Can science give a complete description of reality?

[jay gw]

Science

The observation, identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical explanation of phenomena.
Systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation.

Reality

The totality of all things possessing actuality, existence, or essence.
The state or quality of having existence or substance.
The whole of what is actual or real.

____

Will science at some point describe AND explain the entirety of everything that is real? Why or why not? Is there anything beyond scientific explanation?

[Mercutio]

No.

Next question?

Maybe I am not understanding, but I have never seen claim that science could ever give a complete description of reality (whatever that is), and I have often seen that such a description is not possible (I have only seen the "not possible" claim from science--religion may very well claim to have the whole picture. Whether or not they agree with the other religion that also claims to have the whole picture.

[jay gw]

I have never seen claim that science could ever give a complete description of reality

You know that it is the aim of scientists to explain their fields completely so there are zero details left unexplained, right?

[Mercutio]

You know that it is the aim of scientists to explain their fields completely so there are zero details left unexplained, right?
No. I do not know this. I thought their job was to give the best explanation of the observed evidence, but to acknowledge that an explanation that is a better fit could come along at any time...

Seriously, we phrase things probabilistically for a reason. Take a look at Bronowski's "Knowledge and Certainty"--we already know (for instance, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle) that there are limits to what we can possibly know. If randomness is involved at any level, there will never be "zero details left unexplained". If randomness is accepted as an "explanation", then why not claim that everything not understood right now is due to random processes and be done with it?

[Interesting Ian]

Science

Is there anything beyond scientific explanation?

Yes of course. Consciousness is.

[RandFan]

No. Such an assumption is antithetical to science.

[Z]

Gee, Ian is posting again... What a hypocrite.

Ian, did you or did you not claim to be leaving the forums?

Well, if you're gonna be here, you could at least apologize for being a jackanape before you 'left'.

Oh, sorry - on topic: No, for one reason: IIRC, there is some theorem that says that in order to describe any system completely, you have to use language/concepts/sets one order higher than the system you are attempting to describe. I can't, at the moment, remember where I heard that, or what it was in reference to, but it is the sole thing IMO that prevents science from ever fully describing the universe.

Consciousness, however, is already coming under the microscope, as it were. Breakthroughs were recently reported on MSNBC.com (as well as, I'm sure, other places) in the search for consciousness, and it's quite likely that we're no more than 100-150 years from a complete understanding of this simple phenomenon. Of course, Ian doesn't like that - new research that shows consciousness might be wholly material after all is sure to annoy him greatly. But he'll go on spouting his dogma in spite of any evidence to the contrary.

:D

Hi, Ian!

ETA: No, Jay, it is not the goal of any branch of science to gain a 'complete description' of their field... that would compromise their intellectual integrity - not to mention put a lot of them out of work. Apparently, science is yet another field you need to read up on.

[Mercutio]

Yes of course. Consciousness is.
Everything is beyond scientific "explanation", if by "explanation" you mean and end to any further question.

Consciousness is not, however, beyond scientific exploration. I think scientific exploration of consciousness is our best bet at understanding it; philosophy has had a couple of thousand years with no success, maybe science needs another few years.

[Interesting Ian]

No.

Next question?

Maybe I am not understanding, but I have never seen claim that science could ever give a complete description of reality (whatever that is),


There's the total theory of everything (T.O.E). The world is assumed to be wholly physical and all disparate phenomena is susceptible to being subsumed under just one very simple elegant and beautiful theory.

[jay gw]

If randomness is involved at any level, there will never be "zero details left unexplained".
This is not true. Randomness does not mean infinite possibilities. All random variables have ranges and they can be understood. Even though they are random they are in no way unexplained or unknown.

[Interesting Ian]

Everything is beyond scientific "explanation", if by "explanation" you mean and end to any further question.

Consciousness is not, however, beyond scientific exploration. I think scientific exploration of consciousness is our best bet at understanding it; philosophy has had a couple of thousand years with no success, maybe science needs another few years.

We can explore consciousness by systematic means. I meant that consciousness cannot be explained with reference to any other scientific entities. Science deals exclusively with cause and effect.

[Freakshow]

Yes of course. Consciousness is.

In what way? Compare what we know of conciousness now to past times in human history. We have learned much of what conciousness is, including how it is that it is altered by certain drugs (both theraputic and recreational).

We don't know everything. But it is reasonable to believe that we will continue to learn more and more. Will we ever know "everything"? That depends on what one means by "everything".

[Mercutio]

This is not true. Randomness does not mean infinite possibilities. All random variables have ranges and they can be understood. Even though they are still random they are in no way unexplained or unknown.
Then we quibble on the use of the word "details". When you say "zero details left unexplained", that may be a problem.

[Interesting Ian]

Gee, Ian is posting again... What a hypocrite.

Ian, did you or did you not claim to be leaving the forums?

Well, if you're gonna be here, you could at least apologize for being a jackanape before you 'left'.

Oh, sorry - on topic: No, for one reason: IIRC, there is some theorem that says that in order to describe any system completely, you have to use language/concepts/sets one order higher than the system you are attempting to describe. I can't, at the moment, remember where I heard that, or what it was in reference to, but it is the sole thing IMO that prevents science from ever fully describing the universe.

Consciousness, however, is already coming under the microscope, as it were. Breakthroughs were recently reported on MSNBC.com (as well as, I'm sure, other places) in the search for consciousness, and it's quite likely that we're no more than 100-150 years from a complete understanding of this simple phenomenon. Of course, Ian doesn't like that - new research that shows consciousness might be wholly material after all is sure to annoy him greatly. But he'll go on spouting his dogma in spite of any evidence to the contrary.

:D

Hi, Ian!

ETA: No, Jay, it is not the goal of any branch of science to gain a 'complete description' of their field... that would compromise their intellectual integrity - not to mention put a lot of them out of work. Apparently, science is yet another field you need to read up on.


No, I'm afraid that consciousness is something that in principle science cannot explain. I'm actually in the process of writing about this at the moment for my forthcoming website. Unfortunately I haven't completed the appropriate section yet, but I will paste in what I've written so far.


The other aspect of science we now need to look at is number "4” from the above list: namely “all change in the world is explicable in terms of an unbroken chain of cause and effect”. Despite what is widely believed physics is not concerned with the intrinsic essence or nature of the world. It is purely concerned with the causal role of all things and hence the effects they have on other things. Effects here should be understood in a purely quantitative manner – that is to say an effect is some happening or process in the world. Hence it is something which in principle can be measured. Typically this might mean that some microscopic entities might cause or precipitate motion in other microscopic entities. Such motion can of course be measured.

The causal role or causal powers of an entity or process is simply another way of talking about its properties. That is to say it is a thing’s properties that define its causal role and thus its effects on its environment. Consequently it is the properties of things which physicists are purely interested in. Let’s try to illustrate this by considering both a sub-atomic particle in the form of an electron and an everyday object such as a table.

An electron has properties such as electric charge, mass and so on. When we state it has these properties we mean nothing over and above the idea that it behaves and effects its environment in a characteristically given specific manner. For example its mass (roughly weight) will determine its path and hence where it will be at a specific time. Where it will be and its electric charge will in turn determine whether it will affect other electrically charged elementary particles in the vicinity.

Let’s consider an everyday object such as a table. It too has certain properties. For example I perceive it as having a certain characteristic brown colour with a certain shape. On reaching out my hand I experience a tactile (sense of touch) sensation of hardness. If it is a small table I could lift it up and throw it. In doing this the table might crash into other objects and knock them over or break them. This can be explained in terms of its properties of mass and hardness.
For both the electron and the table, and indeed all other physical things, their reality, at least as understood by science, is exhausted by the sum total of an object’s or thing’s properties. These properties are equated with its causal powers. Thus, for a table, its hardness is nothing other than the mutually electrical repulsion between the electrons near the surface of the table and the electrons in the fingertips that touch the table. In a similar manner the colour of the table that we perceive, namely brown, is explained by the fact that brown is a certain wavelength of light. When light hits the table, it is only this wavelength of light that is reflected; all other wavelengths are absorbed by the table. So when we say the table is brown, what we really saying is that the table has the property to reflect the wavelength of light that our minds interpret as brown, and to absorb all other wavelengths of light. In other words to say it is brown is to say it has this particular causal power in question. The pertinent point here that is crucial to grasp is that the totality of a tables properties – that is to say everything we can possibly say about a table – is simply the total sum of its abilities to causally impact upon its environment and, at the end of the day, to effect our five senses in a given manner.

At the risk of this getting too philosophically complex I should mention that it might be objected by some people that the world is not simply the sum of all its properties or causal powers. Thus a table might be said to have or possess certain properties and the reality of the table should not be equated with a simple sum of such properties(footnote). We need not however concern ourselves with this possibility. Science -- and in particular physics -- must, by definition, only be interested in the effects that things or processes have in the world. These effects are wholly determined by the causal powers of things and processes and to talk about causal powers is simply to talk about the properties of objects. If there is anything to an object which is not known by its properties and hence causal powers, and thus cannot affect the environment in anyway whatsoever, then we could never ever know about it because it is only the ability to affect the environment whereby we could come to know of it. This is not to say that there cannot be such aspects to objects and processes, but they would nevertheless necessarily escape the scope of any possible science.

I want now to tie in together these ideas of reductionism and of causal powers. These ideas entail that, in principle, science only ever deals with structure and dynamics. Structure here means the arrangement of the parts of some object. Dynamics refers to the movements of those parts, or what those parts are doing. Complete knowledge of both the structure and dynamics will tell us how the structure will change as the parts move or evolve according to physical laws. Hence, as we saw in the discussion regarding reductionism, the parts of some object can explain its properties or behaviour as a whole. Thus, as was mentioned, an understanding of the intricate mechanism of a clockwork clock will reveal how the hands of the clock move. And, taking this further, light is reflected off the clock’s moving hands, this enters our eyes, a sequence of physical events occur in our brains, and eventually the movement of the hands registers in our consciousness.

From a scientific perspective what needs to be understood here is that the whole process is constituted and is nothing more than a continuous chain of cause and effect. Each link in the chain is the effect of the previous link, and in turn causes the next link. But there is literally nothing more than a sequence of causes. In order to emphasize this point, consider one of the components of a clockwork clock -- say one of its wheels. Obviously it plays a crucial causal role in the functioning of the clock as a whole.


Sorry, that's as far as I got. However I shall be shortly be getting round to explaining that obviously consciousness is not constituted by its causal powers, even if it has causal powers. But science deals exclusively with causal powers. Therefore science cannot accommodate consciousness. Obviously I'll go into much more detail on my website.

[jay gw]

I meant that consciousness cannot be explained with reference to any other scientific entities.
How do you know?

Then we quibble on the use of the word "details". When you say "zero details left unexplained", that may be a problem.
Details unexplained is like saying gaps in knowledge or information.

I'm afraid that consciousness is something that in principle science cannot explain.
And you know this how? The reason you believe that consciousness can't be explained is because you're using the wrong definition of it.

Merriam Webster dictionary

Consciousness: The state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought.

Stedman's Medical Dictionary: The state of being aware, or perceiving physical facts or mental concepts; a state of general wakefulness and responsiveness to environment; a functioning sensorium.

There's nothing in the definitions of consciousness that can't be explained scientifically, at some point.

[Dymanic]

The reason you believe that consciousness can't be explained is because you're using the wrong definition of it.
I'm with Ian on this one; consciousness is something that in principle science cannot explain. I'm not convinced that it can even be rigorously defined. Science describe and explain everything? No way.

[jay gw]

I'm not convinced that it can even be rigorously defined.

There are several definitions for consciousness. They all include the state of being aware of one's self and surroundings. That can be explained fairly well already.

[Z]

That's like saying a program cannot be explained by science. It's really no different.

Programs arise in the hardware and have, themselves, causal powers. Consciousness is really no different from a program in operation. As such, it will, inevitably, be understood and explained by science.

As for science dealing only in 'cause and effect', that's demonstrably untrue, as well - look at quantum physics, for example, where there appear to be 'uncaused' effects. However, to be fair, it is my honest opinion that most researchers are probably not accepting that there are uncaused effects, rather than that they have not yet discovered the causes...

Of course, the consciousness problem will always be a stumbling block as long as people like Ian insist that there is some immaterial / spiritual aspect to it. No matter what science describes, explains, or understands, the spiritualist will undoubtedly insist that there is some ethereal and subtle thing about 'being conscious' that hasn't yet been encapsulated by science. Much like the whole 'qualia' nonsense. But does the fault lay, then, with science, or with those who choose to remain willfully ignorant?

[thaiboxerken]

Complete, no, but better than any other method we've established.

[jay gw]

Of course, the consciousness problem will always be a stumbling block as long as people like Ian insist that there is some immaterial / spiritual aspect to it.

Exactly.

[Dymanic]

There are several definitions for consciousness.
Do you consider that an argument for its definability?

They all include the state of being aware of one's self and surroundings.
In other words, they are empty tautologies. Keep it up, you're doing a great job of arguing my point for me.

[Taffer]

Dymanic, Ian (welcome back, by the way), consider this:

Science has done a darn good job of explaining/predicting conscious behaviour by making the assumption that conscious thought is material in nature. There is no reason to believe that this understanding/explanations/predictions will stop here, and indeed might continue until we fully grasp and understand consciousness.

So how, exactly, is it not explainable by science?

Additionally, why do we not, for the sake of this discussion, agree on a single definition of 'consciousness'? I suggest "the state in which an organism is able to think, reason, distinguish itself from others and be self aware", or something similar.

ETA: I'd also like to second Zaayr's analogy of consciousness. Very accurate, in my opinion.

[thaiboxerken]

In other words, they are empty tautologies. Keep it up, you're doing a great job of arguing my point for me.

Hardly the case, they are useful tautologies that describe an aspect of life.

[Batman Jr.]

Insofar as consciousness is defined as our behaviors, we can figure out what consciousness is. Extending the definition of consciousness to the aspect of it which is purely experiential, consciousness is only partly definable. There is no possible scientific means to infer experiences from behaviors. For instance, when someone says they see something as "red," we can't tell if the experience of red for them is the same as the experience of red for us. We can't even, for that matter, tell if they've truly experienced anything at all. The best we can do is just to presume everyone to have a certain kind of inward perception as we don't know if things could possibly be otherwise. I've argued this more times than I can remember, and I'm getting sick of it. No one ever seems to catch on.

[Dymanic]

Science has done a darn good job of explaining/predicting conscious behaviour...
Has it? Your choice of words suggests that behavior is something which includes aspects which are not conscious. Would you say that science has been successful at distinguishing which aspects of behavior are 'conscious' and which are 'unconscious'?

...by making the assumption that conscious thought is material in nature.
I hope you are not making the assumption that I would suggest (as I believe Ian does) that consciousness is something independent of any physical substrate, and that it is because of this that it cannot be explained by science. I suggest, rather, that a scientific explanation for consciousness would first require establishing that there is something to explain scientifically; that there is a qualitative difference between the sort of activity we observe in the brains of organisms we might recognize as being capable of consciousness and those we would not.

I suggest that 'consciousness' is an intuitive abstraction; a "useful fiction". The utility of such a conceptual tool for us in our daily lives is not diminished due to its intuitive or its abstract nature, but it does not lend itself to scientific "explanation" any more than does (say) music. Is music real? Is it qualitatively different from mere sound in some way that can be explained scientifically? A Stradivarius violin might be probed and tested with a variety of scientific equipment. A work by Mozart might be analyzed mathematically. The scientists doing the probing and analyzing might announce (say on MSNBC) that their findings constituted breakthroughs. But even if they did, we couldn't know for sure that their explanations were the best possible; those explanations could never be more than the best available (and that only if there were no dissenters; do we expect to see less of them in the future?)

If we subject the intuitive to exhaustive analysis, are the results best interpreted analytically, or intuitively?

[Taffer]

Has it? Your choice of words suggests that behavior is something which includes aspects which are not conscious. Would you say that science has been successful at distinguishing which aspects of behavior are 'conscious' and which are 'unconscious'?

All behaviour is 'unconscious'. My behaviour, including my emotional state upon my responding to your post, is controlled by physical processes. This has been shown, time and time again, when the emotional state of someone is changed through known, physical, processes via the use of drugs, electricity, etc.

I hope you are not making the assumption that I would suggest (as I believe Ian does) that consciousness is something independent of any physical substrate, and that it is because of this that it cannot be explained by science. I suggest, rather, that a scientific explanation for consciousness would first require establishing that there is something to explain scientifically; that there is a qualitative difference between the sort of activity we observe in the brains of organisms we might recognize as being capable of consciousness and those we would not.

Of course there is a physical difference between conscious and non-conscious oragnisms. Why would you think there wasn't?

I suggest that 'consciousness' is an intuitive abstraction; a "useful fiction".

I agree.

Is music real?

Yes.

Is it qualitatively different from mere sound in some way that can be explained scientifically?

Yes.

But even if they did, we couldn't know for sure that their explanations were the best possible; those explanations could never be more than the best available (and that only if there were no dissenters; do we expect to see less of them in the future?)

Yes. So? You seem to suggest that science should be able to give some kind of knowledge that is above average knowledge. This is mistaken, however. All scientific knowledge is just "the best available".

If we subject the intuitive to exhaustive analysis, are the results best interpreted analytically, or intuitively?

You seem to suggest that , simply because we have fabricated a nice little fantasy (i.e. 'consciousness'), that it is a physical reality. We need not study the fantasy to understand it. If we could, for example, understand the human need for such a fantasy, then we would understand the fantasy. Science deals with the material. Consciousness is the result of material processes, which are understandable, but is not, in itself, a physical reality.

[jay gw]

Consciousness is the result of material processes, which are understandable, but is not, in itself, a physical reality.

Agreed.

[Interesting Ian]

That's like saying a program cannot be explained by science. It's really no different.


A program is just information. Of course it can be completely explained by science. Everything whose reality is totally manifested by its objective physical effects in the world might in principle be explained by reductive science.



Programs arise in the hardware and have, themselves, causal powers.



Programs have causal powers? Well their physical implementation I guess. Methinks you've completely failed to understand my argument as usual.



Consciousness is really no different from a program in operation. As such, it will, inevitably, be understood and explained by science.


A program is simply information. That information is given to us by physical means via a display on a monitor or whatever. Moreover information is only information from a perspective of a conscious mind. For example a book may contain lots of information. But in reality it is just marks on sheets of paper which has no meaning in and of themselves, but which nevertheless conveys something to a conscious mind. Ummm , something like a string of 0's and 1's which conveys some meaning to a conscious mind is not itself the very same thing as consciousness!!

But I'll be writing about this stuff in my "Whether computers can be conscious" section. It certainly has absolutely nothing to do with the part of my website I quoted in this thread.


As for science dealing only in 'cause and effect', that's demonstrably untrue, as well - look at quantum physics, for example, where there appear to be 'uncaused' effects. However, to be fair, it is my honest opinion that most researchers are probably not accepting that there are uncaused effects, rather than that they have not yet discovered the causes...


No No No, you understand nothing. If the concept of causation confuses you so much just read it as my site saying that we only know things through their effects on the world. If some aspect of a thing has no effects whatsoever in the world, then by definition we cannot scientifically know about it.



Of course, the consciousness problem will always be a stumbling block as long as people like Ian insist that there is some immaterial / spiritual aspect to it.



There is not an immaterial aspect to it. What it is, its essence, cannot be captured by science since science deals exclusively with cause and effects (or just effects if you like). Consciousness is not just a happening in the world. It is hope, fear, love, the taste of strawberrys etc etc etc.


No matter what science describes, explains, or understands, the spiritualist will undoubtedly insist that there is some ethereal and subtle thing about 'being conscious' that hasn't yet been encapsulated by science. Much like the whole 'qualia' nonsense. But does the fault lay, then, with science, or with those who choose to remain willfully ignorant?

What qualia nonsense? The fact that we have experiences such as the taste of coffee, the experience of redness etc is an undeniable fact. No communication is possible with people who deny this.

I don't mean to be nasty, but I don't think my website is for you. You just completely misunderstand everything all the time.

[Interesting Ian]

This new forum is doing my nut in. Why do I have to bloody sign in everytime I come here or even preview my post!

[Interesting Ian]

I hope you are not making the assumption that I would suggest (as I believe Ian does) that consciousness is something independent of any physical substrate, and that it is because of this that it cannot be explained by science.

That's certainly emphatically not my position. The hypothesis that it might well be independent of any physical substrate is a possibility that comes about because we are compelled to conclude consciousness is special compared to physical existents.

It cannot be explained by science due to the reasons I gave above. Even if consciousness just slavishly follows physical processes in the brain and are utterly dependent on them, this doesn't alter the fact it cannot be explained by science.

I'm not in particular disagreement with anything you've said in this thread.

[Interesting Ian]

I suggest that 'consciousness' is an intuitive abstraction; a "useful fiction".

Not you're saying the same as zaayrdragon that consciousness doesn't exist. I really do think it's a complete waste of time discussing consciousness with people who do not believe they are conscious.

[The Central Scrutinizer]

You know that it is the aim of scientists to explain their fields completely so there are zero details left unexplained, right?

Ummmm....No.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

In order for a description to exist, it must be physically encoded. It is trivially clear that a complete description of reality could not possibly be physically encoded within reality. So clearly the answer is "no".

Of course, this has absolutely nothing to do with consciousness, nor with whether or not it can be understood scientifically.

Not you're saying the same as zaayrdragon that consciousness doesn't exist. I really do think it's a complete waste of time discussing consciousness with people who do not believe they are conscious.
Well, let's go to the map. You clearly define consciousness to be something supernatural, and then try to discuss it on a board populated primarily by skeptics who do not believe in the supernatural.

If you don't want to waste your time trying to discuss the supernatural with people who do not believe it exists, I suggest you go find some people who do, and discuss it with them. If you insist on trying to discuss such nonsense here, then you have nobody to blame for wasting your time but yourself.


Dr. Stupid

[Taffer]

Not you're saying the same as zaayrdragon that consciousness doesn't exist. I really do think it's a complete waste of time discussing consciousness with people who do not believe they are conscious.

So you are the only one who understands and everyone else doesn't understand. My we think highly of ourself, don't we?

Instead of picking apart your post point by point, let me ask you this:

If consciousness has no bearing on the physical universe, then how can we effect emotions, thought and experiences through the use of (understood) physical processes?

