Look, I know this is daft, but- [Archive]

Soapy Sam

13th November 2005, 05:23 PM

Merc , you're missing my point, I think. (Or I'm missing yours).
So far, you are the only one to use the term "entity". I certainly don't think of consciousness as an entity. It's a property displayed by people. Because it;'s a dynamic property, it might be termed a process.
I don't agree that feeling, hearing or seeing are anything directly to do with consciousness. I see no reason why a mind wholly devoid of sensory apparatus could not be conscious. (Though I can't see how one could evolve by natural selection, so I doubt such actually exist. Yet) Consciousness ("awareness " is the nearest synonym I'm aw...I can think of) . A spider can see. I don't know if it is conscious.

What I'm getting at in the thread is this. A couple of quid's worth of chemicals , given a few billion years of events, develops the ability to reproduce and self-organise, to become mobile, homeostatic, all the other neat tricks life pulls. But there is nothing in there yet that can form detailed internal abstract models, not only of it's surroundings, but of itself in relation to those surroundings.

At that point, there is no concept of paranormal. Or normal. There are in fact, no concepts at all, because there exists nothing in which they may be conceived.
And then , there is. Something new under the sun- a watcher who knows he is watching. A splinter of the universe which is self aware.

A mind is a sort of event horizon. Data get sucked in and what emerges is something utterly changed in nature. Suddenly the universe has an inside and an outside.
Now let me repeat my impossible question. Was that event predictable had there been anything able to predict it? Is there anything inherent in life that enables us to predict the evolution of consciousness?

If so, what is it and does it allow us to predict what other properties may emerge? Are there more surprises in store along the evolutionary road? (Not necessarily mental).

Can anyone imagine an emergent property of life more surprising than consciousness?

delphi_ote

13th November 2005, 05:29 PM

If consciousness did not exist, I doubt I'd be typing this.

Actually, that statement goes to the very heart of the thing. We can't really imagine such a world.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

13th November 2005, 05:35 PM

If there had been anything able to predict it, that thing probably would have been conscious, and so would not have been making much of a leap to predict it. So your question is incoherent. Oh wait, right, you said it was incoherent to begin with.

If we take consciousness to be the ability of a creature to establish a sense of "self acting in the world," then I don't think it's surprising that it evolved. Very useful.

~~ Paul

hammegk

13th November 2005, 05:48 PM

If we take consciousness to be the ability of a creature to establish a sense of "self acting in the world," then I don't think it's surprising that it evolved. Very useful.

Rephrasing a bit "If we take consciousness to be the ability to establish a sense of "self acting in the world," then I don't think it's surprising that it exists. I'd posit nothing could be said to exist without that ability.".

Mercutio

13th November 2005, 06:07 PM

Merc , you're missing my point, I think. (Or I'm missing yours).
So far, you are the only one to use the term "entity". I certainly don't think of consciousness as an entity. Ok, but then you say that it...
can form detailed internal abstract models, not only of it's surroundings, but of itself in relation to those surroundings.
So...you call it an "it"...I think that anything you can call an "it" is fair game for me to call an entity. After all...does a process have surroundings?

At that point, there is no concept of paranormal. Or normal. There are in fact, no concepts at all, because there exists nothing in which they may be conceived.
And then , there is. Something new under the sun- a watcher who knows he is watching. A splinter of the universe which is self aware.
All your language implies an entity...a "thing".
A mind is a sort of event horizon. Data get sucked in and what emerges is something utterly changed in nature. Suddenly the universe has an inside and an outside.
Now let me repeat my impossible question. Was that event predictable had there been anything able to predict it? Is there anything inherent in life that enables us to predict the evolution of consciousness?
Language. The ability to use a noun to refer, metaphorically, to a process. So that a behavior sounds the same as an entity. And confuses us.

If so, what is it and does it allow us to predict what other properties may emerge? Are there more surprises in store along the evolutionary road? (Not necessarily mental).

Can anyone imagine an emergent property of life more surprising than consciousness?Maybe. This one deserves some thought.

Soapy Sam

14th November 2005, 02:18 PM

GAH!.
Merc, I just wrote a long reply to the above. When I tried to post I got the JREF 1-2. (First the forum has logged me out and generates an Invalid Thread error, then Firefox crashes when I try to go back to cut & paste). I have a 3am start. So forgive the following brevity.

Intelligence cannot be predicted , because in any world where it does not already exist, there is , by definition, nothing able to predict it. It may be explicable after the event in scientific / Darwinist terms, but not predicted.

(Intelligence = conscious awareness for my purpose)

I wonder if there are other properties analogously unpredictable by intelligence.

I concur with you and Paul, that language fails us in questions like this. Yet it is a question anyone might ask , without great education or brilliance.

(That said, I don't remember seeing it anywhere.)

Dymanic

14th November 2005, 02:36 PM

Intelligence cannot be predicted , because in any world where it does not already exist, there is , by definition, nothing able to predict it.

(Intelligence = conscious awareness for my purpose)
So our definition of consciousness is going to look something like:

The ability to percieve consciousness -- in self or others -- whether it actually exists or not.

Soapy Sam

14th November 2005, 02:41 PM

Well, the whole question is certainly self referential.

As is my intent to switch offf and try to get some kip. I have to be up at 3 a.m.
Next communication will be from Kazakhstan.

Evenin' all!

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

14th November 2005, 06:08 PM

No need to be self-referential if we define consciousness to be a certain class of brain functions.

~~ Paul

Mercutio

14th November 2005, 06:58 PM

No need to be self-referential if we define consciousness to be a certain class of brain functions.

~~ Paul
Oh, Paul, Paul, Paul...in practice, of course, we do not define consciousness as a class of brain functions--nor could we, as we use the term. We do not have access (under normal circumstances) to people's brain functions; we have access to their public behaviors. Because of this, the only way we could learn the word as we normally use it is by pairing the word with publicly available behavior. Those who taught you the language had no access to your brain functions, or to your thoughts, to teach you this word; likewise, you did not have access to their brain functions or thoughts. You learned to attach the word "consciousness" to a fuzzy set of observable behaviors, and "consciousness" is an emergent property of this fuzzy set.

Note that "consciousness" is thus defined by agreement in a language community (and yes, each of us has a slightly different learning history, each of us has a slightly different version of what "consciousness" is, and no, it is not a problem; each snowflake is different, but nobody every confuses them with kittens). We generally say that only living things can be conscious (some will say only humans can be--note that this part is one of the fuzzy areas), but we do use the language of consciousness with other things--my computer hates me, my car does not want to start, my microwave is acting up and doesn't want to heat my water. Why use this language? Because they are "behaving" in the same manner that we label as "conscious" in people.

So there is no need to define consciousness as a pattern of brain functions. We simply need to look at how we already use the word, and how we learned it.

c4ts

14th November 2005, 07:20 PM

Why use this language? Because they are "behaving" in the same manner that we label as "conscious" in people.
Not so. The people are projecting their own behavior into an imagined similarity as they attempt to describe something poetically. They are fully aware that the microwave, for example, didn't choose to malfunction, but the poetic explanation sufficises because they have no explanation at hand, or that explanation would be tedious, like this post. The comparison is absurd, and therefore humorous to some, so it works sometimes. We have a tendency to want to anthropomorphize everything because we are human, and we may have difficulty understanding things that aren't.

Tricky

14th November 2005, 07:49 PM

Sam, you are absolutely correct.

It's daft.:p

Dymanic

14th November 2005, 08:09 PM

We do not have access (under normal circumstances) to people's brain functions; we have access to their public behaviors.
And since access to our own brain functions is not much better, we often observe our own behaviors first, explaining them afterward as the results of internal processes -- in much the same way we would do if it were another person doing the behaving.

Those who taught you the language had no access to your brain functions, or to your thoughts, to teach you this word; likewise, you did not have access to their brain functions or thoughts.
I wouldn't stop there. It doesn't seem quite enough to note that we do not have access to the brain functions of others; we don't even have 'privileged access' to our own. It's not just that we project our own behavior on to others -- our notion of our own consciousness is little more than an internalized third-person perspective; the projection of the behaviors of others (and their accompanying explanations) onto ourselves.

Mercutio

14th November 2005, 08:53 PM

And since access to our own brain functions is not much better, we often observe our own behaviors first, explaining them afterward as the results of internal processes -- in much the same way we would do if it were another person doing the behaving.

I wouldn't stop there. It doesn't seem quite enough to note that we do not have access to the brain functions of others; we don't even have 'privileged access' to our own. It's not just that we project our own behavior on to others -- our notion of our own consciousness is little more than an internalized third-person perspective; the projection of the behaviors of others (and their accompanying explanations) onto ourselves. Agreed, 100%. After all, we had to learn how to label our own introspective accounts from people who had no access to them. The only way to do that is via their observations of our behavior.

Not so. The people are projecting their own behavior into an imagined similarity as they attempt to describe something poetically. They are fully aware that the microwave, for example, didn't choose to malfunction, but the poetic explanation sufficises because they have no explanation at hand, or that explanation would be tedious, like this post. The comparison is absurd, and therefore humorous to some, so it works sometimes. We have a tendency to want to anthropomorphize everything because we are human, and we may have difficulty understanding things that aren't.You have never seen somebody plead with their car to start on a cold morning, or sweet-talk their computer into re-booting just one more time when it is making that nasty clicking sound. (Importantly, it is when their "behavior" is unpredictable that we treat it like conscious choice)

Note also, the "imagined similarity" which we project is also what we have with other people. I have no access to your thoughts--just your behavior. I infer your consciousness just as I do theirs. (and frankly, the computer and car are the easy ones to poke holes at, even though I am right. Try asking a horse person if a horse is conscious. Or a cat person. Or even a budgie person. Lizard people talk of the personalities of their various lizards...the computer and the car are extremes!)

