Review of Dennett on the science of religion

[ceo_esq]

For anyone interested, this week's edition of The New Yorker carries an intriguing review by evolutionary geneticist H. Allen Orr of Daniel Dennett's new book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. Link is below.

http://www.newyorker.com/critics/books/

[Giz]

For anyone interested, this week's edition of The New Yorker carries an intriguing review by evolutionary geneticist H. Allen Orr of Daniel Dennett's new book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. Link is below.

http://www.newyorker.com/critics/books/

"For some people, the spell cast by religion seems to have less to do with the particular claims made by a particular tradition than with larger metaphysical claims: the universe has a purpose, God exists, or life is sacred. So the more serious question is whether a science of religion—indeed, whether science in general—can undermine these sorts of beliefs."

- Probably not. Wishful thinking is rather hard to eradicate.

[ceo_esq]

"For some people, the spell cast by religion seems to have less to do with the particular claims made by a particular tradition than with larger metaphysical claims: the universe has a purpose, God exists, or life is sacred. So the more serious question is whether a science of religion—indeed, whether science in general—can undermine these sorts of beliefs."

- Probably not. Wishful thinking is rather hard to eradicate.

That's true, but I don't think that's what Orr was getting at there, which he goes on to explain:

Science can certainly undermine particular factual claims made by religion (the universe was created in six days), but it's far less clear that it can challenge religion's general metaphysical claims (the universe has a purpose). To insist on this distinction is to recognize what it means for something to be a metaphysical, not a physical, claim. What experiment could prove that the universe has no purpose? To suppose that a kind of physics can demolish a kind of metaphysics is to commit what philosophers call a category mistake.

I think he was suggesting that the chief difficulty with whether science can undermine religious beliefs has to do with an objective "category mistake", not with the subjective tenacity of belief.

[drkitten]

I think he was suggesting that the chief difficulty with whether science can undermine religious beliefs has to do with an objective "category mistake", not with the subjective tenacity of belief.

But it's not necessarily a category mistake. One of the effects of a lot of recent studies into brain mapping, in particular, is to present a materialist and a-theistic explanation for a lot of apparently metaphysical phenomena.

A classic example, of course, is Darwin's contribution to Paley's Watchmaker argument. Paley attempted to infer a metaphysical entity (a Creator, and hence a purpose in creation) from a physical one (the watch, or more metaphorically, the complexity of life). Prior to Darwin's theories (and the physical evidence for those theories), there was no acceptable materialistic explanation of the apparent complexity. As Dawkins put it, "Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist."

Similarly, one oft-cited reason for belief in God is personal experience -- having "felt" His presence. Recent advances in neurology have suggested that this "feeling" can be produced via purely material stimulation of of neural tissues. This doesn't disprove the noumenous feeling of God, but it offers a competing explanation where before there essentially was none.

[ceo_esq]

But it's not necessarily a category mistake. One of the effects of a lot of recent studies into brain mapping, in particular, is to present a materialist and a-theistic explanation for a lot of apparently metaphysical phenomena.

This strikes me as precisely the sort of thing that can lead one into the category mistake to which Orr alludes, but I suppose I can't really say absent a clarification as to what the pronoun I've bolded above is meant to refer.

[ETA: Does "it" mean, as Orr says, the supposition that a kind of physics can demolish a kind of metaphysics? That is not, to my mind, what your examples demonstrate (except perhaps the supposition part).]

[Iacchus]

For anyone interested, this week's edition of The New Yorker carries an intriguing review by evolutionary geneticist H. Allen Orr of Daniel Dennett's new book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. Link is below.

http://www.newyorker.com/critics/books/The only problem is that religion (what it alludes to) is not a natural phenomen.

[drkitten]

This strikes me as precisely the sort of thing that can lead one into the category mistake to which Orr alludes, but I suppose I can't really say absent a clarification as to what the pronoun I've bolded above is meant to refer.

I quote from Orr (well, from your quotation of Orr):


To suppose that a kind of physics can demolish a kind of metaphysics is to commit what philosophers call a category mistake.

I specifically claim that "a kind of physics can demolish a kind of metaphysics" by presenting a credible, purely-physical, counter-hypothesis. That's what the "it" refers to above. And I specifically claim that there's no category mistake involved in such a claim.

In particular, to claim that a particular proposition (e.g., "the universe has a purpose") is purely metaphysical is to some extent an argument from ignorance. It's a statement that we are ignorant of any physical implications that such a proposition has.

