can be called counsience. But, at the borderlines things get fuzzy...

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Iacchus
Agreed, I might be predisposed to liking certain things, but I can always "choose" to override those things. Yes, but overriding this predisposition might be caused by that memory that says: "you'll get fat and won't be loved by dozens of hot chicks", which will elicit a protest voice from your primeval reproductive drive, which might be suppressed by the memory of the last time you let that run rampant and you got a slap in the face.
So you ponder a while and then the memory of last thursday's hot-dog binge springs to mind, lending weight to your desire for acceptance, tilting the balance in favour of not eating ice cream (sorry Atlas), making you decide to drink a nice cool glass of water, because you see you were standing next to the tap anyway.

Don't you agree that choosing might, in this kind of way, encompass a causal rationale that is completely determined by the contents of your brain? And would it change the way you choose if it did?

[Atlas]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Actually, I wouldn't call a thermostat 'conscious' or even aware. It's an extremely simple physical device that reacts without knowledge - that is, no stored patterns or material to compare/contrast the thermostat to.

On the other hand, there are self-aware, computer-controlled houses which are essentially large robots. I would call them 'conscious'.

Here's an even more interesting question, though: what constitutes 'alive'? Can a thing be conscious but not alive? Can it be alive but not conscious? (and I don't mean asleep or comatose, either) Z, pour some ice cream on that thermostat and get back to us. Remember, it doesn't have to like it. If you discern that it has some internal state that doesn't like it, it's conscious.

Actually, I hope hammegk and Ian return to the discussion and clear this up. I'm with you in entertaining a definition that requires life to envelop a consciousness. If hammegk and Ian agree we will obviously then differ on our notion of life and 'alive'.

If that's the case then this whole discussion and many future discussions of consciousness will be rendered moot. I don't hold out much hope though. Why would Ian postulate a rolling boulder if he would not accept that in his world dead things have consciousness all the time.

For me, ghosts (as they are inmagined) are dead things, but for religionists those are the living things - the souls that inhabit us.

I think Hammegk and Ian have differing appreciations of the material world. Hamme is an Objective Idealist to Ian's Subjective Idealism if I'm not mistaken.

I don't think Ian accepts life is a suspension of animate matter that possesses some measure of awareness. Hammegk has told me his position in the past but I never know if I understand him. I don't think he'd embrace my definition either.

It would be nice if we could clarify what life is and if it is related to consciousness at all. I'd prefer it if we could come up with different terms so that we could talk about thing more specifically.

For instance, everybody believes their God is alive but not as many believe he's alive in the same sense we are. Still, many Christians believe that they will be reunited with their bodies when they get to heaven. It's all weird to talk about unless some of the fundamentals are understood.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Atlas
Z, pour some ice cream on that thermostat and get back to us. Remember, it doesn't have to like it. If you discern that it has some internal state that doesn't like it, it's conscious. Okay lets forget the house and talk about that italian ice cream parlour that keeps it's ice cream at exactly that icy yet creamy temperature using a thermostat?

I agree with your post, and also, I for one am farther than ever from any certainty about "what materialists must believe".

[Kevin_Lowe]

Originally posted by Atlas
Would a quantum physicist disagree?

I freely admit that quantum physics passeth my understanding.

However, I was under the strong impression that quantum physics is both logical and quantifiable, but also probabilistic and unintuitive. So while it is fairly confusing stuff it does obey its own rules consistently (logic) and you can observe and measure its behaviour (quantifiable).

I am sure someone will correct me if I am wrong.

[Iacchus]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
Yes, but overriding this predisposition might be caused by that memory that says: "you'll get fat and won't be loved by dozens of hot chicks", which will elicit a protest voice from your primeval reproductive drive, which might be suppressed by the memory of the last time you let that run rampant and you got a slap in the face.
So you ponder a while and then the memory of last thursday's hot-dog binge springs to mind, lending weight to your desire for acceptance, tilting the balance in favour of not eating ice cream (sorry Atlas), making you decide to drink a nice cool glass of water, because you see you were standing next to the tap anyway.

Don't you agree that choosing might, in this kind of way, encompass a causal rationale that is completely determined by the contents of your brain? And would it change the way you choose if it did? Do you believe in freedom without responsibility? I don't. This in fact is where cause-and-effect comes into play ... i.e., to the extent that we understand how it works and, are able to "choose" that which seems most sensible.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Information processing, at some point, involves sensation, and an environment in which physical processes and patterns have relationship values and symbolic meanings.


So my calculator does not process information because it does not sense things? I hardly think so. Information processing can be said to occur in all physical processes.


A firing neuron is just a firing neuron; but add a million or more to it, and a firing neuron is now a thinking neuron.

Both the single neuron and the group of neurons can be said to process information. This is my point. There is no physical process that cannot be information processing.


Might as well ask why a silicon chip in a computer can process data, but a lump of silicon in nature can not.

They both can.



The issue of privacy is, frankly, absurdly unimportant. Why is the boulder rolling down the east face of the hill not the rock on top of the hill, or the boulder over on the side of the hill? Because it's not. Because they are not interconnected things. Why do I experience my brain processes, but nobody else's? Because I'm not connected to any other brains. Because I am my brain, and no other. A star can't radiate light from another star; a heating coil in Brussels can't generate heat from a coil in Austin. The question is insensible.

This is precisely the type of answer that I refered to in my other post. And the consequence of this answer is to reveal the fundamental problem as to how your own brain processes could possible be the same thing as experience.


Now, I admit I'm not up on all this philosophical terminology; what is the meaning of 'ontological distinction'?

I would say in this case, the distinction that you have two separately existing physical processes.


But why any brain process should be conscious at all is, at least on the face of it, a purely metaphysical question. Why should light be generated by stimulated molecules at all? Why should water have one type of coherence, and another type of adherence?

The emission of light from stimulated molecules is a description of a physical process. Thus the answer to the "why" question is contained in this descriptive theory. There is no such answer for why brain processes are experience. Nor could there ever be since experience is not physically defined.


And for the last - I completely disagree. The issue of privacy is irrelevant and meaningless. One set of brain processes only has access to those processes which it is. Set A can only ever include members of Set A. Simple. There is nothing about privacy that implies more than brain processes.

What is privacy? It is defined by the fact that we only seem to have our own experiences. We do not say privacy is defined by the fact that we seem only to have our own brain processes! Any reference to privacy implicitly acknowledges something more than brain processes: experience.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Why must it be asked? It's meaningless.

And the answer reveals nothing of the sort.

I'm afraid it's akin to peering in dark corners hoping to find something amazing, when you're in a room full of wonders.

If you want to ponder 'why', there's a million such questions that could be asked - with no point at all. Why does an electron have a negative charge? Why are blue objects not red? Why don't two solid objects pass through each other? Some things have answers - some don't. And, in a few cases, even the questions are meaningless. Why don't stars swim? Why don't lemons make clay pots? Why doesn't glass sing soprano? Meaningless.

What rubbish. You say my question is meaningless but give no indication why. I could very easily dismiss questions I don't like in this manner but I choose to face up to them instead.

I'll repeat my argument, just in case you're ready to stop covering your ears.

Privacy manifests as the seeming inability to experience someone elses experiences. This needs an explanation. Your explanation on offer is to state that since experience is a brain process then privacy is explained by the fact that each others brain process is separate. That's fine, but as I said, it contains the unanswered question of why your own brain processes should be your own experience. It's a question that remains unanswered and, contrary to what you want to believe, is not meaningless.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Atlas
Where are you going with this anyway? For the physicalist, entities have their attributes. The attributes don't bleed over into other entities - normally.

This is probably the usual view for a physicalist, but I may disagree since where one physical process ends and the next one begins is an arbitrary definition IMO.


If consciousness is imposed from an external source it would seem like it would be less inclined to be private. It would seem likely that occasionall multiple entites would channel the same consciousness. That would lend creedence to an externally imposed consciousness driver, like a god.

Where do you stand on this. Idealist/Deist?

Tending towards idealism. It may explain ESP and such like - channeling the same experience perhaps. It remains speculation for me at present

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
I don't see why experiencing is supposed to be somehow special or different from being the stuff that signals travel through.

Because experiences are identified by how they feel qualitatively. The stuff that signals travel through is defined by physical relationships. Qualitativeness is not needed for the latter type of definition.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Kevin_Lowe
No, sorry, appearing out of nowhere without rhyme or reason is not behaviour that is logical or quantifiable.

