How can we be 100% certain "thought exists"?

[Upchurch]

This question is mostly directed to hammegk, who often asserts that he is 100% certain that "thought exists".

A little background: A long, long time ago, hammegk used to claim that he was 100% certain that "*I* think" and that this certainty was the basis of whatever he would then go on to argue. I challenged him on this claim and after a lengthy debate, he finally had to conceed that he couldn't be certain of the "*I*" portion. After that, I let it drop because at that point the discussion was quite involved and time consuming and I had better things to do.

No longer certain of the one thing he was 100% certain of, hammegk has reformulated his claim to say, simply, that he is 100% certain that "thought exists". Lately, he has been using this claim in much the same way he used his 100% certainty that "*I* think".

Since all claims should be challenged at some time or another (and often over and over), I would like hammegk to please explain how he can be 100% certain that "thought exists".

I am willing to accept that thought may exist, just as I was willing to accept that his *I* may exist. What I'm challenging here is his 100% certainty. Or, more specifically, that this 100% certainty is based entirely on fact and not merely faith or opinion. Christians, after all, are 100% certain that Jesus is their lord and savior, but that doesn't necessarily mean that anything they know about Jesus is true. If hammegk's certainty is based on faith or belief, I'm willing to accept that as a valid answer, as well. Not a universally applicable answer, but a valid one.

Thoughts?




(sorry. couldn't resist. :D )

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I will attempt a thing. I do not understand what is "thought" nor Im sure about the 100% part (seems superfluous).

For me it is sufficient to post just a .

Thinking process is needed to write here, to read, to start the computer even to come to the computer. Language is necessary to learn about the actions needed to come to the computer, and I didnt invent language, I learned it from others.

Ergo.

Nah, better this:

.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Just my 2 cents.

I think the central claim is epistemic. We cannot doubt the existence of thought because the doubt itself is thought. So we can be sure that thought exists. Many other things exist as well, but we can doubt them. We can doubt the "I" claim because it is based on the idea of an integrated self in which all things mental are part of a unified whole -- which the experience of seeing a stroke patient destroys quite readily.

The formulation that we cannot doubt that thought exists, however, takes us no further than we cannot doubt that thought exists, and it is really just a formulation that depends on the basis of what we call knowledge -- which depends critically on thought. So I don't think it helps one bit when it comes to ontologic claims.

[ruach1]

This question is mostly directed to hammegk, who often asserts that he is 100% certain that "thought exists".

A little background: A long, long time ago, hammegk used to claim that he was 100% certain that "*I* think" and that this certainty was the basis of whatever he would then go on to argue. I challenged him on this claim and after a lengthy debate, he finally had to conceed that he couldn't be certain of the "*I*" portion. After that, I let it drop because at that point the discussion was quite involved and time consuming and I had better things to do.
No longer certain of the one thing he was 100% certain of, hammegk has reformulated his claim to say, simply, that he is 100% certain that "thought exists". Lately, he has been using this claim in much the same way he used his 100% certainty that "*I* think".

Since all claims should be challenged at some time or another (and often over and over), I would like hammegk to please explain how he can be 100% certain that "thought exists".

I am willing to accept that thought may exist, just as I was willing to accept that his *I* may exist. What I'm challenging here is his 100% certainty. Or, more specifically, that this 100% certainty is based entirely on fact and not merely faith or opinion. Christians, after all, are 100% certain that Jesus is their lord and savior, but that doesn't necessarily mean that anything they know about Jesus is true. If hammegk's certainty is based on faith or belief, I'm willing to accept that as a valid answer, as well. Not a universally applicable answer, but a valid one.

Thoughts?

(sorry. couldn't resist. :D )
What are you really after? What is your intention?

Do you really want to know if "thought exists"?
Or do you just want to jerk Hammegk's chain? :confused:

[Jekyll]

What are you really after? What is your intention?

You keep asking this on different threads, of different people. Is there some kind of backstory I'm missing here?

[Upchurch]

What are you really after? What is your intention? My intention is to challenge a claim. Specifically, that absolute certainty is possible at any level. It certainly may be, but based on what little knowledge and experience I have in this universe it does not appear to be.

If someone claims to be 100% certain about something and that this certainty is not based merely on faith or opinion, they should be able to rationally explain and demonstrate its truth without relying on faith, opinion, or assumptions.

That is what I'm asking hammegk to do.

Do you really want to know if "thought exists"?
Or do you just want to jerk Hammegk's chain? :confused:No, I'm not really interested in whether or not thought, itself, exists absolutely. What I'm interested in is the notion that one can make a claim that is absolutely assumption free.

I am dubious of hammegk's credibility in this claim, especially given that his "100% certainty" has failed in the past. However, I am interested in what he has to say so that one of us can be educated in how we may be wrong.

[Ichneumonwasp]

You know, if you really get down to brass tacks, I suppose the only thing we can be sure of is that doubting exits.:D

[Upchurch]

You know, if you really get down to brass tacks, I suppose the only thing we can be sure of is that doubting exits.:D
Even then, I'm willing to be convinced that there is something we can be 100% certain of. But I'd have to be convinced.

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think I see where you are going with this. Very ingenious.

Yes, there are several assumptions crouched in the way the thinking works. For instance -- we can doubt the existence of virtually everything. But when it comes to doubting our very act of doubting, it seems that we arrive at something that must exist -- namely, doubting, because in the act of doubting we are obviously doing something. We are performing an action -- doubting. So doubting must exist since only existents may perform actions. But we have, in that move, assumed that only existents may perform actions, and we have probably already previously doubted that truth.

Very ingenious, indeed.

[Upchurch]

I think I see where you are going with this. Very ingenious.Well, that last post I was being half serious, half ironic. A smilie would have helped. :)

Yes, there are several assumptions crouched in the way the thinking works. For instance -- we can doubt the existence of virtually everything. But when it comes to doubting our very act of doubting, it seems that we arrive at something that must exist -- namely, doubting, because in the act of doubting we are obviously doing something. We are performing an action -- doubting. So doubting must exist since only existents may perform actions. But we have, in that move, assumed that only existents may perform actions, and we have probably already previously doubted that truth.This is kind of a tangent, but there is always the possibility that we are not genuinely doubting, for example, but merely rejecting a concept simply because it doesn't conform to our already held concepts.

[ruach1]

You keep asking this on different threads, of different people. Is there some kind of backstory I'm missing here?
My intention in asking other's intentions is to see with what and with whom I am dealing.

For example, some people use question after question for the intention of simply winning some type of ego contest over the internet. This, to me, is childish and a wasting of peoples' time who do not feel the need to be involved in the melee of words, questions, accusations, hostilities, etc.

Other's question because they genuinely want to learn--hence JREducational F.

Therefore I ask about intentions to see if I'm witnessing just another :catfight: or if I'm dealing with something a little more substantial.

Additionally, I believe questions of intention may also help the questioner see the above and/or develop his/her thoughts.

Now as far as Upchurch goes, I had always thought him to be a level-headed person. His "calling out" of Hammegk seemed a little shallow. However, his intentions are obviously deeper than this, and I believed (IMHO) the question of said intentions has helped----- whomever or whatever.

[ruach1]

My intention is to challenge a claim. Specifically, that absolute certainty is possible at any level. It certainly may be, but based on what little knowledge and experience I have in this universe it does not appear to be.

If someone claims to be 100% certain about something and that this certainty is not based merely on faith or opinion, they should be able to rationally explain and demonstrate its truth without relying on faith, opinion, or assumptions.

That is what I'm asking hammegk to do.

No, I'm not really interested in whether or not thought, itself, exists absolutely. What I'm interested in is the notion that one can make a claim that is absolutely assumption free.

I am dubious of hammegk's credibility in this claim, especially given that his "100% certainty" has failed in the past. However, I am interested in what he has to say so that one of us can be educated in how we may be wrong.
NO ONE CAN MAKE A CLAIM THAT IS ABSOLUTELY ASSUMPTION FREE.

http://206.225.95.123/forumlive/showthread.php?=156008#post1560083

The link isn't working for me. Go to R&P, "The relationship between science and materialism," post #29 for an excellent justification and must read for anyone in JREF Forum.

[Upchurch]

Now as far as Upchurch goes, I had always thought him to be a level-headed person. His "calling out" of Hammegk seemed a little shallow. However, his intentions are obviously deeper than this, and I believed (IMHO) the question of said intentions has helped----- whomever or whatever.
I am certainly not above a little :catfight: every now and then. (Ed, I love that smilie!) And, there may be an element of that in this.

However, as you pointed out this is an educational foundation's forum board. A foundation that is dedicated to educating specifically about skepticism. The courner stone of skepticism is challenging claims and beliefs, even one's own. No, especially one's own beliefs and assumptions.

Now, either hammegk is right that he is 100% certain of something with no assumptions whatsoever, or I am in that he is assuming something and doesn't realize it. If he's right, I'd like to know how that is possible. If I'm right, he should know that what he's saying is based on opinion/faith/assumption and his certainty is only as strong as that opinion/faith/assumption.

[ImaginalDisc]

This question is mostly directed to hammegk, who often asserts that he is 100% certain that "thought exists".



(sorry. couldn't resist. :D )

Maybe this is very elementary philosophy, but I'll try.

If we designed a machine which immitated the thinking process, according to a rigorous program, and this machine was programmed to believe that thought exists, how would its thinking process be any different from ours? It wouldn't be able to prove its thoughts aren't the product of programming through sophistry alone, could it?

[Upchurch]

NO ONE CAN MAKE A CLAIM THAT IS ABSOLUTELY ASSUMPTION FREE.That is my position, yes. To be entirely self-consistant, I should point out that this could be wrong but does not appear to be.

The link isn't working for me. Go to R&P, "The relationship between science and materialism," post #29 for an excellent justification and must read for anyone in JREF Forum.
Try this (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=1560083#post1560083)

[hammegk]

That is my position, yes. To be entirely self-consistant, I should point out that this could be wrong but does not appear to be.
Which appears less wrong to you? That statement, or thought exists?

BTW, your initial question also offers food for thought, doesn't it? :D


Try this (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?postid=1560083#post1560083)
Interesting comments.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I think we can be sure that thought exists, for some definition of thought and exists, because, like, we couldn't think of the question unless thought exists.

