A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I can say, a red apple looks different from a green apple; and so can a p-zombie. A p-zombie can't say exactly what either of the two apples does look like; but neither can I.
But you can do a better job than that, if you are pressed to try. Could a society of p-zombies come up with the millennia of philosophical conversation about qualia that we have? According to the definition of p-zombies, they're supposed to be able to.

~~ Paul

[sphenisc]

Sorry, what's a PIU?

A p-zombie is supposed to be identical to us, except for phenomenal consciousness. It doesn't seem fair to take away qualia, then add all sorts of additional brain mechanism to allow the p-zombie to talk about qualia even though it doesn't experience them. That's like saying that a p-zombie is sort of like a human, doesn't experience qualia, but is completely rigged up to behave as if it does. What then would be the difference between qualia and "completely rigged like qualia"?

~~ Paul

sorry, pink invisible unicorn (it's the standard examplar of unprovable things on this forum.) Any way , I was only making the point that 69dodge made better.

I'm not sure why you feel removing qualia is unfair; I think that qualia are felt to be the things we are conscious of. A p-zombie can't have qualia without being conscious, in which case it wouldn't be a p-zombie.

[69dodge]

Sorry, what's a PIU?invisible pink unicorn?

Sort of like, UTC is coordinated universal time...

A p-zombie is supposed to be identical to us, except for phenomenal consciousness. It doesn't seem fair to take away qualia, then add all sorts of additional brain mechanism to allow the p-zombie to talk about qualia even though it doesn't experience them. That's like saying that a p-zombie is sort of like a human, doesn't experience qualia, but is completely rigged up to behave as if it does. What then would be the difference between qualia and "completely rigged up like qualia"?Huh. I don't imagine p-zombies as having any additional brain mechanisms. I figure they have exactly the same brains as we do, except that in the hypothetical world in which they exist, such brains aren't accompanied by consciousness.

There would be no difference that we could see. The difference is that in one case, they can see, and in the other case, they can't.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian :
If p-zombies are logically possible, then, by definition, reductive materialism is false.

HypnoPsi
That depends at which point (and by what means) consciousness is said to occur, Ian. Think of combustion. If you put a lump of wood in a fan-assisted oven it will take quite a while at the highest temperature before it ignites in flames producing heat by it's own fuel.


I don't think this is relevant to what I said. What you're referring to here is that there is a certain threshold of physical complexity whereby consciousness will spontaneously come into being. I don't think this can be applied to reductive materialism because they can't believe in the existence of consciousness at all. I mean otherwise there would, by definition, be a distinction between real people and p-zombies. But they consistently deny any such distinction.

This idea that consciousness spontaneously comes into being applies to positions which hold that consciousness is conceptually distinct from the underlying physical processes but ontologically dependent on such physical processes i.e non - reductive materialism and also various dualist positions such as epiphenomenalism, genuine emergentism (http://progressiveliving.org/emergentism_defined.htm) and even maybe interactive dualism (it seems to me that one can be an interactive dualist but still believe that consciousness is created by the brain)




AmateurScientist wrote:
Daniel Dennett (author of Consciousness Explained and very much a materialist, and TAM4 speaker) is a well-known and respected philosopher

II
I have no respect for him whatsoever.

Hypnopsi

I don't see why you should say that.

. . . .

Thesis defence is an academic and scientific rite of passage. It separates the men from the boys. So although I might disagree with Dennett's supporters in this forum with their conscious toilet cisterns, etc., I can respect the signs of some willingness to actually get involved in consciousness research properly. It is a very fascinating subject and we need more solid discussion rather than just the usual invective, name-calling and ridicule.



Do we? I don't agree.

In similarity to the subject of the paranormal there is a great deal of complete and total mutual incredulity on both sides of the debate regarding their opponents position.

But their incredulity is wholly and entirely unjustified where as mine is entirely justified. Dennet thinks that neither he nor anyone else have ever been conscious. He himself has stated that he is a p-zombie and he thinks that everyone else is too. According to him and many people contributing to these forums, no one has ever experienced anything. No one has ever experienced redness, the smell of a rose, the feeling of hunger . .nothing whatsoever. They suppose that consciousness doesn't exist.

And since I cannot prove I am conscious i.e experience qualia, they suppose that it doesn't exist. How is it possible to have a "solid discussion" about this? I know with absolute complete and total certainty I am right. If they truly believe they are not conscious, then either they're right and they truly are p-zombies -- which I find incredibly implausible -- or they are insane.

This is not to say I necessarily dislike them, it's just on this one issue they can be no resolution. Yeah it is inaccurate to say I have no respect for Dennet. I just think that he's either insane or having us all on (the same applies to a lot of people on here).



Whether thermostats are conscious or not; whether people can tell when they're being stared at or not or who's phoning them, has profound implications either way. We're all interested in this for the science, yes? Well, having some respect for those who present ideas - even if we all just end up agreeing to disagree - is important if we're to remove the element on both sides who are clearly just in the fray for the fighting.


Thermostats being conscious is a perfectly reasonable hypothesis. Hell, solipsism is a perfectly reasonable hypothesis compared to what these guys are proposing!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm not sure why you feel removing qualia is unfair; I think that qualia are felt to be the things we are conscious of. A p-zombie can't have qualia without being conscious, in which case it wouldn't be a p-zombie.
Does a p-zombie lack qualia, self-awareness, and/or something else?


Huh. I don't imagine p-zombies as having any additional brain mechanisms. I figure they have exactly the same brains as we do, except that in the hypothetical world in which they exist, such brains aren't accompanied by consciousness.
Then if we asked the p-zombie "Are you conscious?," what would make it say "Yes."?

We're still being too glib.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

If it is our souls that make us conscious, then we cannot program anything that mimics a consciousness into a machine unless we program something that mimics the soul.

Of course we can. It is obviously in principle possible to program a computer, robot or android who acts exactly like a human being. They would not of course be conscious since it is our souls which are conscious.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Dennet thinks that neither he nor anyone else have ever been conscious. He himself has stated that he is a p-zombie and he thinks that everyone else is too.
You're taking this out of context. He said it to be provocative. He believes we should study consciousness as heterophenomenology rather than autophenomenology: a theory about human consciousness can be derived from the third person. In that sense, we are all p-zombies.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Of course we can. It is obviously in principle possible to program a computer, robot or android who acts exactly like a human being. They would not of course be conscious since it is our souls which are conscious.
Really? So our souls are contributing absolutely nothing to our internal experience or our behavior that can't be simulated mechanistically?

