Philosophical conceptions of the self and cognitive science

[UndercoverElephant]

The following is an article by Shaun Gallagher describing the various ways cognitive science has tried to get to grips with "the self".

http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~gallaghr/tics2000.html

The following is my provisional response to the article:


How can we understand the claim that selves are fictions?

There are many senses in which the word “self” is used and many ways in which something can be a fiction, so there are many questions rolled into one in the title of this essay. I will start by a clarification of what we are saying when we identify something as fictitious, and I will draw on a 1994 paper by Peter B Lloyd called “The physical world is a fiction.”(1) Lloyd describes a “four sided pinkel triangle”, which, of course, nobody has ever actually encountered. The then argues that since nobody could ever encounter such an entity, it is indistinguishable from its fictional counterpart.

Lloyd’s summary of the argument:

1. It is intrinsically inconceivable that we can ever perform any experiment or observation to detect the presence of X.
2. Therefore any X is indistinguishable from a fiction.
3. Therefore any X is a fiction. If you disagree with this scheme, then I must ask you for a counter-example, or a contrary proof.

This is, I think, a fairly reasonable definition of what makes something a fiction, and is in tune with a typical dictionary definition such as of “anything invented or imagined.” However, we are already in trouble. Lloyd is a Berkeleyan idealist and the next section of his paper runs:
“Now, let this X be the entire physical universe and all physical things in it. I put it to you that you cannot be sure that X is really there.”

So we must be careful when we start talking about fictions, just in case we haven’t already unsafely reified something which may be strictly fictional according to the above definition, and then find ourselves having to fictionalise reality in order to accommodate our previous oversight. However, for the purposes of this essay, X is not the physical world; it is “the self”.

Shaun Gallagher(2) has summarised two important notions of the self which have been of interest to Cognitive Science:

“Minimal self: Phenomenologically,…a consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience, unextended in time. The minimal self almost certainly depends on brain processes…..

Narrative self: A….self image that is constituted with a past and a future in the various stories that we…tell about ourselves.”

Gallagher’s definition of the minimal self is fascinating in it’s own right. He starts with the word “phenomenologically”, and this is no accident. The “minimal self” he describes is the subject itself. But he then follows it with a materialistically-inspired claim that “almost certainly” this minimal self has its root in brain processes. This is a highly contentious claim because it goes over and above a claim that the mind supervenes on the brain. Whilst it is quite clear that the contents of consciousness are dependent upon brain processes, that the subject of consciousness is also dependent upon brain processes is not clear at all. To confuse these two things would be to fail to distinguish between Chalmers hard and easy problems of consciousness. If this “minimal self” is to be declared fictional on the grounds that they “almost certainly” depend on brain processes then we have at least two major problems. The first is Lloyd’s claim that brains themselves are strictly fictional and the second is that even if they are not there is still no empirical evidence whatsoever to support the claim that the subject of experience is “almost certainly” dependent on brain process. If there were any such evidence, why would anyone advocate eliminative materialism? What would be the point? If there is a materialistic explanation of the subject itself, why should there be a ubiquitous problem with subjectivity in general?

His definition of narrative self is equally interesting. In this case we have cognitive science in total agreement with recent New Age classics such as Eckhart Tolle’s “The Power of Now.”(3) The whole of this book is dedicated to making sure that the minimal self is not confused with the narrative self and that once they are clearly distinguished it becomes clear that the narrative self is nothing but a highly elaborate fiction. In fact the word “ego” is probably a better term for the narrative self, and it is the mental construct which many spiritual traditions deliberately set out to destroy. That the narrative self is a fiction can scarcely be doubted. It is continually open to revision and is always less, rather than more, coherent. It takes the form not only of fictional versions of our own past and projected future but of thought processes which endlessly repeat themselves. These thought processes can be self-reinforcing, serving themselves a bit like Dawkins memes do. They serve themselves, rather than serving the subject who is thinking them – which often leads their “owners” to the psychotherapist who will then spend several months attempting to unravel the self-reinforcing fictional self which has served as that person’s identity. So I think we can safely say this has passed the “Lloyd test” as it surely is intrinsically inconceivable that we could ever perform any experiment or observation to detect the presence of a narrative self.

