Free Will [Archive] - JREF Forum

Lord Kenneth

4th May 2003, 12:27 PM

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
Arrrgh! Not again?

M'kay. lets see:

A concious choice made by a mind that is not predetermined, random, or "caused" by past events.

That definition does not make sense. It leaves out everything. Free will is the ability to make choices based on a complex evaluation of predetermined factors (like if I have no money, I can't decide to spend a million), past events (I make my decisions partly on experience), and randomness (maybe not mathematical randomness, but what we call whims).

That definition of free will I agree with, if you agree that the concept of blame or "fault" in this area is technically meaningless.

Such as, "It's your fault for making that decision!" or such.

Basically, I am referring to where the decision stems from, why people make decisions, made soley from physical processes.

Or, try it this way: How would a computer make a nonrandom, "uncaused" decision?

The only computers we really know of (apart from a few experimental setups) are binary von Neumann machines. They are an extremely poor analogue to a biological brain. So the question is irrelevant.

It was more of the concept and not the details, if that makes sense. Not the 1's and 0's but the electricity and circuitboard that makes up how the 1's and 0's are processed.

Or perhaps I am not making any sense whatsoever?

confused:

c4ts

4th May 2003, 05:31 PM

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

4th May 2003, 05:37 PM

Okay, I'm going to go out on a limb here. Who gives a damn? If you find out you have free will, you gonna go out and spend all your money and shoot a few people? If you don't, you gonna lie die in bed and become catatonic? Just do whatever you feel is a good thing to do and stop worrying about it. Learn to love not knowing.

~~ Paul

Lord Kenneth

4th May 2003, 05:43 PM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Okay, I'm going to go out on a limb here. Who gives a damn? If you find out you have free will, you gonna go out and spend all your money and shoot a few people? If you don't, you gonna lie die in bed and become catatonic? Just do whatever you feel is a good thing to do and stop worrying about it. Learn to love not knowing.

~~ Paul

I feel that learning and justification of ideas is a good thing to do.

Lord Kenneth

4th May 2003, 05:45 PM

The biggest problems of free will debates is that people are arguing for something they may have different ideas of, for example we both may "believe in free will", but not the same free will. The "soul free will", which is the kind I first stated in this topic, is the standard Christian-type one. The more scientific "free will but from physical processes" is not the same.

DialecticMaterialist

4th May 2003, 06:05 PM

I tend to agree with Cobra here.

Now the original argument for free was put forth mainly as an argument for determinism. Meaning it was supposed to be something outside of causality and unpredictable. Remember the original description of determinism is IF someone passive knew everything, they could predict everything.

Thus compatibalist can define free will as something causal, great but then they are not really defending free will as it was understood and are conceding to determinism.

Likewise I can define "soul" as consciousness and neurons in the human brain but it loses the meaning it had in the dualist debate.

However I will disagree with Cobra on how this makes us all "blameless" or makes the word fault meaningless. All fault means is "responsibility" for a mistake. It has nothing to do with libertarian free will. Responsibility merely means you deserve to be punished or rewarded for an action, what counts as "deserving" is a total value judgement, it can be pure emotional preference for that reaction, admiration, to change behavior etc.

Fault can also mean "character weakness" again this can be due to genes, conditioning, etc. as well as free will.

Lord Kenneth

4th May 2003, 06:10 PM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist

However I will disagree with Cobra on how this makes us all "blameless" or makes the word fault meaningless. All fault means is "responsibility" for a mistake. It has nothing to do with libertarian free will. Responsibility merely means you deserve to be punished or rewarded for an action, what counts as "deserving" is a total value judgement, it can be pure emotional preference for that reaction, admiration, to change behavior etc.

Fault can also mean "character weakness" again this can be due to genes, conditioning, etc. as well as free will.

Think of it this way... Is it the bridge's fault for falling, or the conditions that caused it to fall, or the conditions that caused the conditions for the bridge fall, and so on, and so on, all the way to the big bang? Like I said, techincally there is no such thing as blame, but that is not arguing that things should go unpunished. That was the sense I used "blame" in.

Oh yes, you mentioned "soul" as well. That is a good example of believing in the "same thing", but actually having different definitions.

hammegk

4th May 2003, 06:14 PM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist
....

However I will disagree with Cobra on how this makes us all "blameless" or makes the word fault meaningless. All fault means is "responsibility" for a mistake. It has nothing to do with libertarian free will. Responsibility merely means you deserve to be punished or rewarded for an action, what counts as "deserving" is a total value judgement, it can be pure emotional preference for that reaction, admiration, to change behavior etc.

Fault can also mean "character weakness" again this can be due to genes, conditioning, etc. as well as free will.

Interesting point, but if we do not have libertarian free will -- we think we know it when we use it but it's undefinable -- how are we responsible for the sequence of chance physical events expressed first in the dna in the fertile cell that became us, and then by the physical happenings that programmed our maximum perceived (by us) benefit algorithm that's always been running the show?

c4ts

4th May 2003, 06:43 PM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Okay, I'm going to go out on a limb here. Who gives a damn? If you find out you have free will, you gonna go out and spend all your money and shoot a few people? If you don't, you gonna lie die in bed and become catatonic? Just do whatever you feel is a good thing to do and stop worrying about it. Learn to love not knowing.

~~ Paul

Consequences (or lack of them) aside, I'm still facinated by the idea.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

4th May 2003, 06:55 PM

c4ts said:Consequences (or lack of them) aside, I'm still facinated by the idea.
If that's all it is, I'll allow you to continue this discussion. But don't come crying to me when it spirals down into a black hole yet again.

~~ Paul

c4ts

4th May 2003, 07:00 PM

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
c4ts said:
If that's all it is, I'll allow you to continue this discussion. But don't come crying to me when it spirals down into a black hole yet again.

~~ Paul

I doubt Franko would dare to post on this thread.

DialecticMaterialist

4th May 2003, 08:36 PM

Think of it this way... Is it the bridge's fault for falling, or the conditions that caused it to fall, or the conditions that caused the conditions for the bridge fall, and so on, and so on, all the way to the big bang? Like I said, techincally there is no such thing as blame, but that is not arguing that things should go unpunished. That was the sense I used "blame" in.

Well like I said, it is a value-judgement. The question of "deserves" to be rewarded or punished is still up for grabs if by fault you mean held responsible.

If you mean "character weakness" i'll simply say bridges don't have character.

But back to responsibility, personally I wouldn't hold the bridge "responsible" 1) Because I don't think it can really be punished (It can't feel pain) and 2) It's not lifelike and I tend to require some sort of biological characteristic in my view of what should or should not be punished/rewarded as a face value standard for my value judgement.(Basically as a sort of brute fact or raw feel.)

To elaborate on the second, it's like this. You can spend a lot of time around a rock, and never feel any affection for it. But if you spend enough time around a human or animal, you will probably end up developing a sort of bond with it or end up disliking it. We treat living and nonliving things in a qualitatively different manner due to our own natures. Thus having some sort of similiar biology is an intrinsic prerequiste for determining empathy,loyalty and fondness. This biological prerequisite is not valued because it satisfies another standard of value but for it's own sake. (Which is why I say it's instrinsic i.e. an end in itself not extrinsic-a means to an end.)

DialecticMaterialist

4th May 2003, 08:45 PM

how are we responsible for the sequence of chance physical events expressed first in the dna in the fertile cell that became us, and then by the physical happenings that programmed our maximum perceived (by us) benefit algorithm that's always been running the show?

I have no idea as to what you mean by a "maximum percieved benefit algorithm" is so I will not comment on that.

Well again, responsible simply means "deserves to be held accountable" for a given action. Accountable means "rewarded or punished" and "deserves" simply means: met a certain standard(which can be set by just about anything.).

So what are our standards? Emotions. And why act on them?

2 reasons.

1) Because we try to satisfy emotions as a general course of action. Emotions(or feelings) in fact are the sole basis for any action I can imagine, so not acting on them wouldn't make sense. I believe most of us naturally have the urge to reward good behavior in some way (with praise and such) and condemn bad behavior(with criticism or punishment).

2) Because it can help us achieve extrinsic ends, like changing behavior, preventing more of such behavior occuring in the future(let your spuse abuse you and drop it...they'll do it again: press charges, and they'll stop.) etc.

c4ts

4th May 2003, 08:50 PM

I don't think the reason is simply the bad anthropomorphism of blaming an inanimate object. A bridge is not blamed for its collapse because it lacks the ability to prevent itself from collapsing. Just as a marble that rolls off the table is not given credit for its motion. In the same sense, a human who is pushed off a cliff is not blamed for the act of falling or hitting the ground.

DialecticMaterialist

4th May 2003, 09:55 PM

Well I don't see how it's anthropomorphism, because I'm not attributing human characteristics to inanimate objects.

But as for the bridge, it can be argued that from the POV of the big bang and causal chain that the human was no more "free" to prevent his actions then the bridge. Really each rose or fell based on instrinsic characteristic and the surrounding enviroment.

However for me that is not the basis for blame anyways so it's somewhat of a none issue.

DialecticMaterialist

4th May 2003, 10:02 PM

Sorry for the double posts c4ts but you brought up an interesting point that I'd like to go into and treat separately.

In the same sense, a human who is pushed off a cliff is not blamed for the act of falling or hitting the ground.

Why is that exactly?

Now you are arguing that it is because they could have somehow prevented their action. I can't agree though as the action was determined.

But I do have another answer.

Mine is that blame or praise is based at some level on character judgement/character evaluation. And we expect actions to reveal character.

Thus if a person gets pushed off a cliff that shows little to nothing of his character; perhaps lack of alertness but we generally see that as inconsequential and of no major fault.

But if a person pushes someone off a cliff, lets say for fun, it shows something VERY consequential i.e. that the person is a homocidal maniac. And tell us what the person will likely do in the future, that the person is in short a malevolent character and must be judged accordingly.

Just as we judge consequences on merits and flaws, so we judge people, as people's actions over the long term lead to certain consquences, among which is to excite their peers emotions in a variety of ways causing their peers to evaluate them and act accordingly.

MRC_Hans

5th May 2003, 12:10 AM

Now somebody mentioned Franko, teehee: Remember MPB? I would not call it an algorithm, but when we make a conscious decision, we will weigh pros and cons and reach the decision we percieve as most beneficial. I find "percieve" to be a keyword here; this is where we have the highest degree of freedom: I feel I have a great deal of influence on how I percieve things, and this has a great influence on the decisions I make.

There is also the pragmatic view, already mentioned in this thread: Real life is full of decisions, and whether you make good or bad ones has a profound effect on the quality of your life, so it is really no use speculating.

Finally, there is the darwinistic angle. I have mentioned this before in one of the countless free willy (sorry! Hehhe) debates here: Humans are slower, softer, weaker, equipped with duller senses that most animals we've had to compete with during the ages. In spite of this, we have managed to become the dominant species of the planet. This can be solely due to our superiour brain. If all desicions of that brain were simply logic extrapolations of by past and present conditions, it would not have been such an advantage.

Hans

Peter Soderqvist

5th May 2003, 03:38 AM

have some of you read Daniel Dennett 's new book, Freedom Evolves? :)

Matt Ridley reviews Freedom Evolves by Daniel C. Dennett
"Either our actions are determined, in which case there is nothing we can do about them, or our actions are random, in which case there is nothing we can do about them."

Daniel Dennett to the rescue. The ebullient, pugnacious and ever pithy sage of Boston has written books on free will, consciousness and Darwinism. He now returns to free will with a remarkably persuasive new idea derived from Darwinism: that freedom of the will is something that grows, that evolves. The greater the sophistication of an organism, the greater its knowledge of the world and of itself, so the greater its ability to take charge of its own destiny. A rock has no freedom to choose; a bacterium has very little; a bird has some; a conscious primate has much more; a conscious primate inheriting a rich lode of cultural knowledge has the most of all.

Determinism - the idea that a cause automatically produces an effect - is not, says Dennett, the same as inevitability. This is a surprising assertion which he spends several chapters justifying, and I think he succeeds.
http://www.arts.telegraph.co.uk/arts/main.jhtml?xml=/arts/2003/02/09/boden09.xml&sSheet=/arts/2003/02/09/bomain.html

Freedom Evolves by Daniel Clement Dennett
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0670031860/qid%3D1051189359/sr%3D2-1/ref%3Dsr%5F2%5F1/102-4996388-7998558

hammegk

5th May 2003, 04:35 AM

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
...Remember MPB? I would not call it an algorithm, but when we make a conscious decision, we will weigh pros and cons and reach the decision we percieve as most beneficial. I find "percieve" to be a keyword here; this is where we have the highest degree of freedom: I feel I have a great deal of influence on how I percieve things, and this has a great influence on the decisions I make.

See, we agree. The only questions to answer now is what is that "I" you mention and how does it "influence" inert matter? And why does it believe and "act" as if it had free will?

Dennett continues to prove materialism true, once you grant him the axiom -- "materialism is true". ;) I don't even need to read all the logic he has erected on that base.

Janus

5th May 2003, 04:54 AM

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
this is where we have the highest degree of freedom: I feel I have a great deal of influence on how I percieve things, and this has a great influence on the decisions I make.

This might well be true. However the system is still closed. Whatever occurs when you infulence yourself is still the result of information already have, and processes that you already know. You may have refined your opinion, you may have even changed your mind; But I don't think you have escaped determinisim.

...If all desicions of that brain were simply logic...
I suspect that we would already agree that the computation of MBP isn't nessecarly logical. Also the further down you go from human intelegence, the less part reasoning plays in the computation of MPB. Perhaps the thing that destingishes humans from other animals is improvment in our ability to make logic extrapolations using past and present conditions

Edit: By reasoning in the above - I meant methodical evaluation of all the details. The desicion is still rational, just lesser refininement

Peter Soderqvist

5th May 2003, 05:13 AM

TO HAMMEKG

What is the point with to only have read representations you already have agreed with, but nothing critical? I have 7 books by Dennett; namely, The Mind's I with Hofstadter, The Intentional Stance, Consciousness Explained, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Kind of Minds, Brainchildren, and Freedom Evolves! I have also all Richard Dawkins books, including his last one, namely, The Devils Chaplain. Erwin Schrodinger was a Darwinist, and a genuine scholar of Veda, and considered that consciousness is the ground of all being, not matter, as you can see if you click on my home side and read the Epilogue in his book, what is life? So why cannot you reconcile both, or at least educate yourself rigorously in your opponents way of reasoning? I am reading for the moment David Deutsch book The Fabric of Reality, and Carl Sagan 's book The Demon hunted World, Science as the Candle in the Dark, and Lynn Margulis The Symbiotic Planet. :)

MRC_Hans

5th May 2003, 05:41 AM

Janus:
This might well be true. However the system is still closed. Whatever occurs when you infulence yourself is still the result of information already have, and processes that you already know. You may have refined your opinion, you may have even changed your mind; But I don't think you have escaped determinisim.The system is not closed. I might for instance decide that I do not have enough information to make a decision and go seek more. Determinism is a closed system: At any time, it contains only whatever information can be derived from the initial state. The human mind, however, is an open system (I know this comparison is not quite valid, still), because new information can be entered. Not only that, but I can decide to create new information on which to base a decision; this is what science does all the time.