The boundary between the physical and metaphysical is drawn by taking the fullest extension of the physical that we know of, and then putting everything outside that boundary into the "metaphysical." As our knowledge of the physical increases, so does our definition of the metaphysical decrease.

[ceo_esq]

I specifically claim that "a kind of physics can demolish a kind of metaphysics" by presenting a credible, purely-physical, counter-hypothesis. That's what the "it" refers to above. And I specifically claim that there's no category mistake involved in such a claim.

I see. In that case, there is no category mistake, I agree. However, I don't agree with the claim that presenting a credible, purely-physical counter-hypothesis to a metaphysical claim demolishes it; but that appears to hinge on one's definition of "demolish". [ETA: Indeed, I wonder how often a physical explanation can really be described as a "counter-hypothesis" to a metaphysical claim.]


In particular, to claim that a particular proposition (e.g., "the universe has a purpose") is purely metaphysical is to some extent an argument from ignorance. It's a statement that we are ignorant of any physical implications that such a proposition has.

I suppose this is true, and of course it is also true that the same proposition may have both physical and metaphysical implications. Though I'm not sure Orr or anyone else would describe the proposition The universe has a purpose as "purely metaphysical" in the sense you seem to be using that expression. If nothing else, it obviously carries the "physical implication" that the universe exists.


The boundary between the physical and metaphysical is drawn by taking the fullest extension of the physical that we know of, and then putting everything outside that boundary into the "metaphysical." As our knowledge of the physical increases, so does our definition of the metaphysical decrease.

I'm not sure I agree with these statements. (They depend on definitions, perhaps). Our knowledge of the physical has increased greatly in the last 50 years, for example. I don't perceive a corresponding reduction - and certainly not a directly proportionate one - in the scope of the preoccupations of metaphysics during the same period. Increased knowledge of the physical seems generally to take place within its own category without resulting in a redefinition of the categories (or perhaps more exactly, in the addition of a member of one set at the expense of the other set).

[Cain]

I like Dr. Orr's sobering analysis. If memory serves, he wrote a critical review of _Darwin's Dangerous Idea_ for the journal _Evolution_ some 10 years ago.

[drkitten]

I'm not sure I agree with these statements. (They depend on definitions, perhaps). Our knowledge of the physical has increased greatly in the last 50 years, for example. I don't perceive a corresponding reduction - and certainly not a directly proportionate one - in the scope of the preoccupations of metaphysics during the same period. Increased knowledge of the physical seems generally to take place within its own category without resulting in a redefinition of the categories (or perhaps more exactly, in the addition of a member of one set at the expense of the other set).

Well, metaphysicists tend to take longer to respond to new developments in science than scientists themselves do -- heck, they often take longer to respond to new developments in metaphysics than scientists themselves do.

But quite a bit of of metaphysical questioning has been folded into the realm of the physical in the past fifty years or thereabouts. Just as some simple examples : the Big Bang theory has essentially put an end to the question about whether the univese has always existed (it hasn't), whether the laws of physics have always been constant (they haven't -- witness electroweak unification), whether the universe will persist forever (current thinking says yes, based on the observed mass of the universe, but that may change with new physical data), and whether or not we occupy a physically special place in God's universe (we know that there are at least other planets out there, so it's not that special.) A theologian in 1950 would have regarded all of those as deeply metaphysical or theological questions, and we begin now to have physical answers to them.

Similarly, the past fifty years, although a hundred years might be a better time scale, have given us quite a bit of insight into the nature of moral behavior; read A Clockwork Orange for a very good literary explanation about what we may be able to do. C. S. Lewis wrote extensively about this in his book The Abolition of Man, a book he could not have envisioned in 1900 because the psychology wasn't there. We are starting to develop a theory of morality in terms of evolutionary fitness (Ackerman? and his iterated prisoner's dilemma are a good mathematical formulation, in terms invented by von Neumann and Morgenstern). We're even starting to look at some of the questions involved in the psychology of the esthetic sense -- what makes some music, paintings, etc. "better" than others?

[drkitten]

I see. In that case, there is no category mistake, I agree. However, I don't agree with the claim that presenting a credible, purely-physical counter-hypothesis to a metaphysical claim demolishes it; but that appears to hinge on one's definition of "demolish". [ETA: Indeed, I wonder how often a physical explanation can really be described as a "counter-hypothesis" to a metaphysical claim.]

Well, is homosexuality a moral choice (a sin?), or is it a hormonally-controlled physical attribute of a human being?