Tolle’s book even goes some way to agreeing with Gallagher’s definition of the minimal self – which should have been obvious from its title. The minimal self, according to Tolle, exists in an eternal “now”. From a phenomenological point of view, it is always the present, in contrast with the narrative self which is forever concerned with the past and the future and has no interest in the ever-present “now”.

So what of the minimal self? Gallagher first questions the immunity principle, based upon the xase of schizophrenics suffering from thought insertion. I think the immunity principle is in no danger, as Gallagher himself has agreed elsewhere(3).

“His judgment that it is he who is being subjected to these thoughts is immune to error through misidentification, even if he is completely wrong about who is causing his thoughts. In the latter case, with respect to agency, he is in a position to make only statements in which he uses the first person pronoun as object--and in such cases the immunity principle is not at stake, and therefore cannot be violated.”

Gallagher then proposes two ways to proceed in our analysis of the minimal self. His first example is of an “ecological self”, and he describes a baby mimicking facial expressions of adults. This sort of behaviour is surely instinctive. Newborn infants also “know” how to suck a nipple. Is this evidence of a minimal self? I don’t think so. This is instinct, and I see no reason to believe that a human baby mimicking adult facial expressions is any different. The second choice is phenomenological, and describes Galen Strawson’s characterisation of the self as “the subject of experience”. Gallagher then goes on to say:

“This is a momentary self without long-term continuity, and thus, without a history – a ‘bare locus of consciousness, void of personality’”.

At this point I depart company with Gallagher, but not Strawson. The phenomenological subject is certainly void of personality. It has no identity. As already described, our sense of personal identity is maintained by the narrative self, so the minimal self, the subject, has no history of its own. But it is momentary only in the sense that Tolle describes it as momentary – for the minimal self it is always now. But to say it is “without long-term continuity’ would be to make a serious mistake. On the contrary, it is the sole continuity which unifies our entire experience of reality, from the moment we are born to the moment we die. The only times it is missing is when we are in deep (dreamless) sleep and when we are anaesthetised.

Gallagher’s account continues….

“On this view, a human being consists of a series of transient selves, each one lasting only as long as a unique period of experience lasts…”

I am not sure what to make of this. What is “a unique period of experience”? As long as it takes me to type this sentence, perhaps? How long is a piece of string? How long is a Now? There are no such things as unique periods of experience.

“…without continuity.”

At which point I must return to Peter B. Lloyd. Whilst I am not suggesting we adopt his suggestion that we are all disembodied minds, it nevertheless remains an epistemic possibility. Yet we experience an objective world. The “minimal self” (as the subject of experience) remains a continuous presence for the whole of our lives, whether we are conscious, self-conscious, semi-conscious or dreaming. The minimal self is the paradigm case of continuity.

Gallagher then goes on to re-assure everybody that Strawson is a good materialist, and that the minimal self is “manifest in terms of brain processes”, (whatever this is supposed to mean). This leads him to point of that it is possible to be “conscious of myself as a minimal subject of experience without being aware of the brain processes that may (or may not) generate the self” (whatever that is supposed to mean). Despite the total lack of any understanding of what we mean by “generate” or “manifest in terms of”, Gallagher then assures us that it may be possible to manifest/generate minimal selves in robots – but only if we drop Strawson’s definition of the self as the subject of experience. In other words, only if “minimal self” now means “ecological self” and has nothing to do with subjectivity at all. Indeed, “minimal selves” have now been reduced to “the conceptual level”. Unfortunately, since I am acutely aware that the subject of my own experiences (as opposed to my fictional narrative self) is not merely a concept, this isn’t going to get us very far.

Perhaps if we could move beyond the relentless attempts to defend materialism, we might see a different way in which the minimal self could be considered fictional, or at least non-existent. One could fill several shelves with books devoted to the relationship between Being and Nothing, but I will restrict myself to one quote from Hegel:

“…the Absolute is Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so without content, -- or in saying that God is only the supreme Being and nothing more; for this is really declaring Him to be the same negativity as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle, as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same abstraction.”

