The Leprechaun Test: What Color Is Your Skepticism?

[Piggy]

NB: I'm posting this in "General Skepticism and The Paranormal" because of the "General Skepticism" part and because I consider it a "JREF Topic" (and I don't want it in the "Religion and Philosophy" forum). But if it needs to be moved, so be it.

On another thread (which I won't cite b/c the title offends some folks) I proposed the Leprechaun Test, which I will summarize here:

If you follow the rules of a certain philosophy and they lead you to the conclusion that the strongest negative statement that can be made regarding an unsupported claim is "I don't know", then apply the identical logic to leprechauns.

If, by applying these rules to the question of whether leprechauns are real, the strongest negative statement you can make is still "I don't know", then this philosophy is unsound.

The Leprechaun Test proved useful b/c it allowed myself and 2 other posters to conclude that we could stop trading evidence -- since I accepted the test and they didn't, it was clear we had reached the point of agreeing to disagree, and no further discussion would be productive.

We shook hands and said "Good game".

I propose that the Leprechuan Test may be of use in defining 3 strains of skepticism evidenced on that thread. These could be called "strong", "weak", etc. or some other set of descriptive terms, but that's bound to cause problems, so let's stick to colors.

Orange skepticism adheres to the Leprechaun Test. (E.g., If it hasn't been demonstrated, it's irrational, and there's good reason to doubt it, forget about it.)

Green skepticism does not adhere to the Leprechaun Test, but only goes as far as "I don't know" without allowing positive belief. (E.g., If it hasn't been demonstrated, but it has not or cannot be positively disproven, one must take an agnostic position.)

Purple skepticism rejects the Leprechaun test entirely by allowing positive belief of non-scientific/non-empricial theories. (E.g., If it has not been demonstrated, but cannot by definition be disproven, then one may have a faith-based or philosophical belief in it without being a non-skeptic.)

Since I can already hear the tails bristling, let me say that the purpose of this notion is not to divide skeptics, but to possibly define -- for those who care to indulge -- some existing fundamental differences and make it easier to talk about them.

So... what color is your skepticism, if you care to say?

I proudly self-identify as an orange skeptic.

[tkingdoll]

I'm orange. I've never known where you're supposed to draw the line otherwise. If God is an I-don't-know then so is Santa, and if aliens crop circles are an I-don't-know then so are the Cottingley Faeries.

So, colour me orange.

[I less than three logic]

I’m an orange too. (I know what your thinking. Ok maybe I am a little fruity, and BTW puns are the lowest form of humor.) :)

The logic seems rather simple. Until there is evidence to conclude otherwise, I just assume it doesn’t exist. I figure there are an infinite number of things that don’t exist; yet only a finite number that actually can. The numbers are on my side, right? :D

I am willing to entertain an idea though. I just require real evidence (that would be the hijacked scientific meaning for those of you that don’t know) before I accept it as real.

[arthwollipot]

Logically, the only rational position to take is Green. However, I choose to make a leap of faith into the Orange camp.

[GregC]

Skeptic

[tsg]

Logically, the only rational position to take is Green.

I don't agree with this at all. It is entirely logical and rational to hold the position that, while not impossible, a given claim is so unlikely that it is virtually impossible. That is, the chances of it being true are so remote there is no point in entertaining it any further unless some serious evidence is presented.

Color me orange, and rationally so.

[Complexity]

Normally, I'm all colors of the rainbow, but today I'm

Skeptical Orange

:clap: :clap: :clap: :clap: :clap:

[Ersby]

Green, I guess. With flecks of purple.

[arthwollipot]

I don't agree with this at all. It is entirely logical and rational to hold the position that, while not impossible, a given claim is so unlikely that it is virtually impossible. That is, the chances of it being true are so remote there is no point in entertaining it any further unless some serious evidence is presented.

Color me orange, and rationally so.

Virtually impossible is not the same a actually impossible. That is why I don't feel that it is rational to make the final leap. I embrace (what I perceive as) my irrationality and colour myself orange.

[.13.]

Orange, with very cool green stripes.

For example:

Strongest opinion I have on extraterrestial life is: I don't know.

But to accept that the extraterrestial life is flying around abducting people/cows is a different thing. Although I don't know if they are doing that I'll dismiss the idea because of lack of evidence.

[CaptainManacles]

Orange, I believe in the Leprechaun test, but not in Leprechauns. If you are unable to conclude that there is no such thing as the end of the rainbow, you're going to have a hard time concluding anything.

[Aardvark]

I'm orange. I've never known where you're supposed to draw the line otherwise. If God is an I-don't-know then so is Santa, and if aliens crop circles are an I-don't-know then so are the Cottingley Faeries.

So, colour me orange.

I live only a few miles from Cottingley. The fairies were demonstrated to be a complete fake several years ago.

One of the young ladies even appeared on TV and explained how they did it. She will be in her 80's now. So a full confession plus a reconstruction showed the slight of hand. Just a magic trick.

[Shrike]

Mine's black.

YOU'RE ALL IDIOTS!

But then the coffee wears off and I resort back to the usual orange which is required for Dutch soccer fans (http://images.google.nl/imgres?imgurl=http://home.student.utwente.nl/d.f.j.hartsink/voetbal2.jpg&imgrefurl=http://home.student.utwente.nl/d.f.j.hartsink/frame_b_fotos_oranje.html&h=314&w=235&sz=34&tbnid=RYQFxYA0zL0PyM:&tbnh=113&tbnw=84&hl=nl&start=2&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dvoetbal%2Bindiaan%26svnum%3D10%26hl%3 Dnl%26lr%3D%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:nl-NL:official_s%26sa%3DN).

[Gaga]

shouldn't be dependant on the claim being put forth? I mean, there's a bit of difference between fairies and a borderline medical treatment. Or did I miss something in the op?

[hgc]

This color thing is a real minefield. If you were offering me lollipops of those 3 colors, I would reach for the purple. So when I read the choices, my mind reaches for a tasty treat and I end up believing in reiki therapy.

[Piggy]

Orange, with very cool green stripes.

For example:

Strongest opinion I have on extraterrestial life is: I don't know.

But to accept that the extraterrestial life is flying around abducting people/cows is a different thing. Although I don't know if they are doing that I'll dismiss the idea because of lack of evidence.
I think that makes you pure orange.

The proposition that there is life outside the Earth, while not proven, is not irrational, and at this time there's no good reason to reject it. The universe is vast and we know very little about conditions on other planets. Since the laws of physics apply everywhere, it's not unreasonable that life may have arisen elsewhere.

So being agnostic on the ET question would not force you, by the same logic, into agnosticism on the leprechaun question.

[CFLarsen]

I'm a black hole.

[Piggy]

shouldn't be dependant on the claim being put forth? I mean, there's a bit of difference between fairies and a borderline medical treatment. Or did I miss something in the op?
The Leprechaun Test can be applied to any claim. Your position on whether the test is of any value is what indicates, for the purposes of this thread, the "color" of your brand of skepticism.

If the skeptical method you employ in evaluating unusual claims, when applied to the question "Do leprechauns exist?", allows you to answer "No", then here we're calling that "orange".

If your preferred skeptical method allows you to answer nothing stronger than "I can't say for sure" regarding the existence of leprechauns, we're calling that "green".

Orange skeptics feel that it is justifiable to reject unsupported and a-rational claims if there is good reason to believe they aren't true. Orange skeptics agree that the Leprechaun Test is of use -- if a given approach to evaluating claims, when applied to leprechauns, forces anything weaker than "no", that approach is flawed.

Green skeptics take the position that unless a claim can be positively disproven, one is not justified in conferring positive belief, but the strongest negative statement than can be legitimately made is "It's highly unlikely, but I don't know for sure". For greens, the leprechaun test isn't meaningful.

I used the remaining secondary color, purple, to stand for a 3rd type of skeptical standard which goes farther than the green standard by allowing positive belief purely on faith or on the basis of a non-materialist philosophy for non-disproven but irrational claims.

[Gaga]

The Leprechaun Test can be applied to any claim.
[...useful explanation...]
I see, got it.

[tsg]

Virtually impossible is not the same a actually impossible. That is why I don't feel that it is rational to make the final leap. I embrace (what I perceive as) my irrationality and colour myself orange.

Considering how few things are actually impossible and how few things are 100% provable, how do you claim to know anything?

ETA: Ignore this. See my next post.

[tsg]

Orange skeptics feel that it is justifiable to reject unsupported and a-rational claims if there is good reason to believe they aren't true. Orange skeptics agree that the Leprechaun Test is of use -- if a given approach to evaluating claims, when applied to leprechauns, forces anything weaker than "no", that approach is flawed.

Green skeptics take the position that unless a claim can be positively disproven, one is not justified in conferring positive belief, but the strongest negative statement than can be legitimately made is "It's highly unlikely, but I don't know for sure". For greens, the leprechaun test isn't meaningful.


I think this explanation might change my answer. If "no" means "I don't believe so." then I'm orange. But the green view could also fit "extremely unlikely, but technically not impossible, but in all practicality I don't believe so".

It seems to me the questions could be worded "Do you believe leprechauns exist" and be less ambiguous, but might also change the meaning of the test.

Hmmmm. Now I have to go think.

ETA: I think where I'm getting hung up is the gap I perceive between "No" and "I can't say for sure". I think the closest I ever get to "no" is "Highly doubtful. Possible but not probable enough to warrant making decisions counting for the possibility." In other words, "close enough to impossible to be ignored".

[UrsulaV]

Good lord, the Leprechaun threat level is at Orange?

They'll kill us all, and take our lucky charms!

[Piggy]

If "no" means "I don't believe so." then I'm orange. But the green view could also fit "extremely unlikely, but technically not impossible, but in all practicality I don't believe so".

It seems to me the questions could be worded "Do you believe leprechauns exist" and be less ambiguous, but might also change the meaning of the test.
As the saying goes, "no" means "no".

For the purposes of this thread, if a given method, when applied to the question "Do leprechauns exist?" forces any conclusion weaker than "No", then that method is either green or purple (or non-skeptical).

If your position on leprechauns is "I can't affirm without reservation that they do not exist, but for all practical purposes we can behave as if they don't", then you fall into the green variety of skeptical methods.

To qualify as orange, as defined here, one must be able to say without reservation "There are no leprechauns... period."

The distinction is, I believe, important, because many disputes among skeptics regarding particular cases come down to this fundamental difference in approach. So in those cases, when we recognize that we're down to an orange v. green schism, we can stop trying to convince each other by evidence and "agree to disagree" b/c the differences arise from differing approaches, not in any evidentiary issues.

[tkingdoll]

I live only a few miles from Cottingley. The fairies were demonstrated to be a complete fake several years ago.

One of the young ladies even appeared on TV and explained how they did it. She will be in her 80's now. So a full confession plus a reconstruction showed the slight of hand. Just a magic trick.

Er, yes, that's why I used it as my example. It wasn't sleight of hand so much as just simple drawings copied from a book.

Randi owns the original plates you know.

[tsg]

As the saying goes, "no" means "no".

For the purposes of this thread, if a given method, when applied to the question "Do leprechauns exist?" forces any conclusion weaker than "No", then that method is either green or purple (or non-skeptical).

If your position on leprechauns is "I can't affirm without reservation that they do not exist, but for all practical purposes we can behave as if they don't", then you fall into the green variety of skeptical methods.

To qualify as orange, as defined here, one must be able to say without reservation "There are no leprechauns... period."


Let me ask one more question for clarification: where does "I have no reason to believe that they do" fall?

ETA: (Okay one, more) And is there a difference between that statement and the addition of "and lots of reasons to believe that they don't".

[ChristineR]

Well, I'm really not getting this. What is a leprechaun? Do I believe that at one time there was a miserly dwarf who lived in the woods and wore green to camoflauge himself? Did someone successfully kidnap him and force the dwarf to reveal the hiding place of one of his money stashes?

Or are you talking about leprechaun as a cultural and literary phenomenon? They're reasonably important aspects of culture.

Or leprechauns as moral lessons?

Or is the question whether there is an unknown species of homo (homo leprechaunis?) that lives in the woods of Ireland and has abilities (teleportation, invisibility) not found in homo sapiens?

I think I can conclude that the last proposition is so unlikely as to be irrelevant. The odds are far, far, less than one in a billion. But of course we can't prove it absolutely.

[Piggy]

Let me ask one more question for clarification: where does "I have no reason to believe that they do" fall?
If that is the strongest negative statement allowed by your method of analysis, then it falls in the green range.

