Please explain the "TV set" model of the brain

[aggle-rithm]

Several posters, mainly Ian, have made the analogy that the brain is like a TV set, receiving and interpreting signals from the mind, rather than, in fact, generating the mind.

The analogy seems consistent, up to a point, but I have a few questions:

1. A TV set (or radio, or other receiving device) is meant to be observed by outside entities. It doesn't have a subjective reality (at least, I assume it doesn't), but we do. Does the analogy break down at this point? If not, why?

2. If the brain is simply a "filter" for the outside signal, and diminished cognitive/motor functions are the result of the signal being blocked, then:
A. Shouldn't it be blocked only from the outside entities, and not from the subjective viewpoint? and
B. Since partial damage results in partial "blockage" of the "signal", then wouldn't complete destruction of the brain result in complete "blockage"?

I apologize if I've misrepresented this viewpoint. The questions are based on my best understanding of the analogy.

[aggle-rithm]

One thing I should make clear: I believe the evidence shows that the subjective experience in cases of mental illness and/or brain damage is consistent with what is observed on the outside. People say they feel "different" and often mourn the loss of their former selves. (if necessary, I can provide references to this.) Therefore, I think the behavior observed by outsiders is a fair indication of what is going on inside, especially in cases of grotesque changes in personality.

[Ashles]

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
Several posters, mainly Ian, have made the analogy that the brain is like a TV set, receiving and interpreting signals from the mind, rather than, in fact, generating the mind.
...snip...
I apologize if I've misrepresented this viewpoint. The questions are based on my best understanding of the analogy.
One thing to clarify - Ian's analogy isn't an analogy of the brain, but an analogy of his theory of consciousness. I only make this distinction because Ian clearly doesn't know the first thing about the actual brain.

As regards to the limitations of his analogy that will be up to Ian to address.

[jmercer]

The analogy breaks, I believe, because of a simple question: "Why would my brain receive my consciousness instead of yours?"

In other words, what's so unique about any given brain as an "receiver" that it would only tune into one specific entity and not others?

[Ratman_tf]

Originally posted by jmercer
The analogy breaks, I believe, because of a simple question: "Why would my brain receive my consciousness instead of yours?"

In other words, what's so unique about any given brain as an "receiver" that it would only tune into one specific entity and not others?

Past lives? Clairvoyance?

Not that I believe such things are true, just playin' devil's advocate for a moment.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Several posters? Who else holds this idea?

Why doesnt work? Because... it is not needed. There is no "anomalous" data that needs to invoque a different theory than the current scientific one (that the mind is produced by the brain).

Well, in fact this is incomplete, I would say that what we call "the mind" is instanciated by the body/world interactions. Its "in between them" so to speak, and not specifically "inside" the brain.

In any case its a difficult subject, thats why some have to invent such weird ideas. But I believe they do it just because they have not read enough about current scientific discoveries. ;)

[drkitten]

Originally posted by Ratman_tf
Past lives? Clairvoyance?


What do these mean, in this context?

How does "clairvoyance" explain why I pick up my own mind, and not, for example jmercer's?

[Francois Tremblay]

Occam's Razor indicates that we have absolutely no reason to posit a separate "mind" that is somehow different from the brain. The "mind" is only the subjective expression of our brain states. That's all.

What evidence does anyone here have that we need MORE ? Present the evidence and I'll listen.

[jmercer]

Originally posted by Ratman_tf
Past lives? Clairvoyance?

Not that I believe such things are true, just playin' devil's advocate for a moment.

Ok... and I'll play the heavenly prosecution. ;)

And... past lives/clairvoyance affect brains in what manner that permits them to tune to a single unique consciousness?

[jmercer]

Originally posted by new drkitten
How does "clairvoyance" explain why I pick up my own mind, and not, for example jmercer's?

:D

Because your clairvoyance tells you I don't swing that way!

:D

(Sorry, couldn't resist! ;))

[Batman Jr.]

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
Several posters, mainly Ian, have made the analogy that the brain is like a TV set, receiving and interpreting signals from the mind, rather than, in fact, generating the mind.

The analogy seems consistent, up to a point, but I have a few questions:

1. A TV set (or radio, or other receiving device) is meant to be observed by outside entities. It doesn't have a subjective reality (at least, I assume it doesn't), but we do. Does the analogy break down at this point? If not, why?

2. If the brain is simply a "filter" for the outside signal, and diminished cognitive/motor functions are the result of the signal being blocked, then:
A. Shouldn't it be blocked only from the outside entities, and not from the subjective viewpoint? and
B. Since partial damage results in partial "blockage" of the "signal", then wouldn't complete destruction of the brain result in complete "blockage"?

I apologize if I've misrepresented this viewpoint. The questions are based on my best understanding of the analogy.

One thing I should make clear: I believe the evidence shows that the subjective experience in cases of mental illness and/or brain damage is consistent with what is observed on the outside. People say they feel "different" and often mourn the loss of their former selves. (if necessary, I can provide references to this.) Therefore, I think the behavior observed by outsiders is a fair indication of what is going on inside, especially in cases of grotesque changes in personality.
The "TV set" theory I suspect wouldn't hold up because functions of the brain as they relate to outwardly manifested behavior appear to be explicable in the same way as the well-understood computational processes of a computer can make clear why a computer "behaves" in the way it does. When it comes to aspects of the psyche amenable to scientific measurement, Occam's razor instructs that we must discard of the "radio waves" of consciousness for purposes of practicality. Your recognition of certain physical pathologies of the brain affecting the state of an individual's personhood as viewed on the outside is an important point in realizing this.

[aggle-rithm]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Several posters? Who else holds this idea?



I've seen at least one other person make this claim, but I can't remember who it was. Maybe I'm exaggerating a little when I say "several".

[aggle-rithm]

Originally posted by Ashles

As regards to the limitations of his analogy that will be up to Ian to address.

I'm sure Ian doesn't believe there are any limitations. That's what I would like for him to explain.

[Ashles]

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
I'm sure Ian doesn't believe there are any limitations. That's what I would like for him to explain.
Well I meant that the "TV set" model of the brain would obviously only work up to a certain point. Even if you take the analogy to it's logical extreme then there are problems with the medium of information transfer, interference, identical receivers, information conversion...

No-one sensible or rational could logically claim that this analogy was useful to an understanding of the way the brain interpreted the idea of consciousness...

Oh. I see what you mean.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
[B]Several posters, mainly Ian, have made the analogy that the brain is like a TV set,



Is the Universe likewise like a balloon?

When I used to go to 6th form college (for 16 and 17 year olds), in an English language class, we each in turn had to stand up and talk about a topic for 10 minutes that we were personally interested in. I decided to talk about Cosmology. I was trying to explain about the "Big Bang" and the expansion of the Universe. I explained that it was incorrect to think of it as a normal explosion with Galaxies rushing through space and away from a common centre. In order to try to facilitate the understanding to my fellow pupils, I employed the analogy of a balloon get blown up. On the surface of the balloon are painted little black dots. I asked them them to imagine that the little black dot represented galaxies and the actual surface of the balloon represented the 3 dimensional space-time continuum. Now as the balloon expands the black dots (galaxies) move away from each other, but they are carried along by the fabric (space-time continuum) of the balloon (Universe). Moreover, it can be understood that no one black dot (Galaxy) is at the centre of the balloons surface (centre of the Universe).

One person asks what happens when the Universe pops. I basically said "huh". he said 'if the Universe is like a balloon then it must pop eventually after its expanded so much. I said 'no it won't'. He said then it's not like a balloon then, and he dismissed my entire metaphor.




receiving and interpreting signals from the mind, rather than, in fact, generating the mind.

The analogy seems consistent, up to a point, but I have a few questions:

1. A TV set (or radio, or other receiving device) is meant to be observed by outside entities. It doesn't have a subjective reality (at least, I assume it doesn't), but we do. Does the analogy break down at this point? If not, why?



Because the TV set is being compared to the brain. The brain does not have a subjective reality.



2. If the brain is simply a "filter" for the outside signal, and diminished cognitive/motor functions are the result of the signal being blocked, then:
A. Shouldn't it be blocked only from the outside entities, and not from the subjective viewpoint?



You mean that brain states ought not to affect conscious states?

If the brain only modifies consciousness or minds, rather than being the progenitor of the mind, the question then arises as to why we need brains at all.

The first thing to recognise here is that processes within the brain are akin to any information processing system. As with any such information processing system there are architectural constraints and these serve to limit the mind so we only have access to those perceptions that follow the familiar and regular patterns that we associate with the physical world. This then allows us to function proficiently whilst we subsist in this empirical reality.