I'd be interested in what you mean by "without rhyme or reason".

Anyway you are wrong for this reason:

If the hand appears then it can be measured. For example, the number of times it appears per hour, or it spatial location. This is clearly logically quantifiable definitions of "the appearance of the slapping hand".



It's physical because it's physical, you can feel it slapping you.

LOL! I applaud you for such a coherent definition. "its physical because its physical". Also, are you saying that something that is physical is something that is experienced? I didn't realise you were an idealist!


Thus it is conceivable that a physical thing that is not logical and quantifiable might exist. So as a rigorous definition, yours doesn't work.

What's your definition of physical in this statement?


You are muddling observation with necessity. All the horses I have observed like carrots. This is not justification to claim that it is true by definition that all horses like carrots. In the same way the observation that physical phenomena can be modeled quantitatively and logically is not proof that it is true by definition that all physical phenomena can be so modeled.


This is terrible disanalogy. You have to define "horse" first before you can say that they like carrots. In the same way, we are trying to define "physical" first before we say anything else about "physical" things.

You say that all "physical" phemomena can be defined quantitatively and logically. If logical quantitative relationships do not initially define "physical" then what definition are you using?


The point was that such a definition would be illogical and stupid. If I tried to "be consistent with that definition" in the face of a horse that didn't like carrots I would be an idiot.

You first said that you defined a horse to be "things that like carrots" (not in your second reply where you stated that all horses like carrots). Thus, here, a "thing that does not like carrots" is not a horse.


the correct response is to realise that my "definition" of what it is to be a horse was fundamentally wrong-headed, not to soldier on with it regardless.

Implying that you have redefined what it is to be a horse. So tell me what is wrong headed about defining physical to be logical quantitative relationships. So far you've offered "something is physical because you feel it". Not very informative Kevin.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Tending towards idealism. It may explain ESP and such like - channeling the same experience perhaps. It remains speculation for me at present Ok, my ESP acronym has, over the years changed into: Errors in Sense Processing.

I'm tending toward the physicalist explanations of things. They work and deal with error identification and correction honestly. I like that.

My current model of consciousness is primarily concerned with the mindsight experience. The visual space that maps our world and allows us to navigate through it, where ideas occur. Whenever our eyes are open we experience an idea of the world. And in this space are triggered ideas of the bodily wants, needs, fears, etc. For example: "I'm thirsty," can appear in the mind before it is uttered at the mouth.

Because I'm a computer programmer I naturally pick a model that is similar to the computer. The mindsight idea space is equivalent to the monitor display. This is merely an organized representation of some pretty ugly and complicated workings happening in the meat of the machine.

When I move the mouse, press a keyboard key, what happens is not directed by the display. The programs are interacting invisibly far below. The display changes when I click into something, but the clicked choice isn't driven by the screen manipulation. It only seems that way. Everything happens in invisible programs designed to echo a valid representation of the available world space.

That is, it's my opinion that the conscious ideascape is always an ephemeral resultant of complex chemical-molecular interaction. We only seem to decide or experience things in that space but the reality is that the meatbrain is the CPU, programs, memory devices, and motor controller that drives all of the processes that the body can know. The ideascape has mapping to the senses, like the neurons associated to sight and to the processing neurons central to brain function. When we see something in the physical world it hits the processing center and one resultant is an echo in the ideaspace that is an image of the physical world.

We are making choices not in the ideaspace where we see the ideas being manipulated. They are just echoes of complex processes handled by the meatbrain.

[Z]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
What rubbish. You say my question is meaningless but give no indication why. I could very easily dismiss questions I don't like in this manner but I choose to face up to them instead.

I'll repeat my argument, just in case you're ready to stop covering your ears.

Privacy manifests as the seeming inability to experience someone elses experiences. This needs an explanation. Your explanation on offer is to state that since experience is a brain process then privacy is explained by the fact that each others brain process is separate. That's fine, but as I said, it contains the unanswered question of why your own brain processes should be your own experience. It's a question that remains unanswered and, contrary to what you want to believe, is not meaningless.
That's fine, but as I said, it contains the unanswered question of why your own brain processes should be your own experience. It's a question that remains unanswered and, contrary to what you want to believe, is not meaningless.
Nope. You're still spouting nonsense.

Experience is a function of the brain. If two sets of grey matter are not directly connected, there is no reason to expect one to 'experience' what the other is experiencing.

Your 'privacy' question just reveals your intent to lean toward idealism. Sadly, if you remove such biased intent, you could understand more clearly that the question is absurd and meaningless.

As it is, I can't see much of 'thought' in most of your posts here... only speculation from an inherently dualist or idealist point of view.

And, FYI, I am a dualist, but I can see clearly from a materialist point of view as well, and can also see - under any concept of reality - how such a question is blatantly ignorant.

Good day.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Iacchus
Do you believe in freedom without responsibility? I don't. This in fact is where cause-and-effect comes into play ... i.e., to the extent that we understand how it works and, are able to "choose" that which seems most sensible.

We are not free. There is no "freewill", we feel we can choose, but we cant. So no, we are not responsable. Difficult concept to grasp, I understand.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
That's fine, but as I said, it contains the unanswered question of why your own brain processes should be your own experience. It's a question that remains unanswered and, contrary to what you want to believe, is not meaningless.

Actually, I answered this, you both missed it. Our consciousness is directly based on our senses and memory. If I could have access to yours, I would be "you".

And I believe that someday this will be possible. Note the "I believe" part. In this subjects, we are all expressing what we believe, no more, no less.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Nope. You're still spouting nonsense.

Experience is a function of the brain. If two sets of grey matter are not directly connected, there is no reason to expect one to 'experience' what the other is experiencing.


Yes, so you repeat. And I repeat that this explanation of privacy only reiterates the fact that it contains no explanation of how qualitative experience can be defined in terms of a function of any individual brain.

Your explanation of privacy completely ignores any need for such an explanation. Instead, it takes it as a presupposition. I'm questioning that presupposition.


Your 'privacy' question just reveals your intent to lean toward idealism. Sadly, if you remove such biased intent, you could understand more clearly that the question is absurd and meaningless.


Please explain why it is meaningless rather than merely stating that it is.


As it is, I can't see much of 'thought' in most of your posts here... only speculation from an inherently dualist or idealist point of view.

We all have to deal with the phenomena of experience.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Actually, I answered this, you both missed it. Our consciousness is directly based on our senses and memory. If I could have access to yours, I would be "you".


I meant the question of why brain processes are experiences per se.


And I believe that someday this will be possible. Note the "I believe" part. In this subjects, we are all expressing what we believe, no more, no less.

I do not believe that I have experiences. That is a different form of knowledge. Belief is inference. Experience is not inferred.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

David said:
Yes, so you repeat. And I repeat that this explanation of privacy only reiterates the fact that it contains no explanation of how qualitative experience can be defined in terms of a function of any individual brain
Neither does any other metaphysic. For some reason, labeling consciousness as "mental" or "ideal" seems to enable some people to stop fretting over the difficult questions about how our mental experiences work.

~~ Paul

[Z]

BTW - just remembered your calculator question.

Pressure on keys = sensory input.

Thank you.

Yes, so you repeat. And I repeat that this explanation of privacy only reiterates the fact that it contains no explanation of how qualitative experience can be defined in terms of a function of any individual brain.

Ah... so all you're asking is for science to hurry up and complete the research that we're currently doing? OK, that's fine.

Because that's all it amounts to - the honest answer is, no one knows yet.

But this question - how does the physical brain create qualitative experience - is a totally different question from why brain A can't have experiences that brain B is having. The first question is valid, meaningful, and logical; the second is meaningless and moronic.

Asking how the brain 'has' or 'generates' or whatever experience is meaningful. Asking why I can't experience what you experience is silly and ignorant.

So ask the right questions, and you might get somewhere.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I do not believe that I have experiences. That is a different form of knowledge. Belief is inference. Experience is not inferred.

What are the components of the Experience? because for me it is based on making sense of the senses. Now, is there something "raw" behind this process?

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Because experiences are identified by how they feel qualitatively. The stuff that signals travel through is defined by physical relationships. Qualitativeness is not needed for the latter type of definition. It's not needed for that type of definition. I agree, and that's why we can study signals running through someones brain. But my point is: there is never an instance where you are this person's brain. You are only the stuff that signals travel through, when you're being you. Yes, it's a special vantage point, but I see no reason why it shouldn't be the result of simply being the only bag of organs that that specific set of signals travel through.