ETA: (Okay one, more) And is there a difference between that statement and the addition of "and lots of reasons to believe that they don't".
Not for the purposes of the OP, no. If you can't take those 2 statements, add the irrationality of the claim, and arrive at "therefore, leprechauns are imaginary", then you're green.

Btw, what does ETA mean? I live near Hartsfield Airport, so all I can think of is "Estimated Time of Arrival".

[Piggy]

Or is the question whether there is an unknown species of homo (homo leprechaunis?) that lives in the woods of Ireland and has abilities (teleportation, invisibility) not found in homo sapiens?
Yes, that's what's meant by "leprechaun" -- I'm not referencing ideas about leprechauns, images of leprechauns, representations of leprechauns, fictional characters who happen to be leprechauns, or any of that. I mean actual little guys with magical powers running around in the woods.

I think I can conclude that the last proposition is so unlikely as to be irrelevant. The odds are far, far, less than one in a billion. But of course we can't prove it absolutely.
Then you fit into what we're calling the green camp here.

[tsg]

If that is the strongest negative statement allowed by your method of analysis, then it falls in the green range.

Not for the purposes of the OP, no. If you can't take those 2 statements, add the irrationality of the claim, and arrive at "therefore, leprechauns are imaginary", then you're green.

Then I guess I'm green, albeit just this side of orange.

Btw, what does ETA mean?

"edited to add"

[Roboramma]

If your position on leprechauns is "I can't affirm without reservation that they do not exist, but for all practical purposes we can behave as if they don't", then you fall into the green variety of skeptical methods.

To qualify as orange, as defined here, one must be able to say without reservation "There are no leprechauns... period."

I was going to answer orange, but then I saw this. Colour me green, because that's exactly how I view it.

I don't think any other view can be considered logical.

The reason I wanted to choose orange is that I usually take "doesn't exist" as shorthand for "is so unlikely to exist that for all intents and purposes I should treat it as though it doesn't." (I think tsg said that better).
I genuinely surprised that there's anyone who disagrees with that shorthand.

For that, thanks for the thread Piggy. That insight probably will make disagreements at the least easier to understand. :)

[ImaginalDisc]

Howdy

How is skeptecism reasonable? If I say "There is no Santa Claus", and I'm faced with evidence that I was wrong I'll say, "Golly gee, I was wrong." I think skeptecism is an unwillingess to take a stand, or an unwillingness to admit to a mistake, if you're later proven wrong.

P.S. Why are we the color of prison jumpsuits?

[ImaginalDisc]

I was going to answer orange, but then I saw this. Colour me green, because that's exactly how I view it.

I don't think any other view can be considered logical.

The reason I wanted to choose orange is that I usually take "doesn't exist" as shorthand for "is so unlikely to exist that for all intents and purposes I should treat it as though it doesn't." (I think tsg said that better).
I genuinely surprised that there's anyone who disagrees with that shorthand.

For that, thanks for the thread Piggy. That insight probably will make disagreements at the least easier to understand. :)

Ok, here's a claim. My eyes are blue. Now, if I sent you a photo of me, you'd clearly see my eyes are brown. However, its the magical pink invisible leprachauns from Planet X who alter the evidence, including direct observation and have fooled the world into thinking my eyes are brown. Even though I have no evidence that my eyes are blue, I claim they are blue.

So, possible, or false?

[ChristineR]

I guess I'm going to have to be green then. First, because if you cannot give a logical proof that leprechauns do not exist, you simply cannot say beyond doubt that they don't. Certainly you can say they do not exist way, way, way beyond any reasonable doubt. But the math lover in me will not allow for an orange position here.

Secondly, because I don't believe you can meaningfully separate leprechauns from their cultural position. Leprechauns are a legend: that's indisputable. The legend corresponds to facts to some unknown extent. At the one end is the claim that it is completely fictional, at the other the claim that such beasties wander the woods today. In the middle (actually somewhat skeptical/left of middle) is the most likely case, that the legends are embellished versions of historical fact. My non-belief in magical men in the woods is a side issue. The most important questions are in the historical and cultural status of the leprechaun.

[tsg]

Alright, I apologize for being so thick about this, but it's really bothering me. I'll state my position and someone tell me what color I am.

Assuming a normal conversation:

Someone: "Do leprechauns exist."
Me: "No."
S: "So it's impossible for them to exist?"
M: "It's not absolutely impossible, but I'm as sure as I can reasonably be that they don't."

Personally, I think any statement stronger than the last one treads into belief without evidence and therefore stops being skepticism.

[ImaginalDisc]

Alright, I apologize for being so thick about this, but it's really bothering me. I'll state my position and someone tell me what color I am.

Assuming a normal conversation:

Someone: "Do leprechauns exist."
Me: "No."
S: "So it's impossible for them to exist?"
M: "It's not absolutely impossible, but I'm as sure as I can reasonably be that they don't."

Personally, I think any statement stronger than the last one treads into belief without evidence and therefore stops being skepticism.

I think your dialogue is perfectly reasonable, but maybe the trouble is in the use of "impossible". A sqaure circle? Logically impossible. Leprachauns? So unlikely as to be considered impossible. Fair enough?

Edit: Are you restricting "impossible" to things which are only logically impossible?

[tsg]

I think your dialogue is perfectly reasonable, but maybe the trouble is in the use of "impossible". A sqaure circle? Logically impossible. Leprachauns? So unlikely as to be considered impossible. Fair enough?

I think that's what I'm getting at, yeah.

Edit: Are you restricting "impossible" to things which are only logically impossible?

Impossible as in "incapable of existing or occurring" for whatever reason. It doesn't necessarily have to be logically impossible, but I have to admit I'm having a hard time thinking of an example that isn't.

[Bronze Dog]

Trying the wikipedia whatchamacallit for my overlong joke and failing.
Copper is a reddish-colored metal, with a high electrical and thermal conductivity (among pure metals at room temperature, only silver has a higher electrical conductivity). Copper has its characteristic color because it reflects red and orange light and absorbs other frequencies in the visible spectrum, due to its band structure. Contrast this with the optical properties of silver, gold and aluminium.

Copper occupies the same family of the periodic table as silver and gold, hence it shares many characteristics with these metals. All have high thermal and electrical conductivity. All are malleable metals. Gold and copper are the only colored metallic elements.

[Orb]

Definitely Orange, but we need a better car paint color name, like "coral" or "autumn sunrise" ;)

[Nyarlathotep]

I'm a black hole.


Must........resist.....taunt. Willpower.......weakening.

[Nyarlathotep]

I THINK I'm an orange, if I understand the cateories correctly. My default positio on any given subject depends on a lot of things, including how likely I find it, how important it is, etc. For example if you tell me you met Elvis in 1975, I am likely to believe you even without proof. It's not of earth shattering importance whether youa re right or wrong and people DO meet celebrities occasionally. On the other hand if you tell me you spoke to Elvis in 2005, then I'm going to require proof. Talking to dead celebrities is a lot less likely (and has greater ramifications) than talking to a live one.

So orange, I think.

[I less than three logic]

Alright, I apologize for being so thick about this, but it's really bothering me. I'll state my position and someone tell me what color I am.

Assuming a normal conversation:

Someone: "Do leprechauns exist."
Me: "No."
S: "So it's impossible for them to exist?"
M: "It's not absolutely impossible, but I'm as sure as I can reasonably be that they don't."

Personally, I think any statement stronger than the last one treads into belief without evidence and therefore stops being skepticism.
My conversation would go more like this:

Someone: “Do leprechauns exist?”
Me: “No.”
S: “So it's impossible for them to exist?”
Me: “It’s not a question of whether or not they can not exist. You asked if they do exist. Until I have evidence to conclude otherwise, my answer is no.”

Asking if they do exist, then asking if it is impossible for them to exist is just shifting the goal posts. My answer is no, and will remain no until there is evidence to the contrary.

If the question was, “Is it impossible for leprechauns to exist?”

My answer would be, “No, it’s not impossible.” This doesn’t change my first answer though. The questions don’t mean the same thing.

[El Greco]

http://www.dw-world.de/image/0,,1795545_4,00.jpg

[.13.]

I think that makes you pure orange.

The proposition that there is life outside the Earth, while not proven, is not irrational, and at this time there's no good reason to reject it. The universe is vast and we know very little about conditions on other planets. Since the laws of physics apply everywhere, it's not unreasonable that life may have arisen elsewhere.

So being agnostic on the ET question would not force you, by the same logic, into agnosticism on the leprechaun question.

I guess I somewhat misunderstood your question then.

But after reading the thread I'm inclined to say:
I can't disprove the existance of leprechauns. And I lack belief in them until there is positive evidence. I don't say I know they don't exist. I believe they don't exist and that little leap of faith is justified and rational. Does that make me purple because I believe in something that can't be proven right? I'm getting confused now... :)

[tsg]

Just playing Devil's advocate for my own edification:

My conversation would go more like this:

Someone: “Do leprechauns exist?”
Me: “No.”
S: “So it's impossible for them to exist?”
Me: “It’s not a question of whether or not they can not exist. You asked if they do exist. Until I have evidence to conclude otherwise, my answer is no.”

Isn't that a closer answer to "do you believe they exist?" (if there is a difference between the two questions)?

And would your answer change if the second question was "So, it's impossible that they do exist?"

[RSLancastr]

If i understand the OP correctly (and it's quite likely that I don't), then I am Green.

However, purple is my favorite color.

Can we make the second category purple?

[aggle-rithm]

Should there be a color for totally whacko "skepticism" like that displayed by the loosers?

Someone: Do leprechauns exist?
Looser: I never said that. Stop putting words in my mouth!
S: No, I'm just asking...
L: If you don't want to engage in an honest debate, get out of here and quit wasting our time!
Moderator: BANNED!!!

[I less than three logic]

Just playing Devil's advocate for my own edification:



Isn't that a closer answer to "do you believe they exist?" (if there is a difference between the two questions)?

And would your answer change if the second question was "So, it's impossible that they do exist?"
When asking someone a question, unless you’re asking an omniscient one, the best you can get is that person’s opinion. Therefore, I would have to conclude that “Do they exist?” and “Do you believe they exist?” are the same question.

It looks like your looking for an absolute certainty. Unfortunately, these only exist in mathematics. We must always evaluate and re-evaluate our conclusion against available and newly discovered evidence.

In this case, when asked about leprechauns. Evidence for is basically zero, merely legends about their existence, unsupported anecdotes, and nothing more.

Evidence against include: The magical nature of leprechauns described in the legends contradicts well support conclusions about the physical laws of the universe. Knowledge of the tendency for people to change, exaggerate, and misinterpret details of a story, and the major distortion that happens as these tendencies accumulate.

After weighing the evidence, I am confident, comfortable, and believe I am being completely rational, when I firmly say, “Leprechauns do not exist.” Should new evidence to the contrary come to light, I’ll happily re-examine this and form a new opinion.

When I apply this same logic to a faith based question, such as the existence of God or Gods, which basically has the same evidence as leprechauns. I am confident, comfortable, and believe I am being completely rational, when I firmly say, “God or Gods do not exist.” Show me some evidence, and I’ll re-evaluate this one too. :)

[tsg]

When asking someone a question, unless you’re asking an omniscient one, the best you can get is that person’s opinion. Therefore, I would have to conclude that “Do they exist?” and “Do you believe they exist?” are the same question.

It looks like your looking for an absolute certainty. Unfortunately, these only exist in mathematics. We must always evaluate and re-evaluate our conclusion against available and newly discovered evidence.

In this case, when asked about leprechauns. Evidence for is basically zero, merely legends about their existence, unsupported anecdotes, and nothing more.

Evidence against include: The magical nature of leprechauns described in the legends contradicts well support conclusions about the physical laws of the universe. Knowledge of the tendency for people to change, exaggerate, and misinterpret details of a story, and the major distortion that happens as these tendencies accumulate.

After weighing the evidence, I am confident, comfortable, and believe I am being completely rational, when I firmly say, “Leprechauns do not exist.” Should new evidence to the contrary come to light, I’ll happily re-examine this and form a new opinion.

When I apply this same logic to a faith based question, such as the existence of God or Gods, which basically has the same evidence as leprechauns. I am confident, comfortable, and believe I am being completely rational, when I firmly say, “God or Gods do not exist.” Show me some evidence, and I’ll re-evaluate this one too. :)


Seeing as how these sentiments precisely echo my own, I will make my answer "what I less than three logic said." I believe that puts me in orange unless someone else would like to try to confuse me further :).