Note that such a robot is not what a p-zombie is supposed to be.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

II
Why should a behavioural indistinguishable android not be conscious, but a functional indistinguishable one is?

Paul
I can't answer this, because I don't know what we mean by a "behaviorally indistinguishable" p-zombie. If it's indistinguishable across all possible tests, then I'd say it's conscious.



Think of a computer playing noughts and crosses (or tic tac toe or whatever the denizens in the USA call it). We can simply program it to always respond in a certain way eg if its opponent places a cross in one of the corners then the computer is simply programmed to place an "O" in one of the 2 adjacent corners (but not the corner across) in order to avoid defeat.

The same goes for . .say . .chess. The 50 move rule ensures there are a finite number of possible games of chess. Thus a computer could in principle be simply programmed to make the best move in every possible game of chess on any move -- just like in the noughts and crosses. And an android could be specifically programmed to respond in an appropriate manner to all possible environmental situations.

Obviously it would be ludicrous in the extreme to say such an android is conscious, right? So we can reject behaviourism.

But there is another possible type of android. Let's think of a computer playing chess again. This time all its programmed with all the rules of the game and a "desire" to win. It's not even programmed that the Queen is valuable and that taking opponents pieces is generally advantageous to the goal of winning. Instead it learns everything by trail and error, and thus keeps improving until it too in a finite time plays perfect games of chess, just like the other chess playing computer. Again an android could be in principle created which always responded appropriately due to "learning" from experience.

But the 2 androids are externally absolutely indistinguishable. I'm assuming though that people on here would wish to say the 1st android is definitely not conscious, but the 2nd one definitely is?

It's the distinction between materialist behaviourism and materialist functionalism.

[Interesting Ian]

You're taking this out of context. He said it to be provocative.


He either believes it or he doesn't. He has stated he does. Should I suppose he is lying?



He believes we should study consciousness as heterophenomenology rather than autophenomenology:



Never heard of either word.




a theory about human consciousness can be derived from the third person.



No it can't.




In that sense, we are all p-zombies.

~~ Paul

There is only one sense that we can be a p-zombie, and speaking for myself I know with absolute certitude that I am not one.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Ian :
Of course we can. It is obviously in principle possible to program a computer, robot or android who acts exactly like a human being. They would not of course be conscious since it is our souls which are conscious.

Paul
Really? So our souls are contributing absolutely nothing to our internal experience or our behavior that can't be simulated mechanistically?



Why shouldn't it be able to be simulated?? Imagine a chess playing computer again. I know that they don't really play like human beings, but there is no reason why they could not be programmed to play human like moves. An android simply is a computer which does everything that we can do instead of just one thing like chess. There's no reason to suppose that a robot couldn't simulate the entirety of our behaviour.

Or if there is some reason then please enlighten me.

[Interesting Ian]

Does anyone have a clue how we might approach a proof that p-zombies are logically possible? I'm particularly interested to see how we do this without regard to a particular assumed metaphysic.

~~ Paul

No the default assumption is to suppose they are. Why on earth shouldn't they be?

[AmateurScientist]

Ian,

[edit due to cross post with Ian]

In your post above (two posts above the last) you are being deliberately thick, as in closed-minded. You are much brighter than that. Paul made a thoughtful response to you. It's a bit rude and over the top to dismiss it as you seem to have done.

I have never heard of either of those words either, but I can deduce their meanings from the context and from their prefixes. I'm sure you can too.

Dennett's point is well taken. It's deeper than you seem to be giving it credit for. Since none of us can peer into the mind of another, we necessarily have to assume heterophemenology in order to conclude that we are not the lone humans awash in a sea of p-zombies. It's not a difficult concept, but it's deeper than you seem to be willing to ascribe to Dennett.

AS

[Interesting Ian]

Let me bring up a thought experiment that Stimpy mentioned previously.

Let's say we have a zombie world that appears identical to ours, except that the people are p-zombies. The causal laws are different so that the resulting physical facts are identical to ours, even though there is no phenomenal consciousness. Suddenly, one day, all the causal laws change so that the people are no longer p-zombies, phenomenal consciousness pops into existence, and the world is identical to ours.

Would the people of that world notice the change?

~~ Paul

Not if memories are physical or are entirely dependent or caused by the physical. It would be like creating a duplicate of you. The duplicate certainly wouldn't think it has just popped into existence unless it was informed.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Obviously it would be ludicrous in the extreme to say such an android is conscious, right? So we can reject behaviourism.
I am awash in glibness. Which aspects of consciousness would it be ludicrous to claim this robot has? All of them? And why should I reject a stimulus-response model here?

But the 2 androids are externally absolutely indistinguishable. I'm assuming though that people on here would wish to say the 1st android is definitely not conscious, but the 2nd one definitely is?
Not me. I don't know how to work with such a discrete definition of consciousness.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

He either believes it or he doesn't. He has stated he does. Should I suppose he is lying?
No, I think you should suppose he is being provocative.

There is only one sense that we can be a p-zombie, ...
That's clearly not true, since we can't even decide whether faking behavior is allowed or not.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why shouldn't it be able to be simulated?? Imagine a chess playing computer again. I know that they don't really play like human beings, but there is no reason why they could not be programmed to play human like moves. An android simply is a computer which does everything that we can do instead of just one thing like chess. There's no reason to suppose that a robot couldn't simulate the entirety of our behaviour.
If you're including internal behavior, then I see no reason even to postulate a soul. Why bother, if everything works just the same without one?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by 69dodge :
This sounds like, what if the world were created a moment ago, all of us with all our (fake) memories?

We wouldn't know that's what happened.

So neither would the p-zombies who became conscious.

Paul
Doesn't sound the same to me.



Huh?? Are you joking??



The p-zombie people existed prior to the change, with their experiences and memories.



They don't have any experiences or memories, they are not conscious. They only appear to have them from the 3rd person perspective.



Part of our confusion here is that we can't decide exactly what it is that p-zombies are missing.



They are missing any consciousness. They are automatons merely operating according to physical laws and have no more consciousness than a boulder rolling down a hill.


They certainly have brains, experiences, memories, thoughts, etc., otherwise they would be distinguishable from us.


Bar the brain they have none of these.


For that matter, they must have some sort of qualia, or they couldn't talk about them.



Of course they could.

[Interesting Ian]

If you're including internal behavior, then I see no reason even to postulate a soul. Why bother, if everything works just the same without one?

