Please explain the "TV set" model of the brain [Archive]

Batman Jr.

18th July 2005, 05:31 PM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
Several posters, mainly Ian, have made the analogy that the brain is like a TV set, receiving and interpreting signals from the mind, rather than, in fact, generating the mind.

The analogy seems consistent, up to a point, but I have a few questions:

1. A TV set (or radio, or other receiving device) is meant to be observed by outside entities. It doesn't have a subjective reality (at least, I assume it doesn't), but we do. Does the analogy break down at this point? If not, why?

2. If the brain is simply a "filter" for the outside signal, and diminished cognitive/motor functions are the result of the signal being blocked, then:
A. Shouldn't it be blocked only from the outside entities, and not from the subjective viewpoint? and
B. Since partial damage results in partial "blockage" of the "signal", then wouldn't complete destruction of the brain result in complete "blockage"?

I apologize if I've misrepresented this viewpoint. The questions are based on my best understanding of the analogy.

One thing I should make clear: I believe the evidence shows that the subjective experience in cases of mental illness and/or brain damage is consistent with what is observed on the outside. People say they feel "different" and often mourn the loss of their former selves. (if necessary, I can provide references to this.) Therefore, I think the behavior observed by outsiders is a fair indication of what is going on inside, especially in cases of grotesque changes in personality.
The "TV set" theory I suspect wouldn't hold up because functions of the brain as they relate to outwardly manifested behavior appear to be explicable in the same way as the well-understood computational processes of a computer can make clear why a computer "behaves" in the way it does. When it comes to aspects of the psyche amenable to scientific measurement, Occam's razor instructs that we must discard of the "radio waves" of consciousness for purposes of practicality. Your recognition of certain physical pathologies of the brain affecting the state of an individual's personhood as viewed on the outside is an important point in realizing this.

aggle-rithm

18th July 2005, 05:48 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Several posters? Who else holds this idea?

I've seen at least one other person make this claim, but I can't remember who it was. Maybe I'm exaggerating a little when I say "several".

aggle-rithm

18th July 2005, 05:49 PM

Originally posted by Ashles

As regards to the limitations of his analogy that will be up to Ian to address.

I'm sure Ian doesn't believe there are any limitations. That's what I would like for him to explain.

Ashles

18th July 2005, 06:05 PM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
I'm sure Ian doesn't believe there are any limitations. That's what I would like for him to explain.
Well I meant that the "TV set" model of the brain would obviously only work up to a certain point. Even if you take the analogy to it's logical extreme then there are problems with the medium of information transfer, interference, identical receivers, information conversion...

No-one sensible or rational could logically claim that this analogy was useful to an understanding of the way the brain interpreted the idea of consciousness...

Oh. I see what you mean.

Interesting Ian

18th July 2005, 06:20 PM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
[B]Several posters, mainly Ian, have made the analogy that the brain is like a TV set,

Is the Universe likewise like a balloon?

When I used to go to 6th form college (for 16 and 17 year olds), in an English language class, we each in turn had to stand up and talk about a topic for 10 minutes that we were personally interested in. I decided to talk about Cosmology. I was trying to explain about the "Big Bang" and the expansion of the Universe. I explained that it was incorrect to think of it as a normal explosion with Galaxies rushing through space and away from a common centre. In order to try to facilitate the understanding to my fellow pupils, I employed the analogy of a balloon get blown up. On the surface of the balloon are painted little black dots. I asked them them to imagine that the little black dot represented galaxies and the actual surface of the balloon represented the 3 dimensional space-time continuum. Now as the balloon expands the black dots (galaxies) move away from each other, but they are carried along by the fabric (space-time continuum) of the balloon (Universe). Moreover, it can be understood that no one black dot (Galaxy) is at the centre of the balloons surface (centre of the Universe).

One person asks what happens when the Universe pops. I basically said "huh". he said 'if the Universe is like a balloon then it must pop eventually after its expanded so much. I said 'no it won't'. He said then it's not like a balloon then, and he dismissed my entire metaphor.

receiving and interpreting signals from the mind, rather than, in fact, generating the mind.

The analogy seems consistent, up to a point, but I have a few questions:

1. A TV set (or radio, or other receiving device) is meant to be observed by outside entities. It doesn't have a subjective reality (at least, I assume it doesn't), but we do. Does the analogy break down at this point? If not, why?

Because the TV set is being compared to the brain. The brain does not have a subjective reality.

2. If the brain is simply a "filter" for the outside signal, and diminished cognitive/motor functions are the result of the signal being blocked, then:
A. Shouldn't it be blocked only from the outside entities, and not from the subjective viewpoint?

You mean that brain states ought not to affect conscious states?

If the brain only modifies consciousness or minds, rather than being the progenitor of the mind, the question then arises as to why we need brains at all.

The first thing to recognise here is that processes within the brain are akin to any information processing system. As with any such information processing system there are architectural constraints and these serve to limit the mind so we only have access to those perceptions that follow the familiar and regular patterns that we associate with the physical world. This then allows us to function proficiently whilst we subsist in this empirical reality.

Now when the mind operates in detachment from the brain, when it is temporarily or permanently disembodied, then its processing is released from the constraining influence of the arrays of primitive processing units (essentially the brain). It will then have access to all other perceptions apart from our everyday perceptions. Those other perceptions will be driven by some other "engine", and the person may seem to be passing through other worlds. This would be broadly consistent with the anecdotal experiences of some out-of-body experiences, especially near-death experiences - and indeed with reportedly channelled descriptions from the dead, as well as with traditional accounts such as those found in the "Tibetan Book of the Dead".

and
B. Since partial damage results in partial "blockage" of the "signal", then wouldn't complete destruction of the brain result in complete "blockage"?

Only if the self continues to operate through the brain.

To repeat what I've said before:

Imagine if you will 2 very intelligent people from the early 18th century who, by some means or other, are miraculously transported to our present day. Imagine further they encounter a television set showing a film. After being suitably astounded, and after tinkering around with its internal components and finding that tinkering with particular components effects the picture quality in particular characteristic ways, you can imagine one of them claiming that not just the picture, but the storyline of the film must be wholly generated by these internal components since tinkering with them affects the picture. He might claim there is overwhelming evidence that this must be so. The other person, however, will rightly point out that although he grants that the picture itself is generated by these internal components, it cannot be the case that the actual contents of the movie, the actual storyline with its depiction of various emotions and so on, can be generated by just these internal components. This is because there is nothing about the physical processes within the TV set which could conceivably lead to the generation ex nihilo of such a storyline.

So with a television set the state of its internal components will affect the quality of the picture, but this does not entail that the storyline depicted by the picture is affected too. Indeed no matter how poor the picture quality might get e.g. a snowy picture, ghosting etc, a given film will continue to show the same events.

I want to suggest that some useful insights into trying to understand a possible relationship of the self to its brain might be gained from consideration of this television set metaphor. A loose analogy might be drawn between the television set and the brain, the storyline of a TV programme and the self, and finally the picture quality of programme displayed and the mind states undergone by the self. Thus, just as tinkering with the internal components of a television set will have consequences for the quality of the picture displayed, but will not change the storyline of the programme, so too might alteration of the brainâ€™s processes affect states of the mind without bringing about any change in the actual self.

Thus the suggestion here is that just as the storyline of a film does not have its origin in the television set's internal components, neither might the self have its source or origin in the brain. Rather it conceivably could be the case that the self's existence is ontologically self-subsistent and is â€œfilteredâ€ by the brain. What I mean by â€œfilteredâ€ is that although the self does not change as the state of our brains change so as to become a literally different self, the selfâ€™s mind states do change. That is to say differing particular mind states change according to the particular physical configuration of the brain. Thus the various mental states we experience during our lives are a result of both the self - accounting for the feeling of a persistent self and the more general dispositions of selfhood - and also the particular physical configuration of the brain the self is â€œfilteredâ€ by. The feeling of a persistent enduring self remains intact, but, due to the change in mind states, our moods, interests and intelligence will vary. This then will account for the correlation between brain states and mind states. This account of the self and its brain which I have provided here is referred to as the transmission theory.

I think this corresponds very nicely with our intuitive notions we have regarding the self. After all, the self is the essential you. To elucidate: although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives. Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states. Thus I (that is the self) might, for example, be in a good mood or a bad mood. But my self is not to be equated by such given mind states. Rather I experience being in a good mood, or a bad mood, or indeed any other mental state. The I or the self is that which endures, but which can experience various mental states such as differing moods. Such a self is known in philosophical parlance as a substantial self.

Note that this notion of a literal same self is difficult to maintain if we suppose that the self is actually generated by the brain. For example, if we happen to be materialists - by far the most common group to hold self is generated by the brain (see the next section for an explication of this term) - we must maintain that any â€œselfâ€ must simply be equated with the brain, or more precisely with the processes taking place within it. Given that brain states are in a constant state of change, it would certainly seem that, in a literal sense, the self must also be in a constant state of change. Be clear as to what this means. It means that there can be no unchanging enduring self, i.e. substantial self, under materialism. Our selves are quite literally equated with our mind states. Later, under the duplicate experiment section, it will be argued that under materialism that we must effectively think of our selves as literally ceasing to be, only to be replaced by an almost exact duplicate, spontaneously springing ex nihilo into being every infinitesimal fraction of a second. Within this scenario it might be difficult to avoid concluding our sense of self is effectively an illusion. Indeed this is precisely what many philosophical materialists maintain.

Interesting Ian

18th July 2005, 06:28 PM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
[B]One thing I should make clear: I believe the evidence shows that the subjective experience in cases of mental illness and/or brain damage is consistent with what is observed on the outside. People say they feel "different" and often mourn the loss of their former selves. (if necessary, I can provide references to this.)

Why should they mourn the loss of a self which is not them? People are very imprecise in their statements. This proves nothing.

Therefore, I think the behavior observed by outsiders is a fair indication of what is going on inside, especially in cases of grotesque changes in personality.

If what the subject says differs from the impression from the 3rd person perspective, then who should we believe?

However if a person truly sincerely believes that he has just come into existence, then that is certainly interesting. But I think they just mean that their mind states are now characteristically different, not that their self has literally changed! :eek:

Interesting Ian

18th July 2005, 06:29 PM

Originally posted by jmercer
The analogy breaks, I believe, because of a simple question: "Why would my brain receive my consciousness instead of yours?"

In other words, what's so unique about any given brain as an "receiver" that it would only tune into one specific entity and not others?

An interesting question. I have absolutely no idea. I hope you're not implying that this somehow gives evidence for the hypothesis that consciousness is generated by the brain.

Interesting Ian

18th July 2005, 06:31 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Several posters? Who else holds this idea?

Why doesnt work? Because... it is not needed. There is no "anomalous" data that needs to invoque a different theory than the current scientific one (that the mind is produced by the brain).

Well, in fact this is incomplete, I would say that what we call "the mind" is instanciated by the body/world interactions. Its "in between them" so to speak, and not specifically "inside" the brain.

In any case its a difficult subject, thats why some have to invent such weird ideas. But I believe they do it just because they have not read enough about current scientific discoveries. ;)

Bodhi Dharma Zen,

You clearly have not got a faintest clue about the mind-body problem and why it is indeed a problem. Read my website once it's completed.

Interesting Ian

18th July 2005, 06:33 PM

Originally posted by Francois Tremblay
[B]Occam's Razor indicates that we have absolutely no reason to posit a separate "mind" that is somehow different from the brain.

But logical incoherence trumps this perverted materialist version of "Occam's razor".

drkitten

18th July 2005, 06:33 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
An interesting question. I have absolutely no idea. I hope you're not implying that this somehow gives evidence for the hypothesis that consciousness is generated by the brain.

No. It merely decreases the plausibility of your TV hypothesis.

Evidence against X is almost never for Y, unless Y can be shown to be equivalent to not-X.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

18th July 2005, 06:35 PM

Ian said:
An interesting question. I have absolutely no idea. I hope you're not implying that this somehow gives evidence for the hypothesis that consciousness is generated by the brain.
No, it just gives evidence that your theory is half-assed.

Jmercer's question is one of many facets of the overall question: If reality is a monism and my brain is just played on my senses like the rest of the external world, then why does it have control over my consciousness?

~~ Paul

aggle-rithm

18th July 2005, 06:39 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Why should they mourn the loss of a self which is not them? People are very imprecise in their statements. This proves nothing.

Maybe I was being imprecise. What I meant is that people have memories of having been able to do things that are now impossible and having had certain desirable qualities that are now gone. So, more precisely, they mourn the loss of a big chunk of the "self", where the self is defined as being composed of many psychological/physical components that come together to form a whole.

Interesting Ian

18th July 2005, 06:41 PM

Originally posted by Batman Jr.
The "TV set" theory I suspect wouldn't hold up because functions of the brain as they relate to outwardly manifested behavior appear to be explicable in the same way as the well-understood computational processes of a computer can make clear why a computer "behaves" in the way it does. When it comes to aspects of the psyche amenable to scientific measurement, Occam's razor instructs that we must discard of the "radio waves" of consciousness for purposes of practicality. Your recognition of certain physical pathologies of the brain affecting the state of an individual's personhood as viewed on the outside is an important point in realizing this. [/B]

Even the perverted materialist interpretation of Occam's razor cannot trump the fact that materialism is incoherent. Consciousness is not susceptible to a reductionist scientific explanation; not ever.

BTW you are assuming the world is physically closed. If so then I would assume you are right in your statement that

"functions of the brain as they relate to outwardly manifested behavior appear to be explicable in the same way as the well-understood computational processes of a computer can make clear why a computer "behaves" in the way it does"

But I have no interest in functions of the brain. My argument concerns consciousness.

Interesting Ian

18th July 2005, 06:42 PM

Originally posted by new drkitten
No. It merely decreases the plausibility of your TV hypothesis.

I have absolutely no idea why. And I bet you couldn't supply a reasonable answer.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

18th July 2005, 06:51 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Bodhi Dharma Zen,

You clearly have not got a faintest clue about the mind-body problem and why it is indeed a problem. Read my website once it's completed.

Oh, I do. You have obviously never noticed it, but Im one of the few in the forum that doesnt hold a fixed possition. I believe everything we think we know about it is wrong.

You are wrong, materialists are wrong, dualists, emergentists, every single person who knows he "knows" is wrong.

You, on the other hand, are not only ignorant in the subject, but in your being completly wrong. Why do I say this, is such a crude manner? Because your "anomalous" data is the PSI phenomena, which is like believing in santa and pink unicorns. Sorry.

Ashles

18th July 2005, 07:04 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Is the Universe likewise like a balloon?

When I used to go to 6th form college (for 16 and 17 year olds), in an English language class, we each in turn had to stand up and talk about a topic for 10 minutes that we were personally interested in. I decided to talk about Cosmology. I was trying to explain about the "Big Bang" and the expansion of the Universe. I explained that it was incorrect to think of it as a normal explosion with Galaxies rushing through space and away from a common centre. In order to try to facilitate the understanding to my fellow pupils, I employed the analogy of a balloon get blown up. On the surface of the balloon are painted little black dots. I asked them them to imagine that the little black dot represented galaxies and the actual surface of the balloon represented the 3 dimensional space-time continuum. Now as the balloon expands the black dots (galaxies) move away from each other, but they are carried along by the fabric (space-time continuum) of the balloon (Universe). Moreover, it can be understood that no one black dot (Galaxy) is at the centre of the balloons surface (centre of the Universe).

One person asks what happens when the Universe pops. I basically said "huh". he said 'if the Universe is like a balloon then it must pop eventually after its expanded so much. I said 'no it won't'. He said then it's not like a balloon then, and he dismissed my entire metaphor.
Ian I don't know if this says more about him or about you.

Analogoes such as this break down at certain points. They are used to explain general concepts.

If you think the guy in your college was a moron then I agree with you completely and we logically agree that your 'TV' analogy only goes so far.

Otherwise... well let's not consider 'otherwise'.

Ratman_tf

18th July 2005, 09:47 PM

Originally posted by new drkitten
What do these mean, in this context?

How does "clairvoyance" explain why I pick up my own mind, and not, for example jmercer's?

Maybe clairvoyance is picking up another's perceptions. I'm assuming that the TV analogy works both ways, otherwise you'd have people walking into walls as the mind directing them would have no feedback.

Assuming clairvoyance exists, of course. ;)

Ratman_tf

18th July 2005, 09:55 PM

Originally posted by jmercer
Ok... and I'll play the heavenly prosecution. ;)

And... past lives/clairvoyance affect brains in what manner that permits them to tune to a single unique consciousness?

IF a mind is seperate from the brain/body, then it follows that the brain of, say, General Custer is somewhere out there.

Let's say I have a memory of a previous life. Following the TV analogy, perhaps that past life would actually be a memory of ole Custer's mind getting picked up as 'interference' by my brain.

I guess I'm just brainstorming (waht-waaa) possiblities where the consciousness/brain interface isn't quite perfect.

Not that it actually proves anything. Just a fancy that the topic brought to my... mind.
:o

Batman Jr.

18th July 2005, 11:45 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Even the perverted materialist interpretation of Occam's razor cannot trump the fact that materialism is incoherent. Consciousness is not susceptible to a reductionist scientific explanation; not ever.

BTW you are assuming the world is physically closed. If so then I would assume you are right in your statement that

"functions of the brain as they relate to outwardly manifested behavior appear to be explicable in the same way as the well-understood computational processes of a computer can make clear why a computer "behaves" in the way it does"

But I have no interest in functions of the brain. My argument concerns consciousness.
I agree that inward perception cannot be measured scientifically; that is why I elaborated that I was talking about "aspects of the psyche amenable to scientific measurement." However, where I have to part with you is where you come to the conclusion that this hypothetical metaphysicalâ€”perhaps not even metaphysical, but maybe just unknownâ€”component of consciousness can not only take from but fuel the brain. From what has been ascertained from scientific study, everything so far appears consistent with the intellectual powers of the brain being autonomous, self-sufficient. This is unlike a television set where there are no internal devices accountable for what is received through an external signal. Now, I'm surmising that you might want to argue that there are no internal devices in the brain that could be pointed to and positively identified as being causative of consciousness. This is true, but one important caveat about this line of reasoning has to be elucidated upon so that one could see the fundamental differences between this kind of situation and that of the television. In the case of the television, we are talking about external influences on the television which fall within the bounds of epistemology. As a result, we can identify cause-and-effect relationships in what will, for instance, create the screenplay being read by the actors on screen or the musical score being bellowed out of the speakers. We can realize that the requisite elements for generating such things don't exist in the television. With the brain, the internally unidentifiable elementâ€”consciousnessâ€”completely falls out of our field of observation. This glaring absence of its mensuration keeps us from comprehending what could possibly produce it. It can't be associated through empirical means with anything, even its truthful cause, so even if consciousness was self-contained in the brain, it would be impossible to discover that it was! From this, we can see that the self-contained proposition cannot be ruled out as with the TV.

delphi_ote

18th July 2005, 11:53 PM

Originally posted by Intelligencer Ian
Even the perverted imperialst interpretation of Occam's razor cannot trump the fact that imperialsm is incoherent.

I think I'm just going to substitute "imperialism" for "materialsm" whenever I read Ian's posts. Then he'll sound like a Secret Agent working for the Revolution against the perverted JREF Imperialsts, and I'll just pretend I'm reading a spy novel. I'll call him "Intelligencer Ian."

This might increase my chances of survival (though only slightly) when braving threads he posts in.

Soapy Sam

19th July 2005, 01:26 AM

Ian-
Just FYI.
I did not discuss your analogy with anyone, here or elsewhere.
I had no prior knowledge of, or involvement in this thread.

Perhaps I'm psychic?

We now return you to the main feature...

davidsmith73

19th July 2005, 04:05 AM

19th July 2005, 04:07 AM

This analogy is broken in so many ways, it's almost laughable to think anyone would bother using it.

I'm sure that Ian either has already or is going to use his example of the two 18th Century gentlemen who examine a television.

But again, there are gaping holes in this thinking.

First, if the television were brought back to them, in the 18th Century, would it display anything? No. It might give them tantalizing hints of what might be done regarding electricity, perhaps, but even if it came with a self-contained power supply, it would still display static.

Eventually, the two gentlemen might open it up, and discover the receiver, but to what end? At best, they would ponder why someone would build a machine that makes static.

On the other hand, if the two gentlemen were brought to this time, they would inevitably be exposed to radio wave theory, television studios, etc. and would quickly understand television just as we would.

We are in much the same position: if there were 'self transmitters' out there, there is a good chance we would already have discovered them by now. At the very least, we'd have bits of the brain with no current discernable use that, nevertheless, would affect the consciousness of the patient directly if altered.

But that's not the case.

What does Ian have to support his theories about the television model? Anecdotal evidence of ESP, OOB, NDE, etc. None of which is scientifically valid, all of which has been debunked to varying degrees.

I think someone else pointed out that there is a fundamental difference between a television program and consciousness, in that one is clearly and obviously an illusion, which could not be generated as is within the television, whereas the other is entirely consistant with the physical composition of the brain. Our illusion of self does not appear to exceed the limits of our brain; in fact, it is defined by those limits.

Really, a computer model of the brain would be far, far more accurate, even if one wanted to enter ESP into the picture.

19th July 2005, 04:09 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Holy transistors Batman! (sorry couldn't resist).

Interesting take on the analogy. Personally, I think that the analogy should be used only as an analogy about how we can easily make a false conclusion based on correlation alone. Regardless of how consciousness is eventually defined, all we have to go on at present is a correlation between the physical state of the brain and phenomenal states of consciousness. We manipulate the brain in various locations, observe a change in phenomenal states and conclude that consciousness is generated "in the brain". Similarly, we could manipulate components of a TV set, observe a change in the display and conclude that the display pattern is generated "in the TV". I agree with you that the TV display and phenominal aspects of consciousness are defined by different characteristics, the latter perhaps not even definable by physical relationships, but that is not relavent to the analogy. The fundamental point of the analogy is to show how false conclusions can be drawn from correlations.

But that is NOT his fundamental point in using the analogy. Instead, his deliberate correllation between brains and televisions is to demonstrate how the Self can be received through the Brain, and how we might misunderstand the brain's role in the Self.