The claim that merely being homosexual is inherently immoral -- which I regard as almost purely a metaphysical proposition, because "morals" are about as non-physical as you can get -- becomes significantly less plausible if we can point to a genetic or environmental basis for it. As a matter of fact, being left-handed used to be regarded as a sin. What changed?

[Jekyll]

Science can certainly undermine particular factual claims made by religion (the universe was created in six days), but it's far less clear that it can challenge religion's general metaphysical claims (the universe has a purpose). To insist on this distinction is to recognize what it means for something to be a metaphysical, not a physical, claim. What experiment could prove that the universe has no purpose? To suppose that a kind of physics can demolish a kind of metaphysics is to commit what philosophers call a category mistake.
Of course there is a huge difference between showing the universe does not have a purpose and showing that a presumption of a particular purpose is not necessary to explain the universe.

Orr himself seems to be performing a form of category mistake in his comparison of undermining one particular claim against the disproving an infinite number of possible claims.

He might as well be asking: "What experiment could prove that the universe was not created by god?"

I don't see any reason for the division between factual claims and those of purpose.

[ceo_esq]

Well, metaphysicists tend to take longer to respond to new developments in science than scientists themselves do -- heck, they often take longer to respond to new developments in metaphysics than scientists themselves do.

Agreed. And for better or worse, we are no longer in an era where trained scientists are also trained metaphysicians. Still, I'm not persuaded that we're simply waiting for the inevitable other shoe to drop when metaphysics finally assimilates all the scientific progress of the past fifty years.


But quite a bit of of metaphysical questioning has been folded into the realm of the physical in the past fifty years or thereabouts. Just as some simple examples : the Big Bang theory has essentially put an end to the question about whether the univese has always existed (it hasn't), whether the laws of physics have always been constant (they haven't -- witness electroweak unification), whether the universe will persist forever (current thinking says yes, based on the observed mass of the universe, but that may change with new physical data), and whether or not we occupy a physically special place in God's universe (we know that there are at least other planets out there, so it's not that special.) A theologian in 1950 would have regarded all of those as deeply metaphysical or theological questions, and we begin now to have physical answers to them.

I'm open to correction on this point, but I do not see why or how the questions you mention are (or would appear, to a theologian in 1950, to be) of a fundamentally metaphysical nature, albeit that the answers are, like any empirical facts, potentially highly relevant to metaphysical inquiries. The fact (which I assume arguendo) that it would not have appeared feasible in 1950 to design and carry out an experiment to resolve these questions does not alter this.


Similarly, the past fifty years, although a hundred years might be a better time scale, have given us quite a bit of insight into the nature of moral behavior; read A Clockwork Orange for a very good literary explanation about what we may be able to do. C. S. Lewis wrote extensively about this in his book The Abolition of Man, a book he could not have envisioned in 1900 because the psychology wasn't there. We are starting to develop a theory of morality in terms of evolutionary fitness (Ackerman? and his iterated prisoner's dilemma are a good mathematical formulation, in terms invented by von Neumann and Morgenstern). We're even starting to look at some of the questions involved in the psychology of the esthetic sense -- what makes some music, paintings, etc. "better" than others?

I don't disagree with your observations as to Burgess and Lewis, as well as the one I think you meant to make with respect to Axelrod. Yet I don't view any of them as either provoking or reflecting a fundamental change in the relationship of the two categories (physical and metaphysical). The same goes for your reference to the psychology of aesthetics, an enterprise which I think would have been basically recognizable to Aristotle.


Well, is homosexuality a moral choice (a sin?), or is it a hormonally-controlled physical attribute of a human being?

The claim that merely being homosexual is inherently immoral -- which I regard as almost purely a metaphysical proposition, because "morals" are about as non-physical as you can get -- becomes significantly less plausible if we can point to a genetic or environmental basis for it. As a matter of fact, being left-handed used to be regarded as a sin. What changed?

Well, that's not a bad example, actually. Let's consider a hypothetical claim that homosexuality per se is morally fraught. It might rest, inter alia on the physical premise that homosexual orientation is not biologically determined, and also take into consideration the metaphysical premise that only states that are not biologically determined can be morally fraught.

Now let's imagine that new physical knowledge leads us to realize that homosexuality is a biologically determined state. The argument and conclusion will need to be revised to the effect that homosexuality is not morally fraught. Accordingly, new physical knowledge has prompted both a new physical understanding and, indirectly, a new metaphysical understanding.