~~ Paul

It doesn't. I believe in free will, remember?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No the default assumption is to suppose they [p-zombies] are [logically possible]. Why on earth shouldn't they be?
Cripes Ian, do you have no glibnometer at all? If a thing is logically possible simply because we can name it, then everything is logically possible. We have to talk about logically possible in some framework, don't we?

In the framework of reductive materialism, a p-zombie is impossible by definition. For that matter, I don't see how a p-zombie is possible in your monism. You say that everything is mind, so how can I remove consciousness and leave anything else behind to stand in for the p-zombie?

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

They don't have any experiences or memories, they are not conscious. They only appear to have them from the 3rd person perspective.
A p-zombie has no memory mechanism? How does it work then? I thought we removed qualia or self-awareness or something, not memory.


They are missing any consciousness. They are automatons merely operating according to physical laws and have no more consciousness than a boulder rolling down a hill.
Even a boulder has a memory mechanism.


Bar the brain they have none of these [experiences, memories, thoughts, etc.].
This is so bizarre I don't know how to respond.


Of course they could [talk about qualia].
How? They don't even have memory in which to record stock phrases.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It doesn't. I believe in free will, remember?
Since you utterly refuse to define free will in any mechanistic way, then I don't see how it has an effect on the world, and so, again, I repeat: Why bother, if everything works just the same without a soul?

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Folks, I think it's become clear that when we say "let's remove consciousness," some of us are saying a quite different thing from others of us.

~~ Paul

[Belz...]

It doesn't. I believe in free will, remember?

Funny thing. You don't even have a choice to believe.

[Belz...]

They don't have any experiences or memories, they are not conscious. They only appear to have them from the 3rd person perspective.

So... a computer has no memory because it is not conscious ?

They are missing any consciousness. They are automatons merely operating according to physical laws and have no more consciousness than a boulder rolling down a hill.

Yeah, but they don't know that. Do we ?

Bar the brain they have none of these.

Okay, that's just wierd. Even for you.

[69dodge]

Then if we asked the p-zombie "Are you conscious?," what would make it say "Yes."?What makes you say "yes"?

I mean, it feels like you hear the question and understand what it means and then decide on an answer and say it. But that's just what it feels like to you. If an external observer looked closely at what was going on in your ears and brain and mouth, he'd just see physical stuff following physical laws. A p-zombie consists of the same physical stuff, following the same physical laws, so how could it not respond the same way you do?

[69dodge]

I believe in free will, remember?So do you think a p-zombie could exist? It seems to me that you wouldn't think so. Could a p-zombie, which lacks free will, behave the same as a person, who has it? If so, in what way is the person's will free, after all, if his behaviour can be perfectly well described as his physical body following physical laws?

[cpolk]

Every bit of "psychological manipulation" is done through physical means--the inputs are visual, verbal, tactile, etc.--we cannot directly manipulate "the mind".

Right - the machine will have some sort of "senses" - allowing it to interact with the external world. We can either manipulate it through those senses (which is how it experiences "qualia"), or we can manipulate it purely at the mental/psychological level, which is what propaganda is all about.

If it is capable of developing new psychologies other than what we programmed it to, and in the psychology continues to show an understanding of its environment, then how is it not conscious?

Note that I'm not saying "humanly" conscious, just conscious.

Suppose we have programmed it to try random variations and use what works? Both Natural Selection and Operant Learning use that mechanism.

Since we'll have programmed it, we will know what it is capable of in terms of psychology. When it begins changing its program - making re-writes - according to its experience of the external world via senses (qualia, to some) then there is no difference, without invoking a God, to how we do it.

When the psychology changes to something unexpected, we'll look to see whether there were merely lines added onto the original programming (not necessarily consciousness, simply learning) or whether lines were deleted from the original programming and replaced with new lines (a sure indication of an awareness of 'self' and adaptability to the exteneral world according to its senses, motivated by 'self').

This might not be clear enough, but we can still dig deeper to find an answer. :)

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Huh. I don't imagine p-zombies as having any additional brain mechanisms. I figure they have exactly the same brains as we do, except that in the hypothetical world in which they exist, such brains aren't accompanied by consciousness.


Then if we asked the p-zombie "Are you conscious?," what would make it say "Yes."?


What makes you say "yes"?

I mean, it feels like you hear the question and understand what it means and then decide on an answer and say it. But that's just what it feels like to you. If an external observer looked closely at what was going on in your ears and brain and mouth, he'd just see physical stuff following physical laws. A p-zombie consists of the same physical stuff, following the same physical laws, so how could it not respond the same way you do?
I can't answer this until you tell me which metaphysic we're assuming. If we are assuming reductive materialism, then there are no p-zombies by definition and your original statement (above) doesn't make sense. So you must have been assuming some metaphysic in which p-zombies might make sense, such as dualism. Yet now you say "same physical stuff, same physical laws."

In the case of dualism, removing consciousness could have two results: (1) The p-zombie is missing some experience we call consciousness or qualia, in which case he would answer something other than "yes" to "Are you conscious?" But then he would not be a p-zombie, because he is supposed to be indistinguishable from us.

(2) The p-zombie is not missing any experience. Then we have two possibilities. Either nothing was removed, in which case what the heck is dualism? Or something was removed that has no effect on the p-zombie's brain, in which case we have some silly form of epiphenomenalism.

So, the only scenario I can imagine that would produce the result we want under dualism is to remove consciousness, whatever that is, and then augment the physical brain to cover for the missing experience. But that's just a conversion from dualism to reductive materialism, isn't it? And it's not the intent of the p-zombie concept, I don't think.

~~ Paul

[cpolk]

I don't know about that. I don't think we talk about them very well. What we say about qualia only makes sense to other people because they've already experienced the qualia for themselves. We don't really describe them at all completely. So why couldn't a p-zombie who lacks them also describe them very incompletely?

It's not a matter of being able to describe them, it's whether or not they can experience them. Since qualia, the indiescribable input from our senses, are the foundation of how we continue to experience, then once the p-zombie stops experiencing qualia, it can no longer experience new things.

This isn't a matter of green or red apple, it's a matter of abstract. If the p-zombie has no qualia, it has no abstract. If it has no abstract, it has no difference in meanings of words such as "beauty" or "ugly" or "passion" or "hate". It also has no "ambition", which would provide it with no "motivation" to do anything. It would just do nothing - or as is the case of the frame problem, it would never focus on anything relevant.