The reason we can understand the claim that the minimal self is a fiction is nothing to do with it being reducible to brain processes, nothing to do with it being non-continuous and nothing to do with it being merely conceptual. Its non-existence is of a far more fundamental nature than that of Sherlock Holmes (or the four-sided pinkel triangle). It can be considered fictional only on the grounds that Being is intimately related to Nothingness.

1 Lloyd, Peter B., Philosophy Now, No. 11, 1994

2 Gallagher, Shaun, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol.4 No.1, 2000

3 Gallagher, Shaun, Self-Reference and Schizophrenia, Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience, ed. Dan Zahavi. (pp. 203-239). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~gallaghr/copenhagen.html

4. G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Vol. 1, translation by Humphrey Palmer, 1971, p

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Interesting reading. Comments later, I just want to say that there is more than logical arguments when we want to "dissect" the so called "self". Eastern philosophies know about this, while in the west almost every philosopher have ignored that knowledge.

[UndercoverElephant]

Interesting reading. Comments later, I just want to say that there is more than logical arguments when we want to "dissect" the so called "self". Eastern philosophies know about this, while in the west almost every philosopher have ignored that knowledge.

You meant every anglo-american analytical philosopher, maybe? Why do you think I included a Hegel quote? He was German, not Eastern.

[hammegk]

Interesting stuff.

Does thought exist? If not what is the minimal self within the fictional (per Lloyd) physical universe?

[UndercoverElephant]

Interesting stuff.

Does thought exist? If not what is the minimal self within the fictional (per Lloyd) physical universe?

Lloyd is an outright Berkeleyan, of the Interesting Ian type.

[hammegk]

Forget Lloyd's universe, and Berleley. Does thought exist? Or do you think it also fails the fictional test?

[UndercoverElephant]

Forget Lloyd's universe, and Berleley. Does thought exist? Or do you think it also fails the fictional test?

Depends what you mean by "thought".

You often state "I think."

In which case, you (as in your minimal self) continually observe your own thoughts, and you'd agree with Lloyd that you never actually observe the physical world (in the sense he is talking about i.e. the external physical world, not the objects of perception). As for me? Tell me what you mean by "thought" and I'll try to answer.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

You meant every anglo-american analytical philosopher, maybe? Why do you think I included a Hegel quote? He was German, not Eastern.

Well, Wittgenstein certainly understood the subject. I like Hegel's quote, still, Im talking more about reaching "a different point of view" from where one can see the world (other than seeing it from the Narrative Self). I have tried to show you this other view, but so far, it has been unnoticed ;)

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Oh, btw, would you mantain that there is a "minimal self" that its not based on brain activity? I feel that, in a way, you want to equate it to being, or nothing, in the sense of "ultimate reality" (whatever that means ;)).

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, Wittgenstein certainly understood the subject. I like Hegel's quote, still, Im talking more about reaching "a different point of view" from where one can see the world (other than seeing it from the Narrative Self). I have tried to show you this other view, but so far, it has been unnoticed ;)

You'll have to elaborate on this one....

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh, btw, would you mantain that there is a "minimal self" that its not based on brain activity?


Absolutely.


I feel that, in a way, you want to equate it to being, or nothing, in the sense of "ultimate reality" (whatever that means ;)).

Absolutely. :)

[UndercoverElephant]

BDZ

I cannot believe that I am being asked these questions by a person calling himself "Bodhi Dharma Zen". :con2:

Geoff

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

hehe, as I have told you several times ;) I think more or less the same as you, so, any question by me is not because I doubt your conclusions or argumentations (well, sometimes), but because (for me) it is interesting to see how you arrived to them.

I believe also that it is difficult to mantain, from more than a purely logical perspective, that "a minimal self" can be sustained without invoking any of the so called intuitive assumptions made by some form or other of physicalism.

This is when Im curious about what you could put as "evidence" regarding the subject.

For example, you would have to propose that the "minimal self" is as inherent to the universe "itself" as the gravitational force, or something like that, and I cant see how this could be. Again, from a physicalist point of view.

So, Im curious about your answer to this problems.