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
What are the components of the Experience? because for me it is based on making sense of the senses. Now, is there something "raw" behind this process? I think it is a very flexible word. The "raw" aspect is anything endured in realtime. A night's sleep is endured and so I would classify it as the experience of a night's sleep.

Your notion of "making sense" in regard to a night's sleep is the second aspect, the memory or appreciation aspect. While there is not generally too much of what passes for a memory of a night's sleep we often comment as if there was. "That was a lousy/great night's sleep."

Let's say we endure a rock concert by our favorite band. In that long moment of endurement we are thrilled. Afterward, reminiscing, we comment, "That was an experience I'll not soon forget." But here the 3 hour concert, appreciated as memory, is condensed. What we remember is the thrill of being there and a few details.

[Kevin_Lowe]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I'd be interested in what you mean by "without rhyme or reason".

Anyway you are wrong for this reason:

If the hand appears then it can be measured. For example, the number of times it appears per hour, or it spatial location. This is clearly logically quantifiable definitions of "the appearance of the slapping hand".


By "without rhyme or reason" I mean that there is absolutely no discernable pattern to its appearance whatsoever, which to me seems both perfectly possible and incompatible with describing the appearance of the hand in any logically quantifiable way.


LOL! I applaud you for such a coherent definition. "its physical because its physical". Also, are you saying that something that is physical is something that is experienced? I didn't realise you were an idealist!


Perhaps foolishly I assumed that it was so obvious that a hand that slaps people must be a member of the set of physical things that nothing more need be said.

If you plan on arguing otherwise I would like to see you do it and I would be very surprised if you made any headway.


What's your definition of physical in this statement?


"Clearly, obviously, unambiguously solid and able to be interacted with" will do fine for that statement. Physical in the everyday and uncontroversial sense.


This is terrible disanalogy. You have to define "horse" first before you can say that they like carrots. In the same way, we are trying to define "physical" first before we say anything else about "physical" things.


I see your problem, you are going about this backwards. You should be observing that which is physical and then trying to define it.


You say that all "physical" phemomena can be defined quantitatively and logically. If logical quantitative relationships do not initially define "physical" then what definition are you using?


I have not actually advanced a definition yet, I am just making the point that the definition you advanced is flawed because it excludes potential phenomena that are unambiguously physical.


You first said that you defined a horse to be "things that like carrots" (not in your second reply where you stated that all horses like carrots). Thus, here, a "thing that does not like carrots" is not a horse.


Only if my definition was in fact correct, which it wasn't.


Implying that you have redefined what it is to be a horse. So tell me what is wrong headed about defining physical to be logical quantitative relationships. So far you've offered "something is physical because you feel it". Not very informative Kevin.

I suspect you are being deliberately obtuse, but I cannot tell why. Does some cherished idealist conclusion hang on the idea that physical stuff must be that which can be defined by logical quantitative relationships, or are you just questioning whether physical objects are physical for kicks?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

----------------------------------------------------------------------
this explanation of privacy only reiterates the fact that it contains no explanation of how qualitative experience can be defined in terms of a function of any individual brain
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Neither does any other metaphysic.

I agree, but some philosophies do not need to. For example, mental monism does not need to explain experience in terms of physical relationships. With that metaphysic, its the other way round. It needs to explain the existence of physical relationships in terms of experience. That's not to say that mental monism has a coherent definition of experience though!

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
BTW - just remembered your calculator question.

Pressure on keys = sensory input.

Thank you.


You said that information always involves sensation didn't you?

How is the pressure applied to a calculator keypad a sensation?


Ah... so all you're asking is for science to hurry up and complete the research that we're currently doing? OK, that's fine.

No, that's not my positon. I regard it as inconceivable that science could provide an explanation of qualitativeness in terms of physical relationships.


But this question - how does the physical brain create qualitative experience - is a totally different question from why brain A can't have experiences that brain B is having.

The first question is valid, meaningful, and logical; the second is meaningless and moronic.

Asking how the brain 'has' or 'generates' or whatever experience is meaningful. Asking why I can't experience what you experience is silly and ignorant.


No, it's only a "silly" question if you accept that experience is a brain process. And since we have established that the question of how a brain process = experience has not been answered in any conceivable way then a materialist cannot accept it as a fact, which means that the first question is definately not "silly", just secondary. Furthermore, my reason for mentioning this "silly" question was to highlight the fundamental question.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
What are the components of the Experience? because for me it is based on making sense of the senses. Now, is there something "raw" behind this process?

I don't understand your question. Could you rephrase it?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Kevin_Lowe
By "without rhyme or reason" I mean that there is absolutely no discernable pattern to its appearance whatsoever, which to me seems both perfectly possible and incompatible with describing the appearance of the hand in any logically quantifiable way.

I don't think so. If there is absolutely no discernable pattern to its appearance then we're dealing with a perfectly random event. This means that its appearance can be described in terms of a probability distribution, which is definately quantifiable and logical. I don't know why you are continuing with this desparate attempt to define a physical thing as something that cannot be described in terms of logical quantifiable relationships. It doesn't work.


Perhaps foolishly I assumed that it was so obvious that a hand that slaps people must be a member of the set of physical things that nothing more need be said.

If you plan on arguing otherwise I would like to see you do it and I would be very surprised if you made any headway.

I have never been arguing that the slapping hand is not physical. I'm arguing that it is defined as physical because it has logical quantifiable relationships. How are you defining it as physical?



"Clearly, obviously, unambiguously solid and able to be interacted with" will do fine for that statement. Physical in the everyday and uncontroversial sense.

"solid" is a reference to a logical quantifiable relationship as is "able to be interacted with". :D



I see your problem, you are going about this backwards. You should be observing that which is physical and then trying to define it.

How does Kevin know what he is observing is "physical" before he defines it?


I have not actually advanced a definition yet, I am just making the point that the definition you advanced is flawed because it excludes potential phenomena that are unambiguously physical.

LOL! You just used the term "physical" after explicitly stating that you have not actually advanced a definition yet! You must have a definition of the term in mind when you use it otherwise all of what you are saying here is meaningless. What is it?

[Z]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
You said that information always involves sensation didn't you?

How is the pressure applied to a calculator keypad a sensation?

Obviously, the nature of the senses is lost upon you, isn't it?

Our senses are nothing more than 'keys' upon which 'fingers' press to get reactions. Take sight, for example; here, the keys are the cones and rods, and the fingers are the photons that strike them.

So, a calculator possesses a 'sense' to know when a key is being pressed, and which key it is. Sensation.

Think, David, think.

No, that's not my positon. I regard it as inconceivable that science could provide an explanation of qualitativeness in terms of physical relationships.

Then it is you who has the closed mind, quite simply.

If you simply regard it as difficult, or unlikely but possible, then there might be a point in discussing it with you. But you have completely closed your mind to that possibility.

Hence, no further discussion on the subject with you is possible.

No, it's only a "silly" question if you accept that experience is a brain process. And since we have established that the question of how a brain process = experience has not been answered in any conceivable way then a materialist cannot accept it as a fact, which means that the first question is definately not "silly", just secondary. Furthermore, my reason for mentioning this "silly" question was to highlight the fundamental question.

What else could experience be, than a brain process?

Let me ask a simple enough question: is there experience without a brain? Any evidence, at all? Any?

The correct answer would be, there is no evidence of experience without a brain at this time. It is unlikely that experience could occur without a brain, but not impossible. However, at this time, the current working model is that a brain is required to have experience.

Thus, at this time, your question is merely silly.

Besides, materialists don't accept anything as 'fact' either - just appropriate current theory or 'best possible theory'. At present, the concept that brain states = experiences is the best possible theory.

Ergo... :D

Still, I think you might be smart enough to grasp these basic, fundamental concepts. You don't fully sound as lost as Ian, yet.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Obviously, the nature of the senses is lost upon you, isn't it?

Our senses are nothing more than 'keys' upon which 'fingers' press to get reactions. Take sight, for example; here, the keys are the cones and rods, and the fingers are the photons that strike them.

So, a calculator possesses a 'sense' to know when a key is being pressed, and which key it is. Sensation.

Think, David, think.