Now when the mind operates in detachment from the brain, when it is temporarily or permanently disembodied, then its processing is released from the constraining influence of the arrays of primitive processing units (essentially the brain). It will then have access to all other perceptions apart from our everyday perceptions. Those other perceptions will be driven by some other "engine", and the person may seem to be passing through other worlds. This would be broadly consistent with the anecdotal experiences of some out-of-body experiences, especially near-death experiences - and indeed with reportedly channelled descriptions from the dead, as well as with traditional accounts such as those found in the "Tibetan Book of the Dead".




and
B. Since partial damage results in partial "blockage" of the "signal", then wouldn't complete destruction of the brain result in complete "blockage"?



Only if the self continues to operate through the brain.

To repeat what I've said before:

Imagine if you will 2 very intelligent people from the early 18th century who, by some means or other, are miraculously transported to our present day. Imagine further they encounter a television set showing a film. After being suitably astounded, and after tinkering around with its internal components and finding that tinkering with particular components effects the picture quality in particular characteristic ways, you can imagine one of them claiming that not just the picture, but the storyline of the film must be wholly generated by these internal components since tinkering with them affects the picture. He might claim there is overwhelming evidence that this must be so. The other person, however, will rightly point out that although he grants that the picture itself is generated by these internal components, it cannot be the case that the actual contents of the movie, the actual storyline with its depiction of various emotions and so on, can be generated by just these internal components. This is because there is nothing about the physical processes within the TV set which could conceivably lead to the generation ex nihilo of such a storyline.

So with a television set the state of its internal components will affect the quality of the picture, but this does not entail that the storyline depicted by the picture is affected too. Indeed no matter how poor the picture quality might get e.g. a snowy picture, ghosting etc, a given film will continue to show the same events.

I want to suggest that some useful insights into trying to understand a possible relationship of the self to its brain might be gained from consideration of this television set metaphor. A loose analogy might be drawn between the television set and the brain, the storyline of a TV programme and the self, and finally the picture quality of programme displayed and the mind states undergone by the self. Thus, just as tinkering with the internal components of a television set will have consequences for the quality of the picture displayed, but will not change the storyline of the programme, so too might alteration of the brain’s processes affect states of the mind without bringing about any change in the actual self.

Thus the suggestion here is that just as the storyline of a film does not have its origin in the television set's internal components, neither might the self have its source or origin in the brain. Rather it conceivably could be the case that the self's existence is ontologically self-subsistent and is “filtered” by the brain. What I mean by “filtered” is that although the self does not change as the state of our brains change so as to become a literally different self, the self’s mind states do change. That is to say differing particular mind states change according to the particular physical configuration of the brain. Thus the various mental states we experience during our lives are a result of both the self - accounting for the feeling of a persistent self and the more general dispositions of selfhood - and also the particular physical configuration of the brain the self is “filtered” by. The feeling of a persistent enduring self remains intact, but, due to the change in mind states, our moods, interests and intelligence will vary. This then will account for the correlation between brain states and mind states. This account of the self and its brain which I have provided here is referred to as the transmission theory.

I think this corresponds very nicely with our intuitive notions we have regarding the self. After all, the self is the essential you. To elucidate: although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives. Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states. Thus I (that is the self) might, for example, be in a good mood or a bad mood. But my self is not to be equated by such given mind states. Rather I experience being in a good mood, or a bad mood, or indeed any other mental state. The I or the self is that which endures, but which can experience various mental states such as differing moods. Such a self is known in philosophical parlance as a substantial self.

Note that this notion of a literal same self is difficult to maintain if we suppose that the self is actually generated by the brain. For example, if we happen to be materialists - by far the most common group to hold self is generated by the brain (see the next section for an explication of this term) - we must maintain that any “self” must simply be equated with the brain, or more precisely with the processes taking place within it. Given that brain states are in a constant state of change, it would certainly seem that, in a literal sense, the self must also be in a constant state of change. Be clear as to what this means. It means that there can be no unchanging enduring self, i.e. substantial self, under materialism. Our selves are quite literally equated with our mind states. Later, under the duplicate experiment section, it will be argued that under materialism that we must effectively think of our selves as literally ceasing to be, only to be replaced by an almost exact duplicate, spontaneously springing ex nihilo into being every infinitesimal fraction of a second. Within this scenario it might be difficult to avoid concluding our sense of self is effectively an illusion. Indeed this is precisely what many philosophical materialists maintain.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
[B]One thing I should make clear: I believe the evidence shows that the subjective experience in cases of mental illness and/or brain damage is consistent with what is observed on the outside. People say they feel "different" and often mourn the loss of their former selves. (if necessary, I can provide references to this.)



Why should they mourn the loss of a self which is not them? People are very imprecise in their statements. This proves nothing.



Therefore, I think the behavior observed by outsiders is a fair indication of what is going on inside, especially in cases of grotesque changes in personality.

If what the subject says differs from the impression from the 3rd person perspective, then who should we believe?

However if a person truly sincerely believes that he has just come into existence, then that is certainly interesting. But I think they just mean that their mind states are now characteristically different, not that their self has literally changed! :eek:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by jmercer
The analogy breaks, I believe, because of a simple question: "Why would my brain receive my consciousness instead of yours?"

In other words, what's so unique about any given brain as an "receiver" that it would only tune into one specific entity and not others?

An interesting question. I have absolutely no idea. I hope you're not implying that this somehow gives evidence for the hypothesis that consciousness is generated by the brain.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Several posters? Who else holds this idea?

Why doesnt work? Because... it is not needed. There is no "anomalous" data that needs to invoque a different theory than the current scientific one (that the mind is produced by the brain).

Well, in fact this is incomplete, I would say that what we call "the mind" is instanciated by the body/world interactions. Its "in between them" so to speak, and not specifically "inside" the brain.

In any case its a difficult subject, thats why some have to invent such weird ideas. But I believe they do it just because they have not read enough about current scientific discoveries. ;)

Bodhi Dharma Zen,

You clearly have not got a faintest clue about the mind-body problem and why it is indeed a problem. Read my website once it's completed.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Francois Tremblay
[B]Occam's Razor indicates that we have absolutely no reason to posit a separate "mind" that is somehow different from the brain.

But logical incoherence trumps this perverted materialist version of "Occam's razor".

[drkitten]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
An interesting question. I have absolutely no idea. I hope you're not implying that this somehow gives evidence for the hypothesis that consciousness is generated by the brain.

No. It merely decreases the plausibility of your TV hypothesis.

Evidence against X is almost never for Y, unless Y can be shown to be equivalent to not-X.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
An interesting question. I have absolutely no idea. I hope you're not implying that this somehow gives evidence for the hypothesis that consciousness is generated by the brain.
No, it just gives evidence that your theory is half-assed.

Jmercer's question is one of many facets of the overall question: If reality is a monism and my brain is just played on my senses like the rest of the external world, then why does it have control over my consciousness?

~~ Paul

[aggle-rithm]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Why should they mourn the loss of a self which is not them? People are very imprecise in their statements. This proves nothing.



Maybe I was being imprecise. What I meant is that people have memories of having been able to do things that are now impossible and having had certain desirable qualities that are now gone. So, more precisely, they mourn the loss of a big chunk of the "self", where the self is defined as being composed of many psychological/physical components that come together to form a whole.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Batman Jr.
The "TV set" theory I suspect wouldn't hold up because functions of the brain as they relate to outwardly manifested behavior appear to be explicable in the same way as the well-understood computational processes of a computer can make clear why a computer "behaves" in the way it does. When it comes to aspects of the psyche amenable to scientific measurement, Occam's razor instructs that we must discard of the "radio waves" of consciousness for purposes of practicality. Your recognition of certain physical pathologies of the brain affecting the state of an individual's personhood as viewed on the outside is an important point in realizing this. [/B]

Even the perverted materialist interpretation of Occam's razor cannot trump the fact that materialism is incoherent. Consciousness is not susceptible to a reductionist scientific explanation; not ever.

BTW you are assuming the world is physically closed. If so then I would assume you are right in your statement that

"functions of the brain as they relate to outwardly manifested behavior appear to be explicable in the same way as the well-understood computational processes of a computer can make clear why a computer "behaves" in the way it does"

But I have no interest in functions of the brain. My argument concerns consciousness.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by new drkitten
No. It merely decreases the plausibility of your TV hypothesis.


I have absolutely no idea why. And I bet you couldn't supply a reasonable answer.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Bodhi Dharma Zen,

You clearly have not got a faintest clue about the mind-body problem and why it is indeed a problem. Read my website once it's completed.

Oh, I do. You have obviously never noticed it, but Im one of the few in the forum that doesnt hold a fixed possition. I believe everything we think we know about it is wrong.

You are wrong, materialists are wrong, dualists, emergentists, every single person who knows he "knows" is wrong.

You, on the other hand, are not only ignorant in the subject, but in your being completly wrong. Why do I say this, is such a crude manner? Because your "anomalous" data is the PSI phenomena, which is like believing in santa and pink unicorns. Sorry.

