Newcomb's paradox: Yet another refutation of materialism?

[Interesting Ian]

There was a thread about Newcomb's paradox before which I participated in. However the thread seems to have disappeared. I can't remember what conclusions I had before, but since last night I have been thinking about it, and I have concluded that it necessarily refutes determinism and therefore materialism. I just wonder if people agree.

Here is the "paradox" which I have simply lifted off this webpage: http://slate.msn.com/?id=2061419#ContinueArticle


Newcomb's Problem goes like this. There are two closed boxes on the table, Box A and Box B. Box A contains $1,000. Box B contains either $1 million or no money at all. You have a choice between two actions: 1) taking what is in both boxes; or 2) taking just what is in Box B.


Now here comes the interesting part. Imagine a Being that can predict your choices with high accuracy. You can think of this Being as a genie, or a superior intelligence from another planet, or a supercomputer that can scan your mind, or God. He has correctly predicted your choices in the past, and you have enormous confidence in his predictive powers. Yesterday, the Being made a prediction as to which choice you are about to make, and it is this prediction that determines the contents of Box B. If the Being predicted that you will take what is in both boxes, he put nothing in Box B. If he predicted that you will take only what is in Box B, he put $1 million in Box B. You know these facts, he knows you know them, etc. So, do you take both boxes, or only Box B?


Well, obviously you should take only Box B, right? For if this is your choice, the Being has almost certainly predicted it and put $1 million in Box B. If you were to take both boxes, the Being would almost certainly have anticipated this and left Box B empty. Therefore, with very high likelihood, you would get only the $1,000 in Box A. The wisdom of the one-box choice seems confirmed when you notice that of all your friends who have played this game, the one-boxers among them are overwhelmingly millionaires, and the two-boxers are overwhelmingly not.


But wait a minute. The Being made his prediction yesterday. He either put $1 million in Box B, or he didn't. If it's there, it's not going to vanish just because you choose to take both boxes; if it's not there, it's not going to materialize suddenly just because you choose only Box B. Whatever the Being's prediction, you are guaranteed to end up $1,000 richer if you choose both boxes. Choosing just Box B is like leaving a $1,000 bill lying on the sidewalk. To make the logic of the two-box choice even more vivid, suppose the backs of the boxes are made of glass and your wife is sitting on the other side of the table. She can plainly see what's in each box. You know which choice she wants you to make: Take both boxes!

To repeat what I said on another board:

It cannot possible be sensible just to take box B since it is already the case that B either has the money within it or it doesn't. Your choice per se does not change anything.

We need to bear in mind that it is not our actual choice which dictates what the superior being will beforehand place in each of the 2 boxes, but rather our intention to choose at that time he makes the prediction.

A good understanding of this situation should reveal that it is impossible for the superior being to predict perfectly or nearly perfectly. A logical paradox is created so something has to give. You see, if this being is always right, then it is surely sensible to take just the one box. But we already know that it is more rational to take both boxes, and this cannot possibly be denied as, at the time of choosing, it is already the case that the boxes have the money in, or they don't. Therefore we get a logical inconsistency.

Complete and total prediction must be in principle impossible. Indeed it must be logically impossible. That is to say that in any logically possible Universe, it necessarily is the case that a complete and total knowledge of the physical state of the Universe, plus a complete and total knowledge of every sentient being's psychological state and/or soul state would not be sufficient to predict any sentient beings actions with a total and complete unerring accuracy.

In other words it must necessarily be the case that we can genuinely choose at a given moment which could not in principle be predicted before, no matter how much knowledge someone has -- indeed no matter if they had an infinite amount of knowledge.

The only way to deny this proof would be to endorse fatalism. Thus I won't get out of bed because everything that happens will happen anyway, so to speak. But our immediate experience of ourselves as causal agents clearly makes this a complete nonsense (and we all know it's wrong anyway, otherwise we'd all stay in bed!). If we do have a genuine choice which I don't think any sane person would deny, then this "paradox" necessarily shows that determinism cannot possible be true.

In another thread I have already provided a proof that mental causation necessarily must exist. I now have realised in the past 18 hours that we necessarily have libertarian free will. Newcomb's paradox demonstrates this, and demonstrates that determinism does not and indeed could not characterise reality.

It is also yet another refutation of materialism since we have shown that the origin of at least some of our actions are different from all physical events and processes.

Does anyone disagree with me?

[Interesting Ian]

Hmmm . .why is a thread entitled "Bible and spanking children" considered to be similar to this one?? :eek:

[Darat]

Just a point Ian, determinism does not equal materialism, you could be a materialist who doesn't hold that reality is deterministic.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Your analysis is flawed. There is no logical inconsistency. If we assume absolute determinism (as the thought experiment requires), then there is absolutely no logical inconsistency at all.

Sure, the money is either there or not, so you should choose both envelopes, right? Wrong.

Sure, whether the money is there or not has already been determined, but so has my decision whether to take both envelopes or not.

The problem is that you are assuming some sort of non-deterministic free-will here. You are imagining that if there is money in both envelopes, that I could possibly choose to take both envelopes or not. If determinism is correct, and the being is that accurate at predicting what will happen, then I can't make that choice.

So there is no logical contradiction.

Of course, the entire point is moot, since determinism (at least this type of determinism) is false. So I don't see how it could have any bearing on materialism anyway.

The only way to deny this proof would be to endorse fatalism. Thus I won't get out of bed because everything that happens will happen anyway, so to speak.
Exactly. But the thought experiment requires fatalism. Without it, the entire thought experiment is nonsense. Without fatalism, the being couldn't be that accurate. He could be defeated simply by basing your answer on some random process, such as electrical resistor noise.

But our immediate experience of ourselves as causal agents clearly makes this a complete nonsense (and we all know it's wrong anyway, otherwise we'd all stay in bed!).
No we wouldn't. Your argument here is self-defeating. You claim that we'd all just stay in bed, but this presumes that we would actually be able to choose to do so. If it is already determined that you would not, then you would not. Besides, lot's of people actually do believe in fatalism, and they go on with their lives. Why? Because their lives would suck if they didn't. When you get hungry, you'll drag your sophomoric butt out of bed and get some food, regardless of your silly metaphysical beliefs. Fatalism doesn't even enter into it.

If we do have a genuine choice which I don't think any sane person would deny, then this "paradox" necessarily shows that determinism cannot possible be true.
I don't know what you mean by "genuine choice", but one need not appeal to things like free-will to know that the type of determinism required by this "paradox" is false. One need only look at the scientific evidence against it. And without determinism, the paradox shows nothing at all, because its premise requires it.

It is also yet another refutation of materialism since we have shown that the origin of at least some of our actions are different from all physical events and processes.

Does anyone disagree with me?
I do, on two counts:

1) This "paradox" doesn't refute determinism. Nor does it need to. Determinism has already been shown scientifically to be false.
2) Refuting determinism does not refute materialism, since materialism is quite compatible with quantum indeterminacy.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Just a point Ian, determinism does not equal materialism, you could be a materialist who doesn't hold that reality is deterministic.
Materialism holds that sentient beings and all other physical things and processes are of a similar ontological type. If the future actions of human beings are innately unpredictable, then the same must also be the case for all otehr processes within reality. But this doesn't appear to be so. WE think of physical laws as beuing universal. The Earth will always orbit the Sun whilst the Sun is there. The Earth's behaviour is not innately unpredictable.

[Interesting Ian]

Darat,

I was thinking that it might have been a good idea to have entered a poll on this thread asking if people would choose both boxes or just the one. Could you do this? Just tried to send you a pm but it says my box is full. Does this mean you didn't receive my pm's yesterday too? I pointed out that being born in 1901 would make me 104, well over 13!

Ian

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Materialism holds that sentient beings and all other physical things and processes are of a similar ontological type. If the future actions of human beings are innately unpredictable, then the same must also be the case for all otehr processes within reality. But this doesn't appear to be so. WE think of physical laws as beuing universal. The Earth will always orbit the Sun whilst the Sun is there. The Earth's behaviour is not innately unpredictable.
Actually, you are mistaken. The fact of the matter is that all other processes in reality are innately unpredictable. At the quantum level, all events are unpredictable. Predictable behavior only comes about when you average many of these events together.

Even the Earth's behavior is unpredictable on a long enough time scale. In fact, it is both noisy and chaotic.


Dr. Stupid

[Z]

There may be something substratic to the quantum level that causes 'chaotic' behaviour to, in fact, be ordered; but if so we haven't a hope of learning what it is yet. But quantum indeterminancy - a demonstrable phenomenon - has wide-spread implications for a material universe.

Nonetheless, as pointed out above, your analogy is inherently flawed and therefore meaningless. Remember, you're talking about someone who knows what you will predict with 100% accuracy - meaning, whatever you chose, he predicted it. The logical thing to do, every single time, would be to choose box B. Why? Because by setting your intention to choose box B, and leaving it set, you ensure that he will predict your choice and leave you the cool million. In short, you are using the deterministic nature of the scenario to predict what the being will predict to ensure your enrichment.