Yet what has really happened here? Homosexuality has been shifted from one physical category ("not biologically determined") to another ("biologically determined"), as well as from one metaphysical category ("morally fraught") to another ("not morally fraught"). This amounts to a rearrangement of the furniture on either side of the physical/metaphysical divide, not a revision of where the divide lies. The premises and conclusion of the revised argument, although informed by a better scientific understanding, have not thereby become "more physical" or "less metaphysical" than those of the original claim.


Of course there is a huge difference between showing the universe does not have a purpose and showing that a presumption of a particular purpose is not necessary to explain the universe.

True, although I would submit that such a statement requires some qualification with regard to explaining the universe. After all, metaphysical formal, final or efficient causes could exist or be true without being necessary to provide a workable account of the physical universe. Indeed, in principle one does not need knowledge of all true physical causes to explain the physical universe.


Orr himself seems to be performing a form of category mistake in his comparison of undermining one particular claim against the disproving an infinite number of possible claims.

Could you elaborate?


He might as well be asking: "What experiment could prove that the universe was not created by god?"

Perhaps, but where is the category mistake in that question?


I don't see any reason for the division between factual claims and those of purpose.

Claims of purpose are factual claims [ETA: in a certain sense], so in that sense you're right. The division between metaphysical claims and physical claims, on the other hand, is simply a function of the different properties of those respective claims. It exists regardless of a reason. But I should think that the reasons for maintaining the cognitive distinction are readily apparent, no?

[drkitten]

Well, that's not a bad example, actually. Let's consider a hypothetical claim that homosexuality per se is morally fraught. It might rest, inter alia on the physical premise that homosexual orientation is not biologically determined, and also take into consideration the metaphysical premise that only states that are not biologically determined can be morally fraught.

Now let's imagine that new physical knowledge leads us to realize that homosexuality is a biologically determined state. The argument and conclusion will need to be revised to the effect that homosexuality is not morally fraught. Accordingly, new physical knowledge has prompted both a new physical understanding and, indirectly, a new metaphysical understanding.

Yet what has really happened here? Homosexuality has been shifted from one physical category ("not biologically determined") to another ("biologically determined"), as well as from one metaphysical category ("morally fraught") to another ("not morally fraught"). This amounts to a rearrangement of the furniture on either side of the physical/metaphysical divide, not a revision of where the divide lies.

I disagree. More accurately, I think you're putting too much weight on your metaphors, since you're attempting to draw a distinctinon between a physical object (furniture) that can be moved around at whim within a relatively fixed space, versus a physical space that is categorized via an explicit and movable boundary. When we're dealing with concepts that are inherently not physical, trying to distinguish between two purely physical metaphors should be regarded with a certain amount of suspicion.

The premises and conclusion of the revised argument, although informed by a better scientific understanding, have not thereby become "more physical" or "less metaphysical" than those of the original claim.

I think the key question to be addressed here is what the actual "argument" is, both before and after it's been "revised." I claim that the key question here is one of the nature of "sin," and as such I regard it as a metaphysical question. I further claim that a key question about the nature of sin is whether or not it actually exists -- whether as a term, it has any genuine referent. If it does, then a lot of other metaphysical questions open up. Is there a difference between mortal and venial sin? What are the effects of sin on the humanity? Can these effects be mitigated or eliminated by any process we understand? Can sin be mitigated by works, or only by faith alone? Et cetera. Given your background, I'm sure you could discuss any of these questions for hours -- but only in a context where we accept that "sin" is in fact, real (in a metaphysical sense).

For argument's sake, I will take the other side in that debate. Resolved : that the word "sin" has no metaphysical referent. If I'm correct, then there's a whole area of discussion that belongs
properly to psychology (and thus to the physical sciences), not to metaphysics. And I cite as evidence in favor of my argument -- not, of course, as proof, but as evidence -- the recent findings with regard to biological determination of "moral" behavor such as homosexuality, altruism, kin-selection, and so forth.

Returning to an earlier paragraph of yours:


I'm open to correction on this point, but I do not see why or how the questions you mention are (or would appear, to a theologian in 1950, to be) of a fundamentally metaphysical nature, albeit that the answers are, like any empirical facts, potentially highly relevant to metaphysical inquiries. The fact (which I assume arguendo) that it would not have appeared feasible in 1950 to design and carry out an experiment to resolve these questions does not alter this.