Of course, I also think my keyboard exists, for some possibly different definition of exists.

~~ Paul

[Upchurch]

Which appears less wrong to you? That statement, or thought exists?I have no method for measuring probability of truth, for these kinds of questions anyway. I have no way to compare them. I think both may very well be true.

BTW, your initial question also offers food for thought, doesn't it? :D Do you plan to try to answer it?

Interesting comments.I was merely providing the link for rauch1. Is it relevent as to how you can be 100% certain that "thought exists"?

[Upchurch]

I think we can be sure that thought exists, for some definition of thought and exists, because, like, we couldn't think of the question unless thought exists.
(my emphasis)

But are you, or can you be, 100% certain that thought exists? As I said, I'm not arguing that thought doesn't exist. I'm arguing against the claim of 100% certainty.

[Q-Source]

(my emphasis)

But are you, or can you be, 100% certain that thought exists? As I said, I'm not arguing that thought doesn't exist. I'm arguing against the claim of 100% certainty.

Are you asking this question because you´re not 100% sure that "You think"?

What makes you be uncertained that this is the case?

[Upchurch]

Are you asking this question because you´re not 100% sure that "You think"? No. I'm asking this question because I'm not 100% certain that one can be 100% certain. The "thought exists" claim, itself, is irrelevant except that it has been put forth as something that someone (i.e. hammegk) is certain of beyond any doubt whatsoever. If he or anyone can be 100% certain of this claim without relying on any assumption, opinion, or faith, I would like to know how this is possible.

I emphasised Paul's use of the word "think" because, in this context, it usually indicates that what follows is his opinion.

eta: I should never be allowed to post without first spell checking. yikes.

[hammegk]

I have no method for measuring probability of truth, for these kinds of questions anyway. I have no way to compare them. I think both may very well be true.
Seems to me (that is I think) that last position is dualism of some sort.


Do you plan to try to answer it?
I have done so to my satisfaction. You will need to do the same for yourself, or answer otherwise as you think best.


I was merely providing the link for rauch1. Is it relevent as to how you can be 100% certain that "thought exists"?
Derailing your own thread?

I'm arguing against the claim of 100% certainty.
Without invoking thought, please do so.


More appropriately, what is your certainty that physical matter/energy exist?

[Upchurch]

I have done so to my satisfaction. You will need to do the same for yourself, or answer otherwise as you think best.
hm. Just so I understand, you consider:
BTW, your initial question also offers food for thought, doesn't it? :D
to be a satisfactory answer to:
I would like hammegk to please explain how he can be 100% certain that "thought exists".

Is that correct?

[Q-Source]

No. I'm asking this question because I'm not 100% certain that one can be 100% certain.


Don´t worry about others, are YOU not 100% certain that you think?


If he or anyone can be 100% certain of this claim without relying on any assumption, opinion, or faith, I would like to know how this is possible.

We arrive to that claim by Descartes´method of skepticism. The assumption is that we have to doubt everything we cannot be certain about.
The mere question of whether or not I think proves that "I think", so this is the only undoubtable knowledge I can ever have. Many others have already pointed it out.

[Ichneumonwasp]

The mere question of whether or not I think proves that "I think", so this is the only undoubtable knowledge I can ever have.

No it doesn't. There is a very big assumption cradled in that "I" -- that selves are integrated wholes. They are not.

[Q-Source]

No it doesn't. There is a very big assumption cradled in that "I" -- that selves are integrated wholes. They are not.

Am I missing something?. Are you questioning the existence of *I* as an integrated thing?. This is another issue and maybe it requires another thread. The OP is about whether or not thought exists.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes, because you used the common form of the cogito. The "I" is not clearly integrated since it is very possible to lop off parts of mental function with a scalpel.

Further, it isn't clear that "thought" is what definitely exists. Look more closely and you will see that the radical doubt "proves" that doubting exists, not all aspects of thought. I can doubt that imagination exists and my doubting of that does not mean that it must exist. It is only the doubting that must exist.

But that is also based on an underlying assumption -- that only existents can act in the real world. I happen to think that is a pretty darn good assumption, but it is an assumption.

[Upchurch]

Don´t worry about others, are YOU not 100% certain that you think? No. How can I be? There may very well be something involved that I am currently unaware of that refutes the possibility that I think (or, more inline with this thread, that thought exists).

But, this is beside the point. hammegk is making the claim of absolute certainty on a subject. My opinion about the subject is irrelevent to whether or not hammegk can explain how he can be 100% certain about it.

We arrive to that claim by Descartes´method of skepticism. The assumption is that we have to doubt everything we cannot be certain about. Yes, and he ultimately failed to do that. He eventually had to assume that God (or whatever was presenting him with this view of "the world") was not a deceiver in order to reach his ulitmate conclusion. He tried, but he could not formulate an argument without some assumption.

Even to the extent of "cognito ergo sum", he assumes that there is an "I" to do the doubting in the first place.

The mere question of whether or not I think proves that "I think" is the only undoubtable knowledge I can ever have. Many others have already pointed it out.How do you know it is undoubtable?

[UserGoogol]

I think that the one thing which is absolutely certain is that experience exists, or maybe to put it in a less presumptuous (but more philosophically silly) fashion, "this exists." (Or possibly "something exists.") That is to say, the experience of right now is absolutely certain, because I mean, here it is. It might not at all be what I think it is, but there it is.

But to say that "thought" exists seems like a much larger claim, which I do not think we can accept as 100% certain. Thought implies that there is a "me" who is behind all these sensations and that "I" am capable of originating various cognitive proccesses. I do not think that this is entirely self-evident, because it's possible that there is merely the illusion of cognitive proccesses, and that in reality "this moment" is all that exists and that there is merely the impression that there is a person called me who is thinking.

I think you can quasi-prove the existance of "thought" by merely saying "If I'm not thinking... then... whatever." That is, you can't be certain thought exists, but if it doesn't exist, you don't need to worry about it, because "you" don't actually exist. But no, I wouldn't say thought is 100% certain.

[Mercutio]

If you define "thought" and "exists" broadly enough, then it cannot be doubted. I think hammegk has been consistent (in my experience, anyway) in not extrapolating too far from these wide definitions. (perhaps one exception, but that is not for this thread) The problem arises when someone goes from "thought exists" as broadly defined, to claiming specifics about the nature of thought and existence as agreed to in "thought exists". Hammy has tended not to do this.

For less broad definitions, perhaps "something exists" is more appropriate. "Thought" has, for most speakers of our language, connotations over and above those that hammegk uses in "thought exists", and that seems to be where people have problems with the statement (especially with the 100% certainty).

Myself? I don't find "thought exists" or "matter exists" or "something exists" to be terribly useful statements. When agreeing to one of them makes my cereal stay crispier in milk, let me know.

[gnome]

Of course it's a hundred percent certain that thought exists. If you think about it for a couple of minutes, you'll realize it's true :)

[hammegk]

Hmm. I may reach 100% certainty that if thought does not exist, we think it does.

Yes, Uppie. A play on words.

mu



Merc: What my position does do is eliminate dualism as a logical thought. It won't make your cereal crunchier sfaik.

[Upchurch]

Hmm. I may reach 100% certainty that if thought does not exist, we think it does.

Yes, Uppie. A play on words.But no answers or explanations.

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't know, man.

Why I've heard tell of a multidimensional syncitial caterpillar who defecates this obnoxious humor that invades the "minds" of simple 3 dimensional creatures who are fooled into "thinking".

We could just call it caterpillar feces. That seems to capture the essence of most thoughts anyway.:)

[Upchurch]

If you define "thought" and "exists" broadly enough, then it cannot be doubted.How does that work? Once you start playing with the definitions, then you open an entirely different can of worms in terms of certainty. Language has a built-in ambiguity that only gets worse with broader definitions.

[roger]

For what it's worth, Bertrand Russell was the first (to my knowledge) to argue that "I think, therefore I am" should be reduced to "there are thoughts." It may have subsequently been Hammegk's original (independent) construction, but let's give credit where credit is due.

I have no problem with the construction. Any argument that there is not something going on here in "me' is going to fall on



wait for it





it's a good'un





wait.....



on deaf ears. :D

[strathmeyer]

We can be 100% certain thought exists because we can tell the difference between those who do and don't have them.

[ruach1]

Of course it's a hundred percent certain that thought exists. If you think about it for a couple of minutes, you'll realize it's true :)
I think Gnome's on to something here...

No really. I don't know what its called, but I call it a "theory vs practicality" dynamic. For example, some say that "all is one" such that things do not exist independently of anything else (see Net of Indra, or a recent episode of The Soprano's). Thusly, two boxers in a ring are not actually fighting the other, they're really fighting themselves.

Theoretically, the boxers really are fighting themselves because since all is one and everything is everything, then they are really hitting themselves.

Practically speaking, this is nonsense. When fighter "A" hits fighter "B" fighter "A" doesn't feel it anywhere else but his hand, and, when I'm watching the fight, I don't feel it at all being that I am apart of this all encompassing totality as well--and thank God for that--at least for now.

Similar situation here...

If one doesn't think thought exists, then one is deceiving oneself. If not being able to fully claim thought exists brings one to question whether one thinks or not, then one is deceiving oneself as well.
Why?

Because we all know that we don't live in a theoretical world--apart from the moments of mental *asturbation we (may) enjoy on JREF Forum. Rather, we live in a practical world, and to question whether thought exists really only serves the aformentioned practice--enjoyable as it may or may not be.

[Dark Jaguar]

Not sure I see what's the issue here. How can my own existance be called into doubt? Well, from my own perspective I mean? Sure, it can be sliced away, but unless there's some other definition of integrated, I'm going with the one I use which says that things can become integrated when they once weren't and then lose that integration later, like sticking a processor into a computer makes the components integrated, but that processor can be removed later.

But maybe philosophers have a definition stating that anything that is "integrated" means that it can't be divided into seperate components?

My thoughts may be generated by a machine and so free will may be called into doubt. My thoughts may be an "illusion" created by nth dimensional entities, but they are still clearly existant, whatever they might be, are they not?

[Upchurch]

Okay, one more time.