[Piggy]

Should there be a color for totally whacko "skepticism" like that displayed by the loosers?

Someone: Do leprechauns exist?
Looser: I never said that. Stop putting words in my mouth!
S: No, I'm just asking...
L: If you don't want to engage in an honest debate, get out of here and quit wasting our time!
Moderator: BANNED!!!
Yes. That's called being YELLOW!

[Piggy]

A couple of significant issues have been raised, so let me tackle them one at a time.

From the green POV, orange skepticism makes a "leap of faith" by moving from "It's highly unlikely, but not disproven" to "It's false". So, how are purple and orange different?

The orange position is that the movement from "no valid supporting evidence" + "irrational" + "strong evidence against" is NOT a leap of faith. (More on that in another post)

The purple position is that it is not incompatible with skepticism to engage in faith, or in metaphysical belief, when it comes to areas not amenable to scientific inquiry.

As defined in this thread, green, orange, and purple versions of skeptical reasoning are defined by the rules that an individual applies to unproven or unprovable claims. So it doesn't make sense for, say, someone with a green POV to say, "I see a leap of faith there, so oranges must be purple". What makes an orange an orange is that s/he doesn't see any "faith" in that leap. What makes a purple a purple is that s/he does not define skepticism in such a way as to exclude conscious acts of faith when it comes to, for example, theological belief systems which are non-scientific per se.

These flavors of skepticism are differentiated by the rules which various groups of skeptics consider valid, not by other groups' opinions of those rules.

[BryanLower]

Orange.
I can definately make stronger negative statements than "I don't know". Particularly about Leprechauns.

But I don't object to answering "I don't know". Especially if I really don't know.

[ImaginalDisc]

AThe purple position is that it is not incompatible with skepticism to engage in faith, or in metaphysical belief, when it comes to areas not amenable to scientific inquiry.


Can you give me an example of a question which is not amenable to scientific inquiry?

[Piggy]

In this case, when asked about leprechauns. Evidence for is basically zero, merely legends about their existence, unsupported anecdotes, and nothing more.

Evidence against include: The magical nature of leprechauns described in the legends contradicts well support conclusions about the physical laws of the universe. Knowledge of the tendency for people to change, exaggerate, and misinterpret details of a story, and the major distortion that happens as these tendencies accumulate.

After weighing the evidence, I am confident, comfortable, and believe I am being completely rational, when I firmly say, “Leprechauns do not exist.” Should new evidence to the contrary come to light, I’ll happily re-examine this and form a new opinion.

When I apply this same logic to a faith based question, such as the existence of God or Gods, which basically has the same evidence as leprechauns. I am confident, comfortable, and believe I am being completely rational, when I firmly say, “God or Gods do not exist.” Show me some evidence, and I’ll re-evaluate this one too. :)
This is a very interesting post!

It reminds me of Don Henley's famous line, "I could be wrong. But I'm not."

I am such a strong orange, that I'm willing to go farther than I<3 logic and declare, based on the evidence, that there can be no doubt that no new evidence will or can ever be produced, so the answer is an unqualified "No". I would literally bet my life on the non-existence of leprechauns.

It's definitely a cusp argument. Some might see it as green, some might see it as orange. And I think it helps us keep in mind the fact that these distinctions -- while useful, like the distinction between atmosphere and outer space, or between language and dialect -- being human constructs, don't necessarily have hard edges.

[Piggy]

Orange.
I can definately make stronger negative statements than "I don't know". Particularly about Leprechauns.

But I don't object to answering "I don't know". Especially if I really don't know.
Good point. Being orange doesn't mean one is obliged to go to "No" when confronted with unsupported claims. "I don't know" is still a possibility.

What the Leprechaun Test says is that if a given methodology, when applied the question "Do leprechauns exist?"*, requires stopping anywhere short of "No", then that methodology is insufficient per se.

[Piggy]

Can you give me an example of a question which is not amenable to scientific inquiry?
Well, sure -- "Is the 2nd Primus studio lineup with Brain on drums as kick @$$ as the 1st studio lineup with Herb on drums?"

But that's irrelevant to the OP, of course.

If you want an example of a relevant question that's not amenable to scientific inquiry, see any thread in which the issue of "Christian skeptics" is debated, or (if you have the stomach for it) JustGoeff's Husserl thread. You'll find plenty of purple positions there, as well as greens and oranges.

The reason I can't claim that these are out of bounds for scientific inquiry is that I don't agree that they are.

However, since affiliation is based on the methods which the individual recognizes as valid -- which is what makes this exercise useful, since it helps identify points at which some debates reach stalemate -- you'll have to ask a purple that question to get a real answer.

[tsg]

What the Leprechaun Test says is that if a given methodology, when applied the question "Do leprechauns exist?"*, requires stopping anywhere short of "No", then that methodology is insufficient per se.

Let me see if I understand:

"Do leprechauns exist?"

Green: It is not possible to conclusively prove that something does not exist, so the best we can say is "extremely unlikely".

Orange: With the understanding that it is not possible to conclusively prove that something does not exist, based on the available evidence, no.

Have I got it yet?

[Piggy]

From the green POV, it may seem that moving from:

It's unproven.
It's irrational.
There's strong evidence against it.

to:

It's false.

in any case whatsoever requires a leap of faith.

Surely, the green says, you must admit that there is some chance, no matter how small, that any claim which has not been positively disproven might be true. Therefore, going to "No" constitutes a leap of faith.

The orange response is that scientific, logical, and mathematical methods, while forming the core of skeptical inquiry, are not sufficient by themselves. Positing a "leap of faith" assumes that they are.

From the orange POV, the green position has some significant problems.

First, it denies the validity of the strong atheistic position, in the face of theistic claims which merely posit unprovability/undisprovability as an essential characteristic of God.

Because theistic claims may be rhetorically presented in such a way as to ensure that they are not positively disprovable, the green position effectively strong-arms a skeptic into adopting nothing stronger than agnosticism. By extension, this allows theists to posit atheism as another type of faith.

For the orange, however, atheism is merely normal thought devoid of any reference to a theory where none is required. Therefore, the dilemma inherent in the green position is evidence of an insufficient methodology which makes skeptical inquiry vulnerable to mere verbal trickery.

Furthermore, the green position risks making skepticism seem foolish, if it forces us to introduce doubt (no matter how infintesimal) into issues about which there is no doubt in the real world. For the orange, if a given method introduces doubt when applied to the question of whether leprechauns are real, that in itself is evidence that there is a flaw in there somewhere.

As an example, suppose I up and declare that there's an undetectable dog in my room. As evidence I point to a history of objects that turn up where I don't remember putting them, unexplained noises, and a family tradition of stories about the undetectable dog that lives in this house.

Because the dog is undetectable, it is by definition undisprovable. A staunch green position would hold that, while we can safely live our lives assuming that this is all nonsense, although the odds approach zero they are not actually zero.

The orange says, b******t, the odds are zero, it's bunk, and no leap of faith is required to reach that conclusion.

[Piggy]

Let me see if I understand:

"Do leprechauns exist?"

Green: It is not possible to conclusively prove that something does not exist, so the best we can say is "extremely unlikely".

Orange: With the understanding that it is not possible to conclusively prove that something does not exist, based on the available evidence, no.

Have I got it yet?
From my POV, your description of the orange position is not quite strong enough. The orange position is that yes, it is possible to affirm conclusively (change from "prove" made advisedly) that some things do not exist.

[Meffy]

I'd like to think I'm what you're calling orange, but being realistic I haven't the intellectual clarity nor discipline to claim that. So color me green. With white stripes, of course.

P.S.: My tail isn't bristling from your suggestion. It's always like this.

[Bronze Dog]

Furthermore, the green position risks making skepticism seem foolish, if it forces us to introduce doubt (no matter how infintesimal) into issues about which there is no doubt in the real world.
The way I'd put this: It's fostering unreasonable doubts. Of course, "reasonable" is understandably difficult to define.

As an example, suppose I up and declare that there's an undetectable dog in my room. As evidence I point to a history of objects that turn up where I don't remember putting them, unexplained noises, and a family tradition of stories about the undetectable dog that lives in this house.

Because the dog is undetectable, it is by definition undisprovable.
At least until after my CROW extensions run out. Wish they'd bring back those old plain, but continuous radar stealth back units back into production.

The orange says, b******t, the odds are zero, it's bunk, and no leap of faith is required to reach that conclusion.
I prefer to think the odds are just so small as to be negligible, at least up until a leprechaun walks away from JREF headquarters with an even fuller pot of gold.

[tsg]

The orange says, b******t, the odds are zero, it's bunk, and no leap of faith is required to reach that conclusion.

I prefer to think the odds are just so small as to be negligible, at least up until a leprechaun walks away from JREF headquarters with an even fuller pot of gold.

I think this is where I'm getting hung up. There are certainly things that I would say the possibility of existence is as close to zero as you can get without having incontrovertible proof of their non-existence, and to those I would answer "no, they don't exist". Does that qualify as orange or is it still not strong enough?

[JamesDillon]

I think this is where I'm getting hung up. There are certainly things that I would say the possibility of existence is as close to zero as you can get without having incontrovertible proof of their non-existence, and to those I would answer "no, they don't exist". Does that qualify as orange or is it still not strong enough?
If I'm interpreting it right, that would still be green, which is why I'm green myself. Making that last leap between 99.999% and 100% certainty in the non-existence of a phenomenon seems to me to create a qualitative difference between orange and green, and as such I see no difference between orange and purple except the content of their faith-based beliefs.

[I less than three logic]

I think this is where I'm getting hung up. There are certainly things that I would say the possibility of existence is as close to zero as you can get without having incontrovertible proof of their non-existence, and to those I would answer "no, they don't exist". Does that qualify as orange or is it still not strong enough?
I think I’m becoming skeptical of my skeptical category as well. I have no problem answering with a definite no when asked a question upon which the evidence is severely lacking. But I can not muster the sense of arrogance to believe my opinions infallible.

My original thought was that if you can answer with a solid “No” to the leprechaun test, you fell within the orange category. This I have no problem with, when I answer “no”, I mean “no”, and not “I don’t know” or “We can’t know”. However, if new evidence were to be discovered, I couldn’t possibly stick with my original answer. My opinions are based on evidence, and as such must be re-evaluated should new evidence appear.

“Doubt is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is an absurd one.” – Voltaire

[Roboramma]

Here's my problem with the orange position:

Imagine I lived 800 years ago (just an arbitrary number). Also, imagine someone comes to me with a very large book. In this book are billions of claims. Leprechauns, fairies, gods of all sorts are covered. So are things like, "the earth orbits the sun, whose surface is 70000 degrees Celsius" - as well as a definition of degrees Celsius (note, that claim is also false), "the stars are large trees planted in the sky, and set on fire", etc.
There are also things like, "the universe was once very small, dense and hot, but over the course of 15 or so billion years, it has expanded and cooled", "There are tiny living things all over and inside your body that you cannot see, but which can affect you", and all sorts of other claims that were true, which for which I had no evidence (and maybe even the appearance of evidence against).

Now, as I read through these claims, I am asked to judge them - are they true or false?
Using the orange position, by answering no to all of them, I would get most of these answers right, but some of them I would get wrong. Yet the orange position isn't that he's sometimes right and sometimes wrong to say "no, this does not exist/is false", his position is that he is always right (he is certain that such and such does not exist).

The green, however, could say to all the claims, "Based on what I know, I'm am almost certain this is false, to the point that I will treat it as such until new evidence comes to light."
The orange can't "treat it as such until new evidence comes to light" because even the possibility of new evidence has been ruled out.

The green still considers it possible that X could be true, and I don't see how anyone can argue that it isn't possible for X to be true.
If it is possible that X is true, then its not certain that X is false. That just seems like basic logic to me, unless I'm missing something about the definition of certain.

None of this suggests that a green considers it likely that any of these unlikely claims that we see today will turn out to be true (I certainly don't). But that's different from saying that one can be absolutely certain that they are false. (On the other hand, I still think we're justified in treating them as though they were false - just as I am justified in treating any specific lottery ticket as though it were not the winner).

[Jon.]

In response to the original OP, my position is that any claim that can be advanced without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. Does that make me orange or green? Or some murky brown colour?

[ChristineR]

Jon, I think there is evidence for leprechauns. Very poor evidence, but evidence nonetheless.

[tsg]

Piggy's explanation here (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=1574470#post1574470) seems to me to have a pretty big gap between green and orange. It seems to paint orange as requiring the complete absence of any doubt whatsoever, but green as a wishy-washy "well it might, who can say?".