You say a computer program exists, because it is just information. But we are just information, too, Ian. If our brain is just a large computer, with many states of 'on' and 'off' (instead of the binary two), and our consciousness just the program 'run' on this computer, then this would explain all the facts. It would seem to be seperate from the physical, but would not be. How, exactly, are we not information? Which part of our 'consciousness' a) cannot be explained physically and b) cannot be described as information?

Secondly, you only seem to be aware of one type of scientific reasoning: Induction. Do not forget (as some who opposed Darwin did) that this is the only for of scientific reasoning. There is, too, Deductive reasoning.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That's certainly emphatically not my position. The hypothesis that it might well be independent of any physical substrate is a possibility that comes about because we are compelled to conclude consciousness is special compared to physical existents.
Absolutely. It is special because it is the experience of what goes on in our brains, and nothing else is that. I'm not sure why this should lead to your hypothesis, but what the heck. Now, how do we test your hypothesis?

~~ Paul

[Taffer]

Well, let's go to the map. You clearly define consciousness to be something supernatural, and then try to discuss it on a board populated primarily by skeptics who do not believe in the supernatural.


To add to this, I'd like to point out that Ian seems to start with the assumption that consciousness is supernatural in nature, and the tries to argue that it is supernatural in nature, based on this assumption.

I like roundabouts :)

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I suggest that 'consciousness' is an intuitive abstraction; a "useful fiction".
What does this mean, exactly? If it means that eventually we will explain consciousness in terms of lower-level mechanisms, sure. But that doesn't make consciousness a fiction, just a catch-phrase, like "automobile engine."

~~ Paul

Edited to add: Perhaps you meant that a dualistic view of consciousness is a useful fiction.

[Z]

The problem with Ian - other than his hypocritical nature and lack of comprehension - is that he believes he is absolutely right, all of the time. There really is no arguing with him.

Notice, for example, that he brings up emotional states and sensory input as aspects of consciousness, even though we know that emotional states are nothing more than biochemical reactions within the body (purely material states), etc. He denies that computers can ever be conscious - or that is what I infer from his statements - in spite of the fact that brains are nothing more than biological computers.

Consciousness is nothing more than the state of a series of programs running that have certain levels of awareness, such as awareness of self as individual, awareness of other-than-self, memory, and so forth. As such, any system with these capacities may certainly said to 'be conscious'. It is no different from 'life' - there is no physical material 'thing' called life, but there is a state of being called 'alive' which can be discerned from 'not alive'.

As for his 'website', the various snippets he has quoted have been wordy and filled with fallacy after fallacy, not at all geared to the common readership, but not at all up to the quality of the readership it appears to aim for. He makes common mistakes, tries to mask reality with pithy analogies, and utterly fails to convince in any fashion. Consider his preferred analogy - that the 'mind' is like a television program. Utterly flawed in almost every way, yet he clings to this foolish analogy as if it were the bedrock of his reasoning. Consider his clinging to anecdotal evidence of NDEs and OBEs - two states that scientists are learning more about every year, and which have nothing to do with 'leaving the body' - yet he clings to poorly done studies and bad anecdotal evidence rather than face valid scientific study that proves what these phenomena really are.

No, Ian's website is not for those of us who think, and it's not for the common person who neither cares about nor comprehends what he's talking about... it's his personal masturbation site, and frankly not worth bothering with... much like Ian himself, who never listens, never learns, and gets abusive regularly. And when he's threatened with banning if he gets abusive again, he storms off in a huff... just to come slinking back in again, with all his old, tired, useless fallacies in tow.

Well, Ian son, don't worry - we'll be right here to keep you from polluting the minds of new posters and passers-by. After all, with lifegazer gone, what else is there for me to do? :D

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Notice, for example, that he brings up emotional states and sensory input as aspects of consciousness, even though we know that emotional states are nothing more than biochemical reactions within the body (purely material states), etc. He denies that computers can ever be conscious - or that is what I infer from his statements - in spite of the fact that brains are nothing more than biological computers.
I'm not sure it's fair to say that we know these things. There's still room for finding out that consciousness is some sort of magical thing. Unlikely, I think, but not impossible.

~~ Paul

[Iacchus]

No.

Next question?And of this you're certain? How so? ;)

[Z]

Well, it's not fair to say we know anything at all... this could all be the Matrix, after all.

But the best available evidence is that emotions are biophysical processes within the body. Why should that make 'consciousness' difficult to explain?

[Iacchus]

Well, it's not fair to say we know anything at all... this could all be the Matrix, after all.

But the best available evidence is that emotions are biophysical processes within the body. Why should that make 'consciousness' difficult to explain?Perhaps because it takes consciousness to explain it? Thus making the whole thing self-referential and "circular."

[Dymanic]

All behaviour is 'unconscious'.
I take it then that your position is that science has "done a darn good job of explaining conscious behaviour" by demonstrating that no such thing exists.


Perhaps you meant that a dualistic view of consciousness is a useful fiction.
I don't think I've yet encountered a definition of consciousness that does not rest on dualistic assumptions. It is useful to take such a stance; to act as if we (and others) had selves, or souls, or free will.

[jay gw]

What it is, its essence, cannot be captured by science since science deals exclusively with cause and effects (or just effects if you like).

Consciousness doesn't have an essence except in the philosophical sense.

[RandFan]

I don't think I've yet encountered a definition of consciousness that does not rest on dualistic assumptions. It is useful to take such a stance; to act as if we (and others) had selves, or souls, or free will. Agreed as to the first and last. I'm not exactly certain however what the options are. To assume that there is no self and no free will doesn't really suggest much as far as behavior modifaction for one who doesn't believe in god.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't think I've yet encountered a definition of consciousness that does not rest on dualistic assumptions. It is useful to take such a stance; to act as if we (and others) had selves, or souls, or free will.
Then I say let's take back the term from the dualists! It's a collective term for certain mental functions that need explaining.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

I really can't be bothered having to sign in every time! Jesus!

In order for a description to exist, it must be physically encoded. It is trivially clear that a complete description of reality could not possibly be physically encoded within reality. So clearly the answer is "no".

You are talking nonsense. It is clearly not trivially clear. If you think that a T.O.E is so obviously false then maybe you could become famous if you were to be good enough to demonstate this to physicists.


Of course, this has absolutely nothing to do with consciousness, nor with whether or not it can be understood scientifically.

It has absolutely everything to do with it since consciousness is the one existent which clearly cannot be subsumed by physics.




Well, let's go to the map. You clearly define consciousness to be something supernatural, and then try to discuss it on a board populated primarily by skeptics who do not believe in the supernatural.


I clearly do no such thing. On the contrary, I have never provided a definition of consciousness. It is absolutely impossible to do so. Nevertheless we can clearly see that consciousness is not the type of existent which can be encompassed by physics.




If you don't want to waste your time trying to discuss the supernatural with people who do not believe it exists, I suggest you go find some people who do, and discuss it with them. If you insist on trying to discuss such nonsense here, then you have nobody to blame for wasting your time but yourself.

Fair enough.

[Mercutio]

Ian, take a look in the forum help or forum management areas--there is a simple solution to the login problem. I don't remember it offhand, but it might be as simple as clearing out your cache before you log on next time.

[Interesting Ian]

Hi Stimp,

It is clear, albeit it not trivially clear ;), that you are wrong about this :D

I even think that deep inside yourself you know that I'm right. You know deep inside you that I'm right in my conclusion that consciousness is physically inexplicable; even if it is wholly dependent upon the brain.

You know that your consciousness is ontologically distinct from what you perceptually perceive. I know you're not stupid, and I know that deep inside yourself you know this and are worried about it ;)

[Freakshow]

This new forum is doing my nut in. Why do I have to bloody sign in everytime I come here or even preview my post!

Make sure you enable the "Remember me?" check-box when you sign in. It enables the storage of a cookie on your computer that will be used for subsequent visits to the site.

[Interesting Ian]

So you are the only one who understands and everyone else doesn't understand. My we think highly of ourself, don't we?


yes



Instead of picking apart your post point by point, let me ask you this:

If consciousness has no bearing on the physical universe, then how can we effect emotions, thought and experiences through the use of (understood) physical processes?

I think it does effect the physical universe.



You say a computer program exists, because it is just information. But we are just information, too, Ian.


Thanks for informing me.



If our brain is just a large computer, with many states of 'on' and 'off' (instead of the binary two), and our consciousness just the program 'run' on this computer, then this would explain all the facts. It would seem to be seperate from the physical, but would not be. How, exactly, are we not information? Which part of our 'consciousness' a) cannot be explained physically and b) cannot be described as information?

Your misunderstanding is so profound I don't know how to respond to this. Information is, say, something like a sequence of 0's and 1's. But the sequence conveys something that a conscious being can understand. But a string of 0's and 1's, whether in a special sequence to convey information or not, is clearly not conscious.



Secondly, you only seem to be aware of one type of scientific reasoning: Induction. Do not forget (as some who opposed Darwin did) that this is the only for of scientific reasoning. There is, too, Deductive reasoning.
Induction is essential, so is hypothetico-deduction.

[Interesting Ian]

Dymanic
I suggest that 'consciousness' is an intuitive abstraction; a "useful fiction".

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
What does this mean, exactly? If it means that eventually we will explain consciousness in terms of lower-level mechanisms, sure. But that doesn't make consciousness a fiction, just a catch-phrase, like "automobile engine."
.
No he doesn't mean that. He means something very radical indeed.

Tables are useful fictions. But in reality they do not exist. There simply exists certain characteristic visual qualia, and certain characteristic tactile (sense of touch) qualia. But the concept of a table is indispensible. Even though it doesn't really exist. I think Dymanic is saying it's the same for consciousness. Consciousness doesn't really exist just as tables don't really exist.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

In order for a description to exist, it must be physically encoded. It is trivially clear that a complete description of reality could not possibly be physically encoded within reality. So clearly the answer is "no".
You are talking nonsense. It is clearly not trivially clear.
Isn't it? The physical encoding of the complete description is yet another thing which needs to be completely described, and the physical encoding of that complete description will require every bit as much physical complexity to encode as the description it is describing, and so on.

This is actually a very old issue in philosophy. No physical system can contain a complete representation of itself.

If you think that a T.O.E is so obviously false then maybe you could become famous if you were to be good enough to demonstate this to physicists.
This has nothing to do with any T.O.E., because scientific theories are not complete descriptions of the phenomena they describe. Scientific theories are models which can be used to accurately predict future observations, not complete perfect descriptions of every detail.

Of course, this has absolutely nothing to do with consciousness, nor with whether or not it can be understood scientifically.
It has absolutely everything to do with it since consciousness is the one existent which clearly cannot be subsumed by physics.
Ahh, the sweet smell of hypocrisy. First you berate me for stating that something which is not even remotely philosophically controversial, is trivially clear, and then you assert that probably one of the most controversial claims in philosophy, is clear.

Suffice it to say that it is not at all clear to me that consciousness cannot be understood scientifically.

Well, let's go to the map. You clearly define consciousness to be something supernatural, and then try to discuss it on a board populated primarily by skeptics who do not believe in the supernatural.
I clearly do no such thing. On the contrary, I have never provided a definition of consciousness. It is absolutely impossible to do so.
I love how whenever anybody points out that you define consciousness to be supernatural, you claim that you have not defined it at all, and that it can't be defined. What a load of crap. The simple fact of the matter is that if you do not define what you mean by that particular sequence of letters, then you are not saying anything meaningful at all when you talk about it.

Nevertheless, you make it quite clear when you do talk about it, that whatever it is you are talking about, it is supernatural.

I mean, don't you even recognize how ludicrous it is for you to accuse somebody of claiming that X does not exist, when you cannot even state what the symbol X refers to in the first place?!?!

Nevertheless we can clearly see that consciousness is not the type of existent which can be encompassed by physics.
What's this "we" crap? I don't even know what you mean by the word "consciousness", since you claim to be unable to define it. So how could anything at all be clear about it?

You are just talking nonsense. Either define your terms and stick to those definitions, or stop babbling. This crap of making all sorts of claims, and then retreating from any criticism of your arguments by stating that your terms cannot be defined, is pure nonsense.

I even think that deep inside yourself you know that I'm right. You know deep inside you that I'm right in my conclusion that consciousness is physically inexplicable; even if it is wholly dependent upon the brain.
I am sure that it makes things much easier on you to tell yourself this, but it simply isn't true. Deep down, I think that your views on consciousness aren't even wrong. They are so hopelessly incoherent and misguided that it would not even be meaningful to talk about them being "right" or "wrong". They are just pure nonsense.

But if it makes you feel better, go ahead and believe that I believe whatever you want me to.

You know that your consciousness is ontologically distinct from what you perceptually perceive. I know you're not stupid, and I know that deep inside yourself you know this and are worried about it.
Nice amateur psycho-analysis. Now it's my turn. I think that the only reason you come to skeptic sites like this one to spew your nonsense, is because deep down you realize that your beliefs really don't make any sense. But the idea of things not being the way you believe they are, of death really being the end, and that you are nothing more than a biological machine, and that your life has no more intrinsic meaning than that of a potato, scares the living crap out of you. I think you come here spewing your nonsense in the vain hope that if you can convince some of us that you are right, that will somehow solve your crisis of faith, and get rid of that nagging suspicion that maybe, just maybe, you really are nothing more than a biological machine that will eventually just stop working.

Then again, maybe my assessment of you is as completely off-base as your assessment of me is. Who knows? Who cares?


Dr. Stupid

[Freakshow]

But a string of 0's and 1's, whether in a special sequence to convey information or not, is clearly not conscious.


I disagree. I think it is entirely possible that neurons firing off and on (0's and 1's, in a sense), is all that our conciousness is.

[Iacchus]

I disagree. I think it is entirely possible that neurons firing off and on (0's and 1's, in a sense), is all that our conciousness is.And, while it is possible to "capture" music on a recording (both video and sound), are all these impulses that get amplified and played back all there is to the music?

[jay gw]

You know deep inside you that I'm right in my conclusion that consciousness is physically inexplicable; even if it is wholly dependent upon the brain.

Your conclusion is based on what, exactly?

[Taffer]

And, while it is possible to "capture" music on a recording (both video and sound), are all these impulses that get amplified and played back all there is to the music?

Music is based upon mathematical formulae and the interaction between music and the brain, causing chemicals to be released which, in turn, effect emotional states. Nothing more.

yes

Well, enough said really.

I think it does effect the physical universe.

How can it effect, and be affected by, the material universe and yet, magically, not be material?

Your misunderstanding is so profound I don't know how to respond to this. Information is, say, something like a sequence of 0's and 1's. But the sequence conveys something that a conscious being can understand. But a string of 0's and 1's, whether in a special sequence to convey information or not, is clearly not conscious.

It is clearly not consciousness only if we first accept the fact that consciousness is somehow not material. However, let us do the opposite, and assume that consciousness is the result of 'the material'. First, it would seem like us to be magically seperate from the material universe (check), secondly it would be affected by the material universe (check), and thirdly it would simply be no more then a complex computer program (check). Hmm, seems like my explanation saves more phenomenon, and also does a better job of explaning said phenomenon. Which is better?

As for AI, Ian, you seem to think it is impossible. However, this is only the case if you first assume that consciousness is somehow seperate from the physical universe and from the physical body. Nice little axiom there. ;)

[thaiboxerken]

This is simply retarded. Ian is arguing about consciousness on a level where he is simply rejecting any and all definitions of the term. He could be leading people on using this same method by saying that "science has not adequately defined what an electron is".

[Batman Jr.]

Now, I don't subscribe to an expressly supernatural view of what consciousness is like Ian appears to do, but consciousness, when incorporating concepts of inward perception (the experience of the behavior rather than the behavior itself), is not entirely explicable by scientific means and will never be explicable, and that's especially considering the physical nature of the brain and the brain's behaviors. As behavior is entirely accounted for by physical processes in the brain, there is no need to believe that there exists an apparatus which experiences that behavior. Since inward experience, an aspect of consciousness considered essential for something to be defined as "conscious," would therefore always be in violation of Occam's Razor and thus extraneous to any prospective theory of the mind, it could never possibly be incorporated into scientific postulation. Like I said, consciousness can neither be completely understood by science nor by any other methods for that matter.

[Taffer]

Now, I don't subscribe to an expressly supernatural view of what consciousness is like Ian appears to do, but consciousness, when incorporating concepts of inward perception (the experience of the behavior rather than the behavior itself), is not entirely explicable by scientific means and will never be explicable, and that's especially considering the physical nature of the brain and the brain's behaviors. As behavior is entirely accounted for by physical processes in the brain, there is no need to believe that there exists an apparatus which experiences that behavior. Since inward experience, an aspect of consciousness considered essential for something to be defined as "conscious," would therefore always be in violation of Occam's Razor and thus extraneous to any prospective theory of the mind, it could never possibly be incorporated into scientific postulation. Like I said, consciousness can neither be completely understood by science nor by any other methods for that matter.

Nonsense. The 'feeling' that there is something 'experiencing' consciousness is explicable by science. It is the result of various interactions within the brain. If science can understand enough of the brains working to make you have an out of body experience using physical, understood, methods, then science can explain why if feels like there is a 'ghost in the machine', experiencing our consciousness. You're right, the postulation that an entity of some form is 'experiencing consciousness' is a needless complication in the light that this 'feeling' is simply a result of the brain interacting with itself. However, it more suggest that this postulation is false, not science unable to explain it.

[Batman Jr.]

Nonsense. The 'feeling' that there is something 'experiencing' consciousness is explicable by science. It is the result of various interactions within the brain. If science can understand enough of the brains working to make you have an out of body experience using physical, understood, methods, then science can explain why if feels like there is a 'ghost in the machine', experiencing our consciousness. You're right, the postulation that an entity of some form is 'experiencing consciousness' is a needless complication in the light that this 'feeling' is simply a result of the brain interacting with itself. However, it more suggest that this postulation is false, not science unable to explain it.
Please don't be so rude with your use of the word "nonsense." As I said earlier, I've had this same conversation more times then I can remember, and without fail, the opposing party loses.

Your observation of "near death experiences" proves nothing, as a person expressing that they have had one relies entirely on mechanistic processes which cause them to arrange words expressing such a sentiment. There is no requirement that a person actually experience anything. You could program a robot to also describe a near death experience upon receiving certain inputs, and this wouldn't be qualitatively different from near death experiences supposedly induced in humans. Does this demonstrate conclusively that the robot actually had inward perceptions of what it was describing? No, it doesn't. It rather only shows us that its behaviors are mechanistic, not that there is an experiencing of those behaviors occurring. As all of these behavioral experiments can be explained with such mechanistic processes, an experiencing of the behaviors involved would be extraneous. As actual experience and perception is considered essential in something being "conscious," consciousness cannot be understood by science. The concept of consciousness per se would be a violation of Occam's Razor. A tenable theory of it would never be possible.

[Dymanic]

The 'feeling' that there is something 'experiencing' consciousness is explicable by science. It is the result of various interactions within the brain.
I'm not prepared to disagree with that; but then, like your attempted explanation for "music", it really isn't enough of an explanation to deserve much of an effort at refutation anyway. It's like offering, as an explanation for the origin of the universe, the statement: "it has something to do with physics". Identifying specific interactions within the brain as being those responsible for producing the effect would be impressive (it would, in fact, be very impressive), but I can't help but wonder if any of us would ever find such explanations very satisfying, or (perhaps more importantly) very comprehensible. Is that too much to ask of a complete description of reality?

[Taffer]

Please don't be so rude with your use of the word "nonsense." As I said earlier, I've had this same conversation more times then I can remember, and without fail, the opposing party loses.

Is this supposed to impress me?

Your observation of "near death experiences" proves nothing, as a person expressing that they have had one relies entirely on mechanistic processes which cause them to arrange words expressing such a sentiment. There is no requirement that a person actually experience anything. You could program a robot to also describe a near death experience upon receiving certain inputs, and this wouldn't be qualitatively different from near death experiences supposedly induced in humans. Does this demonstrate conclusively that the robot actually had inward perceptions of what it was describing? No, it doesn't. It rather only shows us that its behaviors are mechanistic, not that there is an experiencing of those behaviors occurring. As all of these behavioral experiments can be explained with such mechanistic processes, an experiencing of the behaviors involved would be extraneous. As actual experience and perception is considered essential in something being "conscious," consciousness cannot be understood by science. The concept of consciousness per se would be a violation of Occam's Razor. A tenable theory of it would never be possible.

Or perhaps your example shows that consciousness is nothing more then a fabrication, and all near death experiences are simply mechanic responses? How can you say, in this case, that anyone other then yourself is conscious? It seems an awfully solipsistic point of view.

[Taffer]

I'm not prepared to disagree with that; but then, like your attempted explanation for "music", it really isn't enough of an explanation to deserve much of an effort at refutation anyway. It's like offering, as an explanation for the origin of the universe, the statement: "it has something to do with physics". Identifying specific interactions within the brain as being those responsible for producing the effect would be impressive (it would, in fact, be very impressive), but I can't help but wonder if any of us would ever find such explanations very satisfying, or (perhaps more importantly) very comprehensible. Is that too much to ask of a complete description of reality?

Ad Hominem attacks aside, I fail to see how saying "it has something to do with physics" means that science cannot explain something. I do not know the exact physical processes that go on inside the brain. But, as they are physical processes, I'm sure they will be understood one day. So how, exactly, does this mean science cannot explain consciousness? You are attributing a 'ghost in the machine'. There is no ghost, just as there is no such thing as 'consciousness' in a physical sense. 'Consciousness' is simply the result of physical processes, and as such, is wholly understandable by science.

[Batman Jr.]

Is this supposed to impress me?
No, it's supposed to make you aware of your haughtiness. I don't know if you meant to be haughty. If you didn't, I apologize.
Or perhaps your example shows that consciousness is nothing more then a fabrication, and all near death experiences are simply mechanic responses? How can you say, in this case, that anyone other then yourself is conscious? It seems an awfully solipsistic point of view.
It most certainly could open up the door to solipsism. Reverse solipsism would also be legitimized, because the feelings I have about my own consciousness are generated by the same calculations that generate feelings of consciousness in others that are, as I explained, completely independent as far as can be told of whether or not one is actually experiencing any of their feelings. However, my logic proves these ontological ideas to be true no more than it proves a traditional understanding of the "conscious human mind." Instead, it shows that the fundamental ontological question of consciousness is unanswerable.

[Taffer]

If you didn't, I apologize.

I didn't. That's ok. :)

Let me ask you something B-man-J. It seems to me that there are two options: 1) Consciousness is the result of physical processes or 2) Consciousness is independant of any physical processes. If 1), then obviously consciousness is explainable by science. If 2) then we have a problem (I'd ask for proof, then show you physical reactions to physical processes in the brain which affect consciousness). Which is it?