[hammegk]

You often state "I think."
Actually, my position is 'That Thought exists is a 100% certainty'. There's been a recent discussion as to whether that statement is an assumption on my part, and the best I can do is aver that I consider it the prime tautology, not an assumption, based on the evidence available to me and logic.


Next, 'I think I think'.

In which case, you (as in your minimal self) continually observe your own thoughts, and you'd agree with Lloyd that you never actually observe the physical world (in the sense he is talking about i.e. the external physical world, not the objects of perception). As for me? Tell me what you mean by "thought" and I'll try to answer.
I cannot define it. I'd suggest it as the antithesis to everything we 'think' we perceive under the name physical. Neither could I defend the idea that my 'minimal self' is involved in what we call observing one's own thoughts.

Even though I cannot defend the idea 'you think' I give that assumption equal confidence to 'I think I think'. For either of us, does Lloyd's Fiction argument cause 'thought' to be a fiction?

The next question along these lines would address the noumen, which I suspect will be deemed as fictional as Lloyd's physical universe.

[hgc]

Actually, my position is 'That Thought exists is a 100% certainty'.
...
I cannot define it. ...Good stuff!

:crazy:

[Robin]

Lloyd is an outright Berkeleyan, of the Interesting Ian type.
But Ian is a dualist isn't he? Ian?

[UndercoverElephant]

hehe, as I have told you several times ;) I think more or less the same as you....


Funny.....what you write sounds far more like the words of an ex-Christian than a Buddhist.


, so, any question by me is not because I doubt your conclusions or argumentations (well, sometimes), but because (for me) it is interesting to see how you arrived to them.

I believe also that it is difficult to mantain, from more than a purely logical perspective, that "a minimal self" can be sustained without invoking any of the so called intuitive assumptions made by some form or other of physicalism.


I have no idea what you mean, you'll have to explain more.


This is when Im curious about what you could put as "evidence" regarding the subject.

For example, you would have to propose that the "minimal self" is as inherent to the universe "itself" as the gravitational force, or something like that, and I cant see how this could be. Again, from a physicalist point of view.


Why from a physicalist point of view?


So, Im curious about your answer to this problems.

Why? I'm not a physicalist...... :confused:

[UndercoverElephant]

But Ian is a dualist isn't he? Ian?

Ian is a mental monist. He was never a dualist. And I know he is familiar with Peter Lloyd because Ian bought Lloyds books on my recomendation.

[UndercoverElephant]

I cannot define it. I'd suggest it as the antithesis to everything we 'think' we perceive under the name physical.


That sounds like dualism.

"Thoughts" seem to have at least two aspects - noetic and noematic. "Noematic" refers to the object or content (noema) whereas "Noetic" refers to the act of thinking of the object or the content (noesis). Do we encounter noematic things? Yes, and we can call the encounter noesis. So, yes, Lloyd would claim we can observe (our own) minds.


Even though I cannot defend the idea 'you think' I give that assumption equal confidence to 'I think I think'. For either of us, does Lloyd's Fiction argument cause 'thought' to be a fiction?


My thoughts are encounterable to you, but since none of us wishes to defend solipsism it would be to go too far to say that other minds are fictional.


The next question along these lines would address the noumen, which I suspect will be deemed as fictional as Lloyd's physical universe.

Lloyd's system includes something he calls "The metamind", which functions as noemenon.

[Humphreys]

Unlike most here, I'm not of the opinion that "something that is undetectable, and has no effect on the Universe" is the same as something not existing, necessarily.

From our perspective, we certainly could never tell the difference, so it might as well be non-existent, but it still could exist.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Whether mind is a fiction depends entirely on your definition of the term. If mind is something other than brain function, it's a fiction unless you can perform an experiment to detect it. Finding it separate from a brain would be a start.

~~ Paul

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Funny.....what you write sounds far more like the words of an ex-Christian than a Buddhist...

.... Why from a physicalist point of view?


LOL! I was never a christian, if that helps. Why do you say that? I do know what westerns think, in general, so talking in the appropriate language is important when you want to expose some eastern philosophies.