The question is not whether or not thought exists. The question is whether or not anyone can know something with 100% certainty. The "thought exists" subject is arbitrary and incidental. It could have just as easily have been "there is a monitor in front of me", a la JustGeoff.

[Upchurch]

My thoughts may be generated by a machine and so free will may be called into doubt. My thoughts may be an "illusion" created by nth dimensional entities, but they are still clearly existant, whatever they might be, are they not?
Well, is the illusion of thought the same thing as thought itself? How can you know if you are actually experiencing thought or merely the illusion of it?

[gnome]

Well, is the illusion of thought the same thing as thought itself? How can you know if you are actually experiencing thought or merely the illusion of it?

If it's not a perfect simulation of thought, then there is a way to tell if it's the real thing by comparing. If there's no way to tell, is there a significant difference?

An illusion of a dynamic process can't be thought of as different than a naturally-occuring version of the same process, unless there are identifiable flaws.

[chriswl]

For what it's worth, Bertrand Russell was the first (to my knowledge) to argue that "I think, therefore I am" should be reduced to "there are thoughts."
It goes back much further than that. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-99) argued that we should say "it thinks" just as we say "it thunders".

[hammegk]

Well, is the illusion of thought the same thing as thought itself? How can you know if you are actually experiencing thought or merely the illusion of it?
Uppie, I definitely am 100% certain "*I* experience thought", "or the illusion of it".

Thanks. I hadn't thought of that one.



For what it's worth, Bertrand Russell was the first (to my knowledge) to argue that "I think, therefore I am" should be reduced to "there are thoughts." It may have subsequently been Hammegk's original (independent) construction, but let's give credit where credit is due.
I didn't know I'd ripped off Bert. :) BTW, very little is truly original and independent. Human thoughts are a product of the times. If not that guy, someone else.


My thoughts may be an "illusion" created by nth dimensional entities, ...
Or The Solipsist, or ???.


but they are still clearly existant, whatever they might be, are they not?
We seem to agree.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

.








.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

(sorry, I couldnt post a dot alone) forum rules.

[Robin]

It is impossible for an agent of finite intelligence and knowledge to possess 100% certainty, no matter how great that intelligence and knowledge might be. There is always the possibility that something you don't know or didn't think of might contradict your belief.

But I couldn't be certain.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

But I couldn't be certain.

:D

Attempt to have it (100%) is an exercise of futility.

Im writing, all you are writing, what else is needed?

[Piscivore]

Why I've heard tell of a multidimensional syncitial caterpillar who defecates this obnoxious humor that invades the "minds" of simple 3 dimensional creatures who are fooled into "thinking".

I call it "Winston Butternut". He is my friend.

[Q-Source]

Yes, because you used the common form of the cogito. The "I" is not clearly integrated since it is very possible to lop off parts of mental function with a scalpel.

That is another issue. But it doesn´t change anything, you still end up with "Brain thinks". As soon as any entity becomes awares that it thinks, it proves it does.



I can doubt that imagination exists and my doubting of that does not mean that it must exist. It is only the doubting that must exist.

Doubting is a thinking process, and that´s what we are discussing here. Your example just proves what I am saying.

Are you seriously saying that you are not certain that you (or your brain) think?.

[Q-Source]

No. How can I be? There may very well be something involved that I am currently unaware of that refutes the possibility that I think (or, more inline with this thread, that thought exists).

Only cerebral death can refute the claim that you think.


But, this is beside the point. hammegk is making the claim of absolute certainty on a subject. My opinion about the subject is irrelevent to whether or not hammegk can explain how he can be 100% certain about it.

He, you, I, we can be 100% certain about it because we are typing and reading this thread.

[Q-Source]

Okay, one more time.

The question is not whether or not thought exists. The question is whether or not anyone can know something with 100% certainty. The "thought exists" subject is arbitrary and incidental. It could have just as easily have been "there is a monitor in front of me", a la JustGeoff.

No, this is a complete different issue. You cannot compare "there is a monitor" with "I think". NOTHING outside "I think" can be 100% certain, in this you are right. If you want to discuss this level of uncertainty then you should pick a different example and most of us would agree with you.

[hammegk]

Uppie can't do that, because he'd have to admit that his physicalist stance requires dualism.

[hodgy]

I don't really get what you're arguing about here. 'I think therefore I am' is just logic - in itself it doesn't imply any peculiar quality or definition to the terms 'I' and 'think'. Its irrelevant whether I am a discrete agent or a part of a vast consciousness. The nature of thinking is irrelevant.

I can be 100% certain that 'I' 'am' because 'I' 'think' irrespective of what 'I' and 'thought' actually consist of.

[hammegk]

Best I can do on that position is assume it to be true for discussion sake; I do assign a very, very, high probability of it being true, and extend the same assumption to you.

Philosopher Uppie did talk me out of that one as something full 100% confidence could be placed in. :)

[hodgy]

What?

What's being said here (unless I'm missing the point) is something along the lines of 'I am but I might not be'.

This is a logical impossibility, is there some nuance of the discussion that I am not aware of?

[Q-Source]

Best I can do on that position is assume it to be true for discussion sake; I do assign a very, very, high probability of it being true, and extend the same assumption to you.


If you assign a very high probability to that claim (but less than 100%) then you invalidate it.

[Q-Source]

What?

What's being said here (unless I'm missing the point) is something along the lines of 'I am but I might not be'.

This is a logical impossibility, is there some nuance of the discussion that I am not aware of?

No, it is just as ridiculous as it sounds.
As I see the problem, Upchurch is mixing claims such as "this monitor exists" with "I think, therefore I exist". He believes that both claims require the same level of uncertainty.

[hodgy]

If you can see, feel or otherwise be aware of a monitor then the monitor exists. That the monitor might be conjured up in your imaginaton is irrelevent - in that case there is a part of your consciousness that implements a monitor.

If we are saying that we cannot be 100% certain of logic then all bets are off and there's not much point in any discussion.

[Dark Jaguar]

As far as I can tell, logic dictates that my awareness exists as an absolute undeniable reality. All else may be under question, but certainly there's a "me". It may be made of component parts that can be sliced away one by one, but that doesn't change the fact that, well, there it is at the moment. I can find no logical explanation, at all, ever, in which the very experience I am experiencing is NOT in fact existant, because I am experiencing it and if it didn't exist, I couldn't experience it. My interpretation of the experience could be way off. I may not have free will in the "thought" part of it, but that part seems a 100% certainty.

This assumes one thing and one thing only that I can tell. I assume my logic is correct. So, assuming my logic isn't flawed somewhere, sure 100% certainty is possible for ONE thing, except that if we don't assume that, no it isn't, and I'm not sure I have much cause to think my logic is flawless, which the argument depends on...

So no, I guess no knowledge can be attained with 100% certainty, but in the question of my experience, now, existing, I'm pretty sure my logic is accurate enough for me to say "that's the most certain thing I can think of", with enough doubt there to be open to someone else pointing out some logical flaw in my reasoning.

[Ichneumonwasp]

That is another issue. But it doesn´t change anything, you still end up with "Brain thinks". As soon as any entity becomes awares that it thinks, it proves it does.

The point is that the "I" is not 100% certain (or rather that the full extent of the "I" is not certain -- that would be more correct). That some form of thought occurs is certain, but it does not necessarily involve the entire "I" as an intergrated being. That is the only point in that exercise. It has nothing to do with brain thinking or what-have-you, except by way of illustration that the "I" is not a complete inviolable whole. Descartes stretched too far in proclaiming "I" think, therefore "I" am. He showed that thinking occurs, so thought exists. The rest of what makes up "I" may or may not be 100% certain. It clearly is not absolutely certain because I can chop bits of it off and continue the exercise, and I may be fooled into thinking that I am something that I am not.



Doubting is a thinking process, and that´s what we are discussing here. Your example just proves what I am saying.

Are you seriously saying that you are not certain that you (or your brain) think?.


Yes, doubting is a thinking process, but the 100% certainty in the existence of doubting does not prove the existence of other forms of thought. I may doubt calculation, imagining, etc. (that I may be fooled in them), but I cannot doubt "doubting" without contradiction. So, Descartes not only did not prove "I" think therefore "I" exist with 100% certainty, but he did not even prove with 100% certainty the totality of the statement "thinking occurs, so thinking exists". It depends on how the word "thought" or "thinking" is defined. If it is defined to mean "doubting", then he did prove that form of thinking exists with 100% certainty (though this depends on a prior assumption which I think we all can agree upon), but he did not prove that all forms of thinking exist with 100% certainty.

Now, this needs to be contrasted with the real world where we obviously do think. Personally I think that the full range of thought is certain as well as the world outside my window. This is just an intellectual exercise to demonstrate that Descartes did not necessarily prove what we thought he proved. We make all sorts of assumptions in the way we approach the cogito. It doesn't sound too sexy to say that he proved doubting exists.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But are you, or can you be, 100% certain that thought exists? As I said, I'm not arguing that thought doesn't exist. I'm arguing against the claim of 100% certainty.
My ability to answer this question makes me 100% certain.

More or less.

~~ Paul

[roger]

I don't really get what you're arguing about here. 'I think therefore I am' is just logic - in itself it doesn't imply any peculiar quality or definition to the terms 'I' and 'think'. Its irrelevant whether I am a discrete agent or a part of a vast consciousness. The nature of thinking is irrelevant.

I can be 100% certain that 'I' 'am' because 'I' 'think' irrespective of what 'I' and 'thought' actually consist of.Well, the problem is that a lot of people, Descartes included, go on to assume that "I' has been proven, but don't recognize it as an assumption. Not that it's a problem in a practical sense, just philosophical.

[hammegk]

If you assign a very high probability to that claim (but less than 100%) then you invalidate it.
As others have said, no. The part that is iffy is the 'I'; that's where assumption enters the arena. :)

[roger]

Well, is the illusion of thought the same thing as thought itself? How can you know if you are actually experiencing thought or merely the illusion of it?What on earth is the "illusion" of thought?

Hint - differentiating the two already presupposes a heck of a lot.

Don't get tied up in the semantics. Don't call it thought, if you don't want to.

I can't believe that you are arguing that you are less than 100% certain that there is "something" that is the Upchurch experience (hey, new marketing slogan for JREF!), whether it's really a corporal body, brain in a vat, computer simulation, or something none of us have thought of. We're not arguing about the medium, or the form it takes, just that it clearly is happening.