HypnoPsi

15th November 2005, 08:41 AM

If consciousness did not exist and someone suggested it might, would we brand it "paranormal"?

(I appreciate the logical contradiction inherent in the question, but we have some experience of illogical questions here. I have confidence in you all.)From http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/eliminativism.html

eliminativism - The view that, because mental states and properties are items posited by a protoscientific theory (called folk psychology), the science of the future is likely to conclude that entities such as beliefs, desires, and sensations do not exist. The alternate most often offered is physicalist and the position is thus often called 'eliminative materialism'.

The above is a rather long article unfortunately but, as it notes, in the introduction "eliminativism claims that it is an empirical fact" so, clearly, not everyone thinks it is illogical. Indeed, one such individual who thinks it's very logical is none other than Daniel Dennett.

A favourite of strong skeptics (of the atheist variety, who believe that skepticism should be applied to matters of faith as well as to testable claims) everywhere, Dennett himself has described his views as 'uncompromising eliminativism'.

Personally, I fail to see how Dennett's views really differ in any significant way from the ephiphenomenalism of McFadden, Pockett and John (http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4&dsid=2222&dekey=Electromagnetic+theories+of+consciousness&gwp=8&curtab=2222_1&linktext=Electromagnetic%20theories%20of%20conscio usness). Although they would be called physicalists, in that they accept consciousness as real, they are still asserting the electromagnetic basis for consciousness which doesn't strike me as ultimately being that different from Dennett's eliminitivism at the end of the day.

Either way, whether we're talking about electromagnetism as consciousness or Dennett's idea of thermostats as 'intentional systems' with beliefs about the world (as a metaphor for the sodium-potassium pump in neurons) it seems clear that we always end up with something very much like panpsychism, pantheism or animism (a subject that has been covered to the point of redundancy in another thread) which, for obvious reasons, is a big red no-no for atheist skeptics.

That's why more eliminativist forms of eliminitavism (if such is possible) are beginning to gain currency in certain quarters because it offers a way of dealing with what Chalmers calls 'the hard problem of consciousness' - you just ignore it's very existence and play the worn out "but can you prove X exists?" game so loved by all skeptics everywhere. However, in this instance, that's folly since materialism (as opposed to realism) is faith-based unless you go down android-esq "I am just a physical thing interacting with physical things" route.

You can expect this debate to pick up considerable steam in philosophical debates as robots (particularly androids/gynoids) become more commonplace due to the human propensity to anthropomorphisise objects. (Dennett himself is a strong supporter of robot consciousness - which seems paradoxical in light of his 'uncompromising is strange given his 'uncompromising eliminativism' stance.

Of course, ultimately, it doesn't matter whether we're talking about a fully interactive humanoid robot or one of Dennett's thermostats, the question is still the same: do we accept the existence of consciousness (meaning either souls, animism, panpsychism or pantheism) or do we claim (pretend?) it doesn't really exist?

Personally, I don't see eliminativism (or it's close cousin physicalism) ever really taking off outside of strong skepticism circles. People know consciousness too intimately to just write it off - and elminativism has always had a bad press thanks to a certain Mr Orwell's S-R dystopia, 1984, laid out one view of the logical dehumanising end of eliminativism - though I note that Dennett seems to have mastered doublespeak.
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HypnoPsi

dogbite666

15th November 2005, 09:27 AM

If consciousness did not exist and someone suggested it might, would we brand it "paranormal"?

This isn't really a question. In order to ask this question you first have to support the idea that consciousness doesnt exist, which is irrational because in order to contemplate whether consciousness exists or not you need to have consciousness, the ability to percive that which exists. In other words 'I think therefore I am!'. You cannot contemplate without the ability to contemplate!

If you are asking if something which exists but unknown to man is paranormal then the answer is no, this is something people who doubt science can't understand. Science concerns everything in the natural world, just because we havent discovered something yet doesnt mean it is not part of the natural world and does not conform to the laws of nature.

Dymanic

15th November 2005, 10:19 AM

Personally, I fail to see how Dennett's views really differ in any significant way from the ephiphenomenalism of McFadden, Pockett and John
I fail to see how you fail to see that. Are you sure you've really put forth the effort?

Personally, I don't see eliminativism (or it's close cousin physicalism) ever really taking off outside of strong skepticism circles.
Well, it's hard to argue with that. It's enough of a challenge to persuade those outside of strong skepticism circles that crop circles are not left by extraterrestrial visitors.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

15th November 2005, 10:32 AM

Oh, Paul, Paul, Paul...in practice, of course, we do not define consciousness as a class of brain functions--nor could we, as we use the term. We do not have access (under normal circumstances) to people's brain functions; we have access to their public behaviors. Because of this, the only way we could learn the word as we normally use it is by pairing the word with publicly available behavior. Those who taught you the language had no access to your brain functions, or to your thoughts, to teach you this word; likewise, you did not have access to their brain functions or thoughts. You learned to attach the word "consciousness" to a fuzzy set of observable behaviors, and "consciousness" is an emergent property of this fuzzy set.
And then I discovered that my behavior is a product of brain function, so I realized, transitively, that consciousness is a product of brain function.

You got a problem wid dat?

~~ Paul

hammegk

15th November 2005, 12:13 PM

And then I discovered that my behavior is a product of brain function, so I realized, transitively, that consciousness is a product of brain function.

You got a problem wid dat?

Why do you aver brain function is not a product of conscious? As objective idealism views everything -- ideal and perceived-as-physical.

Or, hey, I got it! Conciousness & crop circles are at the same level of subtlety. ;)

Eos of the Eons

15th November 2005, 12:33 PM

And then I discovered that my behavior is a product of brain function, so I realized, transitively, that consciousness is a product of brain function.

~~ Paul
I agree emphatically. I figure consciousness ceases to exist the moment we are brain dead.

HypnoPsi

15th November 2005, 02:34 PM

Originally Posted by HypnoPsi :
Personally, I fail to see how Dennett's views really differ in any significant way from the ephiphenomenalism of McFadden, Pockett and John
I fail to see how you fail to see that. Are you sure you've really put forth the effort?Quite sure. Does it really matter that McFadden, Pockett and John say it's the E/M field produced by the brain while for Dennett consciousness just is whenever there is a binary choice (which is always since nothing is at absolute zero and for every action there is an equal or an opposite reaction)? They both end up asserting that consciousness is Matter/Energy and nothing else in the end.Personally, I don't see eliminativism (or it's close cousin physicalism) ever really taking off outside of strong skepticism circles.Well, it's hard to argue with that. It's enough of a challenge to persuade those outside of strong skepticism circles that crop circles are not left by extraterrestrial visitors.Strange... I know a few pro-psi parapsychologists, noetic scientists and paranormal investigators and I can only think of one who's even entertained the idea that crop circles are not man-made. You must keep some strange company.
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HypnoPsi

HypnoPsi

15th November 2005, 02:47 PM

And then I discovered that my behavior is a product of brain function, so I realized, transitively, that consciousness is a product of brain function.What process did you go through to conclude these things? Do you accept that this is faith-based?
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HypnoPsi

Francois Tremblay

15th November 2005, 02:57 PM

What is this fop going on and on about ? It doesn't matter if we don't have access to OTHER people's consciousness, we have access to ours.

Dymanic

15th November 2005, 03:17 PM

Does it really matter that McFadden, Pockett and John say it's the E/M field produced by the brain while for Dennett consciousness just is whenever there is a binary choice (which is always since nothing is at absolute zero and for every action there is an equal or an opposite reaction)?
I thought I had read just about everything Daniel Dennett has published to date, but I can't recall a single passage that seems a likely candidate to serve as the basis for the forming of such a view of his position. If he expressed the idea as incoherently as you have just done, I suppose I might have simply stumbled thickheadedly past it (it's happened before). Do you have in mind something in particular he said that you could point me to so that I might give it a closer look?

You must keep some strange company.
You have no idea.

Dymanic

15th November 2005, 03:21 PM

It doesn't matter if we don't have access to OTHER people's consciousness, we have access to ours.
Where did you get an idea like that?

HypnoPsi

15th November 2005, 05:43 PM

I thought I had read just about everything Daniel Dennett has published to date, but I can't recall a single passage that seems a likely candidate to serve as the basis for the forming of such a view of his position.I also believe that Dennett is saying something much the same as Sheldrake, but I doubt you'd agree with that either.
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HypnoPsi

Jeff Corey

15th November 2005, 05:55 PM

I'm with Mercutio. Other people's "conscious" is unknowable to scientists, even though brain activity may be correlated with certains tasks.

Dymanic

15th November 2005, 06:55 PM

I also believe that Dennett is saying something much the same as Sheldrake, but I doubt you'd agree with that either.
You're right. And since you're so good at peeking inside my brain, you probably also know that I do not believe that you have actually read what Dennett says, as well as how little interested I therefore am in discussing what you believe he says.

Boo

15th November 2005, 06:57 PM

HypnoPsi

15th November 2005, 07:00 PM

our language suggests that consciousness is causal, that it allows us to do this or that; it suggests that it is an entity, something that we can possess or lose. Our language does not speak of consciousness as a process.What reason do you think there might be for this? If consciousness were a process rather than a causal entity then why would linguistic descriptions of consciousness not follow from this?Rather than saying that consciousness allows us to think, to see, to remember, to hear...it is the fact that we do these things that leads us to label ourselves as "conscious". So, consciousness as a causal entity is a circularly defined and cannot be said to exist.Why is this "the fact"? How do you know that language hasn't correctly evolved to describe consciousness? Can you say cogito ergo sum?
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HypnoPsi

HypnoPsi

15th November 2005, 07:03 PM

You're right. And since you're so good at peeking inside my brain, you probably also know that I do not believe that you have actually read what Dennett says, as well as how little interested I therefore am in discussing what you believe he says.Then read Dennett instead of my posts. Whatever I post, lest I resort to plagiarism, will always be my interpretation of Dennett; likewise with yourself.
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HypnoPsi

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

16th November 2005, 06:36 AM

Why do you aver brain function is not a product of conscious? As objective idealism views everything -- ideal and perceived-as-physical.
Because we can dick with brain function and change consciousness. When the day comes that I can dick with consciousness directly, I'll get back to you. But see below.

