Occam’s Razor

[RichardR]

A criticism of Occam’s Razor is that it doesn’t necessarily lead to the right conclusion - it’s not infallible. Of course, that’s correct. But is that a reason to ignore it? Surely if you apply Occam’s Razor, it just means you don’t invent unnecessary explanations? So only by ignoring the razor are you taking an additional step – inventing something. And why take that additional step?

To ask the question a different way - for what reason would any skeptic ignore Occam’s Razor when evaluating a claim?

[MRC_Hans]

Occam's razor is to be applied after evaluating all evidence. I don't think one should ever ignore it, but it will often be wise to validate it. If the second-least complex explanation is not very unlikely, it is a good idea to try and investigate it.

Hans

[athon]

The problem is, science is not about finding truth. You can't find the 'right' model. It's a method that endeavours to identify the model that has the best probability of describing outcomes. It's about predicting likely effects.

Occham's Razor does this. It suggests the most likely model of a selection based on the premise that a model which uses the most evidence with the least speculation is more useful in predicting outcomes than any of the rest.

Add in the fact that science is self-correcting, Occham's Razor has a pretty strong place in the scientific method.

Athon

[Darat]

Aren't there practical reasons for following a guideline like Occam’s Razor? What it tells us is that if you have two theories, one that can be tested in 30 minutes with a bar of soap and a candle and another that requires 46 years of work with two particle accelerators and a space-based neutrino detector, is "Test the first theory first you idiot!".

This is a reason why when looking at paranormal events it makes much more sense to check the easy to test for stuff first - so instead of measuring slight variations in the surrounding EM field when someone claims they can read without using their eyes Occam's Razor tells us "check they aren't peeking".

When you think about it the million dollar challenge is an example of Occam's Razor applied to the (almost) real world.

[Batman Jr.]

A criticism of Occam’s Razor is that it doesn’t necessarily lead to the right conclusion - it’s not infallible. Of course, that’s correct. But is that a reason to ignore it? Surely if you apply Occam’s Razor, it just means you don’t invent unnecessary explanations? So only by ignoring the razor are you taking an additional step – inventing something. And why take that additional step?

To ask the question a different way - for what reason would any skeptic ignore Occam’s Razor when evaluating a claim?
I think the problem is that people use Occam's Razor incorrectly. A common misapplication of it is to invoke it to justify belief in the absence of things unseen. Occam's Razor was never meant to prove the negatives of the unobserved or untestable. Its actual purpose lies in the need to keep unessential elements out of a theory, to keep us from arbitrarily assuming the existence of unknowns. For instance, I think the common Invisible Pink Unicorn demonstration of the Razor is actually wrong because the arguer is using Occam's Razor to say that the Invisible Pink Unicorn actually doesn't exist. What you could use Occam's Razor to say in that particular instance is that there is no evidence of the unicorn interacting with the observable world and thus no reason as of yet to consider its existence or nonexistence at all. In other words, it is, for the time being, irrelevant. This is a better interpretation of the precept because we realize that science is constantly changing and expanding in its knowledge, so a rule which disproved the unknown would have been itself disproved many times over already.

[c4ts]

A criticism of Occam’s Razor is that it doesn’t necessarily lead to the right conclusion - it’s not infallible. Of course, that’s correct. But is that a reason to ignore it? Surely if you apply Occam’s Razor, it just means you don’t invent unnecessary explanations? So only by ignoring the razor are you taking an additional step – inventing something. And why take that additional step?

To ask the question a different way - for what reason would any skeptic ignore Occam’s Razor when evaluating a claim?

It works when you apply it to dual realities.

[steenkh]

For instance, I think the common Invisible Pink Unicorn demonstration of the Razor is actually wrong because the arguer is using Occam's Razor to say that the Invisible Pink Unicorn actually doesn't exist. What you could use Occam's Razor to say in that particular instance is that there is no evidence of the unicorn interacting with the observable world and thus no reason as of yet to consider its existence or nonexistence at all. In other words, it is, for the time being, irrelevant. This is a better interpretation of the precept because we realize that science is constantly changing and expanding in its knowledge, so a rule which disproved the unknown would have been itself disproved many times over already.
I do not think that Occam's razor can prove or disprove anything. I believe it is a guideliune that tells us if we should use our energy on some hyporthesis or not. In the case of the invisible unicorn, we have two hypotheses: One where such beings exist, and one where such beings do not exist. Occam's razor does not prove or disprove either theory, but, considering that the world is perfectly explainable without such beings, it tells us that we would probably waste our ressources on the invisible unicorns.

[Batman Jr.]

I do not think that Occam's razor can prove or disprove anything. I believe it is a guideliune that tells us if we should use our energy on some hyporthesis or not. In the case of the invisible unicorn, we have two hypotheses: One where such beings exist, and one where such beings do not exist. Occam's razor does not prove or disprove either theory, but, considering that the world is perfectly explainable without such beings, it tells us that we would probably waste our ressources on the invisible unicorns.
You're missing the point: Judgments of unneeded variables, whether positive or negative, should be omitted. There are actually three competing theories: The world exists and there also exists an Invisible Pink Unicorn of which we have no evidence, the world exists and there does not exist an entity which fits the description of the Invisible Pink Unicorn, and the world exists, period. Obviously, the most parsimonious explanation of things must be the explanation which pertains only to the observed and nothing more, so the third option would be the best. Also, the first two theories would be subsumed into the one of the greatest brevity, so given that any one of these theories is true, the third must be true. You have a 100% chance of being correct if you choose it. In the case that the unicorn exists, the first one would be wrong, but the second and third ones, correct. In the case it does not exist, the first and third would be right and the second, wrong. Both of the theories which make pronouncements about the unicorn have the pontential of being incorrect given that a certain condition of unknown probability occurs; however, there is no case in which the one which remains ambiguous is wrong.

[steenkh]

I do not see how you can ever disprove certain things like invisible unicorns or gods. Occam's razor tells us that since the world can be perfectly explained without gods, there is no need to believe gods exits. How can it ever become a proof with 100% certainty? One day somebody might find a way of interaction with gods that noone had noticed before (like if praying could heal).

I am quite certain that Occam's razor is not a 100% proof but a proof with XX% certainty.

[athon]

Science is not about proof, though. Proof is a mathematical term.

It's about accumulation of evidence in support of a model. Complicated models are better at addressing complicated observations, however they do this at the cost of needing to address multiple variables. Occham's razor is a way of compromising this; finding the most suitable models that address variables economically.

This is where woo's get all mixed up. Science cannot provide absolute truth. It isn't about that. It is about making models that can predict outcomes with a comfortable degree of certainty. Occham's Razor is a tool with which we can do this and add to that certainty.

Athon

[Melendwyr]

There are always an infinite number of possible explanations for any set of data. Occam's Razor makes it possible to select between them.

Additionally, it's just good sense. If you can explain something by making a certain number of assumptions, why would making more or more extravagant assumptions be better?

[Batman Jr.]

I do not see how you can ever disprove certain things like invisible unicorns or gods. Occam's razor tells us that since the world can be perfectly explained without gods, there is no need to believe gods exits. How can it ever become a proof with 100% certainty? One day somebody might find a way of interaction with gods that noone had noticed before (like if praying could heal).

I am quite certain that Occam's razor is not a 100% proof but a proof with XX% certainty.
Right. The problem I have with Occam's Razor is when people use it to make probabilistic judgments of things of which there is insufficient evidence to find a probability. In the case of an invisible unicorn, by its definition, the unicorn couldn't be observed. We couldn't figure out its possible causes to induce the likelihood of its existence. The best thing we could do is to say that the existence of the unicorn is irrelevant to us because it is not required to explain anything around us. Belief in it has no pragmatic value.

[bruto]

We shouldn't forget in all this that Occam himself was a theologian too. He applied his principle of parsimony in more than one way. When he cut science loose from god he also cut god loose from science. God or the Spaghetti Monster or that pink unicorn become articles of pure faith. Science cannot invoke them, but neither can it address them. The skeptic who uses his wisdom of cause and effect, science and logic, to argue against God is as out of place in Occam's world as the creationist who attempts to stick God into our genes. For Occam, the incompatibility of science and theology not only purifies science, but confirms and demonstrates God's transcendence of necessity.

It's ironic that some of those now trying their hardest to de-positivize science and blunt Occam's razor are those whose theology would best benefit from actually understanding it.

[Melendwyr]

Of course science can address it. Things that, by their very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry, are unreal. There is no meaningful way in which they can be said to exist.

[bruto]

Of course science can address it. Things that, by their very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry, are unreal. There is no meaningful way in which they can be said to exist.

I disagree. God cannot be disproven, or proven. He can of course easily be doubted, or denied, for various reasons, including the inaccessiblity of divinity to empirical verification. It seems reasonable to conclude that something so remote and unaccountable can be done without and not missed. However, to suggest that there is no meaningful way god can be said to exist is, to my mind, logical positivist ummm... [which rule is that?]. When my crackpot cousin tells me he believes in Jehovah, I know he is a crackpot, but I also know what he means. His ramblings are devoid of good sense and intellectual rigor, but not of meaning in any really useful common-sense sense of the term.

[Festus]

Ockham's razor. The rule which states "plurality should not be assumed without necessity". In other words if you can prove a postulate without relying on an assumption, such an assumption should be excluded. Two things of interest here. First, Ockham's razor is a rule or guideline for setting the basis of an argument, the supportive information assumed by the author. Second, nothing in Ockham's razor implies in any way that it is related to the scientific method or that it is appropriate for the evaluation of any phenomenon that can be proven or disproven in fact.
There seems to be a notion that Ockham's razor can be taken to mean that the argument with the fewest assuptions tends to be the more correct. Given the quoted definition above this meaning is an extrapolation of the original that ignores the critical value of necessity.

The following sites have similar references.
skepdic.com/occam.html
wotug.kent.ac.uk/parallel/www/occam/occam-bio.html
math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/General/occam.html

[bruto]

Ockham's razor. The rule which states "plurality should not be assumed without necessity". In other words if you can prove a postulate without relying on an assumption, such an assumption should be excluded. Two things of interest here. First, Ockham's razor is a rule or guideline for setting the basis of an argument, the supportive information assumed by the author. Second, nothing in Ockham's razor implies in any way that it is related to the scientific method or that it is appropriate for the evaluation of any phenomenon that can be proven or disproven in fact.
There seems to be a notion that Ockham's razor can be taken to mean that the argument with the fewest assuptions tends to be the more correct. Given the quoted definition above this meaning is an extrapolation of the original that ignores the critical value of necessity.

The following sites have similar references.
skepdic.com/occam.html
wotug.kent.ac.uk/parallel/www/occam/occam-bio.html
math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/General/occam.html


Nothing in Ockham's razor as stated above implies that it is related to scientific method, etc. but I think if you look a little further into Ockham's philosophy you will find that this was his intention. I grant I have not read the primary sources, but it appears he also stated it more than once, and with slight variations. As far as I've read, it seems clear that he intended quite explicitly to secularize science, and used this principle of parsimony to suggest that if natural explanations suffice, supernatural ones are unneeded. In the process, being a good Catholic scholastic, he used his arguments to exempt theology from both scientific proof and parsimony.

[drkitten]

Of course science can address it. Things that, by their very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry, are unreal. There is no meaningful way in which they can be said to exist.


This is simply wrong. Let me give a counterexample from The Science of Discworld. In this book, which is basically a recaptitulation of the history of the Earth from an outsider's standpoint, the outsiders find that "civilization" (broadly defined) has been invented and re-invented many times throughout history, starting with some statue-constructing crabs in the Carboniferous and extending through tool-using dinosaurs.

Of course, "science" doesn't know about these. Furthermore (and this is part of the authors' point), science would not be expected to know about these civilizations -- the sand-and-spit statues, or the wooden tools, could not possibly survive to the present to be found by modern scientists. But just because we cannot possibly inquire about dinosaur tools would make them no less real.

Of course, this example is fictitious. But that's the point. Suppose that I took seriously these ideas and wanted to investigate them scientifically. I couldn't. But saying "I don't know whether or not any dinosaurs could have made wooden tools" is entirely different than saying "Dinosaurs could not have made wooden tools, because there is no way to subject the question to scientific inquiry."