[davidsmith73]

I am willing to accept that thought may exist, just as I was willing to accept that his *I* may exist. What I'm challenging here is his 100% certainty. Or, more specifically, that this 100% certainty is based entirely on fact and not merely faith or opinion.

The existence of experience is impervious to doubt because experience is existence.


Christians, after all, are 100% certain that Jesus is their lord and savior, but that doesn't necessarily mean that anything they know about Jesus is true.

Physical facts about Jesus can be doubted. The experiences that christians have cannot. Note that I just mean the experiences themselves. Similarly, the existence of my experience of the flying spaghetti monster I had after taking LSD is impervious to doubt.

If hammegk's certainty is based on faith or belief, I'm willing to accept that as a valid answer, as well. Not a universally applicable answer, but a valid one.

It has nothing to do with faith or belief. Its about the nature of existence. I think that as long as you as have to ask "how can you be certain experience exists?" you will never understand why.

[Upchurch]

As others have said, no. The part that is iffy is the 'I'; that's where assumption enters the arena. :)
Then lets focus on the "thought exists" part and explain how you can be absolutely certain of this without relying on any assumption whatsoever.

[Upchurch]

What on earth is the "illusion" of thought?

Hint - differentiating the two already presupposes a heck of a lot.It was Dark Jaguar's term, not mine. And not differentiating the two also presupposes some things, too.

How do you know that your "thought" isn't just an illusion of thought? Is such a thing impossible? Why?
Don't get tied up in the semantics. Don't call it thought, if you don't want to. If it is an "illusion of thought", it isn't actual thought. If such a thing exists, it would not be thought.

I can't believe that you are arguing that you are less than 100% certain that there is "something" that is the Upchurch experience (hey, new marketing slogan for JREF!), whether it's really a corporal body, brain in a vat, computer simulation, or something none of us have thought of. We're not arguing about the medium, or the form it takes, just that it clearly is happening.The basis of skepticism is to question everything, even those things that you are very, very, very sure must be true. So far, it appears that there is a level of uncertainty concerning everything. Things we knew to be true yesterday are plainly false today.

The point is that there is always room to doubt. The more certain you are of an idea, the more open you need to be to the idea that it could be wrong. If none of the challenges to it so far have panned out, that's a very good indicator that it may very well be right. But that doesn't mean that something couldn't come along tomorrow that disproves it entirely.

You can never prove something is a 100% true. (at least, so far. I'm still waiting to see otherwise.) The best you can do is to not yet have shown it to be false.

[Upchurch]

Uppie can't do that, because he'd have to admit that his physicalist stance requires dualism.
More assumptions, or just projection of non-willingness to question?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

If you doubt about your doubts, what does that makes you?

[UserGoogol]

I suppose to answer your question depends on what you mean by doubt. I would argue that "the existance of sensation" or "X implies X" are "self-evident truths." But I would not call them undoubtable per se.

For one, it is possible to doubt things self-evidently true things, simply due to being a bit untrusting of the reality in front of your face. However, this might not be the best sense of doubt to use. It is also true however that one can doubt one's own understanding of the statement. Even if a particular statement like "sensation exists" is true, you might get it bound up with other nonsense. And also, it is simply possible to at least contemplate that logic itself is invalid, or even that the whole idea of using "propositions" to describe reality is completely useless. And that brings a deep pall of doubt over everything.

And of course, the problem with the third possibility is that you cannot prove the validity of logic, because you need a system of logic in order to prove something. So yes, I suppose that everything is doubtable, but the "minimal doubt" is so small that some might not consider it to "really" be doubt.

[Upchurch]

So yes, I suppose that everything is doubtable, but the "minimal doubt" is so small that some might not consider it to "really" be doubt.
But very tiny does not mean zero.


Unless hammegk is trying to say that 0.99999.... equals 1? ;)

[UserGoogol]

But very tiny does not mean zero.


Unless hammegk is trying to say that 0.99999.... equals 1? ;)

I'm saying that there is a certain amount of uncertainty in the definition of doubt (appropriately enough) and therefore my examples might not be considered to "really" be doubt by everyone.

[hammegk]

But very tiny does not mean zero.


Unless hammegk is trying to say that 0.99999.... equals 1? ;)
No, I'm not. That's your physicalism problem; the same one I've been posting about for a few years now to no avail, or understanding by most. :)

Thanks again.

[Upchurch]

I'm saying that there is a certain amount of uncertainty in the definition of doubt (appropriately enough) and therefore my examples might not be considered to "really" be doubt by everyone.
Sorry, that was mostly a dig at hammegk, but a valid point nonetheless.

It's really a question of 100% or absolute certainty, which means no doubt whatsoever. Zero. Zip. Nada.

If hammegk agrees with your statement, then he must not have any uncertainty in the definition of "doubt" (or rather "certainty" as the case may be) nor in "thought" and "exists". There would have to be no ambiguouity at all. Which means that he should be able to explain in purely definitive terms the rational certainty of "thought exists" without relying on any assumptions at all.

This is an opportunity for him to do so.

[Upchurch]

No, I'm not.Thanks! Then you would agree with UserGoogol's statment and should be able to do exactly what I outlined in the post above.

[davidsmith73]

It's really a question of 100% or absolute certainty, which means no doubt whatsoever. Zero. Zip. Nada.

Upchurch, what kind of answer are you expecting? It can't be one of inductive reasoning because that necessarily involves doubt. Can it be one of deductive reasoning? I suppose if someone were to give a watertight deductive argument, the validity of deduction itself could still be brought into doubt.

I think that you have to look carefully at the statement "experience is impervious to doubt". What is meant here is that doubt is not part of the story at all. I think it was Wittgenstein who did not like the word "know" when used in the phrase "I know what a certain experience feels like" because that implies the possibility of error. The meaning of error is meaningless to this issue. Error and doubt can only be applied to aspects of reality that are supposed to be non-experiential.

[Upchurch]

Upchurch, what kind of answer are you expecting? It can't be one of inductive reasoning because that necessarily involves doubt. Can it be one of deductive reasoning? I suppose if someone were to give a watertight deductive argument, the validity of deduction itself could still be brought into doubt. I'm expecting that it cannot be done, despite claims to the contrary.

I think that you have to look carefully at the statement "experience is impervious to doubt". Sorry, who is saying this?

[davidsmith73]

I'm expecting that it cannot be done, despite claims to the contrary.

Expecting that what cannot be done? An inductive or deductive argument? Personally I think neither of these can be applied to Hammegk's statement yet the statement is still true.

Do you think that a statement can be true and yet not amenable to inductive or deductive reasoning?


Sorry, who is saying this?

Hammegk.

eddited to add: and me :)

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If you doubt about your doubts, what does that makes you?
A metadoubter?

~~ Paul

[Upchurch]

Expecting that what cannot be done? An inductive or deductive argument? Personally I think neither of these can be applied to Hammegk's statement yet the statement is still true.It doesn't really matter to me how it is done, only that it does not rely on any assumptions, opinion, or belief whatsoever.

Sorry, "it" meaning "having knowledge of something with 100%, or absolute, certainty".

Do you think that a statement can be true and yet not amenable to inductive or deductive reasoning?Sure. There are other forms of reasoning besides inductive or deductive. All of them, including inductive and deductive, require some sort of premise taken as given.

If, however, you asking me if a statement can be true and yet not applicable to reasoning, I'd have to say maybe, but I have no idea how one would designate the statement's truth other than by faith, opinion, and/or assumption.

Hammegk.

eddited to add: and me :)
Gotcha. I didn't understand.

I think that you have to look carefully at the statement "experience is impervious to doubt". What is meant here is that doubt is not part of the story at all.Why? Surely, you aren't saying that everything we experience is absolutely what it appears to us to be? If we experience David Copperfield making the Statue of Liberty vanish, there is no doubt that we can apply to this?

[hammegk]

Upchurch. Go chase your own tail while you think about things.

This thread is turning into one of the best thrusts I've yet seen into the most glaring weakness of physicalism. :)

[Upchurch]

Upchurch. Go chase your own tail while you think about things.

This thread is turning into one of the best thrusts I've yet seen into the most glaring weakness of physicalism. :)
This thread isn't about physicalism. This thread is about how you can be 100% certain that something is true, specifically "thought exists".

Are you unwilling to support this claim?

[davidsmith73]

It doesn't really matter to me how it is done, only that it does not rely on any assumptions, opinion, or belief whatsoever.

And if it can't be conveyed to you by these means, would you hold that Hammegk cannot be certain of his statement?


If, however, you asking me if a statement can be true and yet not applicable to reasoning, I'd have to say maybe,

Yes, that's what I meant and perhaps we're getting somewhere :) I think we are dealing with one such statement here.


but I have no idea how one would designate the statement's truth other than by faith, opinion, and/or assumption.

You don't need any of these things. Experience is existence. It doesn't need opinion, belief or assumption. I don't understand why so few get it :(



Why? Surely, you aren't saying that everything we experience is absolutely what it appears to us to be? If we experience David Copperfield making the Statue of Liberty vanish, there is no doubt that we can apply to this?

To the experience, no. If you assume the existence of objective physical reality you can doubt that the physical statue disappears etc.

If I take LSD and have an experience I label as "a pink elephant", there is no doubt as to the qualitative nature of that experience. It exists.

[Jekyll]

The question is not whether or not thought exists. The question is whether or not anyone can know something with 100% certainty. The "thought exists" subject is arbitrary and incidental. It could have just as easily have been "there is a monitor in front of me", a la JustGeoff.

Honestly, the only possible doubt you can have about "Does thought/experience exist?" is regarding comprehension of the question.

Assuming I correctly 'get' it, then yes, by the fact of my experience of my experience, experience exists.:D

I don't see what other room for doubt there could be.

[hammegk]

This thread isn't about physicalism.
At least you hadn't intended it to be. :)

[Upchurch]

And if it can't be conveyed to you by these means, would you hold that Hammegk cannot be certain of his statement?No, if his certainty is based on faith, opinion, and/or assumption, I can accept that as a valid answer. As I said in the OP:
Or, more specifically, that this 100% certainty is based entirely on fact and not merely faith or opinion. Christians, after all, are 100% certain that Jesus is their lord and savior, but that doesn't necessarily mean that anything they know about Jesus is true. If hammegk's certainty is based on faith or belief, I'm willing to accept that as a valid answer, as well. Not a universally applicable answer, but a valid one.