[Ashles]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Is the Universe likewise like a balloon?

When I used to go to 6th form college (for 16 and 17 year olds), in an English language class, we each in turn had to stand up and talk about a topic for 10 minutes that we were personally interested in. I decided to talk about Cosmology. I was trying to explain about the "Big Bang" and the expansion of the Universe. I explained that it was incorrect to think of it as a normal explosion with Galaxies rushing through space and away from a common centre. In order to try to facilitate the understanding to my fellow pupils, I employed the analogy of a balloon get blown up. On the surface of the balloon are painted little black dots. I asked them them to imagine that the little black dot represented galaxies and the actual surface of the balloon represented the 3 dimensional space-time continuum. Now as the balloon expands the black dots (galaxies) move away from each other, but they are carried along by the fabric (space-time continuum) of the balloon (Universe). Moreover, it can be understood that no one black dot (Galaxy) is at the centre of the balloons surface (centre of the Universe).

One person asks what happens when the Universe pops. I basically said "huh". he said 'if the Universe is like a balloon then it must pop eventually after its expanded so much. I said 'no it won't'. He said then it's not like a balloon then, and he dismissed my entire metaphor.
Ian I don't know if this says more about him or about you.

Analogoes such as this break down at certain points. They are used to explain general concepts.

If you think the guy in your college was a moron then I agree with you completely and we logically agree that your 'TV' analogy only goes so far.

Otherwise... well let's not consider 'otherwise'.

[Ratman_tf]

Originally posted by new drkitten
What do these mean, in this context?

How does "clairvoyance" explain why I pick up my own mind, and not, for example jmercer's?



Maybe clairvoyance is picking up another's perceptions. I'm assuming that the TV analogy works both ways, otherwise you'd have people walking into walls as the mind directing them would have no feedback.



Assuming clairvoyance exists, of course. ;)

[Ratman_tf]

Originally posted by jmercer
Ok... and I'll play the heavenly prosecution. ;)

And... past lives/clairvoyance affect brains in what manner that permits them to tune to a single unique consciousness?

IF a mind is seperate from the brain/body, then it follows that the brain of, say, General Custer is somewhere out there.

Let's say I have a memory of a previous life. Following the TV analogy, perhaps that past life would actually be a memory of ole Custer's mind getting picked up as 'interference' by my brain.

I guess I'm just brainstorming (waht-waaa) possiblities where the consciousness/brain interface isn't quite perfect.

Not that it actually proves anything. Just a fancy that the topic brought to my... mind.
:o

[Batman Jr.]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Even the perverted materialist interpretation of Occam's razor cannot trump the fact that materialism is incoherent. Consciousness is not susceptible to a reductionist scientific explanation; not ever.

BTW you are assuming the world is physically closed. If so then I would assume you are right in your statement that

"functions of the brain as they relate to outwardly manifested behavior appear to be explicable in the same way as the well-understood computational processes of a computer can make clear why a computer "behaves" in the way it does"

But I have no interest in functions of the brain. My argument concerns consciousness.
I agree that inward perception cannot be measured scientifically; that is why I elaborated that I was talking about "aspects of the psyche amenable to scientific measurement." However, where I have to part with you is where you come to the conclusion that this hypothetical metaphysical—perhaps not even metaphysical, but maybe just unknown—component of consciousness can not only take from but fuel the brain. From what has been ascertained from scientific study, everything so far appears consistent with the intellectual powers of the brain being autonomous, self-sufficient. This is unlike a television set where there are no internal devices accountable for what is received through an external signal. Now, I'm surmising that you might want to argue that there are no internal devices in the brain that could be pointed to and positively identified as being causative of consciousness. This is true, but one important caveat about this line of reasoning has to be elucidated upon so that one could see the fundamental differences between this kind of situation and that of the television. In the case of the television, we are talking about external influences on the television which fall within the bounds of epistemology. As a result, we can identify cause-and-effect relationships in what will, for instance, create the screenplay being read by the actors on screen or the musical score being bellowed out of the speakers. We can realize that the requisite elements for generating such things don't exist in the television. With the brain, the internally unidentifiable element—consciousness—completely falls out of our field of observation. This glaring absence of its mensuration keeps us from comprehending what could possibly produce it. It can't be associated through empirical means with anything, even its truthful cause, so even if consciousness was self-contained in the brain, it would be impossible to discover that it was! From this, we can see that the self-contained proposition cannot be ruled out as with the TV.

[delphi_ote]

Originally posted by Intelligencer Ian
Even the perverted imperialst interpretation of Occam's razor cannot trump the fact that imperialsm is incoherent.

I think I'm just going to substitute "imperialism" for "materialsm" whenever I read Ian's posts. Then he'll sound like a Secret Agent working for the Revolution against the perverted JREF Imperialsts, and I'll just pretend I'm reading a spy novel. I'll call him "Intelligencer Ian."

This might increase my chances of survival (though only slightly) when braving threads he posts in.

[Soapy Sam]

Ian-
Just FYI.
I did not discuss your analogy with anyone, here or elsewhere.
I had no prior knowledge of, or involvement in this thread.

Perhaps I'm psychic?


We now return you to the main feature...

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Batman Jr.
I agree that inward perception cannot be measured scientifically; that is why I elaborated that I was talking about "aspects of the psyche amenable to scientific measurement." However, where I have to part with you is where you come to the conclusion that this hypothetical metaphysical—perhaps not even metaphysical, but maybe just unknown—component of consciousness can not only take from but fuel the brain. From what has been ascertained from scientific study, everything so far appears consistent with the intellectual powers of the brain being autonomous, self-sufficient. This is unlike a television set where there are no internal devices accountable for what is received through an external signal. Now, I'm surmising that you might want to argue that there are no internal devices in the brain that could be pointed to and positively identified as being causative of consciousness. This is true, but one important caveat about this line of reasoning has to be elucidated upon so that one could see the fundamental differences between this kind of situation and that of the television. In the case of the television, we are talking about external influences on the television which fall within the bounds of epistemology. As a result, we can identify cause-and-effect relationships in what will, for instance, create the screenplay being read by the actors on screen or the musical score being bellowed out of the speakers. We can realize that the requisite elements for generating such things don't exist in the television. With the brain, the internally unidentifiable element—consciousness—completely falls out of our field of observation. This glaring absence of its mensuration keeps us from comprehending what could possibly produce it. It can't be associated through empirical means with anything, even its truthful cause, so even if consciousness was self-contained in the brain, it would be impossible to discover that it was! From this, we can see that the self-contained proposition cannot be ruled out as with the TV.

Holy transistors Batman! (sorry couldn't resist).

Interesting take on the analogy. Personally, I think that the analogy should be used only as an analogy about how we can easily make a false conclusion based on correlation alone. Regardless of how consciousness is eventually defined, all we have to go on at present is a correlation between the physical state of the brain and phenomenal states of consciousness. We manipulate the brain in various locations, observe a change in phenomenal states and conclude that consciousness is generated "in the brain". Similarly, we could manipulate components of a TV set, observe a change in the display and conclude that the display pattern is generated "in the TV". I agree with you that the TV display and phenominal aspects of consciousness are defined by different characteristics, the latter perhaps not even definable by physical relationships, but that is not relavent to the analogy. The fundamental point of the analogy is to show how false conclusions can be drawn from correlations.

Edited to clarify:

People here seem to mistaking the analogy for a hypothesis about how consciousness and the brain interact. It's not a hypothesis, just an analogy about false conclusions.

[Z]

This analogy is broken in so many ways, it's almost laughable to think anyone would bother using it.

I'm sure that Ian either has already or is going to use his example of the two 18th Century gentlemen who examine a television.

But again, there are gaping holes in this thinking.

First, if the television were brought back to them, in the 18th Century, would it display anything? No. It might give them tantalizing hints of what might be done regarding electricity, perhaps, but even if it came with a self-contained power supply, it would still display static.

Eventually, the two gentlemen might open it up, and discover the receiver, but to what end? At best, they would ponder why someone would build a machine that makes static.

On the other hand, if the two gentlemen were brought to this time, they would inevitably be exposed to radio wave theory, television studios, etc. and would quickly understand television just as we would.

We are in much the same position: if there were 'self transmitters' out there, there is a good chance we would already have discovered them by now. At the very least, we'd have bits of the brain with no current discernable use that, nevertheless, would affect the consciousness of the patient directly if altered.

But that's not the case.

What does Ian have to support his theories about the television model? Anecdotal evidence of ESP, OOB, NDE, etc. None of which is scientifically valid, all of which has been debunked to varying degrees.

I think someone else pointed out that there is a fundamental difference between a television program and consciousness, in that one is clearly and obviously an illusion, which could not be generated as is within the television, whereas the other is entirely consistant with the physical composition of the brain. Our illusion of self does not appear to exceed the limits of our brain; in fact, it is defined by those limits.