I fully realise this notion, but lets backtrack a little to see the point of this particular aspect of the debate. You originally said this:

"there are no conscious rocks, unless they possess senses and data-processing the likes of which we do not understand. "

To which I responded:

"Can you tell me in what way any physical process is not information processing? "


Your claim is that all aspects of experience is information processing. Now, I am saying that all physical processes, for example the physical processes going on in a rock, can be regarded as information processing. Thus you must give an account of why one physical process is not associated with experience and the other is. This is effectively the same as providing a solution to the hard problem. However, our disagreement (which I now realise a little better after your varied effort at clarifying your points) is most likely down to our initial definitions of what it is we are trying to explain. You seem to think that what needs explaining is sensation and you seem to be initially defining sensation in a relational way, ie, access to percepts. That is not what I am talking about when I say "experience". By that I mean qualitativeness which is not defined in a relational way. If we don't agree on the same initial definition of what it is we are trying to explain then we are bound to end up talking past each other. Ho hum.




Then it is you who has the closed mind, quite simply.

If you simply regard it as difficult, or unlikely but possible, then there might be a point in discussing it with you. But you have completely closed your mind to that possibility.

Hence, no further discussion on the subject with you is possible.


I always open to change my mind. The way to do that would be to question my notion of conceivability. But based on the nature of experience and my current reasoning I must conlcude that it's impossible. Otherwise I'd be lying to myself.




What else could experience be, than a brain process?

I don't have an alternative conception as yet. Perhaps others do. But be under no misconception that a lack of an alternative makes the problems associated with the problematic view go away!


Let me ask a simple enough question: is there experience without a brain? Any evidence, at all? Any?

The meaning of that question depends upon your philosophical point of view. If I were an idealist then right now there is experience that is not dependent on a brain! What the idealist must provide is an account of why the experiences that give rise the illusion of a physical brain are associated with other experiences we normally label as subjective.

[Z]

OK, most of what you said, David, wasn't half-bad this time. Definitely helps to define your P.O.V. more clearly.

However, I do have a major problem with this statement:

By that I mean qualitativeness which is not defined in a relational way.

How is qualitativeness not defined in a relational way? In fact, how is any quality of any thing defined without relationships?

I think I need to ask you to restate or clarify this line - it seems another snagging point in meaningful communication between us.

Now, I am saying that all physical processes, for example the physical processes going on in a rock, can be regarded as information processing. Thus you must give an account of why one physical process is not associated with experience and the other is. This is effectively the same as providing a solution to the hard problem.

"Can be regarded." Sure. I can regard anything any way I like. But that doesn't make it so.

After all, what are the key aspects that turns chemical/physical reactions into information processing? I would argue that some form of memory would have to be involved. What memory is involved in a rock rolling down-hill? Some sensory input must occur - which, again, pre-implies a central thought processor as well.

Of course, I admit my conception of information processing invariably requires some form of 'brain' - some means, chemical or mechanical, of storing, retrieving, and comparing data - which also implies some form of symbolic translations.

A rock rolling down-hill is not information processing. A rock rolling downhill, where the entire hill is comprised of rock-paths, movable gates, and catch-points might be information-processing IFF there is a user present to interpret the symbolism and operate the gates.

But that's my view - information processing requires some sort of calculation device.

The meaning of that question depends upon your philosophical point of view. If I were an idealist then right now there is experience that is not dependent on a brain! What the idealist must provide is an account of why the experiences that give rise the illusion of a physical brain are associated with other experiences we normally label as subjective.

But no evidence. Got it, thanks.

[Beerina]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No, as I keep saying our consciousnesses cannot play any role in a scientific theory. If consciousness is causally efficacious then we have to retreat to interactive dualism at a minimum.

And this is bad because...?

Why even go to dualism? Consciousness must be of a type of physics, perhaps undiscovered parts of our own, or perhaps wildly different, but still physics of some kind.

How could it be otherwise? "Uncaused" is meaningless.

[Kevin_Lowe]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I don't think so. If there is absolutely no discernable pattern to its appearance then we're dealing with a perfectly random event. This means that its appearance can be described in terms of a probability distribution, which is definately quantifiable and logical.


I could argue otherwise, but I'll redefine the phenomenon to make it simpler instead. The hand only ever appears once in the history of the universe, slaps you, and then vanishes never to return. There is no logical reason for it to appear, nor for it to slap you, nor for it to disappear. In fact, the phenomenon goes against everything we know of how the universe works. It's a genuine anomaly, and in fact it is the only genuine anomaly in the history of the universe.

For your definition to work, you have to explain either how such a phenomenon is logically quantifiable, or explain why such a phenomenon is not physical.


I have never been arguing that the slapping hand is not physical. I'm arguing that it is defined as physical because it has logical quantifiable relationships. How are you defining it as physical?


:rolleyes: In the everyday English sense still.



How does Kevin know what he is observing is "physical" before he defines it?


I poke it, same as anything else. After all, it could be a hallucination, in which case the thing I am seeing has no physical existence of its own - it's just atoms in my brain misbehaving, although I am in a sense observing that misbehaviour via my hallucination.


LOL! You just used the term "physical" after explicitly stating that you have not actually advanced a definition yet! You must have a definition of the term in mind when you use it otherwise all of what you are saying here is meaningless. What is it?

:rolleyes: The English definition.

Look, there are things that are unambiguously physical. A nice big rock, for example. No sane definition of the physical is going to exclude a nice big rock. If your definition of the physical excludes a nice big rock, your definition is idiotic.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by Kevin_Lowe
:rolleyes: The English definition.

Look, there are things that are unambiguously physical. A nice big rock, for example. No sane definition of the physical is going to exclude a nice big rock. If your definition of the physical excludes a nice big rock, your definition is idiotic. Though I'm not sure if I agree with David's definition of physical, it hardly seems fair to counter this argument by pointing to the popular definition of physical. We're having this discussion precisely because that definition isn't clear and becomes problematic at some point.

For example, I could Imagine defining such a hand as a freak occurrence that is compatible with, say, quantum physics but just extremely improbable. But then I know nothing about quantum mechanics.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon

How is qualitativeness not defined in a relational way? In fact, how is any quality of any thing defined without relationships?


Ok, almost fell into my own trap. I did not mean to say that we define a qualitative experience. It has a mode of existence that cannot be defined full stop, since definitions as you rightly say are relational in nature. This inability to be defined is why I have the conception of non-relational nature of qualitative experience.


"Can be regarded." Sure. I can regard anything any way I like. But that doesn't make it so.

After all, what are the key aspects that turns chemical/physical reactions into information processing?

Well, an input can be specified, for example the initial physical state of the reaction, and an output can be specified in terms of the physical state after the reaction has taken place. In addition, the entropy of the system start and end point can be measured, which is the measure of the systems information content. Couple this with the direct causal relationship between the start and end point of the reaction then you have information processing. Is there something more to information processing that you are trying to get at?



I would argue that some form of memory would have to be involved.


Why on earth would you say that?


What memory is involved in a rock rolling down-hill?

None, only because "memory" is a specific type of information processing.


Some sensory input must occur - which, again, pre-implies a central thought processor as well.

Not sensory input, just input.




But no evidence. Got it, thanks.

Well of course not. Similarly, materialism or epistemology does not require evidence of objective reality, nor can it give any without involving itself in circular reasoning. That doesn't stop manu from adopting those philosophies as coherent.

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
...I did not mean to say that we define a qualitative experience. It has a mode of existence that cannot be defined full stop...

...Well of course not. Similarly, materialism or epistemology does not require evidence of objective reality, nor can it give any without involving itself in circular reasoning...Are you saying that you could be a materialist without being able to point to a hotdog, which to the hotdog salesman is also a hotdog, and expect to get a hotdog? Every time you interact with other minds there is evidence for objective reality, that's why materialism posits it, and why science tries to model it rather than to model Neverneverland.

Now it's fine if you dispute the existence of objective reality, after all, it's just an assumption, but it does leave you with a complete lack of anything to back up arguments pertaining to reality. And here you are, asserting statements of fact and saying you're not going to back them up.

You're not hoping to convince anyone, are you?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Kevin_Lowe
I could argue otherwise, but I'll redefine the phenomenon to make it simpler instead. The hand only ever appears once in the history of the universe, slaps you, and then vanishes never to return. There is no logical reason for it to appear, nor for it to slap you, nor for it to disappear. In fact, the phenomenon goes against everything we know of how the universe works. It's a genuine anomaly, and in fact it is the only genuine anomaly in the history of the universe.