Hans

hammegk

5th May 2003, 06:31 AM

Originally posted by Peter Soderqvist
TO HAMMEKG

What is the point with to only have read representations you already have agreed with, but nothing critical? I have 7 books by Dennett; namely, The Mind's I with Hofstadter, The Intentional Stance, Consciousness Explained, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Kind of Minds, Brainchildren, and Freedom Evolves! I have also all Richard Dawkins books, including his last one, namely, The Devils Chaplain.
And you assume I have not. OK, could you provide the example of the logic in those defending the materialist/atheistic/scientific model that has not begun with the axiom "materialism is true"?

Have you seen an argument from that viewpoint that alleviates -- to your 100% satisfaction --in any way determinism is the only logical conclusion materialists can reach?

Then, does your mind act to you as if it were 100% deterministic?

Erwin Schrodinger was a Darwinist, and a genuine scholar of Veda, and considered that consciousness is the ground of all being, not matter, as you can see if you click on my home side and read the Epilogue in his book, what is life? So why cannot you reconcile both, or at least educate yourself rigorously in your opponents way of reasoning? I am reading for the moment David Deutsch book The Fabric of Reality, and Carl Sagan 's book The Demon hunted World, Science as the Candle in the Dark, and Lynn Margulis The Symbiotic Planet. :)
You seem to suggest Dualism, which again is imo not logically defensible. BTW, I have no trouble with the evolutionary record, and actually can postulate a "why" without the mental masturbation materialists/atheists rely on. No "sky-daddies" are needed either.

Dancing David

5th May 2003, 11:46 AM

So where did I loose the ability to make choices.
Everything is interdependant so I loose free will?

I may have been raped as a child and abused by my family , so I may be predisposed to engage in these behaviors, so what? So I chose not too.

So I partake of a reality where each particle interacts with each other particle, how did I loose free will?

Free will means that within the parameters of reality I can make choices that effect the outcome of my life.

Please make your arguements a little more concrete so us LD types can follow.

Peace
dancing David

c4ts

5th May 2003, 12:03 PM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist
Well I don't see how it's anthropomorphism, because I'm not attributing human characteristics to inanimate objects.

Earlier you had said:

But back to responsibility, personally I wouldn't hold the bridge "responsible" 1) Because I don't think it can really be punished (It can't feel pain) and 2) It's not lifelike and I tend to require some sort of biological characteristic in my view of what should or should not be punished/rewarded as a face value standard for my value judgement.(Basically as a sort of brute fact or raw feel.)

You are saying you cannot hold the bridge responsible because it lacks the characteristic of culpability, and I had inferred this was a human trait. I am saying you can't hold the bridge responsible because it had no choice in the action itself, and if a man were to physically collapse like a bridge, he could not be blamed for it either. He might, however, take blame for certain actions leading up to his collapse.

But as for the bridge, it can be argued that from the POV of the big bang and causal chain that the human was no more "free" to prevent his actions then the bridge.
As I said, if a human collapsed like a bridge, he would not be held accountable for the act of collapse. I think the problem lies in the action itself. There are actions a man can perform that a bridge cannot, and some of these are acts in which we find volition. For example, he can write a poem about the collapsing bridge. Although he may be inspired by an event that occured in his surrounding environment, nobody is going to say that the environment or the bridge caused him to write the poem.

Really each rose or fell based on instrinsic characteristic and the surrounding enviroment.

However for me that is not the basis for blame anyways so it's somewhat of a none issue.

DialecticMaterialist

5th May 2003, 02:42 PM

As I said, if a human collapsed like a bridge, he would not be held accountable for the act of collapse. I think the problem lies in the action itself. There are actions a man can perform that a bridge cannot, and some of these are acts in which we find volition. For example, he can write a poem about the collapsing bridge. Although he may be inspired by an event that occured in his surrounding environment, nobody is going to say that the environment or the bridge caused him to write the poem.

But then there are actions that a bridge, water and the air can perform that a man cannot, is that evidence of them having a will and we lacking one?

To run with your reasoning, a bridge can then decide to collapse or may not decide to...and nobody can blame the enviroment or anything else caused it to collapse.

The problem here is that sort of reasoning is circular, the man's action: writing the poem cannot be attributed to a cause because it cannot.

But I believe that the man, as part of a causal universe has done just that. And much evidence affirms this. If a cause cannot be affirmed then we must suppose the man did it randomly, the act was completely random...i.e. done for no reason at all. The man could have chosen to write a poem, or kill somebody, or start of business, or devour his neighbour with each choice being one equally probable in a wholly random mind immune from such things a "causes". This is similiar to the existentialist protagonist, the man who will murder "just cause".

According to this reward and punishment become meaningless, why blame or praise something done out of sheer randomness? This will not encourage or discourage any type of behavior because then the behavior will have to be "caused" in some way.

The problem is with the word used here "cause" i.e. what is THE cause?

As if the determinist is supposing only a single cause to explain the man's action. However this is not the case, the determinist realizes the man's actions are complex and thus need be explained by a variety of causes over a long period of time.

However this complexity alone does not make the action "free" in the sense that it is uncaused, and to say that this alone is what gives a basis for "blame" or "praise" i.e. responsibility is somewhat of a non sequitur.

In the end it does come down to a value judgement, whether we blame or praise an act, and our value judgements do vary. Perhaps to you having a certain number of actions available over others is your basis: don't blame a bride because it's not as internally driven or cannot run like a man can.

But that's only proximate, in the end we have to ask WHY you make this distinction? What's at the core of this? And I imagine its because deep down your evaluations, in terms of responsibility, are based around certain life like qualities. There are explanations for this even further back I imagine, but that's more a question for psychology then philosophy(though it does make evolutionary sense, in that blaming/praising an animal in the past leads to results but doing so with an inanimate object does not.)

Dancing David

6th May 2003, 09:35 AM

DM: Slow down, you have made a lot of assertions and ergos but very little in the way of showing your work.

Four persons see the bridge collapse:
Person A decides to learn to fly as bridges are fall-able.
Person B decides to go home and watch TV
Person C writes a poem about grocery shopping
Person D writes a poem about the bridge falling and how it is like the way philosophy drags itself down.

How did any of these individuals loose free will, your argument seems to be based upon two notions:

A. There are things in motion which can not be proved to have volition therefore there is no volition.
B. There is the interdependant nature of reality, therefore there is no free will.

Please provide a thought experiment which demonstrates your theory that there is no free will.

Peace
dancing David

aggle_rithm

6th May 2003, 10:44 AM

Originally posted by Dark Cobra

Or, try it this way: How would a computer make a nonrandom, "uncaused" decision?

Computers can simulate randomness by taking randomness from the outside world (such as the time of day) and using it as a foundation for making decisions. The computer is EXTREMELY dissimilar to the human brain, though, so I don't think it's a very good analogy.

DialecticMaterialist

6th May 2003, 11:12 AM

Four persons see the bridge collapse:
Person A decides to learn to fly as bridges are fall-able.
Person B decides to go home and watch TV
Person C writes a poem about grocery shopping
Person D writes a poem about the bridge falling and how it is like the way philosophy drags itself down.

How did any of these individuals loose free will, your argument seems to be based upon two notions:

I'm puzzled. First off I never said man "lost his free will" that's a loaded argument. And I never said an argument like the above proved man had no free will.

A. There are things in motion which can not be proved to have volition therefore there is no volition.

Nope I'm going by the assumption that everything we know about is under causality, therefore to suppose there is an uncausal thing is superfluous and counter-intuitive. I don't personally treat people as if their actions are completely random but somewhat predictable.

B. There is the interdependant nature of reality, therefore there is no free will.

Never said that at all. I didn't even say reality was interdependent.
I'm saying it all fits under causality which is somewhat a logical deduction (inferred via the law of identity and the fact of motion existing); as well as something inferred by experience and the principle of parsimony.

Dancing David

6th May 2003, 01:03 PM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist

Nope I'm going by the assumption that everything we know about is under causality, therefore to suppose there is an uncausal thing is superfluous and counter-intuitive. I don't personally treat people as if their actions are completely random but somewhat predictable.

Never said that at all. I didn't even say reality was interdependent.
I'm saying it all fits under causality which is somewhat a logical deduction (inferred via the law of identity and the fact of motion existing); as well as something inferred by experience and the principle of parsimony.

I thank you for clarifying that:

I thought you were saying that free will did not exist because of causality? Or maybe that there is no free will because of causality, I misunderstood your posts.

Why would free will nessecarily be a-causal?

Sorry if I am still confused.

Peace
dancing David

DialecticMaterialist

6th May 2003, 01:11 PM

Thank you for asking.

Well if you define free will in such a way as to be causal, then yes, I agree free will can exist. If by that you mean the ability to make "conscious choice" etc.

However I was talking about the traditional libertarian definition of free will, the one under which determinism was supposed to be false. That by it's very nature was put forth as a-causal and of course universal causality must rule that version of free will out.

I really don't like using the term "free will" however as it seems to imply determinism is false. I know compatibalists can mean something different, just as Objectivists, when they speak of a "soul" don't literally mean the dualist spirit but mere consciousness. I still see that as too open to misreading though, especially in a society where supernaturalism/dualism is still so prevelant.

c4ts

6th May 2003, 01:17 PM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist

The problem here is that sort of reasoning is circular, the man's action: writing the poem cannot be attributed to a cause because it cannot.

That is not what I am saying. The act of writing poetry is not an action of direct cause and effect. The collapsing bridge did not force the man to write the poem.

DialecticMaterialist

6th May 2003, 01:31 PM

That is not what I am saying. The act of writing poetry is not an action of direct cause and effect. The collapsing bridge did not force the man to write the poem.

Now I'm really confused. Are you saying that the collapsing bridge not being the cause of the man writing the poem, means(or proves) the man's will is not causal?

If so, I agree that the bridge is not "the cause" of the man writing a poem but I don't see how that makes the will free of causality/undertemined in any sense. Surely the bridge collapsing would have something to do with a poem about that specific bridge collapsing but it's not "the cause." I don't think any determinist/anti-libertarian is that simple.(Perhaps I may be wrong with Franko and Wraith.)

However that doesn't rule out causality altogether, there is psychological history, exegenetic influences, physiology, birth order etc. This all leads to the man writing the poem. It's still causal, just more complex.

c4ts

6th May 2003, 01:39 PM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist

Now I'm really confused. Are you saying that the collapsing bridge is not the cause of the man writing the poem?

I thought I was saying it was not the cause all along, that acts of voltion are without direct or deterministicly physical cause. Although he could not have written the poem without witnessing the event, he did not have to write anything just because he saw it.

DialecticMaterialist

6th May 2003, 02:42 PM

I thought I was saying it was not the cause all along, that acts of voltion are without direct or deterministicly physical cause. Although he could not have written the poem without witnessing the event, he did not have to write anything just because he saw it.

I'm still not completely sure of this but right now this seems like a non sequtur i.e a bridge collapsing is not sufficient cause to make a witness write a poem; thus the decision to write a poem was uncaused.

But this doesn't follow, just because one event is not sufficient does not mean that many other events strung together could not be efficient.

c4ts

6th May 2003, 02:53 PM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist

I'm still not completely sure of this but right now this seems like a non sequtur i.e a bridge collapsing is not sufficient cause to make a witness write a poem; thus the decision to write a poem was uncaused.

But this doesn't follow, just because one event is not sufficient does not mean that many other events strung together could not be efficient.

What sort of events might these be?

DialecticMaterialist

6th May 2003, 03:34 PM

Their genes, how they developed in the womb, events that in their lives that affected them psycholgically etc. All which transpired together to make the man so that when he saw that bridge collapse he felt more compelled to write a poem then do anything else. The bridge alone is not sufficient, but the bridge and other causes are.

ImpyTimpy

6th May 2003, 05:00 PM

What about the free will choices before all those events? I mean obviously outside of genetics, but things like what reactions were chosen to the previous events leading up to this point...

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist
Their genes, how they developed in the womb, events that in their lives that affected them psycholgically etc. All which transpired together to make the man so that when he saw that bridge collapse he felt more compelled to write a poem then do anything else. The bridge alone is not sufficient, but the bridge and other causes are.

Dancing David

6th May 2003, 05:24 PM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist
However I was talking about the traditional libertarian definition of free will, the one under which determinism was supposed to be false. That by it's very nature was put forth as a-causal and of course universal causality must rule that version of free will out.

Oh, I wish I had remembered more of this, what is the traditional libertarian definition, determinism is kind of a vauge one too.
I don't suppose this has to do with Calvin and predestination does it?

On the bridge thing, I see a bridge fall, I write a poem about the bridge or maybe I write a poem about groceries, as a poet don't i get to filter out the thousnad things that happen each day that I didn't write about?

Peace
dancing david

c4ts

6th May 2003, 06:13 PM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist
Their genes, how they developed in the womb, events that in their lives that affected them psycholgically etc. All which transpired together to make the man so that when he saw that bridge collapse he felt more compelled to write a poem then do anything else. The bridge alone is not sufficient, but the bridge and other causes are.

Genes are no more responsible for human behavior as they are blueprints for the human body. They may restrict a few particulars, but they do not actually write the poetry. They may make addiction to one thing more likely than addiction to another, they may even carry a combination resulting in a mental illness, but they do not compel, command, or dictate action. Even if they did, compulsion is a tricky thing, because impulses can be deliberately ignored.

