Smoking Ban...For You, Not Leftist Elites (cont'd)

[shanek]

I've tried numerous times to post this in the thread, no go. So I'm posting it here.

Originally posted by mfeldman
I have to jump back into this thread here, bc this is the point I was trying (unsuccessfully) to get across earleir. Shanek, you are using a particular, non-dictionary, definition of freedom

No; in that case, I was using Victor's dictionary definition of freedom! If freedom is the absence of restraint (I would use the word "force," but it's pretty much the same thing) then how is restraining others any kind of freedom
at all?

EDITED TO ADD: For reference sake, here's the original thread:

http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&threadid=18358

[Victor Danilchenko]

Yes, restraining others is indeed an abridgement of their freedom; and some freedoms are mutually restraining. That's the whole point -- absolute freedom is logically impossible, having some restrains is unavoidable, and so it's up to us to decide which freedoms should be restrained at the expense of which other freedoms, so as to minimize freedom abridgement in general. Again, to take a fist/nose example, we decide that restraining your freedom to act in harmful manners is better than implicitly (by not doing so) restraining my freedom to not have my person and property harmed. Other examples don't lend themselves to as easy a solution, but we can only find a solution once we agree that the problem (how to abridge freedoms so as to minimize total freedom abridgement) even exists.

What I've been trying to do is prove to you that freedom cannot be absolute (and tangentially that literal interpretatoin of Constitution is unsupportable). Once you realize that freedoms will inevitably be abridged in some manner, we will hopefully be able to reasonably discuss just which abridgements should be enacted to as to optimize the outcome. As long as you keep asserting that some freedoms can be absolute, you are effectively still deciding to abridge some freedoms at the expense of others (that's inescapable), but you are also ignoring that fact, making it impossible to reasonably discuss whether your "freedom tradeoff scheme" is the best, or whether we can do better.

Edited to add: Please read my followup post before responding that i once again ignored your statements.

[Thanz]

Glad to see this thread continued. Here is the reply to shanek I've been trying to post.

Originally posted by shanek


Wait a minute...

Let's go back to the "fire in a crowded theatre" example. I shout, fire, fire, there's a fire, run for your lives, etc., everyone panics, calls 911, the fire dept. comes out, etc., and then I'm arrested. You say, that speech is the only basis on which they can arrest me. Right?

Okay, so what if I didn't say a word and pulled the fire alarm instead, with the same results? Do I not get charged thus?

Of course I do, so it is not free speech that is being infringed on. It is starting a panic and wasting public resources, regardless of the method.

This is just side-stepping the issue. It doesn't matter whether you COULD accomplish the same mayhem without speech - it only matters if you DO. And there may be examples where pulling a fire alarm could be considered some sort of activist expression.



I think I just found the source of our contention...

You keep talking about "his freedom," as if he were the only one with freedom. But the other patrons have freedoms, too, freedoms which were abridged by my (hypothetical) actions.

I don't ignore that the other patrons have freedom. Their freedoms are specifically addressed in the second stage of the analysis - first, we concede that if the speaker is not allowed to speak without fear of punishment, his freedom to speak is infringed. Once we understand the infringement, we look to the freedoms of others that the speaker infringed upon to balance which infringement is more egregious: the infringement on the speakers speech, or on the others safety/security.

Anything that infringes on freedom is not freedom. By definition.

And this is where the problem is. You are defining freedom in a very strange way.

Let's take a more benign example. If I so choose, I can call someone an ugly, ill-tempered, moronic boob. I have the 'freedom' to do this. The boob in question may be harmed by my remarks. His freedom to not be verbally assaulted has been infringed upon. Does this mean I am not free to call him a boob if I want? Should I be arrested for that? Or is it simply freedom of speech, and the boob's feelings are less important than my freedom of speech?




I disagree; the analysis is there, just with a different focus. Mine focuses on whether or not the actions abridge the freedom of others. Whereas yours gets into an examination of which are justified infringements of freedom and which ones aren't. The problem I have with your view is that it makes it to easy to justify things that really are an infringement on freedom.

Make sense now?

Still doesn't make sense, I'm afraid.

My view is that your definition makes it too esay to take away freedoms by defining them out of existence. For example, many people feel that hate speech is quite harmful. Does this mean that you don't have a freedom of speech when it comes to hate speech? And what is considered "hate speech"? Your definition of freedom of speech allows someone to define whatever speech they deem harmful right out of the freedom of speech. That leads to a slippery slope - and one where they don't even have to justify the exclusion.

At least with my approach, one is upfront both about the infringement and the reasons why it is justified. I think that my approach actually makes it harder to justify an infringement than yours - you just seem to be saying that if there is harm, it isn't speech - without directly addressing the harm.

[Victor Danilchenko]

P.S. Shane,

Saying that freedoms that abridge other freedoms aren't, "freedoms", is inconsistent. freedoms abridge each other. My freedom from bodily harm abridges your freedom to swing your fist, and your freedom to swing your fist abridges my freedom from bodily harm; is neither one of those freedoms a "real freedom" now?

You can't get out of jail free by redefining matters to suit your beliefs -- you have to sit down and realize that we will have to decide which freedoms to abridge and which to preserve. We cannot simplt decide, based on ideological bias, that abridgement of freedom from harm disqualifies my freedom to swing fists from being a true freedom, but abridging your freedom to swing fists doesn't disqualify my freedom from bodily harm thusly.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
Yes, restraining others is indeed an abridgement of their freedom; and some freedoms are mutually restraining.

Wait a minute—you said that freedom was the absence of restraint! So how can a freedom restrain anybody? You're not sticking to your own definition.

That's the whole point -- absolute freedom is logically impossible, having some restrains is unavoidable,

No, it's not. There is never any kind of restraint, any kind of force, unless someone does it first. Hence the Libertarian principle of "noninitiation of force." The only proper force is in response to, and protection from, the initiation of force. In this, you're not abridging the freedom of the person you're acting against because his actions are not a part of freedom. By YOUR definition.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
This is just side-stepping the issue. It doesn't matter whether you COULD accomplish the same mayhem without speech

I didn't say that. I said that IF you accomplished the same mayhem without speech you would find yourself facing the same charges! So why should it be any different when speech is involved, just because we have "freedom of speech"? If it's the same offence either way, it's not the speech that's being restrained!

And again, if you said the exact same thing without the resulting mayhem, no charges. Hence, it ain't the speech!

And this is where the problem is. You are defining freedom in a very strange way.

Victor's definition agrees with me. The very first definition in American Heritage is "The condition of being free of restraints." As I said earlier, I would substitute "force" for "restraints," but again it's pretty much the same thing.

"Free of restraints." Therefore, if there are restraints, you don't have freedom.

Let's take a more benign example. If I so choose, I can call someone an ugly, ill-tempered, moronic boob.

And that, being a statement of opinion, is not actionable. He has no recourse against you. Why? Because we have FREEDOM OF SPEECH!

Still doesn't make sense, I'm afraid.

Geez! How many other ways do I need to explain it?

My view is that your definition makes it too esay to take away freedoms by defining them out of existence.

No, it doesn't. My definition, which is the same one the dictionary uses, and the same one our founders used to draft the Constitution, does not allow for the "defining away" of freedoms. Only if it initiates force or fraud against others is it not a freedom.

It's YOUR idea that we can somehow "interpret" freedom, or that freedom isn't absolute, that's been responsible for a lot of the problems we have today, including even the "hate speech" example you tried to use against me.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
Saying that freedoms that abridge other freedoms aren't, "freedoms", is inconsistent.

Actions that abridge freedoms are not freedoms. Stop trying to put words in my mouth. (I might as well be telling the wind to stop blowing there...)

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek


Victor's definition agrees with me. The very first definition in American Heritage is "The condition of being free of restraints." As I said earlier, I would substitute "force" for "restraints," but again it's pretty much the same thing.

"Free of restraints." Therefore, if there are restraints, you don't have freedom.

Why do you not see that a law that says I can't shout fire in a theatre or shout into a crowd to take down the capitalist pig-dogs that are holding us back is a "restraint" on speech?



And that, being a statement of opinion, is not actionable. He has no recourse against you. Why? Because we have FREEDOM OF SPEECH!

But why? Previously, you have relied on the concept of harm. If the boob is harmed, then by your reasoning and definition I don't have the freedom to say that.


No, it doesn't. My definition, which is the same one the dictionary uses, and the same one our founders used to draft the Constitution, does not allow for the "defining away" of freedoms. Only if it initiates force or fraud against others is it not a freedom.

Your definition is not what the dictionary says. The dictionary does not say "Anything that infringes on freedom is not freedom. By definition." It talks about freedom from restraints - nothing about infringing on other freedoms. If I am not allowed to infringe on someone's "freedom", that constitutes a restraint, does it not?


It's YOUR idea that we can somehow "interpret" freedom, or that freedom isn't absolute, that's been responsible for a lot of the problems we have today, including even the "hate speech" example you tried to use against me.

What do you mean "tried to use against you"? Why don't you actually address the argument? Many consider "hate speech" to be "initiating force or fraud" against the target group. Do you agree? Is there freedom of speech for hate speech? Who determines if the speech "initiates force or fraud"? If I say that it does, haven't I, in essence, defined "hate speech" out of "freedom of speech"?

[Victor Danilchenko]

shanek

Wait a minute—you said that freedom was the absence of restraint! So how can a freedom restrain anybody?Freedom of X is lack of restraints on X. Freedom from restraints on X can restrain Y, though -- and this is what happens: X restrains Y and Y restrains X, so we cannot have both total freedom of y and total freedom of X. Hence, we need tradeoffs.

You cannot define as freedom that which is absence of restrains on others, because this leads to both fist-swinging and nose-having being considered non-freedoms.

No, it's not. There is never any kind of restraint, any kind of force, unless someone does it first.So whoever acts first is at fault and is the abridger of another's freedom, eh? Oh, how nice it would have been to live in your simplistic world...

Everyone acts all the time. You cannot simply draw a temporal line in the sand and proclaim that acts from this point on count, and the first act after this moment counts as the initiation of force.

You drop your suitcase on the sidewalk, and I trip over it, breaking my leg. Who initiated force? You? OK, so dropping the suitcase was the initial act that counted. Now let's say you drop the suitcase and I pick it up and walk away with it -- who initiated force, you or I? I, because i walked away with your property? Why do you suddenly change which act is considered the 'first' act for determining whose freedom is being abridged?

You really need to give up your illusion, and face reality -- there is no simply syntactic rule that will let you determine acontextually which act constitutes abridgement and which does not. The nature of the acts matters, and it matters in complex ways; in order to arbitrate conflicts of freedoms, we would have to actually sit down and think about which freedom is more deserving of protection. This problem cannot be solved by simplistic syntactic analysis, you need to get into semantics.

Hence the Libertarian principle of "noninitiation of force."But fraud of course does not involve force, yet you wouldn't consider the forcible government response to fraud to be "initiation of force"... As I said, simple syntactic rules simply aren't sufficient here.