I see no paradox at all.

BTW - I see you're still here, liar.

[drkitten]

Materialism holds that sentient beings and all other physical things and processes are of a similar ontological type. If the future actions of human beings are innately unpredictable, then the same must also be the case for all otehr processes within reality. But this doesn't appear to be so. WE think of physical laws as beuing universal. The Earth will always orbit the Sun whilst the Sun is there. The Earth's behaviour is not innately unpredictable.

Except that it is. There's a lot of work in the chaotic dynamics of the solar system, and, over the
long-term, the Earth will not necessarily always orbit the sun as long as the sun is there. (The
Solar System will almost certainly -- as in, almost all of our simulations agree that it will -- lose
a planet in the distant future due to orbital drift. It's not clear, because of how the orbits interact,
exactly which one it will be.)

Planetary dynamics is a chaotic system -- our ability to predict is limited by the accuracy of our ability to take measurements, which in turn is limited by our measuring equipment and ultimately limited by Heisenberg.

If something as simple as a large lump of rock falling is inherently unpredictable, how about human behavior? Even under materialism, it's logically consistent to assume that humans will never be predicted perfectly because the system is too complicated.

[Darat]

Materialism holds that sentient beings and all other physical things and processes are of a similar ontological type. If the future actions of human beings are innately unpredictable, then the same must also be the case for all otehr processes within reality. But this doesn't appear to be so. WE think of physical laws as beuing universal. The Earth will always orbit the Sun whilst the Sun is there. The Earth's behaviour is not innately unpredictable.

That does not mean determinism is an inherent part of materialism such that if determinism is "proven" to be false (which so far it is has been) them materialism is "proven" false.

[Z]

Nor, in fact, does 'proving' determinism to be false 'prove' that absolute free will is not also false. Unless you can 'prove' that our will alters the outcomes of the millions of quantum particles throughout our selves that cause us to make decisions as we do...

[Interesting Ian]

Your analysis is flawed. There is no logical inconsistency. If we assume absolute determinism (as the thought experiment requires), then there is absolutely no logical inconsistency at all.


The thought experiment assumes that absolute predictability is in principle possible. If that equates to determinism, or determinism is a prerequisite of such absolute predictability, then yes.



Sure, the money is either there or not, so you should choose both envelopes, right? Wrong.

Sure, whether the money is there or not has already been determined, but so has my decision whether to take both envelopes or not.

The problem is that you are assuming some sort of non-deterministic free-will here.


Not as a premise. No, I am assuming a non- fatalistic free-will here. What the hell's the difference you might ask. It's a very subtle complex issue, but fatalism means that everything that does happen shall inevitably happen. But at the moment of our decision we are aware of the power of our own causal agency to make either choice. Fatalism directly contradicts the implicit recognition of our own causal agency to make either chioce.

The contradiction comes about in our certainty that we do in fact make choices. Even if the choices I make can be described by physical laws, it is simply a plain fact that I do make choices.

Now I am not pre-supposing the non-existence of determinism (given that we understand determinism to entail absolute predictability in principle). For example you might be absolutely 100% confident that if I see a £20 note on the street I will pick it up and pocket it. Now clearly I could have chosen not to, even if inevitably I will. The word "could" here is of course ambigious. I'm not saying that if you rewound the Universe I might have chosen differently -- on the other hand, pointing out I would still do the same action if the Universe and my psyche were in entirely the same state, is completely vacuous. If one knows my psyche inside out then in principle I am absolutely predictable. But clearly, prima facie, predictability does not in itself mean I have no free will. I am immediately implicitly aware of my ability to make choices which I feel averse to and therefore shall not make. This does not alter the fact I could have exercised my free will to make those choices. It might be true that everything I do stems from what I intrinsically am. But this cannot have any consequences for my free will.

Anyway, seems that this superior being might well be able to unfailingly predict all of my actions even if I have free will.

What is interesting is that Newcomb's paradox proves this is not so.



You are imagining that if there is money in both envelopes, that I could possibly choose to take both envelopes or not. If determinism is correct, and the being is that accurate at predicting what will happen, then I can't make that choice.

Yeah, to hell with what compatibilists think huh?? ;)

You're right, but only because I've just proved it in my opening post. Since our immediate experience tells us that we can indeed make that choice, then determinism is necessarily false.



So there is no logical contradiction.

I have proved otherwise.





Of course, the entire point is moot, since determinism (at least this type of determinism) is false. So I don't see how it could have any bearing on materialism anyway.

If you're thinking about QM, then this is entirely an irrelevancy as I keep persistingly telling you. I don't intend to keep explaining this to you.


II
The only way to deny this proof would be to endorse fatalism. Thus I won't get out of bed because everything that happens will happen anyway, so to speak.

Stimp
Exactly. But the thought experiment requires fatalism. Without it, the entire thought experiment is nonsense. Without fatalism, the being couldn't be that accurate. He could be defeated simply by basing your answer on some random process, such as electrical resistor noise.

No you can't base your answer on some random process. That's not allowed. You have to make the decision. Prima facie the being could be that accurate. Ok QM and chaos theory will ensure your environment will slightly change, thus possibly affecting your decision. But that's entirely uninteresting. It's not addressing the paradox. Just imagine you are placed in a virtual environment from the time of the being's prediction until your choice.



II
But our immediate experience of ourselves as causal agents clearly makes this a complete nonsense (and we all know it's wrong anyway, otherwise we'd all stay in bed!).

Stimp
No we wouldn't. Your argument here is self-defeating. You claim that we'd all just stay in bed, but this presumes that we would actually be able to choose to do so. If it is already determined that you would not, then you would not.

You say my argument is self-defeating then fail to explain why. I think you're getting determinism and fatalism confused.


II
It is also yet another refutation of materialism since we have shown that the origin of at least some of our actions are different from all physical events and processes.

Does anyone disagree with me?

Stimp
I do, on two counts:

1) This "paradox" doesn't refute determinism. Nor does it need to. Determinism has already been shown scientifically to be false.


I'm talking about determinism as its currently employed with some slight randomness thrown in by QM. This QM issue is entirely a red herring. Determinism and randomness are 2 sides of the same coin. The fact that there is a littele innate randomness thrown into the world has absolutely zero metaphysical implications.


2) Refuting determinism does not refute materialism, since materialism is quite compatible with quantum indeterminacy.

Again I state that I'm using determinsim as currently understood. This QM issue is entirely a red herring. It's a logical fallacy ito think it has any implications for my proof.

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,


Actually, you are mistaken. The fact of the matter is that all other processes in reality are innately unpredictable. At the quantum level, all events are unpredictable. Predictable behavior only comes about when you average many of these events together.

Even the Earth's behavior is unpredictable on a long enough time scale. In fact, it is both noisy and chaotic.


Dr. Stupid
You're saying the Earth might not always orbit the Sun? 5 billion years does not give a long enough time scale as far as I was aware.

Anyway, none of this alters the fact that a refutation of determinism (current sense of word) suggests a refutation of materialism.

Let's give the QM and chaos theory red herrings a rest shall we?? They have zero implications for the paradox.

As I say, imagine that you are in some virtual reality from the time the being makes its prediction until your choice.

[Interesting Ian]

I'm ignoring your posts zaardragon. I have absolutely 100% confidence that you have said nothing of any merit.

[Upchurch]

Again I state that I'm using determinsim as currently understood. This QM issue is entirely a red herring. It's a logical fallacy ito think it has any implications for my proof.Then you're not really refuting materialism, are you? At least not modern materialism.

It appears that this virtual environment that you are constructing is a strawman of materialism (a "strawism", perhaps?), which is easily defeated, rather than materialism itself.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian http://www.randi.org/forumlive/images/misc/backlink.gif (http://showthread.php?p=1208707#1208707)
Materialism holds that sentient beings and all other physical things and processes are of a similar ontological type. If the future actions of human beings are innately unpredictable, then the same must also be the case for all otehr processes within reality. But this doesn't appear to be so. WE think of physical laws as beuing universal. The Earth will always orbit the Sun whilst the Sun is there. The Earth's behaviour is not innately unpredictable.

Except that it is. There's a lot of work in the chaotic dynamics of the solar system, and, over the
long-term, the Earth will not necessarily always orbit the sun as long as the sun is there. (The
Solar System will almost certainly -- as in, almost all of our simulations agree that it will -- lose
a planet in the distant future due to orbital drift. It's not clear, because of how the orbits interact,
exactly which one it will be.)

I said innately unpredictable. Anyway, let's skip all the irrevelancies.



If something as simple as a large lump of rock falling is inherently unpredictable, how about human behavior? Even under materialism, it's logically consistent to assume that humans will never be predicted perfectly because the system is too complicated.

According to materialism then our behaviour is random. So sure, you wouldn't be able to predict behaviour. Where as if we are souls our behaviour might be perfectly predictable. I think all this misses the essence of the paradox though.