I consider the "strong atheist" position to be irrational. I see no difference between absolute certainty, without evidence, that there is a god and absolute certainty, without evidence, that there is not a god. My atheism is "lack of belief", no more and no less. I'm as sure as I can be that, if we were to discover incontrovertible proof of the existence of god (for any reasonable definition), there would be little to no resemblence to any god in classic religious teachings.

Were I to be asked, "Do leprechauns exist?" I would answer "no" on the basis that, with the available evidence, I'm as sure as I can be that they don't. The orange position appears to be "any doubt you have, no matter how small, in the non-existence of leprechauns is unreasonable" while the green position appears to be "if you have any doubt at all you can't answer no to that question." That would put me somewhere in the middle.

My response to "do you believe in god?" is usually "which one?"

[Greyman]

I believe I fall into the orange catagory. I can say "No, it doesn't exist", thus giving a stronger response than "I don't know". From this position, if shown evidence to the contrary I would admit I'm wrong and change my stance.

Leaveing the possibility of changeing ones position is not the same as the Green position of saying "I don't know" or "It can't be known". Which seems to me to be a position of having no position.

[tsg]

Jon, I think there is evidence for leprechauns. Very poor evidence, but evidence nonetheless.

This is a semantic argument over the meaning of the word "evidence". I think we can assume from the context that Jon means "good evidence".

[Greyman]

Ok, if Orange is the absolute absence of doubt, and Green is everything between that and "It can't be known", then I am Green. This is not how I originally understood the positions, but I may have been wrong.

[Jon.]

This is a semantic argument over the meaning of the word "evidence". I think we can assume from the context that Jon means "good evidence".

I would agree, tsg, with the proviso that "good" means some combination of "repeatable", "unrefuted" and "from a reliable source". Of course, that gets us into secondary issues about the quality of sources and the degree of evidence required to refute evidence, which is a big part of the reason why I think categories like these are not always useful.

Just remember that there are two kinds of people in the world: those who divide the world into groups, and those who don't. :D

[JPK]

Good afternoon Piggy.
Well, sure -- "Is the 2nd Primus studio lineup with Brain on drums as kick @$$ as the 1st studio lineup with Herb on drums?"


No!

It's true!:)

[tsg]

I would agree, tsg, with the proviso that "good" means some combination of "repeatable", "unrefuted" and "from a reliable source".

Sounds reasonable. I was just trying to head off a pointless argument about whether or not unverifiable anecdotes about ridiculous claims constitutes "evidence" when it was clear from your statement what you meant. Semantic arguments are rarely useful. What's important is not how other people commonly use the word but what the person who did use the word meant.

[Meffy]

<utter_irrelevance> Do green skeptics grow outward from a central nexus, all bendy and stretchy and fun to watch? What is the hand sign for purple skepticism? </utter_irrelevance>

I'm leaning toward classifying myself as "green, asymptotic to orange" due to not feeling qualified to declare absolutes.

[Jon.]

I'm leaning toward classifying myself as "green, asymptotic to orange" due to not feeling qualified to declare absolutes.

Well put. I would apply a similar term to myself. These absolute divisions are rather artificial, and while this colour scale may have been useful in the context described in the OP, they don't always work when generalized.

[El Greco]

Using the orange position, by answering no to all of them, I would get most of these answers right, but some of them I would get wrong. Yet the orange position isn't that he's sometimes right and sometimes wrong to say "no, this does not exist/is false", his position is that he is always right (he is certain that such and such does not exist).

The green, however, could say to all the claims, "Based on what I know, I'm am almost certain this is false, to the point that I will treat it as such until new evidence comes to light."
The orange can't "treat it as such until new evidence comes to light" because even the possibility of new evidence has been ruled out.

The green still considers it possible that X could be true, and I don't see how anyone can argue that it isn't possible for X to be true.
If it is possible that X is true, then its not certain that X is false. That just seems like basic logic to me, unless I'm missing something about the definition of certain.

None of this suggests that a green considers it likely that any of these unlikely claims that we see today will turn out to be true (I certainly don't). But that's different from saying that one can be absolutely certain that they are false. (On the other hand, I still think we're justified in treating them as though they were false - just as I am justified in treating any specific lottery ticket as though it were not the winner).

800 years ago nobody could prove your orangeness wrong. For practical purposes it doesn't matter if we are wrong today about leprechauns. If and when science reaches the point to start proving leprechauns, then and only then it will be irrational to discard their existence.

If we start with the "maybes" then we can't disprove the existence of anything at all. Yet in our everyday lives we all act like most woo things don't really exist. What's the point in recognizing their purely philosophical potential for existence ?

[Meffy]

Jon: The exercise was sufficient to get me to face my own lack of absoluteness. Not to mention getting in a joke. That's got to be worthwhile. :-}

[ChristineR]

Okay, let's accept that there is a large body of claims which are supported only by the sort of evidence that has been considered and refuted. That is, we don't have to consider stories of drunk people seeing leprechauns or space aliens or anything new because the issue of drunks seeing things has already been studied in detail and that evidence is not good enough to be considered.

Without getting into where we draw the line between that sort of evidence and worthwhile evidence, is Jon saying that he is "orange" on topics that have only poor evidence to support them?

It's a subtle but interesting distinction. My (green) position is that I cannot take an absolute stand on something that cannot be logically proven. The orange position is that we can take a stand on things that are overwhelmingly unlikely based on the evidence. But Jon seems to be arguing that certain claims can be dismissed because there is no good evidence for them.

[ImaginalDisc]

Well, sure -- "Is the 2nd Primus studio lineup with Brain on drums as kick @$$ as the 1st studio lineup with Herb on drums?"

But that's irrelevant to the OP, of course.

If you want an example of a relevant question that's not amenable to scientific inquiry, see any thread in which the issue of "Christian skeptics" is debated, or (if you have the stomach for it) JustGoeff's Husserl thread. You'll find plenty of purple positions there, as well as greens and oranges.

The reason I can't claim that these are out of bounds for scientific inquiry is that I don't agree that they are.

However, since affiliation is based on the methods which the individual recognizes as valid -- which is what makes this exercise useful, since it helps identify points at which some debates reach stalemate -- you'll have to ask a purple that question to get a real answer.

Maybe I missed your point. I think all questions are amenable to scientific inquiry, even if they don't have scientific answers.

[tsg]

But Jon seems to be arguing that certain claims can be dismissed because there is no good evidence for them.

That is the gist of the phrase, yes. It should be pointed out that "dismissed" in this context means "disregarded" or "ignored" as if they were never made.

[Piggy]

My original thought was that if you can answer with a solid “No” to the leprechaun test, you fell within the orange category. This I have no problem with, when I answer “no”, I mean “no”, and not “I don’t know” or “We can’t know”. However, if new evidence were to be discovered, I couldn’t possibly stick with my original answer. My opinions are based on evidence, and as such must be re-evaluated should new evidence appear.
If you believe that it's possible that new evidence may appear which could possibly demonstrate the existence of leprechauns, then how can you honestly say "No, they don't exist" with no qualifications in the first place?

That's what I don't get.

If you believe something stronger than "Hoo, boy, is it ever unlikely!"... if you believe "They don't - period", then where is there room for "But it's possible that evidence may someday be produced which would show that they do"?

[Piggy]

Using the orange position, by answering no to all of them, I would get most of these answers right, but some of them I would get wrong. Yet the orange position isn't that he's sometimes right and sometimes wrong to say "no, this does not exist/is false", his position is that he is always right (he is certain that such and such does not exist).
Not necessarily.

Is there a conspiracy by the government to cover up hundreds of alien abductions? No.

Are aliens trying to communicate with us? I don't think so, but maybe.

Is string theory correct? It's not proven, and maybe untestable per se, but I can't say that it's not.

All those are orange positions.

The orange position is that it is possible, not necessary, to make a definite negative statement in some cases where a claim is irrational, there is no credible supporting evidence, and positive empirical disproof does not exist.

The green position is that, under those circumstances, a truly definitive "No" is never possible -- one is obliged to stop at something like "The chances are so small that it's safe to behave as if it were impossible".

That's why the Leprechaun Test. An orange looks at the situation ("Do leprechauns exist?") and says, "superstitious origin, no credible evidence, violates everything we know about physics and biology, it's false, no qualifiers, no hedges, end of story, game over, pure bunk." A green won't go that far.

[Piggy]

The orange position appears to be "any doubt you have, no matter how small, in the non-existence of leprechauns is unreasonable" while the green position appears to be "if you have any doubt at all you can't answer no to that question."
That pretty much sums it up, except that I would stress that the "no" is an absolute, unqualified "no", with no "out" for new evidence, no hedge for some teensy odds in favor.

Again, that's refers explicitly to the Leprechaun Test.

It does not follow from here that an orange must get to "No" for every unproven and irrational claim.

You may be on the cusp, tsg, but from where I stand it seems you're inside the green b/c there's always some qualifier to that "No".

[Piggy]

Maybe I missed your point. I think all questions are amenable to scientific inquiry, even if they don't have scientific answers.
I wouldn't go so far as to say "all" b/c that would include the Primus question. And don't listen to JPK b/c he's obviously a Herb snob who doesn't appreciate Brain's less flashy style and how that reconfigured the dynamic of the band allowing them to explore musical territory they never could have gotten into with Herb.

What I mean is, the answer to your question "Which questions are not amenable to scientific inquiry" will be different if you ask a strong orange like me or a purple like some Xian skeptics.

Purples (and I've met some in a couple of threads, which is why I include them) maintain that positive belief is allowable within a skeptical framework when it is applied to areas outside the purview of science. An example, from what has been posted by proponents of this view, would be faith in God on the part of a person who felt that God's existence is by nature not a question that science can answer either way.

[Piggy]

Signing off of this thread for the night, but one more observation....

Oranges don't deny that they can be wrong. An orange can decide, that's irrational, it violates the laws of physics, there's no credible evidence, there's lots of evidence against, and its origins are superstitious, therefore it's an unqualified "no". Then s/he may discover, oh, wait, I totally misread those studies and failed to look at all this stuff over here, so I can't go to "no" on this one.

That's just simple human error.

It doesn't change his/her orange position that it is not always impossible to get to a totally unqualified "no" without positive empirical disproof. It doesn't change his/her orange position that if a methodology fails the Leprechaun Test, it is insufficient.

[Piggy]

If I'm interpreting it right, that would still be green, which is why I'm green myself. Making that last leap between 99.999% and 100% certainty in the non-existence of a phenomenon seems to me to create a qualitative difference between orange and green, and as such I see no difference between orange and purple except the content of their faith-based beliefs.
Thanks, JD. (Btw, JD was involved in the discussion on the thread that sparked this one.) JD and I are a clear case of green/orange dichotomy.

From his POV, my progressing to the totally unqualified "No" in the absence of positive disproof is, as tsg said, irrational, or a leap of faith.

From my POV, because my methodology does not require me to stop at the borders of scientific inquiry, pure logic, and mathematical proof, I am not always required to hedge the "No" if there is not empirical disproof -- in some cases I can rationally go that far.

But, JD, there is a difference b/t oranges and purples, even from a green POV, in that oranges maintain that no leap of faith is occurring.

[JamesDillon]

Signing off of this thread for the night, but one more observation....

Oranges don't deny that they can be wrong. An orange can decide, that's irrational, it violates the laws of physics, there's no credible evidence, there's lots of evidence against, and its origins are superstitious, therefore it's an unqualified "no". Then s/he may discover, oh, wait, I totally misread those studies and failed to look at all this stuff over here, so I can't go to "no" on this one.

That's just simple human error.

It doesn't change his/her orange position that it is not always impossible to get to a totally unqualified "no" without positive empirical disproof. It doesn't change his/her orange position that if a methodology fails the Leprechaun Test, it is insufficient.

Why not? It seems like what you're describing here is a provisional conclusion, always subject to the caveat that it could be rebutted by the discovery of further evidence. That seems to me to be a description of the green position, and I don't see how you can be a consistent orange if you admit that.