Really, a computer model of the brain would be far, far more accurate, even if one wanted to enter ESP into the picture.

[Z]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Holy transistors Batman! (sorry couldn't resist).

Interesting take on the analogy. Personally, I think that the analogy should be used only as an analogy about how we can easily make a false conclusion based on correlation alone. Regardless of how consciousness is eventually defined, all we have to go on at present is a correlation between the physical state of the brain and phenomenal states of consciousness. We manipulate the brain in various locations, observe a change in phenomenal states and conclude that consciousness is generated "in the brain". Similarly, we could manipulate components of a TV set, observe a change in the display and conclude that the display pattern is generated "in the TV". I agree with you that the TV display and phenominal aspects of consciousness are defined by different characteristics, the latter perhaps not even definable by physical relationships, but that is not relavent to the analogy. The fundamental point of the analogy is to show how false conclusions can be drawn from correlations.

But that is NOT his fundamental point in using the analogy. Instead, his deliberate correllation between brains and televisions is to demonstrate how the Self can be received through the Brain, and how we might misunderstand the brain's role in the Self.

Yet, clearly, the analogy fails to work, even on that behalf, unless his two gentlemen are just unfailingly stupid - much like himself.

[Z]

This concept was presented to me a few days ago, and I'd like to share it, though this might not be the best place to do so:

Think of the brain as a piece of paper. By itself, it is nothing, but one can see the potential it might have.

Now think of brain activity as ink on paper. If observed, what else can it be? Just ink on paper.

But to those who understand, the ink on the paper make a story. That story is the Self.

When you alter bits of the paper, or bits of the ink, the Story changes. But only for the Reader.

Is this a good analogy? No. Because it postulates yet another level - a Reader, a person who must understand. In the case of our Brain, the Story IS the Reader. And it leaves an unanswered question: who is the writer?

Here, at least, was someone who realized that analogies can only go so far - and that fatal flaws exist even in the best analogies.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But that is NOT his fundamental point in using the analogy. Instead, his deliberate correllation between brains and televisions is to demonstrate how the Self can be received through the Brain, and how we might misunderstand the brain's role in the Self.

That may be Ian's hypothesis about consciousness and the brain. I think it was Rupert Sheldrake who wrote about the analogy about 20 years ago (he may have borrowed it from someone else of course). I'm almost certain that Sheldrake intended the analogy to be used only as one about false conclusions from correlations rather than a proposed hypothesis about how consciousness and the brain interact. Thats certainly how I use the analogy anyway. And its clear that if you restrict the analogy to these terms then it does not fail.

[Z]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
That may be Ian's hypothesis about consciousness and the brain. I think it was Rupert Sheldrake who wrote about the analogy about 20 years ago (he may have borrowed it from someone else of course). I'm almost certain that Sheldrake intended the analogy to be used only as one about false conclusions from correlations rather than a proposed hypothesis about how consciousness and the brain interact. Thats certainly how I use the analogy anyway. And its clear that if you restrict the analogy to these terms then it does not fail.

Sure, if I restrict any analogy to specific terms it does not fail.

And while I agree with your analysis of Sheldrake's proposal, we aren't discussing Sheldrake, but Iandrake.

One of the things that I like about analogies is that we can extend them beyond the imposed limitations and come to understand where the analogy differs from the subject, and by doing so, learn more about the subject. For example, if the TV analogy is extended, then we get Ian's supposition that brains receive the Self - so is there a receiver? A transmitter? Two 18th Century gents in the 20th or 21st century could find these things for themselves, because they would be out there, somewhere, and evidence would lead them to these things; in the 18th century, there'd be no picture at all, so there'd be no reason to look for such things - since they wouldn't exist at all.

I could say that the brain is like an overripe tomato, because they're both soft and squishy. If I restrict the terms, the analogy does not fail. But that certainly doesn't make it the BEST analogy, nor would it be honest when trying to describe a brain to those unaware of what a brain is or what it's for to only use this analogy. Whereas Ian embraces the TV analogy as the best possible analogy to use, and rejects better analogies - because they undermine the point he would like to impose.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Sure, if I restrict any analogy to specific terms it does not fail.

Didn't you just say that even the best analogies have fatal flaws?


And while I agree with your analysis of Sheldrake's proposal, we aren't discussing Sheldrake, but Iandrake.

Noted, and I was just making a point about the correct usage of the analogy. :)


One of the things that I like about analogies is that we can extend them beyond the imposed limitations and come to understand where the analogy differs from the subject, and by doing so, learn more about the subject. For example, if the TV analogy is extended, then we get Ian's supposition that brains receive the Self - so is there a receiver? A transmitter?


I would say probably not. Taking the analogy to represent a mechanism of how consciousness interacts with the brain would be a step in the wrong direction in my opinion.


Two 18th Century gents in the 20th or 21st century could find these things for themselves, because they would be out there, somewhere, and evidence would lead them to these things;

That's not the point of introducing these gentlemen into the analogy though is it. They are put in the analogy to represent a person or persons who does not know anything about the mechanism by which the pattern on the TV screen is generated. In principle it would be possible for the gentlemen to figure out how the pattern is generated eventually, but that is to miss the point of the analogy. The analogy is supposed to represent our reasoning on the brain vs consciousness, but applied to a different system. If someone claims that phenomenal consciousness if generated by the brain and does so based on the observation that manipulating the brain results in a change in phenomenal consciousness, then the TV analogy shows how it is possible to make a false conclusion based on the same reasoning. The analogy is about false reasoning, not about any proposal about how the brain acts as a receiver.


I could say that the brain is like an overripe tomato, because they're both soft and squishy. If I restrict the terms, the analogy does not fail.

But the TV analogy is not meant to be used to state that the brain acts like a TV. It is meant to be used to state that correlation does not equal cause.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Batman Jr.
I agree that inward perception cannot be measured scientifically; that is why I elaborated that I was talking about

"aspects of the psyche amenable to scientific measurement." However, where I have to part with you is where you

come to the conclusion that this hypothetical metaphysical—perhaps not even metaphysical, but maybe just

unknown—component of consciousness can not only take from but fuel the brain.



So you mean that you accept that brain states affect conscious states, but that conscious states cannot affect brain

states? But we know that consciousness necessarily must be causally efficacious (I can paste in my argument here if

you like?) and we know that consciousness cannot be equated with either the processes of the brain, nor their

functions (again I can paste in the argument). Of course some physical "law" must be broken, but recognising where

the limits of a physical law lie is how science progresses.





From what has been ascertained from scientific study, everything so far appears consistent with the intellectual

powers of the brain being autonomous, self-sufficient. This is unlike a television set where there are no internal

devices accountable for what is received through an external signal.




I don't know what you mean. You will need to elaborate on what you mean about intellectual powers being autonomous

and self-sufficient. Are you claiming here that we have no reason to think the world is not physically closed and

that science provides evidence for this thesis i.e so that brain processes wholly account for intellectual powers?

Can I substitute consciousness for intellectual powers? If you are the problem here is that it is completely and

utterly not a scientific issue -- it's a philosophical issue. But I've already said this in my previous post,

and you agreed with me.
,
If you're simply saying that scientific study is consistent, or even gives highly suggestive evidence, for the

hypothesis that consciousness is wholly a product of the brain, then there are 2 points to be made.

a) Even supposing this is true, evidence does not amount to proof and therefore cannot rule out the TV metaphor of

brain/consciousness.

b) The scientific evidence is an irrelevance. We know this because we immediate experience the causal efficacy of

our consciousness and it is incoherent to suppose this is an illusion. Now the only way that our consciousness can

be causally efficacious and yet for it to be true that the world is physically closed, would be if reductive

materialism is true. But the scientific evidence doesn't give any support for reductive materialism, it only gives

support for the hypothesis that consciousness is a product of the brain (reductive materialism goes waaay

beyond this thesis). So you would need to have independent philosophical reasons for supposing reductive

materialism is true. If such reasons were provided then, and only then could you point to the scientific

evidence supporting your position. Otherwise philosophical reasoning trumps scientific evidence.






Now, I'm surmising that you might want to argue that there are no internal devices in the brain that could be

pointed to and positively identified as being causative of consciousness.



Well how could we ever know they are anyway??





This is true, but one important caveat about this line of reasoning has to be elucidated upon so that one could see

the fundamental differences between this kind of situation and that of the television. In the case of the

television, we are talking about externalinfluences on the television which fall within the bounds of epistemology.

As a result, we can identify cause-and-effect relationships in what will, for instance, create the screenplay being

read by the actors on screen or the musical score being bellowed out of the speakers. We can realize that the

requisite elements for generating such things don't exist in the television. With the brain, the internally

unidentifiable element—consciousness—completely falls out of our field of observation. This glaring absence of its

mensuration keeps us from comprehending what could possibly produce it. It can't be associated through empirical

means with anything, even its truthful cause, so even if consciousness was self-contained in the brain, it would be

impossible to discover that it was!