[Interesting Ian]

Then you're not really refuting materialism, are you? At least not modern materialism.


That's precisely what I'm refuting. What the hell are you talking about??



It appears that this virtual environment that you are constructing is a strawman of materialism (a "strawism", perhaps?), which is easily defeated, rather than materialism itself.

Look, until someone will actually talk about Newcomb's paradox I won't be responding. I have no interest in all these red herrings. Sorry.

[Interesting Ian]

I agree that in this world, such predictability is not possible. But that doesn't address the essence of the paradox, nor my refutation. We just need to imagine that we exist in another Universe which is not governed by QM, but appears to be entirely governed by Newtonian Mechanics.

My proof shows that we logically necessarily have libertarain free will i.e we have libertarian free will in all possible Universes including this one.

[Upchurch]

That's precisely what I'm refuting. What the hell are you talking about??But modern materialism does not include the determinism the environment you describe does. How can you be refuting materialism if don't even use a scenerio that is similar to or compatible with materialism?
Look, until someone will actually talk about Newcomb's paradox I won't be responding. I have no interest in all these red herrings. Sorry.If you merely want to discuss the paradox, that's fine. However, if you want to make the leap that it is a refutation of materialism, you need to justify why it is even applicable to materialism.

[Upchurch]

My proof shows that we logically necessarily have libertarain free will i.e we have libertarian free will in all possible Universes including this one.Assuming you're right about the logical necessity, (1) what does that have to do with materialism and (2) how do you make the leap from a Newtonian universe to ours?

[Interesting Ian]

But modern materialism does not include the determinism the environment you describe does. How can you be refuting materialism if don't even use a scenerio that is similar to or compatible with materialism?
If you merely want to discuss the paradox, that's fine. However, if you want to make the leap that it is a refutation of materialism, you need to justify why it is even applicable to materialism.
Because randomness no more allows for free will then determinism! They are 2 sides of the same coin.

Nah, if anything less so.

Sheesh!

[Interesting Ian]

From that same website:


"I have put this problem to a large number of people, both friends and students in class," Nozick wrote in the 1969 article. "To almost everyone it is perfectly clear and obvious what should be done. The difficulty is that these people seem to divide almost evenly on the problem, with large numbers thinking that the opposing half is just being silly." When Martin Gardner presented Newcomb's Problem in 1973 in his Scientific American column, the enormous volume of mail it elicited ran in favor of the one-box solution by a 5-to-2 ratio.


I wonder if people in this enormous volume of mail also droned on about QM and chaos theory :rolleyes:

[Interesting Ian]

None of this randomness nonsense has any relevance anyway since the original thought experiment doesn't specify that the being can predict with 100%; just very very close to 100%.

How many people agree or disgree with Stimp that it is rational to just choose the one box?

[Roboramma]

Because randomness no more allows for free will then determinism! They are 2 sides of the same coin.

Nah, if anything less so.

Sheesh!
What's your point? If there is randomness in this universe then clearly a materialistic explanation of this universe has to take that into account, in which case it can't be deterministic. Just because you don't have free will doesn't mean you have determinism.

[Roboramma]

I agree that in this world, such predictability is not possible. But that doesn't address the essence of the paradox, nor my refutation. We just need to imagine that we exist in another Universe which is not governed by QM, but appears to be entirely governed by Newtonian Mechanics.

My proof shows that we logically necessarily have libertarain free will i.e we have libertarian free will in all possible Universes including this one.
Huh?
So what you're saying is that materialism is false because in some made up universe it couldn't work?
If materialism in this universe isn't deterministic, then your paradox fails. You can't get around it by saying, "yes, but imagine it was!" And then say that proves that in this universe that paradox still holds.

Unless you can make the paradox work in this universe, it can't apply to this universe.

[Upchurch]

Please expand on how you reached your conclusion that free will is a logical necessity.

[Kevin_Lowe]

My proof shows that we logically necessarily have libertarain free will i.e we have libertarian free will in all possible Universes including this one.

It looks to me like you just snuck libertarian free will into your premises.

Even if that's not and end to the matter right there, at best you can claim to have proven that we have libertarian free will in all possible universes in which our actions can be predicted with absolute certainty, since the thought experiment cannot take place in or apply to other universes.

That would still leave you with the problem of proving that we live in a universe in which our actions can be predicted with absolute certainty, of course. I predict with absolute certainty that you will be unable to prove this. :)

[Roboramma]

None of this randomness nonsense has any relevance anyway since the original thought experiment doesn't specify that the being can predict with 100%; just very very close to 100%.[/b]
But how do you know how close to 100% is possible in this universe? You are, after all, trying to show that this cannot be a deterministic universe, and that therefore materialism is false? I'm not sure, but I think that's your argument.
But if we admit that this universe isn't deterministic, but that the indeterminicy comes not from some outside influence (the soul for instance) but rather from the way that matter itself interacts, then your argument no longer holds.

[drkitten]

Anyway, none of this alters the fact that a refutation of determinism (current sense of word) suggests a refutation of materialism.


Well, it does, actually -- in that at least three people on this thread have constructed possible-world scenarios that are non-deterministic and materialistic.

[Interesting Ian]

What's your point? If there is randomness in this universe then clearly a materialistic explanation of this universe has to take that into account, in which case it can't be deterministic. Just because you don't have free will doesn't mean you have determinism.

My point is that all this talk about randomness due to QM has zero relevance to my argument.

That's my point.

Just suppose the being has very close to 100% predictive powers and we can forget about all this irrelevant nonsense.

[Oleron]

I'll second Roboramma's opinion. The paradox is set in a universe where a supreme being can 100% accurately predict the future. That is not this universe, it is an alternate one.

The answer to the paradox is that the supreme being is not 100% accurate all the time. In our universe the supreme being could surely only ever be 99.999etc% accurate - the possibility for error exists.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian http://www.randi.org/forumlive/images/misc/backlink.gif (showthread.php?p=1208871#1208871)
I agree that in this world, such predictability is not possible. But that doesn't address the essence of the paradox, nor my refutation. We just need to imagine that we exist in another Universe which is not governed by QM, but appears to be entirely governed by Newtonian Mechanics.

My proof shows that we logically necessarily have libertarain free will i.e we have libertarian free will in all possible Universes including this one.



Huh?
So what you're saying is that materialism is false because in some made up universe it couldn't work?



Oh God . . .

Yes I am. But forget about that. Just imagine the being only has close to 100% predictive powers. I never thought of that before.


If materialism in this universe isn't deterministic, then your paradox fails. You can't get around it by saying, "yes, but imagine it was!" And then say that proves that in this universe that paradox still holds.

Unless you can make the paradox work in this universe, it can't apply to this universe.

The paradox works. Just imagine the being only has close to 100% predictive powers. Or imagine a logically possible Universe which is apparently wholly deterministic. Makes no difference.

[drkitten]

The paradox works. Just imagine the being only has close to 100% predictive powers.

There is no paradox.

There are rather obviously -- your own data supports this -- two different "camps" of opinion on this one. The being, being very good at practical psychology, simply observes your behavior and deterrmines which camp you are in. (He might even be able to do it with a personality test -- for example, there might be a strong correlation between people who believe in determinism and people who would only take the single box.) Having observed you, he predicts that you (specifically) are in the "take a single box" camp (or not), fills the boxes appropriately on the basis of his prediction, and presents you with your choice.

If close to 100% of the people behave in such predictable ways (fall into such camps), then the being is obviously possible and non-paradoxical. If a substantial minority of people do not behave predictably (a scenario I find unlikely), then the being is by definition impossible.

Either way, this has nothing to do with materialism. I can make predictions with extremely high accuracy about non-material "stuff" (for example, any randomly chosen real number is probably not a rational one), and there are purely material objects that I can't predict for toffee.

Or imagine a logically possible Universe which is apparently wholly deterministic. Makes no difference.

So this "imagined, logically possible Universe" is somehow different than your previous previous "in some made up universe"?

[Z]

In spite of Ignorant Ian's lies, hypocracy, and sheer ignorance, I shall continue to reply for the benefit of others.

Let's look at this paragraph, shall we?

Now I am not pre-supposing the non-existence of determinism (given that we understand determinism to entail absolute predictability in principle). For example you might be absolutely 100% confident that if I see a £20 note on the street I will pick it up and pocket it. Now clearly I could have chosen not to, even if inevitably I will. The word "could" here is of course ambigious. I'm not saying that if you rewound the Universe I might have chosen differently -- on the other hand, pointing out I would still do the same action if the Universe and my psyche were in entirely the same state, is completely vacuous. If one knows my psyche inside out then in principle I am absolutely predictable. But clearly, prima facie, predictability does not in itself mean I have no free will. I am immediately implicitly aware of my ability to make choices which I feel averse to and therefore shall not make. This does not alter the fact I could have exercised my free will to make those choices. It might be true that everything I do stems from what I intrinsically am. But this cannot have any consequences for my free will.

Does this paragraph strike anyone else as being childishly contradictory?