[Festus]

I don't agree that Ockham's aim was necessarily to secularize science, perhaps to apply a logical system to the arguments of his day, similar to the work of George Boole.
I have read some secondary sources and it seems like Ockham's Razor may not have been directly attributable to the man himself. Rather it may be that the concept stated however many ways was identified with Ockham in the fashion of an idiosyncrasy. Not that the concept was not his but that it was not formally stated as a rule by Ockham. This is important in that it leaves open what Ockham's intention actually was.
I take the stand that the relative number of assumptions between two opposed arguments is irrelavant to the fitness of either argument.
My opinion is that William of Ockham was more of logician than a scientist and in that light Ockam's Razor is more appropriately applied to a single argument as a measure of the fitness of the assumptions than in evaluating the relative worth of opposing arguments based wholy on the raw number of assumptions. If an argument with many accurate and neccesary assumptions is in opposition to an argument with a single wholly false assumption an incorrect interpretation of Ockham's Razor would validate an argument based on falsity and therefore by nature unsound. I therefore submit that it is more fitting that an interpretation of the Razor that reduces unnecessary assumptions in a single argument would be more useful and in keeping with the nature of Ockham's work than a rule that would accept or reject one of many opposing arguments leaving the opportunity for acceptance of arguments supported by specious or unsound assumptions.
In conclusion I would like to add that rules of thumb such as Ockham's Razor are simply shortcuts to conclusions that would be better served with close reading and critical evalution of the position in all parts and as a whole. Shortcuts may save time but they should not substitute for critical thinking.

[Festus]

Drkitten,

"Things that, by their very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry, are unreal." -Melendwyr

"the outsiders find that "civilization" (broadly defined) has been invented and re-invented many times throughout history"- drkitten

"Of course, "science" doesn't know about these." -drkitten

Your example is self-contradictory. If these 'outsiders' are able to find the evidence of these previous civilisations then the potential exists that 'science' can discover the same.
Melendwyr's statement is correct. If there are no potential means of scientific inquiry into the existence of a thing then for all purposes that thing is unknowable and cannot be said to exist. This is deferenciated from the idea of a thing that is completely unknown yet potentially could be discovered.

[drkitten]

"the outsiders find that "civilization" (broadly defined) has been invented and re-invented many times throughout history"- drkitten

Your example is self-contradictory. If these 'outsiders' are able to find the evidence of these previous civilisations then the potential exists that 'science' can discover the same.


Um, no. This is a work of fiction, written from the standard assumption of authorial omniscience. The outsiders didn't "find the evidence" of these previous civilizations -- they watched the civilizations happen as a contemporaneous event. If you are willing to assume that merely being about to write about something from the viewpoint of an omniscienct witness makes something subject to scientific inquiry, then by all means, the Christian God is subject to scientific inquiry -- just read Milton's Paradise Lost. Similarly, a scientific inquiry into the nature of the afterlife is possible because Dante wrote about it.

Scientists can no more assume the viewpoint of the Discworld wizards (the "outsiders") in this book then they can the viewpoint of Dante-the-pilgrim.

Now, depending upon your theoretical framework, we may be able to hypothesize a time-travel device that permits (modern) scientists to go back and to observe for themselves. But if we're permitting ourselves such counterfactual hypotheses, it's just as easy for me to hypothesize a "soul-travel device" that permits me to travel to the afterlife and return with information about the actual existence of God. (In fact, I would argue that a soul-travel device is more plausible than a time travel device, because it doesn't involve any actual paradoxes -- the paradoxes of causality violation implicit in a time-travel device are well-known.)



Melendwyr's statement is correct. If there are no potential means of scientific inquiry into the existence of a thing then for all purposes that thing is unknowable and cannot be said to exist.


No. Re-read the paragraph with the above distinction in mind. Melendwyr -- and you -- are simply wrong.

A still more prosaic example -- what did Caesar have for breakfast on the morning he was assassinated? We have no potential means of scientific inqury into such a question. The breakfast itself has long since decayed, and no historical records mention it. But it's ludicrous to claim that the breakfast cannot be said to exist. Similarly, we have no way of investigating the identity of Caesar's maternal great-grandmother -- but you don't want to suggest that she "cannot be said to exist," do you?

[Festus]

I pointed out that within the fictional framework of your example there is a potential for discovery by later scientists of the previous civilizations. The simplest being having the 'outsiders' relate their direct observations. This by itself invalidates your example as you provided it. In any event the example is self-contradictory in the framework you presented.

"If you are willing to assume that merely being about to write about something from the viewpoint of an omniscient witness makes something subject to scientific inquiry, then by all means, the Christian God is subject to scientific inquiry -- just read Milton's Paradise Lost." -drkitten

I assume you mean "If you are willing to assume that merely writing about something from the viewpoint of an omniscient witness makes something subject to scientific inquiry, then by all means, the Christian God is subject to scientific inquiry -- just read Milton's Paradise Lost."

Why wouldn't "the Christian God" be subject to scientific inquiry? Is it because "the Christian God" doesn't exist? The ability to investigate something does not depend on whether or not someone wrote about it. Writing is not magic.

Whatever you are getting at with the time-machine I can't fathom. Melendwyr's statement does not assume that the means for scientific inquiry must exist, only that the means can potentially be developed. I wouldn't bet on a time-machine to be one of them.

"A still more prosaic example -- what did Caesar have for breakfast on the morning he was assassinated? We have no potential means of scientific inquiry into such a question. The breakfast itself has long since decayed, and no historical records mention it. "-drkitten

Are you sure no records exist? Livy and Plutarch both have details of Julius Caesar's last day. Could there be others?

"But it's ludicrous to claim that the breakfast cannot be said to exist." -drkitten

Why? Did Caesar never skip a meal? He had a busy day according to Plutarch. Perhaps his personal memoirs would give a clue. He had many, giving a means of inquiry.

" Similarly, we have no way of investigating the identity of Caesar's maternal great-grandmother -- but you don't want to suggest that she "cannot be said to exist," do you?"-drkitten

Why? Was Caesar not human, born of a woman? He certainly died as such. The fact that Caesar existed shows that in fact she also existed, her identity is another matter entirely. For that research the family of his mother, Aurelia of the Cotta family. Again, a means of inquiry. You did mean Julius Caesar? Caesar was a family name, not a title or an individual.

"but you don't want to suggest that she "cannot be said to exist," do you?"-drkitten

You don't know what I want to suggest. If I was going to suggest something it would be "Don't post a first draft."

Now that further bad examples are dismissed, let's get to the logic of Melendwyr's statement.

Again -

"Things that, by their very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry, are unreal." -Melendwyr

nature:

The inherent character or basic constitution of a person or thing

thing:

a : A separate and distinct individual quality, fact, idea, or usually entity
b : the concrete entity as distinguished from its appearances
c : a spatial entity
d : an inanimate object distinguished from a living being

potentially:

Existing in possibility : capable of development into actuality.

scientific inquiry:

The process by which scientists ask questions, develop and carry out investigations, make predictions, gather evidence, and propose explanations.

unreal:

lacking in reality, substance, or genuineness

These are the most appropriate definitions I could come up with, if I am misstating your intent Melendwyr let me know.

Given these definitions I take Melendwyr's assertion to be: If the existence of any entity or object cannot now or ever be scientifically investigated then the thing doesn't exist.

Restated; If the means to investigate a thing exists or can be developed then anything that exists can be investigated scientifically.

So then your assertion is that there are things that exist that can never be explained by science? I have heard this before, right before the woo-woo-woo...

[bruto]

I don't agree that Ockham's aim was necessarily to secularize science, perhaps to apply a logical system to the arguments of his day, similar to the work of George Boole.
I have read some secondary sources and it seems like Ockham's Razor may not have been directly attributable to the man himself. Rather it may be that the concept stated however many ways was identified with Ockham in the fashion of an idiosyncrasy. Not that the concept was not his but that it was not formally stated as a rule by Ockham. This is important in that it leaves open what Ockham's intention actually was.
I take the stand that the relative number of assumptions between two opposed arguments is irrelavant to the fitness of either argument.
My opinion is that William of Ockham was more of logician than a scientist and in that light Ockam's Razor is more appropriately applied to a single argument as a measure of the fitness of the assumptions than in evaluating the relative worth of opposing arguments based wholy on the raw number of assumptions. If an argument with many accurate and neccesary assumptions is in opposition to an argument with a single wholly false assumption an incorrect interpretation of Ockham's Razor would validate an argument based on falsity and therefore by nature unsound. I therefore submit that it is more fitting that an interpretation of the Razor that reduces unnecessary assumptions in a single argument would be more useful and in keeping with the nature of Ockham's work than a rule that would accept or reject one of many opposing arguments leaving the opportunity for acceptance of arguments supported by specious or unsound assumptions.
In conclusion I would like to add that rules of thumb such as Ockham's Razor are simply shortcuts to conclusions that would be better served with close reading and critical evalution of the position in all parts and as a whole. Shortcuts may save time but they should not substitute for critical thinking.

You're probably right in that since Ockham was a theologian first, and not particularly concerned with science as a pursuit, but only as a branch of philosophical thought, he was more interested in desecularizing God than the other way around. His main philosophical agenda seems to have been to deny the real existence of universals and relations, and he used the principle of economy to argue against the existence of relations as an entity, in part for theological reasons, because he found a logical contradiction between the idea of real relations and universals and divine omnipotence. However, in the process, he appears to have been pretty explicit in applying the principle of economy to science. I went back to the archives and dug up Frederick Copleston's History of Philosophy, and here is how he puts it:

"..But if creatures are 'absolutes', they can perfectly well be studied without any reference to God. Of course, as we have seen, when Ockham spoke of created things as 'absolutes' he had no intention of questioning their utter dependence on God; his point of view was very much that of a theologian; but none the less, if we can know the natures of created things without any advertence to God, it follows that empirical science is an autonomous discipline. The world can be studied in itself in abstraction from God, especially if, as Ockham held, it cannot be strictly proved that God, in the full sense of the term 'God', exists. In this sense it is legitimate to speak of Ockhamism as a factor and stage in the birth of the 'lay spirit', as M. de Lagarde does. At the same time one must remember that Ockham himself was very far from being a secularist or modern 'rationalist.' "

Eslewhere, Copleston sums up the principle of economy thus: "If two factors will suffice to explain motion, for example, one should not add a third."

edited for sloppy typing

[Robin]

Similarly, we have no way of investigating the identity of Caesar's maternal great-grandmother -- but you don't want to suggest that she "cannot be said to exist," do you?
She can be said to exist because we can establish scientifically that she did. Even if we don't know who she was.

We don't know of Caesar's breakfast but we can scientifically establish that he ate food, even if we don't know that he ate at any specific time or day.

We might even be able to gain a fair degree of confidence about what his breakfast might have been, if he had one.

We don't have to hypothesise such things as time machines to establish that they are theoretically possible to scientifically establish. If we are talking about 'potentially' the subject of scientific enquiry then we could have said that perhaps Caesars body might have been preserved and the DNA in the stomach examined. Caesar might have written about his breakfast and some independent observer also happened to have written about it.

Incidentally I hardly think that a soul travel device can be said to be more plausible than a time travel device. With time travel we have at least an idea of what it is that we can't do.

[drkitten]

I pointed out that within the fictional framework of your example there is a potential for discovery by later scientists of the previous civilizations. The simplest being having the 'outsiders' relate their direct observations. This by itself invalidates your example as you provided it. In any event the example is self-contradictory in the framework you presented.

Boy, you really can't read for toffee, can you?

The book, as I clearly indicated, in my original posting, is fiction. It does not describe the real world, and as far as scientific inquiry goes, it doesn't matter what the Discworld wizards could and could not do, because they are fictional.

However, this fictional account raises a legitimate question regarding the real world. Were there, in fact, tool-using dinosaurs? And I raise that question in the real world, the one where actual scientist go and dig up fossils and make inferences about whether feathered dinosaurs existed (they apparently did), and whether they were killed off by an asteroid impact or by smoking (so far, the evidence supports the asteroid.)

However, I cannot, even in principle address the question of whether or not a species of dinosaurs made and used exclusively wooden tools. There is no "potential for discovery" by later scientists, because we have independent knowledge that wooden tools do not last long enough to be perserved for present study. There are no non-fictional "outsider" wizards with lifespans that are by our standard immortal who could be treated as witnesses. There is nothing. The question cannot, even in principle, be answered.

If you disagree, then please explan what sort of evidence you could expect to find.


Given these definitions I take Melendwyr's assertion to be: If the existence of any entity or object cannot now or ever be scientifically investigated then the thing doesn't exist.

Restated; If the means to investigate a thing exists or can be developed then anything that exists can be investigated scientifically.


And Melendwyr's assertion is completly, inalterably, tragically, inexorably, and unquestionably wrong, beyond salvation or repair.

Lots of things could easily exist -- and we do not have the capacity to know it. There are lots of things for which the means to investigate a thing cannot be developed because the evidence on which we would need to rely no longer exists or has been corrupted beyond the possiblity of repair.

Some simple questions. What colour were Archeopteryx's feathers? We know that such a creature existed, because we have his fossilized bones. We even have the imprints of his feathers, so we know they existed as well. But the color doesn't fossilize. How could you investigate the colour of his feathers? What could you develop that would tell you the colour of his feathers (and that doesn't involve global causality violation)?