What process did you go through to conclude these things? Do you accept that this is faith-based?
See above. I've defined the word consciousness to be a subset of brain function, or behavior if we want to go with Mercutio's definition. I've defined it to be that.

I make no ontological claims whatsoever.

~~ Paul

HypnoPsi

16th November 2005, 08:20 AM

Because we can dick with brain function and change consciousness.How can you be sure? Let's say - God forbid - that you have the misfortune of going blind. The contents of your consciousness would certainly change but why would your consciousness?

Your argument is a classic begging the question fallacy because it contains the premise that consciousness is the same thing as cognitive phenomena. (Personally, I prefer the cinema screen observer model and would argue that is the default experience of the human condition.)When the day comes that I can dick with consciousness directly, I'll get back to you.Mystics say that we can - and a qualitative analysis of their writings and teachings separated by geography and history clearly shows they're describing the same thing - whatever Enlightenment might be. (And I'm definately not going to try to define that!)

There has also been the recent story on the newswires of meditation increasing the thickness of certain areas in the frontal lobes of Buddhist monks. A a freely willed choice (in consciousness) that effects matter has definate philosophical implications.But see below.Originally Posted by Hypno :
What process did you go through to conclude these things? Do you accept that this is faith-based?See above. I've defined the word consciousness to be a subset of brain function, or behavior if we want to go with Mercutio's definition. I've defined it to be that.Which, as I'm sure you would agree, hardly sets the issue in stone. Yes, within your definition, consciousness is just brain function but you have the burden of proof, currently having an hypothesis alone that seems impossible to define in strict scientific or logical terms such as would allow you to completely reject any null hypothesis.I make no ontological claims whatsoever.If that were genuinely true then you would have to abandon all claims whatsoever to the title scientist (or philosopher). A scholar who is absent a philosophical position, proposition, theory or testable hypothesis that s/he is willing to defend is no scientist (something that skeptics would do well to consider).

The truth however, even if you don't quite realise (or accept) it yourself, is that you actaully are making an ontological claim - in the form of materialism. The proposition that brains produce consciousness inevitably requires the existence of a substance that sustains physical phenomena/noumena that is entirely independent of - and completely unreliant upon - (any form of) consciousness; ergo "matter" (or fundamental M/E, if you prefer).

And materialism is a clear, faith-based, metaphysical position for which we no evidence at all - unlike consciousness.

In addition, I want to clearly hammer home the futulity and foolishness of the skeptics' prediliction towards claiming no ontological position (or indeed, claiming to claim nothing) and loading all of the burden of proof on the other guy in every instance. Science doesn't work that way - and skepticism, as a very useful instrument, is supposed to be equally utilised.

If someone wants to be a complete and genuine agnostic and believe it is impossible to support any causal relationship between consciousness and the physical or vice versa they are welcome to, but they abandon scientific practice in the process.

In the wise words of Messers Penn and Teller "everyone has their gri-gri". Skeptics should remember that in science (and philosophy) everyone is supposed (expected, even) to have their grigri or no new knowledge can be constructed. Either we are all skeptical (at times) or there is a new class of agnostic scholar (a "skeptic") contrasted against the traditional "scientist".
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HypnoPsi

Hellbound

16th November 2005, 09:34 AM

The term is gris-gris.

Can't do the little accent marks, though.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

16th November 2005, 10:27 AM

How can you be sure? Let's say - God forbid - that you have the misfortune of going blind. The contents of your consciousness would certainly change but why would your consciousness?
Let's not go there again. When you can explain the difference between "my consciousness" and "the conscious experiences I have," please get back to me.

Your argument is a classic begging the question fallacy because it contains the premise that consciousness is the same thing as cognitive phenomena. (Personally, I prefer the cinema screen observer model and would argue that is the default experience of the human condition.)
I am not making a formal argument. I'm merely suggesting that if we call consciousness a product of behavior, we can also call it a product of brain function.

Mystics say that we can - and a qualitative analysis of their writings and teachings separated by geography and history clearly shows they're describing the same thing - whatever Enlightenment might be. (And I'm definately not going to try to define that!)
You have no way of knowing whether they are playing with their consciousness directly. They may simply be altering internal behavior.

Which, as I'm sure you would agree, hardly sets the issue in stone. Yes, within your definition, consciousness is just brain function but you have the burden of proof, currently having an hypothesis alone that seems impossible to define in strict scientific or logical terms such as would allow you to completely reject any null hypothesis.
I agree that it does not set the matter in stone. I did not say anything of the sort.

If that [me making no ontological claims] were genuinely true then you would have to abandon all claims whatsoever to the title scientist (or philosopher). A scholar who is absent a philosophical position, proposition, theory or testable hypothesis that s/he is willing to defend is no scientist (something that skeptics would do well to consider).
A scientist who insists on the veracity of a particular metaphysic is clearly a clown who is doing so with no evidence whatsoever.

The truth however, even if you don't quite realise (or accept) it yourself, is that you actaully are making an ontological claim - in the form of materialism. The proposition that brains produce consciousness inevitably requires the existence of a substance that sustains physical phenomena/noumena that is entirely independent of - and completely unreliant upon - (any form of) consciousness; ergo "matter" (or fundamental M/E, if you prefer).
I am making no ontological claim at all. I am saying that it appears that the brain---whatever substance it might actually be---is the origin of the behaviors that we call consciousness. If it happens one day that we figure out that what we now call "matter" is actually some mindstuff, or solid material stuff, or striated green cheese, that will be all well and good. We will then know what the brain is. But the brain will still be the source of consciousness.

I wait patiently to be proven incorrect.

~~ Paul

HypnoPsi

16th November 2005, 03:50 PM

The term is gris-gris.

Both http://www.bartleby.com/61/2/G0270200.html and http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?sm1=Z3JpLWdyaSBTZWFyY2ggUHJlZmVyZW5jZXMg&fw=0&fc=3&ss=-1&es=-1&gwp=11&ver=1.0.8.207&method=1 say both variants are fine.

Either way Penn definately pronounced it "gree gree" during the program (it was the one about recycling I think).
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HypnoPsi

HypnoPsi

16th November 2005, 05:49 PM

When you can explain the difference between "my consciousness" and "the conscious experiences I have," please get back to me.It looks like you've done a good enough job yourself by accepting that *you* have conscious experiences.I am not making a formal argument.Of course not. You're a skeptic. You don't propose and defend theses like a scientist is expected to. I'm merely suggesting that if we call consciousness a product of behavior, we can also call it a product of brain function.Aside from the fact that I see no reason to suppose consciousness is a product of behaviour, let's suppose we don't "merely suggest" that it is nothing of the kind and then see where that leads to with regards to brain function.Mystics say that we can - and a qualitative analysis of their writings and teachings separated by geography and history clearly shows they're describing the same thing - whatever Enlightenment might be. (And I'm definately not going to try to define that!)You have no way of knowing whether they are playing with their consciousness directly. They may simply be altering internal behavior.What is internal behaviour?

As a meditator and I experience the effect upon sentience (consciousness) as well as upon sapience (thoughts).I agree that it does not set the matter in stone. I did not say anything of the sort.But you do have the burden of proof that matter exists as an independent entity and that it produces consciousness. Or you could just accept that you hold a faith based position.If that [me making no ontological claims] were genuinely true then you would have to abandon all claims whatsoever to the title scientist (or philosopher). A scholar who is absent a philosophical position, proposition, theory or testable hypothesis that s/he is willing to defend is no scientist (something that skeptics would do well to consider).A scientist who insists on the veracity of a particular metaphysic is clearly a clown who is doing so with no evidence whatsoever.Oddly enough, that's exactly the way I feel most of the time about skeptics, atheists and materialists. And I never said anything about insisting upon the veracity of a particular metaphysic. But I would still stress that a scholar who is absent a philosophical position, proposition, theory or testable hypothesis that s/he is willing to defend is no scientist. The scientists volition is supposed to be as much about discovery as it is about good house-keeping. What I'm pointing out here is that there is no real justifiable reason for any division between skeptics and believers or, worse, "scientists" and "woos" since we're all bound to be skeptical of something.

When Brian Josephson made a statement about Telephy recently, David Deutsche hit back that it was "utter rubbish". Personally, I disagree, but I can respect Deutche since he takes a stand on something - in his case, time-travel and parallel universes (for which there is absolutely no evidence at all). But when it comes to the common or garden variety skeptic's predilection to remain solely and exclusively within a "no claim" position at all times - that's just unscientific cowardice.I am making no ontological claim at all. I am saying that it appears that the brain---whatever substance it might actually be---is the origin of the behaviors that we call consciousness.How can you fail to see that this logic is a classic post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy - particularly because you have no proof of the existence of fundamental M/E to being with?

First, I think you should learn how to defend an ontological position (which is all I'm doing with amaterialism). Second, I think you need to study some psychology and learn the difference between behaviour and cognition. Third, I think you should recognise and admit that attempting to explain the unexplained with the unknown is faith based rather than scientific.

The existence of noumenal objects (demonstrable to reasonable extent by leaving a ticking clock in an empty room for a while) allows you to posit the existence of "matter". (I won't argue with that because it's a data-driven theory and thus scientific.) But positing that this "matter", in the form of neurons, produces consciousness is not data-driven - it's theory driven, fallacious and unscientific.

Consciousness (including self-consciousnes, sentience and sapience), however you define it, isn't 'faith based' - it's evidenced to each of us, even if indemonstrable to others. Thus an intelligent "God" is a perfectly valid, data-driven and scientific, postulation.If it happens one day that we figure out that what we now call "matter" is actually some mindstuff, or solid material stuff, or striated green cheese, that will be all well and good. We will then know what the brain is. But the brain will still be the source of consciousness.