Such a machine, or p-zombie, would be completely incapable of understanding art or philosophy, so I agree with whoever it is who said that they would not be able to carry on a conversation about art or philosophy. They would eventually run into a problem when their programmed language fails to relate their ideas - they would have to think of other ways to express themselves. Self-expression would require that they have experienced qualia, so that they could attempt to relate their ideas to similar qualia you've experienced.

In fact, merely having ideas that they cannot express through programmed language requires qualia, by the definition of qualia.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's not a matter of being able to describe them, it's whether or not they can experience them. Since qualia, the indiescribable input from our senses, are the foundation of how we continue to experience, then once the p-zombie stops experiencing qualia, it can no longer experience new things.
I think that's too narrow a definition of experience. An ant can experience new things and learn from them, though we can certainly argue that an ant has no qualia. That said, I agree that lack of qualia would result in a person whom we could certainly distinguish from ourselves. So a rig-job is required if we want him to be a p-zombie.

~~ Paul

Edited to change "broad" to "narrow."

[69dodge]

I can't answer this until you tell me which metaphysic we're assuming. If we are assuming reductive materialism, then there are no p-zombies by definition and your original statement (above) doesn't make sense. So you must have been assuming some metaphysic in which p-zombies might make sense, such as dualism. Yet now you say "same physical stuff, same physical laws."Yes, I don't see anything illogical about the idea of a p-zombie. Why is "same physical stuff, same physical laws" a problem?

In the case of dualism, removing consciousness could have two results: (1) The p-zombie is missing some experience we call consciousness or qualia, in which case he would answer something other than "yes" to "Are you conscious?" But then he would not be a p-zombie, because he is supposed to be indistinguishable from us.The p-zombie is missing all experiences because it's not conscious, but why does that mean it wouldn't answer "yes"? I can write a trivial computer program that answers "yes" if you ask it whether it's conscious. (I can't personally write a program that passes the Turing test, but I don't see why such a program is impossible in principle.)

(2) The p-zombie is not missing any experience. Then we have two possibilities. Either nothing was removed, in which case what the heck is dualism? Or something was removed that has no effect on the p-zombie's brain, in which case we have some silly form of epiphenomenalism.I think I don't understand how you're using the word "experience". Of course it's missing experiences. All experiences. It's not conscious.

Consciousness was removed. I'd say, consciousness doesn't have an effect on the brain; the brain has an effect on it. (In real people, in this world, that is; not in p-zombies, in p-zombie world. They have the same brains, but aren't conscious.) Is that epiphenomenalism? Ok. But what's silly about it?

[Z]

Think of a computer playing noughts and crosses (or tic tac toe or whatever the denizens in the USA call it). We can simply program it to always respond in a certain way eg if its opponent places a cross in one of the corners then the computer is simply programmed to place an "O" in one of the 2 adjacent corners (but not the corner across) in order to avoid defeat.

The same goes for . .say . .chess. The 50 move rule ensures there are a finite number of possible games of chess. Thus a computer could in principle be simply programmed to make the best move in every possible game of chess on any move -- just like in the noughts and crosses. And an android could be specifically programmed to respond in an appropriate manner to all possible environmental situations.

Obviously it would be ludicrous in the extreme to say such an android is conscious, right? So we can reject behaviourism.

But there is another possible type of android. Let's think of a computer playing chess again. This time all its programmed with all the rules of the game and a "desire" to win. It's not even programmed that the Queen is valuable and that taking opponents pieces is generally advantageous to the goal of winning. Instead it learns everything by trail and error, and thus keeps improving until it too in a finite time plays perfect games of chess, just like the other chess playing computer. Again an android could be in principle created which always responded appropriately due to "learning" from experience.

But the 2 androids are externally absolutely indistinguishable. I'm assuming though that people on here would wish to say the 1st android is definitely not conscious, but the 2nd one definitely is?

It's the distinction between materialist behaviourism and materialist functionalism.

That's an interesting example. As it stands I think the first type of android would be impossible to create - and is the type of android attacked in the Chinese Room problem for example. There's just not any machine capable of storing and accessing sufficient information to handle every real-world situation! The second type is undoubtably the way A.I. is going to develop - in fact that's exactly the approach currently considered the key to future A.I.

[cpolk]

I think that's too broad a definition of experience. An ant can experience new things and learn from them, though we can certainly argue that an ant has no qualia. That said, I agree that lack of qualia would result in a person whom we could certainly distinguish from ourselves. So a rig-job is required if we want him to be a p-zombie.

Well, let's define "experience" then. :) Either do one of the following:

1. Explain what separates an ant from a human, strictly in terms of sensual experience, that makes one "qualia" and one not "qualia", and explain what the other form of experience is.

2. Explain what an ant can "learn through experience" that is not considered qualia.

[cpolk]

Think of a computer playing noughts and crosses (or tic tac toe or whatever the denizens in the USA call it). We can simply program it to always respond in a certain way eg if its opponent places a cross in one of the corners then the computer is simply programmed to place an "O" in one of the 2 adjacent corners (but not the corner across) in order to avoid defeat.

The same goes for . .say . .chess. The 50 move rule ensures there are a finite number of possible games of chess. Thus a computer could in principle be simply programmed to make the best move in every possible game of chess on any move -- just like in the noughts and crosses. And an android could be specifically programmed to respond in an appropriate manner to all possible environmental situations.

Obviously it would be ludicrous in the extreme to say such an android is conscious, right? So we can reject behaviourism.

But there is another possible type of android. Let's think of a computer playing chess again. This time all its programmed with all the rules of the game and a "desire" to win. It's not even programmed that the Queen is valuable and that taking opponents pieces is generally advantageous to the goal of winning. Instead it learns everything by trail and error, and thus keeps improving until it too in a finite time plays perfect games of chess, just like the other chess playing computer. Again an android could be in principle created which always responded appropriately due to "learning" from experience.

But the 2 androids are externally absolutely indistinguishable. I'm assuming though that people on here would wish to say the 1st android is definitely not conscious, but the 2nd one definitely is?

It's the distinction between materialist behaviourism and materialist functionalism.

You are mistaken in that you are failing to recognize the evolution of consciousness. The machine doesn't have to be programmed to react to every envirnmental situation at all. It merely has to learn to adapt, as a human infant does as it grows into adulthood. Think about how little an infant knows at birth - it does not even have full access to its senses!

Taking your second example, how would you program a "desire" to win? That requires abstract thought, which requires the ability of abstractual senses of the outside environment, which all lead to qualia. Basically, you are programming the ability to have qualia - something that, if you regard impossible, makes your hypothetical impossible.