That's correct from the perspective of examining the brain, or even trying to fit consciousness into the scientific

world picture. But what if a "matter duplicator" were created? If a duplicate of someone were created, and it were

conscious and had pretty much the personality of the original, then this would pretty well much show that

consciousness is generated by the brain, yes?




From this, we can see that the self-contained proposition cannot be ruled out as with the TV. [/B]

Oh yes, I agree absolutely that the notion of consciousness being a product of the brain cannot be ruled out. The TV metaphor had the rather modest aim of simply showing that the notion of consciousness being a product of the brain is not a conclusion that is forced upon us!

Edited to add:

Ooops, had to type this out on notepad because my computer keeps spontaneously rebooting itself and I didn't want to lose everything. But it's come out all weird!

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This analogy is broken in so many ways, it's almost laughable to think anyone would bother using it.



How can it possibly be?? So you're saying that if states of Y follow states of X, then the very existence of Y (not its states) cannot possibly originate from anything else but states of X?? :rolleyes:

I can't wait to see your justification (I haven't read the rest of your post yet).




I'm sure that Ian either has already or is going to use his example of the two 18th Century gentlemen who examine a television.

But again, there are gaping holes in this thinking.

First, if the television were brought back to them, in the 18th Century, would it display anything? No. It might give them tantalizing hints of what might be done regarding electricity, perhaps, but even if it came with a self-contained power supply, it would still display static.



Yes that's right, that's why they went forward in time to our time in my example :)

Bringing back a TV set to the 18th century would just produce a TV set showing static (or whatever it's called). Likewise a matter duplicator duplicating a person would only produce a corpse ;)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This analogy is broken in so many ways, it's almost laughable to think anyone would bother using it.

I'm sure that Ian either has already or is going to use his example of the two 18th Century gentlemen who examine a television.

But again, there are gaping holes in this thinking.

First, if the television were brought back to them, in the 18th Century, would it display anything? No. It might give them tantalizing hints of what might be done regarding electricity, perhaps, but even if it came with a self-contained power supply, it would still display static.

Eventually, the two gentlemen might open it up, and discover the receiver, but to what end? At best, they would ponder why someone would build a machine that makes static.

On the other hand, if the two gentlemen were brought to this time, they would inevitably be exposed to radio wave theory, television studios, etc. and would quickly understand television just as we would.

We are in much the same position: if there were 'self transmitters' out there, there is a good chance we would already have discovered them by now.



I have no idea what a self-transmitter is. I certainly don't think anything "transmits" or creates the self.



At the very least, we'd have bits of the brain with no current discernable use that, nevertheless, would affect the consciousness of the patient directly if altered.

But that's not the case.

What does Ian have to support his theories about the television model?



I don't need anything to support it. You need to show wht correlations between conscious and brain states necessitate that the former come from the latter. Once you have done this then you will have debunked my TV set metaphor. But not before.





I think someone else pointed out that there is a fundamental difference between a television program and consciousness,


Yup, and someone could point out there's a fundamental difference between the space-time continuum, and the fabric of a balloon. That doesn't alter the fact that the balloon analogy for the expanding Universe helped me to understand it. So hpow do you explain that??

I presume you are hostile to all analagies whatsoever then? Even if they can sometimes enable people to understand??




in that one is clearly and obviously an illusion, which could not be generated as is within the television, whereas the other is entirely consistant with the physical composition of the brain. Our illusion of self does not appear to exceed the limits of our brain; in fact, it is defined by those limits.

Really, a computer model of the brain would be far, far more accurate, even if one wanted to enter ESP into the picture.

Sorry, I don't see how the above is relevant to the TV set metaphor. It is the materialist who adheres to the computer model of consciousness, not I. If the TV metaphor is wrong, then how is it wrong??

I keep asking this question to everyone! How is it wrong?? In what way is it wrong?? Saying that consciousness is consistent with the hypothesis that brain produces consciousness does not show that it is incoherent to think otherwise!! Does your sheer stupidity know of any limits whatsoever zaayrdragon???

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But that is NOT his fundamental point in using the analogy. Instead, his deliberate correllation between brains and televisions is to demonstrate how the Self can be received through the Brain, and how we might misunderstand the brain's role in the Self.

Yet, clearly, the analogy fails to work, even on that behalf, unless his two gentlemen are just unfailingly stupid - much like himself.

How the self can be received through the brain?? :confused:

I have prvided no answer to that, nor does it even make any sense.

You might as well ask how an object continues in uniform motion in a straight line in the absence of any forces.

Edited to add: I mean how does Newton's first law obtain?

Such a question is obviously outside science just as asking how a brain receives a self. Most questions regarding the worl we simply cannot answer. But that doesn't alter the fact that objects nevertheless do travel at a unifom motion in the absece of any forces!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian, I think you missed my question:

Jmercer's question is one of many facets of the overall question: If reality is a monism and my brain is just played on my senses like the rest of the external world, then why does it have control over my consciousness?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This concept was presented to me a few days ago, and I'd like to share it, though this might not be the best place to do so:

Think of the brain as a piece of paper. By itself, it is nothing, but one can see the potential it might have.

Now think of brain activity as ink on paper. If observed, what else can it be? Just ink on paper.

But to those who understand, the ink on the paper make a story. That story is the Self.

When you alter bits of the paper, or bits of the ink, the Story changes. But only for the Reader.

Is this a good analogy? No. Because it postulates yet another level - a Reader, a person who must understand. In the case of our Brain, the Story IS the Reader. And it leaves an unanswered question: who is the writer?

Here, at least, was someone who realized that analogies can only go so far - and that fatal flaws exist even in the best analogies.

Could you point out where I have ever denied that analogies only go so far?? Are you completely daft??

You and the rest of the materialist/skeptics are denying that the analogy goes anywhere whatsoever!

You are all asserting that consciousness/brain correlations prove that consciousness must be a product of the brain!!

So tell me what the hell has the fact that analogies eventually all fail got the hell to do with the price of tea in China??

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Originally posted by davidsmith73
That may be Ian's hypothesis about consciousness and the brain. I think it was Rupert Sheldrake who wrote about the analogy about 20 years ago (he may have borrowed it from someone else of course). I'm almost certain that Sheldrake intended the analogy to be used only as one about false conclusions from correlations rather than a proposed hypothesis about how consciousness and the brain interact. Thats certainly how I use the analogy anyway. And its clear that if you restrict the analogy to these terms then it does not fail.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sure, if I restrict any analogy to specific terms it does not fail.

And while I agree with your analysis of Sheldrake's proposal, we aren't discussing Sheldrake, but Iandrake.



But you and everyone else is saying that the TV metaphor is utterly absolutely not possible!

I'm saying it's possible, you lot are saying it's not. Sheldrake is saying it's possible. Yet you agree wioth Sheldrake but not me.
You truly are one of the mose awe inspiring stupid people I have ever had the misfortune to communicate with. You can't keep your story straight from one second to the next!





One of the things that I like about analogies is that we can extend them beyond the imposed limitations and come to understand where the analogy differs from the subject, and by doing so, learn more about the subject.



Yes but you need to acknowledge that the TV metaphor is not ruled out a priori as you have done so far knuckelhead!




For example, if the TV analogy is extended, then we get Ian's supposition that brains receive the Self - so is there a receiver? A transmitter?



WOW! This is like discussing the characteristics of a ballon whislt trying to understand the space time continuum!

Jeez

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Didn't you just say that even the best analogies have fatal flaws?



Noted, and I was just making a point about the correct usage of the analogy. :)




I would say probably not. Taking the analogy to represent a mechanism of how consciousness interacts with the brain would be a step in the wrong direction in my opinion.



That's not the point of introducing these gentlemen into the analogy though is it. They are put in the analogy to represent a person or persons who does not know anything about the mechanism by which the pattern on the TV screen is generated. In principle it would be possible for the gentlemen to figure out how the pattern is generated eventually, but that is to miss the point of the analogy. The analogy is supposed to represent our reasoning on the brain vs consciousness, but applied to a different system. If someone claims that phenomenal consciousness if generated by the brain and does so based on the observation that manipulating the brain results in a change in phenomenal consciousness, then the TV analogy shows how it is possible to make a false conclusion based on the same reasoning. The analogy is about false reasoning, not about any proposal about how the brain acts as a receiver.



But the TV analogy is not meant to be used to state that the brain acts like a TV. It is meant to be used to state that correlation does not equal cause.

I agree entirely with DavidSmith.