"Sure, everything I do and am could be predetermined, and sure I would choose the same way every time under the exact same circumstances, but that doesn't affect my free will."

Um, duh, clearly it DOES affect your so-called 'free will', if every single time you are presented with the same set of circumstances, you will always 'choose' the same way. In fact, the fallacy is to look back and claim you 'could have' chosen something different - in a purely deterministic universe, you could not have. Every single 'choice' had no option but to come out as it did. The imaginary universe Ian posits does nothing to disprove determinism or materialism. Once again, Ian fails.

Why do you all feed this troll, though? Why do I feed this troll? When he continues to lie, to be a hypocrite, and to demonstrate his growing ignorance and vast stupidity... yet here we are, each in our own way fueling this debate.

I guess - because it's bloody good fun!

[Interesting Ian]

But how do you know how close to 100% is possible in this universe?

Now that's a tough one. So explore my logically possible Universe scenario then.



You are, after all, trying to show that this cannot be a deterministic universe, and that therefore materialism is false?


As I keep telling people, I don't really know what determinism means. Because of this paradox it cannot be the case that we live in a Universe where our actions can be predicted with absolute certainly. Nor indeed a Universe where the probability is precisely quantifiable such as 99% or 90% or 50% or whatever. Here we're talking about the same type of probability as when we toss a coin and say the chance of heads is 50%. However a more loose form of probability can apply. Here I'm talking about the type of probability where say the bookies give an estimation that there is a 50% chance of a team winning a soccer match. But of course that is unlikely to be the real probability.

All this is getting needlessly complex though.


I'm not sure, but I think that's your argument.
But if we admit that this universe isn't deterministic, but that the indeterminicy comes not from some outside influence (the soul for instance) but rather from the way that matter itself interacts, then your argument no longer holds.
It does hold because this is an irrelevancy. A red herring so to speak. Consider a Universe which is apparently wholly determined. Now if it is impossible for my actions to be wholly predictable in that Universe -- and it seems to me this is so -- and yet for my behaviour not to be random but initiated by acts of free will, then introducing some innate randomness into that Universe (to make the Universe like ours) wouldn't alter that truth, would it?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

The thought experiment assumes that absolute predictability is in principle possible. If that equates to determinism, or determinism is a prerequisite of such absolute predictability, then yes.
It is. As I already mentioned, without determinism, one could easily destroy the being's perfect accuracy by simply choosing randomly.

The problem is that you are assuming some sort of non-deterministic free-will here.
Not as a premise. No, I am assuming a non- fatalistic free-will here. What the hell's the difference you might ask. It's a very subtle complex issue, but fatalism means that everything that does happen shall inevitably happen.
So does determinism.

But at the moment of our decision we are aware of the power of our own causal agency to make either choice. Fatalism directly contradicts the implicit recognition of our own causal agency to make either chioce.
So does determinism.

The contradiction comes about in our certainty that we do in fact make choices. Even if the choices I make can be described by physical laws, it is simply a plain fact that I do make choices.
Your assumption that the decision you will make is not already fixed and inevitable before you make it, contradicts determinism. Thus you are assuming that determinism is false.

Look at it this way. Determinism implies fatalism. So if you assume a non-fatalistic free-will, then you are assuming that determinism is false.

The word "could" here is of course ambigious. I'm not saying that if you rewound the Universe I might have chosen differently -- on the other hand, pointing out I would still do the same action if the Universe and my psyche were in entirely the same state, is completely vacuous. If one knows my psyche inside out then in principle I am absolutely predictable. But clearly, prima facie, predictability does not in itself mean I have no free will.
That depends on what you mean by "free-will". 100% predictability implies fatalism, which implies no non-fatalistic free-will.

Anyway, seems that this superior being might well be able to unfailingly predict all of my actions even if I have free will.
Not if you have a non-fatalistic free-will. If you do, then you could easily destroy his 100% prediction rate by simply choosing at random.

What is interesting is that Newcomb's paradox proves this is not so.
Newcomb's paradox only proves that determinism is not compatible with non-deterministic free-will, which is trivially true.

You're right, but only because I've just proved it in my opening post. Since our immediate experience tells us that we can indeed make that choice, then determinism is necessarily false.
I agree that if we could reasonably conclude from our subjective feeling of being able to make unconstrained choices, that we actually can do so, then that would prove determinism false. I do not agree that we can reasonably draw that conclusion, though, since we could simply be mistaken. The point is moot, though, since as I have already pointed out, we already know that determinism is false.

So there is no logical contradiction.
I have proved otherwise.
There is no logical contradiction in the thought experiment you quoted. The contradiction comes from your added assumption of non-fatalistic free-will, which contradicts the assumptions of the thought experiment.

Exactly. But the thought experiment requires fatalism. Without it, the entire thought experiment is nonsense. Without fatalism, the being couldn't be that accurate. He could be defeated simply by basing your answer on some random process, such as electrical resistor noise.
No you can't base your answer on some random process. That's not allowed. You have to make the decision.
Says who? And what does that even mean, anyway? It is not possible for me to not have my decision be influenced by external sensory input. If any of those influences are random, then by decision cannot be predicted with 100% accuracy. End of story.

Anyway, if we accept your premise of non-fatalistic free-will, then I can just pick at random without any external influence.

The point is that it is not logically possible for him to be 100% accurate (except due to chance), if the choice I will make is not determined at the time he makes his prediction.

This is simple math. If, at the time he makes his prediction, his analysis of whatever information he bases his prediction on, says that there is a 90% chance of one option, and a 10% chance of the other, then he will only have a 90% success rate in his predictions.

The only way his predictions can be 100% accurate (short of just coincidence), is if the choice is already determined when he makes his prediction.

No we wouldn't. Your argument here is self-defeating. You claim that we'd all just stay in bed, but this presumes that we would actually be able to choose to do so. If it is already determined that you would not, then you would not.
You say my argument is self-defeating then fail to explain why.
I did just explain why. If we don't have free-will, then we don't get to decide whether we will just stay in bed or not.

I think you're getting determinism and fatalism confused.
Not at all. Determinism implies fatalism.

I'm talking about determinism as its currently employed with some slight randomness thrown in by QM.
Then the whole thought experiment goes out the window, because in the real world the being could not possibly be anywhere near 100% accurate.

This QM issue is entirely a red herring. Determinism and randomness are 2 sides of the same coin. The fact that there is a littele innate randomness thrown into the world has absolutely zero metaphysical implications.
But it has tremendous implications to this thought experiment. It means that the very premise of it is false.

You're saying the Earth might not always orbit the Sun? 5 billion years does not give a long enough time scale as far as I was aware.
That is exactly what I am saying. Over billions of years the orbit could get perturbed enough by the other planets to cause the orbit to become extremely eccentric. Then all it takes is for it to crash into another planet, or the sun, or it could get slingshotted right out of the solar system. And that is not even considering possible influences by extra-solar objects.

Anyway, none of this alters the fact that a refutation of determinism (current sense of word) suggests a refutation of materialism.
But you have not refuted this weaker form of determinism, since the premise of the thought experiment is incompatible with it.

And even if it were possible for the being to be 100% accurate in our world, that would still not prove anything. Like I said before, it could just be that your subjective feeling that you have some sort of non-fatalistic free-will, is wrong. Do you not acknowledge that this is possible?

As I say, imagine that you are in some virtual reality from the time the being makes its prediction until your choice.
I already did this.

Look. It's really simple. What this thought experiment shows is that we have (at least) two mutually exclusive possibilities.

1) That a being could, given enough information about the current state of the world, and enough computational power, predict with 100% accuracy which choice you will make.

2) That you possess non-fatalistic free-will.

All we can conclude from the thought experiment is that these two possibilities cannot both be true. We cannot conclude from this that materialism is false, because materialism does not require (1) to be true at all.

QM never enters into it. Nor do things like natural laws. It all boils down to the above two possibilities. If (2) is true, then the being can't predict with 100% accuracy. It is just that simple.

I agree that in this world, such predictability is not possible. But that doesn't address the essence of the paradox, nor my refutation. We just need to imagine that we exist in another Universe which is not governed by QM, but appears to be entirely governed by Newtonian Mechanics.

My proof shows that we logically necessarily have libertarain free will i.e we have libertarian free will in all possible Universes including this one.
No it doesn't. Do you even understand what circular reasoning is? Your "proof" starts with the assumption of free-will!

As I said in my first response to you, if we do not assume non-fatalistic free-will, then there is no logical contradiction. If the being predicted that you would choose only one envelope, then you can't possibly choose both. Your response to this was that we innately know that we could. So all you are doing is asserting that we already know we have non-fatalistic free-will, and then concluding from this that we do.

If you wish to simply argue that we have Libertarian free-will because of your certainty that we do, then the thought experiment is unnecessary. If we do not begin with that assumption, there is no way you can derive it from the thought experiment.

As usual, your "proof" is nothing more than question-begging.