I wait patiently to be proven incorrect.Interesting. You think that even if "we figure out that what we now call "matter" is actually some mindstuff [..] the brain will still be the source of consciousness". Care to explain that?
_
HypnoPsi

Mercutio

16th November 2005, 07:02 PM

My understanding of conciousness is based on my training as a Paramedic, that is conciousness is measured by how well the brain is functioning and responds to stimuli. The tool used for determining conciousness is the Glasgow Coma Scale:
Best Eye Response. (4)

1=No eye opening.
2=Eye opening to pain.
3=Eye opening to verbal command.
4=Eyes open spontaneously.

Best Verbal Response. (5)

1=No verbal response
2=Incomprehensible sounds.
3=Inappropriate words.
4=Confused
5=Orientated

Best Motor Response. (6)

1=No motor response.
2=Extension to pain.
3=Flexion to pain.
4=Withdrawal from pain.
5=Localising pain.
6=Obeys Commands.

Using this anything with a central nervous system can be said to be concious to varying levelss.

Awareness is related to orientation and requires the ability to percieve and communicate; awareness of self (name), location, time (morning, afternoon evening, night without visual clues), event (what is happening and why).

I have to agree with those that state conciousness is not an entity but a state of brain function, measurable and definable within given parameters.

BooThanks for a good concrete example, Boo. Note that everything on this list is observable behavior. And has to be. All this is is a very particular and standardized example of the determination of what consciousness is as we learn it from our language community.

HypnoPsi...erm...Dennett and Sheldrake? If you can make that mistake, I feel much better about your failure to understand my points here. I don't know which of them you misunderstand--or perhaps it is both--but I also have read them both, and I concur with Dynamic on this one.

Soapy Sam

17th November 2005, 05:53 AM

Do we all accept that conscious awareness exists?

If so, has anyone seen anything in biology or Darwinism that would lead to the prediction that it could evolve in organic creatures?
(I don't think saying "it's an advantage" really qualifies. But let's assume it does. It's an advantage because it allows a vast flexibility of response to change. Fine. Can anyone think of any other property which would offer a similar , or better advantage?)

I can think of a couple, but they would violate TLOP and would be basically magical. Now as sceptics we presumably accept that intelligence, the ability of organic sludge to generate mental models and manipulate the environment thereby is NOT magical. We presumably accept this because we assume:-
1. There is no magic.
2.Anything which exists is, therefore, non-magical.
3. Consciousness exists and is therefore non magical.

But the only reason we can even suppose 1. Is because we are conscious.
Is this therefore a circular argument?

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

17th November 2005, 06:48 AM

What is internal behaviour? The things that you experience going on in your head.

As a meditator and I experience the effect upon sentience (consciousness) as well as upon sapience (thoughts). As a meditator and a teacher of TM, I experienced various things going on in my head. I had no reason to believe that any of them were happening to some sort of fundamental consciousness separate from my brain. Whether one assumes that or not could simply be a matter of how you think about it.

But you do have the burden of proof that matter exists as an independent entity and that it produces consciousness. Or you could just accept that you hold a faith based position. I'm perfectly happy making no such claim.

Oddly enough, that's exactly the way I feel most of the time about skeptics, atheists and materialists. And I never said anything about insisting upon the veracity of a particular metaphysic. But I would still stress that a scholar who is absent a philosophical position, proposition, theory or testable hypothesis that s/he is willing to defend is no scientist. What branch of philosophy are you talking about when you say "philosophical position," if not metaphysics?

When Brian Josephson made a statement about Telephy recently, David Deutsche hit back that it was "utter rubbish". Personally, I disagree, but I can respect Deutche since he takes a stand on something - in his case, time-travel and parallel universes (for which there is absolutely no evidence at all). But when it comes to the common or garden variety skeptic's predilection to remain solely and exclusively within a "no claim" position at all times - that's just unscientific cowardice. Time travel and parallel universes are not "philosophical positions."

How can you fail to see that this logic is a classic post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy - particularly because you have no proof of the existence of fundamental M/E to being with? I said nothing about fundamental M/E. You appear to mix ontological and epistemological claims all willy-nilly, and then accuse me of making an ontological claim when I am not. Here is what I am saying, and note there is nothing ontological about it:

The longer we investigate the behaviors that we call consciousness, the more and more they will appear to be dependent on brain function.

First, I think you should learn how to defend an ontological position (which is all I'm doing with amaterialism). Second, I think you need to study some psychology and learn the difference between behaviour and cognition. Third, I think you should recognise and admit that attempting to explain the unexplained with the unknown is faith based rather than scientific. I have no interest in defending an ontological position, whether you require it of me or not.

The existence of noumenal objects (demonstrable to reasonable extent by leaving a ticking clock in an empty room for a while) allows you to posit the existence of "matter". (I won't argue with that because it's a data-driven theory and thus scientific.) But positing that this "matter", in the form of neurons, produces consciousness is not data-driven - it's theory driven, fallacious and unscientific. We modify consciousness by manipulating neurons. How is that not scientific? What alternate scientific means are you using to manipulate consciousness?

Consciousness (including self-consciousnes, sentience and sapience), however you define it, isn't 'faith based' - it's evidenced to each of us, even if indemonstrable to others. Thus an intelligent "God" is a perfectly valid, data-driven and scientific, postulation. How would one attempt to falsify this?

Interesting. You think that even if "we figure out that what we now call "matter" is actually some mindstuff [..] the brain will still be the source of consciousness". Care to explain that? If we find that everything is mindstuff, then everything is mindstuff, including the brain. So then the ontological question is answered and we are back to epistemological questions. Such an epistemological question would be: Which mindstuff appears to bring forth the experiences we call consciousness? An entirely plausible answer to that question is: The mindstuff we call the brain, in a simple cause and effect relationship.

The problem with immaterialists is that, once they conclude that "everything is mindstuff," they still insist on saying "and the mindstuff I call consciousness is more fundamental than the mindstuff I call material." In fact, they insist on the mindstuff they call consciousness somehow being the source of the mindstuff they call material. And so they become dualists in the name of consciousness being paramount.

The only way to avoid this, it seems to me, is to declare that the mindstuff I call material is simply an illusion and that the material does not exist in any real sense. But that, then, is solipsism.

This is why I say that it is nonsensical to ask the ontological question about what actually exists. All we can do is investigate what we can know.

~~ Paul

Mercutio

17th November 2005, 06:52 AM

Do we all accept that conscious awareness exists?
You'd think that was a simple "yes or no" question, but it really is not. I hate to sound like Bill Clinton, but it really depends on your definition of both "conscious awareness" and "exists". I would argue that it is a very useful term, an emergent property of all sorts of what behaviorists call "private behaviors", also an emergent property of the labeling of the publicly available behaviors spoken of before...but that it does not exist in the sense that we tend to use the word in our language. We have seen on this thread the statement (paraphrasing) "if it were not for consciousness, I couldn't be posting here"; in that sense, I must argue that it does not exist, that it is circularly defined and logically incoherent. On the other hand, if you are saying "conscious awareness" as simply a synonym for our sensory and perceptual processes, and your question translates to "do we see, hear, feel, think, remember...?" then the answer to your question is, I think, yes.

If so, has anyone seen anything in biology or Darwinism that would lead to the prediction that it could evolve in organic creatures?
(I don't think saying "it's an advantage" really qualifies. But let's assume it does. It's an advantage because it allows a vast flexibility of response to change. Fine. Can anyone think of any other property which would offer a similar , or better advantage?)
Again, here you refer to an "it". I think that comes dangerously close to assuming your conclusion. But of course we have selection pressures both for and against a more plastic processing of environmental information (with what we call consciousness being an extraordinarily plastic processing, due in large part to language, in my opinion). Phylogenetic learning (that is, fixed-action patterns, reflexes, etc.) is "inexpensive" biologically; the tarantula-hawk wasp is "programmed" to perform a very specific set of behaviors that look quite intentional, but which simple manipulations can show are a fixed pattern. There is no plasticity to her behavior. To add the ability to learn, within the lifespan of the individual, how to react differently to changes in the environment, is more "costly" biologically. It takes more nerve cells. In a non-changing environment, there is no need for it, and the added metabolic expense does not offer a corresponding reproductive benefit. But in a more varied environment, the ability to learn is a tremendous advantage--or at least, is one successful reproductive strategy. The ability to see that one environmental stimulus predicts another one (classical conditioning) or that one's behavior brings about particular environmental results (operant conditioning) are, I would argue, the beginnings of the continuum on which that which we call consciousness (or, frankly, even "conscious awareness") lies.

But..."the prediction that it could evolve" is tricky. It is one reproductive strategy. It happens to be both very flexible, and very costly. How would we say that it could be predicted? Hmmm...well, one interesting take on it that I have come across (I must search for a citation, though) is that it is the human equivalent of the peacock's tail. Could we predict the peacock's tail from the assumptions of natural selection? What could possibly be the advantage of dragging around the equivalent of a small car on your @$$? Obviously, we can explain it after the fact as the result of sexual selection, a secondary sexual characteristic that signals reproductive fitness. Quite possibly, our brains and correspondent flexibility in learning and processing (which we eventually label "consciousness" or "conscious awareness") were selected for because we were showing off, trying to impress Raquel Welch, one million years BC.

Trying to predict a specific secondary sexual characteristic from the assumptions of natural selection is a fool's errand (horns? tusks? plumage? brains?), but of course the theory predicts that this category of things will be selected for, and with particular success!

I can think of a couple, but they would violate TLOP and would be basically magical. Now as sceptics we presumably accept that intelligence, the ability of organic sludge to generate mental models and manipulate the environment thereby is NOT magical. We presumably accept this because we assume:-
1. There is no magic.
2.Anything which exists is, therefore, non-magical.
3. Consciousness exists and is therefore non magical.