Yes, that's what I meant and perhaps we're getting somewhere :) I think we are dealing with one such statement here.

You don't need any of these things. Experience is existence. It doesn't need opinion, belief or assumption. I don't understand why so few get it :(
How, then, do you determine its truth if not by reason, faith, opinion, or assumption? (Note that I'm talking about truth and not Truth)

You're claiming that "experience is doubtless" is true, but provide nothing in support the truth of the statement.

To the experience, no. If you assume the existence of objective physical reality you can doubt that the physical statue disappears etc.

If I take LSD and have an experience I label as "a pink elephant", there is no doubt as to the qualitative nature of that experience. It exists.
You're merely reiterating the claim. I'm asking you to dig deeper and understand how you can be sure experience exists beyond any doubt whatsoever.

[Upchurch]

At least you hadn't intended it to be. :)
Can't do it, huh? "Thought exists" is just a matter of faith for you, then?

[Upchurch]

Honestly, the only possible doubt you can have about "Does thought/experience exist?" is regarding comprehension of the question.

Assuming I correctly 'get' it, then yes, by the fact of my experience of my experience, experience exists.:D

I don't see what other room for doubt there could be.
In order to reach that conclusion, you had to assume there was a "Jekyll" doing the experiencing. Therein lies the problem.

[Jekyll]

In order to reach that conclusion, you had to assume there was a "Jekyll" doing the experiencing. Therein lies the problem.
No. I use "my experience" as a shortcut to describe one particular experience out of the many we conventionally assume each other to have.

"An experience" is sufficient.

[Upchurch]

No. I use "my experience" as a shortcut to describe one particular experience out of the many we conventionally assume each other to have.

"An experience" is sufficient.
How do you know there was "an experience"?

eta: that is, how do you know there was "an experience", if you aren't assuming that that there is a "Jekyll" and "others" to have "an experience"

[hammegk]

Can't do it, huh? "Thought exists" is just a matter of faith for you, then?
Nope, not to me. As I said early on, the evidence I see is incontrovertible, to me, and it can never be communicated to you by me. Sorry things are not as clear to you, but you may certainly choose to accept that position.

[davidsmith73]

How, then, do you determine its truth if not by reason, faith, opinion, or assumption? (Note that I'm talking about truth and not Truth)


I think you can use reasoning to open the door to the truth of the statement yourself but the truth lies beyond the door of reasoning, ie phenomenal experience.

By the way how are you differentiating truth and Truth?


You're claiming that "experience is doubtless" is true, but provide nothing in support the truth of the statement.

Exactly, because that is a nonsense to do so. I can't explain to you the existential nature of experience because I would have to make experiences publicly accessible to do so, (which reveals how nonsensical the idea of an explanation of phenomenal character is)


You're merely reiterating the claim. I'm asking you to dig deeper and understand how you can be sure experience exists beyond any doubt whatsoever.

I can do that. I can't do it for you though.

[Jekyll]

How do you know there was "an experience"?

eta: that is, how do you know there was "an experience", if you aren't assuming that that there is a "Jekyll" and "others" to have "an experience"
I don't know there was, all I can ever know is there is (an experience).
I know this because I am currently experiencing something, regardless of what "I" actually is.

[Upchurch]

Nope, not to me. As I said early on, the evidence I see is incontrovertible, to me, and it can never be communicated to you by me.So, you assert that it is true, its truth is not open to questioning for you, you cannot explain why it is true, and yet, it is not a matter of faith for you?

You do understand what "faith" means, right?

Sorry things are not as clear to you, but you may certainly choose to accept that position.I can accept that you take this position on unquestioning faith, whether or not you choose to call it that or not. I was allowing the possibility that it might be based on logical reasoning, but that possibility seems even less likely now.

Thanks for your time.

[Belz...]

I think that the one thing which is absolutely certain is that experience exists, or maybe to put it in a less presumptuous (but more philosophically silly) fashion, "this exists." (Or possibly "something exists.") That is to say, the experience of right now is absolutely certain, because I mean, here it is. It might not at all be what I think it is, but there it is.

Actually, it might not be there at all.

[Upchurch]

I think you can use reasoning to open the door to the truth of the statement yourself but the truth lies beyond the door of reasoning, ie phenomenal experience. Yeah, I've heard the same about God. Its absolutely true as long as I believe that it is true.

By the way how are you differentiating truth and Truth?It's been described to me as truth (little "t") is relativistic and Truth (big "T") is absolute.

Exactly, because that is a nonsense to do so. I can't explain to you the existential nature of experience because I would have to make experiences publicly accessible to do so, (which reveals how nonsensical the idea of an explanation of phenomenal character is)It also reveals the assumption of the existance of an experiencer.

[Belz...]

Nope, not to me. As I said early on, the evidence I see is incontrovertible, to me, and it can never be communicated to you by me. Sorry things are not as clear to you, but you may certainly choose to accept that position.

I believe Upchurch means that your interpretation of the evidence as incontrovertible is due to an assumption on your part.

[Mercutio]

Just wondering...if we define thought as broadly as hammegk does (not saying there is anything wrong with that--I have said all along that he is consistent and reasonable in his presentation of this), could we say that this view denies the possibility of thought in, say, computers? (not looking at proving it does exist, but simply exploring possibilities) In a venus flytrap? A sunflower? Does "thought" imply any active component? Could it be purely a reflexively elicited thing? A response to a stimulus (whether that stimulus is physical or ideal)? Does this broad definition of "thought" allow us to deny its application to anything?

[hammegk]

I believe Upchurch means that your interpretation of the evidence as incontrovertible is due to an assumption on your part.
Yes, I agree that is a claim Upchurch relies on, although were he to state it as such, he'd be in the position of needing to provide his "evidence". ;)

[hammegk]

...Does this broad definition of "thought" allow us to deny its application to anything?
Interesting thought, so to speak ...

How would you interpret a (slight rephrase of an earlier thought) :

(I'm 100% confidant "I think I think", or "that illusion exists".) ?

[Upchurch]

Yes, I agree that is a claim Upchurch relies on, although were he to state it as such, he'd be in the position of needing to provide his "evidence". ;)
Oh, I'll readily admit that it is an assumption. However, as you are either unwilling on unable to support claim, I have to go with what is most likely until more information comes to light.

Plus, the fact that you refuse to question this claim is evidence that it is a matter of faith rather than reason. Not conclusive evidence, but fairly strong.

[Mercutio]

Interesting thought, so to speak ...

How would you interpret a (slight rephrase of an earlier thought) :

(I'm 100% confidant "I think I think", or "that illusion exists".) ?
If I read you right the first time on this, I think it both appears to be true (barring something I am not catching), and simultaneously useless. It seems rather like "it appears that stuff exists" (where "stuff" can be ideal or material, and "appears" can be true or illusion); broad enough to hit every possibility, and a no-starter in terms of being able to apply it to answering any meaningful question.

I may, of course, be wrong--can you see any implications that stem from that statement? If that statement is step one...where is step two?

[chriswl]

Plus, the fact that you refuse to question this claim is evidence that it is a matter of faith rather than reason. Not conclusive evidence, but fairly strong.
But isn't the point that you can't intelligibly question the claim. If you say to yourself "perhaps I'm not experiencing anything right now" and think about whether this is true, you can see that it isn't.

I think the question is, does the claim "I know that I am conscious" actually mean anything? The fact that it can't be meaningfully contradicted surely indicates that there is something fishy going on here? If it is a meaningless statement then it can't, for example, invalidate materialism.

[Upchurch]

But isn't the point that you can't intelligibly question the claim. If you say to yourself "perhaps I'm not experiencing anything right now" and think about whether this is true, you can see that it isn't.No, the point is that nothing is free from assumption. Look at what you wrote above. You are not only assuming that there is a "you" to experience but that "experience" is real simply because you perceived it.

Yes, I'll admit that it seems obvious and that it is hard to imagine how it could not be so, but how many times have things that seemed obvious turned out to not be true? Obvious is not a sufficent reason to become immune to questioning.

[chriswl]

No, the point is that nothing is free from assumption. Look at what you wrote above. You are not only assuming that there is a "you" to experience but that "experience" is real simply because you perceived it.
I'm not assuming anything about what experience is, just that it is something we all claim to have (except you, perhaps). Do you think you exist? Is that too big an assumption for you?

[Upchurch]

I'm not assuming anything about what experience is, just that it is something we all claim to have (except you, perhaps). Do you think you exist? Is that too big an assumption for you?
Yes, I think I exist. I never claimed that I didn't.

However, I do so understanding that there are assumptions involved in that. They may be extremely reasonable and likely assumptions, but they are assumptions nonetheless.

And yes, you do appear to be making assumptions about what experience is, namely that there is a "we" to do the experiencing and that experience is real because we perceive it.

ugh, now I'm repeating myself.

[chriswl]

And yes, you do appear to be making assumptions about what experience is, namely that there is a "we" to do the experiencing...
That is implicit in the definition of the word "experience": experiences are things that experiencers have, not things that float around by themselves with no one to experience them.

...and that experience is real because we perceive it.
Dunno what you mean by "real" here. And we don't perceive experience, perception is an experience.

[hodgy]

And yes, you do appear to be making assumptions about what experience is, namely that there is a "we" to do the experiencing and that experience is real because we perceive it.

ugh, now I'm repeating myself.

If there is an experience then by definition there must be an experiencer. The term 'I' is a label that we are using to refer to the experiencer - and that's all. This concept does not require any assumptions about what 'I' might consist of or the relation of 'I' to the rest of the universe (or, indeed, that there is a rest of the universe).

Given that there is an experience (e.g. a thought) then the experience must be real (i.e. there was an experience - I did not lie and say that I had the experience when in fact I didn't - that would have been an example of an experience that was not real).

If I experience walking into a brick wall, the reality of the experience is not the same as the reality of the brick wall. The experience must be real whereas the wall may not be. I cannot be 100% certain of the existence of the wall since I may have dreamt or otherwise imagined it. I can be 100% certain that I had the experience though.