Might there have been two different varieties of Archeopteryx, with different colouration? How many different varieties were there? Were there more or fewer colour variations then there are in the modern cat? Were the colour variations geographically separable (as hair colour is among Europeans, with blonde Norway and brunette Italy)? Were they mixed together within a family as in modern cats? Were colour differences sex-linked as in mallard ducks?

What was the courtship behavior of Archeopteryx? Did the male have some sort of mating call? Were they polygamous like African long-tailed widow birds, or monogamous like most swans and penguins?

.....

And tell me how you're going to investigate these questions. The answers to these questions undoubtedly exist. But I deny in principle your ability to investigate them.

[Festus]

Boy, you really can't read for toffee, can you?

The book, as I clearly indicated, in my original posting, is fiction. It does not describe the real world, and as far as scientific inquiry goes, it doesn't matter what the Discworld wizards could and could not do, because they are fictional.

I read better than you write apparently. I addressed this issue in my last post. If you didn't want your example evaluated in it's fictional context then you should not have used a fictional example. I have not proposed in any way that the example was anything other than fiction. You keep hinting that I am confusing fiction with reality, but yet it is you that proposed to disprove an assertion with science fiction. You can stop shaking that straw man it is exposed. If your example doesn't apply then you shouldn't have used it. Don't blame me for your failures. See the comment in my last post about drafts then use them. Proofreading prevents these sort of logical errors.

However, this fictional account raises a legitimate question regarding the real world. Were there, in fact, tool-using dinosaurs?

I know if such a thing as tool using dinosaurs did exist then they can be scientifically investigated. As it's fiction they cannot definitively be said to have existed, so perhaps not. Tool using dinosaurs have nothing to do with Melendwyr's assertion.

There is no "potential for discovery" by later scientists, because we have independent knowledge that wooden tools do not last long enough to be perserved for present study.


Do they now? Wood can be fossilized, frozen in ice, preserved in layers of limestone beneath the ocean depths. Even if the wood cells have long turned to dust, the material that encompasses it can hold shape and show whether it was worked into a tool. Will there some day be a method to generate the image of an artifact without disturbing it? To be able to see how it has decayed and reliably reconstruct it? There are many applications for such technology both within and outside archeology. I would be surprised if it isn't already being worked out.
You seem to regard time as some sort of universal solvent that destroys everything utterly with no trace. Yet the first law of thermodynamics states that matter cannot be created nor destroyed, only transformed. It stands to reason then that if matter, say an Archaeopteryx, is enclosed in a system, such as trapped in a mudslide, frozen in ice, or sunk in a pond and layered in sand, then all we need is an understanding of how the matter that made up the Archaeopteryx would have changed and reverse the process either physically or through a detailed model. Is it too complicated to sort out? Physicists at the Japan Marine Science and Technology Center have built the Earth Simulator in part to model atmospheric conditions on a planet-wide scale. Could the decay and dissemination of the matter of anything be similarly modeled? The potential exists. Could such a technology be expanded to ever larger scales? How about genetics? If evolution is in fact the manner which all that lives came to be in the form it is then could the process be reversed? Given sufficient computing power could all possible DNA combinations be computed? Could then these sequences be modeled to show what sort of creature would result? Not only would I have every creature that ever existed but also every creature that could possibly exist.

And tell me how you're going to investigate these questions. The answers to these questions undoubtedly exist. But I deny in principle your ability to investigate them.

Deny all you like this is not the question.Niether I nor anyone else has to have the ability to investigate however many spurious examples you come up with. All I have to show is a means of inquiry could potentially exist. Yet again, read Melendwyr's assertion.

And Melendwyr's assertion is completely, inalterably, tragically, inexorably, and unquestionably wrong, beyond salvation or repair.

Yet you cannot seem to show how.All the adjectives in all the languages ever used or yet to be cannot change the fact you have not disproved the inherent logic of the assertion. Simple denial won't do. Logic and physics won't change just because you wish it to be so.

Perhaps you could come up with a logical fallacy in Melendwyr's assertion? Perhaps you could do so without using examples? That would prove your case beyond any doubt yet you resolutely avoid this. Please, get help. Ask a professor, your local librarian, send some emails.

In conclusion this topic has wandered far from Ockham's razor, If you care to continue on new thread, do so and I will follow.

[Festus]

You're probably right in that since Ockham was a theologian first, and not particularly concerned with science as a pursuit, but only as a branch of philosophical thought, he was more interested in desecularizing God than the other way around.


It's always nice to be right. You are far more knowledgeable about the work of William of Ockham than I am. Does Ockham have a means to logically reduce the principles of an argument to their fundamentals? I have read quite a few philosophers and scientists yet outside of Boole and to a lesser extent Blackburn there is no method for consistently structuring and comparing opposing arguments.

His main philosophical agenda seems to have been to deny the real existence of universals and relations,

What are universals and relations?

[bruto]

It's always nice to be right. You are far more knowledgeable about the work of William of Ockham than I am. Does Ockham have a means to logically reduce the principles of an argument to their fundamentals? I have read quite a few philosophers and scientists yet outside of Boole and to a lesser extent Blackburn there is no method for consistently structuring and comparing opposing arguments.



What are universals and relations?

Ockham, like most of the scholastics, wrote a good deal about logic, but as far as I know he pretty much followed Aristotle, and since I've never made much of of a study of it, I'd be wise to plead ignorance.

Universals, in this case, are categories such as "man," "horse," etc. Plato thought that these were the ultimate reality, and individual instances a poor copy of these ideals. Aristotle believed that only individual objects exist, and the universals are a property of them. He's still considered a "realist" because he believed that these universals were inherent in the things themselves. A nominalist like Ockham goes further and says that universals are not real apart from their instances, and are essentially logical terms or meanings which we use to organize and communciate our thoughts, rather than something that is real within the objects we are describing. The things described and the properties they share are real enough, but the universals belong to us, not the things. We can define "man" and know what a man is, and all men share in this category, but the category does not have existence of its own if there are no men to exhibit it, and has no use or meaning if there are no observers who need to know or say what a man is. Nominalism at its extreme can get a little messy, since if we decide that universals are only a term of convenience and not in some way real or at least compulsory, we are hard put to figure out why a man is not sometimes a dog. A similar question to that of universals comes up regarding to the relations between things, qualities such as "similarity." The so-called scholastic realists, such as Duns Scotus, asserted that these relations were entities themselves. Ockham rejected that, suggesting that if relations were real and distinct from their foundations, God could, for example, confer the relation of paternity on a man with no children. Once again, for Ockham the nominalist, these relations have no meaning apart from their instances, but are a way of describing properties of those objects. Ockham goes on to suggest that if relations were real, every act of every object would influence every other object in the universe, since if one moves one's finger, it moves instantaneously in relation to everything in the entire universe; so if the relation were a reality of its own, it would then logically be expected to change everything else in the universe instantaneously.

[Batman Jr.]

Of course science can address it. Things that, by their very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry, are unreal. There is no meaningful way in which they can be said to exist.
Then are you a solipsist? Subjective experience cannot be scientifically observed, so that must constitute proof to me that you're a p-zombie, right? If something can't be observed, it can't be observed. What is your explicit rationale for believing that this means the thing is nonexistent? Here is a thought experiment: Consider a box that cannot be broken into. On top of that, it is made of a material which doesn't permit us to detect the inside of it in any other way either. Does this mean to you that the inside of the box doesn't exist?

[DevilsAdvocate]

Ockham's razor. The rule which states "plurality should not be assumed without necessity". In other words if you can prove a postulate without relying on an assumption, such an assumption should be excluded. Two things of interest here. First, Ockham's razor is a rule or guideline for setting the basis of an argument, the supportive information assumed by the author. Second, nothing in Ockham's razor implies in any way that it is related to the scientific method or that it is appropriate for the evaluation of any phenomenon that can be proven or disproven in fact.
There seems to be a notion that Ockham's razor can be taken to mean that the argument with the fewest assuptions tends to be the more correct. Given the quoted definition above this meaning is an extrapolation of the original that ignores the critical value of necessity.
That's the way I've always understood the use of the term "Ockham's razor". Furthermore, I've never really understood it a an alternative for "lack of evidence", like the "dinosaur tool users" case. I always saw it as a resolution a conflict for which it would be..umm..theoretically?... impossible to get scientific data.

Of course, this example is fictitious. But that's the point. Suppose that I took seriously these ideas and wanted to investigate them scientifically. I couldn't. But saying "I don't know whether or not any dinosaurs could have made wooden tools" is entirely different than saying "Dinosaurs could not have made wooden tools, because there is no way to subject the question to scientific inquiry."

I think this misses the point. Ockham's razor says when explaining anything that anything unnecessary is unnecessary. The razor can't cut suppositions. There must first be an observation that requires an explanation. If there are multiple possible explanations that can't be proven, then you apply the razor.

There may have been tool-using dinosaurs. Or alien space monkeys. Or green giraffe-necked unicorns. But there is no evidence of these things, therefore no explanation of these things is needed, therefore there is no need to apply the razor to the (non-existent) explanations.

The way "Ockham's razor" was originally explained to me was that you can’t measure the exact speed of light (give me a break with the physics, this is just an example). To measure the speed of light, you have to pass it through a long distance and record the time. For example, you bounce a light off a mirror on the moon. You calculate the time and distance, hey presto: speed of light is c. So you conclude light travels at c. But does it? Maybe it goes 2 times the speed to the moon and 1/2 the speed back. Or 3 times there 1/3 back. Or 50 times the and 1/50 back. And so on. If we have no way of testing these possibilities, then we have to decide which one would be correct.

We can either accept that the speed of light is constant c, or that the speed of light varies by n times c going and 1/c coming back. For the latter, we introduce the variable n, and the qualifier “coming and going”. Because there is no evidence or reasonable expectation that the speed “coming” would be different from “going”, "Ockham's razor" says there is no need for the variable n. So we have thousands and millions and billions and billions of possible explanations that could works for c=n*c/n, and one explanation that works without n, c=c. So we accept the simplest. c=c. In a mathematical sense, it is eliminating the unnecessary. In c=n*c/n, n has no consequence. That doesn’t mean that there is not an “n”, but it has no consequence. It has no effect on the outcome. It has no observable effect. If something has no consequence and no observable effect, then it is irrelevant.

It is possible that there were or are tool-using dinosaurs, alien space monkeys, and green giraffe-necked unicorns. But they are irrelevant. If there is no evidence, if there is no observable effect, if there is no consequence to our understanding of the world, then there is no need to “explain” these hypothetical things, and without a need to explain, there is no need to apply "Ockham's razor". :)

[RichardR]

Thanks for the responses. O.R. has been defined as:

"Plurality should not be posited without necessity."

I usually re-state this in more modern English as:

Do not invent unnecessary entities to explain something.

A key word is “invent” – ie something that is not known to exist via any other evidence. The other key word is “unnecessary” - if you can explain something without an additional unproven entity, don’t invoke the additional unproven entity.

Of course, this doesn’t prove the additional unproven entity is false; it’s just a reason not to invoke the additional entity.

So I was interested in the views of skeptics as to situations when this would not apply – when you can ignore O.R. To put it another way, doesn’t ignoring O.R. mean that you invent some unnecessary thing?

Perhaps a couple of examples.

Example A - Reincarnation

It has been stated by some reincarnation researchers that in cultures where they believe that you cannot change sex in a reincarnation, they report no cases of changed sex reincarnation. Where they do believe reincarnates can change sex, this is sometimes reported.

Two explanations have been offered for this:

1 Reincarnation doesn’t happen, and cultural beliefs are applied to make the stories fit, or

2 Reincarnation does happen, and cultural beliefs actually change what happens during reincarnation.

Option (1) above fits very well with the observed facts, and doesn’t require us to make-up and accept the extraordinary claim of reincarnation. I think option 2 is absurd. Am I right to invoke O.R. to accept explanation (1)?

Example B – God

Suppose we have no direct evidence for God, and nothing that we observe about the universe where we need to add “God” to the explanation to make the explanation work. Am I right to invoke O.R. to eliminate any explanations that invoke God?

I was especially interested in replies in the light of this response:

I think the problem is that people use Occam's Razor incorrectly. A common misapplication of it is to invoke it to justify belief in the absence of things unseen. Occam's Razor was never meant to prove the negatives of the unobserved or untestable.

Would your invisible pink unicorn be analogous to reincarnation, or God, in the examples above? If you don’t need the unicorn to explain an observation, can’t you rule it out for now, until different evidence appears?

Thanks again.

[bruto]

Thanks for the responses. O.R. has been defined as:

"Plurality should not be posited without necessity."

I usually re-state this in more modern English as:

Do not invent unnecessary entities to explain something.