For your definition to work, you have to explain either how such a phenomenon is logically quantifiable, or explain why such a phenomenon is not physical.


The fact that the "appearance of the hand" is an anomaly does not make it undefinable by logical quantifiable relationships. Anomalies happen all the time but this does not stop us from defining such anomalies as physical phenomena. There are still aspects of the observation that are logically quantifiably related. It still has physical characteristics. Physical here is still defined by such relationships.

There is also the aspect of the "hand slap" that is not definable as physical, ie all qualitative aspects of this experience.


:rolleyes: In the everyday English sense still.

Which is what? Please explain what you mean in a coherent way.




I poke it, same as anything else. After all, it could be a hallucination, in which case the thing I am seeing has no physical existence of its own - it's just atoms in my brain misbehaving, although I am in a sense observing that misbehaviour via my hallucination.


This is all very incoherent. If you poke something then what exactly are you basing your definition of physical on? Surely not a qualitative feeling!? Its perfectly possible for you to hallucinate the feeling of touch as well as sight. What characteristic of your observations would you base a definition of an electron being physical? You obviously can't poke that. There must be a common characteristic of your observations between poking a large scale physical thing and observing an electron. I say that the common criteria is that both sets of observations are entailed by logical quantitative relationships.


:rolleyes: The English definition.

Which is?


Look, there are things that are unambiguously physical. A nice big rock, for example. No sane definition of the physical is going to exclude a nice big rock. If your definition of the physical excludes a nice big rock, your definition is idiotic.

Of course my definition doesn't exclude a "rock", as long as you are talking about the logical quantifiable characteristics of the "rock" and not the qualitative experience of it.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
Are you saying that you could be a materialist without being able to point to a hotdog, which to the hotdog salesman is also a hotdog, and expect to get a hotdog? Every time you interact with other minds there is evidence for objective reality, that's why materialism posits it, and why science tries to model it rather than to model Neverneverland.


I don't understand what you are trying to say here. I was just pointing out that demanding evidence for a brain that does not experience is not a meaningful question under mental monism. Under mental monism, the physical world would be a consequence of the existence of experience, not the other way round. Also, providing evidence for objective reality is circular because objective reality must first exist in order for evidence to have an meaning.


Now it's fine if you dispute the existence of objective reality, after all, it's just an assumption, but it does leave you with a complete lack of anything to back up arguments pertaining to reality. And here you are, asserting statements of fact and saying you're not going to back them up.

Why does the non-existence of objective reality (defined as reality that is not experiential) mean that I cannot argue for anything pertaining to reality?

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I don't understand what you are trying to say here. I was just pointing out that demanding evidence for a brain that does not experience is not a meaningful question under mental monism. Under mental monism, the physical world would be a consequence of the existence of experience, not the other way round. Also, providing evidence for objective reality is circular because objective reality must first exist in order for evidence to have an meaning. It's very possible that I misread your post, as I'm not a native speaker, but I think you've got it backwards concerning materialism.
First of all, materialism neither intends nor needs to provide evidence for objective reality, it assumes it and goes from there. And it assumes this because I can be pretty certain that when I ask for a hotdog, the salesman sells me a hotdog. He knows what I mean by hotdog, and he get's it right every single time.
This, among other things, is evidence for objective reality.
No circularity, just an assumption. And it is this assumption that makes scientific inquiry possible.

Secondly, nobody is "demanding evidence for a brain that doesn't experience". Experience exists, materialists just want to know how subjective experience arises from the objective. You say: it can't be done, I say: Why not and how are you so sure?

Why does the non-existence of objective reality (defined as reality that is not experiential) mean that I cannot argue for anything pertaining to reality? Because if reality is not objective, there is no way I can judge any statement of fact on thruth content. Simply put: What's true to you may not be true to me.
If you say that objective reality doesn't exist and experience is not definable objectively, what am I supposed to say? Why am I to be persuaded by this argument, or lack thereof?

Of course, I'm not quite sure if you are saying that objective reality doesn't exist, but just in case.
Anyway, It's not quite clear to me where you stand, and why you find it inconceivable that consciousness is physically definable.

[Z]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Ok, almost fell into my own trap. I did not mean to say that we define a qualitative experience. It has a mode of existence that cannot be defined full stop, since definitions as you rightly say are relational in nature. This inability to be defined is why I have the conception of non-relational nature of qualitative experience.

Hmmm.. I think we can only agree to disagree on this. Personally, I don't see any problem with relational definitions - as such, any qualitative experience can be defined.

After all, I can explain 'quaif' as 'the sensation when one grates the skin off of one's knee on a cheese grater', and by repeating this experiment, you can fully comprehend 'quaif'.

Well, an input can be specified, for example the initial physical state of the reaction, and an output can be specified in terms of the physical state after the reaction has taken place. In addition, the entropy of the system start and end point can be measured, which is the measure of the systems information content. Couple this with the direct causal relationship between the start and end point of the reaction then you have information processing. Is there something more to information processing that you are trying to get at?

Do you see the part I highlighted above? This measurement would require an observer, would it not? Someone, say, with memory and a brain, as such?

So the information processing would be done not here, but in a brain?

I almost missed this slip...

Why on earth would you say that?

Because something isn't 'information' until it's compared/contrasted to some other bit of information.

Not sensory input, just input.

What's the difference, in your opinion? I know what I think - I'm curious as to what you think.

Well of course not. Similarly, materialism or epistemology does not require evidence of objective reality, nor can it give any without involving itself in circular reasoning. That doesn't stop manu from adopting those philosophies as coherent.

I don't understand why you might say this. Materialism is all about evidence of objective reality. But any philosophy which cannot draw evidence from an objective source - as objective as possible, meaning observed by the greatest number of persons - is irrelevant.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
..... Materialism is all about evidence of objective reality. ....
As, of course, is objective idealism. :)

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by hammegk
As, of course, is objective idealism. :) Yes.

[Kevin_Lowe]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
The fact that the "appearance of the hand" is an anomaly does not make it undefinable by logical quantifiable relationships. Anomalies happen all the time but this does not stop us from defining such anomalies as physical phenomena. There are still aspects of the observation that are logically quantifiably related. It still has physical characteristics. Physical here is still defined by such relationships.


I think it is time you explain what you mean by logical in this context then, because I don't know what job you think that word is doing.


Which is what? Please explain what you mean in a coherent way.


One more time then.

Some things are unambiguously members of a given set. Sandra Bullock is an actress. Nicole Kidman is an actress. Any proposed definition of "actress" must be such that it includes Sandra Bullock and Nicole Kidman in its set of actresses, or it is immediately and obviously worthless.

In the same way if your definition of what it is physical excludes one or more things that are obviously physical, it is proof your definition is worthless.

Do you understand, at the very least, the form of this argument now, and the relevance of unambiguously physical things to this argument?


This is all very incoherent. If you poke something then what exactly are you basing your definition of physical on? Surely not a qualitative feeling!? Its perfectly possible for you to hallucinate the feeling of touch as well as sight. What characteristic of your observations would you base a definition of an electron being physical? You obviously can't poke that. There must be a common characteristic of your observations between poking a large scale physical thing and observing an electron. I say that the common criteria is that both sets of observations are entailed by logical quantitative relationships.


It's not incoherent at all. I don't pretend to be certain anything is not a hallucination. If I poke something and weigh it and see it then I become 99.9+% certain I am dealing with a physical object. Sometimes I am dreaming when I do this and it happens that I am wrong. Usually, though, subsequent events only further confirm my suspicion that I am dealing with a physical object.

Electrons are something I mostly take on faith (although I have carried out Milliken's famous experiment in high school). Other people have done the poking for me, and since my computer works I assume they must have gotten it mostly right.


Which is?


Go to www.dictionary.com if you are unfamiliar with the word. Failing that make a point.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
It's very possible that I misread your post, as I'm not a native speaker, but I think you've got it backwards concerning materialism.
First of all, materialism neither intends nor needs to provide evidence for objective reality, it assumes it and goes from there.


Precisely. My motive for bringing this point up is because Zaayrdragon has demanded evidence for a brain that does not posses consciousness. Now, under idealism this question is as unanswerable as finding evidence for the existence of objective reality to a materialist. And I hazard a guess that zaayrdragon accepts that objective reality exists.