Yet, clearly, the analogy fails to work, even on that behalf, unless his two gentlemen are just unfailingly stupid - much like himself.

19th July 2005, 04:15 AM

This concept was presented to me a few days ago, and I'd like to share it, though this might not be the best place to do so:

Think of the brain as a piece of paper. By itself, it is nothing, but one can see the potential it might have.

Now think of brain activity as ink on paper. If observed, what else can it be? Just ink on paper.

But to those who understand, the ink on the paper make a story. That story is the Self.

When you alter bits of the paper, or bits of the ink, the Story changes. But only for the Reader.

Is this a good analogy? No. Because it postulates yet another level - a Reader, a person who must understand. In the case of our Brain, the Story IS the Reader. And it leaves an unanswered question: who is the writer?

Here, at least, was someone who realized that analogies can only go so far - and that fatal flaws exist even in the best analogies.

davidsmith73

19th July 2005, 04:19 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But that is NOT his fundamental point in using the analogy. Instead, his deliberate correllation between brains and televisions is to demonstrate how the Self can be received through the Brain, and how we might misunderstand the brain's role in the Self.

That may be Ian's hypothesis about consciousness and the brain. I think it was Rupert Sheldrake who wrote about the analogy about 20 years ago (he may have borrowed it from someone else of course). I'm almost certain that Sheldrake intended the analogy to be used only as one about false conclusions from correlations rather than a proposed hypothesis about how consciousness and the brain interact. Thats certainly how I use the analogy anyway. And its clear that if you restrict the analogy to these terms then it does not fail.

19th July 2005, 04:32 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
That may be Ian's hypothesis about consciousness and the brain. I think it was Rupert Sheldrake who wrote about the analogy about 20 years ago (he may have borrowed it from someone else of course). I'm almost certain that Sheldrake intended the analogy to be used only as one about false conclusions from correlations rather than a proposed hypothesis about how consciousness and the brain interact. Thats certainly how I use the analogy anyway. And its clear that if you restrict the analogy to these terms then it does not fail.

Sure, if I restrict any analogy to specific terms it does not fail.

And while I agree with your analysis of Sheldrake's proposal, we aren't discussing Sheldrake, but Iandrake.

One of the things that I like about analogies is that we can extend them beyond the imposed limitations and come to understand where the analogy differs from the subject, and by doing so, learn more about the subject. For example, if the TV analogy is extended, then we get Ian's supposition that brains receive the Self - so is there a receiver? A transmitter? Two 18th Century gents in the 20th or 21st century could find these things for themselves, because they would be out there, somewhere, and evidence would lead them to these things; in the 18th century, there'd be no picture at all, so there'd be no reason to look for such things - since they wouldn't exist at all.

I could say that the brain is like an overripe tomato, because they're both soft and squishy. If I restrict the terms, the analogy does not fail. But that certainly doesn't make it the BEST analogy, nor would it be honest when trying to describe a brain to those unaware of what a brain is or what it's for to only use this analogy. Whereas Ian embraces the TV analogy as the best possible analogy to use, and rejects better analogies - because they undermine the point he would like to impose.

davidsmith73

19th July 2005, 06:04 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Sure, if I restrict any analogy to specific terms it does not fail.

Didn't you just say that even the best analogies have fatal flaws?

And while I agree with your analysis of Sheldrake's proposal, we aren't discussing Sheldrake, but Iandrake.

Noted, and I was just making a point about the correct usage of the analogy. :)

One of the things that I like about analogies is that we can extend them beyond the imposed limitations and come to understand where the analogy differs from the subject, and by doing so, learn more about the subject. For example, if the TV analogy is extended, then we get Ian's supposition that brains receive the Self - so is there a receiver? A transmitter?

I would say probably not. Taking the analogy to represent a mechanism of how consciousness interacts with the brain would be a step in the wrong direction in my opinion.

Two 18th Century gents in the 20th or 21st century could find these things for themselves, because they would be out there, somewhere, and evidence would lead them to these things;

That's not the point of introducing these gentlemen into the analogy though is it. They are put in the analogy to represent a person or persons who does not know anything about the mechanism by which the pattern on the TV screen is generated. In principle it would be possible for the gentlemen to figure out how the pattern is generated eventually, but that is to miss the point of the analogy. The analogy is supposed to represent our reasoning on the brain vs consciousness, but applied to a different system. If someone claims that phenomenal consciousness if generated by the brain and does so based on the observation that manipulating the brain results in a change in phenomenal consciousness, then the TV analogy shows how it is possible to make a false conclusion based on the same reasoning. The analogy is about false reasoning, not about any proposal about how the brain acts as a receiver.

I could say that the brain is like an overripe tomato, because they're both soft and squishy. If I restrict the terms, the analogy does not fail.

But the TV analogy is not meant to be used to state that the brain acts like a TV. It is meant to be used to state that correlation does not equal cause.

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 06:47 AM

Originally posted by Batman Jr.
I agree that inward perception cannot be measured scientifically; that is why I elaborated that I was talking about

"aspects of the psyche amenable to scientific measurement." However, where I have to part with you is where you

come to the conclusion that this hypothetical metaphysicalâ€”perhaps not even metaphysical, but maybe just

unknownâ€”component of consciousness can not only take from but fuel the brain.

So you mean that you accept that brain states affect conscious states, but that conscious states cannot affect brain

states? But we know that consciousness necessarily must be causally efficacious (I can paste in my argument here if

you like?) and we know that consciousness cannot be equated with either the processes of the brain, nor their

functions (again I can paste in the argument). Of course some physical "law" must be broken, but recognising where

the limits of a physical law lie is how science progresses.

From what has been ascertained from scientific study, everything so far appears consistent with the intellectual

powers of the brain being autonomous, self-sufficient. This is unlike a television set where there are no internal

devices accountable for what is received through an external signal.

I don't know what you mean. You will need to elaborate on what you mean about intellectual powers being autonomous

and self-sufficient. Are you claiming here that we have no reason to think the world is not physically closed and

that science provides evidence for this thesis i.e so that brain processes wholly account for intellectual powers?

Can I substitute consciousness for intellectual powers? If you are the problem here is that it is completely and

utterly not a scientific issue -- it's a philosophical issue. But I've already said this in my previous post,

and you agreed with me.
,
If you're simply saying that scientific study is consistent, or even gives highly suggestive evidence, for the

hypothesis that consciousness is wholly a product of the brain, then there are 2 points to be made.

a) Even supposing this is true, evidence does not amount to proof and therefore cannot rule out the TV metaphor of

brain/consciousness.

b) The scientific evidence is an irrelevance. We know this because we immediate experience the causal efficacy of

our consciousness and it is incoherent to suppose this is an illusion. Now the only way that our consciousness can

be causally efficacious and yet for it to be true that the world is physically closed, would be if reductive

materialism is true. But the scientific evidence doesn't give any support for reductive materialism, it only gives

support for the hypothesis that consciousness is a product of the brain (reductive materialism goes waaay

beyond this thesis). So you would need to have independent philosophical reasons for supposing reductive

materialism is true. If such reasons were provided then, and only then could you point to the scientific

evidence supporting your position. Otherwise philosophical reasoning trumps scientific evidence.

Now, I'm surmising that you might want to argue that there are no internal devices in the brain that could be

pointed to and positively identified as being causative of consciousness.

Well how could we ever know they are anyway??

This is true, but one important caveat about this line of reasoning has to be elucidated upon so that one could see

the fundamental differences between this kind of situation and that of the television. In the case of the

television, we are talking about externalinfluences on the television which fall within the bounds of epistemology.

As a result, we can identify cause-and-effect relationships in what will, for instance, create the screenplay being

read by the actors on screen or the musical score being bellowed out of the speakers. We can realize that the

requisite elements for generating such things don't exist in the television. With the brain, the internally

unidentifiable elementâ€”consciousnessâ€”completely falls out of our field of observation. This glaring absence of its

mensuration keeps us from comprehending what could possibly produce it. It can't be associated through empirical

means with anything, even its truthful cause, so even if consciousness was self-contained in the brain, it would be

impossible to discover that it was!

That's correct from the perspective of examining the brain, or even trying to fit consciousness into the scientific

world picture. But what if a "matter duplicator" were created? If a duplicate of someone were created, and it were

conscious and had pretty much the personality of the original, then this would pretty well much show that

consciousness is generated by the brain, yes?

From this, we can see that the self-contained proposition cannot be ruled out as with the TV. [/B]

Oh yes, I agree absolutely that the notion of consciousness being a product of the brain cannot be ruled out. The TV metaphor had the rather modest aim of simply showing that the notion of consciousness being a product of the brain is not a conclusion that is forced upon us!

Edited to add:

Ooops, had to type this out on notepad because my computer keeps spontaneously rebooting itself and I didn't want to lose everything. But it's come out all weird!

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 07:00 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This analogy is broken in so many ways, it's almost laughable to think anyone would bother using it.

How can it possibly be?? So you're saying that if states of Y follow states of X, then the very existence of Y (not its states) cannot possibly originate from anything else but states of X?? :rolleyes:

I can't wait to see your justification (I haven't read the rest of your post yet).

I'm sure that Ian either has already or is going to use his example of the two 18th Century gentlemen who examine a television.

But again, there are gaping holes in this thinking.

First, if the television were brought back to them, in the 18th Century, would it display anything? No. It might give them tantalizing hints of what might be done regarding electricity, perhaps, but even if it came with a self-contained power supply, it would still display static.

Yes that's right, that's why they went forward in time to our time in my example :)

Bringing back a TV set to the 18th century would just produce a TV set showing static (or whatever it's called). Likewise a matter duplicator duplicating a person would only produce a corpse ;)

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 07:16 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This analogy is broken in so many ways, it's almost laughable to think anyone would bother using it.

I'm sure that Ian either has already or is going to use his example of the two 18th Century gentlemen who examine a television.

But again, there are gaping holes in this thinking.

First, if the television were brought back to them, in the 18th Century, would it display anything? No. It might give them tantalizing hints of what might be done regarding electricity, perhaps, but even if it came with a self-contained power supply, it would still display static.

Eventually, the two gentlemen might open it up, and discover the receiver, but to what end? At best, they would ponder why someone would build a machine that makes static.

On the other hand, if the two gentlemen were brought to this time, they would inevitably be exposed to radio wave theory, television studios, etc. and would quickly understand television just as we would.

We are in much the same position: if there were 'self transmitters' out there, there is a good chance we would already have discovered them by now.

I have no idea what a self-transmitter is. I certainly don't think anything "transmits" or creates the self.

At the very least, we'd have bits of the brain with no current discernable use that, nevertheless, would affect the consciousness of the patient directly if altered.

But that's not the case.

What does Ian have to support his theories about the television model?

I don't need anything to support it. You need to show wht correlations between conscious and brain states necessitate that the former come from the latter. Once you have done this then you will have debunked my TV set metaphor. But not before.

I think someone else pointed out that there is a fundamental difference between a television program and consciousness,

Yup, and someone could point out there's a fundamental difference between the space-time continuum, and the fabric of a balloon. That doesn't alter the fact that the balloon analogy for the expanding Universe helped me to understand it. So hpow do you explain that??

I presume you are hostile to all analagies whatsoever then? Even if they can sometimes enable people to understand??

in that one is clearly and obviously an illusion, which could not be generated as is within the television, whereas the other is entirely consistant with the physical composition of the brain. Our illusion of self does not appear to exceed the limits of our brain; in fact, it is defined by those limits.

Really, a computer model of the brain would be far, far more accurate, even if one wanted to enter ESP into the picture.

Sorry, I don't see how the above is relevant to the TV set metaphor. It is the materialist who adheres to the computer model of consciousness, not I. If the TV metaphor is wrong, then how is it wrong??

I keep asking this question to everyone! How is it wrong?? In what way is it wrong?? Saying that consciousness is consistent with the hypothesis that brain produces consciousness does not show that it is incoherent to think otherwise!! Does your sheer stupidity know of any limits whatsoever zaayrdragon???

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 07:20 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
But that is NOT his fundamental point in using the analogy. Instead, his deliberate correllation between brains and televisions is to demonstrate how the Self can be received through the Brain, and how we might misunderstand the brain's role in the Self.

Yet, clearly, the analogy fails to work, even on that behalf, unless his two gentlemen are just unfailingly stupid - much like himself.

How the self can be received through the brain?? :confused:

I have prvided no answer to that, nor does it even make any sense.

You might as well ask how an object continues in uniform motion in a straight line in the absence of any forces.

Edited to add: I mean how does Newton's first law obtain?

Such a question is obviously outside science just as asking how a brain receives a self. Most questions regarding the worl we simply cannot answer. But that doesn't alter the fact that objects nevertheless do travel at a unifom motion in the absece of any forces!

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

19th July 2005, 07:32 AM

Ian, I think you missed my question:

Jmercer's question is one of many facets of the overall question: If reality is a monism and my brain is just played on my senses like the rest of the external world, then why does it have control over my consciousness?

~~ Paul

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 07:32 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This concept was presented to me a few days ago, and I'd like to share it, though this might not be the best place to do so:

Think of the brain as a piece of paper. By itself, it is nothing, but one can see the potential it might have.

Now think of brain activity as ink on paper. If observed, what else can it be? Just ink on paper.

But to those who understand, the ink on the paper make a story. That story is the Self.

When you alter bits of the paper, or bits of the ink, the Story changes. But only for the Reader.

Is this a good analogy? No. Because it postulates yet another level - a Reader, a person who must understand. In the case of our Brain, the Story IS the Reader. And it leaves an unanswered question: who is the writer?

Here, at least, was someone who realized that analogies can only go so far - and that fatal flaws exist even in the best analogies.

Could you point out where I have ever denied that analogies only go so far?? Are you completely daft??

You and the rest of the materialist/skeptics are denying that the analogy goes anywhere whatsoever!

You are all asserting that consciousness/brain correlations prove that consciousness must be a product of the brain!!

So tell me what the hell has the fact that analogies eventually all fail got the hell to do with the price of tea in China??

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 07:45 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Originally posted by davidsmith73
That may be Ian's hypothesis about consciousness and the brain. I think it was Rupert Sheldrake who wrote about the analogy about 20 years ago (he may have borrowed it from someone else of course). I'm almost certain that Sheldrake intended the analogy to be used only as one about false conclusions from correlations rather than a proposed hypothesis about how consciousness and the brain interact. Thats certainly how I use the analogy anyway. And its clear that if you restrict the analogy to these terms then it does not fail.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sure, if I restrict any analogy to specific terms it does not fail.

And while I agree with your analysis of Sheldrake's proposal, we aren't discussing Sheldrake, but Iandrake.

But you and everyone else is saying that the TV metaphor is utterly absolutely not possible!

I'm saying it's possible, you lot are saying it's not. Sheldrake is saying it's possible. Yet you agree wioth Sheldrake but not me.
You truly are one of the mose awe inspiring stupid people I have ever had the misfortune to communicate with. You can't keep your story straight from one second to the next!

One of the things that I like about analogies is that we can extend them beyond the imposed limitations and come to understand where the analogy differs from the subject, and by doing so, learn more about the subject.

Yes but you need to acknowledge that the TV metaphor is not ruled out a priori as you have done so far knuckelhead!

For example, if the TV analogy is extended, then we get Ian's supposition that brains receive the Self - so is there a receiver? A transmitter?

WOW! This is like discussing the characteristics of a ballon whislt trying to understand the space time continuum!

Jeez

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 07:55 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Didn't you just say that even the best analogies have fatal flaws?

Noted, and I was just making a point about the correct usage of the analogy. :)

I would say probably not. Taking the analogy to represent a mechanism of how consciousness interacts with the brain would be a step in the wrong direction in my opinion.

That's not the point of introducing these gentlemen into the analogy though is it. They are put in the analogy to represent a person or persons who does not know anything about the mechanism by which the pattern on the TV screen is generated. In principle it would be possible for the gentlemen to figure out how the pattern is generated eventually, but that is to miss the point of the analogy. The analogy is supposed to represent our reasoning on the brain vs consciousness, but applied to a different system. If someone claims that phenomenal consciousness if generated by the brain and does so based on the observation that manipulating the brain results in a change in phenomenal consciousness, then the TV analogy shows how it is possible to make a false conclusion based on the same reasoning. The analogy is about false reasoning, not about any proposal about how the brain acts as a receiver.

But the TV analogy is not meant to be used to state that the brain acts like a TV. It is meant to be used to state that correlation does not equal cause.

I agree entirely with DavidSmith.

It's true that I've used the metaphor to try and convey my ideas about the distinction between the self and its differing mind states. I'm not sure if anyone else has ever tried to do that. But that doesn't get off the ground if people are simply a priori asserting that any other conclusion apart from brain states generate conscious states are simply not possible.

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 08:03 AM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Ian, I think you missed my question:

Jmercer's question is one of many facets of the overall question: If reality is a monism and my brain is just played on my senses like the rest of the external world, then why does it have control over my consciousness?

~~ Paul

It controls your consciousness does it? Not simply effects it? Are you saying then that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon??

19th July 2005, 08:09 AM

There are times I almost wish I were mature enough to take Ian off of 'ignore'.

So, someone tell me, in these latest... what, six? Seven? ... posts, has he yet successfully defended his television analogy?

After all, the burden of proof is on him, since he is presenting his theory, correct?

Or is he ranting about the 'incoherency' of the idea that the Self is merely a continual and dynamic pattern of activity of the Brain?

...Well, frankly, whatever his rants are, I'm sure he's only a few steps away from finally giving us the defense we're looking for. But the entire subject has now grown boring.

My own personal opinion: Brains are not like television sets. Brains are like comput.... no, let's correct this here and now. Brains are computers. Organic computers. And the Self is the totality of program activity in the computer in a continual and dynamic state of functionality.

Your mileage may vary.

Ashles

19th July 2005, 08:11 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It's true that I've used the metaphor to try and convey my ideas about the distinction between the self and its differing mind states. I'm not sure if anyone else has ever tried to do that.
They have (http://www.grrl.com/blognov2002.html)
Dossey uses the analogy of TV reception and transmission to explain how a nonmaterial mind acts on a physical body. That is, there is a signal from the non-local, universal mind that is picked up by the individual; clarity of the reception depends upon the individual's receiving equipment. When the picture is bad, there are two possible problems - the signal transmission is bad, or the TV set is bad. In Dossey's opinion, most modern theories of the brain resemble the person who believes the TV itself produces the picture. Thus when something goes wrong with the picture, they look only to the TV. Once it is fixed reception is restored, so like the local theories of the brain, their theory appears verified, just as damage to the brain appears to verify the brain as the origin of mind (Dossey 1989:197). For Dossey, the idea of a non-local mind is an even more advanced conception than the popular mind-body approach to medicine; it emphasizes the causal power of consciousness and "does not regard the mind as operating only within the individual human body or even within a single lifetime of a person" (Dossey 1989:265).
And here (http://www.light-messenger.org/lm0903.html)
To use the mind is similar to a television or radio.

In television, you receive a signal through the air that has the sound and picture and color, and all of that information is impressed repeatedly upon the screen, which is the memory of the television, and creates an image for you to see. As long as there is transmission, there is an image. But think well what happens when there is interference with the transmission. The picture, the sound, the color, or all are distorted, and we do not have the true original image. That is not to say that the transmitter is at fault or that the source of the material is at fault. Obviously, if interference changes the color of the face of an individual to green, we know that the face individual in the studio did not change to green. Therefore, the interference has caused a change in our perception of reality or in consciousness.

If the brain functions in this manner with the consciousness from other dimensions, then the logical question is: What can cause interference? Interference can be caused by other persons, other energies, by the individual preoccupied with other things or physical condition of the individual, and sometimes a type of interference that might be referred to as interdimensional interference. All of these things can impair the communication and flow of information. But memory and analysis, for analysis is bringing to the memory all that you remember or have learned about a subject in order to analyze it, this process needs a healthy memory bank.

Ashles

19th July 2005, 08:16 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
There are times I almost wish I were mature enough to take Ian off of 'ignore'.
How could you put Ian on ignore? He makes my time fly by at work. His recent posts on psychology were worth the admission fee alone.

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 08:24 AM

Originally posted by Ashles
They have (http://www.grrl.com/blognov2002.html)

And here (http://www.light-messenger.org/lm0903.html)

No Ashley, I'm taking the analogy further:

"A loose analogy might be drawn between the television set and the brain, the storyline of a TV programme and the self, and finally the picture quality of programme displayed and the mind states undergone by the self. Thus, just as tinkering with the internal components of a television set will have consequences for the quality of the picture displayed, but will not change the storyline of the programme, so too might alteration of the brainâ€™s processes affect states of the mind without bringing about any change in the actual self".

Note that this is saying more than what the links say?

drkitten

19th July 2005, 08:33 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No Ashley, I'm taking the analogy further:

"A loose analogy might be drawn between the television set and the brain, the storyline of a TV programme and the self, and finally the picture quality of programme displayed and the mind states undergone by the self. Thus, just as tinkering with the internal components of a television set will have consequences for the quality of the picture displayed, but will not change the storyline of the programme, so too might alteration of the brainâ€™s processes affect states of the mind without bringing about any change in the actual self".

Note that this is saying more than what the links say?

Not especially. From the second citation above:

But think well what happens when there is interference with the transmission. The picture, the sound, the color, or all are distorted, and we do not have the true original image. That is not to say that the transmitter is at fault or that the source of the material is at fault. Obviously, if interference changes the color of the face of an individual to green, we know that the face individual in the studio did not change to green. Therefore, the interference has caused a change in our perception of reality or in consciousness.

They're talking about "interference," while you're talking about changes to to the TV set's internal workings -- but since one of the major causes of interference is a change (failure) of internal components, the difference between what you wrote and what they wrote is not especially significant.

drkitten

19th July 2005, 08:35 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It controls your consciousness does it? Not simply effects it? Are you saying then that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon??

Why not? A lot of better philosophers than you have said that, Ian. Take a look at the writings of Douglas Hofstadter, for example -- I believe he won the Pulitzer for saying "consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon" in a very very well-written way.

Ashles

19th July 2005, 08:37 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Note that this is saying more than what the links say?
To be honest I really don't see how your analogy is saying anything further than those.