The only proper force is in response to, and protection from, the initiation of force. In this, you're not abridging the freedom of the person you're acting against because his actions are not a part of freedom.of course they are. You are simply devising an arbitrary (and demonstrably useless) rule for arbitrating which restraints are justified, and which aren't; and thus for which abridgements aren't really abridgement, and which freedoms aren't really freedoms.

Understand this: the arbitration rule you chose (initiation of force) is your arbitration rule; it has no objective standing. it's simply a particular bias of yours which you like to pretend to not be a bias.

[Victor Danilchenko]

shanek

Actions that abridge freedoms are not freedoms.Freedom is always freedom to act or to be -- freedom to speak, freedom to bear guns, freedom to be unharmed, etc. An act or a state is simply an excercise of freedom; without such excercise, a freedom is meaningless. However, excercising freedom X may abridge your freedom Y.

Soviet joke: a russian and an american meet. The russian says: "We have freedom of speech!" The american answers: "Ah, but we have freedom after speech!"

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
Why do you not see that a law that says I can't shout fire in a theatre or shout into a crowd to take down the capitalist pig-dogs that are holding us back is a "restraint" on speech?

Why do you not see that there are no laws saying you can't do that? Only if they result in harm. You can shout it all you want as long as no harm comes of it. I've pointed this out ad nauseum!

But why? Previously, you have relied on the concept of harm. If the boob is harmed, then by your reasoning and definition I don't have the freedom to say that.

No, you do have the freedom to say that. The Supreme Court has even upheld that. It has to be a factually incorrect statement. Statements of opinion cannot be correct or incorrect; they're just opinions.

Your definition is not what the dictionary says.

I quoted the dictionary!!!! "The condition of being free of restraints." American Heritage Dictionary, 4th Edition. If it's a restraint, then you don't have freedom, because freedom is "the condition of being free of restraints"!!! Ergo, anything which restrains is not freedom!!!

What do you mean "tried to use against you"?

Hate speech laws abridge freedom itself because they don't require any harm to have actually been caused. "I think gays are subhuman," even in a context that harms no one, is "hate speech." That's the difference. In all of the other examples we've looked at, there are conditions where you can say the thing and not be in violation of any laws. Not so with hate speech. Therefore, hate speech is an abrogation of free speech.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
Freedom of X is lack of restraints on X.

That wasn't what you said earlier. Moving the goalposts again?

Freedom from restraints on X can restrain Y, though

Then it's not freedom! Freedom is "the condition of being free of restraints!" It doesn't say anything about X or Y or anything else! No restraints=freedom. Restrains=not freedom.

X restrains Y and Y restrains X,

Then neither one of them are freedoms! By definition! If it restrains, it's not freedom, because freedom is "the condition of being free of restraints!"

Geez...

You cannot define as freedom that which is absence of restrains on others, because this leads to both fist-swinging and nose-having being considered non-freedoms.

Me swinging my fist in the air poses no restraings, and thus is a freedom. Me swinging my fist at your nose does pose a restraint, and so it is not a freedom.

So whoever acts first is at fault and is the abridger of another's freedom, eh?

Yes. If I try to kill or harm you, you are perfectly within your rights to use force against me. It's called self-defense. I woudl think even someone as deluded and obstinate as you would be able to tell the difference!

You drop your suitcase on the sidewalk, and I trip over it, breaking my leg. Who initiated force?

No one. It was an accident. Unless I deliberately placed the suitcase there with the intention of tripping you.

OK, so dropping the suitcase was the initial act that counted. Now let's say you drop the suitcase and I pick it up and walk away with it -- who initiated force, you or I?

Arguably you, if it were a situation where it was obvious the suitcase belonged to someone else and hadn't been abandoned.

This isn't even difficult!

But fraud of course does not involve force,

Yes, it does! Fraud is quite definitely a form of force! How do you get that it isn't? If I get you to sign a contract under false pretenses, it's just as if I had forced you to sign it under duress (well, the degree is different, but the concepts the same).

of course they are. You are simply devising an arbitrary (and demonstrably useless) rule for arbitrating which restraints are justified, and which aren't; and thus for which abridgements aren't really abridgement, and which freedoms aren't really freedoms.

it has no objective standing.

Of course it does! By the very definition of freedom which YOU originally cited!!! :rolleyes:

[shanek]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
Freedom is always freedom to act or to be

Changing your definition again? :rolleyes:

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek


Why do you not see that there are no laws saying you can't do that? Only if they result in harm. You can shout it all you want as long as no harm comes of it. I've pointed this out ad nauseum!

And, as I have pointed out, it is not a freedom if my freedom to do it is completely dependant on the actions of other individuals over whom I have no control. I am not free to call for the overthrow of teh capitalist pig-dogs whenever I want if I have to worry whether others will take steps to do that. And that puts a RESTRAINT on my freedom of speech. Why can't you get this simple concept through your head? If I have to worry about about when and where I say something, how is that speech free?

No, you do have the freedom to say that. The Supreme Court has even upheld that. It has to be a factually incorrect statement. Statements of opinion cannot be correct or incorrect; they're just opinions.

So what if they are just opinions? Opinions can harm others. You keep talking about how speech is free until it causes harm (then somehow it is not speech). So, if my opinion causes another person or persons harm, why should I be free to say it? It doesn't matter about the truth, opinion or not, or anything else according to your position - it is all about harm. So why the opinion exception?

I quoted the dictionary!!!! "The condition of being free of restraints." American Heritage Dictionary, 4th Edition. If it's a restraint, then you don't have freedom, because freedom is "the condition of being free of restraints"!!! Ergo, anything which restrains is not freedom!!!

Are all baby animals baby elephants in your world?

Let's add some context, shall we? "Freedom of speech" would therefore mean "The condition of being free of restraints on speech" NOT "The condition of being free of restraints on speech so long as no one else is harmed", which is what you are claiming. The "so long as no one else is harmed" is a restraint on speech and cannot be part of the definition of "freedom of speech".

Whether or not other people are harmed is completely irrelevant to the concept of freedom of speech. They only become relevant if you are trying to justify any sort of infringement on that freedom of speech.

Hate speech laws abridge freedom itself because they don't require any harm to have actually been caused. "I think gays are subhuman," even in a context that harms no one, is "hate speech." That's the difference. In all of the other examples we've looked at, there are conditions where you can say the thing and not be in violation of any laws. Not so with hate speech. Therefore, hate speech is an abrogation of free speech.

But what if I claimed (as some do) that there are NO instances where hate speech is uttered that do not cause harm. It causes harm to whoever hears it - it is an "initiation of fraud" every time it is uttered. Therefore, according to your definition, it is not part of freedom of speech. How is this analysis wrong, under your set of definitions?

[Victor Danilchenko]

shanek

That wasn't what you said earlier. Moving the goalposts again?:rolleyes:

Then it's not freedom! Freedom is "the condition of being free of restraints!" It doesn't say anything about X or Y or anything else! No restraints=freedom. Restrains=not freedom.if any restraint negates freedom, then there is no freedom, because there are always some restrains. the only coherent interpretation is to only consider resraints and freedoms as applying to a particulr person or action.

Then neither one of them are freedoms! By definition! If it restrains, it's not freedom, because freedom is "the condition of being free of restraints!"But restraining something else does not negate "being free of restraint". X may restrain Y, but that doesn't mean that X is not "free of restraint". Simple grammar -- the phrasing in terms of a verb (being) demands a subject. therfore, the definition of freedom as "a condition of being free from restraint" applies to some specific subject (compare that with "absence of restraint", which doesn't imply existence of a subject).

Me swinging my fist in the air poses no restraings, and thus is a freedom. Me swinging my fist at your nose does pose a restraint, and so it is not a freedom.And me having a nose restrains your freedom to swing your fist, and thus isn't freedom either, by your ridiculous interpretation.

Yes. If I try to kill or harm you, you are perfectly within your rights to use force against me. It's called self-defense. I woudl think even someone as deluded and obstinate as you would be able to tell the difference!of course I can -- the question is why one is a legitimate freedom and the other isn't. You are having real trouble with abstraction here, eh?..

No one. It was an accident. Unless I deliberately placed the suitcase there with the intention of tripping you.So? negligent harm is still illegal and a restraint on another's fredom. if I simply thoughtlessly left the suitcase where people walk, it's still my fault!

You see my point? You cannot simply reduce the considerations to "who initiated force"; it's no tthat simple.

Arguably you, if it were a situation where it was obvious the suitcase belonged to someone else and hadn't been abandoned.Very good. but now note that in each of those two examples, there is no way to decide who "initiated force" based purely on examining the actions without examining the significance of those actions; simply saying "initiation of force" is not enough, because unlike the nose/fist example, in most cases determining who 'initiated force" cannot be done simply by examining the actions themselves, without examining their causes and their consequences.

In short, non-initiation of force principle by itself does not give you useful guidance in vast number of cases; it simply begs the question of what constitutes "force" and what constitutes "initiation". In those cases, in order to determine who acted wrongly and who acted rightly, you have to examine the meaning of the said actions, their cultural significance, their causes and their effects. By ignoring this fact and simply repeating "non-initiation of force" mantra, you are simply letting your gut impluse determine which actions are right and which are wrong; in which case, "non-initiation of force" becomes a post-hoc explanation adaptable to simply give veneer of legitimacy to any answer that your gut tells you is right.

This isn't even difficult!of course not. Simply giving your instinctive answer is easy. the trick is in offering a coherent logical framework for determinign the answer, which framework does not rely on your gut impulse, yet provides acceptable answers. "Non-initiation of force" isn't it.

Yes, it does! Fraud is quite definitely a form of force!That's a rather bizarre definition of "force". Look "force (http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=force) up in the dictionary -- note that the only relevant definition is 1a, "The use of physical [emphasis mine -V] power or violence to compel or restrain...

How do you get that it isn't? If I get you to sign a contract under false pretenses, it's just as if I had forced you to sign it under duress (well, the degree is different, but the concepts the same).That the outcome is similar doesn't mean that the causes are equivalent. Fraud is not force by any definition of "force" I have ever encountered, except the bizarre libertarian definition you are using here.

That definition is truly ridiculous. Consider: suppose I compel you with a reasonable argument to enter into a highly detrimental contract with me; no fraud. now I compel you similarly, but by lying; this is fraud. Since fraud is a form of force, it means that the difference between force and non-force is truthfullness? Truth or falsehood are irrelevant to force, dude.

Changing your definition again?You are a complete idiot.

"A condition of being free from restraint" is the definition. "Being" is an intransitive verb, and thus demands a subject, where "condition" is simply a grammatiocal stand-in. Freedom always applies to something or someone -- and when it does, "being free from restraint" is only meaningful inacmuch as one can act in a manner than the said restrain would have restrained otherwise. hence my little joke about "freedom after speech" -- freedom is only meaningful if it can be excercised.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
And, as I have pointed out, it is not a freedom if my freedom to do it is completely dependant on the actions of other individuals over whom I have no control.

No control??? You told them to do it, you inspired them to do it! How is that having no control?

If I have to worry about about when and where I say something, how is that speech free?

Because, as I have repeated over and over and over and over again and you people still ignore, being free means being held responsible for your actions!