Dr.Stupid

[drkitten]

Does this paragraph strike anyone else as being childishly contradictory?

"Sure, everything I do and am could be predetermined, and sure I would choose the same way every time under the exact same circumstances, but that doesn't affect my free will."


No. The point here is more subtle than your "childishly contradictory" description seems to accept.

There is a rather big difference between the ability to do something and the choice to do something. For example, given a choice between steak and crab for dinner, I will choose steak, because I don't like crabmeat. Given the exact same circumstances, I will always choose steak, because the circumstances still include the fact that I don't like crabmeat.

And yet I would be very loathe to say that I have been predetermined to choose steak; I have a very strong intuition that I could choose the crab if I wanted to (but I don't want to). I can even come up with a slightly altered set of circumstances (perhaps I'm dating someone who wants to impress me by taking me to the best crab house in town, and I don't want to provoke a fight) where I would choose the crab and choke it down.

It's possible for someone, via the exercise of free will, to always choose the same course because it appears to them to be the "right" course. Despite having the ability to do otherwise, one may freely choose always to take the same path.

[Z]

It does hold because this is an irrelevancy. A red herring so to speak. Consider a Universe which is apparently wholly determined. Now if it is impossible for my actions to be wholly predictable in that Universe -- and it seems to me this is so -- and yet for my behaviour not to be random but initiated by acts of free will, then introducing some innate randomness into that Universe (to make the Universe like ours) wouldn't alter that truth, would it?

If a universe is wholly determined, then actions are also wholly predictable within that universe. If acts of free will must be introduced, and not accounted for by randomness, then the universe is not, in fact, wholly determined.

I wonder if Ian even knows what he's trying to say anymore? He's slipping like lifegazer, I think... :D

[Z]

No. The point here is more subtle than your "childishly contradictory" description seems to accept.

There is a rather big difference between the ability to do something and the choice to do something. For example, given a choice between steak and crab for dinner, I will choose steak, because I don't like crabmeat. Given the exact same circumstances, I will always choose steak, because the circumstances still include the fact that I don't like crab meat.

And yet I would be very loathe to say that I have been predetermined to choose steak; I have a very strong intuition that I could choose the crab if I wanted to (but I don't want to). I can even come up with a slightly altered set of circumstances (perhaps I'm dating someone who wants to impress me by taking me to the best crab house in town, and I don't want to provoke a fight) where I would choose the crab and choke it down.

It's possible for someone, via the exercise of free will, to always choose the same course because it appears to them to be the "right" course. Despite having the ability to do otherwise, one may freely choose always to take the same path.

This is still not absolute free will, though. Your 'very strong intuition' is the result of innumerable physical factors that lead you to choose steak every time - there is no free will there. Even if, after this conversation, you willingly choose crab, it is only because the brain paths have been set counter to their normal course by way of the thought processes involved in this very conversation. Likewise, your 'wanting to impress' scenario is nothing more than external material events altering the course of the pathways once more. (And it's even more likely, actually, that you would choose a non-crab dish on the menu and let your impressee have the crab).

This is the problem I have with the concept of absolute free will. Practical free will, I am just fine with. But absolute free will simply cannot exist.

Consider a different scenario: You're at your fave restaurant, and there's a choice between your two absolute favorite dishes. How do you choose?

At this point you may think that free will takes a part, but does it really? Doesn't your body/brain at this point begin weighing and balancing factors to determine which choice is best? Which one have you had most recently? What did you have for the last meal? Did you have a conversation about fat and butter, causing you to subconsciously choose the lower fat dish? Is one image more appealing than the other? Was your mom just talking to you about one dish? Etc. etc.

I've been noticing, more and more as the years pass, that all of our so-called 'free choices' are not as free as we might like to think. Free will is a useful practical illusion - but in the end, it is really just that: an illusion.

[Interesting Ian]

There is no paradox.

There are rather obviously -- your own data supports this -- two different "camps" of opinion on this one. The being, being very good at practical psychology, simply observes your behavior and deterrmines which camp you are in. (He might even be able to do it with a personality test -- for example, there might be a strong correlation between people who believe in determinism and people who would only take the single box.) Having observed you, he predicts that you (specifically) are in the "take a single box" camp (or not), fills the boxes appropriately on the basis of his prediction, and presents you with your choice.

If close to 100% of the people behave in such predictable ways (fall into such camps), then the being is obviously possible and non-paradoxical. If a substantial minority of people do not behave predictably (a scenario I find unlikely), then the being is by definition impossible.


All very true. The being knows precisely how I think at the time he makes his prediction. He will know that I think it is utterly irrational just to choose the one box (and it is!), so he will leave box "b" empty. At the time of my decision I will understand that the being knew that I think it is utterly irrational to choose just the one box. So what do I do? It still remains the case that it is utterly irrational to choose the one box. To repeat that website:

suppose the backs of the boxes are made of glass and your wife is sitting on the other side of the table. She can plainly see what's in each box. You know which choice she wants you to make: Take both boxes!
We can even imagine her saying, "you will get £1000 extra if you pick both boxes!" Is she wrong? No of course not! I will get nothing if I choose just box b. I will get £1000 if I choose both boxes. There is no backward causality here.

The paradox is difficult to grasp, but it resides in the notion that I inevitably will choose both boxes. It's ignoring the possibility for example that I could "randomise" in my own mind to choose. More specifically I couldn't choose randomly, but I could choose arbitrarily. We know we can because we immediately experience our own causal agency to make choices, and moreover to make choices we are averse to!

That's the paradox which needs to be resolved.

[drkitten]

This is still not absolute free will, though. Your 'very strong intuition' is the result of innumerable physical factors that lead you to choose steak every time - there is no free will there.

That's a theory, certainly.

My point is not that my intuition is proof that I have free will. Even I'm not stupid enough to offer that. But you're putting the cart before the horse -- if you assume that "absolute free will" cannot exist (a position, you apparently hold), then of course you can offer scenarios under which the illusion of free will is offered to me by virtue of brain states.

But that only applies if you subscribe a priori to a disbelief in absolute free will:


This is the problem I have with the concept of absolute free will. Practical free will, I am just fine with. But absolute free will simply cannot exist.


I don't see how you can make this statement. "Absolute free will" is one of those unfalsifiable concepts like the Invisible Pink Unicorn or the Watchmaker God. Disbelief, I can accept. But outright denial seems to go beyond what can be concluded from the available evidence.

[Roboramma]

It's possible for someone, via the exercise of free will, to always choose the same course because it appears to them to be the "right" course. Despite having the ability to do otherwise, one may freely choose always to take the same path.

Maybe there's a problem with using the word choise here. On the one hand, saying that you have a choise between crab and steak is meaningful in that you know that if cirumstances were different, you might change your mind. You can also be held accountable for your actions. You can say to yourself "if I had acted differently in that situation, it might have turned out better." If there is no such thing as choise, to say "If I had acted differently..." means nothing.
All this argues that the idea of choise is valuable. It's worthwhile to believe that we have a choise in these situations.

On the other hand, what exactly does it mean when we say "If I had acted differently"? We can't be suggesting the we could have acted differently. We didn't, how could we have?
I don't know.

My own problem is that I really don't know what anyone means when they say "free will".

[drkitten]

All very true. The being knows precisely how I think at the time he makes his prediction. He will know that I think it is utterly irrational just to choose the one box (and it is!), so he will leave box "b" empty. At the time of my decision I will understand that the being knew that I think it is utterly irrational to choose just the one box. So what do I do? It still remains the case that it is utterly irrational to choose the one box.

And knowing that you are the sort that has written that and would follow that line of reasoning, I -- or the being -- have placed nothing in Box B.

Where's the paradox?


The paradox is difficult to grasp, but it resides in the notion that I inevitably will choose both boxes. It's ignoring the possibility for example that I could "randomise" in my own mind to choose. More specifically I couldn't choose randomly, but I could choose arbitrarily. We know we can because we immediately experience our own causal agency to make choices, and moreover to make choices we are averse to!

That's the paradox which needs to be resolved.

There is no paradox. If you are the sort of reasoner who can complete the chain of reasoning outlined in the previous paragraph, then the being's prediction has a 50/50 chance of being wrong. If enough people are that sort of reasoner, then the being cannot exist (and there is no paradox, only a silly scenario predicated on a false assumption). If the set of people who would choose to randomize is small enough, then the being will only be predicting "with high accuracy," because the number of people who are inherently unpredictable is sufficiently small.

And this still has bugger-all to do with materialism.

[Upchurch]

I just realized the circular argument from the OP:
The only way to deny this proof would be to endorse fatalism. {snip} If we do have a genuine choice which I don't think any sane person would deny, then this "paradox" necessarily shows that determinism cannot possible be true.

{snip} I now have realised in the past 18 hours that we necessarily have libertarian free will. Newcomb's paradox demonstrates this, and demonstrates that determinism does not and indeed could not characterise reality.
Ian assumes we have free will (because to do otherwise is fatalism and, thus, "insane") to conclude that we have free will. As far as that goes, I have to agree that if we assume A, A is true out of logical necessity. It is not necessarily true out side of that particular logical statement, however. The claim that free will is true in this argument is ultimately based on the assumption that we have it to make our own choice in the first place.