Chapter 10 of Sagan's The Demon-Haunted World gives a good example of green skepticism in action, where Sagan conducts a skeptical inquiry into the hypothetical claim "A[n invisible, heatless, immaterial] fire-breathing dragon lives in my garage." Sagan goes step by step through a skeptical analysis of this claim, describing a conversation in which the hypothetical claimant explains away the apparent lack of all observable evidence for the existence of the dragon. Sagan ultimately concludes that, in the absence of any such evidence, "the only sensible approach is tentatively to reject the dragon hypothesis, to be open to future physical data, and to wonder what the cause might be that so many apparently sane and sober people share the same strange delusion." I think that's exactly right (it's nice when Sagan agrees with me); we can never say with absolute certainty that invisible, immaterial fire-breathing dragons do not inhabit our garages, but the only rational solution is to adopt a tentative and rebuttable non-belief in their existence.

[tsg]

But, JD, there is a difference b/t oranges and purples, even from a green POV, in that oranges maintain that no leap of faith is occurring.

I have to say, as a borderline green/orange, that I don't see a difference. Whether they recognize it as a leap of faith, even if it's just a small one, doesn't mean it isn't one.

[Piggy]

Whether they recognize it as a leap of faith, even if it's just a small one, doesn't mean it isn't one.
That's true. But remember, the difference under discussion is this: What methodologies do different types of skeptical inquirers recognize as valid?

An orange is defined by recognizing as valid, in some cases, an absolute "No" even if there is no positive empirical (scientific or logical) disproof, if that conclusion is merited by other means. For an orange, the Leprechaun Test is valid -- any methodology which fails to reach absolute "No" when applied to "Do leprechauns exist?" must be to some degree flawed.

A green maintains that the absolute "No" can never be valid in the absence of positive empirical (scientific or logical) disproof. A green would agree with Sagan's conclusion regarding the dragon, whereas an orange would go to absolute "No". For a green, the Leprechaun Test is not a valid measure of whether a method of inquiry is sound, and oranges (though they deny it) are in fact making a leap of faith in those cases where they go to absolute "No" in the absence of positive empirical (scientific or logical) disproof.

Purples go farther than greens (and certainly oranges) by allowing not just an agnostic position or an "I think so" (or "I believe so" in the colloquial sense) with regard to unproven claims, but in some cases allowing positive belief in the strict sense. For purples, if the claim, in their view, falls outside the legitimate realm of scientific inquiry and inside the realm of, say, theology or metaphysics, then it is justifiable to assert positive belief in the absence of proof.


It is my feeling that these judgments regarding validity define meaningful (tho not necessarily crisp) boundaries which describe zones of irreducible difference. JamesDillon and I are never going to agree on certain issues, for example, because there is evidence which I will accept as conclusive that he will not and because he sees a leap of faith where I do not.

Whenever the point is reached where this kind of evidence is the underlying difference between our positions, then there's no use trading evidence any longer. We must at that point "agree to disagree".

And it is also my feeling that these differences can be generalized. The purpose of this thread is to explore those possibilities.

[Piggy]

Why not? It seems like what you're describing here is a provisional conclusion, always subject to the caveat that it could be rebutted by the discovery of further evidence.
This is the diciest bit of the whole construct, it seems to me. If it fails somewhere, it may be here. I'll probably have clearer things to say tomorrow, but I'll preface it with this.

The orange position with regard to leprechaun-type claims is that absolute "No" is possible, and this includes the stance that, in these cases, no new evidence is possible.

It does not preclude the possibility, however, that the person in question misunderstood the evidence.

In other words, the orange position is that "No" in the leprechaun case and in similar cases is not prohibited by the methodology itself. But that does not mean that it's impossible for an orange to be a dumb @$$ and jump the gun and screw it up that way and reach the wrong conclusion.

Is that a mere quibble, given that errors are, in fact, possible? I don't think so. But I need to sleep on it.

[Roboramma]

The orange position is that it is possible, not necessary, to make a definite negative statement in some cases where a claim is irrational, there is no credible supporting evidence, and positive empirical disproof does not exist.
Oh, I understood that. I think I didn't make myself clear because I was only addressing the point of contention. My bad.

I recognise that it is of course posible for me to ask an orange, "Do you have any milk?" and for him to say, "I'm not sure, let me check."

But in those situations where he does feel qualified to say, "No, that does not exist." he is saying that he knows this with certainty.
Yet as I showed in my previous post, there are situations where he would say, "no that does not exist" when in fact it did. How is that not proof that his position, that (in this situation) it's impossible that he's wrong, is false?

No one seems to have addressed that point.

Again, for me, and I think many of the greens here, it's still possible to say "no, that doesn't exist."
Its just that the word "No." almost always means, "almost certainly not, to the point that it's stupid to act as though it might be the case."

The green position is that, under those circumstances, a truly definitive "No" is never possible -- one is obliged to stop at something like "The chances are so small that it's safe to behave as if it were impossible".
Yes. And I don't understand how anyone can suggest that saying that it truely is impossible, without actually showing it to be so, is anything other than a leap of faith (albeit a tiny one).

That's why the Leprechaun Test. An orange looks at the situation ("Do leprechauns exist?") and says, "superstitious origin, no credible evidence, violates everything we know about physics and biology, it's false, no qualifiers, no hedges, end of story, game over, pure bunk." A green won't go that far.
Here's the thing. In a real life conversation, if someone said, "Do leprechauns exist?" I'd say, "of course not. don't be rediculous."
"Does Krishna exist?"
"No."

But I say these things in just the same way that if someone said, "Will the earth be orbitting the sun next week?"
I'd answer, "Yes.", even though its possible that it won't be.

(By the way, I'd just like to point out that saying "I don't know with absolute certainty" is very different from suggesting that I have no reason to believe some is true or false. It's that distinction that many theist fail to grasp when attacking atheism -"You can't prove god doesn't exist, therefore you have to admit that my position is as good as yours." No. I have to admit only that you could be right. Just like I have to admit that an airplane could crash into my house at exactly 3:45 this afternoon. But that doesn't make the position that one won't no stronger than the position that one will.)

[Roboramma]

It does not preclude the possibility, however, that the person in question misunderstood the evidence.

I just saw this and realised that my above post could be interpretted not to take this into account. It does. I agree with this point of course, we don't have to say "Nothing is provable because we might make a mistake in our proof."
A similar point could be made about mathematics. We can be certain of some mathematical proofs, even though it's posible that those constructing (and us when analysing) those proofs made mistakes.

My point so far has been different. If it's possible that when you had less knowledge you would have said, "this is definitely not true, and that conclusion is not open to further evidence", but know, based on the knowledge you have, you have to admit that it is true, then the initial conclusion was, quite simply, wrong.
And anything following that methodology is also wrong.

That doesn't mean that it was wrong to say, "This is false." just to suggest that it could be known with certainty.

[Piggy]

I think there are 2 points to consider (and for me to clarify -- but not tonight).

One concerns the difference between the possibility of hedging "no" because the methodology disallows "no" or because one might have made a mistake in applying the methodology, which has been touched on.

The other is that I haven't offered any explanation of what evidence, aside from empirical/scientific/logical disproof, might be sufficient for an orange to get to absolute "No" in cases where positive disproof is absent. I seriously doubt that any definitive list can be created, only examples provided.

The latter is not actually an issue for the Leprechaun Test, but is certainly relevant to the larger thread.

[I less than three logic]

If you believe that it's possible that new evidence may appear which could possibly demonstrate the existence of leprechauns, then how can you honestly say "No, they don't exist" with no qualifications in the first place?

That's what I don't get.

If you believe something stronger than "Hoo, boy, is it ever unlikely!"... if you believe "They don't - period", then where is there room for "But it's possible that evidence may someday be produced which would show that they do"?
I can honestly answer no because after weighting the evidence available for and against the existence of leprechauns the rational conclusion is “No, leprechauns do not exist.” However, I have no reason to believe that all possible evidence for or against the existence of leprechauns is accounted for. Should new evidence be discovered; I must re-evaluate my conclusion.

JD brought up Carl Sagan’s The Demon-Haunted World, thanks JD. :D I honestly believe this book should be required reading in school.

Although, “The Dragon in My Garage” is probably one of my favorite chapters within the book, I think the last two paragraphs of chapter 17 – “The Marriage of Skepticism and Wonder” has something to of relevance to add to this discussion, as well.

No one can be entirely open or completely skeptical. We all must draw the line somewhere. An ancient Chinese proverb advises, “Better to be too credulous than too skeptical,” but this is from an extremely conservative society in which stability was much more prized than freedom and where the rulers had a powerful vested interest in not being challenged. Most scientists, I believe, would say, “Better to be too skeptical than too credulous.” But neither is easy. Responsible, thoroughgoing, rigorous skepticism requires a hardnosed habit of thought that takes practice and training to master. Credulity – I think a better word here is “openness” or “wonder” – does not come easily either. If we really are to be open to counterintuitive ideas in physics or social organization or anything else, we must grasp those ideas. It means nothing to be open to a proposition we don’t understand.

Both skepticism and wonder are skills that need honing and practice. Their harmonious marriage within the mind of every schoolchild ought to be a principle goal of public education. I’d love to see such a domestic felicity portrayed in the media, television especially: a community of people really working the mix – full of wonder, generously open to every notion, dismissing nothing except for good reason, but at the same time, and as second nature, demanding stringent standards of evidence – and these standards applied with at least as much rigor to what they hold dear as to what they are tempted to reject with impunity.

Science needs to be a mix of these two traits, and as Sagan implied above, nothing should be dismissed without good reason. I just don’t have any evidence, no good reason, to conclude that all the evidence has been discovered. I do, however, using the evidence currently available, have good reason to dismiss the existence of leprechauns.

[trvlr2]

Piggy, are your hands making signs?:D

[Piggy]

Piggy, are your hands making signs?:D
It's possible! Always dangerous tinkering with philosophy... There Be (tail-chasing) Dragons!

But I don' think so. (See next post)

[Piggy]

The issue of human error threatens to make the orange position untenable. If one must always hedge a "no" in the absence of positive empirical disproof on the grounds that you might not have all the facts or might have made a mistake, then it's merely a quibble if the methodology prevents you from getting to where you couldn't go anyway.

So we have to ask, "Are there leprechaunesque situations when humans can be sure they are not wrong?"

The clear answer is, yes, of course.

E.g.: Is there an Easter Bunny -- y'know an actual magical rabbit that visits Xian houses all over America and leaves baskets of goodies for the kids on Easter morning?

The answer is an unqualified "No", and nothing short. Why? Because there's enough information to make the conclusion. Plain and simple.

The retort that, well, there actually "could" be an actual Easter Bunny, unknown to everyone, who just isn't doing anything because parents are doing it for him, so you can't say for 100% sure -- is backformed, jury-rigged balderdash and need not be considered.

So the possibility of human error does not void the issue.

So, moving on....

The problem with the green position, from an orange POV, is that it stops at the model.

The methodology used to examine a question creates a kind of model of the actual situation. If the model is incomplete so that there could possibly be valid parts to fill in the gaps that would lead to <= true>, then we have to say "maybe" or "probably" or "dunno" or "chances are so slim we can proceed as if it's false" but not "No -- full stop".

But if the gaps in the model must be stuffed with nonsense-accepted-as-valid in order to get to <= true>, the the orange position is that "No -- full stop" is warranted.

Every model varies from reality to some degree. If it did not, it would be reality itself and not a model.

The orange position, then, can be formulated this way: There are cases in which the gap between "Extremely unlikely" and "No" in the purely logical/scientific model is the result of the limitations of the model, and this can be checked for by verification of the model against our wider experience with the real world, without a leap of faith.

The Leprechaun Test is one check for such gaps.

I am orange because I utterly reject any possibility whatsoever that any evidence will ever, or could ever, be produced to demonstrate the existence of the Easter Bunny or leprechauns, and I believe that any skeptical methodology which introduces a possibility that these things could be real is flawed in that it stops short of doing a final reality-check.

As an orange, I reject the rhetorical sleight-of-hand which allows, for example, theists to posit atheism as a faith. I do not feel constrained to give any credence, no matter how slight, to any particular unsupported and irrational theory that is merely constructed in such a way as to disallow positive disproof.

[arthwollipot]

As an orange, I reject the rhetorical sleight-of-hand which allows, for example, theists to posit atheism as a faith. I do not feel constrained to give any credence, no matter how slight, to any particular unsupported and irrational theory that is merely constructed in such a way as to disallow positive disproof.

But by categorically denying any theory that you consider to be unsupported and irrational, you are placing yourself in exactly the position that you are trying to oppose. You cannot absoutely deny anything without sufficient evidence. Now I grant you, everyone is free to hold their own definition of "sufficient" and this is what sorts the oranges from the greens. The oranges have a tighter definition of "sufficient" than the greens do. The greens are more apt to say "this evidence is sufficient for me to be convinced of the nonexistence of such-and-such a phenomenon. It doesn't exist". The oranges will rather say "It is overwhelmingly unlikely that such-and-such a phenomenon exists". The end result is pretty much the same as far as I can see.