DialecticMaterialist

6th May 2003, 09:22 PM

Oh, I wish I had remembered more of this, what is the traditional libertarian definition, determinism is kind of a vauge one too.
I don't suppose this has to do with Calvin and predestination does it?

It has nothing to do with predestination. Well traditionally determinists have been the ones who advanced the notion of universal causality, libertarians have been the ones who denied this under the banner of free will.

Like most philosophical concepts there is no universally accepted defitnition on this manner but the meaning is basically that free will is something outside of causality.

I like to use this mind experiment to illustrate my point.

Lets say the same person sees a bridge collapse and writes a poem. Now we rewind the event, put in the same exact person, with the same exact bridge under the same exact conditions. The determinist will say that the event, when replayed, will turn out the same way each time(the man will write the poem), the libertarian will say that the man, might somehow do things different, even if everything in the event was exactly the same.

On the bridge thing, I see a bridge fall, I write a poem about the bridge or maybe I write a poem about groceries, as a poet don't i get to filter out the thousnad things that happen each day that I didn't write about?

Yes but again that's circular reasoning if its an argument for free will. I can just as easily say "No what you chose to write about ultimately was based on your preferences, which were developed through your genes interacting with your enviroment."

But this back and forth gets nowhere. Not until we introduce parsimony at least.

DialecticMaterialist

6th May 2003, 09:39 PM

Genes are no more responsible for human behavior as they are blueprints for the human body.

Well yes and no. Yes genes do not set the paticulars but they do set general rules. Genes work too slowly to modify behavior at the actual moment but they can set behaviors up or parameters of behavior up beforehand.

Lets take ducks for example, a duckling is born so as to identify the first large moving thing as its mom. Now this can be a great many things it sees at first (its mom, a human etc.) But after viewing the thing, it then treats the object it first saw as if it were its mother, following it everywhere and such.

Now the duck's behavior is obviously not enviromental, as it really didn't learn to do this from anyone(the duckling was just born), and I don't think this is a matter of free will(this would leave questions concerning why all ducklings 'choose' to do this) so the behavior must be genetic.

I mean different animals raised in the same enviroment will still behave very differently. We can then assume that all animals somehow possess free will and are engaging in a very elaborate deception of making us think otherwise by acting very similiar to eachother and different from other species often times. Or we can assume their behavior differs on the basis of their genetics.

They may restrict a few particulars, but they do not actually write the poetry.

But they contribute. I never said there are genes for writing poetry, or any one factor that makes this so but a combination of factors. Attacking such a position is thus somewhat of a straw man.

They may make addiction to one thing more likely than addiction to another, they may even carry a combination resulting in a mental illness, but they do not compel, command, or dictate action. Even if they did, compulsion is a tricky thing, because impulses can be deliberately ignored.

They can but why would they be? Only on the basis of another, more strongly held value. We must suppose this or suppose pure randomness or a superfluous dualism.

I think you are downplaying how much genes can and do influence behavior. They can set up temperment via hormones, effect intellect via how developed a frontal lobe is, tell us when something feels good or bad via pleasure/pain parameters. Any of these things could lead to radically different behavior if changed just a little.

There are subtle influences as well, a gene may for example program for "nervousness" around larger creatures, and then another set can make the creature smaller then average, creating a nervous personality.

Or a person can be born less attractive then others, leading to a lifetime of bad experiences. In this case genes and personality interact to produce a certain personality.

There is an almost endless amount of variation in behaviors within the animal kingdom. Even for creatures born in the same enviroment. The only thing which could lead to this as we know it is genes. Look at how a man behaves compared to an insect, or a man to a shark or dog. Are these differences in behavior purely do to the enviroment? If I raise a kid and chimp in the same manner, will they grow up with no major differences? The differences in behavior are in many ways genetic, and with such radical differences apparent, it quite ibvious that DNA is one of the most important factors in determining who we are and what we do.

Peter Soderqvist

7th May 2003, 01:35 AM

TO HAMMEGK

You wrote on page 1, 05-05-2003 12:35 PM: Dennett continues to prove materialism true, once you grant him the axiom -- "materialism is true". ;) I don't even need to read all the logic he has erected on that base.

Soderqvist1: I think that materialism is true, in the sense that material interaction produces some effect, and every such effect has just these material causes, and can be computed with a Turing Machine, but all truths are not materialism, for instance a gödel sentence is not computable but true. Materialism is even truth in the sense that it is predictable/falsifiable, and its description about biological phenomena is consistent with its findings! Do you know about any axiom, which is not true, but still fit these criteria?

05-05-2003 02:31 PM: And you assume I have not. OK, could you provide the example of the logic in those defending the materialist/atheistic/scientific model that has not begun with the axiom "materialism is true"?

Soderqvist1: See my reply above!

Have you seen an argument from that viewpoint that alleviates -- to your 100% satisfaction --in any way determinism is the only logical conclusion materialists can reach?

Soderqvist1: Yes their explanation is to my satisfaction, mutation is random quantum jump in the gene and is thus indeterminate, because no one can say when a particular gene mutate, but as I have said; every truth is not theorems! For instance there are incomputable numbers in arithmetic, which is truth, but cannot be proven! Even if some observation appears as now to both you, and me, it still not hold true for an observer from an "orbiting" point of view according to Einstein's special theory of relativity, which states that determinism in the sense of what is before and after, is frame of reference dependent, since an orbiting observer disagree with us!

Then, does your mind act to you as if it were 100% deterministic?

Soderqvist1: yes my mind is deterministic in the sense that, its outcome mirroring earlier causes (Turing Machine), and for the same reason I am countable and thus recognizable, but my mind is not always countable because of various "Gödel Sentences" but its truths are still recognizable!

You seem to suggest Dualism, which again is imo not logically defensible. BTW, I have no trouble with the evolutionary record, and actually can postulate a "why" without the mental masturbation materialists/atheists rely on. No "sky-daddies" are needed either.

Soderqvist1: not at all!
Consciousness is inside all "this" and, outside all "this", and is thus both immanent and transcendent according to Schrodinger, he has used the special theory of relativity and has proven that mind is indestructible by time, it can be found in his mind and matter lecture 1954 in his book what is life on Amazon Com! Note that, there is no general means to determine which observation is first, or second in time, therefore consciousness is one. Just as when we are dreaming, since the dreamer control every actor in the dream, even if he doesn't know anything about it when he is dreaming! ;)

Peskanov

7th May 2003, 02:54 AM

Hi Peter Soderqvist;

----
quote:
a gödel sentence is not computable but true
----

Can you explain this a bit more?

Anyway, note that there are several arguments (about mind being superior to a turing machine) using godël theorem, but all I know have been succesfully refuted.

Peter Soderqvist

7th May 2003, 03:31 AM

TO PESKANOV

Soderqvist1: Once upon a time I had the idea that pi is uncountable, because its Decimals are infinite, and because of there is no such things as a perpetual motion machine, but after I have read a book by Casti (Godel a life of logic) I came to the conclusion that I was wrong! Because a Turing Machine is an abstract perpetual motion machine and is thus "eternal" in a mathematical sense! Pi is infinite and so is the Turing machine and therefore pi is computable, but the most numbers in mathematics is even bigger and is labeled as uncountable numbers! Godel has proved once and for all in 1931, that truth and proof is not the same thing at all, because the numbers of truths are higher than the numbers of proof, or theorems!

In simpler terms, a recipe is a theorem, and a chocolate cake machine is a Turing machine, and every possible or imaginable variant of digestible chocolate cakes are truths! But our language or arithmetic is too "short or weak" in order to be formulated into recipes of every possible cake, hence our symbol systems are incomplete, but consistent, since there will always be abstract chocolate cakes without recipes! A Turing machine can only compute with recipes (programs), and is thus "unaware" about the amount of cakes without recipes, and for the same reason, a Turing Machine cannot compute al possible cakes, therefore; the "cake bible" is forever doomed to incompleteness, but these recipe-less cakes are known by mathematicians, as non-computational arithmetical truths, or non-computational insights as Roger Penrose has said in his book, The Emperor's New Mind. Gödel was a genuine Platonist like Penrose, and the recipe-less
cakes can thus be metaphorically labeled as Platonic-cakes!

You must show that a Turing Machine is aware about "Platonic-cakes", if your representation is that a Turing Machine is analogous to human mind? :)

Peskanov

7th May 2003, 06:47 AM

Peter, I was not asking for an analogy, but I will try to guess what you are referring to..
You are stating there are more truths than theorems (more cakes than recipes, in your analogy).
Where did you get this? I think your analogy is a bit messed. Here you have a few cites from
http://www.miskatonic.org/godel.html

"Within a rigidly logical system such as [...] arithmetic, propositions can be formulated that are undecidable or undemonstrable within the axioms of the system".

And...

"Given any consistent set of arithmetical axioms, there are true mathematical statements that cannot be derived from the set..."

All this does not imply "more truths than theorems"...
Here I have a citation which I think refers to the argument you have in mind:

"Gödel's Theorem has been used to argue that a computer can never be as smart as a human being because the extent of its knowledge is limited by a fixed set of axioms, whereas people can discover unexpected truths .."

Is this one your argument?

Dancing David

7th May 2003, 10:46 AM

DM:
So the determinist say that given identical initial conditions the outcome will be the same, liberatrians say that it could turn out different.

Thought experiment B: The person who watches the bridge fall has OCD and manifests the symptom labeled 'ambivalence', there is a high probability that this person will think about writing the poem and then perseverate and maybe not write it. (You can substitute depression in the case as well, they might want to write the poem but lack motivation).
I think that given the random nature of biochemical ineractions there might be a probability factor here, no?

Peace
dancing david

c4ts

7th May 2003, 12:09 PM

There is an almost endless amount of variation in behaviors within the animal kingdom. Even for creatures born in the same enviroment. The only thing which could lead to this as we know it is genes. Look at how a man behaves compared to an insect, or a man to a shark or dog. Are these differences in behavior purely do to the enviroment? If I raise a kid and chimp in the same manner, will they grow up with no major differences? The differences in behavior are in many ways genetic, and with such radical differences apparent, it quite ibvious that DNA is one of the most important factors in determining who we are and what we do.

The reason you see animals behaving differently, in terms of genetics and their functions, is that genes limit potential. Potential, and its limitations therof, is critical to the identity of an organism as it develops. The greatest example we can see is the similarity between different animal embryos during the early stages of development. They begin as the same basic embryonic structure, but as the develop further, the differences become apparent. It is here where we find the effects of D.N.A. that make one species different from another, since we observe traits that have not been deactivated. The embryo could have been a human foetus, but we find that it becomes a monkey instead. Even then, the restrictions are not usually so great as to limit or deny free will, because the organism will still have potential. Environment, too, is a limitation on potential, but the two factors together do not narrow it down enough. If they did, actions would be extremely easy to predict, much easier than they are now. I think the biological approach is not very helpful because biology as we know it may never get down to what free will is. (However, it's a much better explanation than a theological one.)

Going back to the example of the man and the bridge, let us say that the man sees the bridge collapse. The physical account is that his eyes are affected by the photons relflected off the bridge as it collapsed, so that the information is processed and interpreted by him through the electrochemical activity of his synapses. He is carrying a pencil and a notepad of paper with him. In the biological sense, let us say that he belongs to a species that is equipped to perform the act of writing poetry, and he has inherited a combination of genetic traits that make him well suited for such a task, so that he can enjoy writing it. Furthermore, the combination of genes and circumstances have compelled him to write the poem.

But say he doesn't write it this time. Barring any kind of speculation regarding external circumstances (i.e. his hands fall off, his genes change, someone shoots him, he gets struck by lightning, etc...), is this scenario impossible?

DialecticMaterialist

7th May 2003, 01:00 PM

Thought experiment B: The person who watches the bridge fall has OCD and manifests the symptom labeled 'ambivalence', there is a high probability that this person will think about writing the poem and then perseverate and maybe not write it. (You can substitute depression in the case as well, they might want to write the poem but lack motivation).
I think that given the random nature of biochemical ineractions there might be a probability factor here, no?

Well there is a probability factor but I attribute this due to lack of human understanding not any lack of causality.

Remember that determinism is not predictability.

I'll bring in a thought expiriment to illustrate this, imagine there is a clock on a mountain. Nobody has seen it since it was wound up(its a granfather clock) and the person who placed it had died. The clock is in a place where nothing distrubed it.

Now imagine we are trying to guess at what hour the short handle is pointing to when we reach the top. The probability is one out of twelve, however it is not this way because the clocks motions are inherently random or acausal, but because we lack knowledge of the initial conditions/our knowledge is incomplete.

Or take a deck of cards. You never know what card you will pull first after shuffling the deck, I certainly don't. However that is hardly due to some intrinsic randomness in the acausal sense. Had one been so inclined, I imagine one could have traced every path/position every card was in that deck as it was shuffled and predicted exactly what card would have been on top after the shuffling. His "probability" would be near 1/1. Mine however 1/52.

The above examples illustrate how our incomplete knowledge can turn something determined into something unpredictable.

Dancing David

7th May 2003, 01:27 PM

DialecticMaterialist

7th May 2003, 01:31 PM

The reason you see animals behaving differently, in terms of genetics and their functions, is that genes limit potential. Potential, and its limitations therof, is critical to the identity of an organism as it develops.

True, genes do limit potential but there seems to be more to it as well. Take my duck example, something very specific and hardwired in. Or coyotes and foxes, very similiar potential, very different behavior.

The greatest example we can see is the similarity between different animal embryos during the early stages of development. They begin as the same basic embryonic structure, but as the develop further, the differences become apparent. It is here where we find the effects of D.N.A. that make one species different from another, since we observe traits that have not been deactivated. The embryo could have been a human foetus, but we find that it becomes a monkey instead.

True but afterbirth, the "potential" is not so limited I imagine.

Lets take a baboon and an orangutang, they have a very similiar potential but in the end behave very differently.

Even then, the restrictions are not usually so great as to limit or deny free will, because the organism will still have potential. Environment, too, is a limitation on potential, but the two factors together do not narrow it down enough. If they did, actions would be extremely easy to predict, much easier than they are now. I think the biological approach is not very helpful because biology as we know it may never get down to what free will is. (However, it's a much better explanation than a theological one.)

Well see that doesn't follow.

The weather is another system that is difficult or impossible to predict but still considered determined.