But the only reason we can even suppose 1. Is because we are conscious.
Is this therefore a circular argument?Note that your sentence I highlighted in red is indeed circular. You are assuming causality in consciousness, rather than consciousness as an effect, a label we give to a class of perfectly natural behaviors.

Whether or not our brains are the result of sexual selection is impossible for us to know, but it is A) feasible, and B) consistent with TLOP. There is your white crow. It might not be the real answer, but it answers the question of whether it need be magic. It need not be.

Dymanic

17th November 2005, 07:28 AM

Do we all accept that conscious awareness exists?
Yes. We can't help it. We are -- all of us -- intuitive Cartesian Dualists. You can throw a million words at that intuition, and it still won't go away (but at least you will have tried).

hammegk

17th November 2005, 07:50 AM

After some thought, once one reaches the realization that interactive dualism is nonsense, one is faced with the choice of monism. Oddly to me, most accept that perceived body is more 'real' than the thought that allows it to 'be'. :)

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

17th November 2005, 08:52 AM

Oddly to me, most accept that perceived body is more 'real' than the thought that allows it to 'be'.
How does a thought allow a body to be?

I find the body "more real" because I've seen bodies without thoughts, but never the other way round.

~~ Paul

hammegk

17th November 2005, 11:18 AM

I find the body "more real" because I've seen bodies without thoughts, but never the other way round.

Interesting verb, 'to see' ... do patterns in a computer system that drive an output device (that you can see the pattern on) constitute thought for the computer? And what is this I you refer to? Physical? Or a thought?

HypnoPsi

17th November 2005, 11:48 AM

Originally Posted by Hypno :
What is internal behaviour?The things that you experience going on in your head.Why are you using the word behaviour when the correct psychological term to describe internal experience is cognition? Are you trying to adopt Skinnerian eliminativism, simply ignoring the question? Since you acknowledge there is a you experiencing things going on in your head why not simply recognise sentience?As a meditator and a teacher of TM, I experienced various things going on in my head. I had no reason to believe that any of them were happening to some sort of fundamental consciousness separate from my brain. Whether one assumes that or not could simply be a matter of how you think about it.Do you understand the difference between data-driven science and theory driven non-science? Given that elemental mass (the noumenal) exists you are free to postulate elemental density (matter) exists but that's it. You don't even know what the brain is made of to assume it causes consciousness. It's a non-scientific position. Do you accept that it's faith-based? (I don't have any argument with your position if you do. Faith-based views are fine with me so long as they are not presented as factual.)But you do have the burden of proof that matter exists as an independent entity and that it produces consciousness. Or you could just accept that you hold a faith based position.I'm perfectly happy making no such claim.So, are you taking the agnostic position claiming you don't have enough information about matter or consciousness to take a stand on causality or are you going to step into the scientific arena and defend a proposition (such as matter existing)?I would still stress that a scholar who is absent a philosophical position, proposition, theory or testable hypothesis that s/he is willing to defend is no scientist.What branch of philosophy are you talking about when you say "philosophical position," if not metaphysics?Metaphysics does not strike me as synonymous with "philosophical position" but let's say I'm not talking about anything other than metaphysics. Do you have any? Or are you still to frightened and afraid to defend a "philosophical position"?When Brian Josephson made a statement about Telephy recently, David Deutsche hit back that it was "utter rubbish". Personally, I disagree, but I can respect Deutche since he takes a stand on something - in his case, time-travel and parallel universes (for which there is absolutely no evidence at all). But when it comes to the common or garden variety skeptic's predilection to remain solely and exclusively within a "no claim" position at all times - that's just unscientific cowardice.Time travel and parallel universes are not "philosophical positions."Read what I wrote again:I would still stress that a scholar who is absent a philosophical position, proposition, theory or testable hypothesis that s/he is willing to defend is no scientist.

You don't have to adopt an ontological position if you don't want to (but you should at least declare yourself agnostic about the mind/matter debate), but do you have anything unique to contribute to scientific knowledge? What special purpose does a "skeptic" have? Scientists already fulfill the role of skepticism about each others theories.How can you fail to see that this logic is a classic post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy - particularly because you have no proof of the existence of fundamental M/E to being with?I said nothing about fundamental M/E. You appear to mix ontological and epistemological claims all willy-nilly, and then accuse me of making an ontological claim when I am not. Here is what I am saying, and note there is nothing ontological about it:

The longer we investigate the behaviors that we call consciousness, the more and more they will appear to be dependent on brain function.Again with confusing behaviour with congnition.

Do you not realise you're trying to explain something with an unknown (the nature of brain matter) and that this is unscientific? This is called a fallacy of limited depth. You don't know enough about "matter" to even begin to postulate what it might produce. You are also committing a double false analogy fallacy since consciousness (sentience) is not the same thing as cognition (sapience) and cognition is not the same thing as neural processing.I have no interest in defending an ontological position, whether you require it of me or not.You don't have to defend any ontological position (such as believing in matter) but, if you don't, why not just admit that you are agnostic about the mind/matter debate since you don't know enough about consciousness or matter. What use are you to the discussion if you don't believe anything?[quote]We modify consciousness by manipulating neurons. How is that not scientific? What alternate scientific means are you using to manipulate consciousness?We modify cognitive experience by modifying neurons - but we don't go from A to Z and say that's consciousness! We'd have to demonstrate that "matter" exists first before we can make that claim. As to my "manipulting consciousness", what are you refering to?[quote]Consciousness (including self-consciousnes, sentience and sapience), however you define it, isn't 'faith based' - it's evidenced to each of us, even if indemonstrable to others. Thus an intelligent "God" is a perfectly valid, data-driven and scientific, postulation.How would one attempt to falsify this?Like "matter", I don't think it falls into the realm of testable things.Interesting. You think that even if "we figure out that what we now call "matter" is actually some mindstuff [..] the brain will still be the source of consciousness". Care to explain that?If we find that everything is mindstuff, then everything is mindstuff, including the brain. So then the ontological question is answered and we are back to epistemological questions. Such an epistemological question would be: Which mindstuff appears to bring forth the experiences we call consciousness? An entirely plausible answer to that question is: The mindstuff we call the brain, in a simple cause and effect relationship.Your causal relationship is far from simple since your "mindstuff" is in a 'chicken or egg first?' paradox. Are brains necessary to produce the mindstuff necessary to produce brains or is the mindstuff necessary to produce the brains? If you're talking about panpsychism or animism then it may be the case that there is no arguement for my identity existing in some afterlife - if that's caused by brains. But since your model has 'mindstuff' producing brain matter who says it has to convert matter into brains? It's logical to postulate it might be something beyond M/E. A further question is why did 'mindstuff' produce an ordered Universe?The problem with immaterialists is that, once they conclude that "everything is mindstuff," they still insist on saying "and the mindstuff I call consciousness is more fundamental than the mindstuff I call material." In fact, they insist on the mindstuff they call consciousness somehow being the source of the mindstuff they call material. And so they become dualists in the name of consciousness being paramount.Don't materialists do the exact same thing in reverse? The point isn't about offering any proof of what is indemonstrable. Instead we should only be tackling questions that are answerable - in this instance: what is the default position? If it is to be anything other than 'conscious causality' then we need another "something" to fill in the blank in front of the word '.............. causality'. Given two candidates, consciousness and matter, how can we conclude that matter is the stronger causal candidate when we only have evidence of consciousness and none of matter? (Note: this isn't saying someone should believe one or the other, it's just about recognising the default position.)The only way to avoid this, it seems to me, is to declare that the mindstuff I call material is simply an illusion and that the material does not exist in any real sense. But that, then, is solipsism.But solipsism is paradoxical. You can't have "self" or "selfness" without at least one point of reference such as "other(s)" or "otherness". The solipsist has to adopt a faith based position - that an unconscious part of his/her self is pretending to be everything other than self. That doesn't help us any because we're looking for a position closer to default than that.This is why I say that it is nonsensical to ask the ontological question about what actually exists. All we can do is investigate what we can know.And since we know consciousness exists and do not know matter exists what possible reason can there be for concluding, one, that matter exists and, two, that it causes consciousness - unless one admits it is 'faith-based'?
_
HypnoPsi

Hellbound

17th November 2005, 12:44 PM

Both http://www.bartleby.com/61/2/G0270200.html and http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?sm1=Z3JpLWdyaSBTZWFyY2ggUHJlZmVyZW5jZXMg&fw=0&fc=3&ss=-1&es=-1&gwp=11&ver=1.0.8.207&method=1 say both variants are fine.

Either way Penn definately pronounced it "gree gree" during the program (it was the one about recycling I think).
_
HypnoPsi

Interesting, I'd never seen it spelled without the essss'sesssss'sss (how do you write the plural of a single s, anyway?). Learn sumthin new every day.

In any case, the esese'sesee'ess'ssese'ss's are silent, so the pronunciation is the same either way :)

Jeff Corey

17th November 2005, 12:55 PM

Why are you using the word behaviour when the correct psychological term to describe internal experience is cognition? Are you trying to adopt Skinnerian eliminativism, simply ignoring the question?...HypnoPsi
You obviously know little about Skinner's position if you call it "eliminativism".
Read About Behaviorism to get an idea about what he really said.

EGarrett

17th November 2005, 01:42 PM

I started a thread earlier that was basically the same as this topic. There's a lot of jargon here and it's hard to tell what points are being made, but there is something that I think needs to be said.

There are several functions of a healthy brain. They include information collection (the senses, of which by the way, there are more than five), information storage (memory), Manipulation of the body (movement, speech, etc.)

None of these are the core of a person.

The core is the last function: The active processing of the information. You can't confuse this with the other functions, because when those stop working (i.e. becoming blind) people don't consider you dead. But when this stops, you're brain dead, even if you still respond to stimuli.