The signal transmitted is assumed to be a standard signal. Nothing done to the TV will affect that signal. Your use of the term 'storyline' does not add anything to the analogy.
Storyline, signal... the same point is made that an effect on the brain will cause the signal/storyline to be incorrectly or incompletely interpreted.

So, no your analogy really doesn't go any further.

MRC_Hans

19th July 2005, 08:41 AM

To answer the initial question, I think the fault with the TV analogy is that it is basically self-defeating. What it say is that all we can OBSERVE about the mind is an effect of the brain function, and it needs to stick to that to explain the many observations we make on how various things that affect the brain also effect the mind.

Thus, the claim that some other mind entitiy is transmitting through the brain becomes not only untestable, but also not parsimonious, since all we can observe is explained by the brain, making the non-physical mind or self superfluous.

Ian's elaboration with the two ancient gentlemen examining the TV set really weakens the thesis, because what one of them finds, as he closely examines the TV set and begins to understand its mode of funtion, is that the complexity and general fuctionality of the TV set does NOT support the observed complexity of the storyline shown. More so if he happens on a newscast; it will then be obvious that the TV set is privvy to some external influx of information that could not possible originate inside it.

In contast, we do not find (at least not yet), that the human brain does not have a level of complexity and structure that precludes the complexity of its behaviour (and indeed the analogy admits just that), and it does not provably have access to any information that is not either gained through the physical inputs we know of or originating inside it.

Hans

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 08:51 AM

Originally posted by new drkitten
[B]Not especially. From the second citation above:

Not especially. From the second citation above:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
But think well what happens when there is interference with the transmission. The picture, the sound, the color, or all are distorted, and we do not have the true original image. That is not to say that the transmitter is at fault or that the source of the material is at fault. Obviously, if interference changes the color of the face of an individual to green, we know that the face individual in the studio did not change to green. Therefore, the interference has caused a change in our perception of reality or in consciousness.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well I suppose change in consciousness or perception of reality could equate to my differing mind states. But they don't have an analogy for the self where as I do i.e the actual storyline of the TV programme.

Edited to add:

Actually I was wrong. The transmission is the self. Still I think I put it much more clearly :mad:

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 09:05 AM

Originally posted by new drkitten
Why not? A lot of better philosophers than you have said that, Ian. Take a look at the writings of Douglas Hofstadter, for example -- I believe he won the Pulitzer for saying "consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon" in a very very well-written way.

Then it's a pity that those who awarded this Pulitzer didn't read my proof. Here it is:

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.

Ashles

19th July 2005, 09:08 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Well I suppose change in consciousness or perception of reality could equate to my differing mind states. But they don't have an analogy for the self where as I do i.e the actual storyline of the TV programme.
The signal is the self in their analogy. It doesn't have to be spelt out in detail - it's already clear.
You are merely adding a redundant level of detail, but confusing it as being a deeper level of complexity.

I could create an anology where I describe the self as "Lines of dialogue" in the plot of the TV programme. But I am not adding anything to the analogy. Just as someone else could describe the self as "Words of dialogue" etc. etc. Over-elaborating the description doesn't add anything.
I am just describing the 'self' as a different part of the transmission. It is entirely unhelpful to the overall analogy.

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 09:13 AM

Originally posted by Ashles
[B]The signal is the self in their analogy.

Yes yes, ok, I've just realised. But I've put it more clearly.

It doesn't have to be spelt out in detail - it's already clear.
You are merely adding a redundant level of detail, but confusing it as being a deeper level of complexity.

What detail?? I've just made it more clear!

drkitten

19th July 2005, 09:16 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then it's a pity that those who awarded this Pulitzer didn't read my proof. Here it is:

This is a proof? Oh, you poor, dear, boy. Why don't you go sit down under a tree where it's nice and shady....

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

If you consider it possible for you to be "convinced" that you are conscious without actually being conscious, then the following point is irrelevant.

If it's not actually possible, then point 2 simply does not follow from point 1.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious.

If there is truly no difference between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious, then it's not possible (pace point 2) for you to be convinced that you were conscious without actually being conscious. In other words, the physical causal chain postulated in the first point that is sufficient for you to be convinced that you are conscious is also sufficient for you to be conscious.

The only internal inconsistency is your equivocation between the nature of "causal chain" and about what is actually caused. If there is truly no difference between appearing to be conscious, and actual consciousness, then anything capable of causing. the appearance of consciousness is by definition capable of producing consciousness itself. If, on the other hand, something is capable of causing you to seem to be conscious without your really being conscious, then you have no proof that your "self-perception" of being conscious is not mere seeming, since you've already postulated the possibility of such.

You can't have it both ways. Either "seeming to be conscious" is identical to "conscious" -- in which case, there is no problem, or "seeming to be conscious" is not identical to "conscious," in which case there is again no problem.

I believe Hofstadter's thesis was the first -- that in order to be aware enough to be convinced of your own consciousness, you had to be conscious. Thus any causal process capable of producing the illusion of consciousness was by definition producing true consciousness.

Ashles

19th July 2005, 09:22 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then it's a pity that those who awarded this Pulitzer didn't read my proof.
Oh. My. Dear. God.

Here it is:

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.
Yes.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
How does that follow? Why could consciousness not be a real phenomenon that merely results from functionality of the brain?
Your comment that you would "convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious." is a possibility, but not a logical certainty, so your "proof" falls down it this point and the Pulitzer eludes you for another year.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!
Yes you are conscious, but the fact of being conscious does not tell us about the nature of consciousness. ETA: And newdrk points out above the logical inconsistency that appears at this stage.

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.
The only inconsistency is due to earlier false assumption.

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.
No.

Ashles

19th July 2005, 09:25 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yes yes, ok, I've just realised. But I've put it more clearly.

What detail?? I've just made it more clear!
Put it like this - is was clear to us already. If you have clarified it to yourself then I am happy for you.

19th July 2005, 09:54 AM

Oh lord - See, this is typical Ianist nonsense. He posted this proof a while ago, and it was torn to shreds then. Yet he's still clinging to this proof as if it weren't empty and hollow.

Yep - I would almost go so far as to say Ian is predictable, but he has actually toned down the insults and foul mouth, so maybe he's capable of some learning after all.

Francois Tremblay

19th July 2005, 10:45 AM

No one has yet given any reason to think that identity theory is incomplete. Maybe this is like Christianity, a dogma that some vocal skeptics demand that all other skeptics not question...

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

19th July 2005, 11:14 AM

Ian said:
It controls your consciousness does it? Not simply effects it? Are you saying then that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon??
Control ... effect ... whatever. When I sleep I have no virtually no consciousness. Sounds like control to me.

I note you still haven't answered the question.

~~ Paul

jmercer

19th July 2005, 11:44 AM

Ian,

Analogies can be flawed to the point where their premise is useless; I suspect your TV analogy is in exactly that situation. So let's abandon the TV analogy, and get to the heart of the matter. Here's what I think your perspective is; please correct me if I'm mistaken:

You are essentially stating that self (or consciousness) exists apart from the material brain and the inherent biological, neural and chemical events that make up the brain's processes. "Self" utilizes the brain in an unknown manner to connect "self" to the material world in such a way that permits "self" to interact with it.

Is this correct?

(Edited for clarification)

aggle-rithm

19th July 2005, 11:55 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I agree entirely with DavidSmith.

It's true that I've used the metaphor to try and convey my ideas about the distinction between the self and its differing mind states. I'm not sure if anyone else has ever tried to do that. But that doesn't get off the ground if people are simply a priori asserting that any other conclusion apart from brain states generate conscious states are simply not possible.

I think part of the problem is that, in this model, psychic phenomena are considered a subset of these brain states. The TV analogy helps explain esp, clairvoyance, etc, but it just doesn't fit if you don't find the evidence for these phenomena compelling.

aggle-rithm

19th July 2005, 12:00 PM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
My own personal opinion: Brains are not like television sets. Brains are like comput.... no, let's correct this here and now. Brains are computers. Organic computers. And the Self is the totality of program activity in the computer in a continual and dynamic state of functionality.

Your mileage may vary.

I think brains are like...brains. There is nothing else quite like them.

Especially when sauteed in lemon butter. Mmmmm.... ;)

19th July 2005, 12:03 PM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
I think brains are like...brains. There is nothing else quite like them.

Especially when sauteed in lemon butter. Mmmmm.... ;)

Ugh.

We Dragons prefer them straight, raw, and fresh. That's how we learn things, you know - we consume brains, and absorb the victim's knowledge into our own.

But we never eat politicians. Sure, the brain could easily be fried, boiled, whatever - no knowledge to worry about destroying - but it takes so long to clean a politician...!

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 12:49 PM

Originally posted by new drkitten
[B]This is a proof? Oh, you poor, dear, boy. Why don't you go sit down under a tree where it's nice and shady....

Yes I am absolutely convinced it's a stone cold proof that consciousness cannot possibly be an epiphenomenon. I haven't looked at your comments yet because I'm due to meet my friend at 8pm to go for a drink (15 mins time). I'll address them when I get in.

Tricky

19th July 2005, 02:28 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yes I am absolutely convinced it's a stone cold proof that consciousness cannot possibly be an epiphenomenon.
And herein lies the gist of the matter. You are absolutely, stone cold sure that such a thing is proved, even though you can provide none of that proof, in fact you can't even provide evidence. Each argument you make that the consciousness is not an epiphenomenon relies on the circular assumption that consciousness exists apart from the body. As such, this qualifes as a "belief", but scarcely a proof, or even a well-supported theory.

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 05:34 PM

Originally posted by new drkitten
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then it's a pity that those who awarded this Pulitzer didn't read my proof. Here it is:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr K
This is a proof? Oh, you poor, dear, boy. Why don't you go sit down under a tree where it's nice and shady....

II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr K
If you consider it possible for you to be "convinced" that you are conscious without actually being conscious, then the following point is irrelevant.

By saying this I suspect you cannot have understood my proof at all.

If and only if consciousness is an epiphenomenon, then consciousness, by definition, plays no role in my belief that I am conscious. Thus whether I am conscious or not, it necessarily must be the case that I believe that I am conscious regardless.

If it's not actually possible, then point 2 simply does not follow from point 1.

I most certainly do not believe it is possible! But this is simply a consequence of my belief that epiphenomenalism is not a correct depiction of the mind/body relationship. That is to say I do not subscribe to "1".

Nevertheless, if "1" is true, then "2" follows from "1" by definition. If consciousness is wholly causally inert, then, by definition, it cannot be the existence of consciousness which makes me think I am conscious. Indeed all my behaviour, all my beliefs, all my emotions, in fact all mental processes whatsoever are entirely determined by the physical processes in the brain. My belief that I am conscious constitutes no exception!

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If there is truly no difference between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious, then it's not possible (pace point 2) for you to be convinced that you were conscious without actually being conscious. In other words, the physical causal chain postulated in the first point that is sufficient for you to be convinced that you are conscious is also sufficient for you to be conscious.

Yes absolutely.

The only internal inconsistency is your equivocation between the nature of "causal chain" and about what is actually caused. If there is truly no difference between appearing to be conscious, and actual consciousness, then anything capable of causing. the appearance of consciousness is by definition capable of producing consciousness itself.

Yes absolutely!

You can't have it both ways. Either "seeming to be conscious" is identical to "conscious" -- in which case, there is no problem, or "seeming to be conscious" is not identical to "conscious," in which case there is again no problem.

I believe Hofstadter's thesis was the first -- that in order to be aware enough to be convinced of your own consciousness, you had to be conscious. Thus any causal process capable of producing the illusion of consciousness was by definition producing true consciousness.

I'm sorry? I can't have what both ways?

a) Seeming to be conscious is precisely the same as really being conscious. This you concede.

b) But epiphenomenalism necessarily dictates that even if I were not conscious, I would still be convinced I am conscious (this is point "2" which is necessitated by point "1").

c) So "b" means we can have a case of seeming to be conscious, but where I am in fact not conscious.

d) This logically contradicts "a". Thus epiphenomenalism is refuted.

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 05:52 PM

Originally posted by Ashles
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Then it's a pity that those who awarded this Pulitzer didn't read my proof.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Oh. My. Dear. God.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here it is:

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yes.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

How does that follow?

It follows necessarily because if consciousness is causally inefficacious, then it cannot affect anything whatsoever. Thus if it cannot affect anything whatsoever, this includes all my beliefs. Thus whether I am conscious or not, I will believe precisely the same.

Why could consciousness not be a real phenomenon that merely results from functionality of the brain?
Your comment that you would "convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious." is a possibility, but not a logical certainty, so your "proof" falls down it this point and the Pulitzer eludes you for another year.

It's a logical absurdity. *I* cannot be falsely convinced I am conscious because the very definition of "I" in this context is conscious awareness. So what you're saying is 'Consious awareness might falsely believe that it is conscious' -- a direct contradiction in terms.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yes you are conscious, but the fact of being conscious does not tell us about the nature of consciousness. ETA: And newdrk points out above the logical inconsistency that appears at this stage.

No he hasn't. His reply seems to me to completely miss my argument -- as does yours.

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 05:54 PM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Oh lord - See, this is typical Ianist nonsense. He posted this proof a while ago, and it was torn to shreds then. Yet he's still clinging to this proof as if it weren't empty and hollow.

By proof for consciousness being causally efficacious? Where where where has it been ripped to shreds?? Nobody has ever said anything which remotely challenges my proof.

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 06:06 PM

Originally posted by Francois Tremblay
No one has yet given any reason to think that identity theory is incomplete. Maybe this is like Christianity, a dogma that some vocal skeptics demand that all other skeptics not question...

Functional materialism is to be preferred to identity theory.

A simple thought experiment. Imagine your neurons being replaced one by one by electronic chips which have exactly the same input/output as the neurons they replace. That is to say the chips perform exactly the same function as the neurons they replace. Since your behaviour (including speech) depends purely on the functions played by all the constituent parts of your brain, then necessarily your behaviour will not change in any way whatsoever. This will include your vocal observations. But since you're maintaining that consciousness is tied down to neurons, and indeed your particular neurons, then as your neurons get replaced one by one you would experience a continuous diminishing of consciousness. However, since the electronic chips duplicate the exact same function as the neurons you would be behaving precisely the same way as before. This will include everything you say. Thus you would be telling the outside world that you feel absolutely fine and feel no different whatsoever even though in reality your consciousness would be continually diminishing!!

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 06:16 PM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Control ... effect ... whatever. When I sleep I have no virtually no consciousness. Sounds like control to me.

I note you still haven't answered the question.

~~ Paul

Why does the brain affect consciousness? I've given an answer already in this thread regarding the brain curtailing mental states so we do not experience all realities at once.

Or do you mean how can it?

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 06:21 PM

Originally posted by jmercer
Ian,

Analogies can be flawed to the point where their premise is useless; I suspect your TV analogy is in exactly that situation. So let's abandon the TV analogy, and get to the heart of the matter. Here's what I think your perspective is; please correct me if I'm mistaken:

You are essentially stating that self (or consciousness) exists apart from the material brain and the inherent biological, neural and chemical events that make up the brain's processes. "Self" utilizes the brain in an unknown manner to connect "self" to the material world in such a way that permits "self" to interact with it.

Is this correct?

(Edited for clarification)

Consciousness exists apart from the brain? Does this equate to saying consciousness is not one and the same thing as some physical process? I certainly hold that it is not. Indeed I think it is simply empty of content to say it is.

Or are you saying that I'm saying that consciousness could exist independently of the brain? I believe that also, but my evidence/reasons are that much weaker for this thesis.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

19th July 2005, 06:23 PM

Ian said:
Why does the brain affect consciousness? I've given an answer already in this thread regarding the brain curtailing mental states so we do not experience all realities at once.

Or do you mean how can it?
Why does it? Why does the brain, a figment of our senses played by the Mind, have any control over consciousness at all? What is the point of limiting our experience of pure consciousness with such a contraption?

~~ Paul

Interesting Ian

19th July 2005, 06:29 PM

Originally posted by Tricky
Each argument you make that the consciousness is not an epiphenomenon relies on the circular assumption that consciousness exists apart from the body.

Well let's see shall we? Let's take it one point at a time. Do you think point 1 is assuming that consciousness exists apart from the body? What part of point 1 precisely? I paste in my argument below for your convenience.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

19th July 2005, 08:03 PM

Couldn't we all just stipulate that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon?

Ian said:
But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious.
What does "seeming to be conscious" mean?

~~ Paul

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

19th July 2005, 08:06 PM

Ian said:
A simple thought experiment. Imagine your neurons being replaced one by one by electronic chips which have exactly the same input/output as the neurons they replace. That is to say the chips perform exactly the same function as the neurons they replace. Since your behaviour (including speech) depends purely on the functions played by all the constituent parts of your brain, then necessarily your behaviour will not change in any way whatsoever. This will include your vocal observations. But since you're maintaining that consciousness is tied down to neurons, and indeed your particular neurons, then as your neurons get replaced one by one you would experience a continuous diminishing of consciousness. However, since the electronic chips duplicate the exact same function as the neurons you would be behaving precisely the same way as before. This will include everything you say. Thus you would be telling the outside world that you feel absolutely fine and feel no different whatsoever even though in reality your consciousness would be continually diminishing!!
Who is maintaining that consciousness is tied to neurons specifically?

~~ Paul

Bodhi Dharma Zen

19th July 2005, 08:22 PM

Interesting Ian: "I believe Q and W and E"

Somebody else (pick your favorite poster): "No Ian, because that does not follow and is incoherent."

Interesting Ian: "You, obviously, didnt understand what I said, you know nothing about the subject.

:rolleyes:

Ian, please. Please. Think about this exercise before you state again, with your fancy arrogance, that you "know" that you are "convinced" that "its obvious".

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If and only if consciousness is an epiphenomenon, then consciousness, by definition, plays no role in my belief that I am conscious.

If X is Y then X plays no role in my belief about X.

What????????? :(

Obviously, you believe you make sense. But you utter absurdities all the time. Yes, you will get upset when you read this and you will insult, as usual, the messenger. When it is all for your own good!

Bodhi Dharma Zen

19th July 2005, 08:27 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Thus you would be telling the outside world that you feel absolutely fine and feel no different whatsoever even though in reality your consciousness would be continually diminishing!!

In "reality"!!! :eek: its a thought experiment! for crying out loud!

Tricky

19th July 2005, 09:22 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Well let's see shall we? Let's take it one point at a time. Do you think point 1 is assuming that consciousness exists apart from the body? What part of point 1 precisely? I paste in my argument below for your convenience.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Governed by physical laws, but not pre-determined by physical laws. It is impossible to determine "cause and effect" in many cases. It is sounding like you are trying to make this a discussion of determinism.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
No, that is totally circular. Your conviction that you are conscious has everything to do with the fact that you are conscious. You could not have convictions otherwise. An unconscious being cannot have convictions. Also, point 2 does not follow from point 1 unless you have defined brain functions as deterministic, which is not a thing that has been shown. It is your own little straw man of what materialists believe about consciousness.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious.
Self contradictory. If there is no distinction between conscious and seeming to be conscious, then how can you know you are conscious? You might only "seem" to know without a shadow of a doubt.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
3 continued) Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actually think at all!
"Thinking", like "consciousness", is a term which loosely describes certain brain functions. It is not a thing apart from the body. Again, you are wandering into the arena of "belief" without providing evidence. Once again, your "proof" relies wholly on your assumptions being correct, and I see no reason to believe that they are.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.
By your own proof, you do not have incorrigible certain knowledge that you are conscious. You could only seem to have it, because you couldn't tell the difference. Your entire "proof" rests on the acceptance that your self-assessment of your own consciousness is correct. You cannot "prove" this without assuming the conclusions of the proof. (I believe this is called "begging the question".)

While I do believe you are conscious, Ian, at least the way I define it, I don't think you can prove it, any more than you can "prove" that you are not a very complex android.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.
"Causally efficacious?" My contention is that your consciousness is an emergent property of your body, mostly your brain, a contention for which there is a great deal of evidence. You have done nothing whatsoever to cause me to abandon that contention. You have simply tried to set logical traps with hidden premises that mirror your own unsubstantiated beliefs. There is nothing you have said here that would remotely constitute evidence.

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 06:22 AM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Who is maintaining that consciousness is tied to neurons specifically?

~~ Paul

Identity theorists.

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 06:29 AM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If and only if consciousness is an epiphenomenon, then consciousness, by definition, plays no role in my belief that I am conscious.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If X is Y then X plays no role in my belief about X.

What?????????

Obviously, you believe you make sense. But you utter absurdities all the time. Yes, you will get upset when you read this and you will insult, as usual, the messenger. When it is all for your own good!

An epiphenomenon is something which has no causal power. If it has no causal power then it cannot affect the world. If it cannot affect the world then how could its existence play any role in my belief in its existence?

So when I state that I believe that I am conscious, we can trace back the physical chain of cause and effect. But the fact of my consciousness cannot be the first link, or be a link at all.

aggle-rithm

20th July 2005, 06:53 AM

The mechanism of emotions in the brain and their relationship to memory is pretty well understood. It also seems likely that each of our emotions serves some evolutionary purpose (although some of the baser emotions may be maladaptive in today's world).

So here's my question: Does this disembodied self that is independent of the brain have emotions? If so, what purpose do they serve?

Will we still form new memories when we are independent of the brain? Will emotions still be tied to memory? If all this can happen without the benefit of the brain, then why is the limbic system even necessary?

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 07:04 AM

Originally posted by Tricky

II
Well let's see shall we? Let's take it one point at a time. Do you think point 1 is assuming that consciousness exists apart from the body? What part of

point 1 precisely? I paste in my argument below for your convenience.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly

caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tricky
Governed by physical laws, but not pre-determined by physical laws. It is impossible to determine "cause and effect" in many cases. It is sounding like you

are trying to make this a discussion of determinism.

Governed or determined mean the same thing. If one believes that the world is physically closed then everything that happens unfolds according to physical

laws. The fact that we cannot sometimes determine cause and effect does not alter that fact.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I

would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No, that is totally circular. Your conviction that you are conscious has everything to do with the fact that you are conscious. You could not have

convictions otherwise. An unconscious being cannot have convictions.