Or lets imagine like I did with David, a deck of cards. Lets say, 1000 decks, each card from a deck marked with a number 1-1000, all of which gets shuffled together at certain intervals. Now my chances of predicting the next card to be pulled(number and face) is 1/5,200. Hardly an easy thing to predict. Yet there was no acausal randomness in the whole process. It's only that there were so many factors present, so much complexity, that this was in essence a difficult thing to predict.

Now keep in mind that the human and animal mind is contains even more variables then that deck of cards. Now even though it can be said to be determined, it will be very difficult to predict. The only difference is the "cards" here tend to be shuffled in the same order. Lets say the machine is very repetitive, so we are getting more sucessful then we would with the cards being shuffled.

Also keep in mind I never said that enviroment or genes alone kicked out free will. That would be absurd. What I am saying is that since we can explain all behavior with these two things right now, supposing free will is superfluous.

Going back to the example of the man and the bridge, let us say that the man sees the bridge collapse. The physical account is that his eyes are affected by the photons relflected off the bridge as it collapsed, so that the information is processed and interpreted by him through the electrochemical activity of his synapses. He is carrying a pencil and a notepad of paper with him. In the biological sense, let us say that he belongs to a species that is equipped to perform the act of writing poetry, and he has inherited a combination of genetic traits that make him well suited for such a task, so that he can enjoy writing it. Furthermore, the combination of genes and circumstances have compelled him to write the poem.

But say he doesn't write it this time. Barring any kind of speculation regarding external circumstances (i.e. his hands fall off, his genes change, someone shoots him, he gets struck by lightning, etc...), is this scenario impossible?

Yes and No.

Quite simply one argument against free will is not that such a thing is impossible. But that such a thing is very unlikely and creates a great many needless assumptions.

Another argument which is logical and based on three premises: 1) Things have identity(and identity must by its nature be specific.) 2) Things are in motion. 3) Something does not come out of nothing.

According to the above a specific object would move in accordance to its specific identity, that is in short causality. So to suppose randomness is to suppose an object violated the law of identity while in motion. Or that identity is not specific, but that'd be absurd as really then the thing doesn't have A identity but many.

We can then presume something came from nothing, free will decisions came from the void and are in that sense cut off from the rest of causality, at least initially. However that is likewise absurd.

So given those two arguments, the above scenerio is impossible and superfluous.

DialecticMaterialist

7th May 2003, 01:42 PM

I didn't mean to say predicatable, i was trying to think of situations where even with the same initial conditions (IE rewinding time) there would be a non-deeterminist system, where each time you rewind a different event might occur.

Understood and alas you will never find such a system, nor will I find an example of a system that can be rewound and repeats as the matter is not a purely empirical one. It will not be solved by examples.

Like the question of dualism, there is much interpretation in any event when we do this.

Lets say I could rewind a system and show a libertarian a man making the same choice.. He could say the event is random but that the man simply chose the same thing each time.

Or that there is a bit of randomness and a bit of probability.

Or lets take an unpredictable system(the weather), now we cannot presume indeterminism on the onset so I say unpredictable as the "neutral" description, now no matter how many times you showed variation on a simulator with similiar initial conclusions, even still you couldn't say the system was "undetermined" or "random", mainly because the initial conditions are never exactly the same and the computer adds in numbers. And that's a simplified simulator. Chaos theory is about how small differences in initial conditions can actually lead to exponential differences in consequences.

The fact is no matter what you show there is still a possibility that a) there is true randomness or b) we lack knowledge of something, if our standards are merely empirical.

Thus a determinist will see the same event as a libertarian, and both will come to different conclusions. Just as a dualist can be shown neurology and still find room for a soul. A theist all of science and find room for a god.

It's not until conceptual standards are introduces that progress can be made. Thus the issue will not be decided by any example but by how we judge our interpretations, our conceptual standards.

Peter Soderqvist

8th May 2003, 01:15 AM

TO PESKANOV

Originally posted by Peskanov
Peter, I was not asking for an analogy, but I will try to guess what you are referring to..
You are stating there are more truths than theorems (more cakes than recipes, in your analogy).
Where did you get this? I think your analogy is a bit messed. Here you have a few cites from
http://www.miskatonic.org/godel.html

"Within a rigidly logical system such as [...] arithmetic, propositions can be formulated that are undecidable or undemonstrable within the axioms of the system".

And...

"Given any consistent set of arithmetical axioms, there are true mathematical statements that cannot be derived from the set..."

All this does not imply "more truths than theorems"...
Here I have a citation which I think refers to the argument you have in mind:

"Gödel's Theorem has been used to argue that a computer can never be as smart as a human being because the extent of its knowledge is limited by a fixed set of axioms, whereas people can discover unexpected truths .."

Is this one your argument?

All this does not imply "more truths than theorems"...
http://www.miskatonic.org/godel.html

Soderqvist1: This is also from your link! Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: Gödel showed that provability is a weaker notion than truth, no matter what axiom system is involved ...

Soderqvist1: The earlier cake example is from the book, Godel a Life of logic!
Provability can be shown with recipes, since every turn in the baking is a proof sequence, and every proof sequence added together will give us chocolate cake, this process is a theorem with a truth chocolate cake as its end product, that is the proof that the theorem is consistent and truth!
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0738205184/qid=1052377902/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/102-4996388-7998558?v=glance&s=books

Soderqvist1: this is also from the link:
Nagel and Newman, Gödel 's Proof: Gödel showed that Principia, or any other system within which arithmetic can be developed, is essentially incomplete. In other words, given any consistent set of arithmetical axioms, there are true mathematical statements that cannot be derived from the set... Even if the axioms of arithmetic are augmented by an indefinite number of other true ones, there will always be further mathematical truths that are not formally derivable from the augmented set.

Soderqvist1: given any consistent set of chocolate cakes, there are truth chocolate cakes, which cannot be derived from the set! Even if the set of consistent chocolate cakes are augmented by an indefinite number of other kinds of true cakes, there will always be further truth cakes that are not formally derivable (theorems) from the augmented set! Do you understand now why theorems are incomplete regarding truth statements?

"Godel's Theorem has been used to argue that a computer can never be as smart as a human being because the extent of its knowledge is limited by a fixed set of axioms, whereas people can discover unexpected truths .."

Soderqvist1: as long as there are known truths which cannot be derived from the set of computer programs, the human mind is something more than a computer program, and this truth will not go away, until the Artificial Intelligence Camp have shown that, all truth statements can be derived from the set of computer programs! ;)

Dancing David

8th May 2003, 10:05 AM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist

We can then presume something came from nothing, free will decisions came from the void and are in that sense cut off from the rest of causality, at least initially. However that is likewise absurd.

Show your work, you go from some identity based arguement (which you didn't prove) to saying that free will is extraneous?

Just because things are causal does not mean that human beings don't have free will.

If a machine shuffles the cards then each time you rewind then the machine can shuffle the cards in a predicatable way, unless of course you program in a 'random' factor in the shuffling.

If a human shuffles the cards then there is a good chance that the shuffling is unpredictable(while causal) and each time that you rewind the card might end up in a diffeerent order.

Why is free will an assumption that adds to the equation, I think that I grant the gene arguement, but only for stereo typic behavior and those are exclusively those that are hardwired in, something that most animals have very little of in thier repetoire of bahaviors. most animals are learned behavior and very subject to learning.

Maybe you didn't mean to make a grand leap but i missed the bridge to the new space.(Please stick to one example at a time, you are the one who introduced predictability, I keep using the mechanistic determinism frame work)

You have yet to prove that my dog does not have free will. He does.

Peace

c4ts

8th May 2003, 11:47 AM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist

True, genes do limit potential but there seems to be more to it as well. Take my duck example, something very specific and hardwired in. Or coyotes and foxes, very similiar potential, very different behavior.

True but afterbirth, the "potential" is not so limited I imagine.

Lets take a baboon and an orangutang, they have a very similiar potential but in the end behave very differently.
But one could easily say the baboon lacks the potential to behave like an orangutang, and vice versa. My point was that gene combinations produce chemicals which restrict, rather than compell. All this behavior is working within the genetically restricted system, meaning genetics does not force the baboon to act like a baboon, but limits the development of the organism so that it can only be a baboon once it is born (provided there are no extreme mutations). There are many different things a baboon is capable of which constitute its potential. Behavioral patterns do not rule out free will.

Well see that doesn't follow.

The weather is another system that is difficult or impossible to predict but still considered determined.

Or lets imagine like I did with David, a deck of cards. Lets say, 1000 decks, each card from a deck marked with a number 1-1000, all of which gets shuffled together at certain intervals. Now my chances of predicting the next card to be pulled(number and face) is 1/5,200. Hardly an easy thing to predict. Yet there was no acausal randomness in the whole process. It's only that there were so many factors present, so much complexity, that this was in essence a difficult thing to predict.

Now keep in mind that the human and animal mind is contains even more variables then that deck of cards. Now even though it can be said to be determined, it will be very difficult to predict. The only difference is the "cards" here tend to be shuffled in the same order. Lets say the machine is very repetitive, so we are getting more sucessful then we would with the cards being shuffled.

Also keep in mind I never said that enviroment or genes alone kicked out free will. That would be absurd. What I am saying is that since we can explain all behavior with these two things right now, supposing free will is superfluous.

In your example, I think you are looking for free will where it cannot be observed. Generally, you can observe its effects in certain actions. Writing poetry was my example of an action where it can be seen, and the act of collapse is an example of where it is absent. Your example, cards being shuffled in some kind of order so that they are not 100% predictable, seems to be more of an attempt to duplicate the effects with randomness in its place. But in the failure to entirely predict the outcome, you will not be able to observe any kind of volition in the outcome. The action is too simple, there is no logic involved on the part of the deck, just an order. The order does not even rearrange itself in response to your attempts to predict it, and exhibits no signs of awareness or intelligence. The deck of variables exists as a human mind, but in the kind of action you used as an example, free will is still not observable, and it would be very hard to mistake your own miscalculations for signs of it. This semi-random shuffling is part of an automatic process that takes place within a sort of feedback loop we call self-awareness, something we do not have control over. Free will may have its some of its origins in self awareness, but we are in the dark as to where the rest of it comes from. Perhaps some breakthroughs in the field of creating artificial intelligence will give us a better understanding.

Yes and No.

Quite simply one argument against free will is not that such a thing is impossible. But that such a thing is very unlikely and creates a great many needless assumptions.
Thank you for not bringing it up.

Another argument which is logical and based on three premises: 1) Things have identity(and identity must by its nature be specific.) 2) Things are in motion. 3) Something does not come out of nothing.

According to the above a specific object would move in accordance to its specific identity, that is in short causality.
This goes back to Aristotle's concept of entellechaia...

So to suppose randomness is to suppose an object violated the law of identity while in motion.
My example did not suppose randomness, but deliberation on behalf of the man in his denial of the impulse to write poetry. Deliberation is in accordance with his identity as a rational human being. It only resembles a random action because you cannot know what the man was thinking at any time. In my example, you are not a telepathic observer.

Your earlier example of the deck of cards supposes a certain degree of randomness.

Or that identity is not specific, but that'd be absurd as really then the thing doesn't have A identity but many.

We can then presume something came from nothing, free will decisions came from the void and are in that sense cut off from the rest of causality, at least initially. However that is likewise absurd.

So given those two arguments, the above scenerio is impossible and superfluous. [/B]
No it is not, because the act of deliberation requires more than one outcome more or less equal in possibility to another, creating the need for a decision to be made. The man felt compelled to write the poem, but he has decided not to for his own reasons. The whole point is that causality cannot ignore the role of volition in human identity. Therefore the outcome is not absurd, unless you are saying it is unlikely or absurd to deny one's impulses. And, if you are saying that impulse and its causes rule volition, you deny the possibility of responsibility, making morality impossible.

If you want to say morality is impossible, I may have evidence to the contrary, but I await your explanation. However, I do not think you were trying to say that.

INRM

8th May 2003, 01:23 PM

Actually, Lucifuge Rofocale mentioned something of a Japanese Doctor (at least one with a Japanese last name), who presented an experiment to determine free-will. The experiment entailed electrically-stimulating the correct-part of the brain which, assuming his theory is correct, would cause an involuntary movement which would trick the subject into believing that he triggered the movement.

Of course, I don't know what happened of this experiment.

Was it a success? Was it a failure? Was it ever attempted?

As an aside: Does it really prove we lack free-will, assuming it was a success that is? Or does it just prove that we normally have free-will, but it can be taken away? There *are* things which we normally have control over, but can lose voluntary control over, such as breathing. While it is normally a routine, voluntary-ability, if you sustain a hit to the solar-plexus, you will lose the ability to breathe shortly.

-INRM23

Lord Kenneth

8th May 2003, 01:47 PM

Aren't decisions just "computed" (I lose the term loosely) in the brain from a complex amount of variables?

We are, after all, just made up of cells, which go through physical processes.

We "make" decisions, but the decisions are actually made by physical processes, not the "identity" of the person.

Do we agree on that? It seems you must accept dualism if you disagree.

(Summary: Physical processes produce decisions)

c4ts

8th May 2003, 02:41 PM

Originally posted by INRM
Actually, Lucifuge Rofocale mentioned something of a Japanese Doctor (at least one with a Japanese last name), who presented an experiment to determine free-will. The experiment entailed electrically-stimulating the correct-part of the brain which, assuming his theory is correct, would cause an involuntary movement which would trick the subject into believing that he triggered the movement.

Of course, I don't know what happened of this experiment.

Was it a success? Was it a failure? Was it ever attempted?

As an aside: Does it really prove we lack free-will, assuming it was a success that is? Or does it just prove that we normally have free-will, but it can be taken away? There *are* things which we normally have control over, but can lose voluntary control over, such as breathing. While it is normally a routine, voluntary-ability, if you sustain a hit to the solar-plexus, you will lose the ability to breathe shortly.

-INRM23

I don't think stimulating areas of the brain responsible for our awareness of our own actions tests for free will as I understand it.

c4ts

8th May 2003, 02:56 PM

Originally posted by Dark Cobra
Aren't decisions just "computed" (I lose the term loosely) in the brain from a complex amount of variables?

We are, after all, just made up of cells, which go through physical processes.

We "make" decisions, but the decisions are actually made by physical processes, not the "identity" of the person.

Do we agree on that? It seems you must accept dualism if you disagree.