Assuming you're like me and others who think it is possible, then the way to tell would be to ask it something outside of its frame of reference - something not involving chess - and see if, through sensual interaction alone, it is capable of adapting itself.

[drkitten]

There's just not any machine capable of storing and accessing sufficient information to handle every real-world situation!

Not any machine that we could currently build, no. But it's silly to approach a philosophical argument on the basis of current technology. At least in theory, we could store a near-infinite amount of information in the quantum levels of a single electron in a single hydrogen atom (I'll leave the engineering details to you to work out), which certainly means that we could store enough information for a table-lookup approach to a finite game like chess or go. In fact, since there are really only 10^43 or so different chess positions, we could even go for a fairly gross kind of storage -- one atom, one position, one move -- and store the entire chess problem in only 10^16 tonnes of metallic hydrogen, an amount so small we could harvest it from the oceans of the Earth without having to look to other planets. (Again, I'll leave the engineering details to you).

[Interesting Ian]

II
They don't have any experiences or memories, they are not conscious. They only appear to have them from the 3rd person perspective.

Belz
So... a computer has no memory because it is not conscious ?


Of course not. The use of the word "memory" in computers is metaphorical. They don't consciously recollect anything.


II
They are missing any consciousness. They are automatons merely operating according to physical laws and have no more consciousness than a boulder rolling down a hill.

Belz
Yeah, but they don't know that. Do we ?


They don't know anything, they're not conscious.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Yes, I don't see anything illogical about the idea of a p-zombie. Why is "same physical stuff, same physical laws" a problem?
Because if our alternate world had the same physical stuff and the same physical laws, then people would be like us, not p-zombies. Something has to change.


The p-zombie is missing all experiences because it's not conscious, but why does that mean it wouldn't answer "yes"? I can write a trivial computer program that answers "yes" if you ask it whether it's conscious. (I can't personally write a program that passes the Turing test, but I don't see why such a program is impossible in principle.)
As I said, if you're allowed to make arbitrary changes to a person's brain as you "remove his consciousness," then sure, you can make him answer yes, at least to trivial philosophical questions.


I think I don't understand how you're using the word "experience". Of course it's missing experiences. All experiences. It's not conscious.
Then why would it answer "yes" to the question of whether it is conscious, unless it has been rigged? Not to mention, how can it hear the question if it is missing all experiences?

Consciousness was removed. I'd say, consciousness doesn't have an effect on the brain; the brain has an effect on it. (In real people, in this world, that is; not in p-zombies, in p-zombie world. They have the same brains, but aren't conscious.) Is that epiphenomenalism? Ok. But what's silly about it?
Yes, that's epiphenomenalism. It's silly because it suggests that there is some subset of mental experience that does not form memories, yet here we are talking about those very experiences.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Well, let's define "experience" then. Either do one of the following:

1. Explain what separates an ant from a human, strictly in terms of sensual experience, that makes one "qualia" and one not "qualia", and explain what the other form of experience is.

2. Explain what an ant can "learn through experience" that is not considered qualia.
When I drive along a familiar route, I can navigate it almost nonconsciously, while my mind is pondering something else. There are virtually no qualia associated with that trip. Yet clearly I experienced it, or I would not have taken the correct route.

I realize I'm picking nits here, but I don't think we should equate experience with conscious qualia.

~~ Paul

[cpolk]

When I drive along a familiar route, I can navigate it almost nonconsciously, while my mind is pondering something else. There are virtually no qualia associated with that trip. Yet clearly I experienced it, or I would not have taken the correct route.

I realize I'm picking nits here, but I don't think we should equate experience with conscious qualia.

Pick the nits! LOL That's the only way to sort through this stuff.

What is the difference between "qualia" and "experience", then? What type of experience is necessary for "qualia"?

I would argue, then, that the "qualia" came with the first time you drove down that road, and every subsequent drive was merely recalling (or maybe reaffirming?) that qualia. In the same respect, you only gain "qualia" the first time you taste the apple - every taste afterwards is not qualia unless you learn something new about the taste.

Would you agree with that?

[Belz...]

Of course not. The use of the word "memory" in computers is metaphorical. They don't consciously recollect anything.

What's the difference between OUR stored memories and theirs ?

They don't know anything, they're not conscious.

I asked: "Yeah, but they don't know that. Do we ?" Do WE know that WE're not P-zombies ?

[cpolk]

I asked: "Yeah, but they don't know that. Do we ?" Do WE know that WE're not P-zombies ?

We do. Because, we are capable of abstractual thought. This affects us in many ways.

Ask a p-zombie if they are conscious, they will respond, "Yes." Ask them why. If they do not possess consciousness, then they cannot describe it to you, because they do not possess the qualia of conscious sensations.

They will not be able to speak in metaphors, such as, "It's like..." because they have no qualia; they have no sense of what something is "like".

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

What is the difference between "qualia" and "experience", then? What type of experience is necessary for "qualia"?

I would argue, then, that the "qualia" came with the first time you drove down that road, and every subsequent drive was merely recalling (or maybe reaffirming?) that qualia. In the same respect, you only gain "qualia" the first time you taste the apple - every taste afterwards is not qualia unless you learn something new about the taste.

Would you agree with that?
Oh my. I think I'm experiencing a redness quale whenever I see red or recall a memory concerning red, as long as the experience is conscious. At least, that's my take on the definition of a quale. So a blindsighted person has no qualia for the red and green cups, yet is clearly experiencing the cups, because he can pick up the correct cup when told which color to get.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ask a p-zombie if they are conscious, they will respond, "Yes." Ask them why. If they do not possess consciousness, then they cannot describe it to you, because they do not possess the qualia of conscious sensations.
Then they aren't p-zombies. A p-zombie is physically indistinguishable from a regular person.

To repeat Belz...'s question: How do we know that we're not p-zombies?

~~ Paul

[cpolk]

Then they aren't p-zombies. A p-zombie is physically indistinguishable from a regular person.

To repeat Belz...'s question: How do we know that we're not p-zombies?

~~ Paul

That's the point - they cannot exist, because their own definition (regardless of which of the variety you use) contradicts itself.

[cpolk]

Oh my. I think I'm experiencing a redness quale whenever I see red or recall a memory concerning red, as long as the experience is conscious. At least, that's my take on the definition of a quale. So a blindsighted person has no qualia for the red and green cups, yet is clearly experiencing the cups, because he can pick up the correct cup when told which color to get.