An epiphenomenon is something which has no causal power. If consciousness has no causal power then it cannot affect the world. If it cannot affect the world

then how could its existence play any role in my belief in its existence? So when I state that I believe that I am conscious, we can trace back the physical

chain of cause and effect. But the fact of my consciousness cannot be the first link, or be a link at all. Therefore my belief that I am conscious does not

involve the fact of my consciousness.

Also, point 2 does not follow from point 1 unless you have defined brain functions as deterministic, which is not a thing that has been shown. It is your

own little straw man of what materialists believe about consciousness.

Naturalists believe brain functions are deterministic with a little bit of QM randoness thrown in. But the QM randomness is not reckoned to have any

appreciable impact upon brain processes.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self contradictory. If there is no distinction between conscious and seeming to be conscious, then how can you know you are conscious? You might only "seem"

to know without a shadow of a doubt.

How can I falsely believe I am conscious?? The very word "believe" necessitates consciousness -- otherwise what is it that is believing?? :eek: You might

be mistaken about the fact there is an "I", but you cannot be in error in thinking you are conscious because the feeling of consciousness is

consciousness.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
3 continued) Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not

think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actually think at all!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Thinking", like "consciousness", is a term which loosely describes certain brain functions. It is not a thing apart from the body. Again, you are wandering

into the arena of "belief" without providing evidence. Once again, your "proof" relies wholly on your assumptions being correct, and I see no reason to

believe that they are.

It's absolutely utterly irrelevant whether thinking is a brain process or not. The point holds regardless. If I am not conscious, then there

cannot be any thoughts. Yes? Least of all could I think I am conscious if no thinking is taking place!

While I do believe you are conscious, Ian, at least the way I define it, I don't think you can prove it, any more than you can "prove" that you are not a

very complex android.

I never said I can prove it. I said I know with absolute complete certainty that I am conscious.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Causally efficacious?" My contention is that your consciousness is an emergent property of your body, mostly your brain, a contention for which there is a

great deal of evidence.

Emergent? Emergent?? What type of emergence are we talking about here? Can consciousness in principle be reduced to physical processes in the brain or

not? Or is it a genuine emergence (as in epiphenomenalism?). And does this emergent phenomenon have causal powers of its own? And is this type of

emergence unique in the Universe, or do other phenomena exhibit such emergence?

I know you can't answer this question because you and others on here are simply clueless about the whole subject matter.

You have done nothing whatsoever to cause me to abandon that contention. You have simply tried to set logical traps with hidden premises that mirror your

own unsubstantiated beliefs. There is nothing you have said here that would remotely constitute evidence.

It's not evidence I have provided, it's reasoning.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

20th July 2005, 07:23 AM

Bodhi said:
Obviously, you believe you make sense. But you utter absurdities all the time. Yes, you will get upset when you read this and you will insult, as usual, the messenger. When it is all for your own good!
I believe Ian is correct:

Ian said:
If and only if consciousness is an epiphenomenon, then consciousness, by definition, plays no role in my belief that I am conscious.

~~ Paul

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

20th July 2005, 07:24 AM

Ian said:
Identity theorists.
Identity theorists state that consciousness has to be tied to neurons specifically, and no other computing mechanism?

~~ Paul

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 07:47 AM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Identity theorists state that consciousness has to be tied to neurons specifically, and no other computing mechanism?

~~ Paul

Yes, identity theorists believe that consciousness is the very same thing as neurons firing. It has to be brains therefore which are conscious, an android's electronic brain wouldn't be conscious.

But the most popular form of materialism nowadays is functionalism. Functionalism holds that computers can be conscious.

jmercer

20th July 2005, 09:52 AM

Ah, good. Now we can begin with a fresh, value-based discussion. :)

Since you've differentiated, I will respond to both separately.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Consciousness exists apart from the brain? Does this equate to saying consciousness is not one and the same thing as some physical process? I certainly hold that it is not. Indeed I think it is simply empty of content to say it is.

I take this to mean that you believe there is an immaterial aspect to consciousness that outside of purely physical processes. Very well; let us assume that you are correct. Further, let us assume that this immaterial aspect of ourselves exists in some unknown manner - we won't let that be a sticking point, although it certainly could kill the topic.

This raises a number of other challenges.

1) By what mechanism would the immaterial and material components of our "selves" interact? Obviously, there must be a mechanism which - in part, at least - must exist in a physical sense to be able to bridge the gap between the material and immaterial. What could that be?

2) We have all seen how the human mind and personality progressively changes during the transition from childhood to adulthood. The material aspects of that process (in terms of biology) are documented and identifiable. But if our "self" is immaterial and our brains are simply a component used to interact with the material world... what, then, causes our immaterial self to evolve?

3) Finally, by what mechanism would an "immaterial self" connect to only one "physical self"?

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Or are you saying that I'm saying that consciousness could exist independently of the brain? I believe that also, but my evidence/reasons are that much weaker for this thesis.

No - I wasn't saying that in the sense of "the brain dies, but we go on". However, in order for your hypthosis to be valid, consciousness would have to exist independently of the brain in the sense that it would be immaterial - non-physical, in effect.

If not, then you are conceding that consciousness is a purely physical process.

Tricky

20th July 2005, 10:34 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Governed or determined mean the same thing. If one believes that the world is physically closed then everything that happens unfolds according to physical laws. The fact that we cannot sometimes determine cause and effect does not alter that fact.
If you cannot identify the cause and effect, then you cannot say with certainty that it is a "fact". And one of the laws that could govern the physical world is that randomness exists.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
An epiphenomenon is something which has no causal power. If consciousness has no causal power then it cannot affect the world.
That is incorrect. An epiphenomenon is caused by or accompanies another phenomenon, but it does not mean that it does not itself have causal powers. In fact, for a phenomenon to be detected, then it must have some causal powers. To use an analogy, the fact that an aftershock is caused by and accompanies an earthquake does not mean that the aftershock has no effects of its own.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If it cannot affect the world then how could its existence play any role in my belief in its existence? So when I state that I believe that I am conscious, we can trace back the physical chain of cause and effect. But the fact of my consciousness cannot be the first link, or be a link at all. Therefore my belief that I am conscious does not involve the fact of my consciousness.
This entire line of reasoning is based on the incorrect definition of an epiphenomenon. The way you define an epiphenomenon, it could not possibly exist. How would you go about showing the existence of something with absolutely no causal powers?

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Naturalists believe brain functions are deterministic with a little bit of QM randoness thrown in. But the QM randomness is not reckoned to have any appreciable impact upon brain processes.
To say though that brain functions are aspects of nature does not imply determinism, at least in the sense of "predestined". Neither has it been shown that QM is the only possible source of randomness.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
How can I falsely believe I am conscious?? The very word "believe" necessitates consciousness -- otherwise what is it that is believing?? :eek: You might be mistaken about the fact there is an "I", but you cannot be in error in thinking you are conscious because the feeling of consciousness is consciousness.
That is one aspect of consciousness.

However, my point is that what you call "consciousness" is simply a definition of some of the aspects of brain function. The brain-generated observation that you have this consciousness in no way makes it less a function of the brain.

However, one could define consciousness in such a way as to make it appear that you do not have consciousness. If, for example, you insist on defining it as something apart from bodily functions, then you cannot be said to have consciousness because you cannot show that any aspect of what we define as consciousness exists apart from our body functions. Of course, only person who requires no evidence for their beliefs would define it that way.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It's absolutely utterly irrelevant whether thinking is a brain process or not. The point holds regardless. If I am not conscious, then there cannot be any thoughts. Yes? Least of all could I think I am conscious if no thinking is taking place!
Actually, there can. If you require consciousness to have an element that is external to brain/body processes, then you are essentially saying that consciousness cannot be shown to exist. You would simply be defining thoughts as something apart from consciousness. That is why it is silly to define it that way. Why invoke the necessity of an undemonstrable metaphysical entity in order to accept that you are conscious?

Believe in that metaphysical entity if you like, but you cannot show it to be essential to consciousness since you cannot even show that it exists.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I never said I can prove it. I said I know with absolute complete certainty that I am conscious.
You know that because you define yourself as conscious. However, it is your insistance that the way consciousness is defined requires a non-physical element that you need to give evidence for.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Emergent? Emergent?? What type of emergence are we talking about here? Can consciousness in principle be reduced to physical processes in the brain or not? Or is it a genuine emergence (as in epiphenomenalism?). And does this emergent phenomenon have causal powers of its own? And is this type of
emergence unique in the Universe, or do other phenomena exhibit such emergence?
Any demonstrable phenomenon has causal powers of it's own or else it would not be demonstrable. Things which are believed but which cannot be demonstrated fall under the category of "faith".

Your reasoning for why you believe in the metaphysical aspect of the soul is no different than the belief that a Christian has that Jesus Christ is their savior. They simply believe it so strongly that they require no evidence in order to call it a fact.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I know you can't answer this question because you and others on here are simply clueless about the whole subject matter.
Certainly you will not accept my answers, because they conflict with your faith. But I do understand what you are saying. I simply disagree with it.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It's not evidence I have provided, it's reasoning.
Yes, of the circular variety.

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 11:05 AM

Originally posted by Tricky
[Originally posted by Interesting Ian
An epiphenomenon is something which has no causal power. If consciousness has no causal power then it cannot affect the world.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That is incorrect. An epiphenomenon is caused by or accompanies another phenomenon, but it does not mean that it does not itself have causal powers. In fact, for a phenomenon to be detected, then it must have some causal powers. To use an analogy, the fact that an aftershock is caused by and accompanies an earthquake does not mean that the aftershock has no effects of its own.

Tricky,

We are discussing epiphenominalism! Under epipiphenominalism consciousness does not have any causal powers whatsoever. Yes consciousness would be absolutely unique in that respect because if something has no causal powers how can we ever know about it. I think the epiphenominalist would say that our own consciousness is immediately present to our minds so there is no causal process involved.

I'm arguing that this position in the mind/body problem is incoherent. Do you agree or disagree? If you agree do you believe that the reasons I have provided for its incoherency are not valid?

Edited to add: Just read the rest of your post. It consists purely of nonsensical gobbledegook or non-sequiturs.

But it seems that at least you agree with me that epiphenomenalism is incoherent, so what's the point in arguing against me when you agree with me?? It's not just you. People seem to want to argue with me on some topic even where their position does not at all differ from my own.

Marian

20th July 2005, 11:10 AM

I have the strangest sense of deja vu, I wonder why...

Oh yeah it's because this exact same discussion has gone on for as long as I've been reading the boards, with the same results. Let's skip to the end, Ian: "Because God allows it".

Fin

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 11:26 AM

Originally posted by jmercer
[B]Ah, good. Now we can begin with a fresh, value-based discussion. :)

Since you've differentiated, I will respond to both separately.

I take this to mean that you believe there is an immaterial aspect to consciousness that outside of purely physical

processes.

No I do not believe that. Your assertion does not make sense to me at all. Consciousness has absolutely nothing to

do with materiality or physicality.

Very well; let us assume that you are correct. Further, let us assume that this immaterial aspect of ourselves

exists in some unknown manner - we won't let that be a sticking point, although it certainly could kill the topic.

Nonsensical gobbledegook. I can make no sense of the assertion "exists in some unknown manner" -- nor would I be

able to make sense of an assertion that something 'exists in some known manner'. The concept of existence is

not susceptible to further analysis.

This raises a number of other challenges.

1) By what mechanism would the immaterial and material components of our "selves" interact?

None, there is no intermediary between them where a "mechanism" could reside.

Obviously, there must be a mechanism which - in part, at least - must exist in a physical sense to be able to

bridge the gap between the material and immaterial.

No.

2) We have all seen how the human mind and personality progressively changes during the transition from childhood to

adulthood. The material aspects of that process (in terms of biology) are documented and identifiable. But if our

"self" is immaterial and our brains are simply a component used to interact with the material world... what, then,

causes our immaterial self to evolve?

You're confusing the mind with the self.

3) Finally, by what mechanism would an "immaterial self" connect to only one "physical self"?

No mechanisms. And I have no idea. Nor can I see the importance whatsoever.

No - I wasn't saying that in the sense of "the brain dies, but we go on". However, in order for your hypthosis to

be valid, consciousness would have to exist independently of the brain in the sense that it would be immaterial -

non-physical, in effect.

If not, then you are conceding that consciousness is a purely physical process.

I most emphatically do not have the same definition of material that you have. For me material means it has to be

susceptible to an explanation by reductive science. Consciousness can be generated by the brain and yet be

immaterial.

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 11:28 AM

Originally posted by Marian
I have the strangest sense of deja vu, I wonder why...

Oh yeah it's because this exact same discussion has gone on for as long as I've been reading the boards, with the same results. Let's skip to the end, Ian: "Because God allows it".

Fin

If you want to disagree with me then provide some arguments.

aggle-rithm

20th July 2005, 11:34 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Tricky,

We are discussing epiphenominalism!

As opposed to epiphenomEnalism?

If I'm not mistaken, this is merely the idea that the brain can change the mind, but the mind can't change the brain, just like a chameleon can change colors, but a color can't change chameleons.

I think it's something of a nonsensical argument because you don't normally speak of a property of a thing changing the thing itself. In this case, it seems that epiphenomenalism pre-supposes the existence of an immaterial mind separate from the brain (going beyond the idea that it's simply a property), and argues that since the immaterial can have no effect on the material, the mind can't influence the brain.

If I'm not mistaken.

jmercer

20th July 2005, 11:49 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No I do not believe that. Your assertion does not make sense to me at all. Consciousness has absolutely nothing to

do with materiality or physicality.

Nonsensical gobbledegook. I can make no sense of the assertion "exists in some unknown manner" -- nor would I be

able to make sense of an assertion that something 'exists in some known manner'. The concept of existence is

not susceptible to further analysis.

None, there is no intermediary between them where a "mechanism" could reside.

No.

You're confusing the mind with the self.

No mechanisms. And I have no idea. Nor can I see the importance whatsoever.

I most emphatically do not have the same definition of material that you have. For me material means it has to be

susceptible to an explanation by reductive science. Consciousness can be generated by the brain and yet be

immaterial.

Saw the checkmate coming, hm? :D

Ok, then - I'm done with the topic... :)

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 11:51 AM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
As opposed to epiphenom[b]Enalism?

If I'm not mistaken, this is merely the idea that the brain can change the mind, but the mind can't change the brain, just like a chameleon can change colors, but a color can't change chameleons.

I think it's something of a nonsensical argument because you don't normally speak of a property of a thing changing the thing itself.

A thing is exhausted by its properties. Once you have specified all the properties of an object, there is no remainder.

Under epiphenomenalism consciousness doesn't affect anything whatsoever.

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 11:53 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
A thing is exhausted by its properties. Once you have specified all the properties of an object, there is no remainder.

Apart from the self of course. Physical things are exhausted by their properties.

aggle-rithm

20th July 2005, 11:56 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
A thing is exhausted by its properties. Once you have specified all the properties of an object, there is no remainder.

Is it even possible to specify ALL the properties of an object? For instance, isn't the length of an object's shadow at the equator at exactly 5:54 and 10 seconds, PM, a property of that object? This suggests that the possible number of properties infinite.

I think what is defined as a "property" is largely dependent on the point of view.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

20th July 2005, 12:08 PM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
I believe Ian is correct:

~~ Paul

:) He is not. Let me explain.

Ian said:
If and only if consciousness is an epiphenomenon, then consciousness, by definition, plays no role in my belief that I am conscious.

Why do you have to assume that a belief is not a state of being that has no causal role at all? It can be argued (easily) that a belief is a sensation that is felt on this epiphenomenal consciousness, which would be like a theater in which all sensations occur.

Now, if in this theater there is the sensation of red, of a flower, of a feeling, and emotion and a belief, why do they have to have causal power at all? they are experienced, in that theater, and there they fullfil their causal role, being represented.

He then tried to put things more clear:

An epiphenomenon is something which has no causal power. If it has no causal power then it cannot affect the world. If it cannot affect the world then how could its existence play any role in my belief in its existence?

And you can see that my objection remains. In the assumption that consciousness is an epiphenomena (not that I believe this, because in my view we lack the necessary concepts to even grasp what consciousnesss might be) it can be viewed as the receptacle of all the subjective felt causes and effects.

The error becomes from assuming that a sensation can be something that comes from the world to the mind, this is, have causal power, but what comes from the mind would not have causal powers (example, the "believing" Ian mentions or a decision process). But this is false.

There is the sensation of believing, the sensation of making a decision. Both subjective, both would belong to the epiphenomenal consciouness, and both would be related to a physical process in the brain, with causal powers.

Tricky

20th July 2005, 12:31 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Tricky,

We are discussing epiphenominalism! Under epipiphenominalism consciousness does not have any causal powers whatsoever.
That is not the way I have seen it defined. If you want to atack that strawman, go ahead, but it has nothing to do with the idea that the mind (and consciousness) are emergent properties of the body/brain. From what I understand, that is what most people call epiphenomena. They do not require that those properties be devoid of causal powers.

As you whole line of reasoning is based on this (IMO) incorrect defintion, it's pretty much gobbledygook on its own.

epiphenomena (http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=epiphenomena) - : a secondary phenomenon accompanying another and caused by it.

Where do you get the part about them not having causal powers?

Bodhi Dharma Zen

20th July 2005, 12:42 PM

Originally posted by Tricky
Where do you get the part about them not having causal powers?

Tricky, this is tricky

(sorry, couldnt resist!:p )

Yes, by definition an epiphenomena would not have any causal role. I will attempt to draw a diagram here:

Perceived World --- > words -- > interpreted ---- > sensation of causal reaction

Real World ---------- > letters -- > read by brain -- > causal reaction

Ian beliefs that because the upper level is epiphenomenal and has no causal role then the sensations are irrelevant to the actions. But he forgets (more like neglects) the underlying level that obviously destroys his assumption.

Sorry for the crudeness of the schematic!

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

20th July 2005, 05:01 PM

Bodhi said:
Why do you have to assume that a belief is not a state of being that has no causal role at all? It can be argued (easily) that a belief is a sensation that is felt on this epiphenomenal consciousness, which would be like a theater in which all sensations occur.

Now, if in this theater there is the sensation of red, of a flower, of a feeling, and emotion and a belief, why do they have to have causal power at all? they are experienced, in that theater, and there they fullfil their causal role, being represented.

If they have no causal power at all, how are you talking about them?

And you can see that my objection remains. In the assumption that consciousness is an epiphenomena (not that I believe this, because in my view we lack the necessary concepts to even grasp what consciousnesss might be) it can be viewed as the receptacle of all the subjective felt causes and effects.

The error becomes from assuming that a sensation can be something that comes from the world to the mind, this is, have causal power, but what comes from the mind would not have causal powers (example, the "believing" Ian mentions or a decision process). But this is false.

There is the sensation of believing, the sensation of making a decision. Both subjective, both would belong to the epiphenomenal consciouness, and both would be related to a physical process in the brain, with causal powers.
Your language is too flowery. I do not understand what you are saying, but you sound like you're contradicting yourself in the last sentence.

~~ Paul

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

20th July 2005, 05:03 PM

Tricky said:
Where do you get the part about them not having causal powers?
From the philosophical definition of the word:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism

"Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. In other words, the causal relations go only one way, from physical to mental."

~~ Paul

20th July 2005, 05:07 PM

You know, it is awful weird that Epiphenominalism seems to use a different definition than Epiphenomenon.

I have to agree, I can't call consciousness causally efficacious; but I can call it an epiphenomenon. Which is weird, because believing that consciousness is an epiphenomenon does NOT equate to believing in Epiphenominalism.

Someone, somewhere, made some definition errors, I think.

Soapy Sam

20th July 2005, 05:20 PM

Epiphenomenon.
1.
A secondary phenomenon that results from and accompanies another: â€œExploitation of one social class or ethnic group by another [is] an epiphenomenon of real differences in power between social groupsâ€ (Harper's).
2
Pathology. An additional condition or symptom in the course of a disease, not necessarily connected with the disease.

Epiphenomenalism
The doctrine holding that mental activities are simply epiphenomena of the neural processes of the brain.

From Dictionary.com

Ian- Please explain how such must be acausal.

If I think I want a glass of water ,and I ask for one and someone gives me one, we appear to have gone from desire to thought to spoken message to action to glass of water.
At what point in this sequence do you perceive acausality?

20th July 2005, 05:26 PM

Well, Sam, the problem I'm seeing is there are at least two differing definitions of Epiphenomenalism... one which insists on acausalty, and one that does not.

Could be part of our communication problems, right there.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

20th July 2005, 05:27 PM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
If they have no causal power at all, how are you talking about them?

Paul, there is really nothing more to say about it. Sure, I bet some native speakers can do a whole better job in explaining it, but the principles remain the same.

For every mental state, there is a corresponding physical state. So, the mental sensation of believing about something has a causal role in its physical level. No mystery involved, and no souls required.

This is strange from you, if you were Ian, I would understand.

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 06:45 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Paul, there is really nothing more to say about it. Sure, I bet some native speakers can do a whole better job in explaining it, but the principles remain the same.

For every mental state, there is a corresponding physical state. So, the mental sensation of believing about something has a causal role in its physical level. No mystery involved, and no souls required.

This is strange from you, if you were Ian, I would understand.

Believing something does not have a causal role should epiphenomenalism be correct.

My verbal report that I am conscious is wholly dependant on the physical state of my brain. So is the belief that I am conscious which leads to the utterance in the first place. But the physical state of my brain corresponding to my belief I am conscious is wholly caused by the prior state of my brain, the input from the senses, and the application of physical laws. Consciousness itself plays no role whatsoever in my belief.

Now what can't you understand?

Jeff Corey

20th July 2005, 07:31 PM

I must be simple, because that makes no sense to me whatsoever.
Good ting I has tenure.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

20th July 2005, 07:35 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Believing something does not have a causal role should epiphenomenalism be correct.

My verbal report that I am conscious is wholly dependant on the physical state of my brain. So is the belief that I am conscious which leads to the utterance in the first place.

Lets se... again... Your verbal report occurs in the physical reality, the belief occurs in the physical reality. No. Your belief does not "cause" the utterance, things are way more complex than what your naive model allows you to see. I have told you before, and I repeat it. Read about Folk Psychology,

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
But the physical state of my brain corresponding to my belief I am conscious is wholly caused by the prior state of my brain, the input from the senses, and the application of physical laws. Consciousness itself plays no role whatsoever in my belief.