A key word is “invent” – ie something that is not known to exist via any other evidence. The other key word is “unnecessary” - if you can explain something without an additional unproven entity, don’t invoke the additional unproven entity.

Of course, this doesn’t prove the additional unproven entity is false; it’s just a reason not to invoke the additional entity.

So I was interested in the views of skeptics as to situations when this would not apply – when you can ignore O.R. To put it another way, doesn’t ignoring O.R. mean that you invent some unnecessary thing?

Perhaps a couple of examples.

Example A - Reincarnation

It has been stated by some reincarnation researchers that in cultures where they believe that you cannot change sex in a reincarnation, they report no cases of changed sex reincarnation. Where they do believe reincarnates can change sex, this is sometimes reported.

Two explanations have been offered for this:

1 Reincarnation doesn’t happen, and cultural beliefs are applied to make the stories fit, or

2 Reincarnation does happen, and cultural beliefs actually change what happens during reincarnation.

Option (1) above fits very well with the observed facts, and doesn’t require us to make-up and accept the extraordinary claim of reincarnation. I think option 2 is absurd. Am I right to invoke O.R. to accept explanation (1)?

Example B – God

Suppose we have no direct evidence for God, and nothing that we observe about the universe where we need to add “God” to the explanation to make the explanation work. Am I right to invoke O.R. to eliminate any explanations that invoke God?

I was especially interested in replies in the light of this response:



Would your invisible pink unicorn be analogous to reincarnation, or God, in the examples above? If you don’t need the unicorn to explain an observation, can’t you rule it out for now, until different evidence appears?

Thanks again.



I think in the first instance, O.R. might not be strictly applicable, at least as Ockham would have seen it, if reincarnation is seen as a matter of faith, because he seems to have been pretty explicit that parsimony does not apply to matters of faith. I would tend to choose the simple explanation here, but it is not parsimony alone that makes me do that, but a consideration of likelihood in a matter that is not one of pure faith, at least for me. As it is, though, neither explanation deals with the scientific explanation for how reincarnation might work, so I'm not really sure whether O.R. is applicable here. In this case we're dealing with one explanation that denies reincarnation and one that explains how it might work, rather than two that explain how it works. Neither explanation goes to the base question of investigating supposed instances of reincarnation, and determining whether or not we have any reason to believe that it occurs. At that level, I could conceive of O.R. being applicable if straightforward physical or psychological explanations can be found for the phenomenon, but we need to avoid confusing parsimony with just plain believablity.

But in the second example, I would say that's pretty much what he had in mind: if you can explain the way the universe works using physical laws without god, this means, not that God doesn't exist, but that divine agency is not needed for the explanation, and should be set aside. In Ockham's world, God has a special privilege. He is assumed to exist whether or not he is needed to explain the world. On other matters, such as the existence of universals and relations, Ockham was more severe, and used the razor not only to eliminate them from consideration, but to deny their existence altogether. I think the invisible pink unicorn would be closer to the second instance: if you can explain the workings of the world without I.P.U.s then they should be assumed not only not to apply, but not to exist, unless they, like God, are required by faith (for example, if the Church regarded IPU's in the same way it does archangels).

Now that the sea of faith no longer lies like a bright girdle furled, etc. yada yada, I'm not sure we need to be as circumspect in our use of the razor, but we do need to make sure we don't confuse parsimony with judgments of likelihood and unlikelihood made for other reasons. After all, in some sense, woo explanations could be considered simpler and more direct than what we consider reasonable ones, especially by people who find it possible to deny the existence or knowability of the material world.

[Melendwyr]

Of course, "science" doesn't know about these. Furthermore (and this is part of the authors' point), science would not be expected to know about these civilizations -- the sand-and-spit statues, or the wooden tools, could not possibly survive to the present to be found by modern scientists. But just because we cannot possibly inquire about dinosaur tools would make them no less real. Why can't we inquire about dinosaur tools, again? Such a field can potentially be examined.

Of course, this example is fictitious. But that's the point. Suppose that I took seriously these ideas and wanted to investigate them scientifically. I couldn't. So what? The question is not whether you personally, or even society as a whole, possesses the capacity to investigate matters. The question is whether those matters can theoretically be investigated.

If you declare that God cannot be investigated, even in theory, then God cannot be real.

[Melendwyr]

Then are you a solipsist? I don't think you understand what that term implies. Subjective experience cannot be scientifically observed Says who?

Here is a thought experiment: Consider a box that cannot be broken into. On top of that, it is made of a material which doesn't permit us to detect the inside of it in any other way either. Does this mean to you that the inside of the box doesn't exist? The "inside" of the box doesn't exist in this universe. It can't interact with anything, in any way, and so isn't real.

What exactly are you asserting is the difference between the declaration that the inside exists and the declaration that it doesn't exist? What consequences are implied by one that aren't by the other?

[RichardR]

I think in the first instance, O.R. might not be strictly applicable, at least as Ockham would have seen it, if reincarnation is seen as a matter of faith, because he seems to have been pretty explicit that parsimony does not apply to matters of faith. I am less interested in what Occam would have thought than in how we think it should be applied now. I would tend to choose the simple explanation here, but it is not parsimony alone that makes me do that, but a consideration of likelihood in a matter that is not one of pure faith, at least for me. For me it’s parsimony – Option 2 requires me to accept reincarnation which is an additional thing I have to believe in for the explanation to work, compared with option 1. Option 1 doesn’t require me to do anything – I can explain the observation using only what is known about the universe. Option 2 requires me to do something in addition – invent something called “reincarnation” that is not otherwise known to exist

[Batman Jr.]

Would your invisible pink unicorn be analogous to reincarnation, or God, in the examples above? If you don’t need the unicorn to explain an observation, can’t you rule it out for now, until different evidence appears?

Thanks again.

When you rule out the unicorn, you are complicating the theory. Saying "x happens whenever y happens" is simpler than saying "x happens whenever y happens and invisible unicorns have nothing to do with x and therefore don't exist." You don't have to claim that the unicorn doesn't exist to explain something without the unicorn. Take, for example, the development of theories of heredity. Principles of heredity were established before the discovery of genes, so before heredity knew of the double-helix, heredity theory didn't incorporate into its explanations the role genes play in the passing on of characteristics; it only noted that the passing on of characteristics did happen. With the advent of the study of genes, prior heredity theory wasn't thrown out or proven wrong; it was expanded. This is because the theories which remained viable were ambiguous on the specific mechanisms of heredity. The corrupted version of Occam's Razor would have dictated that for the sake of parsimony, we should have, before the discovery of genes, ruled out intermediaries involved in the transference of traits and said that a particular feature directly creates that same feature in the offspring of its original possessor. This demonstrates that using Occam's Razor in the manner sometimes prescribed is not how science really works. It also shows that your examples of reincarnation and God are false dichotomies.
I don't think you understand what that term implies.
You'd be surprised.
Says who?
An awful lot of the leading scholars in the field of the philosophy of mind. I've explained why many, including myself, have come to this conclusion too often and am sick of having arguments over it. I'd suggest reading proposed answers to Chalmers' "hard problem of consciousness" to find out more.
The "inside" of the box doesn't exist in this universe. It can't interact with anything, in any way, and so isn't real.

What exactly are you asserting is the difference between the declaration that the inside exists and the declaration that it doesn't exist? What consequences are implied by one that aren't by the other?
What if there are things inside the box that interact with one another, but not anything outside the box?

[bruto]

I am less interested in what Occam would have thought than in how we think it should be applied now. For me it’s parsimony – Option 2 requires me to accept reincarnation which is an additional thing I have to believe in for the explanation to work, compared with option 1. Option 1 doesn’t require me to do anything – I can explain the observation using only what is known about the universe. Option 2 requires me to do something in addition – invent something called “reincarnation” that is not otherwise known to exist

I see your point, but while I think parsimony is a reasonable option to use in considering the basic question of whether or not reincarnation is real, applying it to a question on a supposed characteristic of reincarnation is a step late. Probably nitpicking, but if you're going to be an Ockhamist, reincarnation never even gets out of the gate.

[bruto]

I don't think you understand what that term implies. Says who?

The "inside" of the box doesn't exist in this universe. It can't interact with anything, in any way, and so isn't real.

What exactly are you asserting is the difference between the declaration that the inside exists and the declaration that it doesn't exist? What consequences are implied by one that aren't by the other?

What kind of box is this? Is it assumed to be a real box with dimensions in space? If so, we can, perhaps must, infer that some kind of inside exists, even though we are forever unable to examine it, because a box exists in three dimensions and encloses a space which no other object can simultaneously occupy, and even though we may, on principle, and by definition, never see what is inside, and the contents or lack of contents can never be confirmed, to suggest that the inside of the box is nonexistent or without dimension violates our commonly held notions of physics and geometry. Of course a Scholastic Realist would hold that that spatial relationship is an entity in its own right, but even if you don't go that far, it is enough of an implied consequence to give some meaning to the notion that the box has an inside.

Similarly, I would contend that the notion that there is a God, while it may be wrong, foolish, and is certainly not, under any known circumstances at present subject to verification, is not thereby without meaning. Even if you believe that god is entirely outside of the possibility of empirical verification, if you do in fact believe that an omnipotent benevolent deity created the universe out of nothing, having attributed to that god some specific action, then this is a conceivable, meaningful statement even if it is untrue. If I say that when I die I will go to heaven and talk to Jesus, this is a conceivable thing with a clear meaning, even if it is impossible and foolish and requires a miracle that defies all we know of science.

I say that on such and such a day, Caesar had a couple of pop tarts and a bottle of Frobscottle. Nobody can verify what he did have, but you can certainly dismiss that statement as a total fabrication and a foolish one at that. Yet despite the total inability to ascertain the truth and the total absurdity of my statement, it has a clear, well understood meaning (better understood if you've read a lot of Roald Dahl to your kids).

edited typos

[Flange Desire]

... Here is a thought experiment: Consider a box that cannot be broken into. On top of that, it is made of a material which doesn't permit us to detect the inside of it in any other way either. Does this mean to you that the inside of the box doesn't exist?

Thanks for the exercise Batman Jr, and please excuse my lack or rigor in the following ...

The 'inside of the box' does exist, because -
We can observe the exterior (or description) of the box.
And from experience we know how boxes are constructed,
and deduce that the box has an interior,
as all other boxes in our experience do have an interior.
Another way of saying this is that, by definition, a box has an interior.
My dictionary tells me this.
Even though it is mandated that we cannot observe its interior, we can still imagine a scenario where it can be observed.
By calling it a 'box', we have decided the matter.
If its interior does NOT exist then this thing is NOT a box.

Our confidence in the existence of the interior is proportional to the match between the observation (or description) of the box, with the other boxes in our experience, ie, how closely it resembles the box described in our dictionary.

If the thought experiment is reworded slightly to read '... whatever is inside the box don't exist?' (this may actually have been the meaning but I did not read it as such) then similarly, the 'whatever is inside of the box' does exist, because -
Whatever is inside the box has the potential to be observed.
Even though the experiment says that it cannot be observed, one can still imagine a scenario where it can be observed.
The experiment mentions nothing else special about this box, except that we cannot observe its interior, so (WRT its ability to have an interior and contain things) it is the same as the box described in our dictionary.
From experience and definition, all boxes have interiors and can contain things.

There is no reason or argument to propose that the contents of any box (including this particular one) does not exist.

(gee - i hope i was allowed to use the terms 'experience' and 'by definition' in this)

Thanks again for the excersise.
PS, I am in strong agreement with Melendwyr's statement.

[bruto]

Thanks for the exercise Batman Jr, and please excuse my lack or rigor in the following ...

The 'inside of the box' does exist, because -
We can observe the exterior (or description) of the box.
And from experience we know how boxes are constructed,
and deduce that the box has an interior,
as all other boxes in our experience do have an interior.
Another way of saying this is that, by definition, a box has an interior.
My dictionary tells me this.
Even though it is mandated that we cannot observe its interior, we can still imagine a scenario where it can be observed.
By calling it a 'box', we have decided the matter.
If its interior does NOT exist then this thing is NOT a box.

Our confidence in the existence of the interior is proportional to the match between the observation (or description) of the box, with the other boxes in our experience, ie, how closely it resembles the box described in our dictionary.

If the thought experiment is reworded slightly to read '... whatever is inside the box don't exist?' (this may actually have been the meaning but I did not read it as such) then similarly, the 'whatever is inside of the box' does exist, because -
Whatever is inside the box has the potential to be observed.
Even though the experiment says that it cannot be observed, one can still imagine a scenario where it can be observed.
The experiment mentions nothing else special about this box, except that we cannot observe its interior, so (WRT its ability to have an interior and contain things) it is the same as the box described in our dictionary.
From experience and definition, all boxes have interiors and can contain things.

There is no reason or argument to propose that the contents of any box (including this particular one) does not exist.