I don't disagree with your observations as to Burgess and Lewis, as well as the one I think you meant to make with respect to Axelrod. Yet I don't view any of them as either provoking or reflecting a fundamental change in the relationship of the two categories (physical and metaphysical). The same goes for your reference to the psychology of aesthetics, an enterprise which I think would have been basically recognizable to Aristotle.

The fundamental change that I submit has occurred is not that metaphysicians now consider certain experiments feasible that would not have been feasible in 1950 -- but that they consider certain questions to be addressible by experiment, when they would have disagreed vehemently that the questions were so addressible. Lewis has a good formulation of that (same source, IIRC), when he points out that no amount of observation can have any bearing on a moral question. A declarative premise cannot yield a conclusion in the imperative -- from an is, you cannot infer an ought.

And as a general principle, I think I agree with him. But as the homosexuality example shows, that's only true when the ought-question represents a genuine moral choice. If I can show that a given option is not a genuine choice, but a compulsion or a fixed state of the world, then the nature of the ought-question changes. I haven't answered it -- instead I've eliminated it as a meaningful question. As such, by expanding the domain of the physical, I have reduced the domain of the metaphysical.

[ceo_esq]

I disagree. More accurately, I think you're putting too much weight on your metaphors, since you're attempting to draw a distinctinon between a physical object (furniture) that can be moved around at whim within a relatively fixed space, versus a physical space that is categorized via an explicit and movable boundary. When we're dealing with concepts that are inherently not physical, trying to distinguish between two purely physical metaphors should be regarded with a certain amount of suspicion.

Rats. I was rather fond of that little metaphor. No matter, though; that was not intended as what you might call a "load-bearing metaphor" in that the weight of the point does not repose on it - so feel free to read that paragraph without with the pertinent sentence. Do you still disagree?


I think the key question to be addressed here is what the actual "argument" is, both before and after it's been "revised." I claim that the key question here is one of the nature of "sin," and as such I regard it as a metaphysical question.

I agree that the nature of sin is of obvious relevance to the argument, and that it is a metaphysical matter, but it certainly can be distinguished from the argument per se, which you appear to want to move away from.


I further claim that a key question about the nature of sin is whether or not it actually exists -- whether as a term, it has any genuine referent.

I follow you so far, although I can already see definitional difficulties looming ahead.


If it does, then a lot of other metaphysical questions open up. Is there a difference between mortal and venial sin? What are the effects of sin on the humanity? Can these effects be mitigated or eliminated by any process we understand? Can sin be mitigated by works, or only by faith alone? Et cetera. Given your background, I'm sure you could discuss any of these questions for hours -- but only in a context where we accept that "sin" is in fact, real (in a metaphysical sense).

As a nonbeliever, I'm perhaps not well-placed to discuss the finer points of concepts like "sin", so it's just as well if we can skip it.


For argument's sake, I will take the other side in that debate. Resolved : that the word "sin" has no metaphysical referent.

I guess I get stuck with the other side, then? :)

Okay. Just so I understand what you mean by this resolution, let me ask a few preliminary questions, which I honestly hope don't come across as annoying. What is a metaphysical referent? If it's truly metaphysical, then is it safe to say that the existence of the referent does not depend on physical instantiation? Would you say that "chair" has a metaphysical referent independent of the existence of any physical instances of chairs? Would the existence of a metaphysical referent for sin depend on the actual instantiation of, say, sinful acts (presumably by free agents, whether human, angelic or what have you)? What about their potential or logically possible instantiation?


The fundamental change that I submit has occurred is not that metaphysicians now consider certain experiments feasible that would not have been feasible in 1950 -- but that they consider certain questions to be addressible by experiment, when they would have disagreed vehemently that the questions were so addressible.

I don't see why a metaphysician in 1950 could not or would not have deemed such questions to be at least theoretically addressable by experiment, except possibly to the extent that there might be some metaphysical aspect of the questions arising from an ambiguity (for example, if "universe" is taken to refer to something distinct from the thing created by the Big Bang). For all I know, there were metaphysicians fifty years ago who would have taken the stance you describe, but I see nothing about metaphysics as such that would have compelled them to do so.


Lewis has a good formulation of that (same source, IIRC), when he points out that no amount of observation can have any bearing on a moral question. A declarative premise cannot yield a conclusion in the imperative -- from an is, you cannot infer an ought.