Now what can't you understand?

Consciousness itself is an absurd hypothesis (unless you can prove the existence of a consciousness that is not related to physical events), every mental state have an underlying physical reality, so, even in principle, it is nonsensical to claim a separation between the physical state and the mental state!

So, maybe I can understand what you cant, namely, that there is only one level of reality and so, your question is absurd and absolutely irrelevant, you are chasing ghosts, as usual.

Sorry for being so crude, but with you, its usually necessary, its a tool to grow.

Jeff Corey

20th July 2005, 07:38 PM

Well, I'm glad I'm not the only one who thought it total bollocks.

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 07:52 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Lets se... again... Your verbal report occurs in the physical reality, the belief occurs in the physical reality. No. Your belief does not "cause" the utterance, things are way more complex than what your naive model allows you to see. I have told you before, and I repeat it. Read about Folk Psychology,

Consciousness itself is an absurd hypothesis (unless you can prove the existence of a consciousness that is not related to physical events), every mental state have an underlying physical reality, so, even in principle, it is nonsensical to claim a separation between the physical state and the mental state!

So, maybe I can understand what you cant, namely, that there is only one level of reality and so, your question is absurd and absolutely irrelevant, you are chasing ghosts, as usual.

Sorry for being so crude, but with you, its usually necessary, its a tool to grow.

I think you're getting confused between materialism and epiphenomenalism. My argument does not disprove materialism, it disproves epiphenomenalism.

Epiphenomenalism is a dualist position so of course we can talk about consciousness itself.

Hmmm . .where's that bit about the hand gone?? :eek:

You really don't communicate very well at all, do you realise that? What do you mean by "it is nonsensical to claim a separation between the physical state and the mental state" for example? What does separate mean in this context?? Under epiphenomenalism consciousness is non-physical and wholly different from physical processes -- albeit wholly ontologically dependent on such processes. So is that "separate"?

Anyway, my suspicion is that you erroneously believe I am talking about and attacking materialism; but I'm not, I'm attacking a dualist position called epiphenomeanalism. Indeed I have given a logical proof it is false.

Tricky

20th July 2005, 08:03 PM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
From the philosophical definition of the word:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism

"Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. In other words, the causal relations go only one way, from physical to mental."

~~ Paul
If that definition is correct, then Epiphenomenalism is about the silliest philosophical construct since solipsism. If it were true, then it would be impossible for one thought to lead to another thought, since there is no way for the mental event (the thought) to get back to the physical event (the activity of the brain), which is simply ludicrous on the surface (and would make playing "word association" impossible). I think it only goes to show that philosophers have too much time on their hands. ;)

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 08:09 PM

Originally posted by Tricky
[B]If that definition is correct, then Epiphenomenalism is about the silliest philosophical construct since solipsism.

Which begs the question of why you are attacking my refutation of epiphenomenalism. Obviously because you never understood what I was attacking in the first place. Now you might understand why I often ignore your responses to my posts.

Jeff Corey

20th July 2005, 08:13 PM

How many synonyms for drivel are needed here? What a total idiot.

Interesting Ian

20th July 2005, 08:28 PM

Originally posted by Jeff Corey
How many synonyms for drivel are needed here? What a total idiot.

Right . . .

I'm a total idiot, yet not only has no-one been able to mount any sort of challenge to my refutation of epiphenomenalism, they clearly don't even understand what I'm arguing against!

Umm . .so I reckon that I'm the very last person to be justifiably described as a total idiot. :rolleyes:

Tricky

20th July 2005, 08:32 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Which begs the question of why you are attacking my refutation of epiphenomenalism. Obviously because you never understood what I was attacking in the first place. Now you might understand why I often ignore your responses to my posts.
Because I disagree with some of the statements you were making to reach this conclusion. But it appears to me that Epiphenomenalism (as Paul describes it) is self contradictory in its definition, so I'm not sure who you are directing this diatribe towards.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

20th July 2005, 09:15 PM

As others have pointed out, epiphenomenalism is far from perfect. Still, what you understand by it is even more absurd than the original theory! (oh yes, by the way, there are several versions of the theory, so you are just seeing, at best, the variant that suits your criticism).

Lets see. Again.

We have the physical reality, the brain, and a subproduct that is nothing but "an image in a mirror" so to speak. What you say is that the image in the mirror should have causal powers! Yes, thats how absurd you sound.

Yes Ian, a reflection on the mirror is completely real, as real as the thing that is being reflected, yet, it has zero causal powers.

21st July 2005, 12:20 AM

BPScooter

21st July 2005, 01:08 AM

I think this is the thing that makes us all nervous, right?...
cut and paste quote from Ian

"But since you're maintaining that consciousness is tied down to neurons, and indeed your particular neurons, then as your neurons get replaced one by one you would experience a continuous diminishing of consciousness"

So sorry that I can't do a proper cut-n-paste.

Where and when, if a neuronal replacement is happening, would the victim be aware of a diminishment? Unless this is (as we suspect) a thought experiment? or perhaps the perfect neuro-replacement is just something I don't know too much about, and is happening every day.

I do and will continue to state that all human consciousness is a product of neurons. Without neurons, and in particular, 'MY' neurons, well, yes, I wouldn't be tippy tapping on a computer screen. So the F what.

When I believe in the higher power, I suppose it will be because my neurons told me so.

21st July 2005, 01:15 AM

I actually disagree with Ian on this point, primarily because it is my opinion that consciousness is the brain activity as a whole - including 'replacement neurons' - just as our bodies are constantly having bits replaced, with no apparent overall change in 'self', why should there be a change in 'consciousness' when bits of neurology are replaced? Unless these artificial neurons are unable to maintain or integrate with the overall pattern of activity.

I think there would be no diminishing of consciousness if the replacements did their job right.

aggle-rithm

21st July 2005, 05:53 AM

Originally posted by BPScooter
I think this is the thing that makes us all nervous, right?...
cut and paste quote from Ian

"But since you're maintaining that consciousness is tied down to neurons, and indeed your particular neurons, then as your neurons get replaced one by one you would experience a continuous diminishing of consciousness"

So sorry that I can't do a proper cut-n-paste.

Where and when, if a neuronal replacement is happening, would the victim be aware of a diminishment? Unless this is (as we suspect) a thought experiment? or perhaps the perfect neuro-replacement is just something I don't know too much about, and is happening every day.

I do and will continue to state that all human consciousness is a product of neurons. Without neurons, and in particular, 'MY' neurons, well, yes, I wouldn't be tippy tapping on a computer screen. So the F what.

When I believe in the higher power, I suppose it will be because my neurons told me so.

Ian is hardly the first person to describe this thought experiment; it was described at length in my AI textbook. Of course, the authors of that text weren't arrogant enough to claim that they knew what would happen, they simply described some possibilities. (They did comment on the apparent absurdity of someone being aware that their consciousness was diminishing -- "Help, I'm shrinking!")

Since it would be highly unethical to perform this experiment in actuality (and we would have to perform it on ourselves to know what the subjective experience would be!) we'll probably never know for sure.

Interesting Ian

21st July 2005, 06:26 AM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
As others have pointed out, epiphenomenalism is far from perfect. Still, what you understand by it is even more absurd than the original theory! (oh yes, by the way, there are several versions of the theory, so you are just seeing, at best, the variant that suits your criticism).

They all have in common that mentality is wholly causally inefficacious! Otherwise they would not be epiphenomenalist positions! This is what my proof addresses. It's not really a position in the mind/body problem as such. Epiphenomenalism is simply a description that is applied to anyone whose beliefs on the mind/body problem has as a consequenbce that mentality is causally inefficacious. Thus many accuse non-reductive materialists as being epiphenomenalists (indeed I do -- in fact I think reductive materialists are too), but non-reductivist materialists tend to deny they are.

Lets see. Again.

We have the physical reality, the brain, and a subproduct that is nothing but "an image in a mirror" so to speak. What you say is that the image in the mirror should have causal powers! Yes, thats how absurd you sound.

The image in the mirror certainly does have causal powers. Seeing a reflection of a gorgeous young lady in mirror will have certain effects on my body.

Yes Ian, a reflection on the mirror is completely real, as real as the thing that is being reflected, yet, it has zero causal powers.

Nonsense

aggle-rithm

21st July 2005, 06:33 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Right . . .

I'm a total idiot, yet not only has no-one been able to mount any sort of challenge to my refutation of epiphenomenalism, they clearly don't even understand what I'm arguing against!

You say this sort of thing a lot. Have you considered the possibility that you may not be communicating your thoughts clearly?

Interesting Ian

21st July 2005, 06:42 AM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
Ian is hardly the first person to describe this thought experiment; it was described at length in my AI textbook. Of course, the authors of that text weren't arrogant enough to claim that they knew what would happen, they simply described some possibilities. (They did comment on the apparent absurdity of someone being aware that their consciousness was diminishing -- "Help, I'm shrinking!")

[/B]

I don't know what would happen, but I do know what would happen if identity theory is correct!. Once all your neurons are replaced with their functional electronic equivalents, then, if identity theory is true, your consciousness must have ceased to exist. If it continues to exist this is a direct refutation of identity theory.

Now in between those 2 states where more and more neurons get replaced I imagine (if identity theory is correct) the diminishing of consciousness would be continuous rather than occurring at an abrupt point when a certain number of neurons have been replaced. No I don't know that, but it seems eminently reasonable.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

21st July 2005, 06:43 AM

Zaayrdragon and Ian:

The image on the mirror has zero causal powers. Its ontological reality is based estrictly (and only) in photons. You both agree in that its "causallity" is here, in the world, when real things act according to the photons in the mirror. But then again, those photons are emmited here, in the real world, and the consecuences of the actions of the real people who acts are here also. A reflection, "itself" is nothing more than, well, a reflection. It have no ontological status other than mirror a real world.

I dont now why Im arguing in the first place!

I hope its more clear now, I apologize for my lack of knowledge of English language to express such a subtle thing.

Interesting Ian

21st July 2005, 06:46 AM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
You say this sort of thing a lot. Have you considered the possibility that you may not be communicating your thoughts clearly?

Yes, but I don't think people are actually reading carefully what I say. Maybe they wouldn't be able to understand anyway, but I'm not going to go into loads of detail on a message forum. For a kick off my posts would have to be that much longer, and if they can't be bothered to read what I write now, then they certainly won't be able to bother to read my arguments if I expand on what I've said.

I'm making it very simple for my website. I'm certainly won't do so on here considering my posts will no doubt be wiped a few months down the line!

aggle-rithm

21st July 2005, 06:47 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I don't know what would happen, but I do know what would happen if identity theory is correct!. Once all your neurons are replaced with their functional electronic equivalents, then, if identity theory is true, your consciousness must have ceased to exist. If it continues to exist this is a direct refutation of identity theory.

Now in between those 2 states where more and more neurons get replaced I imagine (if identity theory is correct) the diminishing of consciousness would be continuous rather than occurring at an abrupt point when a certain number of neurons have been replaced. No I don't know that, but it seems eminently reasonable.

This brings to mind the "Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy" when the mice were planning to replace Arthur's brain with a synthetic equivalent, saying they could program it so "no one would know the difference".

"But I would know the difference!" said Arthur.

"No, you wouldn't. You'd be programmed not to."

The point being: If we could perform such an experiment, then we would likely never know if the person's consciousness had been preserved or not. It would appear that way to others, and if the person's consciousness was replaced by another, identical consciousness, he wouldn't know the difference, either.

Interesting Ian

21st July 2005, 07:32 AM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
This brings to mind the "Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy" when the mice were planning to replace Arthur's brain with a synthetic equivalent, saying they could program it so "no one would know the difference".

"But I would know the difference!" said Arthur.

"No, you wouldn't. You'd be programmed not to."

The point being: If we could perform such an experiment, then we would likely never know if the person's consciousness had been preserved or not. It would appear that way to others, and if the person's consciousness was replaced by another, identical consciousness, he wouldn't know the difference, either.

But he wouldn't be replaced by an identical consciousness. Identity theorists hold that consciousness is produced by biological material. So after a person's neurons had all been replaced by their functional electronic equivalents, what you would have is a person who appears to be conscious, but who in fact is entirely lacking in any consciousness ( a p-zombie). This is how absurd identity theory is! (not that I am a fan of functionalism/"computational theory of the mind" either).

There's another error you are making. You are treating consciousness and the notion of a self as being synonymous. If functionalism (computation theory of the mind) is correct, then the resulting individual must be "you". This is because functionalism holds that it is merely the causal role of physical processes in the brain which make "you" "you". But the causal roles that the original neurons played, and what their functional electronic equivalents play, is precisely the same. So the resulting electronic brain individual must still be "you" in the fullest sense of the word.

21st July 2005, 08:08 AM

Well, there is something to be said for identity theory - specifically, the fact that neurons are NOT replaced, when all other cellular structures are, definitely leaves me wondering about the exact role of the neuron in consciousness.

I wonder - would our hapless and helpless brain-replacement victim be aware of a diminishment of consciousness, or of a shift of consciousness?

And, Bodhi, a reflection is causally efficacious - in exactly the same manner that art, or words on a page or on a screen are causally efficacious. And, as such, I have to agree that consciousness - whatever it is - is also, itself, causally efficacious.

In the end, however, consciousness still fits in nicely with materialism - in exactly the same manner that reflections, art, and written words fit in. And consciousness would be an epiphenomenon - but not lead to epiphenomenalism. Man, the dual-usage of that term is really annoying!

Interesting Ian

21st July 2005, 08:36 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
[B]Well, there is something to be said for identity theory - specifically, the fact that neurons are NOT replaced, when all other cellular structures are, definitely leaves me wondering about the exact role of the neuron in consciousness.

Hang on a sec -- what about this argument I've put forward which demonstrates its absurdity??

Bodhi Dharma Zen

21st July 2005, 08:41 AM

Zaayr

Does the reflection itself has an ontological reality of its own, or any causal powers at all? Remember, the reflection by itself

Interesting Ian

21st July 2005, 09:21 AM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Zaayrdragon and Ian:

The image on the mirror has zero causal powers. Its ontological reality is based estrictly (and only) in photons. You both agree in that its "causallity" is here, in the world, when real things act according to the photons in the mirror. But then again, those photons are emmited here, in the real world, and the consecuences of the actions of the real people who acts are here also. A reflection, "itself" is nothing more than, well, a reflection. It have no ontological status other than mirror a real world.

I dont now why Im arguing in the first place!

I hope its more clear now, I apologize for my lack of knowledge of English language to express such a subtle thing.

The mirror has causal powers. What you're in effect saying is that the image itself is an illusion. So you can say illusions do not have causal powers even though we know of their existence.

Applying this to epiphenomenalism as an analogy you are saying consciousness has no causal powers, yet we know of its existence. Thus we can know of its existence even though causally inefficacious just as we can know about the image in the mirror even though the image per se is causally inefficacious.

Good attempt BDZ! ;)

So what we have here is that the reason why I think I am conscious (or illusionary conscious) is the physical processes in the brain. Of course this is precisely what epiphenomenalists in fact say.

But then just as it is logically possible for an object not to reflect an image in a mirror (think of vampires), so it is logically possible for my brain processes not to give rise to consciousness since brain processes are wholly sufficient to explain the totality of my behaviour.

But I know with incorrigible certainty that I am conscious. That is to say I cannot possibly be mistaken that I am conscious. But this incorrigible certainty cannot wholly be a consequence of brain processes because it is logically possible for the brain processes not to give rise to consciousness just as it is logically possible for an object not to give rise to a reflection (even if nomonologically impossible).

As I say good attempt though. I had to think about that one.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

21st July 2005, 09:43 AM

Thanks Ian, Im glad you liked it. As I said before, I do not suscribe to any current theory regarding the brain/mind problem, because every theory is incomplete and relies on assumptions that cant be proved. That said, I do understand the notion of a real thing (the mind) which is, at the same time, causally inefficacious. For example, I am perfectly confortable with the notion about we having no free will at all.

BillHoyt

21st July 2005, 10:51 AM

Originally posted by davidsmith73
But the TV analogy is not meant to be used to state that the brain acts like a TV. It is meant to be used to state that correlation does not equal cause.
The analagy is simply poppycock, then. It is blunderbuss, then, because it commits two serious errors. First, it introduces more gobbledygook questions then it answers. And two, it fails to understand that the current scientific thinking is far far beyond this strawman claim that we've confused correlation with cause. No such thing is happening except in certain posters' delusions.

Now let me propose a simple experiment that would put this crap to bed, if it weren't for dualist's continuing obsession with backing themselves up to ever higher and ever more precariously narrow cliffs with each and every clear, evidence-based refutation of their assertions...

Take two chickens (or whatever birds or animals are the least complicated yet still trainable.) Train A to peck at a green (or left) button whenever sees a light turned on. Train B to peck at the red (or right) button. Now cross-transplant the brains, and see what happens.

The test is too simple and utterly unacceptable, of course, to the dualists, because the results would be too clear. The dualists will simply claim the brains have fixed frequency channels that moved with the cross-transplants. Or they'll claim that only such a test in humans will suffice, putting reasonable and rational people into a clear ethical dilemma. Surely the dualists will have to resort to this when they are all standing on one another's shoulders screaming that the men below should stop breathing so heavily lest they tumble off that very high, very tiny precipice to which they've all had to retreat.

And the rest of us will simply stop listening to such cranks.

aggle-rithm

21st July 2005, 11:23 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
But he wouldn't be replaced by an identical consciousness. Identity theorists hold that consciousness is produced by biological material. So after a person's neurons had all been replaced by their functional electronic equivalents, what you would have is a person who appears to be conscious, but who in fact is entirely lacking in any consciousness ( a p-zombie).

Perhaps he is. But neither he nor anyone else would know this, so the veracity of identity theory can't be demonstrated in this way.

There's another error you are making. You are treating consciousness and the notion of a self as being synonymous. If functionalism (computation theory of the mind) is correct, then the resulting individual must be "you". This is because functionalism holds that it is merely the causal role of physical processes in the brain which make "you" "you". But the causal roles that the original neurons played, and what their functional electronic equivalents play, is precisely the same. So the resulting electronic brain individual must still be "you" in the fullest sense of the word.

I must have missed something. What would you say is the distinction between "mind", "consciousness", and "self"? I'm familiar with the Jungian notion of the Self as a "grand unification" of the psyche that includes the totality of conscious and unconscious components (which I suppose would explain "consciousness" as well), but I wanted to know your definition.

21st July 2005, 02:16 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Zaayr

Does the reflection itself has an ontological reality of its own, or any causal powers at all? Remember, the reflection by itself

You ought to know the answer to this, Bod.

NOTHING by itself has causal powers. Some things, when grouped together, interact internally and therefore have causal powers in combination.

Further, would there be a reflection, by itself? Isn't that a nonsensical idea? Nothing to cast a reflection, and nothing to reflect, just some reflection hanging in empty space?

And you have to consider what a reflection is: photons 'rebounding' in a cohesive pattern. This is why high quality mirrors are essential in many laser-related tasks. And certainly, a reflection of laser light - which is laser light - has causal powers when interacting with other objects. A reflection of sunlight can make plants healthy; can charge solar panels; can blind a man. But by itself - nothing has causal powers.

It's like asking if consciousness, without a brain or a body or anything around it, has causal powers. It's not a very coherent question, Bod.

Soapy Sam

21st July 2005, 02:34 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Right . . .

I'm a total idiot, yet not only has no-one been able to mount any sort of challenge to my refutation of epiphenomenalism, hey clearly don't even understand what I'm arguing against!

Umm . .so I reckon that I'm the very last person to be justifiably described as a total idiot. :rolleyes:

Ian- There are some moderately intelligent people here. If nobody understandswhat you are arguing against, it may be that your argument is merely incomprehensible.

Even if you are right, there is no point in arguing your case if you fail to explain it. (Unless your purpose is argument for it's own sake rather than explication.)

Try making it simpler for us.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

21st July 2005, 03:37 PM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
You ought to know the answer to this, Bod.

NOTHING by itself has causal powers. Some things, when grouped together, interact internally and therefore have causal powers in combination.

Further, would there be a reflection, by itself? Isn't that a nonsensical idea? Nothing to cast a reflection, and nothing to reflect, just some reflection hanging in empty space?

And you have to consider what a reflection is: photons 'rebounding' in a cohesive pattern. This is why high quality mirrors are essential in many laser-related tasks. And certainly, a reflection of laser light - which is laser light - has causal powers when interacting with other objects. A reflection of sunlight can make plants healthy; can charge solar panels; can blind a man. But by itself - nothing has causal powers.

It's like asking if consciousness, without a brain or a body or anything around it, has causal powers. It's not a very coherent question, Bod.

I find it strange that you dont see why I posted this nor where I was going. Do I need to repeat that I do not ascribe myself to epiphenomenalism (nor any other mind theory for that matter)?? That said, I recon the reasons to hold epiphenomenalism, and this specific point regardin the mirror was to show that it is possible to have something real that has no causal consequences.

As any model, its not perfect, but please dont come with those laser examples. They do not fit in to the little example.

Now, with this context in mind, can you see what I wanted to say? Or do you want me to explain it, again.

21st July 2005, 05:42 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
I find it strange that you dont see why I posted this nor where I was going. Do I need to repeat that I do not ascribe myself to epiphenomenalism (nor any other mind theory for that matter)?? That said, I recon the reasons to hold epiphenomenalism, and this specific point regardin the mirror was to show that it is possible to have something real that has no causal consequences.

As any model, its not perfect, but please dont come with those laser examples. They do not fit in to the little example.

Now, with this context in mind, can you see what I wanted to say? Or do you want me to explain it, again.

If this was your point, then you have failed. A mirror is not an example of a real thing that has no causal consequences.

Therefore, your model is not only imperfect, but it utterly fails to serve the purpose for which you require it.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

21st July 2005, 05:58 PM

Is your reflection on a mirror, when you are washing your hands, causaly efficacious?

No.

Yet, for someone observing the reflection on the mirror, it would be absolutely real. Maybe he will shoot the mirror with a water pistol (trying to make fun of you), yet, the water will have zero causal power, regarding you. End of story.