(gee - i hope i was allowed to use the terms 'experience' and 'by definition' in this)

Thanks again for the excersise.
PS, I am in strong agreement with Melendwyr's statement.


There's no argument to say that the contents absolutely cannot exist, but no good argument to say that they do either. This is a theoretical box, so we might even allow it to contain a theoretical perfect vacuum and be truly empty. There is a good argument, which may be what Melendwyr was aiming at, to assert that if we have no conceivable, practical way to examine the contents, discussion of their properties is irrelevant, and meaningless in a scientific sense, especially because the assumption that the contents can not be identified in any way carries with it the assumption that they cannot interact with the world outside the box in any way (including, for example, weight, magnetic induction, examination by radiation, or any other way for the contents to exert a measurable influence through the walls of the box), otherwise that interaction could theoretically be measured. It is, therefore, reasonable to treat the contents as if they do not exist in the world, but Melendwy'rs implication that there is no meaningful way to say that the contents exist is, I think, mistaken if he extends it to thought and language (and faith) as well as to useful scientific inquiry. We can imagine a scenario, as you say, that changes the rules and allows us to see within the box. We can imagine a scenario in which it turns out that the contents of the box exert a heretofore unmeasureable, unmeasured force on the world, which will not be discovered until a million more years have passed. We can imagine a scenario in which diligent inquiry and logical toil lead us to conclusions about what the box is there for, who put it there, and thence to speculation on the intended contents. It is possible to speculate in various ways on the contents, and make groundless, untrue, unsound, foolish but meaningful statements about them.

[Batman Jr.]

Thanks for the exercise Batman Jr, and please excuse my lack or rigor in the following ...

The 'inside of the box' does exist, because -
We can observe the exterior (or description) of the box.
And from experience we know how boxes are constructed,
and deduce that the box has an interior,
as all other boxes in our experience do have an interior.
Another way of saying this is that, by definition, a box has an interior.
My dictionary tells me this.
Even though it is mandated that we cannot observe its interior, we can still imagine a scenario where it can be observed.
By calling it a 'box', we have decided the matter.
If its interior does NOT exist then this thing is NOT a box.
You can't "deduce" that the box has an inside because the box obviously is not an ordinary box; the normal rules behind boxes don't apply. All other boxes in our experience have had the potential of being broken into. I could, using your logic, "deduce" that since it is a "box," it can also be broken into. The problem is that you are using "induction" and not "deduction." The other problem is that we don't know if you are really inducing that the box has an interior from the inherent properties of boxes or instead from the fact that the existence of interiors can be related to the breaking into of whatever is enclosing them. Since the observations on which the former induction was made can be subsumed into the latter induction, believing there to be an inherent property of boxes that gives them an interior would be unnecessarily complicating inductively derived rules and thus, believe it or not, in violation of Occam's Razor (the real one, not the fake one I've been criticizing).
Our confidence in the existence of the interior is proportional to the match between the observation (or description) of the box, with the other boxes in our experience, ie, how closely it resembles the box described in our dictionary.

If the thought experiment is reworded slightly to read '... whatever is inside the box don't exist?' (this may actually have been the meaning but I did not read it as such) then similarly, the 'whatever is inside of the box' does exist, because -
Whatever is inside the box has the potential to be observed.
Even though the experiment says that it cannot be observed, one can still imagine a scenario where it can be observed.
The experiment mentions nothing else special about this box, except that we cannot observe its interior, so (WRT its ability to have an interior and contain things) it is the same as the box described in our dictionary.
From experience and definition, all boxes have interiors and can contain things.

There is no reason or argument to propose that the contents of any box (including this particular one) does not exist.

(gee - i hope i was allowed to use the terms 'experience' and 'by definition' in this)

Thanks again for the excersise.
PS, I am in strong agreement with Melendwyr's statement.
The "scenario where it could be observed" argument is similar to my contention against Melendwyr's rejection of the existence of the inside of the box in that I posit that it is possible that there are things inside the box interacting with one another, but not the outside world. In that way, they would exist by Melendwyr's "ontological definition of interaction" but would be untestable and unobservable.

[Flange Desire]

... so we might even allow it to contain a theoretical perfect vacuum and be truly empty. ...

Harrumphh!
A vacuum is measurable, and so the existance of a vacuum inside a box can be observed.
A vacuum is a little different from 'the inside of the box doesn't exist'.

[Flange Desire]

You can't "deduce" that the box has an inside because the box obviously is not an ordinary box; the normal rules behind boxes don't apply.....

Oh OK.
I didn't know that YOUR box did not conform to 'the [other] normal rules behind boxes', as you did not state that.

Thanks again for the excersise.

[Batman Jr.]

Oh OK.
I didn't know that YOUR box did not conform to 'the [other] normal rules behind boxes', as you did not state that.

Thanks again for the excersise.
I did state that because the box cannot be broken into. All other boxes have the property of possibly being broken into. Therefore, you don't know if the existence of interiors in other boxes is related to the induced rule that "things which can be broken into have interiors" or "boxes have interiors." Since the first rule explains all observations and doesn't require the second, you are unjustified in saying that there is a property of boxes that gives them interiors. You sounded sort of sarcastic, so I thought I might try to restate in different terms what I said previously.

[DevilsAdvocate]

Another way of saying this is that, by definition, a box has an interior.I agree. I think Batman Jr has made a good point. But the question should not be whether the inside of the box exists, but whether the "contents of the box" exist. We can speculate that the box contains gold, ancient manuscripts, nothing, anti-matter, a pink unicorn, a perpetual motion machine, etc. How do we apply Occam's razor here? Should we conculde that because the box could contain anything or nothing and that because anything would be more complex than nothing that the box therefore contains nothing--that the "contents of the box" do not exist? No. Because any thing would be as likely as no thing. The contents of the box are "unknown".

Before we can even apply Occams razor, we would have to know "somehting" about the contents of the box in order to formulate hypothesis that could be cut by the razor. We have no evidence of any properties of what is in the box. Therfore, it could be "any thing" (which includes "no thing"). Because the contents of the box (if any) do not affect anything outside the box, there is no phenomena that can be measured, therfore it does not require any explaination. Therefore you have no set of explaination to which Occam's raazor could be applied. Something may or may not exist in the box, but it doesn't matter because the box can't be opened and the contents of the box don't affect anything.

[Batman Jr.]

I agree. I think Batman Jr has made a good point. But the question should not be whether the inside of the box exists, but whether the "contents of the box" exist. We can speculate that the box contains gold, ancient manuscripts, nothing, anti-matter, a pink unicorn, a perpetual motion machine, etc. How do we apply Occam's razor here? Should we conculde that because the box could contain anything or nothing and that because anything would be more complex than nothing that the box therefore contains nothing--that the "contents of the box" do not exist? No. Because any thing would be as likely as no thing. The contents of the box are "unknown".

Before we can even apply Occams razor, we would have to know "somehting" about the contents of the box in order to formulate hypothesis that could be cut by the razor. We have no evidence of any properties of what is in the box. Therfore, it could be "any thing" (which includes "no thing"). Because the contents of the box (if any) do not affect anything outside the box, there is no phenomena that can be measured, therfore it does not require any explaination. Therefore you have no set of explaination to which Occam's raazor could be applied. Something may or may not exist in the box, but it doesn't matter because the box can't be opened and the contents of the box don't affect anything.
This is an important point; it's also a more apt analogue for actual uses of Occam's Razor because I was originally attacking how people use Occam's Razor and then default to the contingency of "nothingness" for the unknown variable. The problem is that "nothingness" is also a value for the unknown variable. We don't know that "nothingness" is more likely than any other description of the unknown, so it's best to say that we just don't know the state of the indefinable variable.

[DevilsAdvocate]

Exactly. Which goes back to what you were saying about genes.

Principles of heredity were established before the discovery of genes, so before heredity knew of the double-helix, heredity theory didn't incorporate into its explanations the role genes play in the passing on of characteristics; it only noted that the passing on of characteristics did happen.The explanation of heredity was unknown, and therefore should be stated as unknown and not that there is "nothing".

I was trying to say before (perhaps not very well) that to use Occam's razor, you must first have something to explain, and multiple possible explanations which can't be proven or disproven.

If you say "dinosaurs used tools", it is not Occam's razor that dismisses this, but rather lack of evidence. But if you say "petrified wood has unexplained notches", then you could conclude that the notches were caused by dinosaur tools, caused by natural formations from petrification, caused by methods of tree growth, caused by natural teeth/horns of dinosaurs, caused by aliens, caused by insects of fungus, caused by God, etc. If the notches COULD be caused by any of these, then we apply Occam's razor. If we accept the explanation of "dinosaur tools", we would have to "create" dinosaur tools because none are know to exist and no evidence suggests that dinosaurs could have used tools. Similarly, we have no evidence of aliens or God, so the razor cuts those possibilities out for the explanation.

Note that Occam's razor does not mean that there is no dinosaur tools, aliens, or God. It just means that inventing these things as an explanation for notches in petrified wood when other explanations are available is not necessary. Or even improbable and unacceptable.

[sphenisc]

Then are you a solipsist? Subjective experience cannot be scientifically observed, so that must constitute proof to me that you're a p-zombie, right? If something can't be observed, it can't be observed. What is your explicit rationale for believing that this means the thing is nonexistent? Here is a thought experiment: Consider a box that cannot be broken into. On top of that, it is made of a material which doesn't permit us to detect the inside of it in any other way either. Does this mean to you that the inside of the box doesn't exist?

Forget the hypothetical box - a standard black hole will do. Does the inside of a black hole exist?

[MRC_Hans]

We can observe the inside of a black hole indirectly, that is, we can observe the effect of it (gravity). There are a lot of things in physics that we can ever only observe indirectly.

Does a thing we cannot observe at all exist? The only sensible answer is: "We cannot know". However, the existene of something does not depend on our ability to observe it (unless you are a solipsist ;) ).

Hans

[sphenisc]

Drkitten,

"Things that, by their very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry, are unreal." -Melendwyr

.

Festus' remaining arguments attempt to disprove that any examples given by others, are things which "cannot be the subject of scientific inquiry".

If carried to its logical conclusion Festus' will demonstrate that there is nothing which, by its very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry.

Combine with Melendwyr's statement this leads use to the conclusion that

Nothing is unreal.

I thank you!
:D

[bruto]

Harrumphh!
A vacuum is measurable, and so the existance of a vacuum inside a box can be observed.
A vacuum is a little different from 'the inside of the box doesn't exist'.

Certainly, and as I said, I think we must admit that if it is a box at all in any meaningful sense of the term, it must have an "inside" or it is not a box. We cannot, however, count on the inside containing anything other than space or extension. As with anything else measurable, we can only measure a vacuum if we can get at it, but in this case we cannot. For the purpose of this thought experiment the box is perfectly sealed. Perhaps I was being ontologically careless in considering a vacuum "nothing at all." It might be necessary to conclude that if a box is a box and not something else, then no matter how it is redefined to be impervious to investigation, it must be assumed to contain "something" if we conclude that total emptiness is itself "something" because it can be measured relative to everything else.

[bruto]

I did state that because the box cannot be broken into. All other boxes have the property of possibly being broken into. Therefore, you don't know if the existence of interiors in other boxes is related to the induced rule that "things which can be broken into have interiors" or "boxes have interiors." Since the first rule explains all observations and doesn't require the second, you are unjustified in saying that there is a property of boxes that gives them interiors. You sounded sort of sarcastic, so I thought I might try to restate in different terms what I said previously.

I have to disagree. Accessibility is not what gives a box its interior. Extension is. The only way you can redefine a box as not having an interior is to redefine it as not occupying space, which essentially redefines it as entirely nonexistent. Now certainly a box that is defined as not existing can be authoritatively stated as not having any properties at all, but it's kind of an isometric exercise, isn't it?

You can conclude that for all intents and purposes the interior is irrelevant, and that from the pragmatic point of view it might as well contain nothing at all, since no interaction with the known world is allowed by definition, but you cannot conclude that it has no interior, because if it is a box, it occupies space, and that space is interior to it. If it is a box of any dimension, then in theory at least there is a location in the universe into which you cannot place anything else, because the space that is interior to the box already is occupied by it. However remote and inaccessible the box itself is, this is a conceivable consequence that does not call for violation of physical laws, and therefore, it seems to me, it allows the idea of the box's interior to have meaning even if the nature of that interior is entirely immune to scientific investigation.

[drkitten]

I read better than you write apparently. I addressed this issue in my last post. If you didn't want your example evaluated in it's fictional context then you should not have used a fictional example.

So address the non-fictional example of the colour patterns of .



You seem to regard time as some sort of universal solvent that destroys everything utterly with no trace.