Also, it does not only rest on your definition of "sufficient", but also on your definitions of "unsupported" and "irrational". The subjectiveness of these terms is the whole reason we have the JREF Prize in the first place, to objectively determine whether claims are true. A green would reject where an orange would want to test, perhaps.

[tkingdoll]

I think as pure skepticism is concerned, the orange pov is already invalid, because you quite simply cannot say 100% for sure, ever. There may not be evidence for something...yet. However, as I said in my post, in that case where do you draw the line? If you are looking to be a "pure" skeptic from a philosophical pov then fine, allow for any possibility, but if, like me, you just want a filter so you don't waste your time on things not worth pursuing, then you have to take the orange position.

I say this because if you entertain the possibility of anything, then how do you dictate whether or not it is worth pursuing? We only have finite resources, but we could spend a lot of time and money investigating whether there is an Easter Bunny. Or, we could spend that resource on something that will deliver results we can use (as a species and as a society).

As an individual, I apply that logic to my own personal thinking and debating time, as well as my personal economy. For example, I could entertain the idea that there might be something to reiki healing, in which case I should need to include it in any course of treatment for any illness I get, because I want to give myself the best possible chance to get well. That would cost me a lot of money and take up a lot of my time. So I use the orange position to dismiss the things in life that there is no evidence for, simply in order to fill my short days with productive, useful, fulfilling things.

It's not a popular statement among diehard skeptics to say that you 'know' something isn't real (for example the Easter Bunny), but I just don't have time to examine any and every claim. I have a filter, which is that if something is clearly stupid, I don't waste my time entertaining it. That goes for god, the Easter Bunny, leprechauns and conspiracy theories. Part of 'stupid' is whether or not it flies in the face of accepted science, part of it is whether or not I can clearly see the history and motivation behind the invention or concept, and part of it is just plain common sense. Of course, my own education, prejudices and experiences will dictate what I consider to be common sense, but as I am just looking for a filter for my own life and no-one else's, I don't think that's too much of an issue.

I coined a phrase a while back "anything that can be conceived, can be believed", which is my way of saying that the human imagination is so vast, the moment you give utterance to an idea or fantasy, some idiot will want it to be true enough to believe it is. The green skeptic position falls into this trap too, in that I can invent any number of things, and a green skeptic could never rightly say any of them are not real. It's just not practical to live that way, so I default to orange. That might make me a bad skeptic, perhaps, but I can live with that. Otherwise you get into an Interesting Ian/Narnia-could-be-real trap.

[JPK]

Good morning Piggy.

I wouldn't go so far as to say "all" b/c that would include the Primus question. And don't listen to JPK b/c he's obviously a Herb snob who doesn't appreciate Brain's less flashy style and how that reconfigured the dynamic of the band allowing them to explore musical territory they never could have gotten into with Herb.
Actually I love both Brain and Herb. But I actually am digging this thread more so please accept my apology for the slight derail. Back to reading.
JPK

[Piggy]

<hijack>

Actually I love both Brain and Herb.

Glad to hear it! I tried to start a thread on this topic, but got no takers. :(

Sorry for calling you a Herb snob. :o

</hijack>

[Roboramma]

I say this because if you entertain the possibility of anything, then how do you dictate whether or not it is worth pursuing?
The same way anyone else does - based on the evidence. A man comes to me with a watch in his hand, and says that it's worth $1000, but he really needs $10 right now for some reason, and he'll sell it to me for that. Sure, he could be telling the truth, be he's probably not. So I don't believe him. There's no need for a philosophical certainty that something is false in order to treat it as false.

I think a large problem in this discussion (and many others) is that "could be true" is often taken as, "is as likely to be true as false, and we have no way of distinguishing between the two." But it isn't the same thing.

As an individual, I apply that logic to my own personal thinking and debating time, as well as my personal economy. For example, I could entertain the idea that there might be something to reiki healing, in which case I should need to include it in any course of treatment for any illness I get, because I want to give myself the best possible chance to get well. Only if you set the likelihood of it's being true at a certain threshold. If you were to say, "I don't know for certain if reiki healing works, but I'd put up $1,000,000,000,000 to your $1 saying that it doesn't."(assuming you had that much to bet ;) ) Then it wouldn't make sense to invest time and money in something that is very unlikely to give you a return.

That would cost me a lot of money and take up a lot of my time. So I use the orange position to dismiss the things in life that there is no evidence for, simply in order to fill my short days with productive, useful, fulfilling things.

The funny thing is that you've basically admitted to being a philosophical green, and given a green's reasons for discarding certain claims (that the chance that they're true isn't worth the time or money to investigate them). I don't see why you need to go one step further and claim certainty. Aren't those initial reasons enough?

Though I just thought about something. There is a real world out there. So these things are either real or they are not. All we're talking about is how much we know about them. So, I guess what I can say is, "There are no leprechauns. I may not be certain about that, but nevertheless, there aren't any." Which seems like a contradiction, but will almost always be right, and I've admitted that I might be wrong. :P

ETA: (Which is basically my position about any god you care to name, "It doesn't exist. I could be wrong about that, but that doesn't change the fact that it doesn't exist." Does this make me irrational too? Oh, well.)

ETA2: Forgot to say: Edited for spelling. :P

[I less than three logic]

I think I’m beginning to understand where you are coming from, and I believe I agree with you for the most part. Perhaps I fall borderline orange/green. I can’t claim there is zero possibility that evidence lay undiscovered. However, using the evidence currently available, and a quick jaunt through the common sense filter, I’m am comfortable concluding that leprechauns, gods, Narnia, the easter bunny, and other claims that fall within the nonsense category do not exist. I would also consider it irrational to waste time looking for additional evidence, and reserve no expectation that additional evidence shall ever be found.

[Piggy]

I guess what I can say is, "There are no leprechauns. I may not be certain about that, but nevertheless, there aren't any." <snip> Which is basically my position about any god you care to name, "It doesn't exist. I could be wrong about that, but that doesn't change the fact that it doesn't exist."
That's a position that just doesn't compute with me.

And it seems to me that, for some issues, there comes a point where one can affirm that we've seen enough and there can be no mistake, check please.

[JamesDillon]

That's a position that just doesn't compute with me.

And it seems to me that, for some issues, there comes a point where one can affirm that we've seen enough and there can be no mistake, check please.
No offense, but I think that attitude gives rise to a kind of institutional orthodoxy that is fundamentally inconsistent with the principles of scientific inquiry. In Philosophy and the Real World: An Introduction to Karl Popper, Bryan Magee provides a good illustration of the dangers of scientific dogmatism in exposition of his characterization of Popper's view "that what we call our knowledge is by its nature provisional, and permanently so." (p. 22). Using the example of Newtonian physics and its eventual replacement by Einstein's theory of general relativity, he explains that
Newtonian physics was the most successful and important scientific theory ever to be advanced and accepted. Everything in the observable world seemed to confirm it: for more than two centuries its laws were corroborated not just by observation but by creative use, for they became the foundation of Western science and technology... If any scientific laws had been verified inductively as Laws of Nature, these had, by countless billions of observations and experiments... Yet after all this, at the beginning of [the twentieth] century, a theory different from Newton's was put forward by Einstein... The world had simply been wrong in believing that all that untold evidence proved Newton's theory. Yet a whole era of civilization had been based on it, with unprecedented material success. If this amount of verification and inductive support did not prove the truth of a theory, what ever could?
(pp. 23-24).

At the risk of opening up a new can of worms, it might help to illuminate my commitment to the green flavor of skepticism to explain that my view of the impossibility of demonstrating with absolute certainty the non-existence of any external entity is a logical outgrowth of my view regarding the impossibility of demonsrating with absolute certainty the existence of any external entity. Yes, this is brain in a vat stuff again; I realize that it has been debated ad nauseam in several other threads, and I'm not particularly eager to revive that debate here, but the fact remains that the weight of intellectual history at least since Descartes suggests pretty persuasively that we simply can't be absolutely certain that any of the sensory impressions that we experience are accurate reflections of external reality (or even that there is any such thing as external reality!) We are of course rationally justified in acknowledging this omnipresent barrier to absolute knowledge and proceeding as if certain that our sensory impressions reflect external reality, but with that insurmountable epistemological obstacle in place, it seems to me that we are only ever rationally justified in saying, "It is extremely likely, on the basis of my consistent sensory impressions, that (,e.g.,) my dog exists as an external entity distinct from my sensory impressions of it." If the most we can ever claim is a very high probability that the objects of ordinary experience do exist in the external world, how can we possibly be justified in claiming absolute certainty that some objects do not exist?


Edit: To add a bit more in direct response to your last post, what if the leprechauns are just so clever that we haven't been able to catch them yet, and they're smart enough to avoid all of our leprechaun-hunting devices? The obvious response is, "That's ridiculous." Of course it is-- at least, believing in leprechauns on that basis would be absurdly irrational. But, whatever level of probability you want to assign to that hypothesis, you have to concede that it is above zero. Ergo, our level of certainty in the non-existence of leprechauns has to be discounted by that .000000001% likelihood of their existence.

[tkingdoll]

If the most we can ever claim is a very high probability that the objects of ordinary experience do exist in the external world, how can we possibly be justified in claiming absolute certainty that some objects do not exist?

Because some ideas are stupid.

The certainty is not the issue though, it's what you do with the certainty.

For example, when I was Christian, I 'knew' there was a god. Now I am an atheist, I 'know' with equal certainty that there is no god. Neither position is valid as 'knowledge' because in actual fact I cannot 'know' one way or the other. The best I can do is make a judgement call.

Which way I make the judgement call, however, has a massive effect on my life, not least in the one simple fact of whether or not I get a lie-in on Sunday mornings.

You can argue all day that we can't know whether our external reality really exists, but when I'm eating hot buttered toast it doesn't actually matter.

In other words, you can tell me I'm a figment of your imagination but it'll still 'hurt' when I stamp on your 'toe'.

[JamesDillon]

Because some ideas are stupid.

The certainty is not the issue though, it's what you do with the certainty.

For example, when I was Christian, I 'knew' there was a god. Now I am an atheist, I 'know' with equal certainty that there is no god. Neither position is valid as 'knowledge' because in actual fact I cannot 'know' one way or the other. The best I can do is make a judgement call.

Which way I make the judgement call, however, has a massive effect on my life, not least in the one simple fact of whether or not I get a lie-in on Sunday mornings.

You can argue all day that we can't know whether our external reality really exists, but when I'm eating hot buttered toast it doesn't actually matter.

In other words, you can tell me I'm a figment of your imagination but it'll still 'hurt' when I stamp on your 'toe'.

I'm not quite sure what to make of that; you seem to agree with everything I said, yet to be rather dismissive of the ideas you're agreeing with. Acknowledging that we can't be 100% certain of our conclusions in no way suggests that we have to treat all ideas equally, or deny that some of them are far more likely to be true than others, if that's what you're suggesting.

[Piggy]

We're getting off the subject here, which is partly my fault -- the OP regards the issue of whether there are meaningful distinctions among skeptics regarding the validity of evidence and methodolgies. My intention was not to begin a debate among the camps, but I suppose that was inevitable, and I'm guilty of indulging in it on this thread.

So I'll shortly post a new splinter thread in which I argue for the validity of the orange perspective.

This thread has been very useful for me, in that I had to seriously question my position. In the end, though, I returned to it, and will argue in favor of it on the other thread.

I think that attitude gives rise to a kind of institutional orthodoxy that is fundamentally inconsistent with the principles of scientific inquiry.
I don't mind that because my strong orange position is that scientific inquiry is not always sufficient. There is no requirement to stop at that boundary.

Using the example of Newtonian physics and its eventual replacement by Einstein's theory of general relativity...
The example does not apply because we're not discussing the certainty of positive propositions here, only the certainty of reaching "No".

I think the issue you raise is a valid one, but I'm not prepared to venture into it. This can o' worms is enough for me at the moment.