It further assumes that the superiorly intelligent Being is not smart enough to take the effect of its own prediction into account when calculating its prediction. :D You have a situation where the Being is nearly 100% accurate in the short term, but whose accuracy on any one prediction goes down with time due to new information being introduced to the system (i.e. the prediction itself, knowledge of the results of previous predictions, etc.). This is certainly an argument against 100% predicitability co-existing with free will, but that's about it.

[Interesting Ian]

Stimp,

I do indeed presuppose the existence of free will in my argument. I take it that the reality of free will is self-evident. But prima facie free will does not seem to necessarily contradict the notion that my actions are in principle wholly predictable. I think this is obvious. Yet Newcomb's paradox appears to me to refute this.

[Z]

That's a theory, certainly.

My point is not that my intuition is proof that I have free will. Even I'm not stupid enough to offer that. But you're putting the cart before the horse -- if you assume that "absolute free will" cannot exist (a position, you apparently hold), then of course you can offer scenarios under which the illusion of free will is offered to me by virtue of brain states.

Perhaps it is better stated that it is unlikely, given the current evidence, that absolute free will can exist.

I don't see how you can make this statement. "Absolute free will" is one of those unfalsifiable concepts like the Invisible Pink Unicorn or the Watchmaker God. Disbelief, I can accept. But outright denial seems to go beyond what can be concluded from the available evidence.

Unfalsifiable, perhaps presently. However, in time, I think we will have it in our power to prove or disprove this concept. If all present absolute brain-states are fully taken into account, and a prediction made about the choice a person will make under absolutely controlled circumstances, and that person can repeatedly make a choice contrary to prediction - then we can prove either that a) absolute free will does exist, after all, or b) that some factor was not taken into account. Yet if all factors are accounted for, then 'absolute free will' could well be the 'unknown factor'.

But let me restate this way: I do not believe that absolute free will is possible under determinism, under materialism, or under any theology with an omniscient and omnipotent god. But of course, I might be wrong.

Thank you for pointing out my problem...

[Interesting Ian]

I just realized the circular argument from the OP:

Ian assumes we have free will (because to do otherwise is fatalism and, thus, "insane") to conclude that we have free will.

Not quite. Amend that to say:

'Ian assumes we have free will (because to do otherwise is fatalism and, thus, "insane") to conclude that we have libertarian free will'.

So not circular or question begging -- or at least not in the way suggested.

[Z]

Stimp,

I do indeed presuppose the existence of free will in my argument. I take it that the reality of free will is self-evident. But Priam facie free will does not seem to necessarily contradict the notion that my actions are in principle wholly predictable. I think this is obvious. Yet Newcomb's paradox appears to me to refute this.

If free will - by which, of course, I mean absolute free will - does exist, then necessarily your actions are not wholly predictable. They may be largely predictable, even to 99% accuracy - but they will never be considered 'wholly predictable'.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I do indeed presuppose the existence of free will in my argument. I take it that the reality of free will is self-evident. But prima facie free will does not seem to necessarily contradict the notion that my actions are in principle wholly predictable. I think this is obvious. Yet Newcomb's paradox appears to me to refute this.
Well then, what you should say is not that the paradox proves that we have free-will (it doesn't), nor that it disproves materialism (it doesn't), but rather that it shows that if we have free-will, then our actions cannot be wholly predictable. That conclusion I would agree with. Indeed, it is just a restatement of what I said earlier: That if our actions can be perfectly predicted, then we do not have any sort of non-fatalistic free-will.

I do not believe in the sort of free-will you are suggesting, nor do I believe that perfect prediction of future choices is possible.

'Ian assumes we have free will (because to do otherwise is fatalism and, thus, "insane") to conclude that we have libertarian free will'.
Could you explain what the difference is between the generic non-fatalistic free-will you have assumed, and the libertarian free-will you claim to be able to conclude, is? And after you do that, could you explain how you draw that conclusion?

And after you do that, could you explain why anybody should accept your premise of a non-fatalistic free-will in the first place?


Dr. Stupid

[Melendwyr]

Generic free will: Your actions aren't the result of any deterministic process, yet they're also neither random nor causeless. Why? It's magic!

Libertarian free will: Microorganisms will migrate away from toxic conditions. Plants usually grow towards light. Animals will learn strategies that result in their getting food. People will seek out the best choices available to them.

[Dancing David]

Hiya Ian,,

I see the weak link in this argument being the supossition of the supernatural predictive being. (Since that would be outside materialism, I can't see it as a refutation of materialism, second the assumption that such being would try to give you the million dollars. Sya that I might die in a car accident when I get the million dollars and end my life before I make the cure for cancer, the being may choose to not give me the million dollars.)


It is also yet another refutation of materialism since we have shown that the origin of at least some of our actions are different from all physical events and processes.


I missed that part could you kindly show it to me again?

[drkitten]

Generic free will: Your actions aren't the result of any deterministic process, yet they're also neither random nor causeless. Why? It's magic!

Libertarian free will: Microorganisms will migrate away from toxic conditions. Plants usually grow towards light. Animals will learn strategies that result in their getting food. People will seek out the best choices available to them.

That isn't a definition. It isn't even a meaningful set of examples, since it argues on two separate levels. Your description of "generic free will" is a causal description, and your description of "libertarian" is a description of effects. I don't even have any reason to believe they describe separate concepts.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

... but rather that it shows that if we have free-will, then our actions cannot be wholly predictable. I realize it's probably obvious, but let me just point out that this is the only definition of libertarian free will that anyone has ever offered. As Melendwyr has pointed out (using funky terms), an actual description of a mechanism for libertarian free will has never been offered. I daresay the concept is incoherent.

~~ Paul

[Beerina]

It cannot possible be sensible just to take box B since it is already the case that B either has the money within it or it doesn't. Your choice per se does not change anything.

We need to bear in mind that it is not our actual choice which dictates what the superior being will beforehand place in each of the 2 boxes, but rather our intention to choose at that time he makes the prediction.

Let's assume the being figures out you'll think all this. Then the being will not put the million in B because he suspects you'll take both. But you, too, are rational, and realize this. So you can't take both.

So you're back to just choosing B. The being realizes this, and puts the million in it for you. You, still being rational, realize this, and go back to wanting to take both boxes. The being realizes this, and takes the million back out. You realize that, and go back to choosing only B.

Ad infinitum.

What I'd do is choose B. That's the safest thing. I'm not gonna risk a million dollars just to get 1.001 million dollars.

And if I were that stupid, I'd decide I was going to roll the dice as to whether to pick both. Now the being has no possible idea which I'll choose. Hence they, too, will decide to place the money (or not) with 50% accuracy. That's better than 0%, which is pretty much guaranteed if I choose both.

Rolling a die, though, is actually a pretty poor choice on my part, hence picking B seems to be the logical and only real choice.

Complete and total prediction must be in principle impossible. Indeed it must be logically impossible.

Yes, for the reason I outlined above. When both sides magically know what the other will choose, you end up with this. Statistics from previous, presumably rational players, show this. Those who choose both almost never get the million.

The only possible way for a being to predict this would be to basically run a simulation of your brain, and see what you chose. Even though you know this, you cannot take advantage of that, because your simulated brain will take advantage of it, too, and "let the cat out of the bag".

You, too, could run a simulation of your brain, see what you chose, then choose the opposite, but the being could run this grander simulation, too, and get the result that way.

However...you could, I suppose, run a simulation of the being and see what they chose. If this were possible, you could gain the advantage by running the simulation only after they had placed the money. Then you would be simulating them simulating you, to the same accuracy the being chose to simulate you. But this would require godlike powers on your part, too.

Of course, you and it simulating each other simulating each other simulating each other ad infinitum basically amounts to the same problem as above. Even a godlike being simulating it to infinity would not arrive at a conclusion anymore than they could tell you what the last digit of PI is. It doesn't exist.

However, if you can encapsulate everything the being is doing, using your godlike powers, you could gain the 100% advantage since you can simulate all reality including that being's thoughts up to the point the being placed (or did not place) the money. Advantage: godlike you!

But wait! Would you?

Here's the part that makes your brain really hurt: If the being knew this, i.e. that you could accurately simulate all reality up to the point of money placement, including what the being itself was deciding, and that you could do this after the placement, and it's reasonable it would realize this, it would know you'd always get 1.001 million if it placed the money, and hence it would not place the million.

Third base!

[chulbert]

It's unclear to me how the introduction of "a day" changes anything at all. The time between when the genie stocks the boxes and the time you make a selection is non-zero in all cases. How does increasing it from a few seconds to an entire day change anything?