Right, but that's just the very old positive-normative distinction so aptly expressed by Hume (though, I think, traceable through Aquinas possibly to Aristotle). What's the specific connection to our 1950s metaphysician? And I think you (or Lewis, though I don't remember him stating it in quite those terms) overstate the matter to say that observation can really have no bearing on a moral question. For example, it may be impossible to deduce from observation the normative principle One ought not to enslave sentient beings, but if you accept it, and the moral question at hand is "Am I doing something I shouldn't be?", observation is required in order for to you figure out whether you are enslaving sentient beings.

[ETA: And doesn't the fact-value split, at least as you've described it, suggest that no amount of physical observation will have any bearing on the metaphysical domain as such?]


And as a general principle, I think I agree with him. But as the homosexuality example shows, that's only true when the ought-question represents a genuine moral choice. If I can show that a given option is not a genuine choice, but a compulsion or a fixed state of the world, then the nature of the ought-question changes. I haven't answered it -- instead I've eliminated it as a meaningful question. As such, by expanding the domain of the physical, I have reduced the domain of the metaphysical.

I'm gathering that the moral question here was something like: "Is it wrong for a man to prefer other men sexually?" If so, we have answered it (for the limited purposes of our hypothetical, anyway); the answer was, "No, it isn't." Why is the question less meaningful by virtue of having been answered in this way?

[Jekyll]

True, although I would submit that such a statement requires some qualification with regard to explaining the universe. After all, metaphysical formal, final or efficient causes could exist or be true without being necessary to provide a workable account of the physical universe. Indeed, in principle one does not need knowledge of all true physical causes to explain the physical universe.

I think this very much depends on what you mean by explain.


Could you elaborate?

Certainly.

Science can certainly undermine particular factual claims made by religion (the universe was created in six days), but it's far less clear that it can challenge religion's general metaphysical claims (the universe has a purpose)To insist on this distinction is to recognize what it means for something to be a metaphysical, not a physical, claim.
He's not comparing like with like here. The difficulty in responding to the second part arises not because one claim is metaphysical and the other is not but because "the universe has a purpose" is a large class of claims whilst the first is a specific claims by the young earthers.

He's only showing the need to treat claims and classes of claims separately and not the need to treat metaphysical claims differently.


Claims of purpose are factual claims [ETA: in a certain sense], so in that sense you're right. The division between metaphysical claims and physical claims, on the other hand, is simply a function of the different properties of those respective claims. It exists regardless of a reason. But I should think that the reasons for maintaining the cognitive distinction are readily apparent, no?
No, I disagree here. I think by it's very nature metaphysics is forced into a similar position as the 'god of the gaps'. Whilst it should be concerned with questions science can not answer, it can only ever look to questions science can not answer at the moment and there is often no guarantee that science will not answer them in the future.

[ntech]

Just a personal note: I bought the book on the day that it was released and could not put it down....
It is worth a read. I challenge any theist to read it with an open mind.

[ceo_esq]

I think this very much depends on what you mean by explain.

In that instance, I meant constructing a model or paradigm that coherently and comprehensively accounts for observed data - something like that.


He's not comparing like with like here.

Surely his goal here is contrast rather than comparison?


The difficulty in responding to the second part arises not because one claim is metaphysical and the other is not but because "the universe has a purpose" is a large class of claims whilst the first is a specific claims by the young earthers.

That might be a separate practical difficulty, but it certainly does not detract from his point. In fact, I'm not sure what you're really getting at here. After all, "the earth was created in six days" is also a theoretically large class, insofar as it encompasses claims that the earth was created in six days by gods/extraterrestrials/random causes/etc., that this took place billions/thousands/scores/etc. of years ago, that it was accomplished via magical/technological/natural/etc. means, and so forth.


He's only showing the need to treat claims and classes of claims separately and not the need to treat metaphysical claims differently.

I daresay that in any formal sense in which the first is a claim, the second is also a claim. Likewise, in any sense in which the second is a class of claims, the first is also a class of claims. Looking at it in this way isn't too important here. The salient difference Orr is identifying does indeed arise from the metaphysical nature of the second: no member of that class of claims is addressable by experiment.


No, I disagree here. I think by it's very nature metaphysics is forced into a similar position as the 'god of the gaps'. Whilst it should be concerned with questions science can not answer, it can only ever look to questions science can not answer at the moment and there is often no guarantee that science will not answer them in the future.