So, dont get picky when you dont need to.

Tricky

21st July 2005, 06:52 PM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Is your reflection on a mirror, when you are washing your hands, causaly efficacious?
Um... yes it is. Without the mirror, you might not get your hands as clean because you missed a spot on the bottom of your left palm which turned out to be a rare toxin that infused through your skin and caused you to lose all the hair below the waist, leading your girlfriend to believe you had joined some kind of cult an thus destroying your chance of having children with her, effectively removing your genes from the gene pool.

Of course, it's silly, but don't pretend that mirror images are not causally efficacious. If they weren't, then why would anyone bother to own a mirror?

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
Yet, for someone observing the reflection on the mirror, it would be absolutely real. Maybe he will shoot the mirror with a water pistol (trying to make fun of you), yet, the water will have zero causal power, regarding you. End of story.
The reflection is real. It is just as real as an unreflected image. Both are light beams that are detected by your sensory apparatus. Neither is the actual object, but just a perception of the object.

The fact that the mirror does not reflect streams of water does not change the fact that it is an excellent reflector of light. Real light.

21st July 2005, 08:31 PM

Well said, Tricky.

Bodhi, this is one of those rare, very rare times when you should be admitting you are incorrect, yet you are stubbornly hanging on to a failed idea. Normally, you tend not to do this; but this time, for whatever reason, you have your heels dug in.

Simplify the question: Can a reflection affect something? Answer: Yes.

And this is why your model fails.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

21st July 2005, 08:56 PM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Well said, Tricky.

Bodhi, this is one of those rare, very rare times when you should be admitting you are incorrect, yet you are stubbornly hanging on to a failed idea. Normally, you tend not to do this; but this time, for whatever reason, you have your heels dug in.

Simplify the question: Can a reflection affect something? Answer: Yes.

And this is why your model fails.

Well, it is interesting, because what I feel here is that, if anything, I have been unable to express exactly what I wanted to express. If I have to admit that my model is wrong, fine, zero problem. But I have to be certain in that, at least, I have transmited what I wanted to say. Do you believe this is a fair request?

So, lets see. A reflection is merely a reflection, it has no ontological reality in the same sense that objects reflected have. I think this is clear.

Secondly, a reflection is something that, well, reflects what happen in the real world, but ITSELF (yes, itself) is nothing but patterns of light in a flat surface, without weight, texture or any other characteristic. I believe this is clear too.

What I wanted to express is very simple. Really. If consciousness is an epiphenomena, real but not causally efficacious, it can be compared to a reflection in a mirror, in the sense that the mirror will reflect what happens in the world without being "part" of it.

Now, lets answer your question. A reflection doesnt affect anything, it is us, interpreting the reflection the ones who can alter the world, the ones who can affect something, in here. There is just the reflection of this. For me, its seems unbelievable to see this in another way.

Now, so far, are we in agreement? or shall I start again?

21st July 2005, 09:12 PM

A reflection doesnt affect anything, it is us, interpreting the reflection the ones who can alter the world, the ones who can affect something, in here.

This is where you are wrong, Bodhi.

A reflection very well may affect things - without us having to interpret anything.

Take a simple, solar-powered toy or calculater, in a dark room. Set it near a beam of light, but not so near it comes on.

Now place a mirror so that the reflection shines upon the solar panel.

Viola! A concrete example of a reflection affecting something without us having to interpret anything about it.

This is why the model fails.

Tricky

21st July 2005, 09:40 PM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This is where you are wrong, Bodhi.

A reflection very well may affect things - without us having to interpret anything.

Take a simple, solar-powered toy or calculater, in a dark room. Set it near a beam of light, but not so near it comes on.

Now place a mirror so that the reflection shines upon the solar panel.

Viola! A concrete example of a reflection affecting something without us having to interpret anything about it.

This is why the model fails.
Exactly, Zaay.

I don't know if any of you have ever played laser tag. Players quickly find out that the way to causally effect a winning score is to aim off the mirrors. My scores went up dramatically once I learned this trick. A reflected beam has exactly the same effect on the sensors as a directl beam.

So the mirror analogy is badly flawed, and we have strayed from the subject. Of course, the original subject (the "TV set" model) is so far distant as to be unrecognizable. Maybe because it is yet another bad analogy.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

21st July 2005, 09:41 PM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This is where you are wrong, Bodhi.

What can I say? You are right. But I have told it before. This is about context, and its well presented in the context I wanted to use it. If you or Tricky dont want to see it, its not a flaw in the argument!

Every metaphor have its limits, no news about it.

Robin

21st July 2005, 11:04 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
So with a television set the state of its internal components will affect the quality of the picture, but this does not entail that the storyline depicted by the picture is affected too. Indeed no matter how poor the picture quality might get e.g. a snowy picture, ghosting etc, a given film will continue to show the same events.
When I was young TV sets had a knob on them marked "Brilliance". A television critic of the time said she was disappointed that turning this knob did not improve the quality of the dialogue.

I agree that our 18th century gentlemen would certainly have considered that the quality of the picture was not relevant, but that interfering with the components did not affect the quality of the story line or dialogue would have immediately led them to assume that these things did not arise from the television itself.

But in the case of consciousness we note that interfering with the components affects things like intelligence, reasoning ability, emotions etc. An immature brain has an immature consciousness, a damaged brain has a damaged consciousness, poor reasoning, altered moods (rather than a sound consciousness imperfectly communicated as you would expect). Chemically altering the brain alters moods, but in a transmission model we would expect emotions to be immaterial and unaffected by physical things like chemicals. Alterations to reasoning ability, intelligence, moods seem analogous to altering the story line. If the transmission model were to hold we would expect all brain injuries/changes to manifest themselves like MND affects Stephen Hawking - ie a well functioning consciousness that is imperfectly communicated via the body.

In any case the argument between our 18th century gentlemen would have been settled straight away as soon as they encountered a second television set. Perhaps a better analogy is a computer with terminals attached.

Robin

22nd July 2005, 12:11 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.
This argument kind of reminds me of a C programming assignment I got, which went something like: "Write a function BOOLEAN thisisrunning() test if the current instance of the program containing the function is running, return true or false."

So straight away I think - when would it ever return false? So why would it be needed? This argument seems to go a bit like that.

Conviction is part of the thing we call consciousness, it is meaningless without it. So 2 could be replaced by
2. Thus my consciousness that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be conscious that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
and could not be regarded as a premise since it is self-contradictory.

Tricky

22nd July 2005, 05:43 AM

Originally posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen
What can I say? You are right. But I have told it before. This is about context, and its well presented in the context I wanted to use it. If you or Tricky dont want to see it, its not a flaw in the argument!

Every metaphor have its limits, no news about it.
I'm afraid it is a flaw in the argument, BDZ, specifically a self-contradictory premise. It doesn't matter what metaphor you use because the concept of a real, acausal thing can only ever be just that: a concept.

For a thing to be shown to be real, it must be detectable. A truly acausal thing could never be detectable, because its detection is caused by it's existence. Thus, by definition, we cannot detect, discover or describe any acausal thing because it is impossible to know anything about it.

Interesting Ian

22nd July 2005, 06:04 AM

Originally posted by Tricky
I'm afraid it is a flaw in the argument, BDZ, specifically a self-contradictory premise. It doesn't matter what metaphor you use because the concept of a real, acausal thing can only ever be just that: a concept.

For a thing to be shown to be real, it must be detectable. A truly acausal thing could never be detectable, because its detection is caused by it's existence. Thus, by definition, we cannot detect, discover or describe any acausal thing because it is impossible to know anything about it.

BDZ simply has to replace his mirror image with an illusion.

Tricky

22nd July 2005, 06:32 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
BDZ simply has to replace his mirror image with an illusion.
No, that won't work either. Even if the illusion is nothing more than your mental activity misinterpreting data, that mental activity can have causal effects. For example, a person on a desert might try to reach a pool of water, which turned out to be a mirage. The illusion had the causal effect of making him change his path.

aggle-rithm

22nd July 2005, 06:48 AM

Interesting Ian

22nd July 2005, 08:50 AM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
But he wouldn't be replaced by an identical consciousness. Identity theorists hold that consciousness is produced by biological material. So after a person's neurons had all been replaced by their functional electronic equivalents, what you would have is a person who appears to be conscious, but who in fact is entirely lacking in any consciousness ( a p-zombie).

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Perhaps he is. But neither he nor anyone else would know this, so the veracity of identity theory can't be demonstrated in this way.

He wouldn't know anything at all if he's an unconscious zombie! As I said he would know because he would find his consciousness gradually diminishing as his neurons got replaced, but he would deny that he feels any different at all.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

There's another error you are making. You are treating consciousness and the notion of a self as being synonymous. If functionalism (computation theory of the mind) is correct, then the resulting individual must be "you". This is because functionalism holds that it is merely the causal role of physical processes in the brain which make "you" "you". But the causal roles that the original neurons played, and what their functional electronic equivalents play, is precisely the same. So the resulting electronic brain individual must still be "you" in the fullest sense of the word.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I must have missed something. What would you say is the distinction between "mind", "consciousness", and "self"?

Read my TV analogy that I posted early in this thread!!!

Interesting Ian

22nd July 2005, 08:55 AM

Originally posted by Robin
This argument kind of reminds me of a C programming assignment I got, which went something like: "Write a function BOOLEAN thisisrunning() test if the current instance of the program containing the function is running, return true or false."

So straight away I think - when would it ever return false? So why would it be needed? This argument seems to go a bit like that.

Conviction is part of the thing we call consciousness, it is meaningless without it. So 2 could be replaced by

and could not be regarded as a premise since it is self-contradictory.

Do you not understand what the word "thus" means? It is not a premise, it is a conclusion. It follows from 1.

Robin

22nd July 2005, 09:10 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Do you not understand what the word "thus" means? It is not a premise, it is a conclusion. It follows from 1.
Perhaps you should look it up. "Thus" does not make something follow from something else. If it does not follow then all the "thuses" in the world will not make it follow.

Furthermore you cannot put a "thus" in front of a self contradictory statement and resolve the contradiction.

A conviction is part and parcel of consciousness. You cannot be convinced of something unless you are somehow concious of it. So to say that something might be convinced it was not conscious is tantamount to saying that it is conscious of not being conscious. It is simply an oxymoron and therefore not a well formed logical statement and the argument fails right there and then.

Interesting Ian

22nd July 2005, 09:33 AM

Originally posted by Robin
[B]Perhaps you should look it up. "Thus" does not make something follow from something else. If it does not follow then all the "thuses" in the world will not make it follow.

I don't need to look it up. I've been using the word all my life. It simply means therefore.

Furthermore you cannot put a "thus" in front of a self contradictory statement and resolve the contradiction.

2 follows from 1. If there is therefore a contradiction then we need to reject 1. That is the whole argument.

A conviction is part and parcel of consciousness. You cannot be convinced of something unless you are somehow concious of it.

Thus epiphenomenalism must be rejected.

Got it yet??

So to say that something might be convinced it was not conscious is tantamount to saying that it is conscious of not being conscious. It is simply an oxymoron and therefore not a well formed logical statement and the argument fails right there and then.

You really need to study some philosophy and logical arguments. This is hopeless.

Look up reductio ad absurdum.

Ashles

22nd July 2005, 10:20 AM

Originally posted by Robin
Perhaps you should look it up. "Thus" does not make something follow from something else. If it does not follow then all the "thuses" in the world will not make it follow.

Furthermore you cannot put a "thus" in front of a self contradictory statement and resolve the contradiction.
Oh Ian's been doing that forever. Usually as part of an atempt to "refute materialism".

Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 1 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870318052)
Sorry Mercutio, but I'm only interested in your arguments.
Are you, or are you not a p-zombie?
In other words do you or do you not have phenomenological conscious states?
I know I do, therefore materialism is refuted.
Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 2 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870324761)
1. Everything physical can in principle be observed, either directly or indirectly, by anyone with unimpaired senses and with the appropriate instruments.
2. Your dreams cannot be so observed by anyone.
3. Therefore your dreams are not physical
4. Therefore there exist some things which are not physical
5. Therefore materialism is refuted.
Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 3 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870383483) (this one is great - behold how much Ian can refute simply by getting out of bed!
But I've already provided my argument to show that it is crucial for how things work. I need to exercise my will in order to get out of bed. Thus physical determinism, and materialism, and naturalism, and epiphenomenalism are refuted.
Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 4 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870528946) (his 'thuses' are actually earlier in the post, but I have provided the entertaining climax)
Because the proper materialist i.e the reductionist materialist, holds that mental properties supervene on physical properties. That is to say that mental properties (the raw feel of experience) are necessarily entailed by certain physical facts. But this simply cannot be done. It cannot be done in principle, not ever, no matter how many thousands of years of advancement in the fundamental sciences. Why? Because physics only ever deals with structure and function. Thousands of years might pass in the advancement of science, millions of years might pass in the advancement of science, but this ain't gonna change cold facts. One cannot (logically) derive qualitative intrinsic experiences from structure and function. To suppose otherwise is to misunderstand what the fundamental science ie physics, is all about.

Materialism is refuted.

It's a stone cold fact.

Can any of you lot understand this though??
Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 5 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870547243) (in which Ian can now refute materialism simply by being alive! Wow.)
Not a different me. I wouldn't be here. The point here is that the chance of me being alive is as near as damn it, zero. Yet I am alive.

Therefore materialism is refuted. I do not have this problem because I believe in reincarnation.
Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 6 (ttp://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870598291) (Ian is talking about twins or something - here it is actually "Otherwise" that is being abused)
OK, I agree that differing experiences will effect our overt behaviour, but intrinsically they must be the same. They must be one and the very same self. Just the same self with differing experiences. Otherwise materialism is refuted.
Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 7 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870953337) (involving meta-electrons and p-zombies).
What I'm saying is that if materialism is true, then we would have to conclude we are all p-zombies (unconscious automata). Just like a "meta-electron" is really nothing more than an electron -- as nothing can have aspects to it which are not susceptible to science -- so we would have to conclude we are all p-zombies since we cannot have aspects to ourselves inaccessible to science (the aspect in this case being consciousness).

But we know we are conscious, thus materialism is refuted. Yes?

Er no.

There are other examples, but that's enough to be going on with for the moment.

Ian makes statements. He also makes other unconnected statements. Then he puts a "thus" inbetween them as though there is a direct logical or causal link.

Fish swim in water thus materialism is refuted.

Robin

22nd July 2005, 10:41 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Thus epiphenomenalism must be rejected.

Got it yet??
Even if this step were valid your argument as a whole would be invalid. Go back and look at your arguement. Epiphenomenalism was not your premise. The whole of (1) was your premise, so you have to reject the whole of (1). You can't just go changing your premise half way through the argument.

So for example an argument that begins:

1. a->b

The premise is not a, the premise is a->b So if you derive a reductio ad absurdum from this then the hypothesis you have negated is not a but the whole of a->b

Got it yet???

But this is moot since as I said 2 does not follow from 1 and all the thuses and therefores will not make it do so. You are saying, "cause and effect would be able to make anything possible, even illogical things"
You really need to study some philosophy and logical arguments. This is hopeless.

Look up reductio ad absurdum.
Right back atcha Ian. It really is the most incompetently constructed argument I have ever seen.

Be clear about what is the hypothesis if you are attempting reductio ad absurdum.

Interesting Ian

22nd July 2005, 11:04 AM

Originally posted by Robin
[B]Even if this step were valid your argument as a whole would be invalid. Go back and look at your arguement. Epiphenomenalism was not your premise. The whole of (1) was your premise, so you have to reject the whole of (1). You can't just go changing your premise half way through the argument.

Yes it is. 1 is simply the premise of epiphenomenalism. The fact that I go on to define it does not mean that epiphenomenalism is not the premise.

But this is moot since as I said 2 does not follow from 1

How the hell can 2 not follow from 1?? Given epiphenomenalism all psychological states or mental states are purely epiphenomenal. Thus we have:

(Brain state X + mental state X) causes conviction I am conscious

But mental state X is epiphenomenal i.e is not causally efrficacious.

Therefore it is purely brain state X by itself which causes the conviction I am conscious i.e my consciousness per se plays no role in my conviction I am conscious.

Tricky

22nd July 2005, 05:40 PM

Originally posted by Ashles
Oh Ian's been doing that forever. Usually as part of an atempt to "refute materialism".

Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 1 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870318052)

Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 2 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870324761)

Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 3 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870383483) (this one is great - behold how much Ian can refute simply by getting out of bed!

Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 4 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870528946) (his 'thuses' are actually earlier in the post, but I have provided the entertaining climax)

Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 5 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870547243) (in which Ian can now refute materialism simply by being alive! Wow.)

Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 6 (ttp://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870598291) (Ian is talking about twins or something - here it is actually "Otherwise" that is being abused)

Ian's abuse of "thus" and "therefore" number 7 (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?s=&postid=1870953337) (involving meta-electrons and p-zombies).

Er no.

There are other examples, but that's enough to be going on with for the moment.

Ian makes statements. He also makes other unconnected statements. Then he puts a "thus" inbetween them as though there is a direct logical or causal link.

Fish swim in water thus materialism is refuted.
Nice research job, Ashles. Indeed, it would be funny if it were not so sad that Ian truly believes that he is using logic correctly. Instead it is the continual, "I feel it to be true, thus, you are an idiot."

And I'm still waiting to find out how an acausal thing can be detected.

Interesting Ian

22nd July 2005, 07:18 PM

Originally posted by Tricky
Nice research job, Ashles.

Yeah thanks Ashless! Refuted everything I've ever said nicely. Keep up the good work.

Tricky

22nd July 2005, 11:02 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yeah thanks Ashless! Refuted everything I've ever said nicely. Keep up the good work.

LOL. You don't need any help on that, Ian. But while instances of your abuse of logic are abundant, it takes some work to compile and link them. Kind of like a little museum to honor your brilliant thoughts. We are all grateful.

Robin

24th July 2005, 05:00 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yes it is. 1 is simply the premise of epiphenomenalism. The fact that I go on to define it does not mean that epiphenomenalism is not the premise.
No it is a matter of form, read the logic books you were recommending me. Your 1 is in the form if ... then.... or in other words A->B. If you negate the statement A->B you have not negated A or B, you have negated the implications. If epiphenomenalism was your premise then you should not have stated your premise in this form that is widely understood in logic to denote an implication. So at best this is a poorly written premise.
How the hell can 2 not follow from 1?? Given epiphenomenalism all psychological states or mental states are purely epiphenomenal. Thus we have:

(Brain state X + mental state X) causes conviction I am conscious

But mental state X is epiphenomenal i.e is not causally efrficacious.

Therefore it is purely brain state X by itself which causes the conviction I am conscious i.e my consciousness per se plays no role in my conviction I am conscious.
But as I said conviction is just a name for one aspect of the thing we call consciousness in which case epiphenomenalism would state then that consciousness was a necessary precondition for conviction. So the brain state that causes consciousness is the same as the brain state that causes the conviction that you are conscious.

It is like saying it is an implication of determinism that you can have a hurricane in an even temperature system because a hurricane is created by physical conditions that create hurricanes and the physical conditions that create temperature differentials play no role in the creation of a hurricane.

It does not, as I say, follow.

Personally I reject the idea of epiphenomenalism (why couldn't they call it something shorter?) because I more or less accept the natural selection theory of evolution. Our characteristics have evolved because they had some survival advantage at some point, and consciousness could have had no survival advantage unless it had some causal influence on behaviour.

Interesting Ian

24th July 2005, 05:25 PM

Originally posted by Robin
No it is a matter of form, read the logic books you were recommending me. Your 1 is in the form if ... then.... or in other words [b]A->B. If you negate the statement A->B you have not negated A or B, you have negated the implications. If epiphenomenalism was your premise then you should not have stated your premise in this form that is widely understood in logic to denote an implication. So at best this is a poorly written premise.

Regardless of whether it is poorly written or not, the fact remains it is quite definitely true. If you don't agree then you fail to understand what epi means. I can't help you there I'm afraid.

But as I said conviction is just a name for one aspect of the thing we call consciousness in which case epiphenomenalism would state then that consciousness was a necessary precondition for conviction.

No epiphenomenalism does not state that. It states what I said -- namely that it is not necessary.

So the brain state that causes consciousness is the same as the brain state that causes the conviction that you are conscious.

This makes no sense at all. There are many brain states causing conscious states, it's just that they will be differing conscious states.

It is like saying it is an implication of determinism that you can have a hurricane in an even temperature system because a hurricane is created by physical conditions that create hurricanes and the physical conditions that create temperature differentials play no role in the creation of a hurricane.

No I am not saying that.

Have a more careful read of my argument.

1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my consciousness is not causally efficacious.

Soapy Sam

24th July 2005, 05:37 PM

Incorrigible?

Robin

24th July 2005, 06:29 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Regardless of whether it is poorly written or not, the fact remains it is quite definitely true. If you don't agree then you fail to understand what epi means. I can't help you there I'm afraid.
So I must go and read logic books, but you are free to ignore even the most fundamental conventions of logic and expect us to tease out what it was that you really meant? No, sorry, you have made a clear blunder in logic.

Will you at least address the bone of contention - that conviction is merely an aspect of consciousness? It is the key and you have been carefully dancing around it.

If I am correct then you are saying that epiphenomenalism implies that a brain state that produces consciousness might not produce consciousness. If not then please supply a meaningful definition of a conviction that does not imply consciousness.

If you can't do this then your premise is quite definitely meaningless.
No epiphenomenalism does not state that. It states what I said -- namely that it is not necessary.
Again, please give your definition of conviction that does not imply consciousness. No, a brain state that is producing a conviction must by definition be producing consciousness.
This makes no sense at all. There are many brain states causing conscious states, it's just that they will be differing conscious states.
That is fine, but any brain state that is producing a conviction is by definition producing consciousness. There is no separating the two and there is no definition of this term that implies that the two are separate.
No I am not saying that.
Then you should clarify. A hurricane is an aspect of a weather system with temperature differentials. So if I said that determinism implied that we could have a hurricane without temperature differentials I would not be making a statement that makes sense. I might say that we could produce a huge wind with a dirty great propellor, but it would not be, by definition, a hurricane. If I said that we could have the eye of the cyclone without a cyclone I would not be making a sensical statement even if I looked around and there was no wind.