Then you are recalling something every time you get behind the wheel of your car as well. :) Is there a difference between recalling the driving experience and recalling the apple experience? Or the red experience? If so, what is it?

"Blindsight", in the way I believe you are using it, is a misconception. If your eyes are not detecting something, you are not seeing it. I would argue, if it was your intent, that people who are colorblind could recognize differences in shades.

So, I don't accept blindsight in the way you're describing it, and I think that if this can be proven under sterile conditions to be anything other than peripheral or grey-scale misconceptions, then it is worth $1-million.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Then you are recalling something every time you get behind the wheel of your car as well. Is there a difference between recalling the driving experience and recalling the apple experience? Or the red experience? If so, what is it?
I don't recall the driving experience when I have one of those auto-pilot experiences. I just end up at the destination.


"Blindsight", in the way I believe you are using it, is a misconception. If your eyes are not detecting something, you are not seeing it. I would argue, if it was your intent, that people who are colorblind could recognize differences in shades.

So, I don't accept blindsight in the way you're describing it, and I think that if this can be proven under sterile conditions to be anything other than peripheral or grey-scale misconceptions, then it is worth $1-million.
Blindsight is an example of nonconscious vision:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight

There are plenty of examples of nonconscious sensory processing. Balance is another one. So is waking up to an alarm.

~~ Paul

[cpolk]

I don't recall the driving experience when I have one of those auto-pilot experiences. I just end up at the destination.


Blindsight is an example of nonconscious vision:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight

There are plenty of examples of nonconscious sensory processing. Balance is another one. So is waking up to an alarm.

~~ Paul

That validates two of my arguments, then. Sensory perception is created by the sensory organs, not the brain. "Blind Sight" is metaphorically blind, not literally blind.

You may not recall that specific driving incident, but most people don't recall what they've had for lunch a few days ago. Do they still experience by gaining qualia when they eat? You said you experience quale every time you see red. Do you remember every incident of it?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That validates two of my arguments, then. Sensory perception is created by the sensory organs, not the brain. "Blind Sight" is metaphorically blind, not literally blind.
Blindsight has nothing to do with metaphors. It simply shows that we can do some visual processing nonconsciously.

You may not recall that specific driving incident, but most people don't recall what they've had for lunch a few days ago. Do they still experience by gaining qualia when they eat? You said you experience quale every time you see red. Do you remember every incident of it?
I now have no idea what your definition of quale is. The auto-pilot experience is not an experience of forgetting something that happened before. It is another example of performing relatively sophisticated actions in a mostly nonconscious way.

Are you suggesting you have continuous balancing qualia while you are walking? If so, pray tell, what do they feel like?

~~ Paul

[69dodge]

Because if our alternate world had the same physical stuff and the same physical laws, then people would be like us, not p-zombies. Something has to change.Yes, something is different. What's different is that in our world, certain physical processes are accompanied by consciousness, and in the p-zombies' world, they aren't. But that's not anything that our current scientific theories deal with. It's not anything that could be called physics. Physics says that nerve impulses work in a certain way, and the p-zombies' nerve impulses work the same way. There's just no consciousness to go along with those nerve impulses. But physics doesn't say there should be.

As I said, if you're allowed to make arbitrary changes to a person's brain as you "remove his consciousness," then sure, you can make him answer yes, at least to trivial philosophical questions.No, no changes to the physics of the brain. Changes to the way the world works, so that the same physics isn't accompanied by consciousness.

Then why would it answer "yes" to the question of whether it is conscious, unless it has been rigged? Not to mention, how can it hear the question if it is missing all experiences?It doesn't hear anything consciously. But it has eardrums that vibrate when sound waves hit them, and it has all the rest of the mechanisms of the ear, and all the same nerves in its brain, etc. And all of those follow the same physical laws as our bodies do, so the physical result is the same: it says whatever we would say.

Yes, that's epiphenomenalism. It's silly because it suggests that there is some subset of mental experience that does not form memories, yet here we are talking about those very experiences.But no mental experience happens without a corresponding physical process in the brain, and so we can always say that it's that physical process which results in the formation of the memory, rather than the mental experience itself. (By "formation of the memory", I mean a physical change in the brain.) And then, since our brain is different from what it would have been in the absence of that experience-and-corresponding-physical-process, our subsequent behaviour and conscious memories, which depend on our brain, also are different from what they would have been, which difference we describe as remembering and talking "about" the experience.

But actually it isn't the experience per se that results in our talking "about" it; it's the physical brain changes which accompanied it. So a p-zombie would also talk "about" it, even though it had no experience to talk about, because it did have the physical changes to its brain.

[cpolk]

Blindsight has nothing to do with metaphors. It simply shows that we can do some visual processing nonconsciously.

It shows that images are formed in the eyes, not in the brain. It is a metaphor - can someone who is blind have blind sight? They have no visual processing whatsoever, neither conscious nor unconscious.

Therefore, it is a metaphor.

Are you suggesting you have continuous balancing qualia while you are walking? If so, pray tell, what do they feel like?

I personally don't at this time, but a baby learning to walk does. As the infant continues to experience qualia, it becomes second-nature - one of those 'unconscious' things.

Also, think of people in rehab after traumatic accidents, who have to learn to re-walk. Isn't quale involved in that process?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No, no changes to the physics of the brain. Changes to the way the world works, so that the same physics isn't accompanied by consciousness.
Yes, this is Stimpy's idea that we would change the causal laws so that everything looks the same but there is no consciousness. I don't think that's what philosophers had in mind when they invented p-zombies. In particular, where would the "real people" be who could interrogate the p-zombie to see if they could tell the difference?

But no mental experience happens without a corresponding physical process in the brain, and so we can always say that it's that physical process which results in the formation of the memory, rather than the mental experience itself. (By "formation of the memory", I mean a physical change in the brain.) And then, since our brain is different from what it would have been in the absence of that experience-and-corresponding-physical-process, our subsequent behaviour and conscious memories, which depend on our brain, also are different from what they would have been, which difference we describe as remembering and talking "about" the experience.
But how could it evolve that the brain happens to form memories that correspond in any accurate way to the epiphenomenal experience, since evolution would not have the advantage of any "input" from those experiences? It couldn't. But then again, how do we know that our memories have anything at all to do with the epiphenomenal experiences? We might just be spouting rubbish.