[jay gw]

Consciousness is just an illusion. The human brain is able to create the illusion of a stable "me". There is no stable you or stable me. Each of us changes from minute to minute. The human brain can store memories for very long periods and uses them to create the illusion of a constant personality. That is a fiction. By the time you finish reading this post you will have undergone real physical changes. You will NOT be you, close but not the same thing.

My awareness of myself is designed to enable me to better control my thoughts and actions. This is more evolved than other animals, who show no ability to control their wills --- they are operating only on instincts. Apparently, animals that can control their will and are aware are more "evolved" than ones that can't.

If consciousness isn't physical based, then why do people change after having brain trauma?

For all those arguing that the consciousness is independent and immaterial of the body, answer the following question:

Explain the reason that the consciousness and personality of a person is not the same after brain trauma, but has undergone occasionally profound changes.

There would be no logical reason why consciousness would change after an accident, at all, if it were immaterial. The fact is ---- it does change.

[Interesting Ian]

I'm not going to go on here any more if I keep having to sign in. I no longer get emails for when someone responds to a thread either. So this new forum format is completely hopeless. And paste isn't available when you right click. The same as that daft philosophy board :mad:


Quote:
Quote:
In order for a description to exist, it must be physically encoded. It is trivially clear that a complete description of reality could not possibly be physically encoded within reality. So clearly the answer is "no".
You are talking nonsense. It is clearly not trivially clear.
Isn't it? The physical encoding of the complete description is yet another thing which needs to be completely described, and the physical encoding of that complete description will require every bit as much physical complexity to encode as the description it is describing, and so on.

This is actually a very old issue in philosophy. No physical system can contain a complete representation of itself.

I have no idea what you are talking about. But you are clearly incorrect. The Universe could have been completely described by Newtonian mechanics. And we could imagine a Universe devoid of all things and processes whatsoever. Obviously such a Universe would be completely describable -- indeed I've just done so.


If you think that a T.O.E is so obviously false then maybe you could become famous if you were to be good enough to demonstate this to physicists.
This has nothing to do with any T.O.E., because scientific theories are not complete descriptions of the phenomena they describe. Scientific theories are models which can be used to accurately predict future observations, not complete perfect descriptions of every detail.

I think the idea here is that eventually scientific theories might give a complete perfect description. Certainly it is not trivially true that they won't, even if manifestly obviously true. I don't think you understand the word "trivial" as employed in philosophy.


Quote:
Of course, this has absolutely nothing to do with consciousness, nor with whether or not it can be understood scientifically.
It has absolutely everything to do with it since consciousness is the one existent which clearly cannot be subsumed by physics.
Ahh, the sweet smell of hypocrisy. First you berate me for stating that something which is not even remotely philosophically controversial, is trivially clear, and then you assert that probably one of the most controversial claims in philosophy, is clear.


I said it is clear. I did not say it is trivially clear.



Suffice it to say that it is not at all clear to me that consciousness cannot be understood scientifically.


See my extract from my forthcoming website quoted earlier.


Quote:
Well, let's go to the map. You clearly define consciousness to be something supernatural, and then try to discuss it on a board populated primarily by skeptics who do not believe in the supernatural.
I clearly do no such thing. On the contrary, I have never provided a definition of consciousness. It is absolutely impossible to do so.
I love how whenever anybody points out that you define consciousness to be supernatural, you claim that you have not defined it at all, and that it can't be defined. What a load of crap. The simple fact of the matter is that if you do not define what you mean by that particular sequence of letters, then you are not saying anything meaningful at all when you talk about it.

That doesn't follow at all. I cannot define redness as experienced, but people clearly -- albeit not trivially clearly -- understand what I mean by redness. Redness cannot be defined, yet we all know what it means. No words, no information, can convey what it is like to experience red. For all I know what I label as being red, you experience as being green, and vice versa.



Nevertheless, you make it quite clear when you do talk about it, that whatever it is you are talking about, it is supernatural.


How have I made that clear? If naturalism is synonymous with physicalism, then it is very clear that consciousness is supernatural. However, people on the Internet Infidels board seem to think that if consciousness is a product of the brain, then by definition it is not supernatural. Therefore it follows that they cannot define naturalism as being synonymous with physicalism. Unfortunately they were unable to provide me with a definition of naturalism. This makes their constant reference to the supernatural as being pretty meaningless.



I mean, don't you even recognize how ludicrous it is for you to accuse somebody of claiming that X does not exist, when you cannot even state what the symbol X refers to in the first place?!?!

I have not stated that I cannot state what consciousness refers to. I said it cannot be defined, meaning that no words can remotely convey its meaning. But I can state what it is. It is everything we have ever experienced, every emotion ever undergone, every thought that has occurred etc. But that is not a definition.


Nevertheless we can clearly see that consciousness is not the type of existent which can be encompassed by physics.
What's this "we" crap? I don't even know what you mean by the word "consciousness", since you claim to be unable to define it. So how could anything at all be clear about it?

Because we can state what can in principle be encompassed by science, and it doesn't include consciousness.



You are just talking nonsense. Either define your terms and stick to those definitions, or stop babbling. This crap of making all sorts of claims, and then retreating from any criticism of your arguments by stating that your terms cannot be defined, is pure nonsense.

You've become a bad-tempered get (get means git). Don't bring your personal life here.



Quote:
I even think that deep inside yourself you know that I'm right. You know deep inside you that I'm right in my conclusion that consciousness is physically inexplicable; even if it is wholly dependent upon the brain.
I am sure that it makes things much easier on you to tell yourself this, but it simply isn't true. Deep down, I think that your views on consciousness aren't even wrong. They are so hopelessly incoherent and misguided that it would not even be meaningful to talk about them being "right" or "wrong". They are just pure nonsense.


What views on consciousness have I expressed?



But if it makes you feel better, go ahead and believe that I believe whatever you want me to.


Don't worry, I will.



Quote:
You know that your consciousness is ontologically distinct from what you perceptually perceive. I know you're not stupid, and I know that deep inside yourself you know this and are worried about it.
Nice amateur psycho-analysis. Now it's my turn. I think that the only reason you come to skeptic sites like this one to spew your nonsense, is because deep down you realize that your beliefs really don't make any sense. But the idea of things not being the way you believe they are, of death really being the end, and that you are nothing more than a biological machine, and that your life has no more intrinsic meaning than that of a potato, scares the living crap out of you. I think you come here spewing your nonsense in the vain hope that if you can convince some of us that you are right, that will somehow solve your crisis of faith, and get rid of that nagging suspicion that maybe, just maybe, you really are nothing more than a biological machine that will eventually just stop working.

The fact that my life may have no more meaning than a potato doesn't scare me in the conventinal usage of the word "scare". We effectively cease to exist evey night during deep sleep. Clearly this is not "scary". It might be highly unsatisfactory of course.

And BTW I scarcely think people would come to this board because they are frightened of dying and want some assurance that they are immortal! ;)

Not that this is at all relevant to this thread since the fact that consciousness is not scientifically explicable scarcely entails that we will survive the deaths of our bodies!


Then again, maybe my assessment of you is as completely off-base as your assessment of me is. Who knows? Who cares?

I don't know, but I'm getting a tad sick of your bad temper. Don't address me if you cannot be civil.

[Interesting Ian]

I disagree. I think it is entirely possible that neurons firing off and on (0's and 1's, in a sense), is all that our conciousness is.
So you don't mean that 0's and 1's cause or elicit consciousness, rather a string of 0's and 1's literally is consciousness? :eek:

(hmm. so much for the multi quote I pressed! What a load of sh*te this new forum format is. And what the hell has happened to my signiture?)

[Interesting Ian]

So you don't mean that 0's and 1's cause or elicit consciousness, rather a string of 0's and 1's literally is consciousness? :eek:

(hmm. so much for the multi quote I pressed! What a load of sh*te this new forum format is. And what the hell has happened to my signiture?)

And my avatar isn't here even though I uploaded it last night. And the quick reply doesn't work.

[Interesting Ian]

Make sure you enable the "Remember me?" check-box when you sign in. It enables the storage of a cookie on your computer that will be used for subsequent visits to the site.
Obviously I did enable that. I know from experience that whenever someone gives advice with problems remotely connected with computers, their advice invariably fails to solve anything.

I just won't bother coming on here anymore.

[Interesting Ian]

How can it effect, and be affected by, the material universe and yet, magically, not be material?

It depends on what you mean by "material" doesn't it? As I said, science only deals with cause and effect. But consciousness is not subsumed under this. The only existent in reality not to be. I've already explained this. If you don't understand my explanation where I go into detail, then there's nothing more I can say to make you understand.

[Interesting Ian]

How can you say, in this case, that anyone other then yourself is conscious? It seems an awfully solipsistic point of view.
Well you can't if the world is physically closed. We have to assume that consciousness affects the physical world. Then we can infer the existence of consciousness from peoples' behaviour. Otherwise we will have no reason to suppose other people are conscious.

[Interesting Ian]

I didn't. That's ok. :)

Let me ask you something B-man-J. It seems to me that there are two options: 1) Consciousness is the result of physical processes or 2) Consciousness is independant of any physical processes. If 1), then obviously consciousness is explainable by science.

No, I've already showed that this isn't true. Well, I'll be writing more about it for my website today.

[Interesting Ian]

Consciousness is just an illusion. The human brain is able to create the illusion of a stable "me".

You need to try and understand the distinction between saying consciousness is an illusion, and the self is an illusion.

Consciousness is self-evidently not an illusion. What is it that is being deceived?

[Interesting Ian]

Consciousness is just an illusion. The human brain is able to create the illusion of a stable "me". There is no stable you or stable me. Each of us changes from minute to minute. The human brain can store memories for very long periods and uses them to create the illusion of a constant personality. That is a fiction. By the time you finish reading this post you will have undergone real physical changes. You will NOT be you, close but not the same thing.

My awareness of myself is designed to enable me to better control my thoughts and actions. This is more evolved than other animals, who show no ability to control their wills --- they are operating only on instincts. Apparently, animals that can control their will and are aware are more "evolved" than ones that can't.

If consciousness isn't physical based, then why do people change after having brain trauma?

For all those arguing that the consciousness is independent and immaterial of the body, answer the following question:

Explain the reason that the consciousness and personality of a person is not the same after brain trauma, but has undergone occasionally profound changes.

There would be no logical reason why consciousness would change after an accident, at all, if it were immaterial. The fact is ---- it does change.

Again you are confused. Consciousness might be a product of the brain, but this doesn't alter the fact that it is non-physical.

[Darat]

Again you are confused. Consciousness might be a product of the brain, but this doesn't alter the fact that it is non-physical.

That just depends on how you define "physical" and "non-physical". For instance when talking about these types of subjects for me "physical" just means something that interacts with other "stuff" (or has the potential to do so).

How do you define "physical" and "non-physical"?

[vbloke]

I have no idea what you are talking about. But you are clearly incorrect.

???

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Consciousness is just an illusion. The human brain is able to create the illusion of a stable "me". There is no stable you or stable me. Each of us changes from minute to minute. The human brain can store memories for very long periods and uses them to create the illusion of a constant personality. That is a fiction. By the time you finish reading this post you will have undergone real physical changes. You will NOT be you, close but not the same thing.
But if the human brain can create an "illusion" of stability, then there is stability. What we don't have is physical sameness from moment to moment.

Explain the reason that the consciousness and personality of a person is not the same after brain trauma, but has undergone occasionally profound changes.
Playing Devil's advocate here: The brain trauma changes the way in which nonphysical mind interacts with the brain, thus presenting the illusion that the mind has changed.

I don't think it's helpful to relegate consciousness to the realm of illusion or folk psychology. The term is useful to refer to a subset of brain function that produce the "feeling of self watching what happens."

~~ Paul

[Z]

So, how many times is Ian going to claim that he's 'going to stop posting here'? If he's going to lie so blatantly about that, how can anyone view his opinions on consciousness as credible, either?

Simple facts: for something to interact with something else, it must be physical/material in some form. Consciousness is, therefore, either an epiphenomenon, or it is physical/material. There are no other options.

What Ian would like to have us believe - it seems - is that there is some class of being which is not physical in any way but still affects the physical world...

Oh, btw, Ian - this is typed using 'Quick Reply'. I get e-mail notification of all the threads I'm observing. My sig works just fine. My avatar upload works just fine. It's you, lad, who lack the basic intellectual capacity to manage this board, not the board that's lacking.

Gentle Reader, observe: here we have Ian, a person who is a demonstrable hypocrite, a liar, willfully ignorant, and unable to understand a simple message forum. Yet he's claiming to have 'absolute knowledge' of what consciousness is and/or whether or not it can be defined, and eventually explained completely, by science! Ian has no credibility, based on this thread alone.

(And it's hilarious that he's demanding OTHERS be civil to him, when he's one incivility away from BANNING himself!)

Well, enough ad-hom attacks... :D

BTW, how is consciousness not included in a chain of cause and effect? Consciousness is CAUSED by the brain - quite obvious - and causes effects in the material world - also quite obvious - so it seems that Ian is, yet again, quite wrong.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I don't think I've yet encountered a definition of consciousness that does not rest on dualistic assumptions.

Oh, but there is! And its a beautiful concept, and a big plus is that you get rid of all the paranormal paraphernalia!

[epepke]

Science won't ever give a complete description of reality. For one thing, there will always be some metaphysical assumptions. For another, the closer it gets, the fewer people will go into science, because it will have become boring.

[Interesting Ian]

That just depends on how you define "physical" and "non-physical". For instance when talking about these types of subjects for me "physical" just means something that interacts with other "stuff" (or has the potential to do so).

How do you define "physical" and "non-physical"?
It's everything materialists/physicalists think exist. And for that definition I'll just quote part of my forthcoming website:

Recent times has witnessed less emphasis on the understanding of the physical as being the fundamental stuff of the world. It was felt that by talking about the fundamental stuff of the world that this suggested more to reality than could strictly be surmised from the basic sciences (by basic I have in mind the sciences of physics, chemistry and biology(footnote)). This is perhaps not an easy point to understand and I shall defer discussion of it until section ? where the mind-body problem is discussed. Suffice to say at this juncture that, at least amongst physicists, there is now a tendency to view the physical as that which can be scientifically described or which plays a fruitful role in our scientific theories describing the world.

So contemporary materialism is the thesis that all that exists is potentially susceptible to a complete scientific explanation.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

As usual, you didnt define the "non-physical"

[Darat]

[COLOR=Purple]It's everything materialists/physicalists think exist. And for that definition I'll just quote part of my forthcoming website:

...snip...

Don't you have your own definition? If not then your argument is not an argument but merely an assertion.

[Interesting Ian]

So, how many times is Ian going to claim that he's 'going to stop posting here'? If he's going to lie so blatantly about that, how can anyone view his opinions on consciousness as credible, either?

Simple facts: for something to interact with something else, it must be physical/material in some form. Consciousness is, therefore, either an epiphenomenon, or it is physical/material. There are no other options.


As I've pointed out numerous times before: if we start calling consciousness physical even though it cannot in principle be accommodated by science, and yet all other existents making up the world can be accommodated by science, then it's going to create a hell of a lot of confusion labelling both types of existent as material.

It's best to describe the material or physical as that which science in principle can explain.

[Interesting Ian]

Don't you have your own definition? If not then your argument is not an argument but merely an assertion.

I can't just produce my own definitions of words. I have to follow standard usage.

PS Did you receive my pm? I sent it off but the text box window didn't disappear -- so I was unsure if it had sent.

[Interesting Ian]

So, how many times is Ian going to claim that he's 'going to stop posting here'? If he's going to lie so blatantly about that, how can anyone view his opinions on consciousness as credible, either?

Simple facts: for something to interact with something else, it must be physical/material in some form. Consciousness is, therefore, either an epiphenomenon, or it is physical/material. There are no other options.



There's another problem with this. You would need to define ghosts as physical since they might make someones heart beat faster, hair stand on end etc. But ghosts (or at least some types of ghosts) are not physically real. That is to say there is nothing physically there; you wouldn't be able to take a photo of them, they don't interact with their environment whatsoever. They only effect you.

Are you sure you wish to call something that is not physically there physical? ;)

[sackett]

Yes! Ian's back! Now we can make war!

I would be a hypocrite if I didn't confess that I missed him, even he does have me on iggy.

[Interesting Ian]

BTW, how is consciousness not included in a chain of cause and effect? Consciousness is CAUSED by the brain - quite obvious - and causes effects in the material world - also quite obvious - so it seems that Ian is, yet again, quite wrong.
Because that would be interactive dualism. Physical events a, b, c etc are defined solely in terms of their causal efficacy. Consciousness is not defined solely in terms of its causal efficacy, there is also "raw" experiences, thoughts, emotions etc. Also this consciousness is only knowable to the subject. Call consciousness C.

So in a chain of cause and effect we might have:

a --> b --> c --> d --> C --> e --> f

But from an objective (3rd person) perspective we will not be able to understand how we get from "d" to "e" because we cannot detect the missing causal link "C" i.e a conscious decision to do something.

It's not the same as postulating a hypothetical entity so that we can understand how we can get from "d" to "e", because such a hypothetical enity must exclusively be defined in terms of its causal role eg to say that an electron has certain properties such as mass, spin, electrical charge etc, simply means that it fulfils a certain causal role in a physical chain of cause and effect.

[Dymanic]

Oh, but there is! And its a beautiful concept, and a big plus is that you get rid of all the paranormal paraphernalia!
Wait, don't tell me what it is, let me guess.

...Uh, ok, I give up. Go ahead and tell me.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I have no idea what you are talking about. But you are clearly incorrect. The Universe could have been completely described by Newtonian mechanics.
No it couldn't. Newtonian mechanics did not even attempt to be a complete description of the universe. It was only a description of how objects in the universe move and interact with each other.

It could have been a completely accurate description of the rules which the universe evolves according to, but that is not a complete description of the universe. That only describes how one state evolves into another. It does not even begin to describe the actual state that the universe is in.

Now, if by "complete description" you just meant a complete description of the natural laws that the universe functions according to, then you should have said so.

And we could imagine a Universe devoid of all things and processes whatsoever. Obviously such a Universe would be completely describable
Clearly no physical representation of that universe could exist within it.

-- indeed I've just done so.
Not within that universe, you haven't. And that was what I said was impossible.

This has nothing to do with any T.O.E., because scientific theories are not complete descriptions of the phenomena they describe. Scientific theories are models which can be used to accurately predict future observations, not complete perfect descriptions of every detail.
I think the idea here is that eventually scientific theories might give a complete perfect description.
A complete description of some specific phenomena, maybe. But not of everything. That is physically impossible.

Certainly it is not trivially true that they won't, even if manifestly obviously true. I don't think you understand the word "trivial" as employed in philosophy.
Maybe the problem is that you just don't understand how information is physically encoded well enough to see how trivial it is?

Anyway, forget about the trivial part. It is definitely true, and easy to prove.

Ahh, the sweet smell of hypocrisy. First you berate me for stating that something which is not even remotely philosophically controversial, is trivially clear, and then you assert that probably one of the most controversial claims in philosophy, is clear.
I said it is clear. I did not say it is trivially clear.
And this somehow makes you less of a hypocrite? Take your semantic acrobatics to somebody who cares.

Suffice it to say that it is not at all clear to me that consciousness cannot be understood scientifically.
See my extract from my forthcoming website quoted earlier.
I did. Sorry, but I don't find assertions backed up by nothing but appeals to ignorance, and intuitive misconceptions, to be very compelling.

I love how whenever anybody points out that you define consciousness to be supernatural, you claim that you have not defined it at all, and that it can't be defined. What a load of crap. The simple fact of the matter is that if you do not define what you mean by that particular sequence of letters, then you are not saying anything meaningful at all when you talk about it.
That doesn't follow at all. I cannot define redness as experienced, but people clearly -- albeit not trivially clearly -- understand what I mean by redness. Redness cannot be defined, yet we all know what it means. No words, no information, can convey what it is like to experience red. For all I know what I label as being red, you experience as being green, and vice versa.
I think that the problem here is that you don't even know what a definition is. I'll give you a hint. It's not a complete description of the thing being defined, which seems to be what you think it is.

Nevertheless, you make it quite clear when you do talk about it, that whatever it is you are talking about, it is supernatural.
How have I made that clear? If naturalism is synonymous with physicalism, then it is very clear that consciousness is supernatural. However, people on the Internet Infidels board seem to think that if consciousness is a product of the brain, then by definition it is not supernatural. Therefore it follows that they cannot define naturalism as being synonymous with physicalism. Unfortunately they were unable to provide me with a definition of naturalism. This makes their constant reference to the supernatural as being pretty meaningless.
Well, supernatural is pretty clear. Anything which does not function according to natural laws.

I mean, don't you even recognize how ludicrous it is for you to accuse somebody of claiming that X does not exist, when you cannot even state what the symbol X refers to in the first place?!?!
I have not stated that I cannot state what consciousness refers to.
Hello? That's exactly what a definition is. A definition specifies what the term being defined refers to!

I said it cannot be defined, meaning that no words can remotely convey its meaning.
Words have meaning, not things. The meaning of a noun (such as consciousness) is simply nothing more and nothing less than a specification of what the noun refers to. You seem to be saying that the thing cannot be defined, whatever that is supposed to mean. I don't even know what it would mean to ask for a definition of a thing.

What we want is your definition of the word "consciousness". When you use that term, what specifically are you using it to refer to?

But I can state what it is. It is everything we have ever experienced, every emotion ever undergone, every thought that has occurred etc. But that is not a definition.
Yes, it is. Like I said before, you clearly don't know what a definition is.

I don't know, but I'm getting a tad sick of your bad temper. Don't address me if you cannot be civil.
This coming from you??? Your hypocricy never ceases to amaze me.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Even in red font my arguments are out there in the cold freezing their nuts off.

[Interesting Ian]

II
I don't know, but I'm getting a tad sick of your bad temper. Don't address me if you cannot be civil.

Stimpson J. Cat
This coming from you??? Your hypocricy never ceases to amaze me.

That's like a 95 year old saying to a 85 year old:

95 year old: Gosh, so it's your 85th birthday! God, you're an old bugger now aren't you?? :eek:

85 year old: Er . .yes . .I suppose so :( . .but yer know, life still goe . . . hang on! You're older than me! You're 95! Hypocrite!