(Summary: Physical processes produce decisions)

No, disagreement is not necessarily dualism. Physical processes produce qualities (not to be confused with magical dualist qualia, whatever those are supposed to be) or properties. Free will is a quality so complex that it is not apparent in terms of only physical interactions affecting one another. It's a property that comes from consciousness, which is a phenominon caused by physical processes.

Peskanov

8th May 2003, 04:18 PM

Peter,
----
quote:
Soderqvist1: as long as there are known truths which cannot be derived from the set of computer programs, the human mind is something more than a computer program, and this truth will not go away, until the Artificial Intelligence Camp have shown that, all truth statements can be derived from the set of computer programs!
----

Okay, I think I can work with this.

First I will address the obvious fallacy of the argument, as has been stated by much people:
We have no proof that the human mind can find all truth statements. We only know that sometimes we can find theorems which seems to be true, but we can't find it's proof.
Therefore, you have not proved that human mind is superior to a turing machine.
This has been noted specially by Turing.

Now, I will try to be more constructive with my argument. Please, anybody fluent in mathematics, feel free to address any mistake.

I will start with a theorem which has recent proof, but until now, it was only a "probable truth". It's the famous theorem x^n+y^n=z^n, by Fermat.
The truth of the theorem can be guessed using testing values and solving the equation, for example.
So, with Fermat's theorem we had a probable truth. Can a computer find a theorem like this if it is not derivable from the axioms? Yes, it can, I will explain a simple algorithm to do so.

1.- Using combination and pertinent sintax rules, sistematically build a theorems.
x+y=z
x*y+z^y = y-z
(x+n)^6 = n/2
...
2.- Test it's validity by substitution
3.- Repeat ad nauseaum

If you look at this algo. you will see that sooner or later, it will find's Fermat's theorem, and it will find it valid, without even knowing it has a proof!!!
Of course the program does not know it. It only knows it resembles truth for n tested values!
The same can be said for mathematicians, too.

DialecticMaterialist

8th May 2003, 04:51 PM

Show your work, you go from some identity based arguement (which you didn't prove) to saying that free will is extraneous?

I don't understand what you are asking for exactly. I'm not aware of what work you are talking about, I don't do research or expiriments.

My identity argument is based on axioms, axioms are considered unporven or instrinsically proven(self-evident) I simply deduce from axioms of logic(like identity) or philosophical concepts.

Just because things are causal does not mean that human beings don't have free will.

That's a bit ambiguous. Are you saying just because some things are causal it doesn't mean everything is?

At a purely empirical level youa re right, but such an assumption promotes a dualism(which is superfluous in the face of a monist determinism) as well as goes against certain logical axioms mainly that things act according to their identity.

Or are you saying that a thing can be causal yet have free will? That free will is then causal?

I'll agree but then free will so defined it not the random free will of libertarianism.

If a machine shuffles the cards then each time you rewind then the machine can shuffle the cards in a predicatable way, unless of course you program in a 'random' factor in the shuffling.

If a human shuffles the cards then there is a good chance that the shuffling is unpredictable(while causal) and each time that you rewind the card might end up in a diffeerent order.

You missed my point. The point wasn't whether the agent shuffling was random or determined but that something which appears acausal due to unpredictability, the cards being shuffled are completely causal. The focus is the cards whose motion is not mysertious, who or what does the shuffling is irrelevant.

Why is free will an assumption that adds to the equation, I think that I grant the gene arguement, but only for stereo typic behavior and those are exclusively those that are hardwired in, something that most animals have very little of in thier repetoire of bahaviors. most animals are learned behavior and very subject to learning.

Well this depends on the animal and is very open to conroversy even in science. Most biologists admit that genes play a significant role though.

Maybe you didn't mean to make a grand leap but i missed the bridge to the new space.(Please stick to one example at a time, you are the one who introduced predictability, I keep using the mechanistic determinism frame work)

I'm not sure what you mean here.

You have yet to prove that my dog does not have free will. He does.

Well that's somewhat like saying I have yet to prove your dog has a soul or an afterlife. In a sense I haven't but in a sense I have showing that such a libertarian stance goes against certain axioms and is not parsimonious.

Lord Kenneth

8th May 2003, 04:54 PM

Originally posted by c4ts

No, disagreement is not necessarily dualism. Physical processes produce qualities (not to be confused with magical dualist qualia, whatever those are supposed to be) or properties. Free will is a quality so complex that it is not apparent in terms of only physical interactions affecting one another. It's a property that comes from consciousness, which is a phenominon caused by physical processes. '

It seems to me that conciousness simply is the entirety of Billy Brain functioning-- not really something being "produced" (in the sense that a cow produces milk), but something built up upon (such as such as computer components working together in such a way that allows us to play computer games or what have you).

Or am I not making any sense, blathering like an idiot?

DialecticMaterialist

8th May 2003, 05:14 PM

But one could easily say the baboon lacks the potential to behave like an orangutang, and vice versa. My point was that gene combinations produce chemicals which restrict, rather than compell. All this behavior is working within the genetically restricted system, meaning genetics does not force the baboon to act like a baboon, but limits the development of the organism so that it can only be a baboon once it is born (provided there are no extreme mutations). There are many different things a baboon is capable of which constitute its potential. Behavioral patterns do not rule out free will.

Well that's not entirely true.

Bees for example display different behavior even though they have the same potential.

An example is honey bees and killer bees. Or the fact that some bees practice a sort of hygiene that others do not. For example, there is a parasite that infects some bee grub. Some bees will throw out and search for all infected grub and some will not.

And many biologists and psychologists now at days accept that about 40 to 60 percent of our behavior is genetic. This is in a large part due to twin studies.

In your example, I think you are looking for free will where it cannot be observed. Generally, you can observe its effects in certain actions. Writing poetry was my example of an action where it can be seen, and the act of collapse is an example of where it is absent. Your example, cards being shuffled in some kind of order so that they are not 100% predictable, seems to be more of an attempt to duplicate the effects with randomness in its place. But in the failure to entirely predict the outcome, you will not be able to observe any kind of volition in the outcome. The action is too simple, there is no logic involved on the part of the deck, just an order. The order does not even rearrange itself in response to your attempts to predict it, and exhibits no signs of awareness or intelligence. The deck of variables exists as a human mind, but in the kind of action you used as an example, free will is still not observable, and it would be very hard to mistake your own miscalculations for signs of it. This semi-random shuffling is part of an automatic process that takes place within a sort of feedback loop we call self-awareness, something we do not have control over. Free will may have its some of its origins in self awareness, but we are in the dark as to where the rest of it comes from. Perhaps some breakthroughs in the field of creating artificial intelligence will give us a better understanding.

Well that's circular. You are suggesting that the two things are not similiar just because the two things are not similiar. Or you are focusing on somewhat irrelevant characteristics, like intelligence and such. And it misses the point of how I'm illustrating that unpredictability does not equal any sort of acausal randomness.

How simple or cpmplex the event is in my example is not necessarily relevent. I could add a billion cards, make it really complex and my point would still stand.

This goes back to Aristotle's concept of entellechaia...

Perhaps you should explain more cause right now we don't really have a refutation. Just a vague reference.

My example did not suppose randomness, but deliberation on behalf of the man in his denial of the impulse to write poetry. Deliberation is in accordance with his identity as a rational human being. It only resembles a random action because you cannot know what the man was thinking at any time. In my example, you are not a telepathic observer.

Ok and I've already explained, that if by free will you mean "mere consciousness" or "deliberation" which is unpredictable, then I agree. But notice there you are advancing a concept that allows for determinism and your position is not a libertarian position.

Your earlier example of the deck of cards supposes a certain degree of randomness.

I don't see how. It merely supposes unpredictability, if you are equating unpredictability to randomness I must say you are attacking a straw man. No determinist I know of equates predictability to determined and unpredictability to randomness.

No it is not, because the act of deliberation requires more than one outcome more or less equal in possibility to another, creating the need for a decision to be made. The man felt compelled to write the poem, but he has decided not to for his own reasons. The whole point is that causality cannot ignore the role of volition in human identity. Therefore the outcome is not absurd, unless you are saying it is unlikely or absurd to deny one's impulses. And, if you are saying that impulse and its causes rule volition, you deny the possibility of responsibility, making morality impossible.

I've already went over responsibility and never denied it.

This argument is a non sequitur. My identity conclusion doesn't follow because a deliberation requires more then one possible option? That fails to negate a single premise.

If anything it can be seen as a new premise proposed, but not a refutation of my premise. And that premise is ultimately question begging. i.e. the man has more then one possible choice, his deliberation is not determined, because deliberation means more then one possible option.

The same thing with your volition negating impulse example, I'm not saying that impulses cannot be ignored but that there is a reason why it is ignored as opposed to followed. That the option to ignore was thus determined.

If you want to say morality is impossible, I may have evidence to the contrary, but I await your explanation. However, I do not think you were trying to say that.

I'm not trying to say that at all. I've in fact went to great lengths to say the opposite of that. (see my original post on this thread and response to Dark Cobra).

I think the question of morality is separate from the one involving free will.

c4ts

8th May 2003, 07:25 PM

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist

Well that's not entirely true.

Bees for example display different behavior even though they have the same potential.

An example is honey bees and killer bees. Or the fact that some bees practice a sort of hygiene that others do not. For example, there is a parasite that infects some bee grub. Some bees will throw out and search for all infected grub and some will not.

And many biologists and psychologists now at days accept that about 40 to 60 percent of our behavior is genetic. This is in a large part due to twin studies.

Well that's circular. You are suggesting that the two things are not similiar just because the two things are not similiar. Or you are focusing on somewhat irrelevant characteristics, like intelligence and such. And it misses the point of how I'm illustrating that unpredictability does not equal any sort of acausal randomness.

How simple or cpmplex the event is in my example is not necessarily relevent. I could add a billion cards, make it really complex and my point would still stand.

Perhaps you should explain more cause right now we don't really have a refutation. Just a vague reference.

Ok and I've already explained, that if by free will you mean "mere consciousness" or "deliberation" which is unpredictable, then I agree. But notice there you are advancing a concept that allows for determinism and your position is not a libertarian position.

I don't see how. It merely supposes unpredictability, if you are equating unpredictability to randomness I must say you are attacking a straw man. No determinist I know of equates predictability to determined and unpredictability to randomness.

I've already went over responsibility and never denied it.

This argument is a non sequitur. My identity conclusion doesn't follow because a deliberation requires more then one possible option? That fails to negate a single premise.

If anything it can be seen as a new premise proposed, but not a refutation of my premise. And that premise is ultimately question begging. i.e. the man has more then one possible choice, his deliberation is not determined, because deliberation means more then one possible option.

The same thing with your volition negating impulse example, I'm not saying that impulses cannot be ignored but that there is a reason why it is ignored as opposed to followed. That the option to ignore was thus determined.

I'm not trying to say that at all. I've in fact went to great lengths to say the opposite of that. (see my original post on this thread and response to Dark Cobra).

I think the question of morality is separate from the one involving free will.

If you're agreeing with me, why do you argue that my example is absurd?

Also, it seemed to me that you were arguing that the factors leading to a decision made it inevitable. Your comparison to the deck of cards suggested that free will was really just randomness. Just what do you think free will is, anyway?

DialecticMaterialist

8th May 2003, 08:10 PM

If you're agreeing with me, why do you argue that my example is absurd?

I said at the begining that if you defined free will so that it was something causal/determined then I agree with that.

I disagreed with your example however as it seemed to be saying the man's behavior was uncaused/undetermined. If you admit the man's behavior was caused or determined though I agree with you.

Also, it seemed to me that you were arguing that the factors leading to a decision made it inevitable. Your comparison to the deck of cards suggested that free will was really just randomness. Just what do you think free will is, anyway?

According to the libertarian stance basically it means man's actions are inherently acausal. Unpredictable to even an omniscient being, not caused. That's what I'm arguing against. I'm aware that people have other defintions of free will and went into that in my first couple of posts on this thread.

Thus free will to me is something inherently random. For that's all it could be if it was undetermined: random.

My comparison to a deck of cards was not to show that free will is random but that something causal could appear random due to being unpredictable. This was to counter your claim that if human action was determined, it could be easily predicted.

Like I said if we have the same exact circumstances and played them out the same exact way many times, saying that the man will make the same choice is basically what determinism is. Saying the man will somehow, despite all causal factors compelling him to make a decision somehow not make the same decision(lets say his mind, reasoning, etc is exactly the same each time as well) then you are introducing some sort of fundamental randomness/acausal in the process and that is libertarianism.

Peter Soderqvist

9th May 2003, 04:17 AM

TO PESKANOV

You wrote on page 2, 05-09-2003 12:18 AM: First I will address the obvious fallacy of the argument, as has been stated by much people: We have no proof that the human mind can find all truth statements.

Soderqvist1: I have never said that a human mind can find all truth statements!
But I have tried to say that a human mind can see something (a truth statement) in a formal logical system, which the system proof sequence doesn't say about itself! There is an example in the book, about a proof sequences which consists of meaningless (strings) known a syntax, the system starts with a simple axiom consisting of two strings a heart, and a spades, and 4 operation rules, this whole operational procedure ends up with a theorem, since the last string in the proof sequence is the theorem! There is statement in this proof sequence that the string doesn't say anything about, namely, in every proof sequence there is a string (a heart), which is always present! That the heart is there in every proof sequence is not formalized in the system, your quote has said! "Given any consistent set of arithmetical axioms, there are true mathematical statements that cannot be derived from the set..." It means that, from this axiom heart and spades, there is a truth mathematical statement there that; "a heart is always present in every proof sequence" which cannot be formally derived from this algorithmic string procedure, which starts with a simple axiom, and ends up with a theorem!

We only know that sometimes we can find theorems, which seems to be true, but we can't find it's proof.

Soderqvist1: Not correct!
There are truth mathematical statements in every formal logical system, which doesn't have any theorems. Every theorem is made up of proof sequences, recipe, theorem, and algorithm are synonymous!

Therefore, you have not proved that human mind is superior to a Turing machine. This has been noted specially by Turing.

Soderqvist1: Turing has said this!
A: M. Turing as quoted from the Mind's I, a book by Hofstadter & Dennett 1981, chapter 4, page 61: I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness: There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any attempt to localize it!