[Belz...]

Just wondering...if we define thought as broadly as hammegk does (not saying there is anything wrong with that--I have said all along that he is consistent and reasonable in his presentation of this), could we say that this view denies the possibility of thought in, say, computers? (not looking at proving it does exist, but simply exploring possibilities) In a venus flytrap? A sunflower? Does "thought" imply any active component? Could it be purely a reflexively elicited thing? A response to a stimulus (whether that stimulus is physical or ideal)? Does this broad definition of "thought" allow us to deny its application to anything?

Hummm. Well "thought" IS response to stimuli, so a good question would be where does thought begin.

ETA: Oh, and I agree that, although Upchurch is technically right that we can't know anything for 100% certain, that is a useless conclusion. For all practical purposes, it IS possible to know something 100%. Otherwise we're just always doing philosophy, which gets us nowhere.

[hodgy]

The truth of 'I think therefore I am' is implicit in the defintion of the words, not in any assumptions about reality. Given the same definition of the words the statement would be true in any possible reality.

[hammegk]

If I read you right the first time on this, I think it both appears to be true (barring something I am not catching), and simultaneously useless. It seems rather like "it appears that stuff exists" (where "stuff" can be ideal or material, and "appears" can be true or illusion); broad enough to hit every possibility, and a no-starter in terms of being able to apply it to answering any meaningful question.

I may, of course, be wrong--can you see any implications that stem from that statement? If that statement is step one...where is step two?
Interesting comments, from whatever source exists. ;)

I have no quick answer. However, as I chew on that, in the alternate way you phrased it where physicalism could win, how do we arrive at the meaning of "illusion"? That's poorly said by me, but do you catch my drift about problems inherent in 'physicalism wins'?

I wonder if you or anyone else here is willing to state their confidence in pure physicalism is a great as my confidence in my answer? Or for that matter, as great as their confidence in my answer?

[chriswl]

I wonder if you or anyone else here is willing to state their confidence in pure physicalism is a great as my confidence in my answer? Or for that matter, as great as their confidence in my answer?
I'm happy to say that I believe in the physical world with absolute certainty. We perceive a world around us which seems to have absolutely reliable properties and characteristics and we find ourselves embedded within this world. Only those who are literally insane doubt this.

One interesting thing about this physical world is that it seems to have an existence quite apart from our experience. It would be absurd to think that things pop in and out of existence depending on whether we are looking at them, especially as they would then have to always represent themselves to us in the state they would have been in if they had been continuing in existence while our back was turned (if a watched kettle was the only kind that ever boiled we would notice this).

Another interesting thing about the physical world is that we can deduce that there is vastly, vastly more of it than can ever be experienced. The overwhelming majority of matter in the universe has probably never been perceived by anything and probably never will. The phenomenon of consciousness appears to be pretty marginal thing in our universe.

But the really interesting and surprising is that our bodies seem to obey the laws of the physical world every bit as rigorously as inanimate objects do. So the laws of the physical world can give a complete description of our every action, including our every utterance and expression and gesture. This contrasts strongly with our intuitions about consciousness as it doesn't seem to leave any space for a consciousness independent of the physical world to act. Furthermore, as we learn more about the brain we can correlate particular parts of it with particular feelings and thoughts and thus see how even our "inner" experiences are entirely caused by actions in the physical world. The mental "I" is squeezed into being nothing but, at best, a powerless, undetectable, epiphenomenal spectator.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Chriswl,

I would add that another way to get certainity about the world its language itself. One of the best arguments against the "only I exists" is that we use a language, and we didnt invented it. ;)

[hammegk]

Chriswl, you are past philosophy. Congraulations.

Just don't allow any hint of dualism to take you off the path. :)

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm still waiting for someone to bring up the obvious problem that the whole formulation of the "problem" rests with Descartian dualism. Why concentrate so firmly on "thought exists" when "thought" must be of something in the world, it must be intentional.

I kept waiting for Geoff to mention what was really important in Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger's philosophies -- that Descartes was wrong and that the subjective-objective distinctions created by his dualism was a big mistake. But he kept harping on the words, kept returning to them as though they were a talisman.

Hammegk, I don't know your individual philosophy, but I am a bit perplexed by why you are so opposed to "physicalism". Does it have something to do with libertarian freedom? I am personally very interested in natural explanations of phenomena like consciousness, but that does not imply physicalism perse. You have commented before that you are just as interested in the mechanisms that explain thought as the next guy, so why do you think this is all about physicalism?

[Jimbo07]

ETA: Oh, and I agree that, although Upchurch is technically right that we can't know anything for 100% certain, that is a useless conclusion. For all practical purposes, it IS possible to know something 100%. Otherwise we're just always doing philosophy, which gets us nowhere.

Shades of the orange/green/purple threads...

[hammegk]

Orange and green are what is being discussed here. Green is interactive dualism of some sort, and cannot be logically defended.

chriswl has avered orange as a physicalist. I aver orange as an objective idealist. Most here lean very very strongly towards physicalism, but imo do not close the door to deny any hint of dualism.

Most here agree with Wasp and consider dualism dead. What is not dead is one's choice of monism, and whether we term the choices physicalism vs ~physicalism, or body vs mind, or objective vs subjective, if no choice is made, I'd term you a dualist -- illogical. Either monism can be logically defended, but after considering both I prefer 'thought exists' over 'physical stuff exists'. The possibility of libertarian free-will is higher imo under idealism than under physicalism, there is no judgement call on the separation line of non-life from life("what-is" has the attribute of 'life'), and HPC is a lesser mystery (thought, of course).

just my 2 cts ... :)

[Krandal2]

A thought or statement is neccessarily true if its counter-example is inconcievable. I cannot concieve the thought "Thought does not exist" without thinking, and it is therefore neccessarily false. I can therefore be as certain the existence of thought as I can of the non-existence of married bachelors.
And I can be 100% certain because in doubting the statement I simultaniously prove it true and erase the grounds on which I can doubt it.

[Mercutio]

Interesting comments, from whatever source exists. ;)

I have no quick answer. However, as I chew on that, in the alternate way you phrased it where physicalism could win, how do we arrive at the meaning of "illusion"? That's poorly said by me, but do you catch my drift about problems inherent in 'physicalism wins'?

I wonder if you or anyone else here is willing to state their confidence in pure physicalism is a great as my confidence in my answer? Or for that matter, as great as their confidence in my answer?
Erm...where physicalism could win? If I said that, I did not mean it. I am neither physicalist nor idealist, so ... oh, never mind. You said "could", and I think I agree with you again.

Anyway, my intent is to poke holes in the very act of asking these particular questions. I have a hard time finding meaning in them. I do not find your view any more silly than any other, but these questions are silly, if one's aim is to find meaningful, helpful answers.

[hammegk]

.... I am neither physicalist nor idealist ...
Although as you know, I've yet to be convinced that any stance exists which truly does not collapse into a monism, or remain dualistic in some way. :)


Anyway, my intent is to poke holes in the very act of asking these particular questions. I have a hard time finding meaning in them. I do not find your view any more silly than any other, but these questions are silly, if one's aim is to find meaningful, helpful answers.
Is finding peace of mind silly? :D

[Mercutio]

Although as you know, I've yet to be convinced that any stance exists which truly does not collapse into a monism, or remain dualistic in some way. :)
Or suspends belief, on questions without answers.... :D

Is finding peace of mind silly? :D
That is not silly in the least. If one view or the other offers peace of mind, I am for it. But if a particular view simply allows one to attain peace of mind by shoring up wishes, that is not peace of mind but belief confirmation. (I am not saying this is your view at all.) I don't see an advantage to one belief system over another, so far.

[chris epic]

I am 100% certain that I think- now you just have to get six billion, five hundred and ninety nine million, nine hundred and ninty nine thousand, nine hundred and ninety-nine more personal confermations and we can come to the conclusion that thought exists for everyone 100%:D

[Ichneumonwasp]

whether we term the choices physicalism vs ~physicalism, or body vs mind, or objective vs subjective, if no choice is made, I'd term you a dualist -- illogical. Either monism can be logically defended, but after considering both I prefer 'thought exists' over 'physical stuff exists'.

But is that not part of the problem? The tradition leading from Kant that became what we know as phenomenology eschewed such firm distinctions as Descartes' mistake, or as John Searle (most definitely not a phenomenologist) has said of the mind-body distinction, "the problem is that we never should have started counting in the first place". The whole idea of discussing subjective vs. objective or choosing between physicalism vs. idealism is the problem. Those distinctions are infected by dualism which invades every crevice like the stench of a dead rat.

If we all agree that there is only ONE THING and that we have precious little way of understanding fully what that one thing "is", then why all the arguing? We all agree that thought exists (at least I think we all do), and we should all agree that thought is always about something -- it is intentional, so it relates to the world (the actuality of thought means there is a world). Why should it matter what the nature of the underlying substance is? We cannot know it because of the structure of our thinking process -- we are limited by the basic categories that make thought possible. Those categories may help us to see very closely what the world really is, but we can never be sure of that. What difference does it make what label we put on the monistic substance?

I agree that the problem arises when we allow dualism in the door. But we can still examine the stuff of the world (whatever its nature) to understand how thought is even possible. It needn't be relegated to the mystical trashbin of "We can't possible comprehend it; I'm not worthy, I'm not worthy". The answers will not eliminate thought, nor will they eliminate mind despite all the recent bluster proclaiming that such explanations must. One cannot eliminate what exists, and we all know that we think and that we experience, so explanations will not eliminate but elucidate. The reason that sunsets were eliminated was because they never existed in the first place. Consciousness is not like that.