LOL

Sorry I can't be bothered to respond to the rest of your post. If you have any arguments to suppose that reductive science can explain consciousness, then produce them and I will show you where you've gone wrong.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't think it's helpful to relegate consciousness to the realm of illusion or folk psychology. The term is useful to refer to a subset of brain function that produce the "feeling of self watching what happens."
I retract this statement. Mercutio has reformed me. The word consciousness is hopelessly polluted and baggage-ridden. It should be allowed to pass from the popular consciousness.

~~ Paul

[billydkid]

Science

The observation, identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical explanation of phenomena.
Systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation.

Reality

The totality of all things possessing actuality, existence, or essence.
The state or quality of having existence or substance.
The whole of what is actual or real.

____

Will science at some point describe AND explain the entirety of everything that is real? Why or why not? Is there anything beyond scientific explanation?

I'm sorry, I don't understand the question.

[Z]

As I've pointed out numerous times before: if we start calling consciousness physical even though it cannot in principle be accommodated by science, and yet all other existents making up the world can be accommodated by science, then it's going to create a hell of a lot of confusion labelling both types of existent as material.

It's best to describe the material or physical as that which science in principle can explain.

That's putting the cart before the horse...

Since science is always advancing, including its principles, then the wisest state of affairs is to come up with a simple definition for material/physical. Basing it off of whether or not science can, in principle, explain it is highly moronic, at best. 2000 years ago, there were many things that science, in principle, would have no hope of explaining - are you intimating that as science progresses, more things become physical/material???

Plus, you are starting - STARTING - with the assumption that consciousness cannot be accommodated by science. With that sort of base assumption, you cannot possibly progress. Willful ignorance at its worst.


There's another problem with this. You would need to define ghosts as physical since they might make someones heart beat faster, hair stand on end etc. But ghosts (or at least some types of ghosts) are not physically real. That is to say there is nothing physically there; you wouldn't be able to take a photo of them, they don't interact with their environment whatsoever. They only effect you.

The phenomena referred to commonly as 'ghosts' have completely physical origins. If there is nothing physically there - if they do not interact with their environment whatsoever - then they do not exist, whatsoever. Unless, perhaps, you are referring to mental delusions, which are physical processes within the brain causing hallucinations. In which case, no, the ghost still does not exist. Or are you referring to alleged spiritual apparitions which, apparently, emit or reflect photons and, therefore, are interacting with their environment and are, therefore, in some manner physical? Or is there some other class of 'ghost' of which I am unaware?

No, Ian, the simple fact about ghosts - they aren't what you think they are. They're not real or true, either. Or, to be fair, the evidence is that ghosts are not at all what they appear to be, and are most commonly simple hoaxes or miscomprehensions of perfectly normal phenomena.

Pretty piss-poor way of trying to disqualify materialism, btw...

Because that would be interactive dualism. Physical events a, b, c etc are defined solely in terms of their causal efficacy. Consciousness is not defined solely in terms of its causal efficacy, there is also "raw" experiences, thoughts, emotions etc.

Raw experiences? Do you mean direct sensory inputs? Raw thoughts? Do you mean actual brain events themselves? Raw emotions? Do you mean the biochemical reactions occuring within the brain/body as a response to the interaction of certain stimuli with the intuitive and/or programmed responses in the brain?

All purely physical, lad - and, therefore, completely defined in terms of causation.

More spew from Ian...

But from an objective (3rd person) perspective we will not be able to understand how we get from "d" to "e" because we cannot detect the missing causal link "C" i.e a conscious decision to do something.

except that we are exactly learning to do just that. In fact, we can induce that conscious decision, to a small degree, through artificial stimulation.

Keep up to date, Ian - brain science is advancing in leaps and bounds. It's a fascinating world we live in, Ian.

Even in red font my arguments are out there in the cold freezing their nuts off.

Not surprising that it would bother you to learn that your arguments are no more valid in other colors than they are in default colors.

The things that would make your arguments valid would be actually learning about the subjects you'd like to discuss - instead of assuming you are always right.

At any rate, your hypocracy and lies and exaggerations and misrepresentations only serve to further discredit your moronic rants and raves... and it's more like a 95 year old person calling a 30-year-old 'Elderly'.

"H.S." still clearly applies to you, Ian.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Consciousness is not defined solely in terms of its causal efficacy, there is also "raw" experiences, thoughts, emotions etc.
But you agree that these raw experience are causally efficacious, so how are they different from everything else?

~~ Paul

[Dymanic]

Originally Posted by me
I don't think it's helpful to relegate consciousness to the realm of illusion or folk psychology. The term is useful to refer to a subset of brain function that produce the "feeling of self watching what happens."
I retract this statement. Mercutio has reformed me. The word consciousness is hopelessly polluted and baggage-ridden. It should be allowed to pass from the popular consciousness.
There may be a point at which intuitive misconceptions are actually more useful than complete descriptions.

[jay gw]

Why do people's definitions of consciousness differ depending on culture?

Consciousness might be a product of the brain, but this doesn't alter the fact that it is non-physical.

What is the substance that makes consciousness?

But if the human brain can create an "illusion" of stability, then there is stability. What we don't have is physical sameness from moment to moment.

What my post should have said is not that consciousness is an illusion, but people BELIEVE they have stability because the millions of changes in the body from one minute to the next are below their awareness. People want to believe they have stable personalities, if they didn't believe it life would get very (much more) interesting.

[Interesting Ian]

I retract this statement. The word consciousness is hopelessly polluted and baggage-ridden.
~~ Paul

It seems extremely clear to me what it means.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Wait, don't tell me what it is, let me guess.

...Uh, ok, I give up. Go ahead and tell me.

Advaita Vedanta

[Interesting Ian]

But you agree that these raw experience are causally efficacious, so how are they different from everything else?

~~ Paul

Because everything else is wholly constituted by their causal effects. They are nothing but their causal effects.

[Iacchus]

Oh, but there is! And its a beautiful concept, and a big plus is that you get rid of all the paranormal paraphernalia!In other words so you're not stuck with trying to explain it. It won't change the fact of whether it exists or not, however. ;)

[Darat]

It seems extremely clear to me what it means.

Would you like to offer a definition then?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Because everything else is wholly constituted by their causal effects. They are nothing but their causal effects.
So then I challenge you to describe one aspect of consciousness that has no causal effect.

~~ Paul

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Ian oh Ian when you will learn something? I really thought you were understanding a month or so. In any case, its pretty impressive that you cant see beyond your own ideas.

The worst thing is that apparently you have read some philosophy papers. So, if you cant grasp the problems that your point of view faces, I believe your case is without possible help.

Dont waste yourself anymore, or our time.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian http://www.randi.org/forumlive/images/misc/backlink.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=1207105#1207105)

[quote]
As I've pointed out numerous times before: if we start calling consciousness physical even though it cannot in principle be accommodated by science, and yet all other existents making up the world can be accommodated by science, then it's going to create a hell of a lot of confusion labelling both types of existent as material.

It's best to describe the material or physical as that which science in principle can explain.


That's putting the cart before the horse...

Since science is always advancing, including its principles, then the wisest state of affairs is to come up with a simple definition for material/physical. Basing it off of whether or not science can, in principle, explain it is highly moronic, at best. 2000 years ago, there were many things that science, in principle, would have no hope of explaining - are you intimating that as science progresses, more things become physical/material???



Science can only explain and deal with processes in the world. Processes are wholly defined in terms of cause and effect. Science cannot advance to be able to explain things whose reality is not wholly constituted by cause and effect. If there is something other to a thing or process than its causal powers, it by definition, could not make any impact on our 5 senses. Therefore, from an objective perspective, we could never know about it.



Plus, you are starting - STARTING - with the assumption that consciousness cannot be accommodated by science. With that sort of base assumption, you cannot possibly progress. Willful ignorance at its worst.


I've explained why it can't.





There's another problem with this. You would need to define ghosts as physical since they might make someones heart beat faster, hair stand on end etc. But ghosts (or at least some types of ghosts) are not physically real. That is to say there is nothing physically there; you wouldn't be able to take a photo of them, they don't interact with their environment whatsoever. They only effect you.


The phenomena referred to commonly as 'ghosts' have completely physical origins.


Your opinion here is wholly irrelevant.

If if ghosts as I define them exist, then you don't want to call them physical.



Or are you referring to alleged spiritual apparitions which, apparently, emit or reflect photons and, therefore, are interacting with their environment and are, therefore, in some manner physical? Or is there some other class of 'ghost' of which I am unaware?


I am talking about spiritual apparitions, yes. But I do not believe that they emit or reflect photons. I believe we perceive them through ESP. This is why ghosts only effect us and not the environment at all. If I'm correct, then it would surely be ludicrous to describe ghosts as being physical.

[Interesting Ian]

So then I challenge you to describe one aspect of consciousness that has no causal effect.

~~ Paul

No you don't understand. The point is that consciousness amounts to more than causal effects. Consciousness might possess causal powers, but are not exhaustively defined by such causal powers. Consciousness has causal powers as their properties, but consciousness itself is the experiencing of qualia, thoughts, emotions etc.

[Interesting Ian]

Ian oh Ian when you will learn something? I really thought you were understanding a month or so. In any case, its pretty impressive that you cant see beyond your own ideas.

The worst thing is that apparently you have read some philosophy papers. So, if you cant grasp the problems that your point of view faces, I believe your case is without possible help.

Dont waste yourself anymore, or our time.

Care to name any of these problems that my point of view has?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No you don't understand. The point is that consciousness amounts to more than causal effects. Consciousness might possess causal powers, but are not exhaustively defined by such causal powers. Consciousness has causal powers as their properties, but consciousness itself is the experiencing of qualia, thoughts, emotions etc.
So the experience of qualia and such has no causal effect?

~~ Paul

[thaiboxerken]

Science can only explain and deal with processes in the world. Processes are wholly defined in terms of cause and effect. Science cannot advance to be able to explain things whose reality is not wholly constituted by cause and effect. If there is something other to a thing or process than its causal powers, it by definition, could not make any impact on our 5 senses. Therefore, from an objective perspective, we could never know about it.

This is loony-speak for "science doesn't deal with the supernatural". You are correct, however, when one talks about those things for which there is no evidence, and no way of "impacting our 5 senses", then you are simply talking out of your arse. You have entered the world of speculation, where pixies play poker with dogs and Spiderman is a real entity.


I am talking about spiritual apparitions, yes. But I do not believe that they emit or reflect photons. I believe we perceive them through ESP. This is why ghosts only effect us and not the environment at all. If I'm correct, then it would surely be ludicrous to describe ghosts as being physical.

It's ludricrous to describe people as having ESP. You just said such things can't be detected with our 5 senses, so you make up a 6th sense to detect things with. You've said that science doesn't deal with things that don't follow a cause-effect type of relation, thus the 5 senses, yet the concept of ESP has this same relationship but science still can't deal with it?

[jay gw]

There is no such thing as an isolated, solitary, purely individual consciousness. Consciousness may not be an individual creation as much as social construction. The way you think about yourself is based on the society you live in. Humans have never not lived in communities. There is no way for a person to form an isolated consciousness because everyone lives in a world of interacting others. Anyone arguing that it is immaterial is doing so because it can't be located and observed in the individual human being. Of course it can't. Consciousness is not an individual creation, it's a social one. There is no way you can think about yourself without using the definitions given to you by your community. That's just not possible. The reason you are conscious of yourself to begin with is because you interact with others.

Why is the consciousness a person describes dependent on their culture? Isn't the human brain a standard thing -- 99 percent of the brain is exactly like the next person's brain? If it's based entirely on the functions of the human brain, then why does the description of it differ from culture to culture and person to person? The evidence is that consciousness is a creation that can be manipulated.

Here is what Buddhists say the consciousness is:

Store consciousness accumulates all potential energy for the mental and physical manifestation of one's existence, and supplies the substance to all existences. It also receives impressions from all functions of the other consciousnesses and retains them as potential energy for their further manifestations and activities. Since it serves as the basis for the production of the other seven consciousness, it is also known as the base consciousness (mūla-vijñāna) or causal consciousness. Since it serves as the container for all experiential impressions it is also called the seed consciousness or container consciousness.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Store_consciousness (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness-only)

I've never heard of anything like that and it sure isn't the way I think about consciousness.

[DrMatt]

A "Description of Reality" implies language. The use of language involves symbols, which can only be transmitted through matter. The set of possible arrangements of matter is at LEAST 2 to the power of the number of elementary particles in the universe. A "Description of reality" would thus have to specify the relationship of all the particles in the universe, weeding out all the arrangements which aren't real. Thus it would take at LEAST 2 ^ (number of particles in the universe) particles to write or state.

Ergo such a discription cannot exist.

NB that this observation doesn't depend at all upon whether the description comes from science or anythig else, only on the grammatical consequences of attempts to describe the universe. And this is also an extremely generous assessment. In real life we use trillions of particles to assemble descriptions of what's going on with a single particle.

[Interesting Ian]

So the experience of qualia and such has no causal effect?

~~ Paul

{sighs}

Of course it has! Qualia cause things, but it is not in its essence merely a causal process!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Then please describe an aspect of the essence of qualia that has no causal effect.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Then please describe an aspect of the essence of qualia that has no causal effect.

~~ Paul

I'm not saying there are any! They have causal effects, but are not in themselves causal effects. They are not constituted by their causal effects. Their essence are not causal effects. In talking about qualia, simply talking about causal processes or effects leaves something out -- namely the qualia or experiences themselves!

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

If you have any arguments to suppose that reductive science can explain consciousness, then produce them and I will show you where you've gone wrong.
Well, probably the most obvious, and most compelling argument for this is that it is already doing so!

Now before you respond by asserting that science has not provided any explanation for any aspect of consciousness, and that everything science has explained is stuff like "neural correlates" of consciousness, keep in mind that I am using exactly the meaning of the word "consciousness" that you gave above:

It is everything we have ever experienced, every emotion ever undergone, every thought that has occurred etc.
There is absolutely no question that science has already provided us with a great deal of information and understanding of the above phenomena, and that it is continuing to do so all the time.

Now, if you want to amend your "not a definition" of "consciousness" to somehow not include the stuff that science has already illuminated, then you should do so clearly, so that we have some idea about what it actually is you are talking about when you claim that science cannot be used to explain it.

So there you go. Science is already doing a bang-up job of explaining consciousness. I see no reason to think that it should just mysteriously fail to continue doing so at some point, and you certainly have not provided any compelling argument as to why it should. On the contrary, the only arguments you have given so far amount to nothing more than the assertion that it is fundamentally impossible for science to tell us anything about it, which is flatly contradicted by the fact that science has already done exactly that.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Let me put it this way:

x causes y or x --> y

In the physical world:

x == -->

In other words an electron, say, is nothing more than the causel effects it has in the world.

So x --> y is really just --> y where --> = the electon.

But in the case of consciousness:

x --> y (where x is consciousness and y some physical effect in the brain.

But in the case of consciousness it is not just --> y . That only applies to the physical world.

Understand now??

[Z]

Ok, so let me get this straight: because Ian believes in imaginary beings that can only be observed via an also imaginary sixth sense, he thinks they are not in any way physical things?

So I could propose, then, that faeries - having no real effect in all the world - are actually real, non-physical things discernable by my 18th sense, faerie-detection, and I could also expect others to believe me?

Ian, lad, you're wriggling. Badly.

If you want to use 'ghosts' as an example, you'd better produce real evidence that they exist - or that people have a sensory form allowing them to detect non-physical entities, etc. etc. However, since 'evidence' would require these phenomena to have a physical existence or component, you cannot ever do so - meaning that they become utterly irrelevant.

And further, you are now wriggling on the issue of causality. "Oh, sure, qualia are causal in nature, but there's a non-causal component of qualia..." And what, pray tell, might that be?

It's as I've said before - someone could lay down a complete, total, and absolute description of qualia, consciousness, OBEs, whatever - and yet Ian would still insist that there was 'something' not covered in the explanation.... why? Because he starts with the assumption that there is something immaterial to it, that's why.

The proper thing to do, of course, is to start with what is known - or at least, what has been observed - about consciousness. Namely, that we are consciously aware. This awareness suggests neither physical nor non-physical existence of consciousness, but further research is demonstrating that different aspects of that consciousness are wholly physical.

Unfortunately, Ian starts from the assumption that consciousness is akin to a transmission being received and interpreted by the brain to produce the self... and this assumption poisons his ability to learn or understand much of anything.

And, of course, there's the fact that he likes to tell everyone that 'he's proven this or that already' - referring, of coures, to older posts which, in turn, were thoroughly trashed as well. But as he simply dismisses opposition to his ideas, in his own mind, these pathetic attempts at explanation are, to him, 'proofs'.

Another minor point - IF ESP exists... and IF entities exist which can only be detected by ESP - then both ESP and the aforementioned entities would both, in fact, be physical entities of a nature not yet understood by science. However, since neither has compelling and incontroversial evidence to support them, we must set them aside when discussing what is known.

So what will it be now? You used ghosts to support your idea that consciousness could be non-physical but causally efficacious; then you used ESP to support your idea of ghosts; what now? Shall you use OBEs and NDEs to support your idea of ESP? How far down do we have to look at your house of cards to find something solid to support it?

[Z]

Let me put it this way:

x causes y or x --> y

In the physical world:

x == -->

In other words an electron, say, is nothing more than the causel effects it has in the world.

So x --> y is really just --> y where --> = the electon.

But in the case of consciousness:

x --> y (where x is consciousness and y some physical effect in the brain.

But in the case of consciousness it is not just --> y . That only applies to the physical world.

Understand now??

So what is it, then, if not --->y?

and it is more accurate, in fact, to use examples such as X+T-->Y, since no effect has a singular cause, either.

Oh, and you only need to open and close your color tags once for the duration of your post... it's really easy, Ian. Just look at the mess quoted above? (as in, quote your own post, and look at the mess it's in... aside from the obvious nonsense, that is.)

[Z]

I'm not saying there are any! They have causal effects, but are not in themselves causal effects.

They are not, in themselves, causal effects? Are you saying that qualia are caused by nothing at all? They just appear, spontaneously and without regard for any interactions between particles/waves/energies/matter???

How very, very curious.

[Interesting Ian]

If you have any arguments to suppose that reductive science can explain consciousness, then produce them and I will show you where you've gone wrong.

Well, probably the most obvious, and most compelling argument for this is that it is already doing so!

Now before you respond by asserting that science has not provided any explanation for any aspect of consciousness, and that everything science has explained is stuff like "neural correlates" of consciousness, keep in mind that I am using exactly the meaning of the word "consciousness" that you gave above:


Quote:
It is everything we have ever experienced, every emotion ever undergone, every thought that has occurred etc.
There is absolutely no question that science has already provided us with a great deal of information and understanding of the above phenomena, and that it is continuing to do so all the time.


Sorry, but I asked you how reductive science can explain consciousness. Using non-reductive science in which consciousness is a given, and then describing its features via introspective reports, and neural correlates and behaviour, is entirely a different question.

[thaiboxerken]

Fairies ARE real!! You just need to develop your 18th sense to detect them.

Yes, this is simply the argument Ian is using.

[jay gw]

The reason that science has such a difficult time with the idea of consciousness is because, in my humble opinion, it's looking in the wrong place. Consciousness is not an object to be observed and measured, thereby making it "invisible" to science. Science requires that there be a thing with some kind of boundaries around it before it can be studied. Consciousness is a social construction, not a purely individual one.

Science should be talking about the IDEA of consciousness, not a sensible object. If you want to reduce consciousness, it boils down to a string of ideas the person has about him/herself they get from their surroundings. That's why cultures have different definitions for it and people in one place do not think of themselves the same way as those in another place. Social science is able to investigate consciousness but hard sciences will never be able to deal with it.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Sorry, but I asked you how reductive science can explain consciousness. Using non-reductive science in which consciousness is a given, and then describing its features via introspective reports, and neural correlates and behaviour, is entirely a different question.
First of all, this distinction between reductive and non-reductive science is a figment of your imagination. There is just science. Reductionism in science is a purely epistemological tool (explanatory reductionism: Explaining something complicated in terms of other simpler phenomena). Ontological reductionism (which seems to be what you have in mind) has absolutely nothing to do with science. There is no such thing as reductive science in that sense of the term. That said, explanatory reductionism certainly has played a significant role in our current scientific understanding of consciousness.

As for consciousness being used as a given, of course it is. Consciousness (meaning the set of phenomena you stipulated the term to refer to above), are observable features of the world. Like all other observable features of the world, science studies them by looking at their interactions and modelling how they work.

So again, science has clearly provided at least a partial understanding of consciousness, and is continuing to provide more understanding every day. So why exactly should we accept your claim that it cannot do so? Exactly which aspects of consciousness are you claiming cannot be understood scientifically?


Dr. Stupid

[thaiboxerken]

The supernatural aspect, Dr Stupid. Science cannot understand the soul.

[Interesting Ian]

Ok, so let me get this straight: because Ian believes in imaginary beings that can only be observed via an also imaginary sixth sense, he thinks they are not in any way physical things?

So I could propose, then, that faeries - having no real effect in all the world - are actually real, non-physical things discernable by my 18th sense, faerie-detection, and I could also expect others to believe me?

Ian, lad, you're wriggling. Badly.

If you want to use 'ghosts' as an example, you'd better produce real evidence that they exist - or that people have a sensory form allowing them to detect non-physical entities, etc. etc.


No no no no no no no!

Remember you were arguing that anything which has a physical effect by definition must itself be physical.

You were not saying that if and only if materialism/physicalism is a correct depiction of reality, then anything which has a physical effect by definition must itself be physical.

Hell, if you were than I'd agree with you since then my definition, and your defintion of the physical, would simply equate to each other!

You were giving a definition of the physical, and obviously this definition must still pertain even if the non-physical exists. ok?? But then you need to describe ghosts -- if they exist -- as physical, even if they do not affect their environment whatsoever (apart from the perceiver who is made aware of the ghost by a telepathic impression).

BTW I have no idea about what you're talking about with color tags and the like. When I quote my own post I only see red text.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

jay gw,

The reason that science has such a difficult time with the idea of consciousness is because, in my humble opinion, it's looking in the wrong place. Consciousness is not an object to be observed and measured, thereby making it "invisible" to science. Science requires that there be a thing with some kind of boundaries around it before it can be studied. Consciousness is a social construction, not an purely individual one.

The thing is, science doesn't regard consciousness that way at all. Put simply, that is not the place that science is looking.