You can easily get mixed up with this, though. Most of your thoughts and memories are in the form of internal stimulation of the sense sections of your own brain. (you remember a sound by "hearing" it again in your head.) It's easy to tell when you're thinking in this way...

But you DO have thoughts that aren't in the form of senses or internal speech. That's where ideas and intuition come from. There is a process going on outside of senses and sense memories, it's just hard to pinpoint even in your own head.

There's also the "inner observer" that allows you to quantify your sense information. It's separate from the senses as well. That's why people can ignore mirages and hallucinations. There aren't appropriate words for these processes, but they are "you" at the core...and that is consciousness.

I haven't made myself nearly as clear as I'd like...but I'll keep trying.

Dymanic

17th November 2005, 02:37 PM

There's also the "inner observer" that allows you to quantify your sense information.

There it is. Intuitive Cartesian Dualism at its finest. "I think, therefore I am a little man inside my brain".

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

17th November 2005, 03:30 PM

And since we know consciousness exists and do not know matter exists what possible reason can there be for concluding, one, that matter exists and, two, that it causes consciousness - unless one admits it is 'faith-based'?
You're going to make this an ontological issue no matter how much I object, aren't you?

Metaphysics does not strike me as synonymous with "philosophical position" but let's say I'm not talking about anything other than metaphysics. Do you have any? Or are you still to frightened and afraid to defend a "philosophical position"?
I hold no metaphysical position. When you can present me with a way to distinguish among them, I'll reconsider.

~~ Paul

EGarrett

17th November 2005, 05:27 PM

There it is. Intuitive Cartesian Dualism at its finest. "I think, therefore I am a little man inside my brain".
Meaning what? You disagree? Why?

Mercutio

17th November 2005, 07:09 PM

Meaning what? You disagree? Why?
Turtles.

Soapy Sam

18th November 2005, 05:08 AM

Cartesian Hallucination: "I think I think, therefore I suppose I must be."

Mercutio- the sexual selection model for the evolution of intelligence is my own favourite. The problem with sexual selection of course, is you can use it to explain pretty well anything.

I'm not following your objection to the word "it" - which has at least two quite different meanings in the sentence you seem to allude to. Are you some sort of "itist"? How would you rewrite that paragraph without using a pronoun?

On a more general level- Does nobody consider it odd that one of the properties of organic matter is the ability to find it odd that one of the properties of organic matter is....etc ad nauseam.

HypnoPsi

18th November 2005, 11:00 AM

HypnoPsi...erm...Dennett and Sheldrake? If you can make that mistake, I feel much better about your failure to understand my points here. I don't know which of them you misunderstand--or perhaps it is both--but I also have read them both, and I concur with Dynamic on this one.Okay then, what's the big difference between Dennett's intentional thermostats with beliefs about the world and Sheldrakes morphic fields in DNA? I'm not saying there is absolutely no difference, just that it seems rather trivial compared to the fact that the logic of both hypothesis is identical - reductionism applied to consciousness.
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HypnoPsi

HypnoPsi

18th November 2005, 11:02 AM

You obviously know little about Skinner's position if you call it "eliminativism".
Read About Behaviorism to get an idea about what he really said.I suggest you do!

http://monism.iqnaut.net/

"A subcategory of eliminativism is radical behaviourism, a view held by B. F. Skinner."

Skinner is very well known as an eliminativist.
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HypnoPsi

HypnoPsi

18th November 2005, 11:17 AM

Originally Posted by EGarrett :
There's also the "inner observer" that allows you to quantify your sense information.There it is. Intuitive Cartesian Dualism at its finest. "I think, therefore I am a little man inside my brain".Ignoring the fact that there is no evidence for a genuninely 'material' and independent 'machine', why should anyone deny the "ghost in the machine"? That's what we experience - that we are observers with agency.

You can freely theorise that this is all an illusion and that consciousness is produced by brains - I have absolutely no disagreement with that - but nobody can argue that matter is not "faith-based" even if it's data driven from the existence of noumenal forms. Neither should anyone deny that it's pseudoscience to claim brains produce consciousness because you'd need to prove some fundamental/independent form of M/E exists and understand it fully before the idea that brains produce consciousness could ever be data-driven and scientific.

Without proof of 'matter' all you are doing is trying to explain the unexplained with the unknown and no theorising about what might be is ever going to same standard of what we each have personal evidence for - that we are, that we think and that we act in the world.

Amaterialism trumps materialism every time because it's an absense of belief in the magical powder/energy hypothesis.
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HypnoPsi

Jeff Corey

18th November 2005, 11:22 AM

From http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/eliminativism.html

eliminativism - The view that, because mental states and properties are items posited by a protoscientific theory (called folk psychology), the science of the future is likely to conclude that entities such as beliefs, desires, and sensations do not exist. The alternate most often offered is physicalist and the position is thus often called 'eliminative materialism'.
According to the definition that you posted, Skinner was not an "eliminativist". Read "About Behaviorism".

HypnoPsi

18th November 2005, 11:27 AM

Cartesian Hallucination: "I think I think, therefore I suppose I must be."Can you not see how utterly futile this is as a criticism of Decartes dictum since your third person actor 'thinks' and 'supposes'!?On a more general level- Does nobody consider it odd that one of the properties of organic matter is the ability to find it odd that one of the properties of organic matter is....etc ad nauseam.Follow that thought.
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HypnoPsi

HypnoPsi

18th November 2005, 11:28 AM

Originally Posted by Hypno :
And since we know consciousness exists and do not know matter exists what possible reason can there be for concluding, one, that matter exists and, two, that it causes consciousness - unless one admits it is 'faith-based'?You're going to make this an ontological issue no matter how much I object, aren't you?What is the issue if not ontological, Paul? Look, I have absolutely no objection at all to you declaring yourself agnostic about the whole consciousness/noumenal causality question if that's what you are. I'm just asking you what your position is? Do you declare yourself a materialist? An atheist? An agnostic? Do you accept that an atheist (as, perhaps, opposed to an amonotheist) is in a 'faith-based' position because there is no evidence for matter? These aren't hard questions. Not taking a stand is cowardice.Metaphysics does not strike me as synonymous with "philosophical position" but let's say I'm not talking about anything other than metaphysics. Do you have any? Or are you still to frightened and afraid to defend a "philosophical position"?I hold no metaphysical position. When you can present me with a way to distinguish among them, I'll reconsider.So do you declare yourself agnostic about the issue of consciousness/noumenal causality? I'm just asking!
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HypnoPsi

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

18th November 2005, 12:39 PM

What is the issue if not ontological, Paul? Look, I have absolutely no objection at all to you declaring yourself agnostic about the whole consciousness/noumenal causality question if that's what you are. I'm just asking you what your position is? Do you declare yourself a materialist? An atheist? An agnostic? Do you accept that an atheist (as, perhaps, opposed to an amonotheist) is in a 'faith-based' position because there is no evidence for matter? These aren't hard questions. Not taking a stand is cowardice.
I take no stand because the choices are incoherent. You can call it cowardice all you want, but that just makes you an annoying dickwad. Why would I be afraid to take a stand if I thought there was anything to stand on?

What atheism has to do with matter I cannot imagine. What god has to do with consciousness I cannot imagine either.

~~ Paul

Dymanic

18th November 2005, 02:35 PM

Ignoring the fact that there is no evidence for a genuninely 'material' and independent 'machine', why should anyone deny the "ghost in the machine"?

By definition, nothing immaterial can causally affect anything material. Regarding this as a "faith-based" position is to ignore an important difference between "faith-based" and "axiomatic": while the faith-based person accepts certain things without proof by choice, science accepts certain things without proof from lack of choice. Absent acceptance of certain propositions, all subsequent propositions are rendered equal in value; invisible pink unicorn theory being, at that point, as good as any other explanation, there really is nothing to gain from further investigation or further discussion (certain propositions, of course, have nothing to lose from such an approach, and much to gain -- precisely why they aren't regarded as scientific propositions).

Quite independent of that, the notion of such a ghost may be trivially dismissed as prima facia logically inconsistent: it leads to an infinite regress.

And though I find your conflation of Dennett's position with that of Sheldrake to be rather amusing, I can't imagine where anyone would begin to help you with that, much less find the time. About the only thing I can suggest is that you forget everything you think you know and start over from scratch.

HypnoPsi

18th November 2005, 04:43 PM

I take no stand because the choices are incoherent. You can call it cowardice all you want, but that just makes you an annoying dickwad. Why would I be afraid to take a stand if I thought there was anything to stand on?

What atheism has to do with matter I cannot imagine. What god has to do with consciousness I cannot imagine either.

~~ PaulTemper, temper.

Tell me Paul, what are you in this thread for? What are you actually saying?
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HypnoPsi

HypnoPsi

18th November 2005, 04:44 PM

By definition, nothing immaterial can causally affect anything material.What material?Regarding this as a "faith-based" position is to ignore an important difference between "faith-based" and "axiomatic": while the faith-based person accepts certain things without proof by choice, science accepts certain things without proof from lack of choice.Accepting things without proof is accepting them on faith however you rationalise it.Absent acceptance of certain propositions, all subsequent propositions are rendered equal in value; invisible pink unicorn theory being, at that point, as good as any other explanation, there really is nothing to gain from further investigation or further discussion (certain propositions, of course, have nothing to lose from such an approach, and much to gain -- precisely why they aren't regarded as scientific propositions).We have evidence of consciousness. We don't have evidence of matter. Everything appears in consciousness as 'be-ing' - nothing more. Why conclude that something theorised is causal rather than something known? It doesn't make any logical sense and you know it.Quite independent of that, the notion of such a ghost may be trivially dismissed as prima facia logically inconsistent: it leads to an infinite regress.What ghost? I'm conscious not a ghost.fsAnd though I find your conflation of Dennett's position with that of Sheldrake to be rather amusing, I can't imagine where anyone would begin to help you with that, much less find the time. About the only thing I can suggest is that you forget everything you think you know and start over from scratch.Oh no, I'm quite, quite, happy with my views as they are thank you very much.