[chriswl]

If we all agree that there is only ONE THING and that we have precious little way of understanding fully what that one thing "is", then why all the arguing? We all agree that thought exists (at least I think we all do), and we should all agree that thought is always about something -- it is intentional, so it relates to the world (the actuality of thought means there is a world). Why should it matter what the nature of the underlying substance is? We cannot know it because of the structure of our thinking process -- we are limited by the basic categories that make thought possible. Those categories may help us to see very closely what the world really is, but we can never be sure of that. What difference does it make what label we put on the monistic substance?
I don't think it's just about labels. Saying the world is all mind or all matter is saying very different things about it. If the world is all mind then this immediately calls into question the idea of intentionality. For an idealist we don't experience things that are external to us, we have thoughts that exist within our minds. This eliminates the gap between perceived and perceiver and in so doing fundamentally eliminates dualism. But at a huge cost - we are unable to think of the physical world in the normal way as something that exists prior to and independently of our minds. Even time must be a kind of illusion - if so called "matter" cannot exist apart from mind then the (immense) period of history where there were no humans cannot have really existed, unless there was a god to observe it. Or maybe it exists only insofar as we indirectly observe it now and its purpose was to eventually produce us. Idealism is just not compatible with a modern naturalist, atheist view of the world.

If we agree that dualism is logically impossible then that leaves some form of physicalism as having to be true by default. The challenge is to understand how physicalism can be true, whilst still doing justice to our sense of subjective experience.

[Ichneumonwasp]

But, it is the all-mind/all-matter distinction that creates the problem in the first place. Someone is going to come along and react to whichever choice we make. If "physicalism wins", then many will simply turn their heads in disgust. If "idealism wins" there are many who will feel that they must stifle a chuckle. We shouldn't even be using these terms. The split is the problem.

If there is one thing and only one thing, then it makes no sense to speak of a fundamental distinction between mind and matter. They are both one. Shouldn't we simply step beyond the argument, with all the baggage it carries, and pretend that Descartes was a very bad dream so that we can move foreward? It doesn't make much sense to me to speak of one arm of a split being correct and the other incorrect. I think both arms are wrong. The split is the problem.

Whether or not some here wish to admit it, it seems very clear to me that Continental philosophy has provided some very cogent insights in this arena. We shouldn't ignore those important contributions. We should stop misinterpreting them, as most literature departments do with Derrida to the point that his name is synonymous with the devil in some circles.

[chriswl]

Shouldn't we simply step beyond the argument, with all the baggage it carries, and pretend that Descartes was a very bad dream so that we can move foreward?
But by separating mind from matter Descartes gave us the physical world and thus made science possible. We can't have a purely mechanical realm governed by laws of physics until we have first separated out the mental. Fortunately for us (and quite surprisingly) it seems that if we turn the methods of science on the brain we can then explain just about all that needs explaining about mental activity too, or at least we can expect that we will be able to in time.

Whether or not some here wish to admit it, it seems very clear to me that Continental philosophy has provided some very cogent insights in this arena. We shouldn't ignore those important contributions. We should stop misinterpreting them, as most literature departments do with Derrida to the point that his name is synonymous with the devil in some circles.
If Derrida hadn't wanted to be misinterpreted then he should have made at least a minimal effort to express himself clearly. Or would that just have exposed the fact that he had nothing to say?

[Ichneumonwasp]

But by separating mind from matter Descartes gave us the physical world and thus made science possible. We can't have a purely mechanical realm governed by laws of physics until we have first separated out the mental.

I'm not sure that follows. We certainly had scientific enquiry before Descartes. Aristotle certainly did what he did long before Descartes, and I don't think we can site that much influence of Cartesian thought on Galileo who was his contemporary (even a bit before his time). Separating objective/subjective is very helpful for scientific thought. But when it comes to consciousness I think it might be more helpful for us to realize that things like emotions are not purely subjective in some "mental" Cartesian sense. Emotions and thoughts are always out there in the world, they are engagements with the world. It makes about as much sense to speak of a private emotion as it does to speak of private language. I think that way of looking at the picture could help in the long run. There seems to be some sort of mental block in this area that revolves around this idea that "subjectivity" is completely unexplainable, qualitative, whatever. But thoughts and feelings are intentional precisely because as organisms we must engage in the world for survival. Our emotions, our feelings, etc. are always about something. Even moods, which generally do not refer to some particular occurrence, are about something -- the concern our orientation to the world itself.

If Derrida hadn't wanted to be misinterpreted then he should have made at least a minimal effort to express himself clearly. Or would that just have exposed the fact that he had nothing to say?

I don't think clarity was his concern. I think play was what he was after. He must rank as one of the worst writers in history though.

[hammegk]

But is that not part of the problem? The tradition leading from Kant that became what we know as phenomenology eschewed such firm distinctions as Descartes' mistake, or as John Searle (most definitely not a phenomenologist) has said of the mind-body distinction, "the problem is that we never should have started counting in the first place". The whole idea of discussing subjective vs. objective or choosing between physicalism vs. idealism is the problem. Those distinctions are infected by dualism which invades every crevice like the stench of a dead rat.
I'd say the rat is neither dead, nor is Kant's noumen. Dualism is dead, but the attributes of 'what-is' cannot be so. I find pushing the problem up a level to phenomenalism is a copout, as is the refusal to choose. I agree that debate as to the value of making the choice is a decision each individual must cope with using all the data, understanding, and logic (s)he can muster.

Body/mind, dead/alive, barren/fecund, the subjective objective/the objective subjective, mu ... which are the attributes you find best characterize 'what-is'?


I don't think it's just about labels. Saying the world is all mind or all matter is saying very different things about it. If the world is all mind then this immediately calls into question the idea of intentionality.
Agreed.


If we agree that dualism is logically impossible then that leaves some form of physicalism as having to be true by default. The challenge is to understand how physicalism can be true, whilst still doing justice to our sense of subjective experience.
Objective idealism to me is a viable, and in fact preferred, alternative; to my mind it does not suffer from the dualism inherent, although possibly latent, in the choice of physicalism. See again my attribute list dichotomies. :)




BTW, I've been labeled from time to time a post-modernist. I find their babble appallingly useless and counter-productive.

[hodgy]

Mind or Matter - does it matter? No! These are both just labels.
The substance of existence is arranged in such a way as to yield mind and matter. Mind might be matter or vice-versa but its really irrelevant because I can never know the answer. In any case, existence has a substance and state that makes it different from non-existence.

I am a materialist in the sense that I would label anything that exists as material, including the mind and whatever might comprise it. From my perspective dualism, solipsism and monism are irrelevant and their disputes obviously un-settlable.

However, one thing that I know for certain - 'cogito ergo sum'.

[hammegk]

Er, actually, the Materialist motto is: sum, ergo cogito.

Cogito, ergo sum is for Idealists. ;)

[UndercoverElephant]

Mind or Matter - does it matter? No! These are both just labels.
.

http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/neutralmonism.html


Mind and matter were something like the lion and the unicorn fighting for the crown; the end of the battle is not the victory of one or the other, but the discovery that both are only heraldic inventions.


(Russell)

[Ichneumonwasp]

Body/mind, dead/alive, barren/fecund, the subjective objective/the objective subjective, mu ... which are the attributes you find best characterize 'what-is'?


Um, wouldn't that be all of them? After all it is the what-is and all of these "are".

We cannot change the reality of what-is by choosing one arm of a human-centered and human-created dichotomy. Doesn't the prospect of a choice demonstrate that, when it comes to Being, neither covers the reality of what-is? For there to be a choice both must "be". We must all choose to be who and what we are, but when it comes to metaphysics the choice is the problem -- Being underlies all such choices.

As far as the choice to organize my life, I thought I made that abundantly clear -- naturalism. That happens to include many idealist notions, such as much of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, but I believe that has a natural "material" explanation. I recognize that it is an approximation, however, and not a reflection of the true underlying reality.

I find pushing the problem up a level to phenomenalism is a copout, as is the refusal to choose.

Why a cop-out? As I said, we do not choose the nature of reality. It is. We can choose how to organize and orient our lives and our thought, but that choice is a limited human choice determined, in part, by the structures that enable thought. It does not necessarily reflect reality. The possibility of a choice should be telling us something here. It may very well be the case that dichotomies and choices are artifacts of the way our brains work -- we certainly have line and feature detectors in our visual system. But we also know that the clear demarcation of tree/not-tree is a fantasy created in our minds. There are molecules bouncing into and incorporating into everything around us. Living beings release bits of themselves into the surrounding environment nearly constantly. The whole being of a tree, for example, consists in its absorption of energy from without, etc., etc. But we don't see that. We don't see that what is tree is immediately surrounded by the same stuff in a different configuration (if string theory is correct). We create the world around us and do not see it for what it is. We are pretty dang close to what is out there -- we must be or we wouldn't be here, since we live in a hostile environment -- but we don't see it exactly as it is.

Er, actually, the Materialist motto is: sum, ergo cogito.

Cogito, ergo sum is for Idealists.

A guy with Sartre for his avatar wrote this? Are you serious?

[UndercoverElephant]

A guy with Sartre for his avatar wrote this?

Looks like James Joyce to me.

"Sandhyas ! Sandhyas ! Sandhyas ! Calling all downs. ... It is just, it is just about to, it is just about to rolywholyover."

http://joycean.org/media/oldjoyce.gif

[Ichneumonwasp]

Whatever.

Since my comment was based more on the presented ideas -- the insistence on choice, which is one of the primary features of existentialism -- the statement stands. Does existence precede essence or essence precede existence?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Does existence precede essence or essence precede existence?

What if "they" are like particle-waves?

[hammegk]

A guy with Sartre for his avatar wrote this? Are you serious?
Why do you think my comment was not serious?


As to your basic comments we are in agreement. I just choose to take one more step.

Good guess, but the avatar is a poet.



Does existence precede essence or essence precede existence?
I'd say Existence and Essence are inseparable: Atman=Brahman.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

The same thing but with different name. From being you can see its appearance, and from no being you can see the essence. :)

[Ichneumonwasp]

Oh, dang, that's Eliot isn't it?

Just goes to show you, like babies, old white guys all look the same.:D

I'd say Existence and Essence are inseparable: Atman=Brahman.

Good answer. To which I must agree.

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh, dang, that's Eliot isn't it?


Err....no, still looks like James Joyce.....


Just goes to show you, like babies, old white guys all look the same.:D


Bit like brain processes and subjective experiences, eh? Just can't tell 'em apart. ;)

[chriswl]

Emotions and thoughts are always out there in the world, they are engagements with the world. It makes about as much sense to speak of a private emotion as it does to speak of private language. I think that way of looking at the picture could help in the long run. There seems to be some sort of mental block in this area that revolves around this idea that "subjectivity" is completely unexplainable, qualitative, whatever. But thoughts and feelings are intentional precisely because as organisms we must engage in the world for survival. Our emotions, our feelings, etc. are always about something. Even moods, which generally do not refer to some particular occurrence, are about something -- the concern our orientation to the world itself.
I'm not sure where it leaves us but I have to say I completely agree with the above.