And it assumes this because I can be pretty certain that when I ask for a hotdog, the salesman sells me a hotdog. He knows what I mean by hotdog, and he get's it right every single time.
This, among other things, is evidence for objective reality.

I don't know what you would call it but it's certainly not evidence for objective reality. The entire concept of evidence requires that objective reality exists, so to have evidence for objective reality is circular reasoning.


No circularity, just an assumption. And it is this assumption that makes scientific inquiry possible.


It is circular for the reason I gave. For sure its an assumption, but you can't have evidence for the assumption when the entire concept of evidence requires the assumption to be true.


Secondly, nobody is "demanding evidence for a brain that doesn't experience".


zaayrdragon is.


Experience exists, materialists just want to know how subjective experience arises from the objective. You say: it can't be done, I say: Why not and how are you so sure?


Because logical relationships can only describe something that is defined by logical relationships. Experience is not defined by logical relationships so it can't be explained by them. The only way for materialists to reconcile this problem is to explain something else, for example consciousness in terms of access, which is relationally defined.


Because if reality is not objective, there is no way I can judge any statement of fact on thruth content. Simply put: What's true to you may not be true to me.


I think I disagree, although I'm still trying to come to terms with the consequences of mental monism. I'll try to answer this soon I hope!

[Iacchus]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
..... Materialism is all about evidence of objective reality. .... Originally posted by hammegk
As, of course, is objective idealism. :) Originally posted by H'ethetheth
Yes. So, what is objective dualism then? ... but the notion that both "objective materialists" and, "objective idealists" exist? ;)

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Hmmm.. I think we can only agree to disagree on this. Personally, I don't see any problem with relational definitions - as such, any qualitative experience can be defined.

After all, I can explain 'quaif' as 'the sensation when one grates the skin off of one's knee on a cheese grater', and by repeating this experiment, you can fully comprehend 'quaif'.

But you are not defining the experience at all here. You are making a statement about the conditions that can be correlated with having the experience. This is not the same as a definition of a physical process whereby the process is completely entailed by the definition. For example, you could give an definition of grating the skin off your knee without mentioning the experience that accompanies that process and still completely entail "skin grating" by such a definition.



Do you see the part I highlighted above? This measurement would require an observer, would it not? Someone, say, with memory and a brain, as such?


If you adopt this reasoning then the brain processes would also require an observer, which just highlights my point (actually Ians original point) that there is no fundamental difference between the physical processes going on in someones brain and a rock. Both can be fully described in terms of physical relationships without the need for any mention of experience.


So the information processing would be done not here, but in a brain?

No, in both.


What's the difference, in your opinion? I know what I think - I'm curious as to what you think.


There is no fundamental difference between "sensory input" and "input". The former just specifies a different context. It's a brain process instead of a rock process. So what? It's still logical relationships all the way down.



I don't understand why you might say this. Materialism is all about evidence of objective reality.

It may seem that way, but I think its circular reasoning to ask for evidence of objective reality because the concept of evidence requires that objective reality exists.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Kevin_Lowe
I think it is time you explain what you mean by logical in this context then, because I don't know what job you think that word is doing.


I mean "logical" in a purely mathematical sense.



Some things are unambiguously members of a given set. Sandra Bullock is an actress. Nicole Kidman is an actress. Any proposed definition of "actress" must be such that it includes Sandra Bullock and Nicole Kidman in its set of actresses, or it is immediately and obviously worthless.

Kevin, I'm asking you why you put these things in a given set. Sandra Bullock and Nicole Kidman would be put the actress set because of certain criteria.

By what criteria are you placing things in the "physical" set?
(this is the third time I've asked you now, please answer!)


Do you understand, at the very least, the form of this argument now, and the relevance of unambiguously physical things to this argument?

Of course I do. So give me an ununambiguously physical thing that is not defined by logical quantitative relationships.



It's not incoherent at all. I don't pretend to be certain anything is not a hallucination. If I poke something and weigh it and see it then I become 99.9+% certain I am dealing with a physical object. Sometimes I am dreaming when I do this and it happens that I am wrong. Usually, though, subsequent events only further confirm my suspicion that I am dealing with a physical object.

Electrons are something I mostly take on faith (although I have carried out Milliken's famous experiment in high school).


So what it your definition of physical then!? What was it about the school experiment that confirms you are dealing with observations of something physical?

I can't imagine it's anything other than logical quantifiable relationships. Can you?

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Precisely. My motive for bringing this point up is because Zaayrdragon has demanded evidence for a brain that does not posses consciousness. Now, under idealism this question is as unanswerable as finding evidence for the existence of objective reality to a materialist. And I hazard a guess that zaayrdragon accepts that objective reality exists. I'm not sure that Zaayrdragon is doing that exactly but I'll let him sort that out himself.

I don't know what you would call it but it's certainly not evidence for objective reality. The entire concept of evidence requires that objective reality exists, so to have evidence for objective reality is circular reasoning. Maybe you're right, even more strictly speaking. If you're a solipsist then I agree that areeing with a figment of imagination on the identity of another figment is not evidence of the existence of objective reality. But if we assume there is more than one mind in existence, this example just is evidence of objective reality.
If another mind - say Bill - refers to something out there - say a hotdog - in the same way that I do, and consistently so, in a myriad of instances, how is that not evidence for the existence of hotdogs that exist independent of both Bill and me? Is it then so strange to assume a philosophical stance based on the assumption that things do exist independent of individual experiences?

It is circular for the reason I gave. For sure its an assumption, but you can't have evidence for the assumption when the entire concept of evidence requires the assumption to be true. I'm sorry but it really isn't circular. All that is needed to make the assumption that objective reality exists, is experiences such as agreeing that there exists something that is not Bill and not me, but a hotdog.
If sufficient experiences exist that objective reality exists, we just assume it does, and there's no reason to provide evidence for it. It would only become circular when an objective whateverist uses the findings of objective whateverism to demonstrate the existence of objective reality. I'd be surprised if you can present a single one of those.

Because logical relationships can only describe something that is defined by logical relationships. Experience is not defined by logical relationships so it can't be explained by them. The only way for materialists to reconcile this problem is to explain something else, for example consciousness in terms of access, which is relationally defined. How can you say this? If we don't know what experience is, how can we say it cannot be described by logical relationships? I agree that science can be wrong, and possibly the subjective nature of experience can never be explained to the satisfaction of some, but let's say we find a neural correlate for every mental process. In principle we can then produce a functional artificial 'brain'. The owner of such a brain would quite possibly show all the signs of being conscious. If this were the case, would you still say that experience is not defined by brain processes? Would you deny that this zombie has real consciousness? Would you say that we inadvertently added the magical ingredient somewhere in the process, and if so, where?


I think I disagree, although I'm still trying to come to terms with the consequences of mental monism. I'll try to answer this soon I hope! I anxiously await.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth

If another mind - say Bill - refers to something out there - say a hotdog - in the same way that I do, and consistently so, in a myriad of instances, how is that not evidence for the existence of hotdogs that exist independent of both Bill and me?

It's certainly evidence for the existence of "hotdogs". But this all boils down to what we precisely mean by "hotdogs". "Hotdogs" is merely a set of related experiences that we can describe and predict to occur under certain circumstances, as is "Bill refering to hotdogs" and indeed anything deemed to be part of objective reality. In that sense it is not circular to have evidence for a physical thing to be part of objective reality. But to conceive of evidence for the existence of objective reality itself is cirular because the null hypothesis (objective reality doesn't exist) makes the concept of evidence meaningless.


Is it then so strange to assume a philosophical stance based on the assumption that things do exist independent of individual experiences?

Not at all. I do it all the time in everyday life. But when I sit down and think about it, the foundations of such habitual thinking don't stand up so strong.


I'm sorry but it really isn't circular. All that is needed to make the assumption that objective reality exists, is experiences such as agreeing that there exists something that is not Bill and not me, but a hotdog.

But at this stage, the "hotdog" exists as a set of experiences. To have evidence that these experience represent something that exists in the absense of those experiences requires the existence of objective reality.


How can you say this? If we don't know what experience is, how can we say it cannot be described by logical relationships?

I do know what experiences feel like. Qualitative feel is a mode of existence that does not require the concept of evidence or belief. Based on this mode of existence I can say for certain that qualitative feel cannot be described by quantitative relationships. I realise that sounds quite arrogant to assert but I must be drawn to that conclusion based on the existence of qualitative experience. I do not have anything further to say about qualia other than their inability to be described by logical relationships, but I think its a big blow for materialism.