So what if they are just opinions? Opinions can harm others.

Not in any real sense. The harm that comes from misinformation is actual harm. You're stretching. Likewise, the only harm that comes from the truth is the harm you did to yourself.

Let's add some context, shall we? "Freedom of speech" would therefore mean "The condition of being free of restraints on speech"

No, it wouldn't. It would mean "being free of restraints on speech that is free of restraints." It goes both ways.

But what if I claimed (as some do) that there are NO instances where hate speech is uttered that do not cause harm. It causes harm to whoever hears it - it is an "initiation of fraud" every time it is uttered. Therefore, according to your definition, it is not part of freedom of speech. How is this analysis wrong, under your set of definitions?

Because you're continuing to look at the speech itself, and not the consequences of the speech. I can say "gay people are evil" all I want, but if I tell a group of homophobes "gay people are all evil and should be killed," and they go out and kill a bunch of gay people as a result, then I'm responsible.

I take you back to the cousin Guido example that everybody keeps ignoring.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
if any restraint negates freedom, then there is no freedom, because there are always some restrains.

Not unless someone does it first! As long as no one initiating force against anyone else, you have total freedom!

But restraining something else does not negate "being free of restraint".

YES IT DOES!!!! How can there be no restraints when there are restraints??? COME ON!!!! :rolleyes:

X may restrain Y, but that doesn't mean that X is not "free of restraint".

But it DOES mean that Y isn't, weasel!

So? negligent harm is still illegal and a restraint on another's fredom. if I simply thoughtlessly left the suitcase where people walk, it's still my fault!

But if you left it where few people walk, or where you wouldn't think people would be walking, it isn't.

You see my point? You cannot simply reduce the considerations to "who initiated force"; it's no tthat simple.

It is in every example you've given thus far.

Very good. but now note that in each of those two examples, there is no way to decide who "initiated force" based purely on examining the actions without examining the significance of those actions;

So? There's still an initiation of force going on.

simply saying "initiation of force" is not enough, because unlike the nose/fist example, in most cases determining who 'initiated force" cannot be done simply by examining the actions themselves, without examining their causes and their consequences.

When did I say it could?

By ignoring this fact and simply repeating "non-initiation of force" mantra, you are simply letting your gut impluse determine which actions are right and which are wrong;

Since I have already stated otherwise, this is just another one of your pathetic lies.

That's a rather bizarre definition of "force". Look "force (http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=force) up in the dictionary -- note that the only relevant definition is 1a, "The use of physical [emphasis mine -V] power or violence to compel or restrain...

Oh? What about, "To compel through pressure or necessity"? Force need not be physical, weasel, and you don't get to pick just the one out of dozens of definitions because it happens to suit you.

That the outcome is similar doesn't mean that the causes are equivalent.

But you are responsible for the consequences of your actions, not the nature of your actions that led to those consequences!

Fraud is not force by any definition of "force" I have ever encountered, except the bizarre libertarian definition you are using here.

Fraud is a form of theft. How is theft not force?

That definition is truly ridiculous. Consider: suppose I compel you with a reasonable argument to enter into a highly detrimental contract with me; no fraud. now I compel you similarly, but by lying; this is fraud. Since fraud is a form of force, it means that the difference between force and non-force is truthfullness? Truth or falsehood are irrelevant to force, dude.

That is absolutely not true. In the latter case, you are a thief. In the former, I simply made a bad deal. How is thievery not force?

A big thing black-hat hackers use to defraud their marks is "social engineering." If I trick you into giving me your password to your online banking account (by pretending to be someone at your bank, say) and I get on and transfer out all of your money, how have I not stolen from you? How have I not used force against you? Yet, by your definition, it's just a "bad deal" because you willingly gave me your password, and the fact that I lied has nothing to do with it.

Do you EVER think through anything you say?

"A condition of being free from restraint" is the definition. "Being" is an intransitive verb, and thus demands a subject, where "condition" is simply a grammatiocal stand-in. Freedom always applies to something or someone

I've never heard anything that said a transitive verb could only apply to a singular noun. How about, "the people"? Or "the world"? Once again, you're trying to weasel out of it.

In this case, freedom applies to the people of the United States of America, and anything that initiates restraint against any of them is an abrogation of freedom.

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek


No control??? You told them to do it, you inspired them to do it! How is that having no control?

Would the rioters be arrested for their actions? Of course. Why? Because they did bad things. Would they be exonerated if they said they only did it because I said so? Of course not - they are not under my control. They chose to riot - I didn't force them. That is having no control.

Because, as I have repeated over and over and over and over again and you people still ignore, being free means being held responsible for your actions!

No. Being ocmpletely, 100% free would mean never being held responsible for your actions. Being held responsible constitutes a restraint. And freedom is free of restraints, remember? So you can't say that being free of restraints is having somoene else impose punishments on you for what you do. It makes no sense at all.

Not in any real sense. The harm that comes from misinformation is actual harm. You're stretching. Likewise, the only harm that comes from the truth is the harm you did to yourself.

So it depends on the type of harm? The degree? Isn't it a bright line in your world - freedom or no freedom? Any harm should mean that you don't have the right to do that - after all, freedom is being held responsible, right?

No, it wouldn't. It would mean "being free of restraints on speech that is free of restraints." It goes both ways.

"Being free of restraints on speech that is free of restraints"? This is a circle, not both ways. What is "speech that is free of restraints" other than "being free of restraints on speech"? If you mean that the only speech that is free is the kind of speech that hurts no one, you are putting restraints on speech before you even get out of the definition! If you are going to make up definitions, at least make them internally consistent.

Face it, the position you advocate does come down to "The condition of being free of restraints on speech so long as no one else is harmed". From a definitional perspective, this make no sense. It makes much more sense to simply say freedom of speech is "The condition of being free of restraints on speech", and then examine whether anyone else is harmed by the freedom of speech, and if so, whether that specific harm outweighs the protection of freedom of speech.

Because you're continuing to look at the speech itself, and not the consequences of the speech. I can say "gay people are evil" all I want, but if I tell a group of homophobes "gay people are all evil and should be killed," and they go out and kill a bunch of gay people as a result, then I'm responsible.

What if you just tell a group of people, "Gay people are evil" and they think - "yeah, he's right! I never thought about it like that before! And if they are evil, they should be killed" and then they go kill someone, are you then responsible?

You are parsing the harm here. Hate speech is always harmful. Under your definition, it is not even speech and should be punished.

I take you back to the cousin Guido example that everybody keeps ignoring.

Who is cousin Guido? Refresh me - I don't know what you are talking about.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
Would the rioters be arrested for their actions? Of course. Why? Because they did bad things. Would they be exonerated if they said they only did it because I said so? Of course not - they are not under my control. They chose to riot - I didn't force them. That is having no control.

Oh, so it's either one or the other? If someone else is partly to blame for their actions that absolves them from any responsibility?

Back to cousin Guido...He killed the guy of his own free will. I didn't force him. Does that absolve me of all responsibility?

No. Being ocmpletely, 100% free would mean never being held responsible for your actions.

That is so completely bizarre, and never in my life have I heard anyone argue that! I think yo're getting desperate. Freedom and responsibility go hand in hand; like two sides of a coin, you can't have one without the other.

Taking away freedom is absolving responsibility. I am not responsible for actions I take under duress. If I am not free, then I am not responsible.

Being held responsible constitutes a restraint. And freedom is free of restraints, remember?

You're twisting it beyond all recognition. The restraint came in when you performed an action that initiated restraint to begin with!

So it depends on the type of harm? The degree?

No, it depends on who's responsible, as I've repeatedly said! I'm getting tired of saying the same thing over and over again and having people claim I mean something else! :mad:

Isn't it a bright line in your world - freedom or no freedom?

I never said that. There is a continuum between total freedom and total oppression. I've made that point many times when I've bemoaned the loss of a freedom here and had people retort with, "well, do you think you'd be better off in Iraq/China/wherever?"

Any harm should mean that you don't have the right to do that - after all, freedom is being held responsible, right?

Now, that's the first thing you've said right! Assuming I am responsible for that harm, that is.

"Being free of restraints on speech that is free of restraints"? This is a circle, not both ways.

It's not circular at all! The former refers to restraints on the speech, the latter refers to restraints the speech has on others!

If you mean that the only speech that is free is the kind of speech that hurts no one, you are putting restraints on speech before you even get out of the definition!

We are talking about free speech here. And free speech, under the definition we've all just agreed to, would necessitate that the consequences of the speech be free of restraint!

If you are going to make up definitions, at least make them internally consistent.

Again, I'm not making up definitions. I'm using the dictionary definition that Victor posited.

What if you just tell a group of people, "Gay people are evil" and they think - "yeah, he's right! I never thought about it like that before! And if they are evil, they should be killed" and then they go kill someone, are you then responsible?

No, no more so than TV shows are responsible for violence (although you would make a politically convenient target). It would only be if you said it in a context that would lead them to the action; for example, if it were a response to the question, "If gays are evil, they should be killed! Are gays evil?"

Hate speech is always harmful.

In what way?

Who is cousin Guido? Refresh me - I don't know what you are talking about.

The scenario I posited where I tell cousin Guido to kill a guy and he does so.

[Victor Danilchenko]

shanek

YES IT DOES!!!! How can there be no restraints when there are restraints??? COME ON!!!! :rolleyes:there can be no restraint on X when there are restraints on Y. X may be imposing restraints on Y, and yet not be restrained itself; thus X is free while abridging Y's freedom. Just because X abridges Y's freedom, doesn't mean that X is non-free itself.

But it DOES mean that Y isn't,Exactly, my slow-witted friend. yes, what it means is that X can be free even as it abridges Y's freedom; and then in turn Y can be free as it abridges X's freedom -- and when it happens together, you have a problem, because both X and Y cannot be free simulatneously. Either one of them will be free while the other's actions are abridged, or neither will be free due to abridging each other; but they cannot be free simultaneously. This is why I keep saying that some freedoms are mutually contradictory -- and that there can be no absolute freedom.

weasel!Can't you get an animal porn video somehwerre to relieve your obvious sexual obsession with weasels?

It is [that simple] in every example you've given thus far.it only seems that simple because you refuse to recognize how your subjective biases are used to fill in the gaps left by the "non-initiation of force" principle.

I have nothing against subjective biases per se; they are unavoidable. However, you have to recognize when you rely on them instead of the ostensible rationale.

So? There's still an initiation of force going on.of course -- you define initiation of force as an action that precedes abridgement of freedom, so anytime a freedom is abridged, someone somewhere did so by initiation force. the question is, can you, based solely on the non-initiation of force principle and without considering the meaning of the acts themselves, determine which act was legitimate and which was the freedom-abridging initiation of force? You can't.

When did I say it could?So you agree that "non-initiation of force" principle is insufficient?

Since I have already stated otherwise, this is just another one of your pathetic lies.of course you stated otherwise -- you never admit when your emotional biases are used as a substitute for reason, big surprise.

Oh? What about, "To compel through pressure or necessity"?First of all, liar, that was definition of the verb "to force", whereas the statement "non-initiation of force" uses a noun. but let's run with it!