[hodgy]

Er, actually, the Materialist motto is: sum, ergo cogito.

Oh no it isn't.

Cogito, ergo sum is for Idealists. ;)

I think its a pretty good starting point for any rationalist.

[hammegk]

Yeah, but I was addressing the ending point.

[davidsmith73]

There seems to be some sort of mental block in this area that revolves around this idea that "subjectivity" is completely unexplainable, qualitative, whatever. But thoughts and feelings are intentional precisely because as organisms we must engage in the world for survival. Our emotions, our feelings, etc. are always about something. Even moods, which generally do not refer to some particular occurrence, are about something -- the concern our orientation to the world itself.


I assume that your claim about emotions and moods being always about something is based on first person accounts. I insist that I feel happy but don't know what I'm happy about. Would you deny that I feel happy or would you insist that I am happy about something but just can't express it? If you answer yes to either of those, it would appear you have to justify why accept first person accounts for your original claim but reject a first person account that goes against it.

[Ichneumonwasp]

I specifically said that moods do not always refer directly to things, to occurrences. They are, however, a relation to the world. You are not happy simply for the sake of being happy. Your happiness is a relation to the world -- the way that you relate to the world.

[Ichneumonwasp]

This isn't anything profound, by the way. It is lifted directly from the phenomenological-existentialist tradition, largely Heidegger.

[davidsmith73]

I specifically said that moods do not always refer directly to things, to occurrences. They are, however, a relation to the world. You are not happy simply for the sake of being happy. Your happiness is a relation to the world -- the way that you relate to the world.


But I insist that I am experiencing this feeling I call happiness but I don't know what I'm happy about or how it relates to anything in the world. I just have this feeling. Doesn't this kind of first person account, communicated to you, cause you a problem when you try to make specific claims about experiences being this or that, which are also based on first person accounts?

[Ichneumonwasp]

No, not really. It doesn't matter that you don't know why you are happy. Your happiness is still a relation to the world. That is simply what it is. It isn't a relation to yourself. It is the way you relate to the world around you.

The fact that you do not know why you are happy is a problem for certain forms of idealism and rationalism, not for naturalism. We know darn well that subconscious processes are the most common form of "thought". We relate to the world largely subconsciously, not consciously. Consciousness is necessary to solve problems when something new enters the environment. Otherwise, you work subconsciously for the most part -- you've experienced it yourself I am sure when you drive down the freeway and suddenly "awaken" to your exit. You were for a time on autopilot, acting through some form of awareness but not fully consciously aware of what you were doing. But you must have had some sort of awareness because you did not drive off the road.

[Mercutio]

But I insist that I am experiencing this feeling I call happiness but I don't know what I'm happy about or how it relates to anything in the world. I just have this feeling. Doesn't this kind of first person account, communicated to you, cause you a problem when you try to make specific claims about experiences being this or that, which are also based on first person accounts?
Hmmm...how is it that you learned to label this feeling?

[davidsmith73]

Hmmm...how is it that you learned to label this feeling?

Well, for the sake of argument, I have invented myself a word for it.

[Mercutio]

Well, for the sake of argument, I have invented myself a word for it.Ok. Problem over, then, as we have no way of knowing if this "happiness" (as you call it) refers to anything in our experience. What a spectacular coincidence that you invented a word we already use, having learned it through public reference to behaviors within our verbal community.

Amazing things we can assume for the sake of argument. Then we can find out all sorts of things about ...our assumptions.

So, in the real world, how did you or anyone else learn to label that feeling?

[davidsmith73]

. Problem over, then, as we have no way of knowing if this "happiness" (as you call it) refers to anything in our experience.

That was my point to Ichneumonwasp when he made a claim about happiness, mood and feeling always being about something. The claim must be based on first person account, so I have given my own first person account that constradicts his claim, yet it is dismissed, even pronounced meaningless by yourself. Thus the original claim about the intentionality of emotions/moods/feelings must surely be similarly dismissed wouldn't you say?

What a spectacular coincidence that you invented a word we already use, having learned it through public reference to behaviors within our verbal community.

Indeed. But getting back to the matter at hand, is such a situation conceivable? My point is that it doesn't have to be learned through public reference to behaviors within our verbal community, or would you disagree?

Perhaps it would be clearer if I claim I have invented the label "fwang" for a feeling I simply experience but can see no intentionality about? If this claim, based on my first person account, contradicts Ichneumonwasp's original claim about the intentionality of feelings, then how can we justify to accept one claim but reject the other of both are based on first person accounts?


Amazing things we can assume for the sake of argument. Then we can find out all sorts of things about ...our assumptions.

So, in the real world, how did you or anyone else learn to label that feeling?

The majority of people learn labels by being told the label by someone else.

How would Mary from the black and white room learn to label colour if she never had contact with any other people? (Sorry to drift from the "real world" as you put it, but sometimes philosophy deals with thought experiments and argument, sorry).

[Ichneumonwasp]

The claim must be based on first person account, so I have given my own first person account that constradicts his claim, yet it is dismissed, even pronounced meaningless by yourself.

A first person account of feelings or emotion in no way contradicts the intentionality of those feelings or emotions. I don't understand what you are trying to say if you claim that not knowing the source of a feeling somehow contradicts its intentionality. Whatever the feeling is, it is an orientation to the world. It doesn't matter if you know the source or reason behind it or not. It still orients you to the world. It is still has intentionality. Purely private feelings don't make sense. We could not communicate them. We couldn't even have this current conversation since you couldn't tell us anything meaningful about such a sensation.

I was not saying that there is no private experience, but that this "private world" is not so inviolable as many people presume. All of those feelings and emotions are about something -- whether it be an actual occurrence in the world or simply one's particular orientation to the world. The private/public distinction was forever blurred by Heidegger (and Wittgenstein).

Intenionality used to be big bugbear that supposedly no one could explain through neural processes. Now you want to claim that experiences are non-intentional? Happiness simply pops up for its own sake, so that you can feel happy with no consequence or orientation to the world at large? There is no reason for it if you don't know the reason? If you had a seizure disorder, I might be able to agree with you, but you need to provide something other than "I don't know why I'm happy" to provide a counter-example.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Wait a second. Do you think all intentionality is fully conscious?

[davidsmith73]

A first person account of feelings or emotion in no way contradicts the intentionality of those feelings or emotions. I don't understand what you are trying to say if you claim that not knowing the source of a feeling somehow contradicts its intentionality.

I'm not saying that. I'm saying that a statement that feelings are intentional or that they always orient you to the world is an appeal to first person perspective is it not? Or am I missing something? If it is, then on what grounds can you dismiss my claim that I have a feeling that does not orient me to the world since that would also be a first person account?


Whatever the feeling is, it is an orientation to the world....

...All of those feelings and emotions are about something -- whether it be an actual occurrence in the world or simply one's particular orientation to the world.

My point is that I am claiming otherwise. How would you dismiss this claim? (Since I cannot see how your claim about their intentionality is not based on first person account)


Now you want to claim that experiences are non-intentional? Happiness simply pops up for its own sake, so that you can feel happy with no consequence or orientation to the world at large? There is no reason for it if you don't know the reason?

From the "answering a question with a question" here, it seems that you can't really find the grounds to dismiss my claim, however much you try to imply that it is unreasonable to claim such a thing. This is my point. If, upon assessing my claim, you are simply left exclaiming how it contradicts your own view but you can't give any reasons why it could not be so, then where does that leave us?


you need to provide something other than "I don't know why I'm happy" to provide a counter-example.

What would that be other than a simple declaration of my first person perspective? Isn't that what you are doing too?

[hammegk]

Possible examples of intentionality would be choosing to override an otherwise learned response pattern, or rearranging knowledge into new relationships. The vast majority of human behavior is nothing but learned responses, and for physicalists, nothing else can be considered possible.

When brain & body are involved, the initial act imo requires intentionality at HPC level.

[davidsmith73]

Wait a second. Do you think all intentionality is fully conscious?

I'm not sure on the meaning of intentionality to be honest. If we are to talk about "unconscious" intentionality then we are simply talking about physical behaviour

[davidsmith73]

When brain & body are involved, the initial act imo requires intentionality at HPC level.

What does HPC stand for?

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm saying that a statement that feelings are intentional or that they always orient you to the world is an appeal to first person perspective is it not?

No. The first person perspective is not accessible by anyone but the person experiencing the feeling or the emotion. The intentionality of the feeling or emotion is simply an expression of its orientation to the world. Every feeling and emotion is an orientation to the world.

You are happy. That happiness is only accessible to you, but your happiness affects the way you see things in the world and the way you relate to the world. Emotions and moods are not purely private experiences in that way. While no one else can have your private experience, your private experience does not exist solely for your benefit. It is a way of you engaging in the world at large, whether or not you realize why you have that particular feeling. Your happiness is "out there" in public space. Ontologically, it is your private experience, but there is an objective epistemic sense in which it is public. You can try to cover it up, but that is simply a different sort of engagement with the world.

Does that make more sense? I guess I should have been more clear from the beginning.

[Ichneumonwasp]

In other words, I am not saying that people have outside access to private experiences. I hope that you did not get that impression. What I am saying is that those private experiences are not purely and exclusively private. The nature of feelings and emotions is that they are engagements with the world, so they are part of public, social space.

[Ichneumonwasp]

From the "answering a question with a question" here, it seems that you can't really find the grounds to dismiss my claim, however much you try to imply that it is unreasonable to claim such a thing.

No. I don't understand the basis of your claim. It doesn't seem to fit what I am talking about.

Or am I missing something? If it is, then on what grounds can you dismiss my claim that I have a feeling that does not orient me to the world since that would also be a first person account?


If you can be happy without it affecting any behavior whatsoever, any way that you view the world, then I would like to see some evidence of this miraculous occurrence. I would question that you truly are happy if what you say is so. It is possible for people to be mistaken in their emotions is it not? How many times have you heard, "Dammit, I'm NOT ANGRY!"