So you are saying that epiphenomenalism implies that we can have a conviction without consciousness. Well maybe there might be a neural pathway from some structure that represented self and some structure that represented consciousness. But it would not be, by definition, a conviction. Add consciousness to this mix and it can be defined as a conviction.
Have a more careful read of my argument.
Thank you I have already read it most carefully and my refutation is the same as it was when you presented it first time - as you have not yet addressed or even acknowledged the key issue please read it most carefully:

What we call a conviction is merely an aspect of what we call consciousness - if we are convinced of something we are by definition conscious

Now please address the key issue - do you agree that what we call a conviction is merely one aspect of the thing we call consciousness? If you don't agree please provide some definition of a conviction what does not uniquely imply consciousness.

Robin

24th July 2005, 10:01 PM

OK my hurricane example is not very good, but here is one definition of epiphenomenalism:
Epiphenomenalism is the view in philosophy of mind according to which physical events have mental effects, but mental events have no effects of any kind. In other words, the causal relations go only one way, from physical to mental.
Now when we are convinced of something it means we are conscious of it in a certain way. If we are unconvinced of something we are conscious of it in a different way. If we absolutely disbelieve something then we are conscious of it in yet another way.

So under the assumption of epiphenomenalism the physical event that produces conviction is producing a certain variety of consciousness.

Nowhere does the definition say that a physical event might simultaneously cause and not cause a specific mental event. So to say that epiphenomalism implies we can be convinced we are conscious when we are not is not an accurate representation of the theory.

Robin

24th July 2005, 10:06 PM

Now if it is meaningful to treat the concepts of conviction and consciousness as separable things, then you can disprove any theory of the mind, for example tell me what is wrong with the following:
1. If it were true that I had free will, and my mind is not governed by deterministic laws, then my conviction that I am conscious might be wholly independent of any other aspect of my mind including consciousness.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given that there is no causal chain of cause and effect in the mind, I might be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

3. But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

4. But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events are independent of each other in the mind, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

5. Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that I have free will

Interesting Ian

25th July 2005, 03:25 AM

Originally posted by Robin
Now if it is meaningful to treat the concepts of conviction and consciousness as separable things, then you can disprove any theory of the mind, for example tell me what is wrong with the following:

I only read 1. I do not need to read any further because 1 doesn't make any sense. I cannot be convinced I am conscious if I am not because if I am not conscious then there is no I to be convinced of anything.

Interesting Ian

25th July 2005, 03:34 AM

Originally posted by Robin
OK my hurricane example is not very good, but here is one definition of epiphenomenalism:

Now when we are convinced of something it means we are conscious of it in a certain way. If we are unconvinced of something we are conscious of it in a different way. If we absolutely disbelieve something then we are conscious of it in yet another way.

So under the assumption of epiphenomenalism the physical event that produces conviction is producing a certain variety of consciousness.

Nowhere does the definition say that a physical event might simultaneously cause and not cause a specific mental event. So to say that epiphenomalism implies we can be convinced we are conscious when we are not is not an accurate representation of the theory.

I don't think you get my argument at all. It merely needs to be metaphysically possible that we could be p-zombies. If epi is true, then it is metaphysically possible.

The fact that if epi is true that it is nomonologically (naturally) necessary that I have certain thoughts given certain physical activity in the brain is neither here nor there. It's completely misses my refutation.

Tricky

25th July 2005, 09:26 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I don't think you get my argument at all. It merely needs to be metaphysically possible that we could be p-zombies. If epi is true, then it is metaphysically possible.
LOL. That's a good one, Ian. "Metaphysically possible?" I don't think you can find a single thing that isn't "metaphysically possible", since there aren't any rules to metaphysics.

Ashles

25th July 2005, 09:43 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Yeah thanks Ashless! Refuted everything I've ever said nicely. Keep up the good work.
Yay! Go me!

drkitten

25th July 2005, 09:43 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I don't think you get my argument at all. It merely needs to be metaphysically possible that we could be p-zombies. If epi is true, then it is metaphysically possible.

Only if the notion of p-zombie itself is logical and self-consistent. Judging from the characteristics you've implied that it has -- I refer specifically here to your statement that if you were a p-zombie, "I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious." Since p-zombies by your own definition lack mental states, and the act of convincing someone by definition attributes mental states to them, then, no, I'm not convinced that p-zombies as you define them are any more metaphysically possible than square circles, married bachelors, massless objects with mass, facts unknown to omniscient beings, or any other "inconsistent by definitions of the components words" construction of which the literature is filled.

The usual retort, of course, is to emend the appropriate definitions slightly -- for example, in L1, it's possible for a shape to be both a circle and a square, but we had to adopt non-standard rules of geometry and definitions in order to do that (and we were hopefully up-front about the sort of changes we were making). If you're using a different definition of p-zombie than the one that doesn't have mental events, please enlighten the rest of us that are using the standard English meanings for words.

Robin

25th July 2005, 09:56 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I only read 1. I do not need to read any further because 1 doesn't make any sense. I cannot be convinced I am conscious if I am not because if I am not conscious then there is no I to be convinced of anything.
Which was exactly the point I was making - conviction and consciousness are inseparable they are the same thing - your point 1 is meaningless for the same reason.

Robin

25th July 2005, 10:19 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I don't think you get my argument at all. It merely needs to be metaphysically possible that we could be p-zombies. If epi is true, then it is metaphysically possible.

The fact that if epi is true that it is nomonologically (naturally) necessary that I have certain thoughts given certain physical activity in the brain is neither here nor there. It's completely misses my refutation.
I note that you have still not acknowledged what I said was my key point - that conviction is an aspect of consciousness. This makes the debate somewhat surreal. Please state either, conviction is an aspect of consciousness or conviction is not an aspect of consciousness. It would clear up the confusion a great deal.

If my contention is correct then the fact that it is possible under epi for a p-zombie to exist is irrelevant because epi does not say that we are p-zombies. So if we are conscious then it is not possible that we are simultaneously not conscious. But your refutation says that under epi we might be conscious when we are not conscious which would mean that one brain state causes simultaneously opposite mental states.

Or to put it another way you are positing the possibility of a conscious p-zombie.

As I said earlier I don't buy epi for simpler and more practical reasons than this, but I made this point earlier - say there could be a p-zombie and there was some mental structure representing consciousness and another representing self and some neural pathway between them. That might be a brain state representing the idea "I am conscious". But you could not call it a conviction since you would have to add consciousness to the mix for it to match the definition.

So a p-zombie might have the internal representation of the idea that it is conscious when it is not. It might even claim to be conscious (you could write a computer program to claim to be conscious).

But it would not be a conviction since a conviction is necessarily conscious.

Robin

25th July 2005, 10:22 AM

Duplicate post

Interesting Ian

25th July 2005, 10:47 AM

Originally posted by new drkitten

II
I don't think you get my argument at all. It merely needs to be metaphysically possible that we could be p-zombies. If epi is true, then it is metaphysically possible.

new drkitten
Only if the notion of p-zombie itself is logical and self-consistent.

If they are not logical and self-consistent then epiphenomenalism is logically refuted.

Sorry guys but I'm finding this conversation a bit tedious. I don't think that people are getting what I'm saying. I think I would need to expand on my original argument and clarify myself by talking about logically possible and metaphysically possible Universes and all that cr@p. But all this stuff is extremely difficult to understand for those not acquainted with philosophy.

Since nobody here is an epiphenomenalist anyway, I'll think I'll just give it a miss :)

aggle-rithm

25th July 2005, 11:14 AM

I'm in the process of reading "The Selfish Gene", and came across and interesting theory of consciousness. Dawkins was commenting on the fact that increasingly complex creatures are able to construct increasingly complete internal models of the world. He suggested that a truly complete map of the world would also contain a model of the brain itself, and that would mean the organism had obtained consciousness.

The only problem with this, he pointed out, was that such a model could become infinitely recursive...a model of a model of a model, ad infinitum.

This brings up two possibilities:

1. The need to avoid the infinitely recursive model causes the brain to generate a quasi-model, or meta-model, of the brain, which is perceived as consciousness.

2. Consciousness, or the mind, IS a model of a model of a model, and that's why it seems intuitively obvious that the mind and the brain are separate entities.

drkitten

25th July 2005, 12:32 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Sorry guys but I'm finding this conversation a bit tedious. I don't think that people are getting what I'm saying.

That's because you're not saying it clearly.

But all this stuff is extremely difficult to understand for those not acquainted with philosophy.

No. I consider myself acquainted with philosophy -- and it's not at all difficult to understand. It's a simple combination of truism and simple logical errors, wrapped up in an enigmatic combination of drivel and gibberish.

Robin

25th July 2005, 06:16 PM

Originally posted by new drkitten
No. I consider myself acquainted with philosophy -- and it's not at all difficult to understand. It's a simple combination of truism and simple logical errors, wrapped up in an enigmatic combination of drivel and gibberish.
Except in the case of Derrida where he skips the truisms and simple logical errors and cuts straight to the drivel and gibberish.

Robin

25th July 2005, 06:28 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Sorry guys but I'm finding this conversation a bit tedious. I don't think that people are getting what I'm saying. I think I would need to expand on my original argument and clarify myself by talking about logically possible and metaphysically possible Universes and all that cr@p. But all this stuff is extremely difficult to understand for those not acquainted with philosophy.

Since nobody here is an epiphenomenalist anyway, I'll think I'll just give it a miss :)
You sound like a car mechanic - "explain why you need to replace all the brake pads when the carburettor gets clogged" . "It's extremely difficult to explain to someone not acquainted with mechanics".

A bit rich from somebody who made the kindergarten logical blunder that I pointed out earlier. If you can't construct a simple proof by contradiction then I hardly think that your advanced metaphysical claims have any credibility.

Robin

25th July 2005, 06:51 PM

Originally posted by Robin
I note that you have still not acknowledged what I said was my key point - that conviction is an aspect of consciousness. This makes the debate somewhat surreal. Please state either, conviction is an aspect of consciousness or conviction is not an aspect of consciousness. It would clear up the confusion a great deal.
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Sorry guys but I'm finding this conversation a bit tedious. I don't think that people are getting what I'm saying. I think I would need to expand on my original argument and clarify myself by talking about logically possible and metaphysically possible Universes and all that cr@p. But all this stuff is extremely difficult to understand for those not acquainted with philosophy.
No Ian, I think we both know it has nothing to do with logically possible and metaphysically possible universes. It has to do with fudging definitions of mental states to make the argument fit (otherwise why won't you give the clarification I have asked for repeatedly?).

I can understand that you want to imply there is some deep metaphysical reason why you can use one definition for epiphenomenalism and another for your own philosophy. But it does not wash.

But if conviction is not an aspect of consciousness and they are distinct things I re-present my counter-proof with step 1 amended for your objection. Now step 1 is definitely true given your assumption about conviction and consciousness and step 2 neatly follows from it:
1. If it were true that I had free will, and the mind is not governed by deterministic laws, then any aspect of the mind might be independent of any other aspect of the mind for example conviction might be independent of consciousness.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given that there is no causal chain of cause and effect in the mind, I might be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

3. But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

4. But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events are independent of each other in the mind, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

5. Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that I have free will

Interesting Ian

25th July 2005, 06:59 PM

Originally posted by Robin
You sound like a car mechanic - "explain why you need to replace all the brake pads when the carburettor gets clogged" . "It's extremely difficult to explain to someone not acquainted with mechanics".

A bit rich from somebody who made the kindergarten logical blunder that I pointed out earlier. If you can't construct a simple proof by contradiction then I hardly think that your advanced metaphysical claims have any credibility.

The point here though is that I haven't made any logical blunders. I am absolutely completely sure about that. You just don't seem to understand anything whatsoever; not just in this thread, but also in others.

:con2:

So what can I do? I've already explained myself upteen times, but you keep going off at a complete tangent and talking complete non-sequiturs. I have comprehensively failed to alleviate your complete and absolute confusion. I can only conclude it is beyond my ability to do so.

So that is that.

Interesting Ian

25th July 2005, 07:06 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

Just one point. Yes to be convinced of something is to necessarily be conscious. As I've always said, 2 doesn't make sense by itself, it is a necessary consequence of 1 i.e it is a necessary consequence of epi.

The very fact that it is logically inconsistent therefore disproves epi.

But I've already stated this time after time after time.

Interesting Ian

25th July 2005, 07:26 PM

Robin,

I'll try just once more.

If and only if epiphenomenalism correctly depicts the mind/body relationship, then the conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious. This is because my conviction is wholly a result of prior physical events in the brain.

The only way you can get around this is by supposing these physical events logically necessitate consciousness. But then that would be reductive materialism and not epiphenomenalism.

If it is not logically necessitated then consciousness does not do anything including making me realise that I am conscious!

STREWTH!! {sweats}

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

25th July 2005, 07:39 PM

Bodhi said:
For every mental state, there is a corresponding physical state. So, the mental sensation of believing about something has a causal role in its physical level. No mystery involved, and no souls required.
As long as the "mental sensation of believing" is absolutely nothing more than a synonym for the physical brain events. There can't be anything more to the sensation than brain events, or there is no way you could speak of the sensation.

Tricky said:
If that definition is correct, then Epiphenomenalism is about the silliest philosophical construct since solipsism. If it were true, then it would be impossible for one thought to lead to another thought, since there is no way for the mental event (the thought) to get back to the physical event (the activity of the brain), which is simply ludicrous on the surface (and would make playing "word association" impossible). I think it only goes to show that philosophers have too much time on their hands.
You is right, sir.

~~ Paul

Edited to add: I wonder if all the definitions of epiphenomenalism are incorrect and philosophers actually have something else in mind?

Robin

25th July 2005, 08:12 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Just one point. Yes to be convinced of something is to necessarily be conscious. As I've always said, 2 doesn't make sense by itself, it is a necessary consequence of 1 i.e it is a necessary consequence of epi.

The very fact that it is logically inconsistent therefore disproves epi.

But I've already stated this time after time after time.
And you are wrong time after time after time. Step 2 just does not follow from step 1.

As you have stated above "to be convinced of something is to necessarily be conscious". Good.

So why is this definition not reflected in your argument?
1. If it were true that my consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.
2. To be convinced of something is to necessarily be conscious
3. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has everything to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain it could not produce incompatible brain states (Ded 1,2)
Now that really does follow.

But "my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious" is not a result of epiphenonenalism, could never by any stretch be a result of epiphenomenalism. It simply does not follow.

Robin

25th July 2005, 09:30 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If it is not logically necessitated then consciousness does not do anything including making me realise that I am conscious!

STREWTH!! {sweats}
Ah, the caps lock comes into play. But that is perfectly true, under epi consciousness does not make you conscious that you are conscious. The underlying brain state makes you conscious that you are conscious.
Robin,

I'll try just once more.

If and only if epiphenomenalism correctly depicts the mind/body relationship, then the conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious. This is because my conviction is wholly a result of prior physical events in the brain.

The only way you can get around this is by supposing these physical events logically necessitate consciousness. But then that would be reductive materialism and not epiphenomenalism.
You may think that logical necessity is confined to reductive materialism but it is not, though to read your posts you might think so. Logical necessity underlies every area of philosophy. You could not, for example, say something was metaphysically possible, unless it were first logically possible.

All I am saying is that if some physical event creates consciousness then that physical event creates consciousness. No? Is this contrary to epiphenomenalism?

A brain state that is producing a conviction is by definition producing consciousness. It might be producing all manner of mental events that link the concepts of self and consciousness. But if the brain state was not producing consciousness then it would not, by definition, be producing a conviction. What is so hard to understand about that?

It is a little like saying you can have a lollipop making machine that can produce a red lollipop without producing a lollipop at all.

Because the the process that makes it red has nothing to do with the lollipop, it is simply a physical process in the machine. You could disable all the physical processes that produce the lollipop except for the part that produces the red. But the result would be a puddle of red food dye. It would not satisfy the strict metaphysical definition of a lollipop.

Similarly you could look at the physical processes that produce a conviction and disable all the parts that have to do with consciousness. You might get something but it would not be a conviction.

No, epiphenomenalism definitely implies that your convictions, including your conviction that you are conscious, have everything to do with consciousness

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 05:51 AM

Originally posted by Robin
Ah, the caps lock comes into play. But that is perfectly true, under epi consciousness does not make you conscious that you are conscious. The underlying brain state makes you conscious that you are conscious.

You may think that logical necessity is confined to reductive materialism but it is not, though to read your posts you might think so. Logical necessity underlies every area of philosophy. You could not, for example, say something was metaphysically possible, unless it were first logically possible.

All I am saying is that if some physical event creates consciousness then that physical event creates consciousness. No? Is this contrary to epiphenomenalism?

A brain state that is producing a conviction is by definition producing consciousness. It might be producing all manner of mental events that link the concepts of self and consciousness. But if the brain state was not producing consciousness then it would not, by definition, be producing a conviction. What is so hard to understand about that?

It is a little like saying you can have a lollipop making machine that can produce a red lollipop without producing a lollipop at all.

Because the the process that makes it red has nothing to do with the lollipop, it is simply a physical process in the machine. You could disable all the physical processes that produce the lollipop except for the part that produces the red. But the result would be a puddle of red food dye. It would not satisfy the strict metaphysical definition of a lollipop.

Similarly you could look at the physical processes that produce a conviction and disable all the parts that have to do with consciousness. You might get something but it would not be a conviction.

No, epiphenomenalism definitely implies that your convictions, including your conviction that you are conscious, have everything to do with consciousness

What has all this got to do with my proof? You don't like the original formulation of my proof so I've reworded it.

Now I don't disagree with anything you say here, absolutely nothing at all, unfortunately however it is all simply a non-sequitur. It does not at all address my proof and there's nothing to respond to.

aggle-rithm

26th July 2005, 06:45 AM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
I wonder if all the definitions of epiphenomenalism are incorrect and philosophers actually have something else in mind?

Yes, but it's a secret! ;)

26th July 2005, 08:10 AM

It's funny, but I think we're all agreeing that epiphenomenalism is ridiculous. But here's the problem: we agree it's ridiculous because we don't agree that any given observable phenomenon - even a subjective one - is acausal in nature; hence, the very nature of epiphenomenalism is silly, IOO.

But this is not to say that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon, in the sense of being a secondary property of an object. Being secondary does not imply an acausal nature; for example, a light being red - redness is an epiphenomenon, but is certainly capable of causal power. This, then, is a part of the confusion: epiphenomenalism has nothing, apparently, to do with epiphenomena.

Ian is arguing, simply, that epiphenomenalism is incoherent, since consciousness clearly has an effect on the individual claiming consciousness - in fact, since the individual claiming consciousness must be conscious in order to be able to make that claim. And we're not disagreeing with him.

We almost wonder, though, why we're arguing epiphenomenalism - it's understandably silly, so why are we all arguing about it?

Furthermore - what does epiphenomenalism have to do with the TV model of the brain?

BillHoyt

26th July 2005, 09:00 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Furthermore - what does epiphenomenalism have to do with the TV model of the brain?

Twas only a side-show. A red herring tossed in to call off the dogs for a bit.

I've several times addressed the "tv model's" deficiencies. First, of course, is that it is facile. Secondly, it introduces far more questions than it answers. What is this mysterious transmission mode that physics has yet to detect? How does the transceiver work, and also escape detection? Are there time lags or is the communication utterly not subject to anything we know about the universe, including the small speed limit problem? Why, if this whole rube-goldberg-mental-confection seems to be beyond all material, physical and biolgical knowledge, can we shut down consciousness so easily with drugs? Why can we permanently alter the receiver with surgery? Why can we elevate or depress its moods if its moods are not material?

And, finally, why don't these armchair nitwits just roll up their dainty sleeves and subject the idea to the acid test: exchange the brains of two twin animals, trained to have opposite reactions to a simple stimulus and pose the question: do the trained reactions travel with the exchanged brains.

Too simple Too much like tossing the pasta at the wall to see if its done.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

26th July 2005, 09:13 AM

Zaay said:
We almost wonder, though, why we're arguing epiphenomenalism - it's understandably silly, so why are we all arguing about it?
It's philosophy, dude! It's like how we keep arguing Mary and the knowledge argument, even though it's busted, too.

Bill said:
And, finally, why don't these armchair nitwits just roll up their dainty sleeves and subject the idea to the acid test: exchange the brains of two twin animals, trained to have opposite reactions to a simple stimulus and pose the question: do the trained reactions travel with the exchanged brains.
First they would have to agree that the proposed animal subject is conscious; that is, has one of these receiver thingies. And even if so, maybe simple reactions aren't part of what's received. Maybe simple reactions are just physical reactions.

~~ Paul

drkitten

26th July 2005, 09:16 AM

Originally posted by BillHoyt

And, finally, why don't these armchair nitwits just roll up their dainty sleeves and subject the idea to the acid test: exchange the brains of two twin animals, trained to have opposite reactions to a simple stimulus and pose the question: do the trained reactions travel with the exchanged brains.

Um,.... unless you are aware of some neurosurgical advances that have passed me by, this simply isn't possible to do. At our current level of technology, we can't reattach nerves in the manner necessary to perform this experiment.

Tricky

26th July 2005, 09:37 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
This, then, is a part of the confusion: epiphenomenalism has nothing, apparently, to do with epiphenomena.
That kinda bugs me too. When I jumped into this discussion, I tried looking up epiphenomenalism and I only got epiphenomena, so I assumed (wrongly) that they were some way related.

Well, I guess they had to name it something.

Pragmatist

26th July 2005, 10:27 AM

Originally posted by new drkitten
Um,.... unless you are aware of some neurosurgical advances that have passed me by, this simply isn't possible to do. At our current level of technology, we can't reattach nerves in the manner necessary to perform this experiment.

There's this:

http://www.indiana.edu/~pietsch/memory-transfer.html

I don't know how valid it is, not my field. It does have a list of possibly relevant references though.

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 10:50 AM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon

But this is not to say that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon, in the sense of being a secondary property of an object. Being secondary does not imply an acausal nature; for example, a light being red - redness is an epiphenomenon, but is certainly capable of causal power.