So, giving someone no reasonable choice is force, eh? Suppose I am starving, and you have money -- and I steal some from you; I was forced by necessity!

if fraud is a form of force, then so is being driven to theft out of desperation; because in both cases the action (you signing fradulent contract, me stealing bread to eat) is compelled through pressure or necessity. Now this is a relatively reasonable interprepattion (in fact, it's one big factor on which I base my rejection of libertarianism), but it's one that poermits me to make a cruicial statement -- money is a form of force, and economic power, just like physical power, can be used to coerce. This is the major reason why i reject the degree of economic freedom that you libertarians espouse.

So what will it be, Shane? i fraud an act of initiation of force? But if so, then being destutute in th epresense of another's money is also initiation of force.

Fraud is a form of theft. How is theft not force?Ummm, because no physical force was applied or threatened? unless it was a mugging or something similar, of course.

That is absolutely not true. In the latter case, you are a thief. In the former, I simply made a bad deal.Yes. but the act itself is the same -- I caused to you to take certain action by saying things to you. The only difference is whether the things I said were true or false -- are you really asserting that that difference determines whether my action was force or not?!.

A big thing black-hat hackers use to defraud their marks is "social engineering." If I trick you into giving me your password to your online banking account (by pretending to be someone at your bank, say) and I get on and transfer out all of your money, how have I not stolen from you?Yes, you have.

How have I not used force against you? Nope, you didn't. What you did was wrong and it illegitimately abridged my freedoms, but it wasn't force. :rolleyes:

Do you EVER think through anything you say?I would ask the same question of you, except that i already kno wthe answer, and your response.

I've never heard anything that said a transitive verb could only apply to a singular noun.'To be' is intransitive.

How about, "the people"? Or "the world"?yes, you can; but you still need a subject. yes, X abriudging Y's freedom abridges the freedom of "the people" (X and Y collectively); but libertarians talk about individual freedoms, and X's freedom is not abridged by the act of X restraining Y.

In this case, freedom applies to the people of the United States of America, and anything that initiates restraint against any of them is an abrogation of freedom.Well then, I have no right to be secure in my person and peoperty, because my person and property rights abridge your freedom to take whatever you see... or wait, th elatter is not freedom because it abridges my rights to security of person and property/ Well, how do you know which one to apply first? Should we consider that you have no right to steal because you abriudge my freedom to have property, or that I have no right to have property because this would abridge your freedom to steal?

You determine which one to give priority to based on your gut reaction. The determination of which restraint gets priority is not in any way implicit in the "non-initiation of force' principle, but rather in your cultural conditioning. Now it's not wrong cultural conditioning, but you have to understand that this is what is going on -- that you do make a determination based not on rational ethical principles, but on your gut reaction; because the principles you nominally hold aren't sufficient for the purpose you put them to.

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek
We are talking about free speech here. And free speech, under the definition we've all just agreed to, would necessitate that the consequences of the speech be free of restraint!

Right here is the core of our disagreement, I believe. I don't know what definition that you are referring to when you say we all agreed to it, I certainly do not agree with this statement.

Let me put this as succinctly as possible: In order for speech to be free speech, the speech itself must be free from restraint. Nothing else. The consequences of the speech are irrelevant. You only look at the consequences of the speech if you are trying to restrain the speech.

You are using "freedom" as some sort of global state of affairs, whereas the term "freedom of speech" refers to specific actions. The question is not "Does this speech increase or decrease freedom as a whole for everyone?" The question is "Are there any laws that would prevent me from saying X (or put a restraint on my ability to say X)?" And a law that says if you say X and other people riot/panic, you are going to jail, then that is a law that prevents you from saying X or restrains you from saying X.

There is nothing in any definition put forth by Victor that would necessitate an examination of the consequences of speech and whether they restrain freedoms other than the freedom of speech.

As Victor has tried to explain, there is no state that is completely free of restraint. Each persons rights puts restraint on the freedom of action of each other person. Freedoms are always in conflict - what we need to do is to decide how to resolve those conflicts.


The scenario I posited where I tell cousin Guido to kill a guy and he does so.

Since you brought it up, I'll address it, but I don't see the big deal. You are free to tell Guido whatever you want. If you tell Guido to kill someone and then he does, the right to life of the person killed outweighs your freedom of speech to say you want him killed. Arresting you is a justified infringement on your right to free speech.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
I don't know what definition that you are referring to when you say we all agreed to it,

The one which states that freedom is the condition of being free of restraints.

In order for speech to be free speech, the speech itself must be free from restraint.

Do you mean that the speech must be unrestrained, or that the speech itself must not pose any restraints on others?

The consequences of the speech are irrelevant.

I disagree. I say the consequences are the only thing that is relevant. And the law, for the most part, agrees with me. If you sue someone for libel, you have to prove that actual damages occured. Just saying it isn't enough.

You are using "freedom" as some sort of global state of affairs,

That seems to be the only useful way of looking at it, since if you don't you get into the contradictions that have been the point of contention here.

When debating the first amendment (which was really fourth in the debates), Thomas Jefferson gave the following wording to James Madison in a letter dated 28 Aug 1789:

The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish any thing but false facts affecting injuriously the life, property, or reputation of others or affecting the peace of the confederacy with foreign nations.

In that same letter, Jefferson said, "These restrictions I think are so guarded, as to hinder evil only." In other words, it was not seen as a hinderance on freedom. I am using the term "freeom" exactly as our founders did.

Since you brought it up, I'll address it, but I don't see the big deal. You are free to tell Guido whatever you want. If you tell Guido to kill someone and then he does, the right to life of the person killed outweighs your freedom of speech to say you want him killed. Arresting you is a justified infringement on your right to free speech.

That wasn't the question. The question was, was Guido's actions somehow under your control?

[shanek]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
there can be no restraint on X when there are restraints on Y.

But then you're changing the definition! Your dictionary didn't say anything about X and Y...it said "free of restrictions." Period.

Exactly, my slow-witted friend.

Then provide a real-world example.

it only seems that simple because you refuse to recognize how your subjective biases are used to fill in the gaps left by the "non-initiation of force" principle.

Please specify and describe these gaps.

of course -- you define initiation of force as an action that precedes abridgement of freedom,

It's actually the other way around. Freedom is defined as the absence of force, and so anything that initiates force is an abridgement of freedom.

the question is, can you, based solely on the non-initiation of force principle and without considering the meaning of the acts themselves,

Well, geez, you have to look at the meaning of the acts themselves to determine where, if anywhere, the force lies. What you're asking is the equivalent of saying "Can you tell a meal is good without actually eating it?"

So you agree that "non-initiation of force" principle is insufficient?

Insufficient for what? Can you please form a coherent question as to what it is you're asking?

of course you stated otherwise

Then you lied.

First of all, liar, that was definition of the verb "to force",

So? It still shows that force does not have to be physical. If that were the case, then the phrase "physical force" would be a redundancy.

So, giving someone no reasonable choice is force, eh?

If you restrict their choices, then yes, you are applying force. (This is assuming that they would otherwise have those choices open to them.)

Suppose I am starving, and you have money -- and I steal some from you; I was forced by necessity!

BS. You're weaseling again. And before you do any more projection on me for using that term:

"weasel: A person regarded as sneaky or treacherous." From American Heritage.

No, you were not in any way forced to steal that money because you have other options open to you: getting a job, going to a charity, foraging for food...options that do not restrict freedom.

Now this is a relatively reasonable interprepattion

Only in your twisted mind.

money is a form of force,

Only in the sense that a hammer is a form of force. It is a tool that can be used for force.

This is the major reason why i reject the degree of economic freedom that you libertarians espouse.

Why? Considering that Libertarians would have sufficient punishments in place for the use of force (unlike what we have now), this is nothing more than one more misunderstanding about libertarianism that you are showing no desire to truly understand.

Ummm, because no physical force was applied or threatened?

Circular argument. Try again.

Yes. but the act itself is the same

No, it isn't. In the former case, you disclosed all the terms of the contract. In the latter, you lied to me about the terms, and so I entered into the contract based on bad information that you gave me.

Yes, you have.

How? There was no force involved, by your definition!

Nope, you didn't. What you did was wrong and it illegitimately abridged my freedoms, but it wasn't force. :rolleyes:

How was it not force? Saying it doesn't make it so, no matter how often you say it.

'To be' is intransitive.

Take it up with American Heritage. It can still apply to plurals.

yes, you can; but you still need a subject.

And again, the subject in the case we're referring to is the American people.

Well then, I have no right to be secure in my person and peoperty, because my person and property rights abridge your freedom to take whatever you see...

Who says I have the right to "take whatever I see"? We've already agreed that's theft! Again, you're twisting the definition of "freedom" to mean "ability."

Well, how do you know which one to apply first?

It's obvious. It's your property, so I have no right to take it. Having property isn't a form of force. Taking it without permission is.

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek


Do you mean that the speech must be unrestrained, or that the speech itself must not pose any restraints on others?

The speech must be unrestrained. Whether the speech itself poses restraints on others does not matter when we examine if the speakers freedom of speech is infringed upon. If his speech is restrained (that is, he is restrained somehow from saying something) then his freedom of speech has been infringed. Period. End of step one. Why can't you understand this?

Once we have concluded step one (if we arrest the protest speaker his freedom of speech is infringed) THEN (and only then) do we look at the consequences of the speech and whether any other freedoms were infringed. If we conclude that no other freedoms were infringed (or restrained) then the arrest was not warranted. If we conclude that some other freedom was infringed, then we need to balance that freedom against the freedom of speech to determine which, in context, is more important. Once that balance has been determined, we act accordingly - either in favour of speech, or whatever other freedom.

Your approach would allow for the infringement of speech regardless of the level of harm on the other side. If speech, in order to be free, must restrain NO OTHER freedoms (as you seem to be claiming) once you find another freedom restrained, the free speech loses. You don't do the second stage of the analysis - free speech always loses.

I disagree. I say the consequences are the only thing that is relevant. And the law, for the most part, agrees with me. If you sue someone for libel, you have to prove that actual damages occured. Just saying it isn't enough.

As I have said before, the consequences are relevant in stage 2 of the analysis - not stage 1. They don't matter to the initial determination of whether something is speech and whether it should be prima facie protected. The consequences are weighed only when we have concluded that the action was speech and that the arrest (or whatever other restraint) constitutes a restraint on that speech.

That seems to be the only useful way of looking at it, since if you don't you get into the contradictions that have been the point of contention here.

Sticking your head in the sand to avoid contradictions is not a wise approach. Nevertheless, the contradictions still exist, you are just less open and upfront about analyzing them.

When debating the first amendment (which was really fourth in the debates), Thomas Jefferson gave the following wording to James Madison in a letter dated 28 Aug 1789:

The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish any thing but false facts affecting injuriously the life, property, or reputation of others or affecting the peace of the confederacy with foreign nations.

In that same letter, Jefferson said, "These restrictions I think are so guarded, as to hinder evil only." In other words, it was not seen as a hinderance on freedom. I am using the term "freeom" exactly as our founders did.