[Melendwyr]

That isn't a definition. It isn't even a meaningful set of examples, since it argues on two separate levels. Your description of "generic free will" is a causal description, and your description of "libertarian" is a description of effects. I don't even have any reason to believe they describe separate concepts. What don't you understand? Generic free will is self-contradiction that's hand-waved away. Libertarian free will is causality and probablity.

Example: natural selection. Creatures with traits that make them more likely to pass on their genes tend to have more offspring, resulting in more creatures with those traits. What causes the "more likely" to predominate? Causality and probablity.

[drkitten]

What don't you understand? Generic free will is self-contradiction that's hand-waved away. Libertarian free will is causality and probablity.

Example: natural selection. Creatures with traits that make them more likely to pass on their genes tend to have more offspring, resulting in more creatures with those traits. What causes the "more likely" to predominate? Causality and probablity.

Well, to start with, I don't understand what "causality and probability" have to do with "will."

No philosopher that I know of would believe, for example, that bacteria have "free will" (which is, like it or not, a term with substantial philosophical and semantic baggage attached). In order to have free will, a creature needs to achieve a certain cognitive level. Many philosophers, particularly the more religiously inclined, would deny that animals of any sort have free will.

For example, many definitions I've seen for "free will" involve choices. "the partial freedom of the agent, in acts of conscious choice, from the determining compulsion of heredity, environment and circumstance." "the power of making free choices unconstrained by external agencies" "Free will is the philosophical doctrine that holds that our choices are ultimately up to ourselves." Bacteria cannot choose.

And yet bacteria evolve. This isn't "free will," whether democratic, republican, green, whig, tory, labour, or libertarian.

[Melendwyr]

No philosopher that I know of would believe, for example, that bacteria have "free will" [blinks] So? Most philosophers are idiots.

For example, many definitions I've seen for "free will" involve choices. "the partial freedom of the agent, in acts of conscious choice, from the determining compulsion of heredity, environment and circumstance." "the power of making free choices unconstrained by external agencies" What about internal agencies? (And since no human being is ever unconstrained by external agencies, that definition is rather useless.)

"Free will is the philosophical doctrine that holds that our choices are ultimately up to ourselves." Bacteria cannot choose. Says who? None of those definitions rules out bacteria having free will any more than they rule out anything having free will.

[drkitten]

[blinks] So? Most philosophers are idiots.

Perhaps, but they're generally remarkably well-informed idiots.


None of those definitions rules out bacteria having free will any more than they rule out anything having free will.

No, but they do rule out bacterial evolution being an example of free will.

Bacteria exposed to antibiotics die. They don't have a choice about dying -- they are compelled by "environment" and "external agency" to do so. Lucky bacteria with the right sort of genes do not die, but again, not by choice. Since living bacteria reproduce, and dead ones do not, the ones that reproduce will be the ones immune to the antibiotic. Evolution -- but no free will.

"Free will" obviously only applies (to humans) in choices where there is no compulsion (among the choices being offered). I can't "choose" (via free will) to fly like a bird or teleport to work, but I can "choose" -- no one is compelling me in an obvious way -- whether to walk, bus, drive, or taxi. External circumstances compel me not to fly, but there is no (obvious) compulsion to cause me to take a taxi. In this sense, the choice of walking or not is "free of external compulsion."

If you believe that I am genuinely free from compulsion when I choose to walk -- that is free will. A cognitive act that requires capacities that bacteria have never been shown to demonstrate in the slightest capacity for. If you believe (as apparently zaayrdragon does) that I am somehow still "compelled" by agencies external to myself -- my environment, my heredity, my brain chemistry -- then you deny the existence of "free will," but not the definition.

Either way, your suggested definition of "libertarian free will" has nothing to do with liberty, freedom, or will.

[Freakshow]

What do hypothetical scenarios about supreme beings and magic have to do with reality? How does such a scenario refute or affirm anything?

[Z]

It doesn't FS - you can go back to torturing your gerbils. :D

[Freakshow]

It doesn't FS - you can go back to torturing your gerbils. :D
:D

Interesting bit of trivia...did you know that Vlad Tepes (AKA Vlad The Impaler, AKA Son of Dracul, AKA Dracula) continued his impalement fetish even while in prison? He would impale the rats that he found in his cell. Bizarre...

[Z]

Evidence, please?

:p

[Freakshow]

Evidence, please?

:p

Google, dude, Google. :)

He actually started impaling at a young age. Birds and rats. That was one F***ed up guy. Too bad atypical antipsychotics didn't come about for another 500+ years.

[Z]

Wasn't there a similar story about Mussolini circulating - that this guy would torture and mutilate his pets, even as a child?

Freaky, how similar evil leaders can be.

I understand there's similar legends about Napolean as well.. I think he was specifically afraid of cats?

[Melendwyr]

No, but they do rule out bacterial evolution being an example of free will. [blinks] I didn't offer evolution, bacterial or otherwise, as an example of traditional free will. I offered it as an example of libertarian free will.

You're not a philosopher by any chance, are you, drkitten?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Melendwyr, I'm not sure where you got your definition of libertarian free will. You appear to be using the definition of compatibilist free will as that of libertarian free will.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarian_free_will

~~ Paul

[Melendwyr]

Perhaps I'm using the term incorrectly... I'm thinking of the political movement of Libertarianism. Possibly there's a philosophical term with a lower-case 'L' that was meant. If so, I apologize.

This philosophical libertarianism seems quite silly, though. It doesn't matter if things are determined, at least from our perspective, if we can't ever predict those determined events. We know that it's impossible to represent the universe completely within itself - thus events will always appear to us to have an element of unpredictability whether they're truly unpredictable or not.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But the libertarian free willies want true free will, the kind where they can make decisions based on something other than determinism and randomness. The trick is defining what that other mechanism is. I ain't got the slightest notion.

~~ Paul

[Freakshow]

Wasn't there a similar story about Mussolini circulating - that this guy would torture and mutilate his pets, even as a child?

Freaky, how similar evil leaders can be.

I understand there's similar legends about Napolean as well.. I think he was specifically afraid of cats?

Torturing and killing animals as a child is common in serial killers. Later in life, they "graduate" to doing the same with adults.

[Alkatran]

I can see why some people would be confused.

The problem says the being can predict you perfectly. The problem goes something like this:

If take 1 box then 1 billion
if take 2 box then 1 thousand

The 'paradox' appears when you assume that A + B > B. The problem is that you really have A1, A2, B1 and B2, one for each possible choice. The whole situation is setup to fool you into thinking there's only two values.

[Interesting Ian]

Melendwyr, I'm not sure where you got your definition of libertarian free will. You appear to be using the definition of compatibilist free will as that of libertarian free will.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarian_free_will

~~ Paul
Just to clarify. I simply used libertarian free will to mean the free will whereby ones actions cannot be 100% predicted, even with infinite knowledge and even if we lived in a Universe which is otherwise wholly determined. Obviously in such a Universe physical objects would in principle be wholly predictable, but we wouldn't be.

Truth of the matter is I don't really understand the difference between compatibilism, and libertarian free will. This is because I do not understand what determinism means. I think Stimpson's position that it means the same as fatalism is false. Fatalism by definition rules out free will, so compatibilism would therefore by definition be false! But since some people are determinists, and yet still believe in free will, they obviously cannot think that determinism means the same as fatalism. At least not unless they're utterly confused. I rather think Stimpson J Cat is one of those people!

[Interesting Ian]

But the libertarian free willies want true free will, the kind where they can make decisions based on something other than determinism and randomness. The trick is defining what that other mechanism is. I ain't got the slightest notion.

~~ Paul

Based on what they want to do. How does this differ from compatibilism?

[Z]

Paul, the 'third mechanism' would be 'will' itself. Those who are seeking non-deterministic, non-random free will - or, as I say, absolute free will - are seeking a decisive factor within Mankind which brings them closer to God... that is, this 'will' of theirs is granted them as a fragment of the Will of God - the divine creative/impulsive/decisive force of God itself.

In other words, God creates a Universe, every part of it; yet grants Man divine and magical 'Free Will', giving Man the power to override the deterministic nature of the Universe as made by God (whether or not through simple physical principle); but which in turn will not be random - for randomness implies a lack of will, or of control, doesn't it?

Will, itself, becomes the mechanism.

For some reason, thinking of the Green Lantern comics from D.C. helps me grasp the principle of this will. *shrug*

Determinism appears to automatically imply fatalism; I think those who believe that determinism and free will are compatible are confused, unless in the former case they are referring to absolute determinism, but in the latter to a relative or practical free will. Which would be a mixture of terms, at best. If this is what compatiblism means - that determinism is compatible with free will - then it is compatiblism that I find confusing.

[Melendwyr]

But 'will' is then part of the universe. How can something that is part of the universe violate the basic laws that describe the universe?

[Z]

But 'will' is then part of the universe. How can something that is part of the universe violate the basic laws that describe the universe?

*shrug*

I never said I understood it, just said that's what some people seem to believe.

Besides.. (going out on a limb) I think this kind of person tends to think, on some level, that will IS the universe...