Science regards consciousness as being essentially a label which people use to refer to a broad set of phenomena, and recognizes that the way people think of these phenomena is often based on intuitive misconceptions and social preconceptions. Maybe this is what you meant by it being a social construction. Anyway, science is studying those phenomena, and doing its best to try not to let these preconceptions misguide it into mistakenly trying to fit these phenomena into some preconceived model.

Anyway, I think you would be very hard pressed to find any scientist who is studying consciousness, who regards it as an object.


Dr. Stupid

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm not saying there are any! They have causal effects, but are not in themselves causal effects. They are not constituted by their causal effects. Their essence are not causal effects. In talking about qualia, simply talking about causal processes or effects leaves something out -- namely the qualia or experiences themselves! Then describe some aspects of the essence of qualia that produce the experiences themselves, but have no causal effects. What part of my experience of redness has no causal effect?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,


First of all, this distinction between reductive and non-reductive science is a figment of your imagination. There is just science. Reductionism in science is a purely epistemological tool (explanatory reductionism: Explaining something complicated in terms of other simpler phenomena). Ontological reductionism (which seems to be what you have in mind)



I do not know what ontological reductionism means. I have never heard of it. There is only reductionism which means understanding some process or thing by looking at the parts which compose it. By reductive science I simply mean that no phenomenon is more than the sum of its parts. We have "sciences" like psychology which deals with consciousness as a given and can investigate it. But I'm not discussing or arguing with that fact. I want to know how the very existence of consciousness can be explained. How do the entitities which physics deal with result in consciousness.





As for consciousness being used as a given, of course it is. Consciousness (meaning the set of phenomena you stipulated the term to refer to above), are observable features of the world. Like all other observable features of the world, science studies them by looking at their interactions and modelling how they work.



If you hold that the world is physically closed, then consciousness is not observable -- either directly or indirectly.



So again, science has clearly provided at least a partial understanding of consciousness, and is continuing to provide more understanding every day. So why exactly should we accept your claim that it cannot do so? Exactly which aspects of consciousness are you claiming cannot be understood scientifically?


Nothing whatsoever about consciousness can be derived from reductive science. We can take its existence as a given and come to conclusions that psychologists come to conclusions about, but that is not at all the question I am asking you. I want to know how the existence of consciousness can be derived. If you say 'well it just exists and cannot be derived from the entities in physics', then that's fine. I agree with you!

[jay gw]

Science regards consciousness as being essentially a label which people use to refer to a broad set of phenomena, and recognizes that the way people think of these phenomena is often based on intuitive misconceptions and social preconceptions.

No, it's not the way people think about the phenomena that's based on social preconceptions. The phenomena itself is a social construction.

Again, you're trying to state that science can identify a thing called consciousness. No it can't. It seems a little weird that in the thousands of years of experiments nobody can come up with one to test the existence or properties of consciousness. That's because science doesn't deal with that kind of phenomena. It's not an immaterial thing, it's a string of ideas that's laid down from birth about who I am and why I'm here and all the big questions. Every day for your entire life you will wake up and interact with others in a physical environment. That will reinforce the initial ideas to the point they are YOU.

That is a social construction not an individual one.

[Interesting Ian]

jay gw,


The thing is, science doesn't regard consciousness that way at all. Put simply, that is not the place that science is looking.

Science regards consciousness as being essentially a label which people use to refer to a broad set of phenomena, and recognizes that the way people think of these phenomena is often based on intuitive misconceptions and social preconceptions.



I'm sorry but science is not a conscious entity. It cannot regard anything. You mean scientists. What they regard consciousness as being is entirely irrelevant to the issue of consciousness since it lies outside the scope of their profession. Scientists only deal with the physical world. They have absolutely no expertise in the realm of the non-physical.




Anyway, I think you would be very hard pressed to find any scientist who is studying consciousness, who regards it as an object.



Perhaps so, but they still regard it as physical, and therefore one would be well advised to treat any of their comments regarding what consciousness is with disdain.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian http://www.randi.org/forumlive/images/misc/backlink.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=1207446#1207446)
I'm not saying there are any! They have causal effects, but are not in themselves causal effects.


They are not, in themselves, causal effects? Are you saying that qualia are caused by nothing at all?



This must be a joke right?? Can none of you understand the most simple English imaginable?? How the hell is it possible for a person with more than one brain cell to think I'm saying that??

[Interesting Ian]

Then describe some aspects of the essence of qualia that produce the experiences themselves, but have no causal effects. What part of my experience of redness has no causal effect?

~~ Paul

I'll just say this one more time>

Your experience of redness has a causal effect, but is not itself a causal effect!

There, if you and zaardragon still can't understand, then I give up. I'm unable to make it anymore simple than I already have. Sorry.

[Z]

No no no no no no no!

Remember you were arguing that anything which has a physical effect by definition must itself be physical.

You were not saying that if and only if materialism/physicalism is a correct depiction of reality, then anything which has a physical effect by definition must itself be physical.

Hell, if you were than I'd agree with you since then my definition, and your defintion of the physical, would simply equate to each other!

You were giving a definition of the physical, and obviously this definition must still pertain even if the non-physical exists. ok?? But then you need to describe ghosts -- if they exist -- as physical, even if they do not affect their environment whatsoever (apart from the perceiver who is made aware of the ghost by a telepathic impression).

BTW I have no idea about what you're talking about with color tags and the like. When I quote my own post I only see red text.

Yes, if something has an effect in/upon the physical world, it is itself in some way physical. You then ask me to describe ghosts as physical "even if they do not affect their environment whatsoever". However, you then invalidate this qualification by adding "apart from the perceiver..." You then try to wriggle even more by using 'telepathic impression' as a non-physical sensory system... yet you cannot prove that telepathic impressions exist any more than ghosts do!

If there is a ghost - and if that ghost affects an observer - then the ghost IS a physical/material phenomenon of some sort. Very, very simple. All your wriggling about is accomplishing is making yourself look very, very foolish indeed.

BTW - here is what I mean by the tag situation (brackets replaced by fancy brackets to prevent parsing): {COLOR=#ff0000}Hell, if you were than I'd agree with you since then my definition, and your defintion of the physical, would simply equate to each other!{/COLOR}

{COLOR=#ff0000}You were giving a definition of the physical, and obviously this definition must still pertain even if the non-physical exists. ok?? But then you need to describe ghosts -- if they exist -- as physical, [I]even if they do not affect their environment whatsoever (apart from the perceiver who is made aware of the ghost by a telepathic impression).{/I}{/COLOR}

In other words, every time you are using color, it's opening the tag at the beginning of a paragraph, closing the tag at the end, then re-opening the same tag next paragraph. Granted, it's a minor point - more of a pet peeve, in my case. But something I thought you might like to be aware of and maybe correct.

It's kind of like spelling - if words are consistantly misspelled (especially now that we have a spell-checker on the forum), then there is a greater likelihood of a poster being taken less seriously by some (anal) people.

But anyway.... for all I know, it's an artifact of using the editor to color your fonts... haven't tried it myself.

[Z]

This must be a joke right?? Can none of you understand the most simple English imaginable?? How the hell is it possible for a person with more than one brain cell to think I'm saying that??

So what are you trying to say, then? If you are saying a qualia is not a causal effect, then you are saying a qualia has no cause... right?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Your experience of redness has a causal effect, but is not itself a causal effect! What does it mean to say that an experience is or is not something? I know what it means for an experience to have certain attributes, but I do not understand what it means for experience not to be an effect.

~~ Paul

Edited to add: Except insofar as Zaay may have understood you.

[Z]

I'll just say this one more time>

Your experience of redness has a causal effect, but is not itself a causal effect!

There, if you and zaardragon still can't understand, then I give up. I'm unable to make it anymore simple than I already have. Sorry.

OK, let's parse this: if you see something which is red (in common parlance): you are saying your experience of seeing red itself can cause things to happen - yet your experience of seeing red is not, itself, caused? This is where I'm running into a problem... as far as I can tell, every experience you ever have has a cause. But it seems as if you are claiming it has no cause - that 'redness' just randomly appears without source, without cause, without reason???

That just doesn't make any sense. And it's not a simplicity issue - I think you really are just that dimwitted, that you don't see what's wrong with what you are saying.

[jay gw]

Consciousness is the scientific term for "soul" and no they're never going to discover it.

What this boils down to is the eternal quest for the fundamental essence of what it means to be a human being.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

OK, let's parse this: if you see something which is red (in common parlance): you are saying your experience of seeing red itself can cause things to happen - yet your experience of seeing red is not, itself, caused? This is where I'm running into a problem... as far as I can tell, every experience you ever have has a cause. But it seems as if you are claiming it has no cause - that 'redness' just randomly appears without source, without cause, without reason???
No, I believe Ian is saying that an experience as some attributes that are causally efficacious, and other attributes that are not. He seems to be using the verb to have for the first lot, and to be for the second. Of course, using to be really rules out the idea that those bits are attributes, so he seems to be saying that there is some part of experience that cannot be described by its attributes. Or something.

We're really trying here, Ian.

~~ Paul

[Z]

Consciousness is the scientific term for "soul" and no they're never going to discover it.

What this boils down to is the eternal quest for the fundamental essence of what it means to be a human being.

What does a 'soul' have to do with the state of being aware of your self as an individual separate from your environment, awareness of your environment, the ability to accept and process sensory input, and memory states? I think if you go in assuming that a 'soul' exists, you're never going to successfully understand the scientific studies of consciousness being undertaken. And you'll never accept scientific studies of consciousness, life, etc. because they'll never carry a satisfying inclusion of 'soul'.

[Interesting Ian]

Yes, if something has an effect in/upon the physical world, it is itself in some way physical. You then ask me to describe ghosts as physical "even if they do not affect their environment whatsoever". However, you then invalidate this qualification by adding "apart from the perceiver..." You then try to wriggle even more by using 'telepathic impression' as a non-physical sensory system... yet you cannot prove that telepathic impressions exist any more than ghosts do!

If there is a ghost - and if that ghost affects an observer - then the ghost IS a physical/material phenomenon of some sort. Very, very simple. All your wriggling about is accomplishing is making yourself look very, very foolish indeed.

BTW - here is what I mean by the tag situation (brackets replaced by fancy brackets to prevent parsing):

In other words, every time you are using color, it's opening the tag at the beginning of a paragraph, closing the tag at the end, then re-opening the same tag next paragraph. Granted, it's a minor point - more of a pet peeve, in my case. But something I thought you might like to be aware of and maybe correct.

It's kind of like spelling - if words are consistantly misspelled (especially now that we have a spell-checker on the forum), then there is a greater likelihood of a poster being taken less seriously by some (anal) people.

But anyway.... for all I know, it's an artifact of using the editor to color your fonts... haven't tried it myself.


Right, that's it, your stupidity knows of no limits. You're going on ignore (as soon as I work out how to do this).

And BTW, I've got it on WYSIWYG (or whatever it's called). I don't use the tags, nor do they appear on here. But don't worry about it annoying you. There is no purpose to responding to any of my posts since I won't be reading any of your responses.

[Z]

No, I believe Ian is saying that an experience as some attributes that are causally efficacious, and other attributes that are not. He seems to be using the verb to have for the first lot, and to be for the second. Of course, using to be really rules out the idea that those bits are attributes, so he seems to be saying that there is some part of experience that cannot be described by its attributes. Or something.

We're really trying here, Ian.

~~ Paul

OK. Let's get down to brass tacks: what is a causal effect? Until now, I've come to believe that a causal effect is any event which has a cause. A cause, of course, meaning the interaction of two or more states / particles / waves / whatever which causes an effect to occur. For Ian to then state that "they have causal effects, but are not in themselves causal effects" would mean, to me, that 'they' [qualia] can cause effects to occur [with interaction with some other 'thing'], but are not themselves caused by anything."

Otherwise, I need a new definition for 'causal effect', please.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I do not know what ontological reductionism means. I have never heard of it. There is only reductionism which means understanding some process or thing by looking at the parts which compose it. By reductive science I simply mean that no phenomenon is more than the sum of its parts. We have "sciences" like psychology which deals with consciousness as a given and can investigate it. But I'm not discussing or arguing with that fact. I want to know how the very existence of consciousness can be explained. How do the entitities which physics deal with result in consciousness.
OK. That is explanatory reductionism. And as I already said, it has played a significant role in our current scientific understanding of consciousness.

If you want to know how it has, I suggest you try reading up a little bit on subjects like psychology and neuroscience. For example, your belief that reductionism does not play any role in psychology is just plain wrong.

Unfortunately, every time this has ever been suggested to you before, you have simply dismissed the idea by saying that you have no interest in science and that it can't tell us anything about consciousness anyway...

As for consciousness being used as a given, of course it is. Consciousness (meaning the set of phenomena you stipulated the term to refer to above), are observable features of the world. Like all other observable features of the world, science studies them by looking at their interactions and modelling how they work.
If you hold that the world is physically closed, then consciousness is not observable -- either directly or indirectly.
Consciousness is observable, so your above "if" is nonsensical. What you should have said is "consciousness is not physical, so the world is not physically closed". And since you earlier defined "physical" to mean "anything which can be understood scientifically", this simply brings us back to the question I already asked: Which aspects of consciousness are you claiming cannot be understood scientifically?

So again, science has clearly provided at least a partial understanding of consciousness, and is continuing to provide more understanding every day. So why exactly should we accept your claim that it cannot do so? Exactly which aspects of consciousness are you claiming cannot be understood scientifically?
Nothing whatsoever about consciousness can be derived from reductive science.
This is simply false. Again, you are simply showing your complete ignorance of what science (including reductive science) has told us about consciousness.

We can take its existence as a given and come to conclusions that psychologists come to conclusions about, but that is not at all the question I am asking you.
Then what the hell are you asking? That is what science does. It looks at phenomena which exists, and explains how they work.

I want to know how the existence of consciousness can be derived.
Derived from what? The existence of rocks cannot be derived from physics, so why should the existence of consciousness be derivable from physics? In both cases, we observe that they exist, and then describe them in terms of natural laws.

If you say 'well it just exists and cannot be derived from the entities in physics', then that's fine. I agree with you!
I am not sure what you are talking about here. Nothing is derived from the entities in physics. That is not how science works.

I think that what you are trying to say is that the various phenomena which you have attached the label "consciousness" to cannot be completely described in terms of the laws of physics as we currently understand them. This may even be the case, but you certainly have not demonstrated that it is. In any event, we do know that at least some aspects of consciousness can be, so your argument is still wrong. In that respect, science has "derived" some aspects of consciousness from so-called "physical entities". If you ever bothered to learn anything about psychology and neuroscience, you would know that.

Again, you appear to be operating under the misconception that none of our scientific understanding of consciousness is reductive in nature. This is simply not the case. You are arguing about something you know absolutely nothing about. The only reason you even believe that none of it is reductive, is because you have already reached the conclusion (based on your own beliefs) that it can't possibly be.

Science regards consciousness as being essentially a label which people use to refer to a broad set of phenomena, and recognizes that the way people think of these phenomena is often based on intuitive misconceptions and social preconceptions.
I'm sorry but science is not a conscious entity. It cannot regard anything. You mean scientists.
What I meant was the current scientific community working on the subject, which was quite clear from the context of my statement.
What they regard consciousness as being is entirely irrelevant to the issue of consciousness since it lies outside the scope of their profession. Scientists only deal with the physical world. They have absolutely no expertise in the realm of the non-physical.
Nonsense. We have already established that at least some aspects of consciousness are physical, since they have physical effects and can be understood scientifically. You are bouncing back to your claim that no aspect of consciousness can be understood scientifically, which is demonstrably false.

Anyway, I think you would be very hard pressed to find any scientist who is studying consciousness, who regards it as an object.
Perhaps so, but they still regard it as physical, and therefore one would be well advised to treat any of their comments regarding what consciousness is with disdain.
Only if you are completely ignorant of the subject. Otherwise you would realize that there is absolutely no question as to whether or not the set of phenomena which you are referring to when you say "consciousness", are at least partially physical.


Dr. Stupid

[Z]

Right, that's it, your stupidity knows of no limits. You're going on ignore (as soon as I work out how to do this).

And BTW, I've got it on WYSIWYG (or whatever it's called). I don't use the tags, nor do they appear on here. But don't worry about it annoying you. There is no purpose to responding to any of my posts since I won't be reading any of your responses.

So instead of responding to my post, and attempting to explain the difference he possesses in viewpoint, like a rational and mature adult, he throws an insult, and decides he's going to stick his fingers in his ears and yell, "LALALAICANTHEARYOULALALA".

Haven't used the WYSIWYG editor. Curious.

I thought what I said was fairly clear - if ghosts exist, and someone is interacting with them, then they are necessarily material/physical, though perhaps not yet understood by science. How is that difficult for Ian to comprehend?

[Interesting Ian]

What does it mean to say that an experience is or is not something? I know what it means for an experience to have certain attributes, but I do not understand what it means for experience not to be an effect.

~~ Paul

Edited to add: Except insofar as Zaay may have understood you.

Experiences have effects. Clearly they are not identical to effects otherwise you are saying we are p-zombies.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Otherwise, I need a new definition for 'causal effect', please.
When I say that an event has a causal effect, or is causally efficacious, I mean that it causes some future event. I'm not talking about whether it was caused.

~~ Paul

[Stimpson J. Cat]

jay gw,

Science regards consciousness as being essentially a label which people use to refer to a broad set of phenomena, and recognizes that the way people think of these phenomena is often based on intuitive misconceptions and social preconceptions.
No, it's not the way people think about the phenomena that's based on social preconceptions. The phenomena itself is a social construction.
Exactly which phenomena are you talking about? It is quite clear that you are using the word "consciousness" to refer to something different than what scientists who claim to be studying it are. Maybe that is the problem? Maybe you are using the word to refer to something that isn't being studied scientifically at all?

Again, you're trying to state that science can identify a thing called consciousness. No it can't. It seems a little weird that in the thousands of years of experiments nobody can come up with one to test the existence or properties of consciousness.
Please define what you mean by the word "consciousness", because using the meaning I am familiar with, the above is quite clearly not true.

That's because science doesn't deal with that kind of phenomena. It's not an immaterial thing, it's a string of ideas that's laid down from birth about who I am and why I'm here and all the big questions. Every day for your entire life you will wake up and interact with others in a physical environment. That will reinforce the initial ideas to the point they are YOU.
I don't have the slightest idea what you are talking about. Please define your terms. I have the feeling that you are talking about something completely different from what everybody else here is talking about.

Consciousness is the scientific term for "soul" and no they're never going to discover it.

What this boils down to is the eternal quest for the fundamental essence of what it means to be a human being.
There is no scientific term for "soul", and that is not what we are talking about here. We are talking about things like thinking, remembering, feelings, emotions, and so forth. You seem to be talking about some sort of spiritual dualism.


Dr. Stupid

[jay gw]

What does a 'soul' have to do with the state of being aware of your self as an individual separate from your environment, awareness of your environment, the ability to accept and process sensory input, and memory states?
That's not the definition of consciousness that some people here and in philosophy are using.

The definition you're using is basically a generic property that is common and universal to all mankind. Ie...... it's a scholarly term for the soul. There is no such thing and that's why it won't be discovered using scientific methods.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Experiences have effects. Clearly they are not identical to effects otherwise you are saying we are p-zombies.
What does it mean to say that X is not identical to effects, other than to say that the name of a thing is not the thing?

Ignoring that question for a moment, give an example of something that experiences have/are that is not an effect of experience?

~~ Paul

[Z]

Experiences have effects. Clearly they are not identical to effects otherwise you are saying we are p-zombies.

How is an experience not identical to an effect? Does this, or does this not, make the claim that experiences are uncaused?

And the concept of p-zombie, as I believe we discussed before, is wholly non-sensical in any form. It is impossible to act as if you were conscious without being conscious - yet consciousness is simply part of a causal chain of effects -

Ah, there's the trap you're setting - by pre-defining consciousness as being 'out of the causal chain', you set the stage for anyone who claims that consciousness is part of the effect chain to be saying that we are all 'p-zombies'. Circular, mate.

[Z]

That's not the definition of consciousness that some people here and in philosophy are using.

The definition you're using is basically a generic property that is common and universal to all mankind. Ie...... it's a scholarly term for the soul. There is no such thing and that's why it won't be discovered using scientific methods.

Yes, consciousness is a generic property that is common and universal to all mankind. Or does your racist mode of thinking demand otherwise?

And are you now saying consciousness does not exist, or souls?

[Z]

When I say that an event has a causal effect, or is causally efficacious, I mean that it causes some future event. I'm not talking about whether it was caused.

~~ Paul

I agree, when you say it has a causal effect. Whether it was caused would be if it is a causal effect.

[jay gw]

Yes, consciousness is a generic property that is common and universal to all mankind.
No it's not, and you can't show it now and will never be able to show that it is.

Dictionary.com
the definition of soul:

The animating and vital principle in humans, credited with the faculties of thought, action, and emotion and often conceived as an immaterial entity.
The central or integral part; the vital core.

You're talking about a fancy term for the soul. Souls do not exist and neither does consciousness in the way you are defining it.

[Z]

Just a note for Jay: I don't think 'consciousness' is a social construct, for the simple reason that one is still conscious even if one is absolutely alone. Hermits, people stranded on islands, etc.

Perhaps Jay is thinking something like conscience? The moral judgement of right and wrong, the feeling of guilt and moral superiority??

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,



II
I do not know what ontological reductionism means. I have never heard of it. There is only reductionism which means understanding some process or thing by looking at the parts which compose it. By reductive science I simply mean that no phenomenon is more than the sum of its parts. We have "sciences" like psychology which deals with consciousness as a given and can investigate it. But I'm not discussing or arguing with that fact. I want to know how the very existence of consciousness can be explained. How do the entitities which physics deal with result in consciousness.
OK. That is explanatory reductionism. And as I already said, it has played a significant role in our current scientific understanding of consciousness.

Look, can we dispense with the inane manifestly false statements?? How can reductionism explain consciousness for Christ's sake?? How many times must I ask you??

[quote]

If you want to know how it has, I suggest you try reading up a little bit on subjects like psychology and neuroscience. For example, your belief that reductionism does not play any role in psychology is just plain wrong.


I have less than zero interest in psychology or whether it uses reductionism. I'm saying that psychology takes the existence of consciousness as a given and proceeds from there. I've already told you this about 4 times. I also have zero interest in science or neuroscience since it cannot in principle explain the existence of consciousness.



Unfortunately, every time this has ever been suggested to you before, you have simply dismissed the idea by saying that you have no interest in science and that it can't tell us anything about consciousness anyway...