Soderqvist1: A computer is a kind of a Turing machine, which is superior to humans, for instance when it comes to huge numbers in mathematics, but a computer can only compute with algorithms.
Humans know some mathematical truth statements, and these are not derivable from algorithms, therefore an algorithm cannot simulate a human mind! Have Turing said otherwise? I have a good reference here to Susan Greenfield, she is Peter Atkins wife, and Atkins and Richard Dawkins are colleagues at Oxford University

Professor Susan Greenfield
I would just like to indicate why biological brains are currently not like current artificial systems. First we have non-algorithmic processes, that is to say we have commonsense and intuition, we don't necessarily think in a step-by-step algorithmic process.
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/ss/stories/s137294.htm

Soderqvist1: I am not a mathematician, so I cannot address the rest of your message!

Dancing David

9th May 2003, 07:28 AM

DM: I am trying to follow your thrust but it makes leaps that I don't follow, so I ask you to show your work , as in how did you make that leap of faith?

I again state that while we can find a causal link to each demonstrable behavior, there is an unpredictable factor in a human making a 'choice'. When humans make choices I call that free will.

You have stated some axioms and such but I don't see yet where my ability to make choices is determined because it may be causal.

Thanks for your patience.

DC: The brain is not a computer it is a biochemical mess, they are not eletrical impulses running down wires , they are biochemical reactions based upon very small electrical potentials. A cell may or may not fire based upon an array of factors in the biochemical mess, there are nuerons that potentiate each other and there are nuerons that repress each other, the whole thing is a mess and very subject to variation.

Peace
dancing david

DialecticMaterialist

9th May 2003, 10:51 AM

DM: I am trying to follow your thrust but it makes leaps that I don't follow, so I ask you to show your work , as in how did you make that leap of faith?

I think I have for the most part supported my points, so where exactly do you see leaps of faith?

I again state that while we can find a causal link to each demonstrable behavior, there is an unpredictable factor in a human making a 'choice'. When humans make choices I call that free will.

Again presuming the unpreidictable is some sort of randomness is both illogical and superfluous. Illogical in that it goes against identity. Superfluous in that it can be attributed to an unpredictable working of enviroment and DNA.

An actions being unpredictable is not proof of free will.

You have stated some axioms and such but I don't see yet where my ability to make choices is determined because it may be causal.

Determined means causal.

Dancing David

9th May 2003, 11:05 AM

I thought you said that determined meant that if we rewind the time tape and let it play then the events would repeat themselves.

When you attribute behavior to DNA and enviroment are you including the internal enviroment, which seems to be the area of free will. I don't see how my behavior is determined, there are many times that I make choices for a wide variety of reasons, I don't see the determinism and I am trying to understand your views.

Again DNA plays a very limited role in behavior except for theose called 'stereo typic'.

I am trying understand you.
Peace

Dancing David

9th May 2003, 11:11 AM

"Again presuming the unpreidictable is some sort of randomness is both illogical and superfluous. Illogical in that it goes against identity. Superfluous in that it can be attributed to an unpredictable working of enviroment and DNA. "

The unprediactable is not in that it is 'random', it is in that making choices is not always consistant. Therefore I feel that often if you rewind the tape that a different choice will be made.

That is why I specifically mentioned the legitemate human behavior of ambivalence.

How is causality deterministic, this seems to be a general arguement. How does it apply to humans making choices? Have you read any nueroanatomy or neuropsychology? (I ain't slamming you, although your tone appears to be rude)

Peace

DialecticMaterialist

9th May 2003, 11:18 AM

I thought you said that determined meant that if we rewind the time tape and let it play then the events would repeat themselves.

Yes I did. I did that to illustrate what determinism is. There are different ways to express the same meaning.

Had I just said "causal" you could ask "what do you mean by causal?" So I gave an example.

When you attribute behavior to DNA and enviroment are you including the internal enviroment, which seems to be the area of free will.

I'd have to, though I'd more call that anatomy or physiology. I'm more or less including all aspects of the person.

I don't see how my behavior is determined, there are many times that I make choices for a wide variety of reasons, I don't see the determinism and I am trying to understand your views.

Well see that's an argument from incredulity. I can understand why you might think behavior is not determined as it is so unpredictable and not fully understood. However that's a matter of technicalities/specifics.

A creationist who knows little of biology might likewise failt to understand how life could evolve(in fact many do.) I'm not comparing free will to creationism, just saying that sometimes certain true things are hard to understand.

However that is ultimately an argument from incredulity, an "I don't believe it." type of argument and it is considered rather weak because it can be due to mere ignorance, or stubborness, just as easily as it can evidence.

Personally I don't have a problem seeing how my behavior is determined at all. When I make a choice, certain things enter my mind, certain values. Like if I want a coffee or tea. Whatever I want more wins out. Hence what I want determines my actions. The only reason I don't follow up on what I want is because I want something else and can't have both. What I don't want doesn't motivate me, for example in this choice "orange juice, soda, battery acid" I don't even consider drinking option three. In fact it doesn't even enter my mind. And I know I can't choose what I want, that's decided by enviroment and genetics. I for example cannot choose to like drinking gasoline, and then go down some gasoline, having it now taste good.

Again DNA plays a very limited role in behavior except for theose called 'stereo typic'.

That's not what modern scientists tend to think. Please read Frank Sulloways "Born to rebel" or Jared Diamond's "The third chimpanzee".

According to twin studies about 40-60 percent of our personality comes from our genes.

Dancing David

9th May 2003, 11:36 AM

I will look for those books, do they include twin studies to determine that? Are they scientific or speculative.

Your arguement seems to be based on the 'lack of understanding' model, we don't understand the machanisms of biology, so therefore they may be deterministic.

Have you ever met someone with OCD? Have you ever had an ambivalent moment, I really think that in those circumstances if you rewind the tape then there may be a different outcome.

Seriously nuero biology is a very messy imprecise thing, wether or not a single nueron fires is a very messy or fuzzy decision(erk seaching for word:outcome), it really isn't as simple as 'under condition A the nueron will fire' it is a whole lot messier than that.

I don't care if free will is determined or not, I just don't understand why it would be eleiminated as a possibility.

Peace

DialecticMaterialist

9th May 2003, 02:36 PM

I will look for those books, do they include twin studies to determine that? Are they scientific or speculative.

Thanks. They are scientific. Both books mention twin studies.

Your arguement seems to be based on the 'lack of understanding' model, we don't understand the machanisms of biology, so therefore they may be deterministic.

Well somewhat. To an extent we are both trying to explain the reason for unpredictability in different ways. We basically go by different mechanisms.

Mine is we know biology and enviroment influence behavior, so when faced with something we don't understand about behavior we can A) Invoke something already established. Extending the reach. or B) Establish something anew. The first requires less assumtions then the second.

Have you ever met someone with OCD? Have you ever had an ambivalent moment, I really think that in those circumstances if you rewind the tape then there may be a different outcome.

I've had an ambivalent moment but think I go by what I believe will best satisfy my desires. That is I believe determined by what I want and how powerful my reasoning skills are.

Seriously nuero biology is a very messy imprecise thing, wether or not a single nueron fires is a very messy or fuzzy decision(erk seaching for wordutcome), it really isn't as simple as 'under condition A the nueron will fire' it is a whole lot messier than that.

I imagine so, but messiness is still compatible with determinism.

I don't care if free will is determined or not, I just don't understand why it would be eleiminated as a possibility.

Well I eliminate the possibility for randomness on logical principle. If you do not accept that argument, due to its being overly abstact then I invoke my second argument.

My second argument(the main one I've been putting forth this thread) does not eliminate the possibility. Not at all. It just goes by probability. Free will may exist, it is possible. Lots of things are possible, souls, martians, gods, ghosts, and there is no 100 percent way to eliminate the mere possibility of these things existing. But the probabolities are a different story.

My argument on this level is not that free will is impossible, just improbable.

Peskanov

9th May 2003, 03:15 PM

Peter,

----
quote:
Soderqvist1: I have never said that a human mind can find all truth statements!
----

Sorry, I messed it, and replied to an argument I recently read, not yours.

----
quote:
There is an example in the book, about a proof sequences which consists of meaningless (strings) known a syntax, the system starts with a simple axiom consisting of two strings a heart, and a spades, and 4 operation rules,
[...]
" It means that, from this axiom heart and spades, there is a truth mathematical statement there that; "a heart is always present in every proof sequence" which cannot be formally derived from this algorithmic string procedure, which starts with a simple axiom, and ends up with a theorem!
----

I am not sure I understand your example correctly. I would be glad to see the original text though. If you have it in digital, can you send it to me via PM?

However, a computer is not forced to derive it's propositions from the axioms of the studied system. Like a mathematic, a computer can you use the algebra of sets to study and find truths about other axiomatic system.

----
quote:
Turing has said this!
A: M. Turing as quoted from the Mind's I, a book by Hofstadter & Dennett 1981, chapter 4, page 61: I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness: There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any attempt to localize it!
----

Ok, but this is very very weak compared with the argument you are supporting. Turing denied the truth of this kind of arguments.

----
quote:
Humans know some mathematical truth statements, and these are not derivable from algorithms.
----

You are confusing "axioms of a defined system to be studied" with the algorithms (or axioms) which makes a computer "tick".
A computer can study the properties of "irrational numbers", despite working in simple "boolean algebra"!
In other words, a computer does not derive truths of a system using his own axioms (boole), but instead, from those choosed by the programmer between those being related (for example arithmetic axioms).

----
quote:
Professor Susan Greenfield
First we have non-algorithmic processes, that is to say we have commonsense and intuition, we don't necessarily think in a step-by-step algorithmic process.
----

This is a naive argument, and was replied by Turing 50 years ago.
For example, a neural net is not a step-by-step algo., but it can very emulated very well through one of them. In fact, programmers do that all time!
About "commonsense and intuition" not being formalisable, this is just wishful thinking...

----
quote:
Soderqvist1: I am not a mathematician, so I cannot address the rest of your message!
----

It boils down to the "million monkeys with typewritters" argument. With time enough, they would write any proposition you can imagine, along with mega-tons of crap.
Translated to computers, it happens that computers can do that and also check if a formalised arbitrary proposition is true!
A computer can generate pseudo-random propositions (unrelated to the axioms of the system being studied), and, once generated, simply check it's validity in this system.
That's, find truths which doesn't derive from the axioms of the studied system.

hammegk

10th May 2003, 08:40 AM

Originally posted by Peskanov
Translated to computers, it happens that computers can do that and also check if a formalised arbitrary proposition is true!
A computer can generate pseudo-random propositions (unrelated to the axioms of the system being studied), and, once generated, simply check it's validity in this system.
That's, find truths which doesn't derive from the axioms of the studied system.

And this has what to do with life, human consciousness, and free will? Nothing that I see.

Peskanov

10th May 2003, 03:11 PM

Hammegk;
Sorry, maybe we are making too much noise...The underlaying theme in this discussion between Peter and me is about a proof against the posibility of mind being deterministic. This has consequences in the concept of free will if he proves his point.
But probably this discussion would be better in thread of his own...

Lord Kenneth

10th May 2003, 03:28 PM

Originally posted by Dancing David

DC: The brain is not a computer it is a biochemical mess, they are not eletrical impulses running down wires , they are biochemical reactions based upon very small electrical potentials. A cell may or may not fire based upon an array of factors in the biochemical mess, there are nuerons that potentiate each other and there are nuerons that repress each other, the whole thing is a mess and very subject to variation.

Yes, I do realize that.

However, I sometimes wonder about this, which is the reason I talk about machines/computers: Could a machine not be made to emulate life? It appears possible, although unlikely.

Also, I believe you mean "neurons".

Either way, machine or biological process, it appears that the outcome is either "random" or produced/caused.

Baker

11th May 2003, 01:51 PM

Is this a new requirement that anyone posting in the R&P forum have their own Free Will thread?

Dancing David

12th May 2003, 11:10 AM

DC: don't find it unlikely at all that machines could emulate life and there fore be considered alive.

Dm: ook, logic, well mine is different, I find it easier to view the world as chaotic and having rules. And while we may know that something is caused it may not be deterministic, arrggh that is onr of SJ Gould's words of warning.

Baker: Diety of choice forbid we would all have our own threads, unless that would demonstrate free will?

Peace

Peter Soderqvist

13th May 2003, 12:10 AM

Originally posted by Peskanov
Peter,

----
quote:
Soderqvist1: I have never said that a human mind can find all truth statements!
----

Sorry, I messed it, and replied to an argument I recently read, not yours.

----
quote:
There is an example in the book, about a proof sequences which consists of meaningless (strings) known a syntax, the system starts with a simple axiom consisting of two strings a heart, and a spades, and 4 operation rules,
[...]
" It means that, from this axiom heart and spades, there is a truth mathematical statement there that; "a heart is always present in every proof sequence" which cannot be formally derived from this algorithmic string procedure, which starts with a simple axiom, and ends up with a theorem!
----

I am not sure I understand your example correctly. I would be glad to see the original text though. If you have it in digital, can you send it to me via PM?

However, a computer is not forced to derive it's propositions from the axioms of the studied system. Like a mathematic, a computer can you use the algebra of sets to study and find truths about other axiomatic system.

----
quote:
Turing has said this!
A: M. Turing as quoted from the Mind's I, a book by Hofstadter & Dennett 1981, chapter 4, page 61: I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness: There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any attempt to localize it!
----

Ok, but this is very very weak compared with the argument you are supporting. Turing denied the truth of this kind of arguments.

----
quote:
Humans know some mathematical truth statements, and these are not derivable from algorithms.
----

You are confusing "axioms of a defined system to be studied" with the algorithms (or axioms) which makes a computer "tick".
A computer can study the properties of "irrational numbers", despite working in simple "boolean algebra"!
In other words, a computer does not derive truths of a system using his own axioms (boole), but instead, from those choosed by the programmer between those being related (for example arithmetic axioms).

----
quote:
Professor Susan Greenfield
First we have non-algorithmic processes, that is to say we have commonsense and intuition, we don't necessarily think in a step-by-step algorithmic process.
----

This is a naive argument, and was replied by Turing 50 years ago.
For example, a neural net is not a step-by-step algo., but it can very emulated very well through one of them. In fact, programmers do that all time!
About "commonsense and intuition" not being formalisable, this is just wishful thinking...