People couldn't believe the world was round at one point. It was utterly impossible for them to comprehend the idea of a ball floating in space. Every experience they had told them the world was, aside from the odd hill, mountain and valley, "flat". It was self-evident.

That's the exact same problem of comprehension that materialists have. Everything seems so real that they're overlooking the fact that they can't grasp it's only ever the 'realness' itself that they're sensing in noumanal forms.
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HypnoPsi

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

18th November 2005, 05:20 PM

Tell me Paul, what are you in this thread for? What are you actually saying? I'm saying that if we are careful, we can use the term consciousness meaningfully, without having it polluted by a bunch of metaphysical crapola.

And please, not the flat Earth thing.

~~ Paul

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

18th November 2005, 05:29 PM

Everything seems so real that they're overlooking the fact that they can't grasp it's only ever the 'realness' itself that they're sensing in noumanal forms.
I'm willing to give this tiresome subject one more shot if you can reword this sentence so it means something to me. Just a few sentences, please, not five paragraphs.

First, let me clean up your sentence:

Everything seems so real that materialists are overlooking the fact that they cannot grasp that it is only ever the "realness" itself that they are sensing in (objects as they are in themselves).

~~ Paul

Boo

18th November 2005, 07:06 PM

The core is the last function: The active processing of the information. You can't confuse this with the other functions, because when those stop working (i.e. becoming blind) people don't consider you dead. But when this stops, you're brain dead, even if you still respond to stimuli.

Brain death is not when active processing stops, brain death is the absence of any measurable electrical activity in the brain. A flat line EEG. It's not mostly dead, it's completely dead and as Miracle Max says when their completely dead the only thing left to do is go through their pockets for loose change. My understanding what you are trying to say is when an individual stops being able to respond to stimuli in a meaningful way they have lost their personality and are therefore 'dead'. An extreme case of this would be Terri Schaivo, as long as her brain recieved fuel (glucose) she continued to respond to basic stimuli but the person that was Terri was 'dead'. I would contend that you are confusing personality or the higher functions of the brain with conciousness.

To refer back to the Glasgow Coma Scale, the highest score available is 15. By the time it drops to 8 survivability is approximately 50%, at 5 it's about 25% and at 3 less than 5%, if that. By the time a person loses that which you define as conciousness they still have even odds of survival even if they do not actively display 'meaningful' response to stimuli.

My point is that 'brain dead' and conciousness are definable terms and wholey seperate from personality.

But you DO have thoughts that aren't in the form of senses or internal speech. That's where ideas and intuition come from. There is a process going on outside of senses and sense memories, it's just hard to pinpoint even in your own head.

I often hear co-workers and have myself explained why I did something as intuition or that it was the right thing to do. I had a 'gut feeling'. We do this when we can't form the logical thought process to explain what we did and why. The following is my understanding of how 'intuition' works and perhaps somebody who has more knowledge in this area can tell me how close I am. (Merc?)

Our senses are continuously taking in information, whether we are aware of the process or not. That information is stored in our brains, I call it the mental rolodex. There are occaisions when we are confronted with a situation and somehow, someway we 'intuitively' know what to do or we have a 'gut feeling' about the correct way to respond. We cannot verbalize or are aware of how and why we know what to do, we just do. At a non aware level our brain takes in the situation, flips through the mental rolodex and spits out an answer. Sometimes 2+2=4 and sometimes it equals 5. As we acquire more knowledge and experience our intuition or gut feelings equal 4 more often than 5. Like all good humans we remember the hits more than the misses.

My point being that 'ideas' and in particular 'intuition' are a result of sense memory, but as you said it's memories we cannot recall acquiring or explain how we processed to form an answer. It was 'intuitive'.

Boo

clarsct

18th November 2005, 07:17 PM

Hmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.

This question of intuition is fascinating. I am quite tempted to say that yes, the brain keeps processing information even when it is not on the 'front burner' so to speak. Many times have I found the answer to a quandry simply by walking away and doing something else for a while. When I come back, it is as though I had been working on the problem all along. I find an answer that is , well, apparent and good. I wonder why I didn't think of it before.

I think it is because my brain was still 'on the job' even though I had focused elsewhere.

I think it is somewhat related to dreaming, as well....

But I could be wrong.

Mercutio

18th November 2005, 08:05 PM

What material?Accepting things without proof is accepting them on faith however you rationalise it.We have evidence of consciousness. We don't have evidence of matter.
Actually, we have evidence of either, evidence which collapses like a house of cards under the assumption of the other. What you see as your bedrock is an illusion under the assumptions of materialism (illusion, as Susan Blackmore explained, not in the sense of "it doesn't exist", but in the more proper sense of "it is not what it appears to be").

That's the exact same problem of comprehension that materialists have. Everything seems so real that they're overlooking the fact that they can't grasp it's only ever the 'realness' itself that they're sensing in noumanal forms.I have become accustomed, after such a long time reading these threads, to seeing people easily seeing a "problem of comprehension" in the other side's view, and missing the very same problem in their own view...simply because "everything seems so real" under their interpretation.

EGarrett

19th November 2005, 12:33 AM

I shouldn't have used the phrase "brain dead." I didn't mean the medical term. Like the rest of the post, it was meant to be completely unscientific and unmedical. I probably just should've said "gone." Or something like that.
___________________

Anyway, let me try to clarify what I meant by "intuition"...

The brain has thoughts that are separate from sights, sounds, feelings and words. They're just hard to recognize because we have no method of understanding anything that isn't a sight, sound, feeling or word...

The best way to notice them is to remember when they lead to another thought that you DO recognize. Like for example...seeing an AT&T commercial and realizing you need to call your parents. It's not the image of the phone that leads to an image of a phone in your head. It's the abstract notion of calling someone that leads to remembering that you have a call to make.

This happens all the time. I think, if you concentrate hard enough, you can recognize ideas coming into your head that aren't associated with sights, sounds, or words that lead to other ideas. (Although once the idea is there, you typically call up mental images that relate to the idea.)

Anyway, as far as I can tell, this is the process that leads to intuition. Especially because the best definition of intuition that I've heard is "knowledge without the words to express it." The brain picks up information and realizes something is going to happen without you having an actual sight/sound memory that goes with it. Because there's no tangible thought that goes with it, it seems magical.

In fact, I believe that "magical brain phenomena" like the artist's "muse" or clairvoyance or the alcoholic's "moment of clarity" are all just terms for these "invisible" thoughts and connections that come without sights and sounds.

One example of this "intuition" that I might use would be putting your foot on the brake when the traffic light turns yellow. But it's not just instinct or conditioned response. It's actually connecting the dots and having an idea about what's going to happen. Maybe more like seeing an AT&T commercial and then immediately cursing to yourself because you've realized that you forgot Mom's birthday.

HypnoPsi

19th November 2005, 03:27 PM

I'm saying that if we are careful, we can use the term consciousness meaningfully, without having it polluted by a bunch of metaphysical crapola.

And please, not the flat Earth thing.

~~ PaulIf you don't want any more of my accusations of flat earthism and fairy dustism then you'll have to do a little better.

Okay, so you're absolutely not going to take an ontological position. To me, that suggests you're agnostic about the whole consciousness/matter issue since you feel you don't have enough evidence either way. Would you accept the label agnostic (yes or no)? (I can respect agnosticism - not quite as much as I respect someone who will actually take a stance and defend a position like materialistic atheism (though I do consider that less logical than agnosticism) - but I can still respect it.)

Now for the tough questions. First, do you declare yourself self-aware and aware of your surroundings, sensing them as real?

If you do, then do you understand that, in trying to define the causal agent of the manifest universe, it is more rational and logical to consider something that is known to exist to be a better candidate than something that is not known to exist?

Finally, even if you don't/won't declare yourself as a materialist, do you accept that there is no irrefutable evidence that matter exists and, consequently, that materialism is therefore a faith-based belief system?
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HypnoPsi

P.S. Let's be clear about something. I'm not adding any "metaphysical crapola" to consciousness or anything else. I'm just saying I have self-awarenes, cognitions and an awareness of my surroundings as real. If you think I'm adding anything you should state precisely what you think it is.

HypnoPsi

19th November 2005, 03:40 PM

Originally Posted by Hypno :
Everything seems so real that they're overlooking the fact that they can't grasp it's only ever the 'realness' itself that they're sensing in noumanal forms.I'm willing to give this tiresome subject one more shot if you can reword this sentence so it means something to me. Just a few sentences, please, not five paragraphs.I'm really not sure that I can. It makes perfect sense to me, but I'm beginning to think it possible that you've been in-the-box for so long that you actually can't quite think outside-the-box any more.

Do you understand that everything only ever appears to you in your mind? Do you understand that should you ever observe or think about quarks or whatever, that doesn't mean you know it's "substance"?First, let me clean up your sentence:

Everything seems so real that materialists are overlooking the fact that they cannot grasp that it is only ever the "realness" itself that they are sensing in (objects as they are in themselves).I'd go further than that and say that everything is real. It's what generates and fascilitates it that is in question. Even if we can't ever answer that question fully, do you understand that in speculating about the causal agent of the manifest Universe and all things therein, it is more logical to consider something known to exist to be a better candidate for causation than something unknown (and unknowable)?
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HypnoPsi

hammegk

19th November 2005, 03:56 PM

Paul is a p-zombie.