Absolutely; it can't. But you are too stupid to understand this.


[quote]
As for consciousness being used as a given, of course it is. Consciousness (meaning the set of phenomena you stipulated the term to refer to above), are observable features of the world. Like all other observable features of the world, science studies them by looking at their interactions and modelling how they work.
If you hold that the world is physically closed, then consciousness is not observable -- either directly or indirectly.
Consciousness is observable, so your above "if" is nonsensical. What you should have said is "consciousness is not physical, so the world is not physically closed".


That's it. I've had enough of the mindnumbing stupidity exhibited by people on this board. I can't be bothered to put you all on ignore. The world can be physically closed and yet consciousness still wouldn't be physical. No conceivable discovery can ever make consciousness physical.

Don't bother responding, I'm gone. I've had more than enough of the mindnumbingly stupid people on here.

[Z]

No it's not, and you can't show it now and will never be able to show that it is.

You're claiming that there are groups of people who are not conscious???

:dl:

OhmiBob, you're pressing the boundaries of 'h-s'ity to Superianal levels!

Show me any group of people anywhere that are not conscious - excluding people currently asleep, in comas, or brain dead, of course.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I agree, when you say it has a causal effect. Whether it was caused would be if it is a causal effect.
Exactamundo, which is why I added "Except insofar as Zaay may have understood you." up above. But I know that's not what Ian means. He's got some causually inefficacious isness thing going on.

~~ Paul

[Z]

Don't bother responding, I'm gone. I've had more than enough of the mindnumbingly stupid people on here.

Gee, we've heard that one before.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Dang, I thought we might finally get somewhere in this thread.

Ian, dude, stop quiting. It's getting tedious. If you're going to quit, don't start in the first place.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Just a note for Jay: I don't think 'consciousness' is a social construct, for the simple reason that one is still conscious even if one is absolutely alone. Hermits, people stranded on islands, etc.

Perhaps Jay is thinking something like conscience? The moral judgement of right and wrong, the feeling of guilt and moral superiority??
Just one thing before I go. Many people hold that consciousness is a social construct. And you need to bear in mind that hermits etc were brought up in a social environment. I think they would say that if you lived your entire life alone, then you would not be conscious.

Er . .now the less I say about that this, the better. It's even more crazy than what most of you guys believe!

[Z]

Just one thing before I go. Many people hold that consciousness is a social construct. And you need to bear in mind that hermits etc were brought up in a social environment. I think they would say that if you lived your entire life alone, then you would not be conscious.

Er . .now the less I say about that this, the better. It's even more crazy than what most of you guys believe!

I'll agree with that, at least... (that this idea is crazy)

Of course, how on earth would you live your whole life alone?

Oh, so are you gone now, Ian, or are you here, or are you going to lurk another couple of months?

[jay gw]

Just a note for Jay: I don't think 'consciousness' is a social construct, for the simple reason that one is still conscious even if one is absolutely alone. Hermits, people stranded on islands, etc.
There are no humans that are born and live absolutely alone. That's a literary creation. Humans always live in communities and the identify you have was created by interacting with surroundings.

That's partly why you're different from me. Consciousness is created through interactions, there is no such thing as an isolated, individual consciousness.

You're claiming that there are groups of people who are not conscious???
So your definition of consciousness is "to be conscious". You changed it from the earlier posts. Why didn't you just say that? Being conscious is purely a physical phenomena, but that's not how you defined consciousness.

What I said was there are groups of people, like yours, who's consciousness is a completely different kind than my groups of people. That's what cultures are. Consciousness is a social construction and "being conscious" is a physical construction.

Saying this: I am conscious.
is a physical construction
Saying this: I am conscious of myself AS A _________
is a social construction

One is the mechanical and the other is the informational. I don't define consciousness as purely something mechanical. There is a second part to it that makes me....me. There is no such thing as a human being or any living thing that is conscious of nothing at all.

That's why even though the brains of people are 99 percent the same, they are in practice vastly different. Consciousness can't be defined by simply pointing to mechanics. There is informational content too. One is hardware and the other is software.

By the way, the mechanics of brains differ enough to change the consciousness from one person to the other by a great deal. So even studying the mechanics will not necessarily lead to an accurate idea of what it is. Is the consciousness of a person with a 200 IQ the same as the consciousness of the one who is retarded?

If I were to put a definition of consciousness together, I would say, very very generally that it is: "The interactions of the bio-chemical with information." It's an action and process rather than a thing. People mistakenly believe that something results from the interactions but it doesn't. There is no new object or entity at all.

That's why robots will someday be conscious. If you provide the mechanics and the informational software, then a machine will be as conscious as you or I. It doesn't require capturing the fundamental human essence in a magical jar and giving it to the robot. Silly! Remember the tin man robot in the Wizard of Oz? He was convinced that all he needed to become human was a heart and so he set out on his journey. But he learned at the end that he already had what he needed to be as human as a human. All the characters were looking for some kind of fundamental essence but found out that there's no such thing.

[Batman Jr.]

I didn't. That's ok. :)

Let me ask you something B-man-J. It seems to me that there are two options: 1) Consciousness is the result of physical processes or 2) Consciousness is independant of any physical processes. If 1), then obviously consciousness is explainable by science. If 2) then we have a problem (I'd ask for proof, then show you physical reactions to physical processes in the brain which affect consciousness). Which is it?
As I said, this question is unanswerable. Using Occam's Razor, I must always exclude the inwardly experiential from any scientific theory of the mind. Since I cannot show that this aspect of consciousness exists in the first place, I certainly wouldn't be able to show it to be affected by anything. If you can't prove a variable to exist, how can you still prove that it changes according to environmental conditions? You can't, and that's why causation between the brain and experience—perhaps the most crucial component required for something to be viewed as "conscious"—is not a scientifically demonstrable thing.

[Freakshow]

As I said, this question is unanswerable. Using Occam's Razor, I must always exclude the inwardly experiential from any scientific theory of the mind. Since I cannot show that this aspect of consciousness exists in the first place, I certainly wouldn't be able to show it to be affected by anything. If you can't prove a variable to exist, how can you still prove that it changes according to environmental conditions? You can't, and that's why causation between the brain and experience—perhaps the most crucial component required for something to be viewed as "conscious"—is not a scientifically demonstrable thing.

Are you saying that your own perceptions of your own conciousness is not in any way useful in a scientific study? Because if so, countless studies are now invalid. Such as studies that are conducted on psychotropic medications used to treat mental illness. And studies on the effects of recreational drug use. Are you saying that all of that research should just be thrown out?

[Z]

There are no humans that are born and live absolutely alone. That's a literary creation. Humans always live in communities and the identify you have was created by interacting with surroundings.

That's partly why you're different from me. Consciousness is created through interactions, there is no such thing as an isolated, individual consciousness.


So your definition of consciousness is "to be conscious". You changed it from the earlier posts. Why didn't you just say that? Being conscious is purely a physical phenomena, but that's not how you defined consciousness.

What I said was there are groups of people, like yours, that are conscious in a completely different way than my groups of people. That's what cultures are. Consciousness is a social construction and "being conscious" is a physical construction.

You lost me here.

I defined consciousness as "the state of being aware of your self as an individual separate from your environment, awareness of your environment, the ability to accept and process sensory input, and memory states"

I excluded people asleep, in comas, and brain-dead above for the simple fact that there are those who believe that, in these states, we have no individual awareness of self, certainly little or no awareness of environments, ability to process sensory inputs - and it has been recently proven that during sleep at least not all memory states are accessible at all times.

So I'm more than a little confused by your response. You are continuing to assert that consciousness is a 'social construction'. While I won't at all deny that social and cultural factors figure into the quality of consciousness - primarily where memory states are involved - consciousness is not wholly dependent upon social factors. Society does not influence your awareness of self - though it may color exactly what it is you see yourself as. Society does not influence your awareness of your self as individual and separate from the whole - though it may enhance your sense of community or place within society. Society certainly doesn't influence your raw sensory inputs.

Even as such, society's influence on your memory and behavior is also a causal physical state. So again, I ask you to show me any group of people anywhere who do not have consciousness.

[Z]

Jay you turd, quit editing your posts while I'm replying to them!

:D

OK, when we are referring to consciousness, we are not saying 'conscious of self as a ______' but simply 'conscious'.

Therefore, consciousness is a purely physical state.

Consciousness: noun
Conscious: adjective

in this sense (scientific/philosophical), referring to the same thing. The first, a state of being, the second, existing in this state of being.

What Ian suggested was that consciousness cannot be explained by science. He didn't say 'social consciousness' or 'the differences between consciousnesses' but simply 'consciousness'.

And the state of being conscious is, itself, universal among humans. The quality of said consciousness is different for each and every human, but not the state of consciousness itself.

[Batman Jr.]

Are you saying that your own perceptions of your own conciousness is not in any way useful in a scientific study? Because if so, countless studies are now invalid. Such as studies that are conducted on psychotropic medications used to treat mental illness. And studies on the effects of recreational drug use. Are you saying that all of that research should just be thrown out?
My own convictions about my consciousness are based on the reasoning of mechanistic processes in the brain which do not require inward perception to exist. Therefore, my belief that I feel conscious does not prove that I in fact am, and my understanding of my consciousness would be completely irrelevant to scientific inquiry, because there is no way to tell if it is right or wrong.

Studies on psychotropic medication are not studies of consciousness. They are studies of the behavior of the brain. I do not deny that the brain is mechanistic and is affected in consistent ways by the outside world. My assertion that a complete theory of the mind which explains consciousness in its entirety would be unscientific predicates itself on the mechanistic nature of the brain.

[Z]

My own convictions about my consciousness are based on the reasoning of mechanistic processes in the brain which do not require inward perception to exist. Therefore, my belief that I feel conscious does not prove that I in fact am, and my understanding of my consciousness would be completely irrelevant to scientific inquiry, because there is no way to tell if it is right or wrong.

Studies on psychotropic medication are not studies of consciousness. They are studies of the behavior of the brain. I do not deny that the brain is mechanistic and is affected in consistent ways by the outside world. My assertion that a complete theory of the mind which explains consciousness in its entirety would be unscientific predicates itself on the mechanistic nature of the brain.

But don't you see? There is no difference from the belief that you are conscious to being conscious. There is no difference because you could not have such belief if you were not, in fact, conscious. This is why a definition of consciousness is vital.

If we define consciousness in some manner similar to my definition used above - "the state of being aware of your self as an individual separate from your environment, awareness of your environment, the ability to accept and process sensory input, and memory states" - then only by meeting these requirements could you believe yourself to be conscious. Without awareness of self, you could not believe 'yourself' to be anything. Without awareness of your environment, IMO (and I admit, this is purely my opinion), no consciousness could possibly develop. Sensory input at some stage would, I believe, be required to form consciousness. And without memory states, you'd never get to the point of being able to state or believe anything at all, would you?

So only by being conscious could you believe that you were conscious. How hard is that to understand? Otherwise, you are inherently defining 'conscious' as a state with an immaterial character which may or may not be real for any being believing itself to be conscious. By using an inherently dualist concept like this, you greatly restrict your ability to understand consciousness as a physical artifact.

[Iacchus]

As I said, this question is unanswerable. Using Occam's Razor, I must always exclude the inwardly experiential from any scientific theory of the mind. Really? Then "who" or, "what" is it that refers to anything at all? Can Science even exist, without a firsthand or, "inward experience" of it? Who is it that's conducting the tests then? Pure automatons? So, can you explain to all the folks here what is meant by "Achilles' heel?" ;)

[Z]

There is a thought which occured to me recently, though, to make me wonder a bit about the nature of consciousness:

I was driving my son to school, and noticing the behavior of other people, and I began to wonder if there were such a thing as active versus passive consciousness - that is, if people's brains switch over to automatic for long stretches of time without their cognizant awareness of what they are doing. I know, for example, that common tasks are relegated to part of the brain designed, essentially, for automation - like driving a car, riding a bike, etc. Is it possible that this sub-conscious part of the brain can take over the entire being from time to time, causing us to more or less be zombies of sorts?

Just something I mused over for a few days... I'm sure it's not a new thought at all. I ought to research it.

[Batman Jr.]

If we define consciousness in some manner similar to my definition used above - "the state of being aware of your self as an individual separate from your environment, awareness of your environment, the ability to accept and process sensory input, and memory states" - then only by meeting these requirements could you believe yourself to be conscious. Without awareness of self, you could not believe 'yourself' to be anything. Without awareness of your environment, IMO (and I admit, this is purely my opinion), no consciousness could possibly develop. Sensory input at some stage would, I believe, be required to form consciousness. And without memory states, you'd never get to the point of being able to state or believe anything at all, would you?
The traditional definition of consciousness requires the existence of experience. Even if an entity expresses that it knows itself to exist, if there is no experiencing of that knowledge, then that entity could not be considered conscious. An automaton could be programmed to act as if it understood itself to exist and do all of the other things beings typically regarded as "conscious" can do, but if there is no inward perception of these behaviors, it is unconscious. The problem is that you're changing the definition of consciousness altogether, that consciousness simply exists wherever consciousness by its classical definition appears to exist. If you want to talk about the appearance of consciousness, then fine, but don't call it "consciousness."

[Freakshow]

My own convictions about my consciousness are based on the reasoning of mechanistic processes in the brain which do not require inward perception to exist. Therefore, my belief that I feel conscious does not prove that I in fact am, and my understanding of my consciousness would be completely irrelevant to scientific inquiry, because there is no way to tell if it is right or wrong.

Studies on psychotropic medication are not studies of consciousness. They are studies of the behavior of the brain. I do not deny that the brain is mechanistic and is affected in consistent ways by the outside world. My assertion that a complete theory of the mind which explains consciousness in its entirety would be unscientific predicates itself on the mechanistic nature of the brain.

So psychotropic drugs (both recreational and therapeutic), do not temporarily alter consciousness? If not, how else would you describe their effects?

[Batman Jr.]

So psychotropic drugs (both recreational and therapeutic), do not temporarily alter consciousness? If not, how else would you describe their effects?
They affect the biochemistry of the brain.

[Freakshow]

They affect the biochemistry of the brain.
Which results in an altering of consciousness. Do you agree?

[Iacchus]

Which results in an altering of consciousness. Do you agree?And what's the difference between that and changing channels on the TV?

[Batman Jr.]

Which results in an altering of consciousness. Do you agree?
No, because it can't be scientifically proven that a consciousness exists to be altered.

[Freakshow]

No, because it can't be scientifically proven that a consciousness exists to be altered.
Now we are back at square one. Are a person's perceptions and descriptions of what they think/feel/sense a description of their conciousness?

[Batman Jr.]

Now we are back at square one. Is a person's perceptions and descriptions of what they think/feel/sense a description of their conciousness?
Consciousness is an experiencing of sensation. It's as simple as that. The exact properties of the sensations aren't really important for defining conscious; we only need know that they are being experienced. If an experiencing of sensation cannot be demonstrated necessary for the purposes of objective scientific observation, then we cannot determine if consciousness exists or not, and we consequently wouldn't be able to come up with a scientific explanation as to its nature. I've said it once and I'll say it again: consciousness per se is a violation of Occam's Razor. It would never be able to fit into any theory of the mind.

[Freakshow]

Consciousness is an experiencing of sensation. It's as simple as that. The exact properties of the sensations aren't really important for defining conscious; we only need know that they are being experienced. If an experiencing of sensation cannot be demonstrated necessary for the purposes of objective scientific observation, then we cannot determine if consciousness exists or not, and we consequently wouldn't be able to come up with a scientific explanation as to its nature. I've said it once and I'll say it again: consciousness per se is a violation of Occam's Razor. It would never be able to fit into any theory of the mind.

Occam's Razor is a neat little (and often true) saying, but not something that is made a principle foundation of scientific study. Whether or not something violates Occam's Razor is irrelevant to a thorough scientific study.

You just said "Consciousness is an experiencing of sensation." I would add to that thoughts and feelings.

But even if we just use your more limited definition, then do drugs that alter our experience of sensation thereby alter our consciousness?

[drkitten]

Now we are back at square one. Are a person's perceptions and descriptions of what they think/feel/sense a description of their conciousness?

How do I as an external observer know that the "descriptions" are accurate and that the
"perceptions" actually exist?

Heck, my laser printer can print me out a "description" of what it feels like to be conscious, starting out with "I think, therefore I am an HP." But if I were to walk into the office and find such
a paper in the output tray, I would regard it as an elaborate hoax -- a practical joke -- and not evidence for the consciousness of the printer.

[Batman Jr.]

But even if we just use your more limited definition, then do drugs that alter our experience of sensation thereby alter our consciousness?
No, because even presuming that we are actually experiencing the sensations induced by the drugs, the drugs are only altering the sensations, not the fact that we are experiencing them.
Occam's Razor is a neat little (and often true) saying, but not something that is made a principle foundation of scientific study. Whether or not something violates Occam's Razor is irrelevant to a thorough scientific study.
If something that violates Occam's Razor is included in a scientific theory, that means that the theory has an element of unnecessary complication and thus has no basis for including that complication within itself. There is no reason to include consciousness in an explanation of the behavior of the brain; therefore, consciousness is an unscientific proposition.

[Freakshow]

How do I as an external observer know that the "descriptions" are accurate and that the
"perceptions" actually exist?

Heck, my laser printer can print me out a "description" of what it feels like to be conscious, starting out with "I think, therefore I am an HP." But if I were to walk into the office and find such
a paper in the output tray, I would regard it as an elaborate hoax -- a practical joke -- and not evidence for the consciousness of the printer.

Then I'll extend to you the same challenge I did to Batman Jr...
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=1207716#post1207716

[Freakshow]

No, because even presuming that we are actually experiencing the sensations induced by the drugs, the drugs are only altering the sensations, not the fact that we are experiencing them.
And going by your previous definition of "consciousness is an experiencing of sensation", I will ask the question again. Does altering the exerpiencing of sensations result in an altering of our conciousness?


If something that violates Occam's Razor is included in a scientific theory, that means that the theory has an element of unnecessary complication and thus has no basis for including that complication within itself. There is no reason to include consciousness in an explanation of the behavior of the brain; therefore, consciousness is an unscientific proposition.
Sorry, I thought before that you were referring to the very over-simplified and somewhat incorrect view of Occam's Razor, that being that the simplest explanation tends to be the correct one. I understand what you mean now.

But still disagree. :)

[drkitten]

Then I'll extend to you the same challenge I did to Batman Jr...
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=1207716#post1207716

Same answer. Science, by definition, studies only the observable.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I've said it once and I'll say it again: consciousness per se is a violation of Occam's Razor. It would never be able to fit into any theory of the mind.
What is "consciousness per se"?

The term consciousness might not fit into any theory of the mind, but crisper terms might. For example: "The feeling of ownership of action evolved as an aid in future planning ..." or "The feeling of a continuous self evolved as an impetus to breed ...".

I could say, then, that the word consciousness could be used as an umbrella term for these things. I could say that, but then Mercutio would beat me down.

~~ Paul

[Freakshow]

Same answer. Science, by definition, studies only the observable.

So, you ARE in favor of tossing out all research into psychotropic medications?

[drkitten]

So, you ARE in favor of tossing out all research into psychotropic medications?

I am not. The effect of psychotropic medication is observable.

The effect of psychotropic medication upon consciousness is not.

See the difference?

[Freakshow]

I am not. The effect of psychotropic medication is observable.

The effect of psychotropic medication upon consciousness is not.

See the difference?

No, I don't. Please explain.

Most research into psychotropic medications relies on reports from the takers of the medication of what they are feeling and thinking. Which is what you are saying is of no scientific value.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

If you want to know how it has, I suggest you try reading up a little bit on subjects like psychology and neuroscience. For example, your belief that reductionism does not play any role in psychology is just plain wrong.
I have less than zero interest in psychology or whether it uses reductionism.
Like I said before, you have no interest in learning the answers to the questions you are asking. You cannot be bothered to learn enough about how psychology is actually done to see the role reductionism plays in it. Far simpler to just bury your head in the sand and insist that it plays none.

I'm saying that psychology takes the existence of consciousness as a given and proceeds from there. I've already told you this about 4 times.
That's how reductive science works. We take a complex phenomenon which we already know exists (like consciousness), and attempt to explain it in terms of other simpler, more fundamental phenomena (like neural activity).

Nowhere in reductive science do we ever start with some set of simple phenomena and logically deduce from them the existence of some new, unknown, more complicated phenomena. That does happen, but it isn't reductionism.

I also have zero interest in science or neuroscience since it cannot in principle explain the existence of consciousness.
Again, you have just proven my point for me. It is pointless for me to try to explain how reductive science has already done what you claim is impossible, because you know absolutely nothing about the subject, and have no interest in learning about it. Furthermore, it is ridiculous of you to demand that I give examples of how reductive science has explained aspects of consciousness, when you refuse to learn enough about the subject to even begin to understand such examples.

Your's is a classic case of willfull ignorance. You protect your beliefs by refusing to learn anything that could possibly challenge them, all the while justifying your refusal to learn based on the fact that learning those things could not possibly have any relevance, since your beliefs say so.

Unfortunately, every time this has ever been suggested to you before, you have simply dismissed the idea by saying that you have no interest in science and that it can't tell us anything about consciousness anyway...
Absolutely; it can't. But you are too stupid to understand this.
No, I am just not ignorant enough to not recognize that it is demonstrably false.

That's it. I've had enough of the mindnumbing stupidity exhibited by people on this board. I can't be bothered to put you all on ignore. The world can be physically closed and yet consciousness still wouldn't be physical. No conceivable discovery can ever make consciousness physical.

Don't bother responding, I'm gone. I've had more than enough of the mindnumbingly stupid people on here.
This reminds me of when my little nephew asked me where all the @ssholes go when I am driving (apperantly my brother gets quite angry at other drivers when driving, and I do not).

If you find that you always seem to be surrounded by mindnumbingly stupid people, you may wish to consider the possibility that it is, in fact, the one person who is involved in all of those discussions, who is stupid.

By the way, you say that you are leaving all the time. I have little doubt that you will read this anyway.


Dr. Stupid

[Batman Jr.]