At the risk of opening up a new can of worms, it might help to illuminate my commitment to the green flavor of skepticism to explain that my view of the impossibility of demonstrating with absolute certainty the non-existence of any external entity is a logical outgrowth of my view regarding the impossibility of demonsrating with absolute certainty the existence of any external entity. Yes, this is brain in a vat stuff again; I realize that it has been debated ad nauseam in several other threads, and I'm not particularly eager to revive that debate here, but the fact remains that the weight of intellectual history at least since Descartes suggests pretty persuasively that we simply can't be absolutely certain that any of the sensory impressions that we experience are accurate reflections of external reality (or even that there is any such thing as external reality!)
I am prepared to argue that brain-in-a-vat thought experiments are irrelevant, that the possibility of the non-existence of external reality is bunk, and that the unreliability of sensory impressions actually mitigates toward the strong orange position. But you'll have to wait for the new thread.

To add a bit more in direct response to your last post, what if the leprechauns are just so clever that we haven't been able to catch them yet, and they're smart enough to avoid all of our leprechaun-hunting devices? The obvious response is, "That's ridiculous." Of course it is-- at least, believing in leprechauns on that basis would be absurdly irrational. But, whatever level of probability you want to assign to that hypothesis, you have to concede that it is above zero.
I absolutely do not have to concede that the level of probability is above zero. Why on earth should I have to concede something as ridiculous as that? This claim is factum ex anus -- it is totally whipped up on the spot, invented as a wholly unsupported and unsupportable verbal trick to try to rhetorically corner a perfectly rational belief which all sane people share. It deserves no respect whatsoever, unless one has one's head so far into one's abstractions that the real world ceases to matter. And for me, the real world never ceases to matter.

[Roboramma]

I don't mind that because my strong orange position is that scientific inquiry is not always sufficient. There is no requirement to stop at that boundary.

This point of yours is interesting Piggy, but I'm not quite sure I understand it yet. Could you clarify? What is it that allows you to go beyond that boundary?

The reason I'm asking is, one, I want to know, but also, throughout this thread I've had the feeling that we have very similar viewpoints, we just articulate them differently.

[Roboramma]

I was just thinking about this again. I think what it comes down to for me is this:

If we were to list all possible rediculous claims (all leprechaun like claims) for which there was no evidence, your methodology says that we could dismiss them all.
However, I think it's likely that some would be true. A very tiny minority, but some.

On the other hand, if I were presented with any specific rediculous claim, I would dismiss it.

Similarly I don't play the lottery because I easily dismiss the idea that any particular lottery ticket is a winner, but I recognise that some of them might be.

I can anticipate one problem with this line of reasoning - yes, there may be some things about the universe that are true that we would find rediculous if they were presented to us with our level of understanding. However, no one alive understands these things either, and so wouldn't hit upon those truths. Thus I can deny all claims that people make, because they just won't happen to hit on the ones that are true.
But again, that's a probability argument. It's certainly possible that someone would be lucky enough to make a mad guess about something weird and for it to just by chance turn out to be true.
It's also possible that my glass of water will spontaneously turn into part steam and part ice. Doesn't mean I expect it to happen, or base my actions on the chance that it might. Because the chance is so small it might as well not exist.

[Piggy]

Hi, Roboramma.

Taking your second post first....

If we were to list all possible ridiculous claims (all leprechaun like claims) for which there was no evidence, your methodology says that we could dismiss them all.
Sticky point, but -- stay with me b/c I have to explain -- not necessarily so.

The Leprechaun Test only reveals that a given methodology contains a flaw. That does not mean, therefore, that all conclusions reached via that methodology are necessarily false.

What the leprechaun test shows is merely the limitations of a method, not whether those limitations matter in any particular case.

So I'd have to ask you what qualifies as "leprechaun like"?

If you mean all claims for which:

1. The origins are purely mythical/superstitious, and have now passed into mere folklore;
2. There is no credible evidence despite hundreds of years of history during which the myth was operative;
3. There is no reason to believe that further exploration of the world will uncover credible evidence;
3. Verification would mean violating accepted facts of natural law.
4. Acceptance would not provide any coherent hypothesis to replace the violated laws, which did not in themselves further violate other known laws;
5. There are no belief-positive supporters who are not considered marginal in the extreme in their beliefs;

Then yes, the orange stance would hold that all such theories are a great load of horsefeathers, and would admit zero (not near-zero) chance of their being true, or of anyone being wrong about their falsity, or of any new evidence coming to light.

[Piggy]

I can anticipate one problem with this line of reasoning - yes, there may be some things about the universe that are true that we would find ridiculous if they were presented to us with our level of understanding. However, no one alive understands these things either, and so wouldn't hit upon those truths.
Since these claims are not leprechaun-like, even a strong orange isn't allowed to go to absolute "No" for them, if I understand you correctly.

Take string theory. Some deny it's even a theory -- that it's unfalsifiable and therefore more akin to a faith. But some string theorists say that we must search for a way to falsify or confirm the theory.

Even a strong orange can't yet reject string theory with 100% certainty. In the absence of disproof we're obliged to say "Who knows" or at best "Who cares?"

The orange skeptic only affirms that we are not bound to stop short of absolute, unqualified "No" in all cases where no positive empirical disproof is available or possible.

The green position is akin to Sagan's dragon -- that unless there is positive disproof, no matter how outrageous the claim, we must stop short of an unqualified "No" even if we affirm that the odds are so infintesimal that we may safely ignore them in real life.

[Piggy]

What is it that allows you to go beyond that boundary?
Several things, actually. There will be more on the splinter thread. (I've found a Web link to a particularly clear, concise, and coherent refutation of Sagan's dragon on the Web, btw, which should help to illuminate the strong orange position, but it doesn't belong on this thread.)

First, the scope of every method of inquiry is limited, so there's no reason to believe that any one will ever be sufficient for all issues.

Also, the insufficiency of logic alone and science alone and history alone are implicit in their combined use when approaching questions of truth, so what is the justification for asserting that their combination must be sufficent?

In other words, there is no proof that the selection of available and valid tools stops there.

But now we're getting into the splinter topic, and it's way too late to write up those posts tonight. More later.

[JamesDillon]

Several things, actually. There will be more on the splinter thread. (I've found a Web link to a particularly clear, concise, and coherent refutation of Sagan's dragon on the Web, btw, which should help to illuminate the strong orange position, but it doesn't belong on this thread.)

First, the scope of every method of inquiry is limited, so there's no reason to believe that any one will ever be sufficient for all issues.

Also, the insufficiency of logic alone and science alone and history alone are implicit in their combined use when approaching questions of truth, so what is the justification for asserting that their combination must be sufficent?

In other words, there is no proof that the selection of available and valid tools stops there.

But now we're getting into the splinter topic, and it's way too late to write up those posts tonight. More later.

I'm eager to see where you're going with this. I will readily admit that the scientific method is insufficient to test the truth of all claims (and have, in fact, already done so in another thread (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=1511701&postcount=69)), but if you have a consistent method of getting at truth that is more reliable (or reliable in different circumstances) than science, we may be venturing into Nobel Prize territory here. As is appropriate with any extraordinary claim, I will remain skeptical until I see the details :)

[Godmode]

I'm orange, but usually after giving it a lot of thought. So maybe I'm with the person who said "orange with healthy green stripes"

Someone mentioned aliens. I'm also in the camp where it seems likely to me that there either have been, is, or will be lifeforms on planets other then ours. I don't have any proof of this, but it seems logical to me. However, there is no way in hell I believe that they are coming to earth and probing people.
I find it unlikely we will ever know, except through pure luck if there are any others. I guess my reasoning is, it happened on earth, so there's no reason to believe it's impossable everywhere else. (Does this make me a bad skeptic?)

[JamesDillon]

I'm orange, but usually after giving it a lot of thought. So maybe I'm with the person who said "orange with healthy green stripes"
If I understand the matter correctly, and perhaps Piggy can confirm this since these are his categories, there can't be any such compromise position as "orange with green stripes." Either it is possible to know with absolute certainty the non-existence of certain phenomena, or it is not. I don't think that the orange position insists that we can always be absolutely certain about the existence or non-existence of every phenomenon; if you believe that such certainty is possible even in some cases, then you're orange and not green.

Someone mentioned aliens. I'm also in the camp where it seems likely to me that there either have been, is, or will be lifeforms on planets other then ours. I don't have any proof of this, but it seems logical to me. However, there is no way in hell I believe that they are coming to earth and probing people.
Neither do I. But is it possible-- not probable, but within the realm of logically conceivable possibility-- that such beings exist and we simply haven't been able to verify their existence yet? If that possibility is conceivable, then we can't be certain of the non-existence of alien abduction. We can, however, conclude that the likelihood that extraterrestrials are really abducting and performing experiments on people is so low that we are justified in assuming that it is not true.

I find it unlikely we will ever know, except through pure luck if there are any others. I guess my reasoning is, it happened on earth, so there's no reason to believe it's impossable everywhere else. (Does this make me a bad skeptic?)
I'm going to go out on a limb here and say that in the eyes of the skeptical mainstream (e.g., Shermer, Randi, Sagan), that openness to possibility makes you a good skeptic. For example, Shermer and Sagan are (or in Sagan's case, were) enthusiastic supporters of the SETI program.

Keep in mind that Piggy has conceded (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=1577578&postcount=108) that orange skepticism cannot be defended without going beyond the knowledge available through the scientific method. He promises to elaborate some alternative epistemological system that will allow us to arrive at certain knowledge beyond the boundaries of science; I am, as I've said, skeptical of that argument, but we can't say anything more about that until we know what it is. For the moment, though, I hope that the avowed oranges in this thread come to realize what a radical position it is. If you believe, as I currently do, that humanity's most reliable knowledge comes through scientific investigation, then green is as far as you can go.

[hammegk]

LOL. What a bunch of interactive dualists who are ashamed to admit that starting from a logically defensible worldview is a neccessary condition for a valid logical argument.

Logically defensible Eliminative Materialism -- one implication being 100% certainty that only the physical exists -- is a difficult position to accept, since the one thing we all 'think' we know at 100% certainty is that each of us 'thinks'. (Actually, all we can know at 100% certainty is that thought exists, or has existed.)

[Piggy]

if you have a consistent method of getting at truth that is more reliable (or reliable in different circumstances) than science, we may be venturing into Nobel Prize territory here.
Let me assure you, I do not.

All I am saying is that science is not always sufficient, and that it is possible, in some cases, to falsify claims that are "un-disprovable" by purely scientific, logical, or mathematical approaches.

I'm typing up the OPs (yes, plural) now. I have some obligations after lunch, but hopefully I can get the thread started today.

PS: My previous post above is flawed. I realized that after I logged off, but it was written in the wee hours so I wasn't up to going back for more posting. Better to just get on with clearer statements in the new thread.

[Piggy]

I don't think that the orange position insists that we can always be absolutely certain about the existence or non-existence of every phenomenon; if you believe that such certainty is possible even in some cases, then you're orange and not green.
That's how I'd put it, yes. Greens maintain that if there's no positive disproof, then there must always be some hedge to absolute "No" -- that the best we can do is "The odds are so remote that they can be ignored for all practical purposes" or "The answer is no unless there's new evidence" or some such. The orange position is that this is not always the case.

That's why the Leprechaun Test is invoked as a determining case. If you can get to "No - period" with no hedge whatsoever on the question "Do leprechauns exist?" (assuming we mean actual little people with magical powers living in the real world), then you're orange. If you only recognize as valid a methodology which requires you to hedge your conclusion in any way short of absolute No regarding leprechauns, you're green.


Keep in mind that Piggy has conceded that orange skepticism cannot be defended without going beyond the knowledge available through the scientific method.
True.

He promises to elaborate some alternative epistemological system that will allow us to arrive at certain knowledge beyond the boundaries of science
Then I've mis-stated my position (or you've misunderstood it). I don't propose anything alternative to science. What I propose are methods additional to these (purely scientific/logical) which, in some cases, can allow us to falsify an "un-disprovable" (from a purely scientific POV) claim. I want to be clear that I'm not proposing anything alternative to science.

If you believe, as I currently do, that humanity's most reliable knowledge comes through scientific investigation, then green is as far as you can go.
I will argue that that's not the case. I agree that scientific investigation produces our most reliable knowledge. I'd better get on with composing the OPs....

[Bronze Dog]

Doing a lot of skimming and skipping other comments, but I think I'll clarify my position: Orange was the closest to my position, but I don't like the absoluteness that almost seemed to be attached to it later (I might have missed a key phrase in the OP.) I guess you could say I'm a "weak" Orange: I can't be certain in a negative, but I can be confident.

If 10,000 years of leprechaun hunting possessed nothing but a string of failures, I would merely be very confident that they don't exist. But if a single hunt came out successful, I'd easily reverse my opinion.