No, you are not. Jefferson calls them "restrictions". What is a restriction, if not a restraint on the freedom of speech? Regardless of how justified Jefferson or you or I feel the restriction is, it is still a restriction! In his sentence he is engaging in what I would term the second stage of analysis - that the restriction is justified once we look at the effects! Clearly, Jefferson is recognizing that his ideas would put a restraint on the freedom of speech - and he is trying to justify them. He is NOT saying that freedom of speech only exists when we don't harm others.

That wasn't the question. The question was, was Guido's actions somehow under your control?

Was Guido under my control? No. Guido could either kill or not kill according to his own will. My actions (telling Guido to kill) are independently culpable as conspiracy to commit murder.


As usual, you haven't addressed portions of my post. I would ask you to specifically address this:
whereas the term "freedom of speech" refers to specific actions. The question is not "Does this speech increase or decrease freedom as a whole for everyone?" The question is "Are there any laws that would prevent me from saying X (or put a restraint on my ability to say X)?" And a law that says if you say X and other people riot/panic, you are going to jail, then that is a law that prevents you from saying X or restrains you from saying X.
and tell me why you disagree with it.

While you are at it, I'd also like you to address this paragraph of Victor's, which I think sums up the situation quite well:
yes, what it means is that X can be free even as it abridges Y's freedom; and then in turn Y can be free as it abridges X's freedom -- and when it happens together, you have a problem, because both X and Y cannot be free simulatneously. Either one of them will be free while the other's actions are abridged, or neither will be free due to abridging each other; but they cannot be free simultaneously. This is why I keep saying that some freedoms are mutually contradictory -- and that there can be no absolute freedom.

[Victor Danilchenko]

shanek

Note that even the Federalist quotes you cited acknowledge that freedoms are abridged: "The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish any thing but false facts.". That "but" means that people will be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish"false facts" which are injurious; so freedom of speech is abridged -- but in a very limited manner, and in well-justified ways.

But then you're changing the definition! Your dictionary didn't say anything about X and Y...it said "free of restrictions." Period.Yes, X must be free of restrictions in order to be free. "to be free of restraints" requires a subject -- something or someone that "is" free of restraints.

Then provide a real-world example.of what? I agreed with you -- X may abridge Y's freedom.

Please specify and describe these gaps.i did. You base your determination of which action is illegitimate ostensibly on the "non-initiation of force" principle; but in reality, in order to determine which action constitutes 'initiation of force', you look at the actions' significance, and apply a hidden, unstated standard. The NIF principle does not offer you any useful guidance -- it simply says "the illegitimate freedom-abridging act is illegitimate", because you define initiation of force to be the freedom-abridging act -- if you take a wallet I dropped and I punch you, you initiated force even though I was the one who first applied physical force; hence your peculiar inclusion of fraud and theft as acts "initiating force". In effect, your "initiation of force" classifications of actions becomes a post-hoc excuse applied to the acts which you determine, based on some other criteria, to be illegitimate.

The real meat of your action discrimination process is in which actions you consider to be initiations of force and which you don't consider thusly; but the method guiding that discrimination is exactly the gap that NIF leaves wide open -- the gap which you fill with something else, an emotional determination or a political bias or whatever it is.

NIF is akin to saying "the poor deserve our help" as a giude to social policy; it simply shuffles the real problem out of sight, hiding it under implicit assumptions, effectively begging the question. What does it mean to "initiate force"? Why would the poor deserve our help?

It's actually the other way around. Freedom is defined as the absence of force, and so anything that initiates force is an abridgement of freedom.Freedom is defined as absence of restraint, but restraints come in many flavors. but yes, anything that initiates force is an abridgement of freedom; and so different freedoms, by requiring their excercise to in some way restrain others, end up restraining others' freedoms. The real question is, which such restraints are legitimate and which aren't. the answer "the restraints which are enacted by initiation of force" is useless, because it simply begs the question of what constitutes "initiation of force".

Explicate the principle by which you determine which acts "initiate force" and which don't, and you will have the real answer.

Note that physical force is obvious; a little less obvious, but still reasonable, is inclusion of any non-physical act which directly harms another's property -- but here's where the grey area begins. Why is lying to harm your property "initiation of force", and telling the truth to harm your property isn't? truth and falsehood have nothing to do with force per se.

Well, geez, you [i]have to look at the meaning of the acts themselves to determine where, if anywhere, the force lies.Yes! And when you evaluate how those meanings contribute to evaluation of the act's legitimacy, you apply some principle other than NIF -- because this evaluation is a precondition for applying NIF. You evaluate whether an act is 'initiation of force" before NIF can be applied, yet you aren't saying how this semantic evaluation is done.

What you're asking is the equivalent of saying "Can you tell a meal is good without actually eating it?"No, what I am saying is that whether a meal is good must be determined by some principle other than "good meals are good for you".

Insufficient for what? Can you please form a coherent question as to what it is you're asking?Insufficient for the one and only purpose to which it applies -- the determination of whether a given act is a legitimate excercise of freedom, or an illegitimate abridgement of freedom.

No, you were not in any way forced to steal that money because you have other options open to you: getting a job, going to a charity, foraging for food...options that do not restrict freedom.if I can't get a job, don't have a charity nearby, and don't know how to forage for food without stealing, I have no other options. Contrawise, a person being defrauded has one very simple option -- not trust the scammer, refrain from signing the deal. Sure, their ability to act is limited by ignorance of the scammer's true actions; but then again, my options in procuring food may be limited by my ignorance of the existence of a soup kitchen nearby, my ignorance of foraging practices, and my ignorance of the fact that Joe's Tack and Bicycle Shop five blocks away is hiring bums to prop up its falling walls with their bodies.

Either way, there dictionary doesn'tr specify a definition of force which would allow you to classify fraud as a form of force, but not theft for survival.

Then you lied.
...
BS. You're weaseling again.
...
Only in your twisted mind.I was under impression that we were under an implied moratorium on this sort of crap. Do it once more in the near future, and I will ignore you permanently.

This post is therefore over. Please address the points raised above.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
The speech must be unrestrained. Whether the speech itself poses restraints on others does not matter when we examine if the speakers freedom of speech is infringed upon. If his speech is restrained (that is, he is restrained somehow from saying something) then his freedom of speech has been infringed. Period. End of step one. Why can't you understand this?

Because you're doing nothing but repeating yourself with no regard for my refutations. As long as my refuations stand, I will continue to dispute your contentions.

Once we have concluded step one (if we arrest the protest speaker his freedom of speech is infringed) THEN (and only then) do we look at the consequences of the speech and whether any other freedoms were infringed.

Show a real-world example of this.

No, you are not. Jefferson calls them "restrictions". What is a restriction, if not a restraint on the freedom of speech?

Reread what he said—he said it was a restraint on evil, not freedom!

Was Guido under my control? No. Guido could either kill or not kill according to his own will. My actions (telling Guido to kill) are independently culpable as conspiracy to commit murder.

Okay, now you're contradicting yourself. Earlier you made the statement that if someone else is not acting under your control then you're not responsible. Are you now reversing that earlier claim?

and tell me why you disagree with it.

Because it is completely antithetical to my claim which I have already described in detail numerous times.

While you are at it, I'd also like you to address this paragraph of Victor's, which I think sums up the situation quite well:


I have asked Victor for a real-world example. I'm awaiting that before I'll respond.

[Victor Danilchenko]

shanek

I have asked Victor for a real-world example. I'm awaiting that before I'll respond.Examples of freedoms abridging each other? I alredy gave yu some, but here's another one.

Your right to property abridges my right to free speech -- I cannot orate from your lawn. Conversely, my right to free speech abridges your property rights -- it limits the control you can have over your property.

in this example it's simple to determine which abridgement is legitimate and which isn't. Fraud is a more interesting example -- there, again, my speech harms your property, but it's not clear per se that speech cannot be used to harm property, since truthful speech is allowed to do so.

In either case, we decide to place restraints on excercise of freedom of speech for the sake of protecting a more important (in these circumstances) freedom.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
Note that even the Federalist quotes you cited acknowledge that freedoms are abridged: "[i]The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish any thing but false facts.". That "but" means that people will be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish"false facts" which are injurious; so freedom of speech is abridged -- but in a very limited manner, and in well-justified ways.

Oh, for crying out loud, can't you even read plain English? The "but" means they DO NOT HAVE THAT RIGHT, not that the right is being infringed! :rolleyes:

Yes, X must be free of restrictions in order to be free. "to be free of restraints" requires a subject -- something or someone that "is" free of restraints.

Once again, you're completely—and dishonestly—ignoring my contention that the subject in this case is the American people!

of what?

Of a freedom that, in and of itself, abridges the freedom of another.

but in reality, in order to determine which action constitutes 'initiation of force', you look at the actions' significance, and apply a hidden, unstated standard.

What hidden, unstated standard? Look, this is very simple:

Dan shoots Hal. Is this an initiation of force? we need to look at the situation to find out.

Dan shoots Hal because he's mad at him. This is an initiation of force, even if the reason he's mad is because of something Hal did to make him mad.

Dan shoots Hal because Hal's about to shoot Dan. This is not an initiation of force. Hal is in the process of initiating force against Dan, and Dan is responding in self-defense.

Get it now?

if you take a wallet I dropped and I punch you, you initiated force even though I was the one who first applied physical force;

Not necessarily. If I picked up the wallet to give it back to you, then you most definitely initiated force! But taking someone's wallet is a form of force, no matter how much you want it to be otherwise.

hence your peculiar inclusion of fraud

It's hardly peculiar. Many writers on the subject include fraud with force. I've also justified it using the dictionary. You're trying to get around it because of ONE DEFINITION which uses the word "physical." But you never answered this question: Why do we have the phrase "physical force" if all force is physical?

All of this is nothing more than you quibbling semantics. It means nothing.

Yes! And when you evaluate how those meanings contribute to evaluation of the act's legitimacy, you apply some principle other than NIF

How?? What principle?? Why won't you answer that most basic and fundamental question? If there's another principle working here, then WHAT THE SMEG IS IT????

Either way, there dictionary doesn'tr specify a definition of force which would allow you to classify fraud as a form of force,

Yes, it does! I quoted it!!!

but not theft for survival.

Did the person you stole from cause you to be starving? No? Then you initiated force against him!!! :rolleyes:

I was under impression that we were under an implied moratorium on this sort of crap.

For name-calling. I never agreed not to point out whenever you told a lie. Maybe if you would stop lying, and stop weaseling out of points you've already made, then I wouldn't have to keep pointing them out.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
Examples of freedoms abridging each other? I alredy gave yu some,

None that survived scrutiny.

but here's another one.

Your right to property abridges my right to free speech -- I cannot orate from your lawn.

You're really getting desperate. Your even coming onto my property without my permission constitutes an initiation of force (trespassing), even before any speech takes place!

I do not inhibit your freedom of speech by stopping you from orating on my lawn. A newspaper does not inhibit your freedom of speech be refusing to publish your article. This is not an abrogation of your freedom because you don't have the right to force us to accomodate you in the first place!