I agree that science can be wrong, and possibly the subjective nature of experience can never be explained to the satisfaction of some, but let's say we find a neural correlate for every mental process. In principle we can then produce a functional artificial 'brain'. The owner of such a brain would quite possibly show all the signs of being conscious. If this were the case, would you still say that experience is not defined by brain processes?

Yes. Why wouldn't I?

Would you deny that this zombie has real consciousness?


While the former question doesn't depend on your philosophical point of view, this one does. I think that if you are an idealist then nothing possesses consciousness. Mmm thats a tough one. I accept that other people are conscious all the time but under idealism it would be meaningless to think that....I think.


Would you say that we inadvertently added the magical ingredient somewhere in the process, and if so, where?


A bit easier to answer. I would say there is no existence that does not have the "magical ingredient" so adding such an ingredient is a meaningless statement.

[Z]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Precisely. My motive for bringing this point up is because Zaayrdragon has demanded evidence for a brain that does not posses consciousness. Now, under idealism this question is as unanswerable as finding evidence for the existence of objective reality to a materialist. And I hazard a guess that zaayrdragon accepts that objective reality exists.

Actually, I'm demanding evidence for consciousness that does not require a brain.

But given your other comments, I see reading comprehension is low on your list of critical skills.

I don't know what you would call it but it's certainly not evidence for objective reality. The entire concept of evidence requires that objective reality exists, so to have evidence for objective reality is circular reasoning.

And without evidence, you have nothing at all.

Because logical relationships can only describe something that is defined by logical relationships. Experience is not defined by logical relationships so it can't be explained by them. The only way for materialists to reconcile this problem is to explain something else, for example consciousness in terms of access, which is relationally defined.

Nonsense.

But you are not defining the experience at all here. You are making a statement about the conditions that can be correlated with having the experience. This is not the same as a definition of a physical process whereby the process is completely entailed by the definition. For example, you could give an definition of grating the skin off your knee without mentioning the experience that accompanies that process and still completely entail "skin grating" by such a definition.

No, 'skin grating' is the process; I specifically mentioned the sensation when you undergo 'skin grating'.

And we are defining the experience by defining the conditions which produce that experience. It's like defining a reaction by giving the constituent chemicals and the process to produce that reaction.

If you adopt this reasoning then the brain processes would also require an observer, which just highlights my point (actually Ians original point) that there is no fundamental difference between the physical processes going on in someones brain and a rock. Both can be fully described in terms of physical relationships without the need for any mention of experience.

Only if you assume an immaterial rider in the brain. The brain processes ARE the observer, quite simply. But apparently, you're in the same mental camp as Ignoramus Ian, so you're about to be pigeonholed with him.

Simply enough, unless some brain is taking the measurements and processing the information, it cannot be 'information processing'. You're saying that a brain requires a brain over it to process its information? Do you realize how utterly stupid this really is?

Qualitative feel is a mode of existence that does not require the concept of evidence or belief.

This is a particularly ignorant statement. How can anything exist with neither evidence nor belief to support them?

Sorry, David, but this is about as stupid as it is possible to come up with.

You have evidence of your feelings - your brain processes your feelings every moment. You have a mental record of those feelings. This is evidence, Dave.

Further, you do have beliefs about your feelings.

If this is the best you can do - including mis-representing what I asked for - then I'm afraid further discussion with you is pointless. You're just not capable of logical, critical thought, apparently.

Have a wonderful fourth of July!

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
It's certainly evidence for the existence of "hotdogs". But this all boils down to what we precisely mean by "hotdogs". "Hotdogs" is merely a set of related experiences that we can describe and predict to occur under certain circumstances, as is "Bill refering to hotdogs" and indeed anything deemed to be part of objective reality. In that sense it is not circular to have evidence for a physical thing to be part of objective reality. But to conceive of evidence for the existence of objective reality itself is cirular because the null hypothesis (objective reality doesn't exist) makes the concept of evidence meaningless.If you can explain to me how this doesn't constitute solipsism, that would be very helpful.

It seems to me that as soon as you concede that experiences confer information about some reality, you will find that this information is very much in favour of a reality that is independent of your individual experience.
I do know what experiences feel like. Qualitative feel is a mode of existence that does not require the concept of evidence or belief. Based on this mode of existence I can say for certain that qualitative feel cannot be described by quantitative relationships.I don't mean to be rude, but this reads to me: "Qualitative feel is something that just exists, therefore it cannot be explained."
That isn't much of an argument, let alone a "blow to materialism".


I summarise your answers about the p-zombie as: "The zombie is conscious because everything has the 'magical ingredient'."
I would say:"The zombie is conscious because nothing has the 'magical ingredient'."

Not only do I agree that "adding the magical ingredient" is a meaningless phrase. I even think the above statements are equivalent.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
If you can explain to me how this doesn't constitute solipsism, that would be very helpful.


Or perhaps you could explain how you deny solipsism?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Actually, I'm demanding evidence for consciousness that does not require a brain.

But given your other comments, I see reading comprehension is low on your list of critical skills.

Whoops! Was a bit too quick to type there. I did mean the other way round. Forgive a man a mistake!


And without evidence, you have nothing at all.

Jury's out on that



Nonsense.

care to tell me why?



No, 'skin grating' is the process; I specifically mentioned the sensation when you undergo 'skin grating'.

And we are defining the experience by defining the conditions which produce that experience. It's like defining a reaction by giving the constituent chemicals and the process to produce that reaction.

Well this is our disagreement. I say by defining the experience as the conditions under which you will have the experience, you are not defining the experience at all. You are just defining a set of relationally defined observations, which is fine but be under no illusion that you are defining or explaining qualitative experience when you do that. Consider the chemical reaction. There is nothing that is left undefined when you have completely described the consituents of the reaction.



Simply enough, unless some brain is taking the measurements and processing the information, it cannot be 'information processing'. You're saying that a brain requires a brain over it to process its information?

No I'm not saying that. I am just saying that there is no fundamental difference between brain processes and rock processes. Both can be regarded as information processing for the reasons I gave in my other post. As long as an input and output can be specified and there is a direct causal relationship between the two then you have information processing.

Would you disagree with that and why?



This is a particularly ignorant statement. How can anything exist with neither evidence nor belief to support them?

Because evidence and belief relate to constructs that are entailed by related elements and are inferred to exist. Qualitativeness does not exist by way of relationships or inference. When was the last time you inferred the existence of redness!?


You have evidence of your feelings - your brain processes your feelings every moment. You have a mental record of those feelings. This is evidence, Dave.

No you have it muddled. Evidence is about inferred knowledge. You can only have evidence for a concept that involves relationships between experiences. You do not require evidence for the qualitative nature of any experience. This is patently obvious.


Further, you do have beliefs about your feelings.

It might serve us best if you give me an example here. I suspect you are refering to a belief about how experiences relate to one another, which is fine. I am denying that we can have beliefs about the qualitative nature of experiences.


Have a wonderful fourth of July!

No thanks, I don't go in for any of that nonsense ;)

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by hammegk
Or perhaps you could explain how you deny solipsism? Or perhaps it's time to realise that by boring figments of your imagination with inane requests, you are boring only yourself.

If David Smith is arguing for solipsism, he's not doing a very good job.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by H'ethetheth
If you can explain to me how this doesn't constitute solipsism, that would be very helpful.

It seems to me that as soon as you concede that experiences confer information about some reality, you will find that this information is very much in favour of a reality that is independent of your individual experience.

I wasn't really presenting a coherent alternative view to an expereince-independent reality. I was just pointing out the circularity of claiming evidence for the existence of an experience-independent realiy. However, what you say here is a subtly different argument to the one I would suggest if I had to suggest an alternative. I would say that reality is not independent of experience per se. So it would be possible for the reality that we obtain information about to be independent of our individual experience at any one time, but it would nevertheless be experiential in nature. In other words, it would be possible to experience such a reality. But as i said, I'm currently trying to work out what that would mean.


I don't mean to be rude, but this reads to me: "Qualitative feel is something that just exists, therefore it cannot be explained."
That isn't much of an argument, let alone a "blow to materialism".

Just as a materialist would say that objective reality "just exists" ;)

[H'ethetheth]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Just as a materialist would say that objective reality "just exists" ;) Exactly!