Now, you might say that it is the very formation of the memories that produces the qualia in the first place, and so there is no problem of chance correspondence between the memories and the experiences. But it can't be that simple, because we'd have no qualia on memory recall. We might be able to get somewhere on this track, however.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It shows that images are formed in the eyes, not in the brain. It is a metaphor - can someone who is blind have blind sight? They have no visual processing whatsoever, neither conscious nor unconscious.

Therefore, it is a metaphor.
It shows that visual processing goes on somewhere else besides the eyes and the damaged V1 area. There is a nonconscious pathway between the eyes and the muscle control system.


I personally don't at this time, but a baby learning to walk does. As the infant continues to experience qualia, it becomes second-nature - one of those 'unconscious' things.

Also, think of people in rehab after traumatic accidents, who have to learn to re-walk. Isn't quale involved in that process?
Indeed, as qualia is also involved in some driving, but not auto-pilot driving. All I'm saying is that some high-level processes are nonconscious.

~~ Paul

[cpolk]

Indeed, as qualia is also involved in some driving, but not auto-pilot driving. All I'm saying is that some high-level processes are nonconscious.

How do they become non-conscious? Through repetition, right? In the beginning, it is just as much a mental effort as it is a physical. Is it not?

Anyway, you are experiencing qualia at traffic lights.

The point is, I'm not certain how p-zombies can possibly exist.

[Mercutio]

It shows that images are formed in the eyes, not in the brain. It is a metaphor - can someone who is blind have blind sight? They have no visual processing whatsoever, neither conscious nor unconscious.

Therefore, it is a metaphor.

Um, no. It is one of many clinical examples that show that vision is accomplished through many parallel pathways, each responsible for a part of our visual experience. Motion, color, form, emotional value, associations, all are independently processed. There is no one place where "an image" exists, with the possible exception of the distal stimulus--the image out there in the real world. Individuals with blindsight do process motion; they do have that element of the visual system still working. It is the processing of and reaction to a visual stimulus; it is sight. It is not recognition, it does not process color, shape, distance, anything like that, but it is very much visual.

[Mercutio]

How do they become non-conscious? Through repetition, right? In the beginning, it is just as much a mental effort as it is a physical. Is it not?
Not always. Some processes never reach the level of conscious awareness. In Capgras' delusion, for instance, the pathways responsible for emotional value of a visual stimulus are missing, and as a result you recognize a loved one's face, but have no feeling of liking them. You do not realize this consciously, though, as that has never been part of the conscious processing. The percept is of "ah, my loved ones have been replaced with identical strangers".

What you are speaking of is automatization, which also occurs. It does take effort initially. But just because the Stroop effect takes work, does not mean that all non-conscious effects take work.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian :
I believe in free will, remember?

69Dodge
So do you think a p-zombie could exist? It seems to me that you wouldn't think so. Could a p-zombie, which lacks free will, behave the same as a person, who has it? If so, in what way is the person's will free, after all, if his behaviour can be perfectly well described as his physical body following physical laws?

I don't believe our physical bodies completely follow physical laws*. There is an input from the self which guides much of our behaviour.

In which case something which is absolutely physically identical to us would not behave as we do. Indeed it would be a corpse. Thus a p-zombie would be nomonologically (physically) impossible.

I of course accept that an android could be so programmed so that the entirety of its behaviour would be indistinguishable from a human being's. But in order to create such an android it wouldn't simply be the case of simulating the function of the brain since the brain by itself does not result in our behaviour. The android's "brain" would have to be vastly more complex than our brains (although of course our brains would be more "complex" in the sense that the particular physical constitution of brains allows influence from the non-physical self).

* I don't know if QM would allow certain outcomes to be influenced by a non-physical self. In which case we would follow physical laws but which would still accommodate a non-physical influence.

[Interesting Ian]

Um, no. It is one of many clinical examples that show that vision is accomplished through many parallel pathways, each responsible for a part of our visual experience. Motion, color, form, emotional value, associations, all are independently processed. There is no one place where "an image" exists, with the possible exception of the distal stimulus--the image out there in the real world.

Of course. And thus under materialism there is no self which is the author of all these experiences. The self under materialism (and any position which holds that consciousness is wholly dictated by brain processes) does not exist but is merely an illusion brought about by successive similar psychological states from second to second.

[Interesting Ian]

Not always. Some processes never reach the level of conscious awareness. In Capgras' delusion, for instance, the pathways responsible for emotional value of a visual stimulus are missing, and as a result you recognize a loved one's face, but have no feeling of liking them. You do not realize this consciously, though, as that has never been part of the conscious processing. The percept is of "ah, my loved ones have been replaced with identical strangers".


Is this kinda like "invasion of the body snatchers"?

[cpolk]

Um, no. It is one of many clinical examples that show that vision is accomplished through many parallel pathways, each responsible for a part of our visual experience. Motion, color, form, emotional value, associations, all are independently processed. There is no one place where "an image" exists, with the possible exception of the distal stimulus--the image out there in the real world. Individuals with blindsight do process motion; they do have that element of the visual system still working. It is the processing of and reaction to a visual stimulus; it is sight. It is not recognition, it does not process color, shape, distance, anything like that, but it is very much visual.

Um. Yes. Blindsight implies that you can see without your eyes - when you're blind. This is obviously not is what is meant, therefore "blind" is a metaphor.

I have no doubt whatsoever that our sensory perception and brain react without the "I", such as when we touch something sharp or hot and jerk away before the "I" is aware of the sensation. That is not what I am disputing.

I am saying that the word "blind" is used as a metaphor. If you believe it is not, can you please provide evidence?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Now, you might say that it is the very formation of the memories that produces the qualia in the first place, and so there is no problem of chance correspondence between the memories and the experiences. But it can't be that simple, because we'd have no qualia on memory recall. We might be able to get somewhere on this track, however.
No, hold on, this doesn't help. It might explain a quale such as red, but it does not explain our ability to discuss qualia. That would require the brain to spontaneously form memories about qualia (meta-memories, so to speak) so that we could subsequently recall those memories and discuss qualia. But the brain would have no reason to form such memories.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I of course accept that an android could be so programmed so that the entirety of its behaviour would be indistinguishable from a human being's. But in order to create such an android it wouldn't simply be the case of simulating the function of the brain since the brain by itself does not result in our behaviour. The android's "brain" would have to be vastly more complex than our brains (although of course our brains would be more "complex" in the sense that the particular physical constitution of brains allows influence from the non-physical self).
And so the point of postulating a soul at all is what, exactly?