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek


Because you're doing nothing but repeating yourself with no regard for my refutations. As long as my refuations stand, I will continue to dispute your contentions.

Why do you think your refutations stand? All of your refutations afre nothing more than word games surrounding "freedom" and "restraint", while ignoring basic english grammar.

Show a real-world example of this.

Be glad to - but it is long. I'll put it in a seperate post for ease of use.

Reread what he said—he said it was a restraint on evil, not freedom!

No, the restraint is on sppech, but Jefferson thinks that it would only have the effect of restraining evil speech.

Okay, now you're contradicting yourself. Earlier you made the statement that if someone else is not acting under your control then you're not responsible. Are you now reversing that earlier claim?

Nope. There is a difference between saying "down with the capitalist pig-dogs" and "Guido, there's 500 bucks in it if you kill that Thanz guy". The first is just a statement. The second is an independant crime.

Because it is completely antithetical to my claim which I have already described in detail numerous times.

Thanks. You disagree because you disagree. Big help here. I am looking for specifics which you seem unable to provide, instead stating over and over that you have explained it. If you had, I wouldn't be asking.

[Thanz]

I posted this: Once we have concluded step one (if we arrest the protest speaker his freedom of speech is infringed) THEN (and only then) do we look at the consequences of the speech and whether any other freedoms were infringed.

and Shanek asked for a real world example. Well, here it is. The two stage analysis is exactly what the Supreme Court of Canada engages in. One of the issues that came before the Court was a law against Hate Propaganda. This is from the headnote summary of the case, R v. Keegstra:

The accused, an Alberta high school teacher, was charged under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code with wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group by communicating anti-semitic statements to his students. Prior to his trial, the accused applied to the Court of Queen's Bench for an order quashing the charge. The court dismissed the application on the ground that s. 319(2) of the Code did not violate freedom of expression as guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The court, for want of proper notice to the Crown, did not entertain the accused's argument that s. 319(3)(a) of the Code violated the presumption of innocence protected by s. 11(d) of the Charter. Section 319(3)(a) affords a defence of "truth" to the wilful promotion of hatred but only where the accused proves the truth of the communicated statements on a balance of probabilities. The accused was thereafter tried and convicted. On appeal the accused's Charter arguments were accepted, the Court of Appeal holding that ss. 319(2) and 319(3)(a) infringed ss. 2(b) and 11(d) of the Charter respectively, and that the infringements were not justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter.

Held (La Forest, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed. Sections 319(2) and 319(3)(a) of the Code are constitutional.

(1) Freedom of Expression

Per Dickson C.J. and Wilson, L'Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ.: Communications which wilfully promote hatred against an identifiable group are protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter. When an activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, through a non-violent form of expression, it has expressive content and thus falls within the scope of the word "expression" as found in the guarantee. The type of meaning conveyed is irrelevant. Section 2(b) protects all content of expression. In enacting s. 319(2) of the Code, Parliament sought to prohibit communications which convey meaning. Section 319(2), therefore, represents an infringement of s. 2(b).

Communications which are intended to promote hatred against identifiable groups do not fall within the ambit of a possible s. 2(b) exception concerning expression manifested in a violent form. This exception refers only to expression communicated directly through physical harm. Hate propaganda is not analogous to violence. It conveys a meaning that is repugnant, but the repugnance stems from the content of the message and not from its form. As for threats of violence, they are not excluded from the definition of expression envisioned by s. 2(b).

Sections 15 and 27 of the Charter, which deal with equality and multiculturalism, and the international agreements signed by Canada on the prohibition of racist statements, should not be used to interpret the scope of s. 2(b). It is inappropriate to attenuate the s. 2(b) freedom on the grounds that a particular context so requires. The large and liberal interpretation given to freedom of expression indicates that the preferable course is to weigh the various contextual values and factors in s. 1 of the Charter. This section both guarantees and limits Charter rights and freedoms by reference to principles fundamental in a free and democratic society.

Section 319(2) of the Code constitutes a reasonable limit upon freedom of expression. Parliament's objective of preventing the harm caused by hate propaganda is of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutional freedom. Parliament has recognized the substantial harm that can flow from hate propaganda and, in trying to prevent the pain suffered by target group members and to reduce racial, ethnic and religious tension and perhaps even violence in Canada, has decided to suppress the wilful promotion of hatred against identifiable groups. Parliament's objective is supported not only by the work of numerous study groups, but also by our collective historical knowledge of the potentially catastrophic effects of the promotion of hatred. Additionally, the international commitment to eradicate hate propaganda and Canada's commitment to the values of equality and multiculturalism in ss. 15 and 27 of the Charter strongly buttress the importance of this objective.

Section 319(2) of the Code is an acceptably proportional response to Parliament's valid objective. There is obviously a rational connection between the criminal prohibition of hate propaganda and the objective of protecting target group members and of fostering harmonious social relations in a community dedicated to equality and multiculturalism. Section 319(2) serves to illustrate to the public the severe reprobation with which society holds messages of hate directed towards racial and religious groups. It makes that kind of expression less attractive and hence decreases acceptance of its content. Section 319(2) is also a means by which the values beneficial to a free and democratic society in particular, the value of equality and the worth and dignity of each human person can be publicized.

Section 319(2) of the Code does not unduly impair freedom of expression. This section does not suffer from overbreadth or vagueness; rather, the terms of the offence indicate that s. 319(2) possesses definitional limits which act as safeguards to ensure that it will capture only expressive activity which is openly hostile to Parliament's objective, and will thus attack only the harm at which the prohibition is targeted. The word "wilfully" imports into the offence a stringent standard of mens rea which significantly restricts the reach of s. 319(2) by necessitating the proof of either an intent to promote hatred or knowledge of the substantial certainty of such a consequence. The word "hatred" further reduces the scope of the prohibition. This word, in the context of s. 319(2), must be construed as encompassing only the most severe and deeply felt form of opprobrium. Further, the exclusion of private communications from the scope of s. 319(2), the need for the promotion of hatred to focus upon an identifiable group and the presence of the s. 319(3) defences, which clarify the scope of s. 319(2), all support the view that the impugned section creates a narrowly confined offence. Section 319(2) is not an excessive impairment of freedom of expression merely because the defence of truth in s. 319(3)(a) does not cover negligent or innocent error as to the truthfulness of a statement. Whether or not a statement is susceptible to classification as true or false, such error should not excuse an accused who has wilfully used a statement in order to promote hatred against an identifiable group. Finally, while other non-criminal modes of combatting hate propaganda exist, it is eminently reasonable to utilize more than one type of legislative tool in working to prevent the spread of racist expression and its resultant harm. To send out a strong message of condemnation, both reinforcing the values underlying s. 319(2) and deterring the few individuals who would harm target group members and the larger community by communicating hate propaganda, will occasionally require use of the criminal law.

The effects of s. 319(2) are not of such a deleterious nature as to outweigh any advantage gleaned from the limitation of s. 2(b). The expressive activity at which s. 319(2) is aimed constitutes a special category, a category only tenuously connected with the values underlying the guarantee of freedom of expression. Hate propaganda contributes little to the aspirations of Canadians or Canada in either the quest for truth, the promotion of individual self-development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the participation of all individuals is accepted and encouraged. Moreover, the narrowly drawn terms of s. 319(2) and its defences prevent the prohibition of expression lying outside of this narrow category. Consequently, the suppression of hate propaganda represents an impairment of the individual's freedom of expression which is not of a most serious nature.

Emphasis mine.

The whole decision can be found here:

R v. Keegstra (http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/cgi-bin/disp.pl/en/pub/1990/vol3/html/1990scr3_0697.html?query=%22hate%20propaganda%22&langue=en&selection=&database=en/jug&method=phrase&retour=/csc-scc/cgi-bin/srch.pl?language=en~~method=phrase~~database=en%2F jug~~query=hate+propaganda~~x=13~~y=9)

edited to add emphasis

[Victor Danilchenko]

Not only are you lacking in intellectual integrity and comprehension ability, Shane, you also seem to be incapable of understanding basic civility, concealing your insults behind allegations of truth. Me calling you "dense" and "faith-blinded" would be at least as true (more so, IMO) as you calling me "a weasel", but you don't seem to understand the problem with taking your personal opinions and treating them as objective facts.

As far as I am concerned, this thread is over. let's see if you can conduct yourself better elsewhere.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
Why do you think your refutations stand?

Because no one has refuted them.

No, the restraint is on sppech, but Jefferson thinks that it would only have the effect of restraining evil speech.

And I would submit he believed evil speech ≠ free speech.

Nope. There is a difference between saying "down with the capitalist pig-dogs" and "Guido, there's 500 bucks in it if you kill that Thanz guy". The first is just a statement. The second is an independant crime.

Why? They're both speech, so by your logic they both have the same degree of freedom, right?

I am looking for specifics which you seem unable to provide,

I have provided pages of specifics! :rolleyes:

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
I posted this:

and Shanek asked for a real world example. Well, here it is. The two stage analysis is exactly what the Supreme Court of Canada engages in.

My understanding was that we were talking about "freedom of speech" as defined in the US Constitution. Hence, Canadian law would be irrelevant. But I'll examine it.

When an activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, through a non-violent form of expression, it has expressive content and thus falls within the scope of the word "expression" as found in the guarantee. The type of meaning conveyed is irrelevant. Section 2(b) protects all content of expression. In enacting s. 319(2) of the Code, Parliament sought to prohibit communications which convey meaning. Section 319(2), therefore, represents an infringement of s. 2(b).

While admitting that my knowledge of Canadian law is lacking, I do say that this makes sense.

Section 319(2) of the Code constitutes a reasonable limit upon freedom of expression. Parliament's objective of preventing the harm caused by hate propaganda is of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutional freedom. Parliament has recognized the substantial harm that can flow from hate propaganda and, in trying to prevent the pain suffered by target group members and to reduce racial, ethnic and religious tension and perhaps even violence in Canada, has decided to suppress the wilful promotion of hatred against identifiable groups.

As I read this, this seems like the same excuses given over here...They don't say the nature of the harm, but if, as is the case here, the "harm" is simply being offended, then they don't have a leg to stand on. To lift words from Thomas Jefferson, "It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg."

What was the case that prompted this ruling? Was it just people being offended? All they say there is that he was "communicating anti-semitic statements." If that's all there was to it, then I would say, yes, this is an abridgement of freedom of expression.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
Not only are you lacking in intellectual integrity and comprehension ability, Shane, you also seem to be incapable of understanding basic civility, concealing your insults behind allegations of truth. Me calling you "dense" and "faith-blinded" would be at least as true (more so, IMO) as you calling me "a weasel", but you don't seem to understand the problem with taking your personal opinions and treating them as objective facts.

As far as I am concerned, this thread is over. let's see if you can conduct yourself better elsewhere.

From the American Heritage Dictionary:

weasel: intr. v. To be evasive; equivocate.

So, if I said you were "evasive" (which you were), that would also be a personal insult? The two words mean the same thing.

This is only about you refusing to take responsibility for your own behavior.

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek

Why? They're both speech, so by your logic they both have the same degree of freedom, right?