I have to ask, does my language upset you? This is not the first time that you complain.

And returning to the important things, If you are not willing to defend that "mind" is a basic component of the universe from physicalism (which is the most spread and respected point of view that we have) (note, by "we" Im talking in a general sense, not including you or me or any other respected member of the forum, ok? :D) then you would have to have a theory that explains things as good as physicalism itself. And no, Im not talking about minds here, but about every other known phenomena.

If you are unable to do this (not that current physics have been able to do it) you will face a problem bigger than trying to make that gravity and quantum mechanics work together.

In other words, IMO, if you want to include "mind" in a worldview you would have to have a TOE.

[hammegk]

Good stuff!

Perhaps stores have a book you need: 'How To Recognize Thought For Dummies". :)

[hammegk]

Whether mind is a fiction depends entirely on your definition of the term.
I see. Does Lloyd's Fictional Physical Universe have that problem too?


If mind is something other than brain function, it's a fiction unless you can perform an experiment to detect it. Finding it separate from a brain would be a start.
~~ Paul
Can anyone else spot the category error? :words:

[UndercoverElephant]

Whether mind is a fiction depends entirely on your definition of the term. If mind is something other than brain function.....


Is it remotely possibly to conduct one of these debates without somebody trotting out a tired old question-begging assumption of physicalism? I mean just once? :(

There is a whole vast realm of thought which doesn't begin with the statement "minds are brain processes."

It's true! :shakes head:

[Dr Adequate]

It's not an assumption, JG, it's a conclusion.

[Dr Adequate]

BDZ

I cannot believe that I am being asked these questions by a person calling himself "Bodhi Dharma Zen". "There is no self underlying the constituent parts of a person." --- Buddha.

[UndercoverElephant]

"There is no self underlying the constituent parts of a person." --- Buddha.

And precisely what part of the opening post denied the teachings of the Buddha? BDZ seems to be a Buddhist who does not recognise the existence of what the Buddha referred to as "The Divine".

http://www.chezpaul.org.uk/buddhism/books/glossary.htm


Brahma:

in Hinduism, The Universal Self

in Buddhism, a divine being of the Form Sphere or the
Formless Sphere


Yet here we have a self-proclaimed Buddhist saying


Oh, btw, would you mantain that there is a "minimal self" that its not based on brain activity? I feel that, in a way, you want to equate it to being, or nothing, in the sense of "ultimate reality" (whatever that means)


If he's a Buddhist, I'm a tomato. :oldroll:

[UndercoverElephant]

It's not an assumption, JG, it's a conclusion.

It is a belief, which is fed into each and every argument as a premise.

[drkitten]

Is it remotely possibly to conduct one of these debates without somebody trotting out a tired old question-begging assumption of physicalism? I mean just once?

Not when the conclusion you are trying to draw is that physicalism is necessarily false, it isn't.

And you misspelled "empirically and theoretically supported conclusion of physicalism." You should update your spelling checker.

[Dr Adequate]

It is a belief, which is fed into each and every argument as a premise. No.

[hammegk]

You're finally correct in that some of us don't believe it.


"There is no self underlying the constituent parts of a person." --- Buddha.
At least a few of us understand that 'self' is the narrative problem.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

"There is no self underlying the constituent parts of a person." --- Buddha.

aahhhhhhh :D

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

And precisely what part of the opening post denied the teachings of the Buddha? BDZ seems to be a Buddhist who does not recognise the existence of what the Buddha referred to as "The Divine".

http://www.chezpaul.org.uk/buddhism/books/glossary.htm



Yet here we have a self-proclaimed Buddhist saying



If he's a Buddhist, I'm a tomato. :oldroll:

You should know better. Its sad that you have to resort to this kind of posts. I have told you in a private post and I will state it here also. Why are you upset for me asking? what if I am or I am not a Buddhist? What does that have to do with the discussion on course??? ;)

Im nothing that can be named.

That said, Yes, Im a Buddhist, not in a religious sense if that is what you are trying to imply because I do not see how religions help. Still, Buddha showed us something, and some of us have SEEN (not believed) his "stuff".