Not everything. Just some things. And those things that are destoryed -- or more accurately, irrevocably transformed beyond recognition -- cannot be recovered.


Yet the first law of thermodynamics states that matter cannot be created nor destroyed, only transformed. It stands to reason then that if matter, say an Archaeopteryx, is enclosed in a system, such as trapped in a mudslide, frozen in ice, or sunk in a pond and layered in sand, then all we need is an understanding of how the matter that made up the Archaeopteryx would have changed and reverse the process either physically or through a detailed model.


Unfortunately, irrevocable transformations exist. This is the second law of thermodynamics.

Is it too complicated to sort out?

Yes.

Physicists at the Japan Marine Science and Technology Center have built the Earth Simulator in part to model atmospheric conditions on a planet-wide scale. Could the decay and dissemination of the matter of anything be similarly modeled?


No.

The potential exists.


No.

Could such a technology be expanded to ever larger scales?


No.

How about genetics?

No.

If evolution is in fact the manner which all that lives came to be in the form it is then could the process be reversed?


No.

Given sufficient computing power could all possible DNA combinations be computed? Could then these sequences be modeled to show what sort of creature would result?


No.



Deny all you like this is not the question.Niether I nor anyone else has to have the ability to investigate however many spurious examples you come up with. All I have to show is a means of inquiry could potentially exist.


Which you have not done.



Perhaps you could come up with a logical fallacy in Melendwyr's assertion?

Certainly. Non sequitor -- "it does not follow." The same argument that applies when someone makes an argument of the form "I have shoes, therefore it will rain tomorrow."

An object subject to an irreversible transformation cannot be recovered for study. We know that irreversible transformations exist from elementary thermodynamics. Therefore, there exist object that cannot be recovered for study. And thus is Melendwyr's assertion conclusively refuted.

[Melendwyr]

An awful lot of the leading scholars in the field of the philosophy of mind. I've explained why many, including myself, have come to this conclusion too often and am sick of having arguments over it. I'd suggest reading proposed answers to Chalmers' "hard problem of consciousness" to find out more. My degree is in cognitive psychology, Batman Jr.

Don't teach a daw to suck eggs.

What if there are things inside the box that interact with one another, but not anything outside the box? So? What if there are? They would constitute a universe (albeit a small and pretty uninteresting one) completely separate from our own. They wouldn't exist relative to us, nor us to them.

[Melendwyr]

Festus' remaining arguments attempt to disprove that any examples given by others, are things which "cannot be the subject of scientific inquiry".

If carried to its logical conclusion Festus' will demonstrate that there is nothing which, by its very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry.

Combine with Melendwyr's statement this leads use to the conclusion that

Nothing is unreal. I hope this argument is a joke, as the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.

[Melendwyr]

An object subject to an irreversible transformation cannot be recovered for study. We know that irreversible transformations exist from elementary thermodynamics. Therefore, there exist object that cannot be recovered for study. And thus is Melendwyr's assertion conclusively refuted. The question of what the object was like before it was irreversibly transformed is an empirical, historical one that is potentially open to scientific examination.

Of course, if you rule out "past" and "future" from the realm of things that can be scientifically examined, your point would hold. Doing so, however, requires declaring those concepts to be without real referrents - that is, they describe unreal things.

[drkitten]

The question of what the object was like before it was irreversibly transformed is an empirical, historical one that is potentially open to scientific examination.


No, by definition of "irreversible." Any scientific examination would implicitly involve the reversal of the transformation.


Of course, if you rule out "past" and "future" from the realm of things that can be scientifically examined, your point would hold.


The inaccessible past, I do rule out. That's my central point.

But the other half of my central point is that the following statement is simply untrue.

Doing so, however, requires declaring those concepts to be without real referrents - that is, they describe unreal things.

The inaccessible past is not unreal. I specifically declare that the inaccessible past is not part of the scientifically examinable, while still being real. Your second sentence is simply a restatement of your original claim that anything unexaminable is unreal. As such, it's still wrong.

[Melendwyr]

No, by definition of "irreversible." Any scientific examination would implicitly involve the reversal of the transformation. No, it wouldn't. Or is archaeology necessarily unscientific, in your mind.

The inaccessible past is not unreal. I specifically declare that the inaccessible past is not part of the scientifically examinable, while still being real. You can redefine the word to mean whatever you like. but the inaccessible past isn't real. There are no possible events in the world that require that past to explain - therefore, it's not part of our universe.

Assuming that the Big Bang cosmology is correct, and further granting that the expansion-contraction hypothesis is valid, in what way could we say that anything before our Big Bang is real?

[drkitten]

You can redefine the word to mean whatever you like. but the inaccessible past isn't real.

The same challenge to you, then. Tell me about the colouration or mating behavior of Archeopteryx.

[RichardR]

I would say, if you can’t measure something directly or indirectly, then there is no difference between a universe where this “thing” exists and a universe where this “thing” does not exist. So essentially the “thing” might as well not exist, for all the difference it makes.

That is not quite the same as saying if you can’t measure it, it doesn’t exist.

[Francois Tremblay]

If you can't measure it, it's not real.

[drkitten]

If you can't measure it, it's not real.

Same challenge to you, then. How do you measure the colouration or mating behavior of Archeopteryx?

[bruto]

Same challenge to you, then. How do you measure the colouration or mating behavior of Archeopteryx?

I also question Francois's assertion, but I'm not sure the archeopteryx is the best example. If we can say with reasonable certainty that the critter didexist at all, it is reasonable to assume that it had certain properties, and although we cannot measure them now, properties such as color that are not inherently unmeasurable can be reasonably assumed to have existed, even if we cannot now measure them or know their details. I would hope nobody here is such a phenomenalist that he would argue that since there were no persons there to record it the archeopteryx was, by definition, colorless.

But what if a subject is inherently unmeasurable? Does that really mean it simply cannot exist? It certainly means we cannot know it, and implies that we should ignore it, but can we be that sure that there is nothing in the universe that can be said even conceivably to exist, that we are not equipped to experience? Is it conceivable that there are other beings in the universe that experience other things than we do? If it is even conceivable that there are, then it is at least conceivable, however unlikely, that real things exist which to us are inherently unmeasurable.

[Batman Jr.]

My degree is in cognitive psychology, Batman Jr.
Appeal to authority fallacy. You are still quite wrong. The only thing you enlighten us with by making this comment is how bad your education was.
So? What if there are? They would constitute a universe (albeit a small and pretty uninteresting one) completely separate from our own. They wouldn't exist relative to us, nor us to them.
Oy. I bet you still believe Karl Popper solved the problem of induction. What kind of nonsensical idea do you have that the "existence" of something is qualified by what it interacts with? Before, you said that just as long as something interacts with something else, it "exists." Now you're resorting to philosophical prevarication so you don't have to admit that you were wrong that things can exist of which we will never be aware.

[drkitten]

I also question Francois's assertion, but I'm not sure the archeopteryx is the best example. If we can say with reasonable certainty that the critter didexist at all, it is reasonable to assume that it had certain properties, and although we cannot measure them now, properties such as color that are not inherently unmeasurable can be reasonably assumed to have existed, even if we cannot now measure them or know their details. I would hope nobody here is such a phenomenalist that he would argue that since there were no persons there to record it the archeopteryx was, by definition, colorless.

There are at least three who have been arguing in favor of exactly such a pheomenalist position : Francois, Melendwyr, and Festus.

The problem is that "inherently unmeasurable" lacks a satisfactory definition. "Colour" is, in fact, too broad a property to consider as a whole. My Honda certainly has a measurable colour (and you're welcome to drop by my office and measure it), but my aspirations, hopes, and dreams do not. I submit, in fact, that it's a domain error to ascribe "colour" to feelings, and as such, "the colour of my dreams" does not exists and is unmeasurable.

Archeopteryx is in a special intermediate place; we can agree that it is not a domain error to talk about the colour of a bird we've never seen, will never see, and in principle ("inherently") cannot ever see. This makes "the colour of an Archeopteryx" inherently unmeasurable.

Especially when we're talking about science, we cannot afford to conflate questions of present capacity ("can we show") with question of theoretical capacity ("can it, in theory, be shown"). But just as importantly, we cannot conflate questions of theoretical capacity with questions of ontology. It is currently believed, for example, that we cannot ever interact with so-called tachyons -- particles that move faster than light -- because of the global causality violations that would result. This does not mean that tachyons don't exist, just that they cannot be detect. Similarly, we cannot ever observe conditions past the event horizon of a black hole, but that doesn't mean there are no conditions there. And similarly, we cannot observe the colour of a long-extinct dinosaur, but that doesn't mean it was colourless.

[Melendwyr]

The same challenge to you, then. Tell me about the colouration or mating behavior of Archeopteryx. I can't.

It would be foolish indeed to confuse "I can't" with "It cannot be done".

[Melendwyr]

Appeal to authority fallacy. You are still quite wrong. The only thing you enlighten us with by making this comment is how bad your education was. As demonstrated by your authoritative citing of your own opinion, I suppose.

I'm not claiming that I'm right because of my degree, and the fact that you try to pretend I am says a great deal about your argument. I'm right because my position is coherent and logically consistent. You should try it some time.

Oy. I bet you still believe Karl Popper solved the problem of induction. What kind of nonsensical idea do you have that the "existence" of something is qualified by what it interacts with? Before, you said that just as long as something interacts with something else, it "exists." It exists relative to that thing. That's the only way 'existence' can be used in a meaningful sense.

When we compare the concept of "a thing that doesn't interact in any way, directly or indirectly, with us" and that of "a thing that doesn't exist", we quickly find that the implications of the first are identical in every way to the implications of the second. There simply isn't a way in which hypothetical things which don't interact with our universe can be said to exist.

Disagree? Give us another definition of 'existence', explained through reference to other concepts. If you can, which I most sincerely doubt.

[Melendwyr]

Archeopteryx is in a special intermediate place; we can agree that it is not a domain error to talk about the colour of a bird we've never seen, will never see, and in principle ("inherently") cannot ever see. This makes "the colour of an Archeopteryx" inherently unmeasurable. No. We cannot say that the color of an Archeopteryx cannot be known in principle. All we can say is that the evidence currently available to us does not speak as to their color.

It is currently believed, for example, that we cannot ever interact with so-called tachyons -- particles that move faster than light -- because of the global causality violations that would result. This does not mean that tachyons don't exist, just that they cannot be detect. What exactly is the difference between something that cannot in principle be measured, and something that doesn't exist? Explain this to us.

[drkitten]

What exactly is the difference between something that cannot in principle be measured, and something that doesn't exist? Explain this to us.

The destruction of evidence, for one. If I burn a paper and powder the ashes, does that mean that the writing on the paper never existed?


We cannot say that the color of an Archeopteryx cannot be known in principle.


On the contrary. I just did. On the grounds that the evidence that would permit us to know the colour is no longer available to any observer.

It's not a question of what you specifically cannot do. It's not a question of what I specifically cannot do. It's a question of what cannot in principle be done by any observer -- because the necessary conditions for doing it no longer hold.

[drkitten]

I'm right because my position is coherent and logically consistent.

I suppose I should thank you for expanding my vocabulary. This is a new use of the words "coherent" and "logically consistent" that I have not previously seen.

[Melendwyr]

The destruction of evidence, for one. If I burn a paper and powder the ashes, does that mean that the writing on the paper never existed? The writing that was on the paper is still subject to scientific investigation. Just not with our current level of technological development.

On the contrary. I just did. On the grounds that the evidence that would permit us to know the colour is no longer available to any observer. Says who?

It's not a question of what you specifically cannot do. It's not a question of what I specifically cannot do. It's a question of what cannot in principle be done by any observer -- because the necessary conditions for doing it no longer hold. You don't know them. Why won't you accept this simple point?

[Batman Jr.]

As demonstrated by your authoritative citing of your own opinion, I suppose.

I'm not claiming that I'm right because of my degree, and the fact that you try to pretend I am says a great deal about your argument. I'm right because my position is coherent and logically consistent. You should try it some time.
You explained nothing on the observability of the value of the variable outlined in the concept of "subjective experience." Your position cannot be "coherent" and "logically consistent" when it is not even enumerated. I do not cite my own opinion as an authority; what I did say is that I have come to my conclusion and wish not to hold the same ridiculous debate for the millionth time over that conclusion and would rather you just read the material pertaining to Chalmers' "hard problem of consciousness" to get an idea of why people such as I believe what we do about "subjective experience."
It exists relative to that thing. That's the only way 'existence' can be used in a meaningful sense.

When we compare the concept of "a thing that doesn't interact in any way, directly or indirectly, with us" and that of "a thing that doesn't exist", we quickly find that the implications of the first are identical in every way to the implications of the second. There simply isn't a way in which hypothetical things which don't interact with our universe can be said to exist.