Then I'll extend to you the same challenge I did to Batman Jr...
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=1207716#post1207716
I already told you that you're misconstruing the results of the studies. The studies have conclusively shown that the brain can be manipulated through various chemical means. There is no reason to think, however, that an experiencing of the brain states is even occurring; in other words, we don't know that consciousness is in any manner involved in the experiments to begin with let alone that it is related to anything in them. The state of the brain is really immaterial to the question of consciousness, because the state of something being conscious is not qualified by what that conscious being is experiencing; it is rather determined by the actual act of experiencing.
And going by your previous definition of "consciousness is an experiencing of sensation", I will ask the question again. Does altering the exerpiencing of sensations result in an altering of our conciousness?
Consciousness isn't defined by the sensations; I make this clear in the reply to your other message directly above and in my more protracted defining of conscious as an "experiencing of sensation" several posts ago. Consciousness is the act of experiencing. It's not the act of experiencing only certain things. Consciousness, by this definition, either exists or it doesn't. Either you experience things or you don't. Therefore, in order for drugs to affect consciousness, they would have to be able to shut off/turn on experience. We know they can change brain states, but without understanding when one who is being experimented upon is experiencing and when they aren't or if they are experiencing at all, we can't create a causal relationship between the drugs and consciousness.
Sorry, I thought before that you were referring to the very over-simplified and somewhat incorrect view of Occam's Razor, that being that the simplest explanation tends to be the correct one.
Don't sweat it. ;)

What is "consciousness per se"?

The term consciousness might not fit into any theory of the mind, but crisper terms might. For example: "The feeling of ownership of action evolved as an aid in future planning ..." or "The feeling of a continuous self evolved as an impetus to breed ...".

I could say, then, that the word consciousness could be used as an umbrella term for these things. I could say that, but then Mercutio would beat me down.
You could use the word "consciousness" for an umbrella term for all of the observable behaviors exhibited by the brain you describe if you would like, but then you would just be addressing those behaviors and not the actual act of experiencing them, which is the crucial element in the classical definition of "consciousness." This is just a matter of semantics, so it's not really important to what I'm trying to say.

[Freakshow]

I already told you that you're misconstruing the results of the studies. The studies have conclusively shown that the brain can be manipulated through various chemical means. There is no reason to think, however, that an experiencing of the brain states is even occurring; in other words, we don't know that consciousness is in any manner involved in the experiments to begin with let alone that it is related to anything in them. The state of the brain is really immaterial to the question of consciousness, because the state of something being conscious is not qualified by what that conscious being is experiencing; it is rather determined by the actual act of experiencing.

The point of contention here I believe is this: "The state of the brain is really immaterial to the question of consciousness..."

I would argue that we currently do not have enough knowledge of the brain to answer one way or the other for certain. But I find it likely that we will have that answer someday. I think (not "know", but "think") that we will eventually have a suitable scientific explanation for human consciousness.

Sometime, I'll have to get my thread started on sentient machines. Meaning...if we have what really truly appears to be a sentient machine, is shutting it off and then rendering it inoperable considered murder? :) It's an interesting conversation, and has some relationship to this thread.

[Z]

So you are, in fact, adding an unnecessary immaterial 'thing' to the situation - the 'experiencing' of things.

What differentiates experience of a thing from sensation, thought, memory, etc? Isn't this just a more vague term for the 'ghost in the machine'?

Considering that the human brain acts as a set of interconnected nodes, each communicating data with the others, I have no problem at all with the concept that the 'experiencing' of consciousness is merely intercommunication between nodes - and, therefore, not only well within the realm of science, but also quite knowable, even by an outside party.

You are simply postulating that 'consciousness' must invariably include some manner of 'ghost' within... which, to me, seems the unnecessary bit. Occam's Razor, and all that.

Simply put, as regards the sciences, there is no difference between consciousness being "the state of being aware of your self as an individual separate from your environment, awareness of your environment, the ability to accept and process sensory input, and memory states" and "the experience of the state of being aware of your self as an individual separate from your environment, awareness of your environment, the ability to accept and process sensory input, and memory states"... except the latter includes an unnecessary layer, much like the concept of qualia introduces an unnecessary layer in the concept of perception. If science analyzes and comes to understand every single bit of the brain - and can cause any experience in any person a scientist could ever wish to cause - then there is no functional and practical difference between a conscious state and the experience of a conscious state.

Amazingly enough, there do not seem to be many definitions of 'consciousness' which insist upon this experiential aspect you speak of, except those put forth by dualists or immaterialists of various types.

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=define%3Aconsciousness

Those which do tend to lamely lament a lack of 'the sheer feel of consciousness' - in other words, to thrash about insisting, in spite of everything, on a 'ghost in the machine'. I get the feeling this is no different from your own problem with most definitions of consciousness - you feel that the very idea implies some manner of soul (or inner being, or whatever) and therefore is false with regards to science. I find it is functionally very useful to dispense with this inner self idea - being, essentially, a pointless and useless mechanism of sorts - and simply focus on what I posited above.

Yes, I believe that man and animals and even some advanced computers are all conscious. I believe that there are degrees of conscious, and that man may not possess 'the ultimate consciousness', per se. As such, I feel that it is science - not philosophy, not religion, but science - which will eventually encompass all questions about consciousness - hands down.

[hammegk]

It seems to me that there are two options: 1) Consciousness is the result of physical processes or 2) Consciousness is independant of any physical processes. If 1), then obviously consciousness is explainable by science.

Ignoring the minor problem that 'physical' per se is a perception which does not prove that 'physical' actually exists, does science explain the fact electrons and protons have an equal charge of opposite sign, or why the force we call gravity has the magnitude it does? M-theory may, I'd guess, but sfaik it seems unlikely.

[Z]

Ignoring the minor problem that 'physical' per se is a perception which does not prove that 'physical' actually exists, does science explain the fact electrons and protons have an equal charge of opposite sign, or why the force we call gravity has the magnitude it does? M-theory may, I'd guess, but sfaik it seems unlikely.

Now? Probably not. Eventually? I see no reason why not. Up to the point that the explanation must exceed the parameters of this known reality, that is.

[thaiboxerken]

The general gist of the Ian/Hammy position can be summed up as this:

Science doesn't deal with the supernatural.

The supernatural is real (because I know with my 6th sense).

Therefore, science doesn't describe reality.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You could use the word "consciousness" for an umbrella term for all of the observable behaviors exhibited by the brain you describe if you would like, but then you would just be addressing those behaviors and not the actual act of experiencing them, which is the crucial element in the classical definition of "consciousness." This is just a matter of semantics, so it's not really important to what I'm trying to say. Why would I not be addressing the actual act of experiencing, say, the feeling of ownership of action? We can run experiments that affect this feeling. We can interview people with brain damage who are lacking this feeling.

I agree, though. I do not understand the "crucial element" in the classical definition, which is why I attempted to get Ian to describe it. What do people think they are experiencing other than private behaviors of feeling and thinking?

~~ Paul

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

The general gist of the Ian/Hammy position can be summed up as this:

Science doesn't deal with the supernatural.

The supernatural is real (because I know with my 6th sense).

Therefore, science doesn't describe reality.

Thats indeed Ian's absurdity in all its glory. Still, Hammegk seems to be more intelligent.

[Taffer]

Ignoring the minor problem that 'physical' per se is a perception which does not prove that 'physical' actually exists, does science explain the fact electrons and protons have an equal charge of opposite sign, or why the force we call gravity has the magnitude it does? M-theory may, I'd guess, but sfaik it seems unlikely.

It doesn't now. But how does this mean it never will?

As to Batman Jr., Zaayr got the right of it in his post above. You forget that Occam's Razor is double edged. Either science can't explain the phenomenon of experiencing consciousness, or there simply is no 'experience of consciousness', and simply just consciousness. In this light, there is no difference between a computer that behaves exactly as a conscious human would, and said human. Both are conscious.

[Batman Jr.]

What differentiates experience of a thing from sensation, thought, memory, etc? Isn't this just a more vague term for the 'ghost in the machine'?
Without experience, "sensations" would be illusions. The appearance of them would be the result of a mechanical object reacting to its environment, receiving input and spitting out output. There would be no such thing as "seeing red" as the act is commonly understood, because one expressing they saw red only did so because of a mindless chain reaction of mechanical processes in the eye and brain. Unless you want to posit that there is something intrinsic in mechanical processes that is responsible for the inwardly experiential, then you can't say experience and mechanical processes responsible for "sensations" can't be differentiated. I'm entirely open to the idea that the experiential aspect of consciousness could be born out of counterintuitively impersonal mechanisms, but I don't see how they can be inextricably linked.
Considering that the human brain acts as a set of interconnected nodes, each communicating data with the others, I have no problem at all with the concept that the 'experiencing' of consciousness is merely intercommunication between nodes - and, therefore, not only well within the realm of science, but also quite knowable, even by an outside party.
We can't tell if the mechanisms in the brain cause inward perception or "experience" because we cannot verify what things have "experiences" and what things don't. Some people are knocked off course by the logical pitfall that because you "know" your own experiences, you can relate them with your brain. This is fallacious as your knowledge of your own experiences and feelings could very well be an illusion created by a series of mechanical operations in your brain that resemble experience and feeling but are not. In fact, you may not yourself possess the ability to "experience" things. For all we know, "experience" could be completely fictitious. We could all be mindless automatons that appear to "feel" and to have "sensations" only because devices in our bodies not necessarily related to actual "sensation" or "feeling" produce behaviors that are superficially analogous to actual "sensation"/"feeling"/"experience."

A thought experiment showing the unreliability of trying to relate our own perceptions with our own brains could be proposed thusly: Let's assume that we know for a fact that "feelings" and "experience" are produced by the multiplicity of electrochemical switches in the brain and nothing more. Then let's assume a hypothetical philosopher named Doug was pondering the relationship between sentience and the physical brain. Before he began his pondering, however, he first underwent a brain operation that made him believe that he was experiencing nothing. He didn't cease to experience; those faculties to experience were left intact, but the faculty which categorized an experience as being "experiential" was changed so that he could not realize an experience to be an experience. With this alteration to his thinking, he began pondering and said that because he "knew" he wasn't "experiencing" anything, he was not sentient and had to conclude that the brain doesn't cause experiences, an obviously erroneous conclusion given the circumstances. Now, let's reverse the situation and say sentience is not caused by the brain and really doesn't exist at all, and the mental faculty which calculates operations in the brain to be "experiential" or not improperly recognizes behaviors which merely give the outward appearance of things experienced to actually be "experiential" and a component of "inward perception." In that case, Doug would, using his "knowledge" of his "inward perceptions," conclude that since his "inward perceptions" can be traced to behaviors in his brain, his brain causes his "inward perceptions." The problem is that this conclusion is also wrong, because he really doesn't experience anything.
You are simply postulating that 'consciousness' must invariably include some manner of 'ghost' within... which, to me, seems the unnecessary bit. Occam's Razor, and all that.
I'm not saying there has to be a "ghost." Inward perception could be the result of brain function and nothing more, and my thesis would still not be in any kind of contradiction with reality. The unnecessary part of your understanding of the mind is that you claim to know without doubt that feelings are in fact caused by purely mechanistic processes, that mechanistic constructs are in and of themselves producers of "feeling" and "experience" as those terms are understood. If you could present to me an argument demonstrating why mechanical processes must necessarily produce "feeling" and "experience" in this way, I'll be happy to examine it.

Amazingly enough, there do not seem to be many definitions of 'consciousness' which insist upon this experiential aspect you speak of, except those put forth by dualists or immaterialists of various types.

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q...Aconsciousness
The principle of "sentience," or the ability to "feel" or "experience," is considered the most necessary component of consciousness. Here is an article on sentience from Wikipedia. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentience) Here is a list of definitions of "sentience" (http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=define%3Asentience&btnG=Google+Search) from Google.

Those which do tend to lamely lament a lack of 'the sheer feel of consciousness' - in other words, to thrash about insisting, in spite of everything, on a 'ghost in the machine'. I get the feeling this is no different from your own problem with most definitions of consciousness - you feel that the very idea implies some manner of soul (or inner being, or whatever) and therefore is false with regards to science. I find it is functionally very useful to dispense with this inner self idea - being, essentially, a pointless and useless mechanism of sorts - and simply focus on what I posited above.

Yes, I believe that man and animals and even some advanced computers are all conscious. I believe that there are degrees of conscious, and that man may not possess 'the ultimate consciousness', per se. As such, I feel that it is science - not philosophy, not religion, but science - which will eventually encompass all questions about consciousness - hands down.
First of all, I don't "insist on a 'ghost in the machine.'" I insist on consciousness being unknowable. The idea of "inward experience" or "sentience" doesn't imply a "soul," because they could be caused by the mechanical processes in the brain. Where I differ with you is in my conviction that there is no scientifically viable evidence which can link sentience with any other phenomena, material or otherwise.

Why would I not be addressing the actual act of experiencing, say, the feeling of ownership of action? We can run experiments that affect this feeling. We can interview people with brain damage who are lacking this feeling.
As I explained, it cannot scientifically be proven that "feeling" even exists. We do not know if the behaviors our brains exhibit are related to any kinds of "feelings" or "sentience" at all, not even from what we think to be our own "experiences."
I agree, though. I do not understand the "crucial element" in the classical definition, which is why I attempted to get Ian to describe it. What do people think they are experiencing other than private behaviors of feeling and thinking?
As I explained above, the "crucial element," the "experiential," is also conventionally known as "sentience." I hope this clears things up for you.

As to Batman Jr., Zaayr got the right of it in his post above. You forget that Occam's Razor is double edged. Either science can't explain the phenomenon of experiencing consciousness, or there simply is no 'experience of consciousness', and simply just consciousness. In this light, there is no difference between a computer that behaves exactly as a conscious human would, and said human. Both are conscious.
I never said the "experience of consciousness." I said that consciousness was defined by being able to "experience"/have "sentience." Without "experience," consciousness by its definition doesn't exist. It's not a matter of consciousness without experience or with experience as the former would be self-contradictory.

[Taffer]

So a computer that can experience, for example, "red" is conscious?

You seem to assume that 'consciousness' is something that can be measured. But it is not. Consciousness, as we usually think of it, does not exist. Consciousness is not a real entity, but is an illusionary effect created by the brain (and obviously has evolutionary benifit).

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

As I explained, it cannot scientifically be proven that "feeling" even exists. We do not know if the behaviors our brains exhibit are related to any kinds of "feelings" or "sentience" at all, not even from what we think to be our own "experiences."
Sorry, I don't understand what you're trying to say. The word feeling is defined to be a set of internal behaviors. They exist by definition.

As I explained above, the "crucial element," the "experiential," is also conventionally known as "sentience." I hope this clears things up for you.
Not one bit.

We can't tell if the mechanisms in the brain cause inward perception or "experience" because we cannot verify what things have "experiences" and what things don't. Some people are knocked off course by the logical pitfall that because you "know" your own experiences, you can relate them with your brain. This is fallacious as your knowledge of your own experiences and feelings could very well be an illusion created by a series of mechanical operations in your brain that resemble experience and feeling but are not. In fact, you may not yourself possess the ability to "experience" things.
What does it mean for something to resemble experience and feeling but not be those things? This sounds heavily dualistic.

~~ Paul

[Soapy Sam]

Reality?

Big thing? Sort of multi-coloured? Lots of blood?

I had it here just a minute ago...

[Z]

Without experience, "sensations" would be illusions.

Absolutely not. An 'illusion' would require someone to fool, and would require something else going on that is not what it appears to be.

But 'sensation' is nothing more than sensory perception - such as video input via camera - and the associated mental (or computational) processing.

If you are referring to the internal sensory computations as 'experience' then there's no problem dealing with experience in the scientific / material world. Otherwise...

The appearance of them would be the result of a mechanical object reacting to its environment, receiving input and spitting out output.

The FACT of them is the same, actually.

There would be no such thing as "seeing red" as the act is commonly understood, because one expressing they saw red only did so because of a mindless chain reaction of mechanical processes in the eye and brain.

Dualism! Observe what you just wrote: "because of a mindless chain reaction of mechanical processes in the eye and brain."

Bingo - your entire bias is hereby revealed. You see 'mind' as a separate entity from 'brain'.

Unless you can somehow construct a series of premises that initially eliminates dualism, I have to toss out your entire post as being biased.

So... can you?

(and, yes, I do operate under the least complicated theory - that feeling, thought, emotion, etc. are nothing more than biochemical reactions occuring in the brain/body - which science is verifying. You are adding an unnecessary dualism intrinsically in your arguments.)

And changing the mark - using 'sentience' now, when previously the term used was 'consciousness' - does nothing to change things, Bats. There is nothing in the Wikipedia article that does anything more to further the debate - 'sentience' is just as possible - just as completely simple - under a purely mechanical POV as well. For example, when used as 'the ability to suffer' - a purely mechanical and scientifically explainable human being can suffer just as easily.

Your thought experiments suffer the same flaws, Bats. A person cannot 'believe' that they are or are not experiencing if the opposite is true. They might feel detached or - through chemical or physical alteration - might experience a different quality of consciousness - but they would still be experiencing - or not experiencing. There is no possible 'illusion' involved.

[Darat]

...snip...

Dualism! Observe what you just wrote: "because of a mindless chain reaction of mechanical processes in the eye and brain."


...snip...

I think you have to be very careful with such criticisms. The English language has dualism embedded in it (;)) and that can make writing about the mind, consciousness and all that jazz very difficult without inadvertently seemingly to be accepting or putting forward a dualistic concept.

[Z]

I think you have to be very careful with such criticisms. The English language has dualism embedded in it (;)) and that can make writing about the mind, consciousness and all that jazz very difficult without inadvertently seemingly to be accepting or putting forward a dualistic concept.

Then he needs to be even MORE careful when describing his position.

Let's consider: his idea is that science cannot encompass consciousness - why? What it appears he is saying, is that science deals in the material, and consciousness includes an immaterial element. Therefore, it is incumbent upon him to provide argumentation which will reach a conclusion showing the possibility of an immaterial component in consciousness; however, he starts with premises that automatically include the immaterial. Circular reasoning, I think.

I am suggesting that consciousness is nothing more than physical processes in the body/brain. He suggests there is something more to consciousness. But can he come to this conclusion without assuming, up front, that it is true?

Certainly, his use of the term 'experience' is of no help - there is nothing in 'experience' that cannot be encompassed within science (unless we continue to assume some immaterial component within it). Switching to 'sentience' is also no help, for similar reasons.

In fact, I'd say his theory is automatically suspect for the simple reason that, no matter how much science ever said on the subject of consciousness, I'm sure he'd still claim that science can't explain 'the sheer raw feeling' of consciousness, whatever that's supposed to mean. His idea is basically non-falsifiable, and therefore suspect.

But it's also important, Darat, to look at the fact that Batman is at one point, claiming no 'ghost in the machine', yet at another frets about the 'mindless chain reaction [...] in the brain' - if we do not assume a 'ghost', then there can be no separation between 'mind' and 'brain', unless we are again re-defining mind.

[hammegk]

.... I am suggesting that consciousness is nothing more than physical processes in the body/brain. He suggests there is something more to consciousness. But can he come to this conclusion without assuming, up front, that it is true? ...

True, as is the the fact that the way you come to your conclusion is based on your assumption, Physical Exists. Unfortunately, you have already used Thought to arrive at your assumption.

[Z]

Yes, but Thought being part of the Physical World... :D

See, in truth I am a dualist; however, I do think that science can fully encompass the experience of consciousness... because I think there is nothing in consciousness that is not physical/material. Including thought.

hammegk, are you assuming that thought is not part of physicalism when you wrote this tripe? :confused:

[hammegk]

Yes, but Thought being part of the Physical World... :D
Facts not in evidence, yet, Thought exists.


See, in truth I am a dualist; however, I do think that science can fully encompass the experience of consciousness... because I think there is nothing in consciousness that is not physical/material. Including thought.
I'd just say you're confused. Dualism (at least any interactive version) is not a logical position.


hammegk, are you assuming that thought is not part of physicalism when you wrote this tripe? :confused:
I suggest Thought *is* reality at the deepest level as well as at the most complex, which in turn allows perception of what we 'think of' as physical. Deepest level is at string-quark-boson-whatever, current most complex the homo sap brain as it's perceived. The position is idealism, and I'm an objective idealist. The objective means that science -- as far as it goes -- is completely logical.

[Z]

Facts not in evidence, yet, Thought exists.


I'd just say you're confused. Dualism (at least any interactive version) is not a logical position.


I suggest Thought *is* reality at the deepest level as well as at the most complex, which in turn allows perception of what we 'think of' as physical. Deepest level is at string-quark-boson-whatever, current most complex the homo sap brain as it's perceived. The position is idealism, and I'm an objective idealist. The objective means that science -- as far as it goes -- is completely logical.

So - dispensing with 'material' vs. 'ideal' - you're a monist. As far as I can tell, monism is the only logical course - my choice for dualism relies entirely on non-logical processes. However - I see no functional difference between either type of monism - except that idealists tend to believe in psychic powers, invisible pink unicorns, God, and other untennable nonsense. Also, in general, idealists have about as much logical thought capacity as a high school freshman on his first date with a cheerleader. And very little comprehension of the nature of science, evidence, or proper research.

The point being - everything in the universe is made up of one type of 'thing' - and this thing, whether it is 'thought' as you would like, or 'matter' as others would like, is the same thing, regardless. In a pure monist universe, regardless of what it is that the universe is made up from, science will know and understand nearly everything about said universe, as far as it can without extending beyond the bound of said universe. And in a monist universe, unless souls are of the same substance as light and quarks and cats and Milli Vanilli fans, they cannot and do not exist. It's as simple as that.

[Melendwyr]

A complete understanding? No. Science may be able to arrive at an accurate and complete understanding of the rules that govern the behavior of reality, but they can never be sure that's what their rules are. Science can never arrive at a complete understanding of reality, reality cannot contain a complete representation of itself.

[patnray]

No. By Godel's Theorem. No matter how complete a system is developed to descibe reality, it will always be possible to pose questions that can't be answered within that system. Not that the questions can never be answered, but the answer will require a system that transcends the current system. And then it will be possible to ask new unanswerable questions.

This only applies to logically consistent systems. Thus religion, and Ian, can answer every question by abandoning logic or consistency, or both...

[Melendwyr]

No. By Godel's Theorem. No matter how complete a system is developed to descibe reality, it will always be possible to pose questions that can't be answered within that system. Correct -- if, and only if, reality is complex enough to represent arithmetic (and thus drawing conclusions is possible). Of course, reality is complex enough, so your argument applies.

[drkitten]

Correct -- if, and only if, reality is complex enough to represent arithmetic (and thus drawing conclusions is possible). Of course, reality is complex enough, so your argument applies.

And if reality is a formal system, which I doubt.

[hammegk]

As far as I can tell, monism is the only logical course - my choice for dualism relies entirely on non-logical processes.
Understood, but why one would so choose is another question.