----
quote:
Soderqvist1: I am not a mathematician, so I cannot address the rest of your message!
----

It boils down to the "million monkeys with typewritters" argument. With time enough, they would write any proposition you can imagine, along with mega-tons of crap.
Translated to computers, it happens that computers can do that and also check if a formalised arbitrary proposition is true!
A computer can generate pseudo-random propositions (unrelated to the axioms of the system being studied), and, once generated, simply check it's validity in this system.
That's, find truths which doesn't derive from the axioms of the studied system.

Soderqvist1: Isn't it premature by you without looking at her scientific papers and credentials, or at least review the link, to say "This is a naive argument" "commonsense and intuition" not being formalize able, this is just wishful thinking…

Neuroscientist Professor Susan Greenfield is the first woman director of the prestigious 200-year-old Royal Institution of Great Britain. She leads a team dedicated to finding out how the brain works and whose latest work has been to look at the connection between Parkinson's and Alzheimer's disease. Professor Greenfield was in Australia as a special guest of the Andrew Olle Memorial Trust Lecture and gave a public lecture in Sydney. The Trust raises money for research into brain cancer.
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/ss/stories/s137294.htm

Soderqvist1: I have no links to the equation you are asking about!
But your own link has described it very well!

Jones and Wilson, An Incomplete Education
In 1931, the Czech-born mathematician Kurt Gödel demonstrated that within any given branch of mathematics, there would always be some propositions that couldn't be proven either true or false using the rules and axioms ... of that mathematical branch itself. You might be able to prove every conceivable statement about numbers within a system by going outside the system in order to come up with new rules an axioms, but by doing so you'll only create a larger system with its own un-provable statements. The implication is that all logical system of any complexity are, by definition, incomplete; each of them contains, at any given time, more true statements than it can possibly prove according to its own defining set of rules.

Nagel and Newman, Gödel 's Proof
Gödel showed that within a rigidly logical system such as Russell and Whitehead had developed for arithmetic, propositions can be formulated that are undecidable or un-demonstrable within the axioms of the system. That is, within the system, there exist certain clear-cut statements that can neither be proved or disproved.

Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach
All consistent axiomatic formulations of number theory include undecidable propositions ...
Gödel showed that provability is a weaker notion than truth, no matter what axiom system is involved ...
http://www.miskatonic.org/godel.html

Soderqvist1: Thus; In the set of all arithmetical systems, there are more true statements than a Turing Machine can possibly prove, according to its own defining set of rules, therefore; in arithmetical systems there are true statements which is computationally undecidable, but we know by non-computational means that these statements are true! Therefore human mind is something more than a computational system or Turing Machines, because we can decide that arithmetical systems are incomplete, which is undecidable by Turing Machines! ;)

hammegk

13th May 2003, 07:12 AM

Originally posted by Peter Soderqvist

Soderqvist1: Thus; In the set of all arithmetical systems, there are more true statements than a Turing Machine can possibly prove, according to its own defining set of rules, therefore; in arithmetical systems there are true statements which is computationally undecidable, but we know by non-computational means that these statements are true! Therefore human mind is something more than a computational system or Turing Machines, because we can decide that arithmetical systems are incomplete, which is undecidable by Turing Machines! ;)

And I have yet to hear any rational rebuttal to this point.

HPC implications also end here imo.

Ergo: matter does not create consciousness (or life as the final logical conclusion). ;)

Peskanov

13th May 2003, 04:11 PM

Peter;

About Susan Greenfield's lecture: I did not look his credentials, just her arguments (which sounds very old to me). You see, you can find neurologist supporting one or the other position; but it also happens that usually those supporting the infeasibility of an artificial mind are terribly ignorant about computers. Susan lecture shows it, and I would thank to you if you address my points instead of showing me Susan's curriculum.

----
Soderqvist1: I have no links to the equation you are asking about!
But your own link has described it very well!
----

I was asking about your example with a small set of axioms, the "heart and spades" example you cited.

----
quote:
Soderqvist1: Thus; In the set of all arithmetical systems, there are more true statements than a Turing Machine can possibly prove, according to its own defining set of rules,
----

Your conclusion does not follow the premises you have cited.
I addressed this point before. A Turing machine does not use his own axioms (those of boolean algebra) as base to study an axiomatic system. You are understanding it bad, have you thinked about learning some programming?
I will try to draw an analogy. A computer has internal language with a limited to a small set simple of words. But using these words he can build and operate an arbitrary long language, only limitated by it's physical size. Hence, the language used by the computer is not restricted by it's natural one. In the same sense, the axioms in which the computer bases it's construction (boolean) does not restrict the ones it can operate.

----
quote:
In arithmetical systems there are true statements which is computationally undecidable, but we know by non-computational means that these statements are true!
----

You are wrong again. Show me just one.

-----
quote:
Therefore human mind is something more than a computational system or Turing Machines, because we can decide that arithmetical systems are incomplete, which is undecidable by Turing Machines!
----

Wrong again. Godël proof is stated in a formal language.
I explained you how a computer can reach this conclusion also. It was in the "monkeys with typewritters" argument.

Peter, how about addressing my points instead of just repeating the same arguments? Take no ofence, but I don't want to repeat them again.

Peskanov

13th May 2003, 04:20 PM

Hammegk,

----
quote:
And I have yet to hear any rational rebuttal to this point.
----

Have you tried looking for it? It works, there are several ones; including those by the original debater, Turing.
And Peter's last version of the argument is bad stated, BTW. I defy you to build it in the shape of a sylogism.

----
quote:
HPC implications also end here imo.

Ergo: matter does not create consciousness (or life as the final logical conclusion)
----

You are too eager to reach your desired conclusion.

Peter Soderqvist

14th May 2003, 12:18 AM

TO PESKANOV

You wrote on page 2, 05-09-2003 11:15 PM: It boils down to the "million monkeys with typewriters" argument. With time enough, they would write any proposition you can imagine, along with mega-tons of crap. Translated to computers, it happens that computers can do that and also check if a formalized arbitrary proposition is true! A computer can generate pseudo-random propositions (unrelated to the axioms of the system being studied), and, once generated, simply check it's validity in this system. That's, find truths which doesn't derive from the axioms of the studied system.

Soderqvist1: This system is inconsistent according to your own sentence, "along with mega-tons of crap" In a consistent arithmetical system when every statement is true, the proof sequence is incomplete, according to Godel's incompleteness theorem, because the theorems in the system are incomplete!
What are you really trying to say here? Do you mean that a stochastic process like "million monkeys with typewriters" can randomly generate some truth sentence like, "me think it is like a weasel" and a computer can confirm its validity, therefore, arithmetical systems are complete ? Btw, I am reading David Deutsch book, The Fabric of Reality, I am on the chapter 5; Universality and the Limits of Computation; theoretically, a universal virtual-reality machine can rend every possible physical environment into virtual-reality, but that is only an infinitesimal subset of all mathematical logical possible environments, which this machine cannot rend into virtual-reality, because it doesn't have any such program in its repertoire! It reminds me about chocolate cakes, as mentioned earlier by me, that there is an infinite amount of logical possible chocolate cakes, which not have any recipes, and for the same reason, they cannot be baked, because recipes or theorems or algorithms are incomplete!

Peskanov

14th May 2003, 08:11 AM

Peter,

----
quote:
What are you really trying to say here? Do you mean that a stochastic process like "million monkeys with typewriters" can randomly generate some truth sentence like, "me think it is like a weasel" and a computer can confirm its validity, therefore, arithmetical systems are complete ?
----

No, I am stating that:
-Given an axiomatic system, both computers and humans can find unexpected truths about it.
-To do so, both need to own a language that allows them to make propositions outside the axiomatic being studied.
- Computers can use a combinatory algorithm to do so.
- Humans ways to do so are largely unkown.

Hey, are you acussing me of being a weasel?? ;)

Now, I would like to clarify a point:
Every algorithm is a theorem , stating that a certain definite procedure will infallibly yield a certain definite result.
Theorems are derived from axioms.
Now, the algorithm output is a set of symbols. The MEANING of these symbols is NOT derived from the boolen axioms!
The meaning of "Your bill is $5.12, thanks for buying" coming from a printer is NOT derived from the boolean axioms. Also, the same goes for the string "x^n+y^n=z^n found probably valid".

----
quote:
theoretically, a universal virtual-reality machine can rend every possible physical environment into virtual-reality, but that is only an infinitesimal subset of all mathematical logical possible environments, which this machine cannot rend into virtual-reality, because it doesn't have any such program in its repertoire!
----

And why can not this machine have such programs? I don't get it.

BTW, a I found link to a good text you will find interesting:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/

hammegk

14th May 2003, 07:00 PM

Originally posted by Peskanov
...
You are too eager to reach your desired conclusion.

LOL. PLease use your free will to find some "matter" in a quark. ;)

Lucifuge Rofocale

14th May 2003, 11:50 PM

Originally posted by INRM
Actually, Lucifuge Rofocale mentioned something of a Japanese Doctor (at least one with a Japanese last name), who presented an experiment to determine free-will. The experiment entailed electrically-stimulating the correct-part of the brain which, assuming his theory is correct, would cause an involuntary movement which would trick the subject into believing that he triggered the movement.

Of course, I don't know what happened of this experiment.

Was it a success? Was it a failure? Was it ever attempted?

As an aside: Does it really prove we lack free-will, assuming it was a success that is? Or does it just prove that we normally have free-will, but it can be taken away? There *are* things which we normally have control over, but can lose voluntary control over, such as breathing. While it is normally a routine, voluntary-ability, if you sustain a hit to the solar-plexus, you will lose the ability to breathe shortly.

-INRM23

It was Shin Shimojo from Caltech.
It has been done, It succeded and it prove we lack libertarian free will.

hammegk

15th May 2003, 06:32 AM

Originally posted by Lucifuge Rofocale

It was Shin Shimojo from Caltech.
It has been done, It succeded and it prove we lack libertarian free will.

Or that a human perception of what-is is subject to coercion.

It certainly offers no insight into the truth of materialism/atheism as a philosophy/religion.

Dancing David

15th May 2003, 08:18 AM

Hey the guy who had galvanic named after him got dead frogs legs to jump, did that disprove they were dead?

Peace

Peskanov

15th May 2003, 02:36 PM

Hammegk,

----
quote:
LOL. PLease use your free will to find some "matter" in a quark.
----

Ok, I will start when I finish identifying the possible components of a theorical "metamind". ;)

hammegk

15th May 2003, 02:54 PM

Originally posted by Peskanov
Hammegk,

----
quote:
LOL. PLease use your free will to find some "matter" in a quark.
----

Ok, I will start when I finish identifying the possible components of a theorical "metamind". ;)

Still LOL. Why is your position, "matter exists", stonger than my position, "mind exists"? I have one data point as *I* think -- so to speak ;) -- and so do you. Still can't see your problem?

Dancing David

15th May 2003, 03:10 PM

Where do you stand on free will Hammgk, I think I read once you said it had been disproved?

As far as the quark, can't be done, little buggers travel only in groups, so they really are theoretical and likely to remain that way.

At least in the philosphy forum I think it's a draw, I can't prove that metamind doesn't exist, you can't prove it does. So both are likely possibilities, I hate to choice in a thread on free will.
So far all the proof of metamind I have seen are of the same kind: you can't prove it doesn't exist.
So I am open to new ideas, it could exist I agree.

Peace

Loki

15th May 2003, 03:11 PM

hammegk,

And I have yet to hear any rational rebuttal to this point.
Peskanov has dealt with this point already, but I just wanted to add my support for his comments. A modern computer's machine language is a small set of mathematical instructons, but this language can be used to construct a spell-checker program.

It may be true to say that humans are "something more" than Turing machines, but it doesn't follow that this "something more" cannot be, ultimately, implemented by a computational engine.

It certainly offers no insight into the truth of materialism/atheism as a philosophy/religion
It offers *no* insight? None at all? Doesn't it show a continued trend to find materialist answers to such questions? This is what I don't understand about your position - it seems that there is *nothing* that can ever defeat the non-materialist worldviews because they can always assert that the data is just "correlations". Dualism/idealism says "we think reality is like this, but there's nothing you can do to prove or disprove it". Materialism says "we think reality is like this, and here's a series of tests that will back it up". If any test fails, materialism is in trouble. But we keep doing these tests, and they keep passing. Why doesn't this constant forward progress amount to at least a tentative insight into the truth? And the alternative philosophy/religions contain an inherent "you'll never know" clause.

Peskanov

15th May 2003, 03:14 PM

Hammegk,

Believe it ot not, I find both positions (materialism and idealism) possible and defendable.
But I don't know what kind of idealism are you "testing". Certainly is not plato's one...
About what keeps the balance in the materism side for me...Reduction. Mankind have had success identifying smaller components in anything which is perceived as complex, and then deducing the complex properties from the small component ones.
In the other hand, mankind had always failed to understand complex systems taken as a whole.
So, as a rule of thumb I prefer to try to reduce all that is perceived as complex, including the world and my mind...and atoms are doing a good work thanks :)

c4ts

15th May 2003, 09:33 PM

Originally posted by Dancing David
Hey the guy who had galvanic named after him got dead frogs legs to jump, did that disprove they were dead?

Peace

Dr. Froggenstein.

hammegk

16th May 2003, 04:13 PM

Originally posted by Loki

It may be true to say that humans are "something more" than Turing machines, but it doesn't follow that this "something more" cannot be, ultimately, implemented by a computational engine.

Perhaps. More succinctly, is "life" an "implemented computational machine"? And I repeat my assertion, science will NEVER know at 100% certainty if "life" chooses to use specific structures or if the specific structures "cause" life.

It offers *no* insight? None at all?

Of course science/materialism offers insight -- into the behavior of our perception of a "physical existent".

....the data is just "correlations".

All I say about that is that knowing if x causes y, or z causes x and y will always be unknowable.

For the correlations under discussion, your first axiom -- an observable, physical, objective "what-is" exists -- contains its' only possible answer.

....the alternative philosophy/religions contain an inherent "you'll never know" clause.
Er, yup. Just as does materialism. ;)

Our choices remain:

I think, therefore I am or

I am, therefore I think.

Free will is one of the ugly problems materialists must face -- if it's all cause/effect free will cannot exist, so they define "compatabilist free will" mumbling something about not being coerced.