At first instance, absolutely YES. To prevent either one is an infringment on the freedom of speech.

Next, is the infringement justified? At this stage, the analysis of the two speeches would diverge.



I have provided pages of specifics! :rolleyes:

No, you have provided pages of telling me you have told me everything.

How, specifically, is a law that says if you say X you might get arrested NOT an abridgement of Freedom of Speech?? How is it not a restraint? Even in your topsy-turvy world of considering all restraints on all freedoms to decide something specific like freedom of speech, this is a restraint on speech.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
At first instance, absolutely YES. To prevent either one is an infringment on the freedom of speech.

Next, is the infringement justified? At this stage, the analysis of the two speeches would diverge.

This is my problem: To examine whether or not it is justified, you look beyond the speech itself. Ergo, as I've said all along, aspects beyond the speech are the determining factor.

How, specifically, is a law that says if you say X you might get arrested NOT an abridgement of Freedom of Speech??

If that's all it says, then it is. I never said otherwise.

[Victor Danilchenko]

shanek

From the American Heritage Dictionary:

weasel: intr. v. To be evasive; equivocate.

So, if I said you were "evasive" (which you were), that would also be a personal insult? The two words mean the same thing.

This is only about you refusing to take responsibility for your own behavior.See, there you go again. I believe that you are dense, dishonest, and faith-blinded (substitute euphemisms as appropriate) just as firmly as you believe that I am evasive and dishonest; and I can demonstrate it to the same standard of evidence or better (especially the 'dense' part, as evidenced by your inability to grasp concepts like 'population aging' or the concepts like coherent ethical system); and so we could continue to sling insults back and forth all day, each of us firmly convinced that we are just stating facts -- but you already know where that leads, don't you?

I am willing to at least appear to give you the benefit of the doubt, by maintaining a civil discourse. Much as I dislike politesse, here it's the only alternative to ignoring you altogether. The rest is up to you.

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek

Supreme Court of Canada:
When an activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, through a non-violent form of expression, it has expressive content and thus falls within the scope of the word "expression" as found in the guarantee. The type of meaning conveyed is irrelevant. Section 2(b) protects all content of expression. In enacting s. 319(2) of the Code, Parliament sought to prohibit communications which convey meaning. Section 319(2), therefore, represents an infringement of s. 2(b).
While admitting that my knowledge of Canadian law is lacking, I do say that this makes sense.

But this goes against what you are arguing!!!

The court is saying that all forms of non-violent expression (violent expression being something like shooting an abortion doctor), regardless of content or whether it restrains other people's freedoms or anything else, are protected by freedom of speech. Period. End of step one.

You, on the other hand, are arguing that some forms of speech are not protected by freedom speech at all, based on their effects, without even examining the relative severity of the effects.

As I read this, this seems like the same excuses given over here...They don't say the nature of the harm, but if, as is the case here, the "harm" is simply being offended, then they don't have a leg to stand on. To lift words from Thomas Jefferson, "It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg."

What was the case that prompted this ruling? Was it just people being offended? All they say there is that he was "communicating anti-semitic statements." If that's all there was to it, then I would say, yes, this is an abridgement of freedom of expression.

The whole case is at the link I posted above. I used this as an example of the two step process I am advocating rather than the specifics of the case, but I would be happy to further discuss this particular case with you if you wish.

What is important is the PROCESS: The court looks at the speech, decides it is protected by freedom of expression. Then they balance the freedom of speech against other rights and freedoms that are in conflict with the freedom of speech to come to a conclusion.

Your approach would require them to collapse the two steps, and if there was harm declare that the speech is not free. Much less transparent analysis which can lead to strange results.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
But this goes against what you are arguing!!!

No, it doesn't; not unless I'm misreading it. Conveying a meaning through a nonviolent form of expression is protected regardless of the type of meaning. What did I miss?

The court is saying that all forms of non-violent expression (violent expression being something like shooting an abortion doctor), regardless of content or whether it restrains other people's freedoms or anything else,

I didn't see that last part in there. Care to point it out? (Note: Only in the part quoted, as this is the complete thought.)

The whole case is at the link I posted above.

Yes, but I've been unable to determine what it was that brought this case forward. Was there actual, presentable harm, or was it just people being offended?

(BTW, I also notice it's "on appeal"—which would suggest that the court decision isn't cut and dried, unless that means something different in Canada than it does in the US.)

I used this as an example of the two step process I am advocating

Okay. The first step was the speech, and the second step was...what?

Then they balance the freedom of speech against other rights and freedoms that are in conflict with the freedom of speech to come to a conclusion.

This is what I'm trying to ask: what rights and freedoms, specifically, are in conflict in this case? The right not to be offended? The right not to be hated? Other non-rights like that? Or any actual, tangible damage?

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek


I didn't see that last part in there. Care to point it out? (Note: Only in the part quoted, as this is the complete thought.)

Again, note that this is the summary of the decision, not the decision itself, but would you care to point out where other freedoms are considered at this stage of the analysis? Other freeodms are clearly taken into account later. Why are you asking me to prove a negative? They certainly do NOT say it is not "expression" if it limits some other dude's rights.

Yes, but I've been unable to determine what it was that brought this case forward. Was there actual, presentable harm, or was it just people being offended?

Keegstra was charged under this law:

Public incitement of hatred -- s. 319(1)

319. (1) Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of

(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or

(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Wilful promotion of hatred -- s. 319(2)

(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of

(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or

(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Defences -- s. 319(3)

(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2)

(a) if he establishes that the statements communicated were true;

(b) if, in good faith, he expressed or attempted to establish by argument an opinion on a religious subject;

(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he believed them to be true; or

(d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable group in Canada.


Definitions -- s. 319(7)
(7) In this section,
"communicating" includes communicating by telephone, broadcasting or other audible or visible means;

"identifiable group" has the same meaning as in section 318;

"public place" includes any place to which the public have access as of right or by invitation, express or implied;

"statements" includes words spoken or written or recorded electronically or electro-magnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other visible representations.

The facts leading to the charge are summarized as follows:

Mr. James Keegstra was a high school teacher in Eckville, Alberta from the early 1970s until his dismissal in 1982. In 1984 Mr. Keegstra was charged under s. 319(2) (then s. 281.2(2)) of the Criminal Code with unlawfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group by communicating anti-semitic statements to his students. He was convicted by a jury in a trial before McKenzie J. of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench.

Mr. Keegstra's teachings attributed various evil qualities to Jews. He thus described Jews to his pupils as "treacherous", "subversive", "sadistic", "money-loving", "power hungry" and "child killers". He taught his classes that Jewish people seek to destroy Christianity and are responsible for depressions, anarchy, chaos, wars and revolution. According to Mr. Keegstra, Jews "created the Holocaust to gain sympathy" and, in contrast to the open and honest Christians, were said to be deceptive, secretive and inherently evil. Mr. Keegstra expected his students to reproduce his teachings in class and on exams. If they failed to do so, their marks suffered.


Keegstra challenged his conviction on the grounds that the law was unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression. The case analyzes whether this is so.

(BTW, I also notice it's "on appeal"—which would suggest that the court decision isn't cut and dried, unless that means something different in Canada than it does in the US.)

The case was appealed from the trial level, to the Court of Appeal, and finally to the Supreme Court, which has the final say - just like in the US.

Okay. The first step was the speech, and the second step was...what?

Whether the infringement on speech is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.


This is what I'm trying to ask: what rights and freedoms, specifically, are in conflict in this case? The right not to be offended? The right not to be hated? Other non-rights like that? Or any actual, tangible damage?

The analysis of the harm of hate propaganda begins on page 745 - simply search for that page and start reading. It is quite lengthy, so I don't want to post it here.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
Again, note that this is the summary of the decision, not the decision itself, but would you care to point out where other freedoms are considered at this stage of the analysis? Other freeodms are clearly taken into account later. Why are you asking me to prove a negative?

I'm NOT asking you to prove a negative! YOU said that they said that with any freedom they should consider whether or not that freedom infringes on other freedoms. I'm asking you to point out where they said that!

They certainly do NOT say it is not "expression" if it limits some other dude's rights.

As near as I can tell, they didn't say it's free expression, either. Unless you're talking about the bit lower down, which I already said was an abrogation of freedom.

Keegstra was charged under this law:

Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of

Is there anywhere where "breach of the peace" is defined? If they're talking about inciting a riot or any of the other aspects we've already talked about, then no, it's not an abrogation of freedom. But I could find nowhere where it was presented that this happened or was shown to be likely to happen in this case.

The facts leading to the charge are summarized as follows:

Hold on...was this in a government school?

The case was appealed from the trial level, to the Court of Appeal, and finally to the Supreme Court, which has the final say - just like in the US.

Well, in the US, there have to be grounds for appeal, which means there needs to be some controversy in the decision or in the facts or the law surrounding it.

Whether the infringement on speech is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

Justified how? All you've mentioned is speech. Does the speech justify itself?

The analysis of the harm of hate propaganda begins on page 745 - simply search for that page and start reading. It is quite lengthy, so I don't want to post it here.

Here's the relevant part:

As the quotations above indicate, the presence of hate propaganda in Canada is sufficiently substantial to warrant concern. Disquiet caused by the existence of such material is not simply the product of its offensiveness, however, but stems from the very real harm which it causes. Essentially, there are two sorts of injury caused by hate propaganda. First, there is harm done to members of the target group. It is indisputable that the emotional damage caused by words may be of grave psychological and social consequence.[/b]

Well, boo hoo hoo. They don't want to be offended. The thing is, where do you draw the line? Televangelists are offensive to me. Should we ban them? By this argument, televangelists do harm to atheists.

In a similar manner, words and writings that wilfully promote hatred can constitute a serious attack on persons belonging to a racial or religious group, and in this regard the Cohen Committee noted that these persons are humiliated and degraded (p. 214).

They say "can constitute a serious attack," but don't say how.

Now look at this bit:

A second harmful effect of hate propaganda which is of pressing and substantial concern is its influence upon society at large. The Cohen Committee noted that individuals can be persuaded to believe "almost anything" (p. 30) if information or ideas are communicated using the right technique and in the proper circumstances (at p. 8):

In other words, we have to restrict free speech because people are too dumb to figure out for themselves what's BS and what isn't! Is this really something you want the government to be doing?

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek


I'm NOT asking you to prove a negative! YOU said that they said that with any freedom they should consider whether or not that freedom infringes on other freedoms. I'm asking you to point out where they said that!

What I said: The court is saying that all forms of non-violent expression (violent expression being something like shooting an abortion doctor), regardless of content or whether it restrains other people's freedoms or anything else,
(emphasis added)

What you said: I didn't see that last part in there. Care to point it out? (Note: Only in the part quoted, as this is the complete thought.)

When you refer to "that last part", I assumed you were referring to the part I have bolded. And, at the first stage of the analysis, it is quite clear that they do not take other freedoms into the analysis. I don't think they specifically say "At this stage, we don't take factors X,Y, and Z into the analysis", but it is clear that they don't. Those factors are considered later on. So, you were asking me to prove a negative, not the question you are now posing to me.