:D

Now, I have tried to point you to a place in which you can also SEE, but so far, you are lost in words. True, words are useful, and this is why I continue to ask you somethings (even if that upsets you, Im sorry for that). To learn from how you deal with some (apparent) logical inconsistencies of thinking, for example, that a "minimal self" is as constituyent of reality as gravity.

Im nothing that can be named,

And certainly even that "minimal self" is to complex to be anything fundamental. Still, its close to what I do think in the end.

So, for the last time, dont feel hurt because of my questions, and dont try to play ad hominem with me... ok?? :D

We share lots of points of view, can we get along with each other and limit ourselfs to the discussion at hand??

[hgc]

Perhaps stores have a book you need: 'How To Recognize Thought For Dummies". :)Recognize what? Thought? Does it have a definition, or is it just a word. if you don't know what it is, how do you know you're recognizing it? I can recognize words, no problem.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Can anyone else spot the category error?
Please enlighten me.


Is it remotely possibly to conduct one of these debates without somebody trotting out a tired old question-begging assumption of physicalism? I mean just once?

There is a whole vast realm of thought which doesn't begin with the statement "minds are brain processes."
Perhaps so. Now we're assuming that something is a fiction if you can't conduct an experiment to detect it, right? So where is the experiment to detect the mind thingie that isn't brain function?

~~ Paul

[UndercoverElephant]

Please enlighten me.


Perhaps so. Now we're assuming that something is a fiction if you can't conduct an experiment to detect it, right? So where is the experiment to detect the mind thingie that isn't brain function?

~~ Paul

Why not actually respond to the opening post, instead of bypassing it completely and just starting up the argument about materialism?

[UndercoverElephant]

No.

Yes.

"Honestly, guv, my beliefs aren't beliefs! It's true!" :oldroll:

[UndercoverElephant]

You should know better. Its sad that you have to resort to this kind of posts. I have told you in a private post and I will state it here also. Why are you upset for me asking? what if I am or I am not a Buddhist? What does that have to do with the discussion on course??? ;)

Im nothing that can be named.

That said, Yes, Im a Buddhist, not in a religious sense if that is what you are trying to imply because I do not see how religions help. Still, Buddha showed us something, and some of us have SEEN (not believed) his "stuff".

:D

Now, I have tried to point you to a place in which you can also SEE, but so far, you are lost in words. True, words are useful, and this is why I continue to ask you somethings (even if that upsets you, Im sorry for that). To learn from how you deal with some (apparent) logical inconsistencies of thinking, for example, that a "minimal self" is as constituyent of reality as gravity.

Im nothing that can be named,

And certainly even that "minimal self" is to complex to be anything fundamental. Still, its close to what I do think in the end.

So, for the last time, dont feel hurt because of my questions, and dont try to play ad hominem with me... ok?? :D

We share lots of points of view, can we get along with each other and limit ourselfs to the discussion at hand??


Ah....so you can SEE but I can't SEE, yet you are the one claiming to be a buddhist but "not in the religious sense". You are no Buddhist, and you can see nothing. I do not believe you've got the first idea what you are talking about, and you are being borderline offensive towards genuine Buddhists.

How about you just stop pretending to be a Buddhist at all?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Sure. :) Now can you get back on course and stop derailing your own thread? You can continue playing at a personal level, Im simply not interested in that.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

And yes, you cant see. Is that offensive? Im deeply sorry! Its not your logic what fails here, but you are not interested in more.

[chriswl]

At this point I depart company with Gallagher, but not Strawson. The phenomenological subject is certainly void of personality. It has no identity. As already described, our sense of personal identity is maintained by the narrative self, so the minimal self, the subject, has no history of its own. But it is momentary only in the sense that Tolle describes it as momentary – for the minimal self it is always now. But to say it is “without long-term continuity’ would be to make a serious mistake. On the contrary, it is the sole continuity which unifies our entire experience of reality, from the moment we are born to the moment we die.
I agree that's how we normally think of things. But we can't justify that claim. Our narrative self is the only thing that ties the "nows" experienced by the minimal self together. My feeling of continuity is the feeling that I am the same person as the person who features in my memories and is the subject of those memories - my narrative self. That is the only way in which it makes sense to say that I am the same person today that I was yesterday. I only know that there was a minimal-self me yesterday because I remember the experiences it had - but my memories are part of my narrative self.