Disagree? Give us another definition of 'existence', explained through reference to other concepts. If you can, which I most sincerely doubt.
A thing either exists or it doesn't. There is no such thing as "existing relative to" something. I've never heard of such a parameter invoked to describe existence, and I don't think anyone else has either. It's just idealist dogmatism integrating itself into your definition of "existence." In materialism, things can "exist" independent of awareness of them, so if you want to be philosophically even-handed, you'll drop your argument. It is also of note that you substitute "practical implication" for "actual reality." Since my position is not concerned with the former, you are using a straw man to justify yourself.

[drkitten]

The writing that was on the paper is still subject to scientific investigation. Just not with our current level of technological development.

Why won't you accept this simple point?

For approximately the same reason that I don't accept that the current Emperor of Japan is a cow. Because it's wrong to the point of lunacy.

[Melendwyr]

But it's not.

The question of whether there is organic life in, say, the Alpha Centauri system, is not within the domain of current science, but that doesn't make it outside of potential scientific inquiry.

This paper-burning example is similar. We currently do not possess the ability to determine what was written on that paper; that does not mean that it cannot be done.

[Melendwyr]

would rather you just read the material pertaining to Chalmers' "hard problem of consciousness" to get an idea of why people such as I believe what we do about "subjective experience." Read it. The man is a complete fool. If his arguments have a bearing on what you believe, you're also a complete fool.

A thing either exists or it doesn't. There is no such thing as "existing relative to" something. I've never heard of such a parameter invoked to describe existence, and I don't think anyone else has either. It's just idealist dogmatism integrating itself into your definition of "existence." In materialism, things can "exist" independent of awareness of them, so if you want to be philosophically even-handed, you'll drop your argument. Who said anything about awareness or materialism? Interaction is the concept being discussed.

You can't even seem to understand basic English, and you expect us to accept that you can make pronouncements about philosophy?

[bagtaggar]

"Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler."

- Albert Einstein

[drkitten]

This paper-burning example is similar. We currently do not possess the ability to determine what was written on that paper; that does not mean that it cannot be done.

At a small enough level, it does. (Or, more accurately, we have more evidence that it cannot be done, than evidence that it can.)

Similar atoms or molecules are actually chemically and physically identical; that's one of the well-established fundamental bases of Dalton's Atomic Theory. If I were to capture a single water molecule, release it, and then re-capture it later, there's no way to determine whether I in fact captured the same molecule or a different one. If I capture a carbon dioxide molecule, there's no way to establish whether was created by the burning of a piece of paper, or by glucose metabolism inside a human body (or any of the other potential sources of carbon dioxide).

Similarly, observations of any effect smaller than the various limits established by Planck's theory are in principle impossible.

If I burn paper and then powder it finely enough, the individual particles will be indistinguishable from each other and from any other particles that would result from burning paper. At a small enough level, no evidence will remain, even in principle, to permit a scientist of any era to recover the writing on the paper. If the only tests that could in principle analyze and recover evidence themselves contradict the laws and principles of science, then it's it's not possible, in principle, to perform those tests -- and therefore not possible, in principle, to investigate the evidence.

To hold otherwise is to reject most of the foundations of science. Which brings me back to my "to the point of idiocy" comment.

[bagtaggar]

This is a very interesting back and forth we have going here.

It's hard to pick a side here, but I think it would be fair to say that there are things in this Universe that have been irreversibly altered to the point where no scientific inquiry can decipher their origins, however precisely what those things are I don't think anyone knows for sure. Technology has proven over and over again its ability to push the envelope of what we can and cannot know, or what is irreversibly altered.

Interesting example, the development of cinematic imaging techniques, like image based lighting and camera matchings. It seemed almost unimagineable that you could track/replicate the motion of a free, hand held camera only a few decades ago, especially if no one was present to observe the camera motion other than the camera man. Often all you have is the film/video. Perhaps if you had previously measured a few points on the ground as a reference for some frame by frame process it could be accomplished, but even so capturing the subtlety of motion of a walking human carrying a camera based entirely on the image produced seemed an insurmountable task. Today we have software like matchmover pro, which does precisely that. It tracks individual pixels and extrapolates camera motion based on thousands of tracks a second. Similar software enables special effects wizards to relight a scene with all the appropriate caustics, specular highlights, translucency and sub surface scattering using only a digital camera, a digital projector, and some proprietary software packages.

Similarly, who is to say that some day, if you were to burn a piece of paper with writing on it, that some volumetric particle tracking system running on a quantum computer couldn't calculate the particle interactions and trace them backwards to their original placement inside the fabric of the paper? Obviously you would need a camera set up ahead of time, and perhaps this would defeat the purpose since you could just record the text itself, but similar experiments with image based lighting have been performed. Based entirely on the light bouncing off of a text book, using only diffuse-diffuse interactions, the software they have today can reconstruct the image of a playing card that the camera cannot actually see, color, detail and all.

Perhaps some day we will develope a wormhole light tunneling system a la "Light of Other Days" and actually take a look at the Archeopteryx plumage.

Who knows. Perhaps a singularity is the only place this kind of regressive science can't go. I don't know, and I'm sure speculation is only frustrating. But I suggest caution before one declares what is irreversible and what isn't.

[Melendwyr]

At a small enough level, it does. (Or, more accurately, we have more evidence that it cannot be done, than evidence that it can.)

Similar atoms or molecules are actually chemically and physically identical; that's one of the well-established fundamental bases of Dalton's Atomic Theory. If I were to capture a single water molecule, release it, and then re-capture it later, there's no way to determine whether I in fact captured the same molecule or a different one. If I capture a carbon dioxide molecule, there's no way to establish whether was created by the burning of a piece of paper, or by glucose metabolism inside a human body (or any of the other potential sources of carbon dioxide). You don't need to be able to reconstruct the note from the burned remnants in order to figure out what was on it.

To hold otherwise is to reject most of the foundations of science. Which brings me back to my "to the point of idiocy" comment. Do you know what the phrase "tunnel blindness" means?

[Francois Tremblay]

Hello ? No one has been able to name something that exists and is not measurable yet.

[bagtaggar]

Love?

[Batman Jr.]

Read it. The man is a complete fool. If his arguments have a bearing on what you believe, you're also a complete fool.
Wow, that was so brilliantly put that I now have no choice but to acquiesce to your rarefied penchant for abrasive, but nonetheless meaningless, locution. Is that you, Christopher Hitchens? But seriously, you'll have to do better than that tripe to make your point.
Who said anything about awareness or materialism? Interaction is the concept being discussed.
No, "existence" is what is being discussed; you previously stated that "interaction" is the prerequisite for "existence." I provided an example whereby an inability to observe an entity didn't preclude that entity's "existence"; in a desperate attempt to save your corrupt ideas, you added another qualifier to the state of "being," namely that things don't "exist" in a relative manner to certain things. Unless you believe idealism is the only way and that it is incontrovertible that observation creates reality, this position is untenable. By the definition of materialism, things act on and produce observation, not the other way around. In light of that, your musings on "relative existences" are in blatant contradiction with a materialistic philosophical outlook. Given that materialism may represent what reality actually is and has not been ruled out of the field of competing theories of ontology, your idealistic analyses carry little weight. It also still stands that you create a straw man in your arguments in that you replace "existence" with "implications," words which obviously represent entirely different concepts.
You can't even seem to understand basic English, and you expect us to accept that you can make pronouncements about philosophy?
I thought your overly simplistic ideas were quite easy to follow; I don't know how you got that impression of my comprehension.

[Francois Tremblay]

It can't be measured with our current technology, but as it's another emotion, thus made of brain impulses, it's definitely measurable.

[Batman Jr.]

It can't be measured with our current technology, but as it's another emotion, thus made of brain impulses, it's definitely measurable.
Conceptually, we distinguish between the expression of love and the feeling of love. Neural correlates will obviously be found for the expression of love, but since the concept of the feeling of love is not required to explain the objective behavior of love, it cannot fit into a legitimate scientific theory of the mind. Therefore, it cannot be measured. It cannot be said to be real or fictitious and, if real, cannot be elaborated upon in terms of its phenomenological qualities.

[bagtaggar]

Love: part tangible, chemical emotion, part abstract notion.

Measuring love is like measuring an idea. It's just the wrong impulse to have.

[Francois Tremblay]

Maybe it is, but it still doesn't fit the criteria. I asked for something that is not measurable. Love is measurable, if only by personal observation.

[DevilsAdvocate]

This is a very interesting back and forth we have going here. It's hard to pick a side here...I'm not sure if there are sides here. Maybe the sides don't exist. Har har har. Sorta. Har.

If I've been following correctly: Let's say I made the box. I put a coin it. The box is real. You can measure it, weigh it, whatever. But no matter what I put in it (if anything), it will weigh, measure, etc. exactly the same. There is no means know either now or in way possible way to detect what is in the box. Then I give the box to youse guys to ponder the existence of the "coin in the box". From what I see:

Francois Tremblay: The coin in the box does not exist because you cannot measure it.

Melendwyr: The coin in the box may exist, but only relative to “in the box”. To an observer out of the box, the coin does not exist.

Batman Jr.: The coin in the box may exist.


Isn’t this the basically the same as Schrödinger's cat?

Francois Tremblay: Schrödinger “interpretation” (it doesn’t exist until we ‘know’ it)

Melendwyr: Everett many-worlds interpretation (it ‘exists’ and ‘does not exist’ simultaneously dependent upon the observer)

Batman Jr.: Copenhagen interpretation (Umm..sort kinda. I’m grasping for a match here. It exists, and observation of it does not change its existence, but observation does change the observer.)

Actually Melendwyr and Batman Jr. seem to be saying the same thing in different ways, which is that a thing either exists or does not, but there is a difference to the observer whether the thing is observed or not. Connecting Melendwyr to Everett is perhaps a bit off because he did not say that the thing exists in simultaneous states or did not exist at all but only exists in its own right but not ‘relative’ to the observer. Which to me is the same thing Batman Jr. is saying. And by expressing it as a ‘relative’ existence, it supports what Francois Tremblay says about it not ‘existing’ if you can’t measure it.
If the ‘existence’ if something is not, and cannot in any way, be relative to your experience, then there is no point in saying that it ‘exists’. The difference would only be consequential in theoretical scenarios because anything (that exists or does not) that is not, and cannot in any way, be relative to the experience of an observer has no effect on the observer.

There may be a “coin in the box”. Or maybe not. The best we can say is that there could be a coin in the box, but it absolutely doesn’t matter.

To apply it to a question like “Does God exist”? And God is defined as an unknowable entity that has no affect on anything. We can ‘apply’ Occam’s Razor and say God does not exist because we don’t need God to explain anything. Indeed, God does not explain anything. But in the case of the magic box, we have something unexplained, indeed unexplainable. What is in the box? Now we have a question. Is a coin in the box? Is nothing in the box? Is God in the box? Is a pink unicorn in the box? In this case, we can’t apply the razor. We now have a question, with multiple hypotheses that cannot be proven. In this case, we must conclude that “we don’t know”. Of course that doesn’t ‘prove’ that pink unicorns or God exist. It would introduce that possibilities that pink unicorns or God exist, but first we would have to find the magic box

[Francois Tremblay]

"You can measure it, weigh it, whatever."

"Francois Tremblay: The coin in the box does not exist because you cannot measure it."

What the fucl< ? Apparently you don't see that you majorly contradict yourself within a few paragraphs - or you think I'm so stupid that I would contradict myself majorly by being able to weight something and then stating that it cannot be measured.

Either way, your glib dismissal doesn't look very rigorous.

If you mean that I wouldn't know there was an object in the box, well, I would think simply opening it would provide the answer - or knowing the original weight of the box. But either way this has no bearing on the fact that I CAN indeed measure the object, and that therefore it exists, regardless of whether I know it's a coin or not.


"It would introduce that possibilities that pink unicorns or God exist, but first we would have to find the magic box"

Even if a "magic" box existed which would be unopenable or unmeasurable in any way (which is impossible), it would not prove that a meaningless concept could magically be made meaningful. Whatever you present us cannot contain a "god" any more than it can contain a "zorglub". Gibberish is not a claim.

[DevilsAdvocate]

What the fucl<I don't think you are stupid. I'm not trying to be glib. I'm not being very rigorous either.

I'm just trying to understand the differnt points that are being made and get them toghter into some sort of semblance.

I would contradict myself majorly by being able to weight something and then stating that it cannot be measured.The idea is that you can weigh the box, but not the contents of he box (the coin).

If you mean that I wouldn't know there was an object in the box, well, I would think simply opening it would provide the answer - or knowing the original weight of the box. But either way this has no bearing on the fact that I CAN indeed measure the object, and that therefore it exists, regardless of whether I know it's a coin or not.The premise is that you cannot open the box. Also that you do not know the original weight of the box (or that the box weighs the same no matter what is put in it). The idea is that you have no way of measuring the contents of the box. You have no access to the 'coin in the box' and cannot measure, in any way, its properties.