Your current question is addressed below.

As near as I can tell, they didn't say it's free expression, either. Unless you're talking about the bit lower down, which I already said was an abrogation of freedom.

What they said is that it is expression that is protected by the Charter of Rights guarantee of freedom of expression. Whether it can be limited is the subject of stage 2 of the analysis.

Is there anywhere where "breach of the peace" is defined? If they're talking about inciting a riot or any of the other aspects we've already talked about, then no, it's not an abrogation of freedom. But I could find nowhere where it was presented that this happened or was shown to be likely to happen in this case.

Sorry, I should have snipped more from the statutory section. Keegstra was charged under subsection 2, which has nothing to do with breach of the peace.

Hold on...was this in a government school?

If by government school you mean a public school, probably but I'm not sure. It makes no difference whatsoever though. Note (in a dramatic return to at least something we were discussing regarding smoking) the definition of "public place".

Well, in the US, there have to be grounds for appeal, which means there needs to be some controversy in the decision or in the facts or the law surrounding it.

Uh, so what? What difference does the existence of controversy make? There is no controversy regarding the proper analytical framework to use.

Justified how? All you've mentioned is speech. Does the speech justify itself?

The methodology is explained thusly (at around p. 735): In R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, this Court offered a course of analysis to be employed in determining whether a limit on a right or freedom can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Under the approach in Oakes, it must first be established that impugned state action has an objective of pressing and substantial concern in a free and democratic society. Only such an objective is of sufficient stature to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom (p. 138). The second feature of the Oakes test involves assessing the proportionality between the objective and the impugned measure. The inquiry as to proportionality attempts to guide the balancing of individual and group interests protected in s. 1, and in Oakes was broken down into the following three segments (at p. 139):

First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair "as little as possible" the right or freedom in question. . . . Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of "sufficient importance".

It is in this proportionality section that other freedoms are considered.

The judgement obviously does not contain all of the evidence presented before the court. The Court had many studies, etc. before it that it analyzed and ruled on. You haven't seen any of it, so I wouldn't be too quick to judge.

In any event, what I am continuing to point out is the method: Infingement, followed by justification in a fullsome analysis.

NOT find a harm, therefore no speech. If that were the approach, once they found that hate propaganda was harmful, they could deny that it is "speech" in all circumstances, which is much broader than what happens here.

[Victor Danilchenko]

Oh, shane, here's another example for you...

What about prisons? Imprisoning someone fundamentally abridges their liberty -- because their excercise of liberty had interfered with others' such excercises. Here, we have a right to pursuit of happiness conflicting with the same right in other people; and thus certain excercises of "right to pursuit of happiness" are abridged, along with the right to liberty and even right to life.

That's a pretty direct head-on conflict of fredoms right there.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
When you refer to "that last part", I assumed you were referring to the part I have bolded.

Actually, I was referring to, "whether it restrains other people's freedoms or anything else," which is not in the part I said I agreed with.

If by government school you mean a public school, probably but I'm not sure.

If so, that changes things. How you operate in your official capacity as a government agent is quite different from how you act on your own. But it appears that this law applies to everybody.

[qutoe]Uh, so what? What difference does the existence of controversy make?[/quote]

It means that the issue isn't cut-and-dried.

The methodology is explained thusly (at around p. 735):

"Pressing and substantial concern"...Sounds like the BS excuses the Supreme Court gives for abridging free speech.

Yes, I would say that this law quite clearly does abrogate freedom of speech.

In any event, what I am continuing to point out is the method: Infingement, followed by justification in a fullsome analysis.

How about pointing out an example of this method in a situation that does NOT involve a clear abrogation of freedom, as this one does? Remember that my argument is that your explanation leads to the very kind of logic that's being displayed in this case.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
What about prisons? Imprisoning someone fundamentally abridges their liberty -- because their excercise of liberty had interfered with others' such excercises.

They're not in prison because of their "exercise of liberty." They're in there because of criminal activity. We've been over this before.

That's a pretty direct head-on conflict of fredoms right there.

Hardly...

[Victor Danilchenko]

shanek

They're not in prison because of their "exercise of liberty."yes, they are -- in bypassing society's restraints on pursuit of happiness, they were acting freely.

They're in there because of criminal activity.Indeed. The criminal activity which also happened to be an excercise of their right to pursuit of happiness; it just also happened to be the kind of excercise that infringed on onthers' rights -- but that doesn't change the fact that freedoms were once again in conflict with each other.

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek
How about pointing out an example of this method in a situation that does NOT involve a clear abrogation of freedom, as this one does? Remember that my argument is that your explanation leads to the very kind of logic that's being displayed in this case.

And what logic is that? That the governement needs to stand up and say why they are abridging a freedom, and then justify it?

Your approach just says: if someone else's freedom of whatever is being infringed then it is not free speech - and therefore we can punish you for saying it. NO justification, NO analysis, NO balancing of any rights. How is this better at all?

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
And what logic is that?

THE VERY LOGIC THAT YOU KEEP IGNORING!!!!!

With a strict definition of freedom as I have given, I maintain that it is clear what acts are free and what acts aren't. I have maintained that your proposition, that we should decide when freedoms can be abridged, lead to injustices. And for a real world example of what you're talking about, you post an instance where the freedom of speech is most definitely being infringed!

Why don't you use an example where it is being unfringed under your definition but not under mine?

[shanek]

I think certain posters in this thread definitely need to read the following. It was written by Libertarian Lewis Napper:

THE BILL OF NO RIGHTS

We, the sensible people of the United States, in an attempt to help everyone get along, restore some semblance of justice, avoid any more riots, keep our nation safe, promote positive behavior and secure the blessings of debt-free liberty to ourselves and our great-great-great grandchildren, hereby try one more time to ordain and establish some common sense guidelines for the terminally whiny, guilt-ridden, delusional and other liberal, bed wetters. We hold these truths to be self-evident: that a whole lot of people were confused by the Bill of Rights and are so dim that they require a Bill of No Rights.

ARTICLE I:

You do not have the right to a new car, big screen TV or any other form of wealth. More power to you if you can legally acquire them, but no one is guaranteeing anything.

ARTICLE II:

You do not have the right to never be offended. This country is based on freedom, and that means freedom for everyone—not just you! You may leave the room, turn the channel, express a different opinion, etc., but the world is full of idiots, and probably always will be.

ARTICLE III:

You do not have the right to be free from harm. If you stick a screwdriver in your eye, learn to be more careful, do not expect the tool manufacturer to make you and all your relatives independently wealthy.

ARTICLE IV:

You do not have the right to free food and housing. Americans are the most charitable people to be found, and will gladly help anyone in need, but we are quickly growing weary of subsidizing generation after generation of professional couch potatoes who achieve nothing more than the creation of another generation of professional couch potatoes.

ARTICLE V:

You do not have the right to free health care. That would be nice, but from the looks of public housing, we're just not interested in public health care.

ARTICLE VI:

You do not have the right to physically harm other people. If you kidnap, rape, intentionally maim or kill someone, don't be surprised if the rest of us want to see you fry in the electric chair.

ARTICLE VII:

You do not have the right to the possessions of others. If you rob, cheat or coerce away the goods or services of other citizens, don't be surprised if the rest of us get together and lock you away in a place where you still won't have the right to a big-screen color TV.

ARTICLE VIII:

You do not have the right to demand that our children risk their lives in foreign wars to soothe your aching conscience. We hate oppressive governments and won't lift a finger to stop you from going to fight if you'd like. However, we do not enjoy parenting the entire world and do not want to spend so much of our time battling each and every little tyrant with a military uniform and a funny hat.

ARTICLE IX:

You do not have the right to a job. All of us sure want all of you to have one, and will gladly help you along in hard times, but we expect you to take advantage of the opportunities of education and vocational training laid before you to make yourself useful.

ARTICLE X:

You do not have the right to happiness. Being an American means that you have the right to pursue happiness—which by the way, is a lot easier if you are unencumbered by an overabundance of idiotic laws created by those of you who were confused by the Bill of Rights.

[Reager]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by shanek
[B]I think certain posters in this thread definitely need to read the following. It was written by Libertarian Lewis Napper:

...QUOTE]

Hmmm. A bit too condescending.


Mike

[Thanz]

Originally posted by shanek


THE VERY LOGIC THAT YOU KEEP IGNORING!!!!!

I'm not ignoring it - it just makes no sense.

With a strict definition of freedom as I have given, I maintain that it is clear what acts are free and what acts aren't.

But it isn't clear in the slightest.

Your approach as I understand it: You are free to say whatever you like, as long as it does not abridge the freedom of any other person. This is the same as saying "you can say whatever you like, as long as it doesn't have any real consequences." What is the point of such speech?

As I have tried to explain to you, the problem in your approach lies in the application of "as long as it does not abridge the freedom of any other person". Who decides this? You? Me? What if we disagree? On what basis doe we decide who is right?

The hate speech law is a perfect example. People who have studied the issue have come to the conclusion that spreading hate propaganda DOES infringe on the freedom of other individuals. On your reasoning, that is enough to ban it altogether. You disagree with the people who say it abridges the freedom of others - but why should we take your word for it? What analytical process did you go through to come up with that answer? And if 10 people can disagree on an issue, how does your approach make anything clear?

I have maintained that your proposition, that we should decide when freedoms can be abridged, lead to injustices. And for a real world example of what you're talking about, you post an instance where the freedom of speech is most definitely being infringed!

Why don't you use an example where it is being unfringed under your definition but not under mine?

See above.

At least my approach (shared by the Court) allows for some honesty and analysis in the infringement. Yours does not.

Your approach would lead me to say that spreading hate propaganda is not "free speech", without any real analysis.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Thanz
I'm not ignoring it - it just makes no sense.

And yet, you do nothing to explain why it makes no sense.

Your approach as I understand it: You are free to say whatever you like, as long as it does not abridge the freedom of any other person. This is the same as saying "you can say whatever you like, as long as it doesn't have any real consequences."

No, it isn't. It can have all of the consequences in the world except those that infringe upon the liberty of others!

As I have tried to explain to you, the problem in your approach lies in the application of "as long as it does not abridge the freedom of any other person". Who decides this?

Ultimately, that would be the job of the courts. But as it is, the courts are under the impression that they can support whatever infringements of freedom they want as long as there's a good enough reason. Sorry, but that ain't how the Constitution works.

The hate speech law is a perfect example. People who have studied the issue have come to the conclusion that spreading hate propaganda DOES infringe on the freedom of other individuals. On your reasoning, that is enough to ban it altogether. You disagree with the people who say it abridges the freedom of others - but why should we take your word for it? What analytical process did you go through to come up with that answer?

Well, how about simply identifying the freedom that is allegedly infringed? And then examining the situation to see if such an infringement has actually taken place? This isn't rocket science. It's based on evidence; evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

At least my approach (shared by the Court) allows for some honesty and analysis in the infringement. Yours does not.

:rolleyes:

Your approach would lead me to say that spreading hate propaganda is not "free speech", without any real analysis.

No, you would have to support that claim by showing what freedoms are being infringed.