Except to the extent I've previously outlined, metaphysics is fundamentally preoccupied with questions that it is not logically, or definitionally, possible for science to answer independently. Albeit that once in a great while there is a genuine and general misapprehension about what falls into that category, it does tend to function as a pretty secure guarantee. In my view, metaphysics does not directly address questions which are even theoretically capable of being addressed empirically in the future. Drkitten and I are discussing the merits of that opinion at this moment.

[drkitten]

In my view, metaphysics does not directly address questions which are even theoretically capable of being addressed empirically in the future.

That's a pretty good description, in my opinion.

Drkitten and I are discussing the merits of that opinion at this moment.

... and the my contribution to the discussion is simply that, as theories of the physical change, the range of questions that are empirically addressible increases.

[hammegk]

... Recent advances in neurology have suggested that this "feeling" can be produced via purely material stimulation of of neural tissues. This doesn't disprove the noumenous feeling of God, but it offers a competing explanation where before there essentially was none.
A very key point imo. Given that one has had more or more numenous experiences, one can choose to accept either view -- which is nothing more or less than choice of monism, physical vs ~physical.

my 2cts ..

eta: I'd posit that a single experience presents the greatest challenge.

[hammegk]

I'm gathering that the moral question here was something like: "Is it wrong for a man to prefer other men sexually?" If so, we have answered it (for the limited purposes of our hypothetical, anyway); the answer was, "No, it isn't." Why is the question less meaningful by virtue of having been answered in this way?

These folks seem to disagree with your answer.

http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/family2.htm


I challenge any theist to read it with an open mind.
Here's one.

http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/StarParker/2006/04/03/192208.html

While you're sending her a copy, you can also perhaps offer the solution to the problems she thinks she has identified.

[Jekyll]

That might be a separate practical difficulty, but it certainly does not detract from his point. In fact, I'm not sure what you're really getting at here. After all, "the earth was created in six days" is also a theoretically large class, insofar as it encompasses claims that the earth was created in six days by gods/extraterrestrials/random causes/etc., that this took place billions/thousands/scores/etc. of years ago, that it was accomplished via magical/technological/natural/etc. means, and so forth.

I'm going to use Orr's quote here "the universe was created in six days". This hasn't been shown to be false, for all we know someone could have spent 6 days trying to get a big bang generator to work before giving in and hitting it with a metaphysical monkey wrench 'till it worked. What has been shown to be false (or at least incredible unlikely) is the specific claims by young earthers, the Christo-Islamic-Jewish creation myth. In the process many other creation myths that don't involve 6 days have been discredited.

A piece of evidence will discredit a whole class of similar claims in the process of discrediting a single claim.
This doesn't mean that you can then turn round and expect to find evidence capable of discrediting a sufficiently broad class of claims. Like "The universe has a purpose."

The salient difference Orr is identifying does indeed arise from the metaphysical nature of the second: no member of that class of claims is addressable by experiment.
I'm not claiming this is false, but I'm saying it hasn't been shown to be true.
Earlier you said Claims of purpose are factual claims [ETA: in a certain sense]
So you're clearly using a different definition of metaphysics to Orr who considers claims of purpose metaphysical.
With Orr, some specific claims of the form "The purpose of the universe is X" are discreditable ~ whenever it is not feasible that X could ocure.
If you could constructively define what you think a metaphysical claim is that would help.

[ceo_esq]

That's a pretty good description, in my opinion.


... and the my contribution to the discussion is simply that, as theories of the physical change, the range of questions that are empirically addressible increases.

Hmm. I conceived of "theoretically capable of being addressed in the future" as a category intrinsically not subject to change, so we must be interpreting it differently. I did not mean "capable of being addressed by a new physical theory in the future", for example. I think was using it in a sense closer, perhaps, to "not logically restricted by the definition of empirical" or simply "potentially addressable". I agree with you that theories of the physical change, the range of questions that are empirically addressible in an immediate or practical sense increases (though I suppose theories of the physical could change in such a way as to have the opposite effect). Yet it seems to me that whatever newly addressable questions arise must come from the ranks of the potentially addressable, which I exclude from the fundamental and direct preoccupations of metaphysics. I must think further on this.


These folks seem to disagree with your answer.

http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/family2.htm

It wasn't an actual answer I was giving, just one assumed for the purposes of the hypothetical scenario.


I'm going to use Orr's quote here "the universe was created in six days". This hasn't been shown to be false, for all we know someone could have spent 6 days trying to get a big bang generator to work before giving in and hitting it with a metaphysical monkey wrench 'till it worked.