Even if a "magic" box existed which would be unopenable or unmeasurable in any way (which is impossible), it would not prove that a meaningless concept could magically be made meaningful.I think I said that that was what you were saying. Sorta. That is, something that is 'unmeasurable', is not "meaningful". To any observer. It could exist, but it wouldn't matter. So why not just say it doesn't exist. I thought that was your whole point. And a relevant one.

Whatever you present us cannot contain a "god" any more than it can contain a "zorglub".I don't agree that a that a whatchmawizit, or a magic box, cannot be said to NOT contain god, or a zorglub, or anything else. My point was that theorerically it can. But I used your point to say that it does not, and could not in any way matter.

That's the point I was making. Any unknown could be god, a coin, zorglub, nothing. It could be any of these possibles (important point is that it 'could', which means that you can't say that it 'does not exists' when it 'could'), but there is relevance (which you bruoght up--it it is not relevant--not measurable, then 'it is meaningless' (which, in a theoretical sense, is a bit different from 'it does not exist). If something can be said to exist but is not measurable, it can really only have a theoretical existance. But could be still said to exist. It just that its existance is, as you said, 'meaningless'. Or at least meaningless to the observer. Which, to the observer, could be said to not 'exist'.

I'm restating what I already posted. I'm agreeing with you, so I'm not sure of the point of the hostility. :confused:

[DevilsAdvocate]

Ermmm...and I was talking about the magic box of the thought experiment that Batman Jr. proposed earlier in this thread. The box can't be opened, and the contents can't be measured in any way, etc. That's what I meant by "the box". I see the thread has gone a bit derailed since that issue was brought up, so I appologize if I didn't make that clear.

[Francois Tremblay]

The reason for my surprise is that you contradict yourself directly when you state that the box-coin system can be measured, and then that the coin cannot be measured. Obviously the coin can be measured as part of the box-coin system. The fact that I don't know there is a coin in there is irrelevant. Your analogy fails the "non-measurable yet exists" test. It is measurable, and I just don't know it.

And the fact that I cannot know there is a coin in there does not mean that *I* would assume there is no coin. You're saying that *I* would claim there is no coin because "it cannot be measured". But it is being measured, I just don't know it. In that case I would simply refrain from making any assumptions about what is in the box, reserving judgment for a time when at least some empirical evidence is given, on the basis that evidence is needed for any proposition. In the absence of any evidence whatsoever, the proposition "there is no coin in the box" is just as false as "there is a coin in the box".

Of course, I don't need to mention that your analogy is also completely unrealistic, and therefore cannot support any proposition. ;)

[Melendwyr]

No, "existence" is what is being discussed; you previously stated that "interaction" is the prerequisite for "existence." I provided an example whereby an inability to observe an entity didn't preclude that entity's "existence" All observation is interaction, but not all interaction is observation.

Two words, Batman Jr.: learn English.

[Melendwyr]

Actually Melendwyr and Batman Jr. seem to be saying the same thing in different ways, which is that a thing either exists or does not, but there is a difference to the observer whether the thing is observed or not. No. I'm saying that a thing can be said to exist only relative to something else. Things in a hypothetical "other universe" might exist relative to each other, but they wouldn't exist relative to us, and vice versa.

There is no way to distinguish between (to create a hypothetical example) a process that utterly destroys matter and energy, and a process that changes matter and energy so that it can never again interact with anything else in our universe. The two conditions are absolutely the same in their consequences and implications.

[Batman Jr.]

All observation is interaction, but not all interaction is observation.

Two words, Batman Jr.: learn English.
If interaction is not in our observation, then it is not interaction in relation to us. Therefore, in accordance with your logic, interaction which is not accompanied by our observation is "nonexistent," and all real interaction must have an observational component. This is idealism.

Here are a few words for you, Melendwyr: Learn logic and stop being such a supercilious creep.

[drkitten]

No. I'm saying that a thing can be said to exist only relative to something else.

Well, against you are amassed all the physicists, philosophers, logicians, lexicographers, and linguists that the human race has produced since the invention of writing.

But you just keep on truckin', honey. After all, they laughed at Einstein, Newton, and the half-wits that were forced to take jobs as court jesters back in the Middle Ages because they couldn't do real work.

[Melendwyr]

Well, against you are amassed all the physicists, philosophers, logicians, lexicographers, and linguists that the human race has produced since the invention of writing. Y'know, all you'd have to do is present a simple explanation (or an example) of how existence can be meaningfully defined as an absolute, and how we might differentiate between a thing that does not exist and a thing that does not interact. With that relatively simple task completed, you'd have destroyed my argument utterly.

Why do I have the feeling insults are the only other thing we'll get from you?

[Melendwyr]

If interaction is not in our observation, then it is not interaction in relation to us. If I creep up behind you unawares and hit you over the head with a rock, did you observe me? If not, how did I interact with you?

[RichardR]

Love?

Are you saying love can't be measured? Can't be observed in any way, even indirectly?

[drkitten]

Y'know, all you'd have to do is present a simple explanation (or an example) of how existence can be meaningfully defined as an absolute, and how we might differentiate between a thing that does not exist and a thing that does not interact. With that relatively simple task completed, you'd have destroyed my argument utterly.


Already done. Is your claim that we can interact with the colour of an Archeopteryx's feathers, or is your claim that the Archeopteryx's feathers were colourless?

My claim -- and example -- is "neither." The colour of the feathers existed (and continues to exist in the timeless present that all 'facts' exist in), but cannot be interacted with.

As to how existence can be meaningfully defined as an absolute, I refer you to any decent dictionary. I recommend the OED for completeness.

[Melendwyr]

Already done. Is your claim that we can interact with the colour of an Archeopteryx's feathers, or is your claim that the Archeopteryx's feathers were colourless? The feathers interacted with things that we interact with. Their color, while unlikely to be determined by current science, is not beyond the scope of science.

My claim -- and example -- is "neither." The colour of the feathers existed (and continues to exist in the timeless present that all 'facts' exist in), but cannot be interacted with. I'd address your comments, but since they were made in the past, I cannot possibly interact with them, and therefore I cannot know what they were or deduce anything about them.:rolleyes:

[Francois Tremblay]

I've already eliminated emotions from that category. Emotions can be measured as a personal experience, and is hypothetically measurable by scientific means.

[Melendwyr]

I've already eliminated emotions from that category. Emotions can be measured as a personal experience, and is hypothetically measurable by scientific means. While the brain is fairly close to a black box at the moment, its workings are mostly certainly subject to scientific examiniation.

So are the details of the physiology of extinct creatures, even if current scientific knowledge cannot provide means to examine them - even if we actually learn them! They're still within the domain of science.

[bruto]

I've already eliminated emotions from that category. Emotions can be measured as a personal experience, and is hypothetically measurable by scientific means.

Since Occam or Ockham if you prefer is the titular head of this thread, you could, of course, also eliminate emotions from the entire argument by emulating his nominalism, and suggesting that emotions, since they are not entities, happen but do not, in the strictest sense, exist.

[sphenisc]

I hope this argument is a joke, as the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.

That was rather the point of including a smiley at the end.


I'd also like to point out that, if the universe is closed, then with a really, really, really good telescope it should be possible to observe light emitted by an Archaeopteryx. Of course it won't be due back here until ...hmmm.... 13.7 billion..... take away ......235 million ..ahhh. Well, you've got plenty of time to get your scope ready.
:D (This is a smiley, to show that I'm trying to be light-hearted and witty in a quietly thought-provoking kind of way)

[athon]

I've already eliminated emotions from that category. Emotions can be measured as a personal experience, and is hypothetically measurable by scientific means.

I guess. If you count measuring distance with a ruler that changes scale and units with time, I suppose it can be measured...

Emotions are relevant within a context. Later, gauging them is difficult as the circumstances change. Indeed you know relatively that you were happy or sad, and the approxiamtely effect it had on your life, but to really guage them effectively is impossible as they relate to context, which in itself varies.

Athon

[bob_kark]

Hello ? No one has been able to name something that exists and is not measurable yet.

The momentum of an electron the instant we know its position.

Yes, I know I'm more of a smart a** than a smart guy.

[Francois Tremblay]

The momentum of an electron the instant we know its position.

Yes, I know I'm more of a smart a** than a smart guy.

Now I don't know much about QM, but I understand that particles small enough can only be understood as having group (wave) properties. So I would have to question the premise that the momentum of an electron is meaningful. But a physicist would be required to clarify this one.

[bob_kark]

Now I don't know much about QM, but I understand that particles small enough can only be understood as having group (wave) properties. So I would have to question the premise that the momentum of an electron is meaningful. But a physicist would be required to clarify this one.

It really was more of a joke than anything. I believe my arguement would fall under the fallacy of equivocation. You mean "something" in the sense of something tangible. A measurement isn't really tangible, its just a measurement. Of course, the electron can still be measured by position and threfore, still exists. Sorry for the confusion.

[Francois Tremblay]

Oh ok. I understand. Yes, I should have seen that before. Sorry for ruining the joke.

[bob_kark]

Oh ok. I understand. Yes, I should have seen that before. Sorry for ruining the joke.

Eh, it was a bad joke anyway.

[allanb]

Ockham's razor. The rule which states "plurality should not be assumed without necessity". In other words if you can prove a postulate without relying on an assumption, such an assumption should be excluded. I'm still grappling with the question of definition, and I don't quite understand this one. Surely if you can prove a postulate without relying on an assumption, the assumption is irrelevant? Or are you simply saying that a proof that doesn't rely on an assumption is better then one that does?

Here is an example of what I think is the razor in action. Some people report that Uri Geller has bent a spoon without touching it. Three possible explanations (there may be others) -

(1) Geller can exert physical force purely by the action of his mind.
(2) The spoon was bent by an invisible being from another planet acting under Geller's control.
(3) Geller is a moderately skilled illusionist.

The assumptions required for #1 and #2 are highly unlikely, whereas the assumption required for #3 is quite likely - I know that illusionists exist (I've seen one or two). So, in the absence of further evidence, I say that #3 is true with a probability of X, X being close to 1.

This neither proves nor disproves anything; moreover, it is quite subjective. Nevertheless, isn't it what Ockham's razor proposes?

[bruto]

I'm still grappling with the question of definition, and I don't quite understand this one. Surely if you can prove a postulate without relying on an assumption, the assumption is irrelevant? Or are you simply saying that a proof that doesn't rely on an assumption is better then one that does?

Here is an example of what I think is the razor in action. Some people report that Uri Geller has bent a spoon without touching it. Three possible explanations (there may be others) -

(1) Geller can exert physical force purely by the action of his mind.
(2) The spoon was bent by an invisible being from another planet acting under Geller's control.
(3) Geller is a moderately skilled illusionist.

The assumptions required for #1 and #2 are highly unlikely, whereas the assumption required for #3 is quite likely - I know that illusionists exist (I've seen one or two). So, in the absence of further evidence, I say that #3 is true with a probability of X, X being close to 1.

This neither proves nor disproves anything; moreover, it is quite subjective. Nevertheless, isn't it what Ockham's razor proposes?


Not quite, I think, at least by the way I understand Ockham's original idea. I think it would go more like this. I have a ball, and I throw it across the room. The arc it describes is explained satisfactorily by a set of laws regarding motion. I need not, then, assume any other laws or hidden forces. But I think you need to have an adequate explanation before you discard the extraneous ones. The razor is not, at least in its original form, a tool for choosing between speculations simply on the basis of simplicity. In the case of spoon bending, I think you would need first to use the razor on a demonstration by someone other that Geller, such as Randi, demonstrating how the trick can be done without supernatural powers. Randi does this trick, and demonstrates that he can do it with only sleight of hand. One can then say "this feat can be performed with no supernatural powers by a magician, therefore when I see this feat performed by others, I can assume that no supernatural powers are involved."

[drkitten]

I'm still grappling with the question of definition, and I don't quite understand this one. Surely if you can prove a postulate without relying on an assumption, the assumption is irrelevant?

That's exactly the Razor in action.

If you can prove what you need to prove without relying on a specific assumption, then there is no need to make that specific assumption, because it's irrelevant to your case.

It's not (as you suggested later) a question of comparative likelihood at all (although Bayes' theorem can be used to address that, in a much more rigourous fashion).

Uri Geller can bend spoons based on his skill as a magician and his claimed psychic powers
Randi can bend spoons based on his skill as a magician

Therefore, we can explain spoon-bending without regard to claimed psychic powers. This doesn't disprove Uri's powers, just renders them irrelevant. His spoon bending doesn't prove his powers, and not much does. If it's not necessary to assume his claimed powers, the Razor says we shouldn't.