ETA: With of course the added remark that objective idealists and physicalists and objective whateverists do so as well.

[Kevin_Lowe]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I mean "logical" in a purely mathematical sense.


Okay, so what job is it doing that is not already covered by "quantitative" in your formulation of what is physical?

If you definition boils down to "physical things are things which can, in theory at least, be measured" then the slapping hand is not a problem for it. I think it might have other problems, but I won't go on about them since it's not clear yet that is a legitimate alternative statement of your definition.


Kevin, I'm asking you why you put these things in a given set. Sandra Bullock and Nicole Kidman would be put the actress set because of certain criteria.

By what criteria are you placing things in the "physical" set?
(this is the third time I've asked you now, please answer!)


I keep answering it the same way. Sorry if you do not like it, but the answer is not going to change just because you pretend not to hear it. If I can poke it, prod it, weigh it, sniff it and generally interact with it by means of my immediate senses it's physical (unless I am dreaming or hallucinating, a possibility I accept, just as I accept the possibility that "Sandra Bullock" does not exist and is a fictional charatcter like Allan Smithee).


Of course I do. So give me an ununambiguously physical thing that is not defined by logical quantitative relationships.


I'll pass on that until we have nailed down what job "logical" is doing in that phrase.


So what it your definition of physical then!? What was it about the school experiment that confirms you are dealing with observations of something physical?


See, poke, manipulate with electrical field etc.


I can't imagine it's anything other than logical quantifiable relationships. Can you?

As above, I am not quite clear yet on what you are trying to convey with "logical", so I'll pass on that.

[Robin]

Originally posted by hammegk
Or perhaps you could explain how you deny solipsism?
Easy, I go to my library and read some Shakespeare, Dante, Eliot (George and TS), Slessor etc... Then I go to the Art Gallery and view some Turners, Renoirs Boyds etc... Then I go to my science books and read what Galileo, Newton, Faraday wrote, and my mathematics .... You get the idea - I couldn't have done all of that - I couldn't have done any of that.

OK it is not proof-beyond-unreasonable-doubt as immaterialists demand but it is pretty obvious that there are people that are not me. So that denies solipsism.

Now if there is a person that is not me and we both see something, say a tree, then it is pretty clear that we have identified an object that is independent of me and him. Moreover he can predict something that neither of us can percieve and I can confirm his prediction. So that denies Idealism.

The idea that there is reality independent of minds is at least a more reasonable assumption than any Idealists make. (ie that there is some sooper-dooper mind that for some reason is trying to fool itself into believing that there is an independent reality).

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Robin
Easy, I go to my library and read some Shakespeare, Dante, Eliot (George and TS), Slessor etc... Then I go to the Art Gallery and view some Turners, Renoirs Boyds etc... Then I go to my science books and read what Galileo, Newton, Faraday wrote, and my mathematics .... You get the idea - I couldn't have done all of that - I couldn't have done any of that.

OK it is not proof-beyond-unreasonable-doubt as immaterialists demand but it is pretty obvious that there are people that are not me. So that denies solipsism.
I agree that I am not The Solipsist, and believe that you aren't either. Unfortunately, that's the best I can do with those facts.


Now if there is a person that is not me and we both see something, say a tree, then it is pretty clear that we have identified an object that is independent of me and him. Moreover he can predict something that neither of us can percieve and I can confirm his prediction. So that denies Idealism.
It confirms that what you consider idealism, and what I consider idealism differs.


The idea that there is reality independent of minds is at least a more reasonable assumption than any Idealists make. (ie that there is some sooper-dooper mind that for some reason is trying to fool itself into believing that there is an independent reality).
See last response.

Question: does Thought exist?

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
I agree that I am not The Solipsist, and believe that you aren't either. Unfortunately, that's the best I can do with those facts.If you get that far and can't go further you are straining at gnats.Question: does Thought exist? I THINK so. And within thought, God exists. And within God, Lifegazer exists. But does thought exist inside Lifegazer? I believe he could answer both ways, neither of which would convince me that there was existing thought behind his answer.

Back to your question. I'm cetain that we could define Thought in or out of existence depending on the definition we employed. If we defined it as the produce of living brains and we accepted that there were such things as living brains we could accept that thought exists.

Some other definition could posit thought as a continuous manifestation of the illusion arising from functioning brains no more real than the perception of a rainbow.

[Robin]

Originally posted by hammegk
I agree that I am not The Solipsist, and believe that you aren't either. Unfortunately, that's the best I can do with those facts.
You can do better than just believe. My poor philosophising might be a figment of your imagination, but you couldn't have dreamed up the greats like Shakespeare, Faraday, Bach etc... you can be as certain as it is possible to be certain of anything that there are minds besides your own.
It confirms that what you consider idealism, and what I consider idealism differs.
Of course there are a host of different philosophies under the label of Idealism. I used to have fun taking the various descriptions of Idealism and Materialism and then swapping the words 'mental' for 'physical' and 'mind' for 'body'. For the most part this little trick transformed one to the other.

I merely point out that if you accept that another mind is a thing independent from you then the tree in the quad is a thing independent from you (even if it is a perception in the mind of God).

The tree is a piece of sense data, Bach is a piece of sense data - but if Bach is more than just the sense data you have of him - had real thoughts and feelings that were not yours - then why is the tree not more than the sense data you have of it?

To me it is this independence that is the important thing - we are only a part of existence - things exist independently from me. What might be the ultimate nature of these things - mental or physical - is not really such an important question. If there is a God then that fact is a good deal more important than whether He created the universe from reality or thought. If there is no God then it does not matter much either.
Question: does Thought exist?
Yes - but it would probably take more years than I have in my life to really understand what I mean by that answer.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Robin
Yes - but it would probably take more years than I have in my life to really understand what I mean by that answer.

Nice.

Im sorry if Im repeating myself. But there are things that should not be said. And Im not Wittgenstein.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Atlas
If you get that far and can't go further you are straining at gnats.
Perhaps. Or perhaps most don't recognize a gnat when they see it.


I'm cetain that we could define Thought in or out of existence depending on the definition we employed.
I disagree.


If we defined it as the produce of living brains and we accepted that there were such things as living brains we could accept that thought exists.
Sure, we both think we Think, and the stuff we perceive as wetware is integral to us thinking.


Some other definition could posit thought as a continuous manifestation of the illusion arising from functioning brains no more real than the perception of a rainbow.
mu

Or may I say, Wow, Far-out. That's a little too much for me. ;)

Originally posted by B D Z

But there are things that should not be said.
Does ummm? count?

Originally posted by Robin

You can do better than just believe. My poor philosophising might be a figment of your imagination, but you couldn't have dreamed up the greats like Shakespeare, Faraday, Bach etc... you can be as certain as it is possible to be certain of anything that there are minds besides your own.
Well, I remain 100% certain Thought exists.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Robin
Easy, I go to my library and read some Shakespeare, Dante, Eliot (George and TS), Slessor etc... Then I go to the Art Gallery and view some Turners, Renoirs Boyds etc... Then I go to my science books and read what Galileo, Newton, Faraday wrote, and my mathematics .... You get the idea - I couldn't have done all of that - I couldn't have done any of that.

OK it is not proof-beyond-unreasonable-doubt as immaterialists demand but it is pretty obvious that there are people that are not me. So that denies solipsism.



sighs

Yup, and I feel it's pretty obvious I am a self.

[Robin]

Originally posted by hammegk
Well, I remain 100% certain Thought exists.
But do you know what you mean by the statement?

[Atlas]

Originally posted by hammegk
... mu

Or may I say, Wow, Far-out. That's a little too much for me. ;)
This time I prefer the answer: mu

I wasn't trying to push that definition only suggest that thought could be defined out of existence - like ghosts or God, something that appears to be real to us sometimes but is not what it appears to be.

I wouldn't want to, however. For me, the world is real and my thoughts of the world are real. One reality is substantial and one is insubstantial but I think it's a lost cause to argue against the existence of those things because of their common usage meanings.

[Robin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
sighs

Yup, and I feel it's pretty obvious I am a self.
Well I don't know that you are talking about, I am not sure that you do either.

I was asked how I deny solipsism and I gave an answer that there are works that are greater than I am capable of so I infer that they are the result of minds not mine. It seems to me a pretty reasonable response.

What possible relevance your comment has I can't see - did you perhaps reply to the wrong post?

You fail to answer my questions but still find time to insert random nonsense like this.