I think he was referring to a claim that the universe was created in substantially its present form in six days, which is consistent with the Book of Genesis read literally, but is not intrinsically "Christo-Islamic-Jewish". There are potentially limitless variations on the theme (though your Big Bang machine wouldn't count as one of them), just as there are potentially limitless variations on the notion that the universe has a purpose.


A piece of evidence will discredit a whole class of similar claims in the process of discrediting a single claim. This doesn't mean that you can then turn round and expect to find evidence capable of discrediting a sufficiently broad class of claims. Like "The universe has a purpose."

How (strictly empirically, anyway) would you go about discrediting any claim that the universe has a purpose?


I'm not claiming this is false, but I'm saying it hasn't been shown to be true.

I suspect that it is logically necessary.


So you're clearly using a different definition of metaphysics to Orr who considers claims of purpose metaphysical.

I do too, but factual and physical are not the same thing. If the proposition The universe has a purpose is true, then it states a fact. Even if it is false, it is still in some sense a factual claim (i.e. it claims to state a fact). It is a metaphysical proposition, however.


With Orr, some specific claims of the form "The purpose of the universe is X" are discreditable ~ whenever it is not feasible that X could ocure.

Where does Orr say this?

I could build a cardboard rocket in my garden for the purpose of carrying me to the moon and back.


If you could constructively define what you think a metaphysical claim is that would help.

I'll try to work up a definition.

[Jekyll]

Where does Orr say this?
I'm restricting the "The universe has a purpose" to one specific claim.

I could build a cardboard rocket in my garden for the purpose of carrying me to the moon and back.
I think there is a difference between "built for a purpose" and "having a purpose", I'm not sure that your rocket~built exclusively to carry you to the moon could be said to have a purpose after you are dead, although it would have still been built for a purpose.


I'll try to work up a definition.
Thanks.

[drkitten]

Hmm. I conceived of "theoretically capable of being addressed in the future" as a category intrinsically not subject to change, so we must be interpreting it differently. I did not mean "capable of being addressed by a new physical theory in the future", for example. I think was using it in a sense closer, perhaps, to "not logically restricted by the definition of empirical" or simply "potentially addressable". I agree with you that theories of the physical change, the range of questions that are empirically addressible in an immediate or practical sense increases

Well, this may be another semantic disagreement, but I think that "questions that are empirically addressible in an immediate or practical sense" are a different, and smaller, set than "questions that are not logically restricted by the definition of empirical."

A classic example of the difference is the question of whether the universe itself is Euclidean. Since in Euclidean space, any three points define a triangle with internal angles summing to exactly 180 degrees, I could test this theory empirically with three widely separated (e.g. hundreds of lightyears) spaceships with powerful radio beacons and some protractors.

However, the amount of travel required renders this "impractical."

The problem, however, is that our theories themselves change. I submit that the category ""theoretically capable of being addressed in the future" practically demands change every time our theories change substantially. For example, only with the theoretical development of non-Euclidean geometry does the question about whether the universe is Euclidean even arise; prior to that, space was just "space."

Many of the great metaphysical problems, for example, are/were posed in a largely dualistic framework. Aristotle would certainly have accepted the idea of a psychological theory of esthetics -- but not a neurobiological one. To Aristotle, "mind" was not one of the categories that could be addressed via experiment, even in the future. We disagree, precisely because we have developed different theories (and because we have a certain amount of physical evidence in support of our theories).


(though I suppose theories of the physical could change in such a way as to have the opposite effect).

Historically, this seems not generally to have been the case. I'm also not sure what kind of data would cause me to believe that something for which I had an acceptable physical explanation could, in fact, not be explained in the physical. So while I will grant that this possibility is grammatical, I'm not sure I believe in it.

Yet it seems to me that whatever newly addressable questions arise must come from the ranks of the potentially addressable, which I exclude from the fundamental and direct preoccupations of metaphysics.

The problem is simply -- who judges "potential"? If you are suggesting that such-and-such is not potentially addressible, I submit that for the most part, that's simply an argument from ignorance. Like Aristotle, you lack the imagination to see what theories will be developed in the next twenty-five centuries. (Hardly a criticism, by the way.)

For example, a traditional core preoccupation of metaphysics is the question "what is good?" I'ts not beyond the realm of possibility that evolutionary psychology will be able to describe "good" in terms purely of brain state -- they're getting quite close with the question "what is love?," another traditional question. The question "what is madness?", once the realm of demons and evil spirits, is now turning out to be something quite mundane and physical like lithium.