It's true that I've used the metaphor to try and convey my ideas about the distinction between the self and its differing mind states. I'm not sure if anyone else has ever tried to do that. But that doesn't get off the ground if people are simply a priori asserting that any other conclusion apart from brain states generate conscious states are simply not possible.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Ian, I think you missed my question:

Jmercer's question is one of many facets of the overall question: If reality is a monism and my brain is just played on my senses like the rest of the external world, then why does it have control over my consciousness?

~~ Paul

It controls your consciousness does it? Not simply effects it? Are you saying then that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon??

[Z]

There are times I almost wish I were mature enough to take Ian off of 'ignore'.

So, someone tell me, in these latest... what, six? Seven? ... posts, has he yet successfully defended his television analogy?

After all, the burden of proof is on him, since he is presenting his theory, correct?

Or is he ranting about the 'incoherency' of the idea that the Self is merely a continual and dynamic pattern of activity of the Brain?

...Well, frankly, whatever his rants are, I'm sure he's only a few steps away from finally giving us the defense we're looking for. But the entire subject has now grown boring.

My own personal opinion: Brains are not like television sets. Brains are like comput.... no, let's correct this here and now. Brains are computers. Organic computers. And the Self is the totality of program activity in the computer in a continual and dynamic state of functionality.

Your mileage may vary.

[Ashles]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It's true that I've used the metaphor to try and convey my ideas about the distinction between the self and its differing mind states. I'm not sure if anyone else has ever tried to do that.
They have (http://www.grrl.com/blognov2002.html)
Dossey uses the analogy of TV reception and transmission to explain how a nonmaterial mind acts on a physical body. That is, there is a signal from the non-local, universal mind that is picked up by the individual; clarity of the reception depends upon the individual's receiving equipment. When the picture is bad, there are two possible problems - the signal transmission is bad, or the TV set is bad. In Dossey's opinion, most modern theories of the brain resemble the person who believes the TV itself produces the picture. Thus when something goes wrong with the picture, they look only to the TV. Once it is fixed reception is restored, so like the local theories of the brain, their theory appears verified, just as damage to the brain appears to verify the brain as the origin of mind (Dossey 1989:197). For Dossey, the idea of a non-local mind is an even more advanced conception than the popular mind-body approach to medicine; it emphasizes the causal power of consciousness and "does not regard the mind as operating only within the individual human body or even within a single lifetime of a person" (Dossey 1989:265).
And here (http://www.light-messenger.org/lm0903.html)
To use the mind is similar to a television or radio.

In television, you receive a signal through the air that has the sound and picture and color, and all of that information is impressed repeatedly upon the screen, which is the memory of the television, and creates an image for you to see. As long as there is transmission, there is an image. But think well what happens when there is interference with the transmission. The picture, the sound, the color, or all are distorted, and we do not have the true original image. That is not to say that the transmitter is at fault or that the source of the material is at fault. Obviously, if interference changes the color of the face of an individual to green, we know that the face individual in the studio did not change to green. Therefore, the interference has caused a change in our perception of reality or in consciousness.

If the brain functions in this manner with the consciousness from other dimensions, then the logical question is: What can cause interference? Interference can be caused by other persons, other energies, by the individual preoccupied with other things or physical condition of the individual, and sometimes a type of interference that might be referred to as interdimensional interference. All of these things can impair the communication and flow of information. But memory and analysis, for analysis is bringing to the memory all that you remember or have learned about a subject in order to analyze it, this process needs a healthy memory bank.

[Ashles]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
There are times I almost wish I were mature enough to take Ian off of 'ignore'.
How could you put Ian on ignore? He makes my time fly by at work. His recent posts on psychology were worth the admission fee alone.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Ashles
They have (http://www.grrl.com/blognov2002.html)

And here (http://www.light-messenger.org/lm0903.html)

No Ashley, I'm taking the analogy further:

"A loose analogy might be drawn between the television set and the brain, the storyline of a TV programme and the self, and finally the picture quality of programme displayed and the mind states undergone by the self. Thus, just as tinkering with the internal components of a television set will have consequences for the quality of the picture displayed, but will not change the storyline of the programme, so too might alteration of the brain’s processes affect states of the mind without bringing about any change in the actual self".

Note that this is saying more than what the links say?

[drkitten]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No Ashley, I'm taking the analogy further:

"A loose analogy might be drawn between the television set and the brain, the storyline of a TV programme and the self, and finally the picture quality of programme displayed and the mind states undergone by the self. Thus, just as tinkering with the internal components of a television set will have consequences for the quality of the picture displayed, but will not change the storyline of the programme, so too might alteration of the brain’s processes affect states of the mind without bringing about any change in the actual self".

Note that this is saying more than what the links say?

Not especially. From the second citation above:

But think well what happens when there is interference with the transmission. The picture, the sound, the color, or all are distorted, and we do not have the true original image. That is not to say that the transmitter is at fault or that the source of the material is at fault. Obviously, if interference changes the color of the face of an individual to green, we know that the face individual in the studio did not change to green. Therefore, the interference has caused a change in our perception of reality or in consciousness.


They're talking about "interference," while you're talking about changes to to the TV set's internal workings -- but since one of the major causes of interference is a change (failure) of internal components, the difference between what you wrote and what they wrote is not especially significant.

[drkitten]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It controls your consciousness does it? Not simply effects it? Are you saying then that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon??

Why not? A lot of better philosophers than you have said that, Ian. Take a look at the writings of Douglas Hofstadter, for example -- I believe he won the Pulitzer for saying "consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon" in a very very well-written way.

[Ashles]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Note that this is saying more than what the links say?
To be honest I really don't see how your analogy is saying anything further than those.

The signal transmitted is assumed to be a standard signal. Nothing done to the TV will affect that signal. Your use of the term 'storyline' does not add anything to the analogy.
Storyline, signal... the same point is made that an effect on the brain will cause the signal/storyline to be incorrectly or incompletely interpreted.

So, no your analogy really doesn't go any further.

[MRC_Hans]

To answer the initial question, I think the fault with the TV analogy is that it is basically self-defeating. What it say is that all we can OBSERVE about the mind is an effect of the brain function, and it needs to stick to that to explain the many observations we make on how various things that affect the brain also effect the mind.

Thus, the claim that some other mind entitiy is transmitting through the brain becomes not only untestable, but also not parsimonious, since all we can observe is explained by the brain, making the non-physical mind or self superfluous.

Ian's elaboration with the two ancient gentlemen examining the TV set really weakens the thesis, because what one of them finds, as he closely examines the TV set and begins to understand its mode of funtion, is that the complexity and general fuctionality of the TV set does NOT support the observed complexity of the storyline shown. More so if he happens on a newscast; it will then be obvious that the TV set is privvy to some external influx of information that could not possible originate inside it.

In contast, we do not find (at least not yet), that the human brain does not have a level of complexity and structure that precludes the complexity of its behaviour (and indeed the analogy admits just that), and it does not provably have access to any information that is not either gained through the physical inputs we know of or originating inside it.

Hans

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by new drkitten
[B]Not especially. From the second citation above:



Not especially. From the second citation above:


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
But think well what happens when there is interference with the transmission. The picture, the sound, the color, or all are distorted, and we do not have the true original image. That is not to say that the transmitter is at fault or that the source of the material is at fault. Obviously, if interference changes the color of the face of an individual to green, we know that the face individual in the studio did not change to green. Therefore, the interference has caused a change in our perception of reality or in consciousness.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Well I suppose change in consciousness or perception of reality could equate to my differing mind states. But they don't have an analogy for the self where as I do i.e the actual storyline of the TV programme.

Edited to add:

Actually I was wrong. The transmission is the self. Still I think I put it much more clearly :mad:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by new drkitten
Why not? A lot of better philosophers than you have said that, Ian. Take a look at the writings of Douglas Hofstadter, for example -- I believe he won the Pulitzer for saying "consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon" in a very very well-written way.

Then it's a pity that those who awarded this Pulitzer didn't read my proof. Here it is:

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.

[Ashles]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Well I suppose change in consciousness or perception of reality could equate to my differing mind states. But they don't have an analogy for the self where as I do i.e the actual storyline of the TV programme.
The signal is the self in their analogy. It doesn't have to be spelt out in detail - it's already clear.
You are merely adding a redundant level of detail, but confusing it as being a deeper level of complexity.

I could create an anology where I describe the self as "Lines of dialogue" in the plot of the TV programme. But I am not adding anything to the analogy. Just as someone else could describe the self as "Words of dialogue" etc. etc. Over-elaborating the description doesn't add anything.
I am just describing the 'self' as a different part of the transmission. It is entirely unhelpful to the overall analogy.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Ashles
[B]The signal is the self in their analogy.



Yes yes, ok, I've just realised. But I've put it more clearly.




It doesn't have to be spelt out in detail - it's already clear.
You are merely adding a redundant level of detail, but confusing it as being a deeper level of complexity.