[luchog]

I don't think any particular colour fits my viewpoint. Depending on the particular claim/circumstance/etc,. I will fit any one of the three, pretty equally; though Purple is probably slightly more dominant.

[Piggy]

If 10,000 years of leprechaun hunting possessed nothing but a string of failures, I would merely be very confident that they don't exist. But if a single hunt came out successful, I'd easily reverse my opinion.
That makes you green, BD. At least for the purposes of this thread, if you can say with a straight face that there's any chance, no matter how remote, that someone might one day fetch up a leprechaun, then you're not orange.

Me, I can't say that. If I'm honest, I have to affirm that there is absolutely no possibility whatsoever that this will every happen, and if a methodology of inquiry admits a chance that it will, this is merely a result of the limitations of the methodology.

I've been revising the OPs for the splinter thread between my daily obligations. Looking forward to getting them posted. That will be a better forum for hashing out the orange position.

[Piggy]

Depending on the particular claim/circumstance/etc,. I will fit any one of the three, pretty equally; though Purple is probably slightly more dominant.
I don't see how that's possible. These proposed distinctions have to do with what types of methods and evidence a person accepts as valid at all.

So, if you think that it's impossible ever to completely falsify a claim that has not been or cannot be disproved by scientific inquiry and cannot be dismissed by applying rigid logical analysis, then you're a green. That is, unless you go farther and allow positive belief in unproven or unprovable claims in the realm of religion or metaphysic, in which case you're purple.

If you're orange, you maintain that even if a claim has not been disproven or is inherently un-disprovable by scientific inquiry and cannot be dismissed by applying rigid logical analysis, it still may be falsifiable.

The upcoming thread "Killing Sagan's Dragon" will go into detail regarding how this is possible, from an orange point of view.

[drkitten]

Am I the only purple participating in this thread?

From my point of view, orange skepticism verges on scientism. There's always the possibility of new evidence arising to disprove anything. The opening poster runs a risk -- admittedly a rather small one -- of having some significant egg on his face when someone digs into a hill in Ireland and discovers some skeletons of what biologists will start calling Homo hiberniensis. I wouldn't have predicted H. floriensis, either.

But I'm also well aware -- perhaps I've spent way too much time reading forensics literature -- of the limitations of what can and cannot be proven "scientifically." The various anti-death penalty "innocence projects" have done a very good job of showing that we, collectively, do a lousy job of "proving" anything. I submit that a person sitting in death row for a crime that he knows he didn't commit is a classic argument in favor of purple skepticism. He has a strong and truthful belief in a fact about the universe -- that the person who committed the crime for which he was convicted was not him -- that by definition could not be proven empirically/scientifically, and in fact could not even be demonstrated to be "reasonable" in the eyes of the jurors.

This, of course, applies to any belief that one holds through personal experience; if I can't prove that I didn't commit a murder last night, I certainly can't prove that I did or didn't see a shooting star last night, or that I did or didn't see an angel, or that God did or didn't speak to me and tell me to take Orleans from the English.

[Bronze Dog]

That makes you green, BD. At least for the purposes of this thread, if you can say with a straight face that there's any chance, no matter how remote, that someone might one day fetch up a leprechaun, then you're not orange.
The problem I perceive with being labelled green is that I can say more than "I don't know". I can say "Probably not."

The way I'm reading it:
"I don't know": 0% confidence in the negative.
"Probably not": High % confidence in the negative.

[tsg]

I submit that a person sitting in death row for a crime that he knows he didn't commit is a classic argument in favor of purple skepticism. He has a strong and truthful belief in a fact about the universe -- that the person who committed the crime for which he was convicted was not him -- that by definition could not be proven empirically/scientifically, and in fact could not even be demonstrated to be "reasonable" in the eyes of the jurors.

I don't think this qualifies as a purple view. The accused person knows for absolute fact that he did not commit the crime. That isn't a belief of faith. That he can't prove that claim to someone else doesn't make it one. It's not about what it takes to convince other people, it's what it takes to convince you.

[Beleth]

No, you're not the only purple here, drkitten. I am too.

There is a huge difference between what hasn't been proven/disproven and what cannot be proven/disproven. If an issue falls into the "cannot" camp, then any position taken on that issue necessarily falls into the "belief based on faith" category; Occam's Razor be damned.

[Piggy]

Hi, everbuddy.

At long last, the new thread is up.

It goes into much more detail regarding the orange position and how it relates to the green position, although it does not discuss purple. For example, BD's point is correct -- as the definition of orange was clarified, it drifted from the oversimplified (and therefore misleading) language in the OP.

This thread has been enormously helpful for me, as I examined, re-evaluated, and clarified my own position on the matter.

I believe that the differences in acceptance of evidence, for the purpose of falsifying claims, outlined here are meaningful. And I do feel that if we pay attention to them, it might be easier for us to understand when to stop arguing certain points, understand that we're dealing with a difference in opinion regarding what constitutes a valid skeptical methodology, and in effect shake hands and say "Good game".

Here is the new thread: Killing Sagan's Dragon: Falsifying the Un-disprovable (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=55469).

Enjoy.

[Piggy]

There is a huge difference between what hasn't been proven/disproven and what cannot be proven/disproven. If an issue falls into the "cannot" camp, then any position taken on that issue necessarily falls into the "belief based on faith" category; Occam's Razor be damned.
Yes, that sounds like a purple position to me, as long as you believe that such "belief based on faith" is consistent with skepticism rather than inherently invalid.

[Beth]

If I'm interpreting it right, that would still be green, which is why I'm green myself. Making that last leap between 99.999% and 100% certainty in the non-existence of a phenomenon seems to me to create a qualitative difference between orange and green, and as such I see no difference between orange and purple except the content of their faith-based beliefs.

I quite agree with you, but if you require absolute certainty to move from green to orange or purple, then there aren't all that many people in the purple category either. A good proportion of theists will allow that while they believe in god, they might be mistaken.

[Piggy]

The opening poster runs a risk -- admittedly a rather small one -- of having some significant egg on his face when someone digs into a hill in Ireland and discovers some skeletons of what biologists will start calling Homo hiberniensis.
Not unless the magical abilities have also left fossils. Just as floriensis isn't evidence of actual hobbits, hiberniensis wouldn't be evidence of actual leprechauns.

[Orb]

I really like this topic; it’s really made me take a hard look at my position. I still have to go with orange for myself. While I think green has a very strong argument, especially for things not completely understood by science, I think we must reach a point where we just have to admit to ourselves that there are no leprechauns. Even if it is possible for them to exist somewhere, the vast majority of the evidence points to non-existence and would take an enormous amount of evidence to the contrary to disprove. When that amount of contrary evidence presents itself, I will change my opinion. Until then, leprechauns/invisible dragons do not exist.

[tsg]

Even if it is possible for them to exist somewhere,

The orange position would be that it is not possible for them to exist somewhere. Anything short of that is green, at least from what I can gather.

[Orb]

OK, well I'm not the best writer, so bear with me. I feel if the object can only exist contrary to known laws of physics (leprechauns, invisible dragons, etc.) then they do not exist. If there is some sight possibility of existance (like Bigfoot), you must still accept non-existence due to the overwhelming evidence against it. I would still say "There is no Bigfoot.", not "there is probably not a Bigfoot". I figured this makes me orange, right?

[tsg]

OK, well I'm not the best writer, so bear with me. I feel if the object can only exist contrary to known laws of physics (leprechauns, invisible dragons, etc.) then they do not exist. If there is some sight possibility of existance (like Bigfoot), you must still accept non-existence due to the overwhelming evidence against it. I would still say "There is no Bigfoot.", not "there is probably not a Bigfoot". I figured this makes me orange, right?

That's what I thought at first, too, but apparently admitting any possibility whatsoever makes it a green position.

[Orb]

That's what I thought at first, too, but apparently admitting any possibility whatsoever makes it a green position.

OK, you're all making my brain work way too hard for a Monday. ;)

I don't think that's what Piggy was saying. I think the point is that we can 100% disprove the existence of something, even when the claims fall inside of known possibilities. Like, if I told you I've been to the moon. How do you know I'm lying?

Now as I understand it a "green" would say "I don't think you've been to the moon, you're too young and a woman, but others have gone, so its not totally impossible", and an orange would say "bullspit, there is no way a 30 yr old woman has been to the moon".

Maybe Piggy can help me out here?

[Roboramma]

Now as I understand it a "green" would say "I don't think you've been to the moon, you're too young and a woman, but others have gone, so its not totally impossible", and an orange would say "bullspit, there is no way a 30 yr old woman has been to the moon".

Yep, but if you admit that it is not totally impossible, even in theory, that a 30 year old woman has been to the moon, then you're a green.

edit to change a ly to a le.

[tsg]

OK, you're all making my brain work way too hard for a Monday. ;)

I don't think that's what Piggy was saying. I think the point is that we can 100% disprove the existence of something, even when the claims fall inside of known possibilities. Like, if I told you I've been to the moon. How do you know I'm lying?

Now as I understand it a "green" would say "I don't think you've been to the moon, you're too young and a woman, but others have gone, so its not totally impossible", and an orange would say "bullspit, there is no way a 30 yr old woman has been to the moon".

Maybe Piggy can help me out here?

My understanding is this.

Green: I cannot rule out the possibility that you have been to the moon, but the odds are so far against it that the likelihood is near zero. You have not been to the moon.

Orange: Despite not being able to prove there is no possibility that you have been to the moon, it is still impossible. You have not been to the moon.

The distinction being that, without definitive proof of the impossibility, green must stop short of saying "it's impossible" where orange does not have that restriction. This is not to say that orange must find it impossible, only that he has that option where green does not.

[Piggy]

My understanding is this.

Green: I cannot rule out the possibility that you have been to the moon, but the odds are so far against it that the likelihood is near zero. You have not been to the moon.

Orange: Despite not being able to prove there is no possibility that you have been to the moon, it is still impossible. You have not been to the moon.
I think that's a fair assessment.

By analyzing the requirements and ramifications of the alternatives, it is clear that Orb's having been to the moon would require a hoax or conspiracy so implausible as to be impossible in the world-as-is.

As for Bigfoot, I'm not ready to move to absolute "No" on that one b/c I don't know enough about, say, the evidence against there being an undiscovered large primate in Asia.

So being orange doesn't mean you'll always come to the same conclusions as other oranges. It just means that you recognize as valid certain methods of falsifying claims which are scientifically/logically undisproven or undisprovable.

[Stir]

Paisley, man, it's paisley. Wild colors ...

[arthwollipot]

I always say "It's virtually impossible that there's a Bigfoot" because if I make an absolute statement, someone always jumps down my throat about it.

[Gaga]

I initially said orange, because I'm like that in my everyday life. I mean, I'm a layman, I have 3 working neurons (most of the time two play billiard and one stay at the score board) if I have to put them at work on something it'd better be something plausible. I'm comfortable with this small "leap of faith".
On the other hand I have to agree that from a philosphical point of view every claim, no matter how outrageously improbable (or even fabricated) has a zillionth of chance of being true or, at least, can't be disproven.

brown?

[Donn]

I'm a green orange-wannabee.
I really want to KISS and I shave with an electric Occam's but sometimes I just ain't smart enough to gather the lines of argument and evidence into a rigorous yes or no.

Fan-bloody-tastic threads Piggy! We've been needing this kinda hard-nosed look at our definitions and fuzzy notions. I am so sick of strong-this and weak-that.

Now all I gotta do is remember what was decided here...

P.S I vote to stickyfy (is that a word?) this thread. I am off to kill Sagan's Dragon now, perhaps that will leave a sticky thread too?

[simba]

How can there are be orange skeptics, because at some point everyone takes something on faith? No one can personally verify everything. Even a hard core skeptic who believes nothing but what science has produced has to take on faith that some where there is (or has been) a scientist who can experimentally show that what they (the skeptic) accept as truth is in fact true. No one has enough understanding to rationally verify that everything they think they know is true. So they take some things on faith. So everyone at most is either a green skeptic or a purple skeptic, right?

This gets even more complicated when you consider that accepted scientific fact comes from a consensus of the vast majority of scientists who contemplate volumes of information gleaned from a huge amount of experimental data from tests examining hypotheses from various directions. Furthermore, given that it’s so complicated to come to a consensus they can sometimes get it wrong. Tell me that in all this that there is not some (albeit small) element of faith?!

[Piggy]

Tell me that in all this that there is not some (albeit small) element of faith?!
Are you telling me that there is? Where is it?