[UndercoverElephant]

I agree that's how we normally think of things. But we can't justify that claim. Our narrative self is the only thing that ties the "nows" experienced by the minimal self together.


Why pluralise "now" at all? There are not many "nows". There is one continuous "now". It's always "now" for my cat, but he has no narrative self.

[UndercoverElephant]

I agree that's how we normally think of things. But we can't justify that claim. Our narrative self is the only thing that ties the "nows" experienced by the minimal self together. My feeling of continuity is the feeling that I am the same person as the person who features in my memories and is the subject of those memories - my narrative self. That is the only way in which it makes sense to say that I am the same person today that I was yesterday. I only know that there was a minimal-self me yesterday because I remember the experiences it had - but my memories are part of my narrative self.

I added a bit to my essay in response to your question. Thanks for actually reading what I wrote and responding constructively, you are helping to improve my grade.

Added section (at the end):


Perhaps the view of the matter which I have described above can help to answer the first of Gallagher’s outstanding questions. He asks “What relationship exists between the minimal self and the narrative self? Is one generated from the other? DO they operate independently of each other?”
According to Gallagher there are a whole series of minimal selves, associated with unique experiences. Presumably these are held together by the narrative self. But once more we have lost sight of the subject and of subjectivity. I would argue that the true relationship is the other way around. The subject of experience occurs even in animals – my cat does not require a load of concepts in order to be able to perceive fishes. What the cat lacks is not a subject for his experiences but self-consciousness and a narrative self. Self-consciousness requires conceptual and reflexive thought. Only once this level of awareness is achieved (and one assumes this is restricted to human beings), then the creation of a fictional narrative self will surely follow. From that moment on it seems quite natural to conflate the narrative self with the minimal self, because both of them are referred to by the first-person pronoun “I”. When we say “I” we tend to mean both “this human being, with his own history and projected future” as well as “the conscious subject which is perceiving you now”. So the answer to Gallagher’s question is that the minimal self was the original self, and that the narrative self appears both evolutionarily and developmentally later, and only after the establishment of fully reflexive self-consciousness. Once we are aware that we are aware, we can start weaving stories about whoever it is who is aware that he is aware. Without it, it is forever "now" and that is all there is to be said.

[chriswl]

Why pluralise "now" at all? There are not many "nows". There is one continuous "now".
Clearly different moments have different conscious content. I assume that what prevents these different moments form being different "nows" for you is that the same "you" is experiencing them. But what does that mean and how do you know it?

What, apart from common sense, makes you sure that your (minimal) conscious experiences yesterday didn't take place from the viewpoint of someone else's body, that the real "you" inhabited a different body? You wouldn't have any memories of being someone else, because those memories were left behind in the other person's brain and now contribute to his narrative self. And your narrative self relies on the memories in your brain, even if you weren't the one who had the conscious experiences associated with them. If the minimal self has a continuity that is seperate from memory then we can never know that this is true. In fact I'd argue that this concept of "continuity" is incoherent.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I agree that's how we normally think of things. But we can't justify that claim. Our narrative self is the only thing that ties the "nows" experienced by the minimal self together. My feeling of continuity is the feeling that I am the same person as the person who features in my memories and is the subject of those memories - my narrative self. That is the only way in which it makes sense to say that I am the same person today that I was yesterday. I only know that there was a minimal-self me yesterday because I remember the experiences it had - but my memories are part of my narrative self.

Absolutely. This "minimal self" (the name itself is wrong, there is no self that has no self so to speak) is not separable and would not belong to time. Memories, continuity, are part of the narrative self, beyond that, it is simply not "a self".

Maybe if we cut off the "minimal self" and exchange it for another word, the problems will disolve themselfs.

[UndercoverElephant]

Absolutely. This "minimal self" (the name itself is wrong, there is no self that has no self so to speak) is not separable and would not belong to time. Memories, continuity, are part of the narrative self, beyond that, it is simply not "a self".