What detail?? I've just made it more clear!

[drkitten]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then it's a pity that those who awarded this Pulitzer didn't read my proof. Here it is:



This is a proof? Oh, you poor, dear, boy. Why don't you go sit down under a tree where it's nice and shady....


1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

If you consider it possible for you to be "convinced" that you are conscious without actually being conscious, then the following point is irrelevant.

If it's not actually possible, then point 2 simply does not follow from point 1.



3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious.



If there is truly no difference between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious, then it's not possible (pace point 2) for you to be convinced that you were conscious without actually being conscious. In other words, the physical causal chain postulated in the first point that is sufficient for you to be convinced that you are conscious is also sufficient for you to be conscious.

The only internal inconsistency is your equivocation between the nature of "causal chain" and about what is actually caused. If there is truly no difference between appearing to be conscious, and actual consciousness, then anything capable of causing. the appearance of consciousness is by definition capable of producing consciousness itself. If, on the other hand, something is capable of causing you to seem to be conscious without your really being conscious, then you have no proof that your "self-perception" of being conscious is not mere seeming, since you've already postulated the possibility of such.

You can't have it both ways. Either "seeming to be conscious" is identical to "conscious" -- in which case, there is no problem, or "seeming to be conscious" is not identical to "conscious," in which case there is again no problem.

I believe Hofstadter's thesis was the first -- that in order to be aware enough to be convinced of your own consciousness, you had to be conscious. Thus any causal process capable of producing the illusion of consciousness was by definition producing true consciousness.

[Ashles]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then it's a pity that those who awarded this Pulitzer didn't read my proof.
Oh. My. Dear. God.

Here it is:

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.
Yes.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
How does that follow? Why could consciousness not be a real phenomenon that merely results from functionality of the brain?
Your comment that you would "convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious." is a possibility, but not a logical certainty, so your "proof" falls down it this point and the Pulitzer eludes you for another year.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!
Yes you are conscious, but the fact of being conscious does not tell us about the nature of consciousness. ETA: And newdrk points out above the logical inconsistency that appears at this stage.

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.
The only inconsistency is due to earlier false assumption.

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.
No.

[Ashles]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yes yes, ok, I've just realised. But I've put it more clearly.

What detail?? I've just made it more clear!
Put it like this - is was clear to us already. If you have clarified it to yourself then I am happy for you.

[Z]

Oh lord - See, this is typical Ianist nonsense. He posted this proof a while ago, and it was torn to shreds then. Yet he's still clinging to this proof as if it weren't empty and hollow.

Yep - I would almost go so far as to say Ian is predictable, but he has actually toned down the insults and foul mouth, so maybe he's capable of some learning after all.

[Francois Tremblay]

No one has yet given any reason to think that identity theory is incomplete. Maybe this is like Christianity, a dogma that some vocal skeptics demand that all other skeptics not question...

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
It controls your consciousness does it? Not simply effects it? Are you saying then that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon??
Control ... effect ... whatever. When I sleep I have no virtually no consciousness. Sounds like control to me.

I note you still haven't answered the question.

~~ Paul

[jmercer]

Ian,

Analogies can be flawed to the point where their premise is useless; I suspect your TV analogy is in exactly that situation. So let's abandon the TV analogy, and get to the heart of the matter. Here's what I think your perspective is; please correct me if I'm mistaken:

You are essentially stating that self (or consciousness) exists apart from the material brain and the inherent biological, neural and chemical events that make up the brain's processes. "Self" utilizes the brain in an unknown manner to connect "self" to the material world in such a way that permits "self" to interact with it.

Is this correct?

(Edited for clarification)

[aggle-rithm]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I agree entirely with DavidSmith.

It's true that I've used the metaphor to try and convey my ideas about the distinction between the self and its differing mind states. I'm not sure if anyone else has ever tried to do that. But that doesn't get off the ground if people are simply a priori asserting that any other conclusion apart from brain states generate conscious states are simply not possible.

I think part of the problem is that, in this model, psychic phenomena are considered a subset of these brain states. The TV analogy helps explain esp, clairvoyance, etc, but it just doesn't fit if you don't find the evidence for these phenomena compelling.

[aggle-rithm]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
My own personal opinion: Brains are not like television sets. Brains are like comput.... no, let's correct this here and now. Brains are computers. Organic computers. And the Self is the totality of program activity in the computer in a continual and dynamic state of functionality.

Your mileage may vary.

I think brains are like...brains. There is nothing else quite like them.

Especially when sauteed in lemon butter. Mmmmm.... ;)

[Z]

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
I think brains are like...brains. There is nothing else quite like them.

Especially when sauteed in lemon butter. Mmmmm.... ;)

Ugh.

We Dragons prefer them straight, raw, and fresh. That's how we learn things, you know - we consume brains, and absorb the victim's knowledge into our own.

But we never eat politicians. Sure, the brain could easily be fried, boiled, whatever - no knowledge to worry about destroying - but it takes so long to clean a politician...!

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by new drkitten
[B]This is a proof? Oh, you poor, dear, boy. Why don't you go sit down under a tree where it's nice and shady....



Yes I am absolutely convinced it's a stone cold proof that consciousness cannot possibly be an epiphenomenon. I haven't looked at your comments yet because I'm due to meet my friend at 8pm to go for a drink (15 mins time). I'll address them when I get in.

[Tricky]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yes I am absolutely convinced it's a stone cold proof that consciousness cannot possibly be an epiphenomenon.
And herein lies the gist of the matter. You are absolutely, stone cold sure that such a thing is proved, even though you can provide none of that proof, in fact you can't even provide evidence. Each argument you make that the consciousness is not an epiphenomenon relies on the circular assumption that consciousness exists apart from the body. As such, this qualifes as a "belief", but scarcely a proof, or even a well-supported theory.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by new drkitten
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then it's a pity that those who awarded this Pulitzer didn't read my proof. Here it is:


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Dr K
This is a proof? Oh, you poor, dear, boy. Why don't you go sit down under a tree where it's nice and shady....


II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Dr K
If you consider it possible for you to be "convinced" that you are conscious without actually being conscious, then the following point is irrelevant.



By saying this I suspect you cannot have understood my proof at all.

If and only if consciousness is an epiphenomenon, then consciousness, by definition, plays no role in my belief that I am conscious. Thus whether I am conscious or not, it necessarily must be the case that I believe that I am conscious regardless.



If it's not actually possible, then point 2 simply does not follow from point 1.



I most certainly do not believe it is possible! But this is simply a consequence of my belief that epiphenomenalism is not a correct depiction of the mind/body relationship. That is to say I do not subscribe to "1".

Nevertheless, if "1" is true, then "2" follows from "1" by definition. If consciousness is wholly causally inert, then, by definition, it cannot be the existence of consciousness which makes me think I am conscious. Indeed all my behaviour, all my beliefs, all my emotions, in fact all mental processes whatsoever are entirely determined by the physical processes in the brain. My belief that I am conscious constitutes no exception!



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



If there is truly no difference between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious, then it's not possible (pace point 2) for you to be convinced that you were conscious without actually being conscious. In other words, the physical causal chain postulated in the first point that is sufficient for you to be convinced that you are conscious is also sufficient for you to be conscious.



Yes absolutely.



The only internal inconsistency is your equivocation between the nature of "causal chain" and about what is actually caused. If there is truly no difference between appearing to be conscious, and actual consciousness, then anything capable of causing. the appearance of consciousness is by definition capable of producing consciousness itself.



Yes absolutely!



You can't have it both ways. Either "seeming to be conscious" is identical to "conscious" -- in which case, there is no problem, or "seeming to be conscious" is not identical to "conscious," in which case there is again no problem.

I believe Hofstadter's thesis was the first -- that in order to be aware enough to be convinced of your own consciousness, you had to be conscious. Thus any causal process capable of producing the illusion of consciousness was by definition producing true consciousness.



I'm sorry? I can't have what both ways?

a) Seeming to be conscious is precisely the same as really being conscious. This you concede.

b) But epiphenomenalism necessarily dictates that even if I were not conscious, I would still be convinced I am conscious (this is point "2" which is necessitated by point "1").

c) So "b" means we can have a case of seeming to be conscious, but where I am in fact not conscious.

d) This logically contradicts "a". Thus epiphenomenalism is refuted.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Ashles
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then it's a pity that those who awarded this Pulitzer didn't read my proof.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Oh. My. Dear. God.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here it is:

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Yes.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


How does that follow?



It follows necessarily because if consciousness is causally inefficacious, then it cannot affect anything whatsoever. Thus if it cannot affect anything whatsoever, this includes all my beliefs. Thus whether I am conscious or not, I will believe precisely the same.