However - I see no functional difference between either type of monism - except that idealists tend to believe in psychic powers, invisible pink unicorns, God, and other untennable nonsense.
If you say so. That's not actually my understanding of idealism.


Also, in general, idealists have about as much logical thought capacity as a high school freshman on his first date with a cheerleader. And very little comprehension of the nature of science, evidence, or proper research.
A rather uncharitable and unsubstantiated claim, unless you've run across idealists who fit that pattern. Hmm. Or perhaps you infer those qualities based on my posts?


The point being - everything in the universe is made up of one type of 'thing' - and this thing, whether it is 'thought' as you would like, or 'matter' as others would like, is the same thing, regardless. In a pure monist universe, regardless of what it is that the universe is made up from, science will know and understand nearly everything about said universe, as far as it can without extending beyond the bound of said universe.
In the world of perception, I'd agree. Divergence in viewpoints only occur at extrema, say, HPC. For a idealist, nothing else is possible since everything is 'conscious' in some sense. Another extreme is finding a dividing line between life and not-life; for the idealist that dichotomy cannot be real.


And in a monist universe, unless souls are of the same substance as light and quarks and cats and Milli Vanilli fans, they cannot and do not exist. It's as simple as that.
Re souls, as that term is used, I'd agree they do not exist.

Given the possibility of 11 or more dimensions and a multi-verse, 'cannot' is more difficult to support.

[Z]

Admittedly, my only encounters with idealists are you (hammegk), Ian, lifegazer, Iacchus...

A pattern doth emerge. Sorry, ham - you're smarter than the rest, though a bigot, but still given to flights of fancy - such as 'everything being conscious'.

[Melendwyr]

And if reality is a formal system, which I doubt. No - anything that can be accurately described by a formal system is limited by the Theorem. Description itself is only meaningful in terms of a formal system; although we frequently rely on flawed, informal systems to describe things, those systems are just part of greater, formal systems.

It's a tautology -- you can't argue against it. Doing so requires making the statement that reality cannot be described, which is self-contradictory.

[drkitten]

No - anything that can be accurately described by a formal system is limited by the Theorem. Description itself is only meaningful in terms of a formal system; although we frequently rely on flawed, informal systems to describe things, those systems are just part of greater, formal systems.

Unproven and probably untrue.

I can easily "describe" a picture in language, for example -- and although there have been countless attempts to model language itself as a formal system, it's not. (This has been evidenced by, for example, the universal abject failure of such attempts.)

Similarly, mathematics is NOT, contrary to popular belief, a formal system -- although mathematicians routinely use formal systems as tools, they are capable of stepping outside of the bounds of any particular formal system to investigate it and, if necessary, of developing a new formal system for a specific interesting question. Mathematics is thus an informal collection of processes, although most of the processes themselves are formal systems. Essentially, the "system" of mathematics is continually under revision by the creation and abandonment of new axioms and rules of inference (see, for example, the historical discussion of the validity of nonconstructive mathematics, or of the axiom of choice). Every time a new axiom is widely accepted (as with the AC), the "formal" aspects of mathematics are changed -- but the acceptance of axioms is not governed by any formal rules, and so is not a formal system.


And, of course, if mathematics is ot a formal system, science is not either. Science doesn't even pretend that its tools are formal systems. But science also accepts new axioms and experimental methods on a routine basis (see the increasing acceptance of meta-analysis, or the use of simulations as a method of experimentation) -- routine, but informal.

So, no, reality is not a formal system, "descriptions" are meaningful without regard to a formal system, and "formal systems" (and by extension, Godel's theorem) are really irrelevant to any substantive epistemological questions outside of pure mathematics.

[Melendwyr]

I can easily "describe" a picture in language, for example -- and although there have been countless attempts to model language itself as a formal system, it's not. (This has been evidenced by, for example, the universal abject failure of such attempts.) All formal systems are languages, drkitten. And while the natural languages may be riddled with inconsistencies, contradictions, and imprecision, they can still be described logically.

Similarly, mathematics is NOT, contrary to popular belief, a formal system -- although mathematicians routinely use formal systems as tools, they are capable of stepping outside of the bounds of any particular formal system to investigate it and, if necessary, of developing a new formal system for a specific interesting question. So mathematicians don't rely on logic? We both know that they do -- and logic can be described as a set of rules that can be applied to statements to generate new statements. Truly illogical methodologies would be rejected by mathematicians wholesale.

Mathematics is thus an informal collection of processes, although most of the processes themselves are formal systems. Essentially, the "system" of mathematics is continually under revision by the creation and abandonment of new axioms and rules of inference (see, for example, the historical discussion of the validity of nonconstructive mathematics, or of the axiom of choice). Every time a new axiom is widely accepted (as with the AC), the "formal" aspects of mathematics are changed -- but the acceptance of axioms is not governed by any formal rules, and so is not a formal system. Mathematicians rely on certain axioms by which they manipulate the axioms of the systems they construct. The axioms themselves are meaningless without the framework of language - if the words I use to convey an axiom are not defined in a wider language, I can't convey the axiom. Or think about it.

So, no, reality is not a formal system, "descriptions" are meaningful without regard to a formal system, and "formal systems" (and by extension, Godel's theorem) are really irrelevant to any substantive epistemological questions outside of pure mathematics. But everything is pure mathematics.

[drkitten]

All formal systems are languages, drkitten. And while the natural languages may be riddled with inconsistencies, contradictions, and imprecision, they can still be described logically.

All formal systems are languages, but not all languages are formal systems. Natural languages can indeed be described logically -- but not successfully.

For proof, I refer you to any recent issue of Computational Linguistics, or for that matter, Grammars.



So mathematicians don't rely on logic?


Exclusively? No.

Again, look at the historical discussion of the Axiom of Choice.

We both know that they do -- and logic can be described as a set of rules that can be applied to statements to generate new statements. Truly illogical methodologies would be rejected by mathematicians wholesale.

Um, wrong. Cantor's original formulation of the infinite, for example, was "illogical," in the strict sense that it was contradictory (cf. Russell's paradox). It took about thirty years to straighten it out, and the solution is still not philosophically clean. Mathematicians recognized it (and the methdology that underlay it) as illogical, but specifically did not reject it wholesale. Instead, because it was interesting, they continued to work on it until they could come up with a reforumulation system that was not obviously illogical.


But everything is pure mathematics.


Nothing is pure mathematics. Mathematics has no ontological consequences.

[Taffer]

If you say so. That's not actually my understanding of idealism.

To my understanding, Idealists and Materialists agree on basically every point except one. Both agree that a physical universe could exist, and that all our observations of said universe are tainted through our perceptions. However, Idealists take this one step further to say that, since we cannot trust anything but our perceptions, only perceptions exist. In other words, the Idealist position is that only 'sense perception' exists. On the other hand, a Materialist still admits that our observations of the physical world are tainted through sense perceptions, but says that something must cause these perceptions. Even if we cannot know it directly, we know something exists to cause these perceptions. Since this something is causal, it must be material.

[Darat]

...snip... Thought exists.

...snip...


As you said: Facts not in evidence, yet.

[Taffer]

Just to throw a spanner in the works here, I propose a question for N.D.K and Melendwyr:

Is mathematical knowledge Synthetic or Analytic in nature? Is it a priori or a posteriori?

[drkitten]

Just to throw a spanner in the works here, I propose a question for N.D.K and Melendwyr:

Is mathematical knowledge Synthetic or Analytic in nature? Is it a priori or a posteriori?


False dichotomy.

[Taffer]

Care to explain?

[Belz...]

Well... I'm going to try and give my thoughts about the whole thread so far.

I think reality can (and will) be explained by science. So far we have no reason to believe otherwise, as pretty much all "mysteries" have fallen to scrutiny. Just because some things seem daunting now doesn't mean they can't be explained. As to whether they can be explained beyond any doubt, that seems unlikely, because there is always room for doubt, reasonable or not.

As far as the consciousness goes, although it is a illusory effect, it still "exists" just as a mirage does. Therefore it, too, can be explained, and probably replicated as well.

Finally, the universe does seem completely deterministic to me. The quantum mechanics term "random" seems to usually refer to things we can't determine because we simply can't know all the variables (the wave function,) which doesn't mean those variables aren't set . Of course, there's the matter of the spacetime foam, but even if it has a bearing on the macroscopic world, this randomness doesn't imply free will. Those random fluctuations are completely out of our control. So it's either completely deterministic, or mostly deterministic with random elements. No free will here, though from our perspective it doesn't seem particularily crucial.

Belz...

[Taffer]

Care to explain?

To explain my own point a little further, not only was it simply a question (not an arguement), it is not a false dichotomy as there are only two types of knowledge. It is either one or the other. A false dichotomy deals with falliciously using two possibly answers to a question that has many answers.

ETA: Welcome to the forum Belz... :)

I think you've got it up perfectly. :)

[Melendwyr]

All formal systems are languages, but not all languages are formal systems. Natural languages can indeed be described logically -- but not successfully. Can you provide a proof that natural languages cannot be described logically? "It hasn't been done yet, therefore it cannot be done" is not a valid argument.

For proof, I refer you to any recent issue of Computational Linguistics, or for that matter, Grammars. That would provide proof that it hasn't yet been done. It would not provide proof that it's impossible -- and frankly, basic logic is against you, here. Even a wholly arbitrary language that contained no structural elements or syntactic rules can still be represented within a logical system. As a disproof of this statement would have been world-famous and probably Nobel-Prize-worthy, I suspect you cannot back up this point.

Again, look at the historical discussion of the Axiom of Choice. We can logically define and explore both possibilities. Logic is consistent with both of the resulting systems -- logic is the formal system in which the two kinds of mathematics (one where the axiom is true, one where it is false) are emulated.

Um, wrong. Cantor's original formulation of the infinite, for example, was "illogical," in the strict sense that it was contradictory (cf. Russell's paradox). It took about thirty years to straighten it out, and the solution is still not philosophically clean. Mathematicians recognized it (and the methdology that underlay it) as illogical, but specifically did not reject it wholesale. Instead, because it was interesting, they continued to work on it until they could come up with a reforumulation system that was not obviously illogical. There is a difference between what we recognize as illogical and what is illogical. Until it was made logical, it wasn't actually mathematics, even if we didn't necessarily realize it at the time.

This is why I can't just spew out random gibberings and call them "mathematics".

Nothing is pure mathematics. Mathematics has no ontological consequences. Mathematics describes the entirety of reality and unreality. Of course it has no ontological consequences! Only once we limit ourselves specifically to examining subsets of mathematics can consequences be derived.

[Melendwyr]

Is mathematical knowledge Synthetic or Analytic in nature? Is it a priori or a posteriori? Is water wet, or is it a substance whose unit molecule composed of two hydrogen atoms chemically bound to a single oxygen atom?

Is the atmosphere a mixture of nitrogen, oxygen, carbon dioxide, and trace gases, or does it surround the planet Earth?

Does the Earth orbit the Sun, or the galactic center?

[Taffer]

Is water wet, or is it a substance whose unit molecule composed of two hydrogen atoms chemically bound to a single oxygen atom?

Is the atmosphere a mixture of nitrogen, oxygen, carbon dioxide, and trace gases, or does it surround the planet Earth?

Does the Earth orbit the Sun, or the galactic center?

Well put, and of course this is how I feel. I asked the question because it seemed to me to be an argument between a purely Synthetic and purely Analytic definition of Math. Perhaps I was wrong. Oh well.

Although I notice you fail to actually answer the question. Note I said mathematical knowledge, not the definition of mathematics. The definition of water is, indeed, both Analytic and Synthetic (it is both wet and made of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen), but the knowledge of water is split into two parts. Analytically water is wet, while Synthetically water is H2O.

[patnray]

Let me put it another way. As we accumulate knowledge and answer questions about reality (or develop models of reality) we also learn new questions to ask, which spurs more investigation into how things work. Science in the 20th century was discovering answers to questions that couldn't even be formulated in the 18th century.

What Godel showed was how to formulate unresolvable questions in any logically consistent system. That mathemeticians are "capable of stepping outside of the bounds of any particular formal system to investigate it and, if necessary, of developing a new formal system for a specific interesting question" only demonstrates what Godel said: that some questions do need a new formal system to be answered.

[drkitten]

Can you provide a proof that natural languages cannot be described logically? "It hasn't been done yet, therefore it cannot be done" is not a valid argument.


No, but the assertion "It hasn't been done yet, therefore it can be done" is not only not a valid argument, but flies in the face of plausibility as well.

In point of fact, it's fairly easy to prove that "language" is not capable of description in any formal system. (Natural) languages are by definition extensible, both in vocabulary and grammar. Any formal description of English would by definition include either a list of vocabulary items or a process by which such a list could be generated. However, any list would immediately be out of date, because new vocabulary items are continually being introduced. An exact "formal" description of the English of 1995 would no longer be valid today -- but both languages are "English." (Grammar changes more slowly -- but equally inexorably.)

Given the moving target problem, the development of a formal system to solve the problem "is this string a legitimate English sentence" is provably insoluble, because the "answer" cannot be expressed in formal, truth-functional terms.

You can, of course, build a succession of formal systems to represent different approximations to English. But that's not the same as saying "English is a formal system," a statement that is provably untrue.

[drkitten]

But the knowledge of water is split into two parts. Analytically water is wet, while Synthetically water is H2O.

Some knowledge of water is synthetic, some is analytic.

Similarly, some mathematical knowledge is synthetic, some is analytic.

[Taffer]

Some knowledge of water is synthetic, some is analytic.

Similarly, some mathematical knowledge is synthetic, some is analytic.

Thank you.

Obviously I misunderstood the argument being had, as my question didn't even raise an eyebrow. Oh well, I guess I'll lurk again until someone needs me. :D

[drkitten]

What Godel showed was how to formulate unresolvable questions in any logically consistent system. That mathemeticians are "capable of stepping outside of the bounds of any particular formal system to investigate it and, if necessary, of developing a new formal system for a specific interesting question" only demonstrates what Godel said: that some questions do need a new formal system to be answered.

But the development of such a system is not itself a formal system.

If it were, mathematicians (not being stupid) would quickly recognize its limitations and attempt to devise a different way to develop such systems.

[hammegk]

As you said: Facts not in evidence, yet.
Oh? What do you think is occuring here? Or, better said, could what is occuring here be occuring if Thought did not exist? And note, I said nothing about your 'thoughts', or mine.


Since this something is causal, it must be material.
So you apparently believe (one of those Thoughts, again...).


Admittedly, my only encounters with idealists are you (hammegk), Ian, lifegazer, Iacchus...
The only person on that list who I'm sure *is* an idealist is me. I suspect the others are dualists.


.... still given to flights of fancy - such as 'everything being conscious'.
A 'flight of fancy' sounds more like Thought than Matter, doesn't it?



Math and reality; that is an interesting subject. Math would 'exist' even if reality didn't -- as I see it.

[Melendwyr]

No, but the assertion "It hasn't been done yet, therefore it can be done" is not only not a valid argument, but flies in the face of plausibility as well. Yes, and when someone here makes that argument, I'm sure your rebuttal will be well-taken.

In point of fact, it's fairly easy to prove that "language" is not capable of description in any formal system. (Natural) languages are by definition extensible, both in vocabulary and grammar. Any formal description of English would by definition include either a list of vocabulary items or a process by which such a list could be generated. However, any list would immediately be out of date, because new vocabulary items are continually being introduced. An exact "formal" description of the English of 1995 would no longer be valid today -- but both languages are "English." (Grammar changes more slowly -- but equally inexorably.) Wrong. We can name things whatever we like, but that doesn't mean the names are meaningful. In order to recognize that a particular use of language is English, instead of, say, German, we need to have certain criteria that defines that language. Those criteria can change, but the means by which they change are still part of formal systems. The means by which they change can change, but they're still part of formal systems. And so on.

Given the moving target problem, the development of a formal system to solve the problem "is this string a legitimate English sentence" is provably insoluble, because the "answer" cannot be expressed in formal, truth-functional terms. If you don't define "legitimate" and "English", then no, that statement cannot be solved. If you do define those concepts adequately, then the statement can be solved.

You can, of course, build a succession of formal systems to represent different approximations to English. But that's not the same as saying "English is a formal system," a statement that is provably untrue. You can also build a formal system that represents how one version of English becomes another. You can build a formal system to represent how the formal representation changes. And so on.

Understanding a language requires the ability to accept a statement in th
Understanding any statement, regardless of the language it's in, requires the ability to apply rules to it and generate new statements.at language and generate new statements - consequences - from it. Your use of language to express ideas, points, and concepts inherently accepts that our communication is describable by a formal system -- yet you continue to deny it!

[Melendwyr]

But the development of such a system is not itself a formal system.

If it were, mathematicians (not being stupid) would quickly recognize its limitations and attempt to devise a different way to develop such systems. Mathematicians cannot recognize the fundamental limitations of mathematicians. The formal system that describes the human capacity to generate models is beyond human comprehension.

In this sense, yes, mathematicians *are* stupid, or at least not smart enough. If they became smarter, they would need to use better, more sophisticated methods of generating models -- and the new system would then be beyond their comprehension.

[Taffer]

So you apparently believe (one of those Thoughts, again...).

Stop arguing semantics. This is a problem of the english language, not the argument.

For all accounts, let I/Me mean "the particular molecular arrangement commonly refered to as Taffer.".
For all accounts, let Think mean "the brain attached to the particular molecular arrangement commonly refered to as Taffer aquired the specific molecular arrangement that is commonly refered to as "thought".".

"Thought" is just a label that humans have attached to a particular molecular arrangement/interaction within a brain. "Thoughts" no more exist then IPU's do. There is no entity, material or immaterial, that is a Thought. It is a construct (social?) to allow us to discuss (relay information).

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Stop arguing semantics. This is a problem of the english language, not the argument.

For all accounts, let I/Me mean "the particular molecular arrangement commonly refered to as Taffer.".
For all accounts, let Think mean "the brain attached to the particular molecular arrangement commonly refered to as Taffer aquired the specific molecular arrangement that is commonly refered to as "thought".".

"Thought" is just a label that humans have attached to a particular molecular arrangement/interaction within a brain. "Thoughts" no more exist then IPU's do. There is no entity, material or immaterial, that is a Thought. It is a construct (social?) to allow us to discuss (relay information).

I have to point out that you are doing semantics too. Now, is your way of trying to fix the meaning of some words fundamentally more "right" than the what Hammegk does? If so, why? and how?

And no, Im not saying he is right and you are wrong, just that if you want to diminish an argument based on semantics you could fall in your own trap!

[hammegk]

Stop arguing semantics. This is a problem of the english language, not the argument.
It's a problem of every language.


For all accounts, let I/Me mean "the particular molecular arrangement commonly refered to as Taffer.".
I'd agree what you believe is 'you' (ego, etc) is a function of those arrangements as we would perceive them.


For all accounts, let Think mean "the brain attached to the particular molecular arrangement commonly refered to as Taffer aquired the specific molecular arrangement that is commonly refered to as "thought".".
For what we might call "Taffer Thoughts" we'd agree. Not that our agreement on this point bears on the question I pose.


"Thought" is just a label that humans have attached to a particular molecular arrangement/interaction within a brain.

It is a construct (social?) to allow us to discuss (relay information).
For what we perceive as Taffer thought and hammegk thought, we'd agree again.


"Thoughts" no more exist then IPU's do. There is no entity, material or immaterial, that is a Thought.
I don't know about IPUs. Otherwise, this statement must, not might be, but must be true -- unless one is an idealist. Dualists would also disagree.

Also note, thought *does* exist, and since monism is the best logical possibility ... what now? Again this does not discuss Taffer thought and/or hammegk thought.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

This is an interesting discussion. Thanks to everyone. I have to say that it is refreshing to find Hammegk defending his possition with brains, contrary to the well known examples of (pseudo) idealists, like Lifegazer or Interesting Ian.

Anyway, I dont have a possition myself (things are way to complex) but I agree in that a monism seems more plausible. I also believe most of the discussion depends on a branch of knowledge that is often mentioned, but also ignored in regards of its consecuences. I also believe that unless we can understand better that branch, every other effort is kind of a waste of time (but it can be fun, thats not on question). I refer, of course, to semantics.

Im concentrated by now in that "little" thing.

[Melendwyr]

Although I notice you fail to actually answer the question. Note I said mathematical knowledge, not the definition of mathematics. The definition of water is, indeed, both Analytic and Synthetic (it is both wet and made of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen), but the knowledge of water is split into two parts. Analytically water is wet, while Synthetically water is H2O. We determine the properties of water from experiment and generalization. Frankly, I don't see the distinction you're making. Some kinds of mathematical knowledge are a priori in that we literally cannot imagine that they can be false. Some kinds of mathematical knowledge are derived from logical manipulation of those axioms.

[Taffer]

We determine the properties of water from experiment and generalization. Frankly, I don't see the distinction you're making. Some kinds of mathematical knowledge are a priori in that we literally cannot imagine that they can be false. Some kinds of mathematical knowledge are derived from logical manipulation of those axioms.

Yes. I thought the discussion you were having was relating to True Analytic versus True Synthetic versions of Math. My bad.

[Dancing David]

Absolutely not.
Science only postulates possible explanations, and then finds models that 'match' well to observation.

Can't be done, to explain all that is the ultimate in reduction. Requires a larger data set than the universe to control the explanation.

[Taffer]

Hamm, you really seem to me to be postulating a 'ghost in the machine'.

You seem to think that the thought processes in the brain are 'read' by something other then the brain. This is not the case. Thoughts are just information coded for by chemicals. This information is interpreted by a different part of the brain, and produces the illusion of 'thought'. What is hard about this? Nothing 'thought' that. The only way to think of 'thoughts' is the result of the interpretation of chemical information by various parts of the brain.

[Taffer]

I have to point out that you are doing semantics too. Now, is your way of trying to fix the meaning of some words fundamentally more "right" than the what Hammegk does? If so, why? and how?

And no, Im not saying he is right and you are wrong, just that if you want to diminish an argument based on semantics you could fall in your own trap!

Indeed. However, in this case, all I am doing is explaining how I use the words so he cannot say I am wrong based upon his idea of the words. In other words, I am explaining so there can be no confusion what I mean when I say "I" and "thought".

[hammegk]

Hamm, you really seem to me to be postulating a 'ghost in the machine'.

Looking at things from a materialist's view, "I am, therefore I think" so to speak, it would be better to say 'the ghost is the machine'. :)

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Or like in Zen, "no ghost, no machine"