The trouble is *I* (and I) THINK libertarian free will exists, and better yet *I* can choose to apply it. And no I can't define "free will" satisfactorily, but still believe I can recognize it.

This leads to further problems: if free will exists, and I can apply it, what is it *I* apply it to? Our perception of neurons/biochem is the minimal level for change, and since I find dualism illogical, my choice continues -- *I* think. Life demonstrates imo that thoughts do effect as well as affect brain function, and science confirms that "brain function" is perceivable, and changes.
;)

Loki

16th May 2003, 05:37 PM

hammegk,

And I repeat my assertion, science will NEVER know at 100% certainty if "life" chooses to use specific structures or if the specific structures "cause" life.
True enough, but rather empty, since you *can't* know 100% that even your "single data point" of "*I* think" is what it seems to you.

Er, yup. Just as does materialism.
If you mean "neither althernative can guarantee a 100% answer" then I agree. But my point is that materialism says "We can never reach 100%, but we can continue to approach 100% over time", whereas the alternatives say "Since you can never reach 100%, there's really no point even trying".

Free will is one of the ugly problems materialists must face -- if it's all cause/effect free will cannot exist, so they define "compatabilist free will" mumbling something about not being coerced.
I think you are failing to grasp the real issues involved in Free Will here - LFW and compatibilism say essentially the same thing, except one is compatibile with observed reality, and the other isn't.

hammegk

16th May 2003, 06:57 PM

Originally posted by Loki

True enough, but rather empty, since you *can't* know 100% that even your "single data point" of "*I* think" is what it seems to you.
Perhaps, although I admit *I* do *think* "I think".

What a materialist has is he *thinks* he exists as a physical machine that *thinks*.

Which is the more parsimonious position?

...the alternatives say "Since you can never reach 100%, there's really no point even trying".
I disagree. As an idealist, I'm as interested in the scientific analyses of our perceived-as-physical "what-is" as is anyone.

I think you are failing to grasp the real issues involved in Free Will here - LFW and compatibilism say essentially the same thing, except one is compatibile with observed reality, and the other isn't.
You may be correct. I'll rethink this point.

Care to comment on the (physical)effect/affect of "mind" on "brain matter", or do you disagree that such an effect/affect exists?

Loki

16th May 2003, 11:18 PM

hammegk,

Care to comment on the (physical)effect/affect of "mind" on "brain matter", or do you disagree that such an effect/affect exists?
I seem to have missed something along the way - what are you referring to here?

hammegk

17th May 2003, 12:01 PM

Originally posted by Loki
hammegk,

I seem to have missed something along the way - what are you referring to here?

For a materialist, no problem in that thought changes are caused by the prior occurence of biochem-neuronal changes. This implies to me that I'm really just an automaton reacting to past & current learning & stimuli, although I'm not sure you agree with this assessment.

As an idealist, I believe my *I* is actually capable of free will choice. Dualism fails (actually reduces to materialism) because the cause 'thought' cannot effect/affect a material brain substance.

However, I agree *my* brain substance does change; if thought is the cause-- and my understanding of myself implies that thought can be the 'cause'-- the perceived brain substance is in essence "not physical".

Peskanov

17th May 2003, 12:19 PM

Hammegk,
All idealists/dualists of the board keep defending LFW and showing it as the weak point of materialism.
However, I don't see LFW being more possible in idealism than in materialism.
In fact, you are saying:
- Human will is not the result of deterministic system.
- Human will is not the result of source of random events.
- Human will is not the result of system with deterministic and random factors.
These are statements are purely conceptual, not referred to materialist framework. Causation is used in the elaboration of all models!
After eading so many threads about it, I can only conclude that your (idealist/dualist) message about free will is:
"The nature of Free Will is an unsolvable mistery by definition".
And I would really like to see the reasons to reach this conclussion. Let's put aside the brain question for a moment, let's talk about mind; when I make a decission I can backtrack most of the reasons that made me took it. That seems a big clue about my mind being a system based in causation, isn't it?

hammegk

17th May 2003, 07:52 PM

Originally posted by Peskanov
.
In fact, you are saying:
- Human will is not the result of deterministic system.
- Human will is not the result of source of random events.
- Human will is not the result of system with deterministic and random factors.
These are statements are purely conceptual, not referred to materialist framework. Causation is used in the elaboration of all models!
You misunderstand my position; much of human existence is indeed governed by those areas of causation. I'd say 99% plus of everything I do is indeed running on brain-biochem autopilot.

I have some concern with "randomness" since I don't recognize it in myself or in others. In fact, between stimulus & response seems to always be available a gap that can often be extended indefinitely if *I* so "think" to do so.

From time to time -- my typing now being an example of sorts -- something I'll call Will which seems anything but random or deterministic gets involved. That's the same *I* that watches & selects or ignores *my* thoughts as they occur.

...I can only conclude that your (idealist/dualist) message about free will is:
"The nature of Free Will is an unsolvable mistery by definition".
And I would really like to see the reasons to reach this conclussion.
Actually what I've meant to say is that I can't define "free will" in a meaningful way, but do think I know it when I see it, and further believe I do see it from time to time, in me and in others.

Let's put aside the brain question for a moment, let's talk about mind; when I make a decission I can backtrack most of the reasons that made me took it. That seems a big clue about my mind being a system based in causation, isn't it?
Nature of & mechanism for to me imply "I think" taking primacy over the materialists' "I am".

Peskanov

18th May 2003, 11:16 AM

Hammegk,

----
quote:
You misunderstand my position; much of human existence is indeed governed by those areas of causation. I'd say 99% plus of everything I do is indeed running on brain-biochem autopilot.
----

From an idealist POV I guess you talk about the brain like a partial reflection of the mind, isn't it?

----
quote:
I have some concern with "randomness" since I don't recognize it in myself or in others. In fact, between stimulus & response seems to always be available a gap that can often be extended indefinitely if *I* so "think" to do so.
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And what makes you think this action (extend the gap) has no causes?
Can't think about simple causes adding to make the decision over time? I certainly can.

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quote:
From time to time -- my typing now being an example of sorts -- something I'll call Will which seems anything but random or deterministic gets involved. That's the same *I* that watches & selects or ignores *my* thoughts as they occur.
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See above.
Maybe you are smater than me, because when I see a simple cockroach running on the floor with his strange movements, I can not tell how much randomness or determinism is playing there.
As a programmer of RT systems, I deal everyday with events which doesn't seem deterministic, although they sure as hell are! In fact is part of my work to guess "what happened". And when I can't, I just shrug and attack the thing from other side.

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quote:
Actually what I've meant to say is that I can't define "free will" in a meaningful way, but do think I know it when I see it, and further believe I do see it from time to time, in me and in others.
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So you go for a purely intuitive concept. Well, at least I can understand that.
After talking with you, Ian, and UCE, I have to conclude that LFW is question of faith, no less no more. You are all unable to offer a single reason to believe the thing exist or makes any sense at all.
About LFW being more pausible under idealism, I still have to hear any reason as well.

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quote:
Nature of & mechanism for to me imply "I think" taking primacy over the materialists' "I am"
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Well, I have no objection. I am more interested about "how it woks", so the order of the points is the inverse for me.

Loki

18th May 2003, 03:29 PM

Peskanov,

As a programmer of RT systems, I deal everyday with events which doesn't seem deterministic, although they sure as hell are!
This seems to me to be a very real example of where reality and perception can divide - a computer's behaviour can be totally determined, but computer users will often refer to the machine as "randomly crashing". From the 'outside' of the decision making, it appears "undetermined" - but from the inside, it clearly is caused. This is a simple, everyday example that shows that the "will" in Free Will can seem to be something other than it is - and therefore it's "appeareance" really tells us little.

About LFW being more pausible under idealism, I still have to hear any reason as well.
I guess it's "more plausible" because under idealism there can be "other rules" (apart from the Laws of Physics) that govern reality, since reality is assumed to consist of a mental realm and a physical realm. Therefore, a full description of the physical realm does not imply a full description of the mental realm, so there can be behaviours in this mental realm that do not or cannot exist in the physical realm. Thus, Will can be non-deterministic, non-random, and not a combination. I'd still argue that this also makes "will" incomprehensible to humans.

LFW is impossible under materialism.
LFW is possible but incomprehensible under Idealism.

Peskanov

19th May 2003, 10:21 AM

Loki,

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quote:
I guess it's "more plausible" because under idealism there can be "other rules" (apart from the Laws of Physics) that govern reality, since reality is assumed to consist of a mental realm and a physical realm.
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Loki, idealism does not postulate a physical realm, only a mental one. The perception of the physical would be a projection of part of the mind (/metamind).
I think tou are refering to dualism, which Hammegk rejects.

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quote:
Therefore, a full description of the physical realm does not imply a full description of the mental realm, so there can be behaviours in this mental realm that do not or cannot exist in the physical realm. Thus, Will can be non-deterministic, non-random, and not a combination. I'd still argue that this also makes "will" incomprehensible to humans.
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I was not talking from a physical POV. Causation and logic are the grounds of physics, yes, but also of plato's idealism, or berkeley's philosophy (much loved by II).
Not only LFW defenders defy causation, they also defys non-causation! They even reject a model containing both. And all that with the weakest reasons one can imagine...It seems they seek to support a contradictory definition in order to maintain a perpetual mistery.

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quote:
LFW is impossible under materialism.
LFW is possible but incomprehensible under Idealism.
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If a form of idealism allows the rule of absurd (P implies Not P) in definitions then I agree, but I have yet to see an idealist openly admit his model contains absurdities and that he likes it that way!

hammegk

19th May 2003, 11:28 AM

Originally posted by Peskanov
From an idealist POV I guess you talk about the brain like a partial reflection of the mind, isn't it?
There is an *I* that thinks (and at times Wills), and a *me* that is this perceived-as-material body that interacts with the rest of the perceived universe. *I* has been associated with *me* as long as I can remember & probably even before then and I/me have spent years training one another.

I buy into F's idea of a Maximum Perceived Benefit algorithm that is basic autopilot for *me*; however, *I* using Will can actually reprogram the brain at some level.

And what makes you think this action (extend the gap) has no causes?
Of course it has a "cause". Under idealism, the "prime cause" can be Will/thought acting to change perceived "brain matter".

Materialists have no out and stimulus/response appears to me to be the only re-programming possibility they have.

....I can not tell how much randomness or determinism is playing ...
For the roach, I'd say very very much determinism, very very little Will, what is random anyway?

So you go for a purely intuitive concept. Well, at least I can understand that.
After talking with you, Ian, and UCE, I have to conclude that LFW is question of faith, no less no more. ....
Faith in the sense that that best explains how *I* think/perceive my "mind" at work.

Well, I have no objection. I am more interested about "how it woks", so the order of the points is the inverse for me.
I'm as enamored of science as you are for definitions & predictions about that perceived world.

Originally posted by Loki

I guess it's "more plausible" because under idealism there can be "other rules" (apart from the Laws of Physics) that govern reality, since reality is assumed to consist of a mental realm and a physical realm. Therefore, a full description of the physical realm does not imply a full description of the mental realm, so there can be behaviours in this mental realm that do not or cannot exist in the physical realm. Thus, Will can be non-deterministic, non-random, and not a combination. I'd still argue that this also makes "will" incomprehensible to humans.

LFW is impossible under materialism.
LFW is possible but incomprehensible under Idealism.
Other than the proviso that as I think of it, "physical realm" is a subset of the "mental realm", and my (and every living things) *I* represents some infinitesmal part of the "mental realm".

Loki

19th May 2003, 03:32 PM

Peskanov/hammegk,

(peskanov wrote) : idealism does not postulate a physical realm, only a mental one
...
(hammegk wrote) : Other than the proviso that as I think of it, "physical realm" is a subset of the "mental realm",
Sorry for the sloppy expression - I meant (but didn't state!) that the "physical realm" is a subset of the "mental realm", not a separate/independant one.

(peskanov wrote) : Causation and logic are the grounds of physics, yes, but also of plato's idealism, or berkeley's philosophy (much loved by II).
Not only LFW defenders defy causation, they also defys non-causation!
...
(hammegk wrote) : Of course it has a "cause". Under idealism, the "prime cause" can be Will/thought acting to change perceived "brain matter".
And that's still the heart of the matter. "Will" under LFW is simply defined as a "Prime Cause" (ie, uncaused), and that's the end of the discussion. I'm still unsure how this "Will which is an uncaused Prime Cause" can be reconciled with the concept of 'identity'.

hammegk

20th May 2003, 01:02 PM

Originally posted by Loki

And that's still the heart of the matter. "Will" under LFW is simply defined as a "Prime Cause" (ie, uncaused), and that's the end of the discussion.

Analogous to the tautology: A physical objective world exists.

The Prime Cause exists.

What we perceive as a physical world is the manifestation governed by TLOP of this Prime Cause.

I'm still unsure how this "Will which is an uncaused Prime Cause" can be reconciled with the concept of 'identity'.
I'd say identity is The aspect of all "life", human consciousness being the highest I'm aware of.

I've asked before and will ask again, where does the non-life/life boundary occur? Idealism to me implies the boundary doesn't exist; just different forms of "perceived matter".

You raise good questions. :)

Peskanov

21st May 2003, 01:41 PM

Loki,Hammegk;

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Loki wrote:
And that's still the heart of the matter. "Will" under LFW is simply defined as a "Prime Cause" (ie, uncaused), and that's the end of the discussion. I'm still unsure how this "Will which is an uncaused Prime Cause" can be reconciled with the concept of 'identity'.
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Hammegk wrote:
Analogous to the tautology: A physical objective world exists.

The Prime Cause exists.

What we perceive as a physical world is the manifestation governed by TLOP of this Prime Cause.
----

Not similar to materialist primitives.
Complex events showing a degree of consistence and coherence are atributed as a direct result of FW.

Under materialism, this complexity is acknowledged, and smaller, simpler components are searched.

Under idealism, a clearly complex phenomena (FW) is postulated as a primitive. Despite being complex, and partially consistent/coherent, the possible existence of smaller components is denied.
Idealists also deny a truly uncaused behaviour, they deny it's randomness, suggesting secretly that there is some logic behind it. As they define it as a primitive they deny FW could be reduced, hence entering a vicious circle.

Sorry, I throw the towel; I simply can't make head or tails of the concept of LFW or why is possible under idealism (or under any model, for that matter).