Why could consciousness not be a real phenomenon that merely results from functionality of the brain?
Your comment that you would "convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious." is a possibility, but not a logical certainty, so your "proof" falls down it this point and the Pulitzer eludes you for another year.



It's a logical absurdity. *I* cannot be falsely convinced I am conscious because the very definition of "I" in this context is conscious awareness. So what you're saying is 'Consious awareness might falsely believe that it is conscious' -- a direct contradiction in terms.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Yes you are conscious, but the fact of being conscious does not tell us about the nature of consciousness. ETA: And newdrk points out above the logical inconsistency that appears at this stage.



No he hasn't. His reply seems to me to completely miss my argument -- as does yours.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Oh lord - See, this is typical Ianist nonsense. He posted this proof a while ago, and it was torn to shreds then. Yet he's still clinging to this proof as if it weren't empty and hollow.


By proof for consciousness being causally efficacious? Where where where has it been ripped to shreds?? Nobody has ever said anything which remotely challenges my proof.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Francois Tremblay
No one has yet given any reason to think that identity theory is incomplete. Maybe this is like Christianity, a dogma that some vocal skeptics demand that all other skeptics not question...

Functional materialism is to be preferred to identity theory.


A simple thought experiment. Imagine your neurons being replaced one by one by electronic chips which have exactly the same input/output as the neurons they replace. That is to say the chips perform exactly the same function as the neurons they replace. Since your behaviour (including speech) depends purely on the functions played by all the constituent parts of your brain, then necessarily your behaviour will not change in any way whatsoever. This will include your vocal observations. But since you're maintaining that consciousness is tied down to neurons, and indeed your particular neurons, then as your neurons get replaced one by one you would experience a continuous diminishing of consciousness. However, since the electronic chips duplicate the exact same function as the neurons you would be behaving precisely the same way as before. This will include everything you say. Thus you would be telling the outside world that you feel absolutely fine and feel no different whatsoever even though in reality your consciousness would be continually diminishing!!

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Control ... effect ... whatever. When I sleep I have no virtually no consciousness. Sounds like control to me.

I note you still haven't answered the question.

~~ Paul

Why does the brain affect consciousness? I've given an answer already in this thread regarding the brain curtailing mental states so we do not experience all realities at once.

Or do you mean how can it?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by jmercer
Ian,

Analogies can be flawed to the point where their premise is useless; I suspect your TV analogy is in exactly that situation. So let's abandon the TV analogy, and get to the heart of the matter. Here's what I think your perspective is; please correct me if I'm mistaken:

You are essentially stating that self (or consciousness) exists apart from the material brain and the inherent biological, neural and chemical events that make up the brain's processes. "Self" utilizes the brain in an unknown manner to connect "self" to the material world in such a way that permits "self" to interact with it.

Is this correct?

(Edited for clarification)

Consciousness exists apart from the brain? Does this equate to saying consciousness is not one and the same thing as some physical process? I certainly hold that it is not. Indeed I think it is simply empty of content to say it is.

Or are you saying that I'm saying that consciousness could exist independently of the brain? I believe that also, but my evidence/reasons are that much weaker for this thesis.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
Why does the brain affect consciousness? I've given an answer already in this thread regarding the brain curtailing mental states so we do not experience all realities at once.

Or do you mean how can it?
Why does it? Why does the brain, a figment of our senses played by the Mind, have any control over consciousness at all? What is the point of limiting our experience of pure consciousness with such a contraption?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Tricky
Each argument you make that the consciousness is not an epiphenomenon relies on the circular assumption that consciousness exists apart from the body.

Well let's see shall we? Let's take it one point at a time. Do you think point 1 is assuming that consciousness exists apart from the body? What part of point 1 precisely? I paste in my argument below for your convenience.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Couldn't we all just stipulate that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon?

Ian said:
But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious.
What does "seeming to be conscious" mean?

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
A simple thought experiment. Imagine your neurons being replaced one by one by electronic chips which have exactly the same input/output as the neurons they replace. That is to say the chips perform exactly the same function as the neurons they replace. Since your behaviour (including speech) depends purely on the functions played by all the constituent parts of your brain, then necessarily your behaviour will not change in any way whatsoever. This will include your vocal observations. But since you're maintaining that consciousness is tied down to neurons, and indeed your particular neurons, then as your neurons get replaced one by one you would experience a continuous diminishing of consciousness. However, since the electronic chips duplicate the exact same function as the neurons you would be behaving precisely the same way as before. This will include everything you say. Thus you would be telling the outside world that you feel absolutely fine and feel no different whatsoever even though in reality your consciousness would be continually diminishing!!
Who is maintaining that consciousness is tied to neurons specifically?

~~ Paul

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Interesting Ian: "I believe Q and W and E"

Somebody else (pick your favorite poster): "No Ian, because that does not follow and is incoherent."

Interesting Ian: "You, obviously, didnt understand what I said, you know nothing about the subject.

:rolleyes:

Ian, please. Please. Think about this exercise before you state again, with your fancy arrogance, that you "know" that you are "convinced" that "its obvious".

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If and only if consciousness is an epiphenomenon, then consciousness, by definition, plays no role in my belief that I am conscious.

If X is Y then X plays no role in my belief about X.

What????????? :(

Obviously, you believe you make sense. But you utter absurdities all the time. Yes, you will get upset when you read this and you will insult, as usual, the messenger. When it is all for your own good!

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Thus you would be telling the outside world that you feel absolutely fine and feel no different whatsoever even though in reality your consciousness would be continually diminishing!!

In "reality"!!! :eek: its a thought experiment! for crying out loud!

[Tricky]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Well let's see shall we? Let's take it one point at a time. Do you think point 1 is assuming that consciousness exists apart from the body? What part of point 1 precisely? I paste in my argument below for your convenience.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Governed by physical laws, but not pre-determined by physical laws. It is impossible to determine "cause and effect" in many cases. It is sounding like you are trying to make this a discussion of determinism.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
No, that is totally circular. Your conviction that you are conscious has everything to do with the fact that you are conscious. You could not have convictions otherwise. An unconscious being cannot have convictions. Also, point 2 does not follow from point 1 unless you have defined brain functions as deterministic, which is not a thing that has been shown. It is your own little straw man of what materialists believe about consciousness.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious.
Self contradictory. If there is no distinction between conscious and seeming to be conscious, then how can you know you are conscious? You might only "seem" to know without a shadow of a doubt.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
3 continued) Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actually think at all!
"Thinking", like "consciousness", is a term which loosely describes certain brain functions. It is not a thing apart from the body. Again, you are wandering into the arena of "belief" without providing evidence. Once again, your "proof" relies wholly on your assumptions being correct, and I see no reason to believe that they are.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.
By your own proof, you do not have incorrigible certain knowledge that you are conscious. You could only seem to have it, because you couldn't tell the difference. Your entire "proof" rests on the acceptance that your self-assessment of your own consciousness is correct. You cannot "prove" this without assuming the conclusions of the proof. (I believe this is called "begging the question".)

While I do believe you are conscious, Ian, at least the way I define it, I don't think you can prove it, any more than you can "prove" that you are not a very complex android.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.
"Causally efficacious?" My contention is that your consciousness is an emergent property of your body, mostly your brain, a contention for which there is a great deal of evidence. You have done nothing whatsoever to cause me to abandon that contention. You have simply tried to set logical traps with hidden premises that mirror your own unsubstantiated beliefs. There is nothing you have said here that would remotely constitute evidence.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Who is maintaining that consciousness is tied to neurons specifically?

~~ Paul

Identity theorists.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If and only if consciousness is an epiphenomenon, then consciousness, by definition, plays no role in my belief that I am conscious.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



If X is Y then X plays no role in my belief about X.

What?????????

Obviously, you believe you make sense. But you utter absurdities all the time. Yes, you will get upset when you read this and you will insult, as usual, the messenger. When it is all for your own good!



An epiphenomenon is something which has no causal power. If it has no causal power then it cannot affect the world. If it cannot affect the world then how could its existence play any role in my belief in its existence?

So when I state that I believe that I am conscious, we can trace back the physical chain of cause and effect. But the fact of my consciousness cannot be the first link, or be a link at all.

[aggle-rithm]

The mechanism of emotions in the brain and their relationship to memory is pretty well understood. It also seems likely that each of our emotions serves some evolutionary purpose (although some of the baser emotions may be maladaptive in today's world).

So here's my question: Does this disembodied self that is independent of the brain have emotions? If so, what purpose do they serve?

Will we still form new memories when we are independent of the brain? Will emotions still be tied to memory? If all this can happen without the benefit of the brain, then why is the limbic system even necessary?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Tricky

II
Well let's see shall we? Let's take it one point at a time. Do you think point 1 is assuming that consciousness exists apart from the body? What part of

point 1 precisely? I paste in my argument below for your convenience.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly

caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.
-----------------------------