Of course. And thus under materialism there is no self which is the author of all these experiences. The self under materialism (and any position which holds that consciousness is wholly dictated by brain processes) does not exist but is merely an illusion brought about by successive similar psychological states from second to second.
There is no self that is the author under your metaphysic, either. You have said that the Metamind plays the external world on my senses. Any self I might have is at the mercy of the Metamind. I am a puppet.


Is this [Capgras Syndrome] kinda like "invasion of the body snatchers"?
Yes, it is.

http://sprott.physics.wisc.edu/PICKOVER/pc/capgras.html

~~ Paul

[Z]

Not any machine that we could currently build, no. But it's silly to approach a philosophical argument on the basis of current technology. At least in theory, we could store a near-infinite amount of information in the quantum levels of a single electron in a single hydrogen atom (I'll leave the engineering details to you to work out), which certainly means that we could store enough information for a table-lookup approach to a finite game like chess or go. In fact, since there are really only 10^43 or so different chess positions, we could even go for a fairly gross kind of storage -- one atom, one position, one move -- and store the entire chess problem in only 10^16 tonnes of metallic hydrogen, an amount so small we could harvest it from the oceans of the Earth without having to look to other planets. (Again, I'll leave the engineering details to you).

Well yes.. for something like chess. But for regular life no. Not that we won't someday have memory capacities in machines capable of holding all that data... but who would take the time and effort to program it? :D

OK yeah - some geek in SoCal would. He'd spend fifty years programming the sum of human knowledge into it and then someone next door would make an actual learning machine and he'd feel like he wasted his life. :)

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Um. Yes. Blindsight implies that you can see without your eyes - when you're blind. This is obviously not is what is meant, therefore "blind" is a metaphor.
No, blind is a complex word, because there are many ways to be blind. Blindsight shows that I can have no conscious visual processes, yet still be able to see and react. I am blind in one visual pathway, sighted in another.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't believe our physical bodies completely follow physical laws. There is an input from the self which guides much of our behaviour.

In which case something which is absolutely physically identical to us would not behave as we do. Indeed it would be a corpse. Thus a p-zombie would be nomonologically (physically) impossible.
How would the components of the brain that accept inputs from the self react when the self was turned off? Why can't we find these components? Why can't physics devise laws for the portions of our brains that aren't completely under the control of the known laws? What's the interface between the soul and the brain?

~~ Paul

[cpolk]

No, blind is a complex word, because there are many ways to be blind. Blindsight shows that I can have no conscious visual processes, yet still be able to see and react. I am blind in one visual pathway, sighted in another.

~~ Paul

blind ( P ) Pronunciation Key (blnd)
adj. blind·er, blind·est

a. Sightless.
b. Having a maximal visual acuity of the better eye, after correction by refractive lenses, of one-tenth normal vision or less (20/200 or less on the Snellen test).
c. Of, relating to, or for sightless persons.

www.dictionary.com

Just admit that "blind" is used as a metaphor and move on.
:)

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Just admit that "blind" is used as a metaphor and move on.
Sure, when you admit that "sight" is also used as a metaphor.

Cpolk: Are you blind?

Blindsighted person: Yes and no.

Cpolk: Can you see?

Blindsighted person: I already answered that.

If I didn't know better, I'd infer that you think the only way a person is "really blind" is if their eyes don't work.

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

blind ( P ) Pronunciation Key (blnd)
adj. blind·er, blind·est

a. Sightless.
b. Having a maximal visual acuity of the better eye, after correction by refractive lenses, of one-tenth normal vision or less (20/200 or less on the Snellen test).
c. Of, relating to, or for sightless persons.

www.dictionary.com

Just admit that "blind" is used as a metaphor and move on.
:)
Is this person sightless? No. They can react to the movement of a visual stimulus. Do they have the same sight that you do? No. Neither does a color-blind person, and neither do I.

"Sight" is more complex than a yes-no proposition.

[Mercutio]

Um. Yes. Blindsight implies that you can see without your eyes - when you're blind. This is obviously not is what is meant, therefore "blind" is a metaphor.
No. Blindsight is defined as Paul and I have said. It is not "without your eyes". Please do not redefine words.

I have no doubt whatsoever that our sensory perception and brain react without the "I", such as when we touch something sharp or hot and jerk away before the "I" is aware of the sensation. That is not what I am disputing.
Nor is anyone else.

I am saying that the word "blind" is used as a metaphor. If you believe it is not, can you please provide evidence?blindsight. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight) it is a technical term.

[Mercutio]

Of course. And thus under materialism there is no self which is the author of all these experiences. The self under materialism (and any position which holds that consciousness is wholly dictated by brain processes) does not exist but is merely an illusion brought about by successive similar psychological states from second to second.
Correct.
Is this kinda like "invasion of the body snatchers"?
Did you look at those videos I linked? One of the presenters (I forget which one) actually made the "body snatchers" comparison, if I recall.

[sphenisc]

When I drive along a familiar route, I can navigate it almost nonconsciously, while my mind is pondering something else. There are virtually no qualia associated with that trip. Yet clearly I experienced it, or I would not have taken the correct route.

I realize I'm picking nits here, but I don't think we should equate experience with conscious qualia.

~~ Paul

I think it would be more constructive to propose a new word to describe the limited 'experience' associated with qualia. Perhaps to 'qualate'?

I also think we need a word for a zombie who things it has quale when it does really have a quale at all, this should be called a Cheney.

[Belz...]

We do. Because, we are capable of abstractual thought. This affects us in many ways.

Ask a p-zombie if they are conscious, they will respond, "Yes." Ask them why. If they do not possess consciousness, then they cannot describe it to you, because they do not possess the qualia of conscious sensations.

They will not be able to speak in metaphors, such as, "It's like..." because they have no qualia; they have no sense of what something is "like".

Okay... so why don't YOU tell me:

1 - Are you conscious ?
2 - Why ?

And then tell me if you couldn't program a p-zombie to tell you just that.

[Belz...]

I don't believe our physical bodies completely follow physical laws*. There is an input from the self which guides much of our behaviour.

In which case something which is absolutely physically identical to us would not behave as we do. Indeed it would be a corpse. Thus a p-zombie would be nomonologically (physically) impossible.

Well, as long as we assume the non-physical secret ingredient, you'd be right. However, we have no reason to believe that such a thing exists; unless you can provide me with a few pointers...

[drkitten]

Just admit that "blind" is used as a metaphor and move on.


Except that it isn't, even by the definition you just posted. The people who exhibit "blindsight" would fail the Snellen test in the appropriate section of their vision.