HypnoPsi

19th November 2005, 04:06 PM

Originally Posted by HypnoPsi :
We have evidence of consciousness. We don't have evidence of matter.Actually, we have evidence of either, evidence which collapses like a house of cards under the assumption of the other.I disagree. Many theists, probably the vast majority, are dualists believing that God created both Souls and "matter". What you see as your bedrock is an illusion under the assumptions of materialism (illusion, as Susan Blackmore explained, not in the sense of "it doesn't exist", but in the more proper sense of "it is not what it appears to be").Yes, under the 'believed in' assumptions of materialism, consciousness is an illusion. I'm fine with faith when it's declared as faith, as you have done, but still curious as to why anyone should adopt such a belief system.

Either way I completely disagree with you that we have evidence of any material substance of anything in the manifest universe. I'd like to see the evidence or the logical argument that supports the view? Consciousness, in terms of self-awareness, awareness of thoughts and of my surroundings, is something I do have evidence of though. How then, is it logical to deem something unknown and unknowable as the causal agent of the manifest universe, and all things therein, rather than something that is known?I have become accustomed, after such a long time reading these threads, to seeing people easily seeing a "problem of comprehension" in the other side's view, and missing the very same problem in their own view...simply because "everything seems so real" under their interpretation.I agree that people tend to do that. But many of the people in this forum think of themselves as 'skeptics', championing the cause of science, logic and rational thinking. I'm just playing by those rules.
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HypnoPsi

Jeff Corey

19th November 2005, 04:32 PM

Clearly not. You misrepresent what others have said, based on your shoddy scholarship. You tell people to go learn about things you know little about.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

19th November 2005, 07:35 PM

Okay, so you're absolutely not going to take an ontological position. To me, that suggests you're agnostic about the whole consciousness/matter issue since you feel you don't have enough evidence either way. Would you accept the label agnostic (yes or no)?
I'm willing to be agnostic on the question of whether any metaphysical concepts are coherent. Until then, it makes no sense to ask me whether I am agnostic on the conceptual distinctions themselves.

Now for the tough questions. First, do you declare yourself self-aware and aware of your surroundings, sensing them as real?
You'll have to define self-aware and real.

If you do, then do you understand that, in trying to define the causal agent of the manifest universe, it is more rational and logical to consider something that is known to exist to be a better candidate than something that is not known to exist?
First, I have no idea what the "causal agent of the manifest universe" refers to. Second, your first question does not define real, let alone known to exist.

Finally, even if you don't/won't declare yourself as a materialist, do you accept that there is no irrefutable evidence that matter exists and, consequently, that materialism is therefore a faith-based belief system.
You'll need to define matter and exist.

Your definitions of real and exists must be different, otherwise you've just said that my surroundings exist.

P.S. Let's be clear about something. I'm not adding any "metaphysical crapola" to consciousness or anything else. I'm just saying I have self-awarenes, cognitions and an awareness of my surroundings as real. If you think I'm adding anything you should state precisely what you think it is.
Again, ignoring the definition of real, I don't think that simple statement is adding much crapola. However, as soon as you start drawing conclusions from that statement, we start walking on thin ice.

~~ Paul

Mercutio

19th November 2005, 09:23 PM

I disagree. Many theists, probably the vast majority, are dualists believing that God created both Souls and "matter".
When I see a dualism that is logically coherent, I may care.
Yes, under the 'believed in' assumptions of materialism, consciousness is an illusion. I'm fine with faith when it's declared as faith, as you have done, but still curious as to why anyone should adopt such a belief system.
The highlighted sentence shows that your assumption of primacy of consciousness is every bit as flawed. You have to assume that consciousness is not an illusion, just as they have to assume that material is not an illusion. Why do you adopt your belief system? When you have that answer, you are most of the way to answering why they adopt theirs.

Either way I completely disagree with you that we have evidence of any material substance of anything in the manifest universe. I'd like to see the evidence or the logical argument that supports the view? Consciousness, in terms of self-awareness, awareness of thoughts and of my surroundings, is something I do have evidence of though. How then, is it logical to deem something unknown and unknowable as the causal agent of the manifest universe, and all things therein, rather than something that is known?I agree that people tend to do that. But many of the people in this forum think of themselves as 'skeptics', championing the cause of science, logic and rational thinking. I'm just playing by those rules.The "evidence" is perfectly consistent with materialism, and perfectly consistent with idealism. Your "known" is only known because you explicitly reject, by assumption, an alternative explanation which you yourself (highlighted in red above) admit could also fit. I am increasingly perplexed that you see the assumptions of the materialist so easily, but continually fail to see that you have equally important assumptions of your own which form the bedrock of your view.

Jeff Corey

19th November 2005, 09:49 PM

This is a bit long, and doesn't necessarily reflect my thinking, but
http://marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/skinner.htm/
ETA,Sorry, link doesn't work anymore.

Soapy Sam

20th November 2005, 12:59 AM

If consciousness did not exist and someone suggested it might, would we brand it "paranormal"?

(I appreciate the logical contradiction inherent in the question, but we have some experience of illogical questions here. I have confidence in you all.)

Back to the OP. So far I think I have one actual reply- "Yes" from Tobias.

Mercutio has rejected the idea that consciousness is an entity- with which I agree- has defined it as a shorthand term for various aspects of human behaviour- which I accept- but has not, so far as I can see, answered the question.
Various people have pointed out that there is a logical contradiction in the OP, thus suggesting that they failed to read the subject title.

Paul and Hypno, with help from Ham, are off on some discussion I don't pretend to understand.

Boo is making a serious attempt to move a self admittedly unrealistic question into the world of reality, which I applaud, but in this case I feel misses the point.

So. I repeat my question, carefully rewording same to avoid use of the term "it".
Does anyone agree that our operational definition of the shorthand term "consciousness" would appear to fit more easily into aspects of the paranormal than into everything else we know about the behaviour of matter?
If that seems too extreme, would anyone agree that consciousness is notably different from the rest of the known behaviour of matter?

If yes to either question, can anyone think of (or imagine of) other , similarly unusual properties which life might be able to evolve?

If the answer is "No"- ie consciousness is purely an electromagnetic phenomenon, no odder than magnetism, can someone clarify why being conscious feels so damn wierd?

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

20th November 2005, 06:40 AM

If the answer is "No"- ie consciousness is purely an electromagnetic phenomenon, no odder than magnetism, can someone clarify why being conscious feels so damn wierd?
Because you don't have the ability to feel what it is like to be anything other than yourself. However, I'm not sure why you use the word weird. Does it really feel weird to you?

~~ Paul

Dymanic

20th November 2005, 07:32 AM

Does anyone agree that our operational definition of the shorthand term "consciousness" would appear to fit more easily into aspects of the paranormal than into everything else we know about the behaviour of matter?
I don't think there is any single operational definition of the term, which is why these discussions inevitably splinter into multiple sub-topics. As I noted above, explaining consciousness generally defaults to Cartesian dualism; if that sort of 'ghost in the machine' is how you explain consciousness, then, yes, it's clearly a paranormal proposition. If not, then before any other questions can be addressed, it seems necessary to be very specific with regard to exactly what it is that one means by "consciousness". Until that is achieved, it isn't clear that there is anything to explain.

Soapy Sam

20th November 2005, 07:47 AM

Dymanic, I personally can't explain it at all. I'm far too ignorant of the details. I've read several books on the evolution of consciousness and the operation of brains, but the truth is I lack the background and the smarts to make much of them.

Paul. Yes, there are days when it does strike me as very wierd indeed.
The impossibility of the question in my OP is an example- there it is in black and white, yet it clearly makes no sense if we suppose English to operate according to TLoP. There are times when I experience something in the real world which triggers a mental response- it might be looking at the stars or just laughing at an unexpectedly funny joke- when I find myself wondering how the heck this can happen inside a two metre tube of guts and plumbing. If minds aren't wierd I can't think what "wierd" means. (And to echo Haldane , I'm not sure we can think what it means.)

Mercutio

20th November 2005, 08:19 AM

Back to the OP. So far I think I have one actual reply- "Yes" from Tobias.

So. I repeat my question, carefully rewording same to avoid use of the term "it".
Does anyone agree that our operational definition of the shorthand term "consciousness" would appear to fit more easily into aspects of the paranormal than into everything else we know about the behaviour of matter?
If that seems too extreme, would anyone agree that consciousness is notably different from the rest of the known behaviour of matter?

If yes to either question, can anyone think of (or imagine of) other , similarly unusual properties which life might be able to evolve?

If the answer is "No"- ie consciousness is purely an electromagnetic phenomenon, no odder than magnetism, can someone clarify why being conscious feels so damn wierd?Ok...I see the question more clearly, I think, although I am going to disagree with your options. First... no, it does not fit into paranormal. That which we call "consciousness" only seems paranormal because our language treats a category of behaviors as if "it" were some entity. When we look past the linguistic gobbledegook, there is nothing particularly paranormal about it. As example...we can examine the process of "seeing a tree", from the distal stimulus, the reflected electromagnetic radiation, the proximal stimulation of retina, the multiple pathways to processing of form, color, associations, etc...but if we assume that we are examining the process of "conscious awareness of the image of a tree", then we have at least two assumed things (conscious awareness and image) that are unexplainable. Fortunately, the apparent incompleteness of the latter explanation is purely an artifact of the initial assumptions; it is as if we assume that the fountain of youth exists in Florida, and reject as incomplete any map that does not locate it there.

My other disagreement is with your "no" alternative. It is no "purely an electromagnetic phenomenon". Not in the least. It is a category label for a class of behaviors (see Boo's list for a very truncated example), which our language circularly treats as the cause of those behaviors rather than as the label for them. We treat the word "love" the same way. We have a long list of behaviors (both public, like sending flowers, holding hands, climbing up balconies, sonnet-writing...and private, like obsessing, getting all melty inside when you think of her, wishing you were with her...) which we have associated with the word "love" (as in "consciousness", when we learn the word "love" we do so only with our teachers pairing the publicly available and observed behaviors--the private behaviors are associated with the word through generalization from the public ones), and yet our language circularly tells us that we do these things because of love.

Our language, because of category errors and circularity, is behind your OP question.