Read this below (in blue):

Despite what is widely believed, physics is not concerned with the intrinsic essence or nature of the world. It is purely concerned with the causal role of all things and hence the effects they have on other things. In practice this means that physicists are purely interested in the properties of things, for it is a thingâ€™s properties that define its causal role and thus its effects on its environment.
Letâ€™s consider an electron. It has properties such as electric charge, mass and so on. When we state it has these properties we mean nothing over and above the idea that it behaves and effects its environment in a characteristically given specific manner. For example its mass (roughly weight) will determine its path and hence where it will be at a specific time. Where it will be and its electric charge will in turn determine whether it will affect other electrically charged elementary particles in the vicinity.

Letâ€™s consider an everyday object such as a table. It too has certain properties. For example I perceive it as having a certain characteristic brown colour with a certain shape. On reaching out my hand I experience a tactile (sense of touch) sensation of hardness. If it is a small table I could lift it up and throw it. In doing this the table might crash into other objects and knock them over or break them. This can be explained in terms of its properties of mass and hardness.

For both the electron and the table, and indeed all other physical things, their reality, at least as understood by science, is exhausted by the sum total of an objectâ€™s or thingâ€™s properties. These properties are equated with its causal powers. Thus, for a table, its hardness is nothing other than the mutually electrical repulsion between the electrons near the surface of the table and the electrons in the fingertips that touch the table. In a similar manner the colour of the table that we perceive, namely brown, is explained by the fact that brown is a certain wavelength of light. When light hits the table, it is only this wavelength of light that is reflected; all other wavelengths are absorbed by the table. So when we say the table is brown, what we really saying is that the table has the property to reflect the wavelength of light that our minds interpret as brown, and to absorb all other wavelengths of light. In other words to say it is brown is to say it has this particular causal power in question. The pertinent point here which is crucial to grasp is that the totality of a tables properties â€“ that is to say everything we can possibly say about a table â€“ is simply the total sum of its abilities to causally impact upon its environment.

At the risk of this getting too philosophically complex I should mention that it might be objected by some people that the world is not simply the sum of all its properties or causal powers. Thus a table might be said to have or possess certain properties and the reality of the table should not be equated with a simple sum of such properties. We need not however concern ourselves with this possibility. Science -- and in particular physics -- must, by definition, only be interested in the effects that things or processes have in the world. These effects are wholly determined by the causal powers of things and processes and to talk about causal powers is simply to talk about the properties of objects. If there is anything to an object which is not known by its properties and hence causal powers, and thus cannot affect the environment in anyway whatsoever, then we could never ever know about it because it is only the ability to affect the environment whereby we could come to know of it. This is not to say that there cannot be such aspects to objects and processes, but they would nevertheless necessarily escape the scope of any possible science.

Now you're sayinbg that the quale redness has causal power. OK I agree. Now lets designate physical events by lower case letters, and the quale redness by Q and cause and effect by >

So when we see redness there are particular events occurring in the environment including ones brain. What we have is

a > b > c > d > Q > e > f > g > h etc

The physical reality of all the lower case letters are exhausted by the causal role they play. There is nothing more to them then there causal role -- at least according to science. Certainly if there is anything more to them then their causal power we could never know about such aspects.

But Q is different. Q is certainly not exhausted by its causal role. For as well as its causal power there is the experience itself -- namely redness.

But this experience is only ever experienced by the one subject. As far as anyone lese is concerned there are only physical events. Thus if we looked into a living brain of someone experiencing red we would simply see

a > b > c > d > e > f > g > h

with Q missed out. But then the occurence of e might seem peculiar as it isn't caused by d and the explanation of e is completely mysterious from the objective (3rd person) standpoint.

And we can't hypothesis the quale Q as we can with say an electron, because an electron is exhausted by its causal powers where as the quale most certainly is not.

We can only conclude that Q and indeed all qualia and therefore consciousness as a whole simply falls out of the scientific world picture. Therefore it cannot be deemed to be physical.

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 11:05 AM

Posted twice despite it saying it hadn't.

BillHoyt

26th July 2005, 11:06 AM

Originally posted by new drkitten
Um,.... unless you are aware of some neurosurgical advances that have passed me by, this simply isn't possible to do. At our current level of technology, we can't reattach nerves in the manner necessary to perform this experiment.
There've been many such experiments done. Been going on for decades, dating back to early optic-nerve re-wiring in both cats and frogs.

aggle-rithm

26th July 2005, 11:12 AM

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Why can we elevate or depress its moods if its moods are not material?

This was something I asked a while back and never got an answer. If the "self" is an autonomous entity, does it feel emotions? Does it have moods at all? Or are these added by the "filter"?

aggle-rithm

26th July 2005, 11:18 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

So when we see redness there are particular events occurring in the environment including ones brain. What we have is

a > b > c > d > Q > e > f > g > h etc

The physical reality of all the lower case letters are exhausted by the causal role they play. There is nothing more to them then there causal role -- at least according to science. Certainly if there is anything more to them then their causal power we could never know about such aspects.

But Q is different. Q is certainly not exhausted by its causal role. For as well as its causal power there is the experience itself -- namely redness.

But this experience is only ever experienced by the one subject. As far as anyone lese is concerned there are only physical events. Thus if we looked into a living brain of someone experiencing red we would simply see

a > b > c > d > e > f > g > h

with Q missed out. But then the occurence of e might seem peculiar as it isn't caused by d and the explanation of e is completely mysterious from the objective (3rd person) standpoint.

...but there is a Q in the second diagram. It is the subjective experience of the observer as he investigates the physical response of the brain when the subject sees red.

There will always be a Q if the phenomenon is observed, either directly or indirectly. If it isn't observed, who cares?

(I'm assuming that either "d" or "e" is the physical response of the brain, and you are not saying that such a response is not detectable.)

BillHoyt

26th July 2005, 11:28 AM

aggle-rithm

26th July 2005, 11:34 AM

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Good luck getting satisfactory answers.

Yeah...hope springs eternal.

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 11:35 AM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
This was something I asked a while back and never got an answer. If the "self" is an autonomous entity, does it feel emotions? Does it have moods at all? Or are these added by the "filter"?

I don't know why. Are you saying we should always be in the same mood for the whole of eternity?

Or are you saying ones moods should be wholy caused by previous mental states and never by the physical states of the brain? Presumably you would have no problem by a persons moods being affected by what comes through the senses such as seeing a glorious sunset etc. But drinking lager is incompatible with the notion that the self doesn't originate from the brain? Can you explain the difficulty?
Why isn't this like the fact you can alter the picture quality by messing about with the components of a TV set?

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 11:39 AM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
...but there is a Q in the second diagram. It is the subjective experience of the observer as he investigates the physical response of the brain when the subject sees red.

There will always be a Q if the phenomenon is observed, either directly or indirectly. If it isn't observed, who cares?

(I'm assuming that either "d" or "e" is the physical response of the brain, and you are not saying that such a response is not detectable.)

Why do people always introduce complete irrelevancies???

I'm talking about the subject, not the observer. From an objective perspective there is no consciousness in anyone else.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

26th July 2005, 11:44 AM

If we're gonna complain about philosophy lingo, we better be prepared to complain about science lingo, too.

Spin my charm quark, baby!

~~ Paul

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 11:48 AM

Originally posted by BillHoyt
Good luck getting satisfactory answers.

But what's wrong with the answers I've already provided in the original TV metaphor? If there's some difficult in this metaphor you have to state what you believe the problem is.

Thus the question

"Why can we elevate or depress its moods if its moods are not material"?

is analogically similar to:

Why can we affect the picture quality displayed on the TV if the TV waves are not the same thing as the components?

So you need to argue why it's unlike the TV in this regard.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

26th July 2005, 11:48 AM

Ian said:
Why isn't this like the fact you can alter the picture quality by messing about with the components of a TV set?
How far are you willing to take this? One way I could mess about with the TV set would be to eliminate the receiver and implant an entire troupe of miniaturized actors. Then suddenly I wouldn't need the Broadcaster at all.

~~ Paul

aggle-rithm

26th July 2005, 11:52 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I don't know why. Are you saying we should always be in the same mood for the whole of eternity?

Or are you saying ones moods should be wholy caused by previous mental states and never by the physical states of the brain? Presumably you would have no problem by a persons moods being affected by what comes through the senses such as seeing a glorious sunset etc. But drinking lager is incompatible with the notion that the self doesn't originate from the brain? Can you explain the difficulty?
Why isn't this like the fact you can alter the picture quality by messing about with the components of a TV set?

I am asking this:

Do emotions reside in the brain, or in the self (as you have described it)?

aggle-rithm

26th July 2005, 11:55 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Why do people always introduce complete irrelevancies???

I'm talking about the subject, not the observer. From an objective perspective there is no consciousness in anyone else.

So what it boils down to is this:

It is not possible for one person to observe things from another person's point of view.

Not surprising. This is similar to saying it is not possible for two distinct entities to occupy the same point in space at the same time.

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 11:55 AM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
I am asking this:

Do emotions reside in the brain, or in the self (as you have described it)?

Emotions are properties of the self obviously. They do not constitute its intrinsic essense of course, although the nature of ones self will influence the propensity to feel certain moods and emotions.

aggle-rithm

26th July 2005, 11:59 AM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Emotions are properties of the self obviously. They do not constitute its intrinsic essense of course, although the nature of ones self will influence the propensity to feel certain moods and emotions.

OK, thanks. Now another question:

Emotions clearly serve specific purposes in the material world, giving us an evolutionary advantage and whatnot. What purpose do they serve in the spiritual world?

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 12:01 PM

Originally posted by aggle-rithm
So what it boils down to is this:

It is not possible for one person to observe things from another person's point of view.

Not surprising. This is similar to saying it is not possible for two distinct entities to occupy the same point in space at the same time.

It is not possible to obseve consciousness yes. Everything else in the Universe can be either observed or can in principle be wholly accommodated into some scientific theory. Consciousness is the sole exception*. What does that tell you?

* Apart from mathematical objective truths and the like, but then they've never been held to be literally part of reality anyway.

26th July 2005, 02:47 PM

Scenario: We have a brain, carefully wired, and analyze it as the optic nerves are exposed to 'red'. We record the brain activity and run more experiments, until we identify exactly what part of the brain responds when 'seeing red'.

Then we have an objective observation of a>b>c>d>Q>e>f etc.

Now, if we test a dozen other patients and get the same brain activity we know they are 'seeing red'. We then bring in the thirteenth guy, and get no signal. It turns out, he's colorblind, and can't differentiate between colors. So for him there is no Q; for him we get a>b>c>d|. End of story.

Same thing with consciousness. We can analyze brains that are conscious and read the patterns of brain activity - we can externally observe consciousness. Therefore, we know that consciousness has causal power.

The problem is in getting some people to accept that patterns of brain activity are consciousness. Because either you accept it, or you assume some non-physical thing called 'consciousness'.

Of course, Ian will necessarily deny that consciousness is the pattern of brain activity; but realistically, that is all it can be.

Since we know brain activity is causal in nature - obviously - then consciousness is causal in nature.

Consciousness is simply a quality of the patterns of brain activity - a secondary phenom like 'red' or 'texture' or what have you. Clearly causal, and clearly material in nature.

jmercer

26th July 2005, 02:49 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It is not possible to obseve consciousness yes. Everything else in the Universe can be either observed or can in principle be wholly accommodated into some scientific theory. Consciousness is the sole exception*. What does that tell you?

* Apart from mathematical objective truths and the like, but then they've never been held to be literally part of reality anyway.

It tells me it's subjective, and therefore, illusory and/or a mere matter of chosen perception. In this case, chosen by evolution. :)

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 03:39 PM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
Scenario: We have a brain, carefully wired, and analyze it as the optic nerves are exposed to 'red'. We record the brain activity and run more experiments, until we identify exactly what part of the brain responds when 'seeing red'.

Then we have an objective observation of a>b>c>d>Q>e>f etc.

Now, if we test a dozen other patients and get the same brain activity we know they are 'seeing red'. We then bring in the thirteenth guy, and get no signal. It turns out, he's colorblind, and can't differentiate between colors. So for him there is no Q; for him we get a>b>c>d|. End of story.

Same thing with consciousness. We can analyze brains that are conscious and read the patterns of brain activity - we can externally observe consciousness. Therefore, we know that consciousness has causal power.

We know that consciousness has causal power OK, but that doesn't follow from what you said before that! LOL

The problem is in getting some people to accept that patterns of brain activity are consciousness. Because either you accept it, or you assume some non-physical thing called 'consciousness'.

I argued that consciousness doesn't fit into our scientific reality. I've argued that it could not ever do so. The only thing in reality which can never be given a scientific explanation. Hence why call it physical?

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 03:42 PM

Originally posted by jmercer
It tells me it's subjective, and therefore, illusory and/or a mere matter of chosen perception. In this case, chosen by evolution. :)

Consciousness is an illusion? What is it that is being fooled? What is the real thing that it is an illusion of?

Robin

26th July 2005, 07:36 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
What has all this got to do with my proof? You don't like the original formulation of my proof so I've reworded it.

Now I don't disagree with anything you say here, absolutely nothing at all, unfortunately however it is all simply a non-sequitur. It does not at all address my proof and there's nothing to respond to.
Your proof hinges on the idea that the statement "I might be convinced I was conscious even if I was not conscious" in step 2 can be derived from the definition of epiphenomenalism.

I have shown that under the assumptions of epiphenomenalism if you took some physical event that produced a conviction and could somehow disable the parts that had to do with consciousness then you would no longer have conviction. You might not even have a mental event, just a brain state.

So step 2 can never be a result of epiphenomenalism. In fact some formulations of this philosophy make this explicit, that the difference between a brain state and a mental state is consciousness.

Robin

26th July 2005, 07:50 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I argued that consciousness doesn't fit into our scientific reality. I've argued that it could not ever do so. The only thing in reality which can never be given a scientific explanation. Hence why call it physical?
The very phrase "fit into our scientific reality" betrays your fundamental misunderstanding of science. You speak as though science makes models of things in order to fit some preconception. But science simply attempts to understand things as they are and not as they think they should be. Things will be beyond science if we are not smart enough to understand them or if we cannot observe them at least indirectly.

If things turn out to be different than we had previously imagined, science adjusts for this. In the past 100 years science has fundamentally altered itself twice to account for things that didn't "fit into our scientific reality".

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 08:02 PM

Originally posted by Robin
The very phrase "fit into our scientific reality" betrays your fundamental misunderstanding of science. You speak as though science makes models of things in order to fit some preconception. But science simply attempts to understand things as they are and not as they think they should be. Things will be beyond science if we are not smart enough to understand them or if we cannot observe them at least indirectly.

If things turn out to be different than we had previously imagined, science adjusts for this. In the past 100 years science has fundamentally altered itself twice to account for things that didn't "fit into our scientific reality".

It doesn't matter how it adjusts itself. It cannot accommodate consciousness -- not ever. I've already explained this in the post with the blue font.

The problem however is that you simply completely fail to understand anything.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

26th July 2005, 08:07 PM

Ian said:
It is not possible to obseve consciousness yes. Everything else in the Universe can be either observed or can in principle be wholly accommodated into some scientific theory. Consciousness is the sole exception*. What does that tell you?
You have absolutely no idea whether this is true. Are you sure you're getting the entire picture when you observe a rock?

If you are going to claim the above, you need a proof.

~~ Paul

Robin

26th July 2005, 08:11 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
But what's wrong with the answers I've already provided in the original TV metaphor? If there's some difficult in this metaphor you have to state what you believe the problem is.

Thus the question

"Why can we elevate or depress its moods if its moods are not material"?

is analogically similar to:

Why can we affect the picture quality displayed on the TV if the TV waves are not the same thing as the components?

So you need to argue why it's unlike the TV in this regard.
But hang on a second - moods are part of my subjective experience! If I am getting a fuzzy picture on my telly it is not fuzzy at the TV station.

So if my subjective experience is affected by imperfect communication between the immaterial mind and the physical brain it means that my subjective experience is located at the receiving end, the material side - in the telly, so to speak.

So that still implies that my subjective experience is a physical thing!

26th July 2005, 08:13 PM

I argued that consciousness doesn't fit into our scientific reality. I've argued that it could not ever do so. The only thing in reality which can never be given a scientific explanation. Hence why call it physical?

And here, as pointed out by Robin, is why he would rightly be called, 'Ignorant Ian'.

Science changes to match reality. Given time, science will include even consciousness fully. There really is nothing that cannot be encompassed by science, eventually, unless it is everything - there's this little problem of orders of system... but I digress.

Since all available evidence points to the concept that 'consciousness' is simply an epiphenomenal property of an active and functioning brain, I'd say that science is already in the process of encompassing consciousness. So Ian can certainly assert all he likes, but that doesn't make it true.

It would be so much simpler if he could prove, definitively, that consciousness did not require a brain to exist - in which case, all of our current theories on consciousness would be invalidated. But anecdotal stories of OBEs and NDEs do not constitute proof; in fact, there is more than sufficient evidence to point to the idea that these phenomena are not what they appear to the subject to be.

Still - we can expect Ian to simply revert to bald assertions and anecdotal evidence. Imagine if he would actually study science for a year, how improved he might become! *sigh*

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 08:30 PM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
You have absolutely no idea whether this is true. Are you sure you're getting the entire picture when you observe a rock?

If you are going to claim the above, you need a proof.

~~ Paul

Read my post in the blue font. I explain it there.

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 08:33 PM

Originally posted by Robin
But hang on a second - moods are part of my subjective experience! If I am getting a fuzzy picture on my telly it is not fuzzy at the TV station.

So if my subjective experience is affected by imperfect communication between the immaterial mind and the physical brain

No. It's nothing to do with imperfect commuincation! It is the brain which affects subjective experience. A TV set may be getting a perfect signal but still have a poor picture. Read my TV set analogy near the beginning of the thread.

.

Actually no . . .don't bother. You never understand anything anyway.

Interesting Ian

26th July 2005, 08:38 PM

Originally posted by zaayrdragon

II
I argued that consciousness doesn't fit into our scientific reality. I've argued that it could not ever do so. The only thing in reality which can never be given a scientific explanation. Hence why call it physical?

zaayrdragon
And here, as pointed out by Robin, is why he would rightly be called, 'Ignorant Ian'.

Science changes to match reality. Given time, science will include even consciousness fully. There really is nothing that cannot be encompassed by science, eventually, unless it is everything - there's this little problem of orders of system... but I digress.

You need to reread my post again with the blue font! This time try to understand it.

{sighs}

I've had enough of all the incredibly stupid people who inhabit this board. You're all as thick as f***.

I'm off.

Robin

26th July 2005, 10:30 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
No. It's nothing to do with imperfect commuincation! It is the brain which affects subjective experience. A TV set may be getting a perfect signal but still have a poor picture
If a picture started good on the transmitting device and is poor on the output of the receiving device then that is the very definition of an imperfect transmission. Look up some text on communication theory. Don't make offensive comments because you have a poor grasp of the terminology of the field you are using for your analogy.

In your analogy is consciousness in the "sender" part or the "receiver" part? Or is it both? If it is affected, as has been shown, by physical alterations to the brain this would suggest it is either in the "receiver" part or both. The consequence of this is that consciousness is either a physical thing or is closely tied to physical conditions (which suggests that the transmission in your analogy is the wrong way).
Read my TV set analogy near the beginning of the thread.
What do you think I was responding to?
Thus, just as tinkering with the internal components of a television set will have consequences for the quality of the picture displayed, but will not change the storyline of the programme, so too might alteration of the brainâ€™s processes affect states of the mind without bringing about any change in the actual self.
So your analogy has the self as the sender and the brain as the receiver. Anything affected by a physical process would also have to be at the receiving end, clearly consciousness is affected by physical processes and so has to be at the receiving end.

So either consciousness is physical or your analogy is a non starter. Or both.

It is unfair to stretch an analogy too far, but to me my emotions are more part of the storyline of my life than the picture quality.
Actually no . . .don't bother. You never understand anything anyway.
I understand lots of stuff. But it is not possible, by definition, to understand that which does not make sense in the first place.

Robin

26th July 2005, 11:44 PM

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
You need to reread my post again with the blue font! This time try to understand it.
The problem is not that we need to re-read your posts, but that you need to read the responses to them just once.

In the first paragraph you again trot out the same old nonsense that we have addressed again and again:
Despite what is widely believed, physics is not concerned with the intrinsic essence or nature of the world. It is purely concerned with the causal role of all things and hence the effects they have on other things. In practice this means that physicists are purely interested in the properties of things, for it is a thingâ€™s properties that define its causal role and thus its effects on its environment.
So what you are saying here is that if something were observed to operate outside of cause and effect then scientists would immediately lose all curiosity in the phenomenon and go on to something else.

Or would they be even more interested in because of this property? Would they rapidly start looking for ways in which the phenomenon could be studied?

If it proved to be outside of any known science would the science community throw up their collective hands and say "not our department". Or would they lick their lips at the prospect of another revolutionary advance in science and possibly a Nobel prize.

Unfortunately you have identified no such revolution:
But Q is different. Q is certainly not exhausted by its causal role. For as well as its causal power there is the experience itself -- namely redness.

But this experience is only ever experienced by the one subject. As far as anyone lese is concerned there are only physical events.
If you were right and the experience of redness has no causal role to play then all you have done is identify a leaf node in the cause/effect tree. Would science study cause and effect and ignore leaf nodes like this?

But does the experience of redness have no causal role? Would the experience of the redness of a vintage Ferrari have no effect on my mood? Does the experience of the blue of the sky and the yellow of the afternoon sun have no effect on my mood? Experiences like this feed back into the system and change it in subtle and complex ways which affect mood and therefore behaviour and as such are experienced by other people.

Moreover it is only the experience of something that can have this type of effect. If you looked into some living brain and didn't find Q, then you would just not be looking hard enough.
{sighs}

I've had enough of all the incredibly stupid people who inhabit this board. You're all as thick as f***.

I'm off.
Frankly that someone who considers deathbed visions as direct evidence of the afterlife considers me incredibly stupid does not worry me too much!

I take something away from every encounter, you take nothing because you don't listen, you just put down any alternative viewpoint to stupidity. I think you are missing a great deal because of this, but it is your, not my loss.

See you next time!