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Based on what they want to do. How does this differ from compatibilism?
That's just not a useful description of the term. How would you make decision based on what you want to do, using a method involving something other than determinism or randomness? What is the other method? How does it work?


Will, itself, becomes the mechanism.
That's not a mechanism, it's just a name for an undefined mechanism. I have to make a decision. I can use my past history, the current environment, and a random number generator. But somehow there is something else I can use, too. What is it?

And what would it mean to have free will at one moment, and then to have made a decision at the next moment?

~~ Paul

[Taffer]

Let me sum up the way this argument will go.

Ian: "There is free will"
Us: "No there isn't"
Ian: "So you don't think there is free will?"
Us: "Correct"
Ian: "That's silly, it is obvious to me that I have free will!"
Us: "This is easily explained by Materialism"
Ian: "No it's not! Because if it was, that would mean Determinism is true!"
Us: "Assuming that random events are just events that aren't understood, this is correct"
Ian: "Determinism cannot be correct, because that would me I have no free will!"
Us: "So?"
Ian: "So?! It is obvious that we have free will! I feel like I have free will, and if we didn't have free will, we would all be robots"
Us: "So?"
Ian: "But if we are robots, we have no meaning"
Us: "So?"
Ian: "But we must have meaning, because then there is no difference between you or I!"
Us: "So?"
Ian: "You don't understand anything. Determinism is false becuase I have shown that we have free will!"
Us: "No, you haven't"
Ian: "Yes, I have! You are just too stupid to understand my arguments!"
Us: "No, we're not, your arguments are flawed"
Ian: "No, they're not, they can't be, because they are obviously true to me"
Us: "So? This makes them true?"
Ian: "Yes, because what I think is important"
Us: "Why?"
Ian: "Because we all have a reason, and this is mine!"
Us: "But you have no reason"
Ian: "I do too. I've already shown that!"
Us: "Where?"
Ian: "You do not understand anything, you are too stupid and shouldn't be on this board!"
Us: "Again, where did you show this?"
Ian: "Bah! I cannot be bothered with the stupidity on this board! I'm leaving"
Us: "Bye"

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Truth of the matter is I don't really understand the difference between compatibilism, and libertarian free will. This is because I do not understand what determinism means. I think Stimpson's position that it means the same as fatalism is false.
A system is deterministic if it evolves with time according to some set of rules, such that the rules plus the initial conditions completely determine the future state of the system.

Fatalism means that all events which will happen in the future are already fixed.

That said, determinism implies fatalism, but not necessarily the other way around.

Fatalism by definition rules out free will, so compatibilism would therefore by definition be false!
No, fatalism rules out what some people call "free-will". It does not rule out compatibilistic free-will. Whether or not you think that compatibilistic free-will should be called "free-will" or not, is wholly irrelevant. Nobody ever asked your permission to call it that.

What fatalism does rule out is any form of free-will which holds that our decisions are not already determined. But since fatalism is false, this hardly makes any difference.

Note that random also just means exactly the same thing as "not determined". So I have no idea what it could possibly mean to say that our decisions are neither deterministic nor random. You could argue that they are influenced by something other than normal matter (this mysterious mental causation you keep going on about), but that just adds another layer of complexity to things. Whatever this mental "stuff" is, it is still either deterministic, or not deterministic (random).

But since some people are determinists, and yet still believe in free will, they obviously cannot think that determinism means the same as fatalism.
Wrong. You have to remember that just because they call it "free-will", doesn't mean that what they are talking about is something which you call "free-will". According to your definition of "free-will", they do not believe in free-will at all.

At least not unless they're utterly confused. I rather think Stimpson J Cat is one of those people!
Using different definitions for terms than you do, does not mean that people are "confused". As for me being one of those people, don't be ridiculous. I don't believe in determinism or fatalism, nor do I believe in what you call "free-will".

But the libertarian free willies want true free will, the kind where they can make decisions based on something other than determinism and randomness. The trick is defining what that other mechanism is. I ain't got the slightest notion.

~~ Paul
Based on what they want to do. How does this differ from compatibilism?
Compatibilism does not claim that our decisions are based on something other than determinism and randomness. Compatibilism is not concerned with the mechanism by which we make decisions. It is concerned with the types of constraints that decision making process is subject to. It starts by recognizing that all decisions are constrained to at least some degree, and refers to "free-will" as the absence of certain types of constraints.

I think you are getting tied up on the term "free" here. You have to remember that scientists, mathematicians, and even philosophers, do not necessarily mean by this what you do. For example, in mathematics and science the term "degrees of freedom" is often used in the context of completely deterministic systems. It does not mean complete freedom in the sense you seem to mean it. What it means is freedom from very specific types of constraints. For example, when describing a planet orbiting a star, we would say that the system has 12 degrees of freedom. That represents the freedom of each of the bodies to move in three spatial dimensions, with any velocity. The dynamical laws which govern the behavior of the system further constrain it to (at least classically) a deterministic system. But that isn't what we are talking about when we talk about the freedom of the objects.

Likewise, with respect to free-will, the compatibilist recognizes that the "will" (be it some sort of spiritual mind-thing, or just something the brain does), functions according to some set of rules, and is to some degree influenced by randomness. If you define "free-will" to mean that the will is free from any constraints, then free-will clearly does not exist, and the term is useless. If you define the term "free-will" to refer to freedom from external constraints, such as the person being controlled by another person, or some sort of injury or disease removing the ability of the brain to function properly, then the term is both meaningful and useful.

And, of course, this is how we use the term "free" normally. If I say that putting my car in neutral allows the wheels to spin freely, I don't mean that they are no longer functioning according to the laws of physics! I just mean that they are not being prevented from spinning by some obstruction.


Dr. Stupid

[drkitten]

[blinks] I didn't offer evolution, bacterial or otherwise, as an example of traditional free will. I offered it as an example of libertarian free will.


And in my opinion, you were wrong to do so, for the reasons outlined.

What you call "libertarian free will" is neither libertarian, nor free, nor will.

[drkitten]

Ian,
Note that random also just means exactly the same thing as "not determined". So I have no idea what it could possibly mean to say that our decisions are neither deterministic nor random.


You're using too broad a definition of "random." Many philosophers hold that "random," for purposes of this discussion, means "acausal." A truly "random" coin flip would have no cause (and not merely an unknown one) for coming down heads as opposed to tails. By definition, it doesn't make sense to ask "why did the coin come down heads?" because, by definition, no causal explanation can be given.

On the other hand, "mental" events appear to be causal. It is a valid question to ask why I chose the steak over the crab ("because I don't like crabmeat"). It may equally be a valid question to ask why I don't like steak -- depending upon your philosophical framework, the answer may involve brain states and conditioning, or it may involve a dualistic ghost in the machine who does not himself like crabmeat. But there are at least three possible sort of explanation -- the purely deterministic, the purely acausal, and the ones where mental states themselves are causally effective. Under this framework, wants and desires are considered to be neither deterministic nor random.

Of course, simply assuming that mental states are causally effective doesn't mean that we've proven that they are -- or explained a mechanism by which they might be.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

drkitten

Note that random also just means exactly the same thing as "not determined". So I have no idea what it could possibly mean to say that our decisions are neither deterministic nor random.
You're using too broad a definition of "random." Many philosophers hold that "random," for purposes of this discussion, means "acausal."
Well, if you noticed, the definition of "determinism" I gave was actually causal determinism (as opposed to some more general non-temporal concepts of determinism which are not relevant to this discussion). So when I said "not determined", "acausal" is exactly what I meant.

On the other hand, "mental" events appear to be causal. It is a valid question to ask why I chose the steak over the crab ("because I don't like crabmeat"). It may equally be a valid question to ask why I don't like steak -- depending upon your philosophical framework, the answer may involve brain states and conditioning, or it may involve a dualistic ghost in the machine who does not himself like crabmeat. But there are at least three possible sort of explanation -- the purely deterministic, the purely acausal, and the ones where mental states themselves are causally effective. Under this framework, wants and desires are considered to be neither deterministic nor random.
Why does this mysterious "ghost in the machine" not have to either be causal or acausal? Doesn't the law of "either A OR NOT A" apply to mysterious non-physical ghosts too? Either this ghost's influences on your decision are completely determined by the prior state of the system (meaning the state of the ghost and anything else that influences its behavior), or they are not. Adding this mysterious non-physical world doesn't change anything. The whole system (which includes the ghosts) is still either causally deterministic, or random.

Of course, simply assuming that mental states are causally effective doesn't mean that we've proven that they are -- or explained a mechanism by which they might be.
I don't think that the relevant question is whether or not they are causally efficacious or not, but rather whether or not there is anything more to them than just brain activity.


Dr. Stupid

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Let me sum up the way this argument will go.


Yep, thats what he does. Boring, isnt it? I once told him that he had no free will, and that I could prove it. I said: You are not free, you cant stop returning to the forum. And well, that was several months ago.

[Z]

Yes... you forgot to add Ian's inevitable return to said board...