Maybe if we cut off the "minimal self" and exchange it for another word, the problems will disolve themselfs.

That may depend on what other word you want to change it too. Specifically, it had better not be a word which eliminates all references to subjectivity and the subject itself.

[UndercoverElephant]

Clearly different moments have different conscious content.


Sure, but they have one and the same subject of experience.


I assume that what prevents these different moments form being different "nows" for you is that the same "you" is experiencing them. But what does that mean and how do you know it?


That is what the reference to the immunity principle is about. It is something I cannot be wrong about. I might be wrong about the content, but I cannot be wrong about the "I".


What, apart from common sense, makes you sure that your (minimal) conscious experiences yesterday didn't take place from the viewpoint of someone else's body, that the real "you" inhabited a different body? You wouldn't have any memories of being someone else, because those memories were left behind in the other person's brain and now contribute to his narrative self.


Nothing. If all I have is a minimal self then I have no individual identity and no real sense of past or future. I am just being me, now. EDIT: and I have no concept of other people as subjects of experience.


And your narrative self relies on the memories in your brain, even if you weren't the one who had the conscious experiences associated with them. If the minimal self has a continuity that is seperate from memory then we can never know that this is true. In fact I'd argue that this concept of "continuity" is incoherent.

Why?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

That may depend on what other word you want to change it too. Specifically, it had better not be a word which eliminates all references to subjectivity and the subject itself.

I see your point. Somehow, this "minimal self" has to be the foundation of the "narrative self". Yes, it is interesting, now I understand better why they used that term.

Advaita Vedanta, and even Zen have their own words for that purpose, which I consider more appropriate, but it could be just because Im feel more familiar with them.

[UndercoverElephant]

I see your point. Somehow, this "minimal self" has to be the foundation of the "relational self" (sorry, its my own word, I forgot the one you used). Yes, it is interesting, now I understand better why they used that term.

Advaita Vedanta, and even Zen have their own words for that purpose, which I consider more appropriate, but it could be just because Im feel more familiar with them.

The opening post makes clear that I am adopting Galen Strawsons's concept as the minimal self as the subject of conscious experience. It has many names. Hinduism calls it "Atman", and insists that you must strip down the narrative self before you can be properly "aware" of it.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

The opening post makes clear that I am adopting Galen Strawsons's concept as the minimal self as the subject of conscious experience. It has many names. Hinduism calls it "Atman", and insists that you must strip down the narrative self before you can be properly "aware" of it.

Thats what is puzzling for me, regarding you this is. You have the intelligence but I somehow see that you lack the will to "reach" it. Maybe you dont want, but then again, that doesnt mean you should be upset with me, does it?

[UndercoverElephant]

Thats what is puzzling for me, regarding you this is. You have the intelligence but I somehow see that you lack the will to "reach" it. Maybe you dont want, but then again, that doesnt mean you should be upset with me, does it?

There is no way for me to respond to this apart from this:

If you meet the Buddha on the road, kill him.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Have you? ;)

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

And yes. So, no more to say in this respect.

Can you recommend me more to read about the subject? I have not read the work of any of them.

[UndercoverElephant]

And yes. So, no more to say in this respect.

Can you recommend me more to read about the subject? I have not read the work of any of them.

Not read the work of any of who? Are you talking about Hindu philosophers or modern philosophers of mind?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Contemporary, alive philosophers. What were you thinking? Google helps of course, but as you are a philosopher I guess you know them personally, so you seem to be a reliable source of info regarding who is doing seriours work.

Still angry or something???

[chriswl]

That is what the reference to the immunity principle is about. It is something I cannot be wrong about. I might be wrong about the content, but I cannot be wrong about the "I".
The immunity principle says that what you are experiencing at this very moment is your experiences, no one else's. It doesn't guarantee that the experiences that you remember having were really yours. What can it mean anyway, to say that the minimal self that experienced the things you remember is the same minimal self that is experiencing things right now? How do you make the comparison. Minimal selves aren't personal in that way, they only seem to be defined by what they experience.

Chris: If the minimal self has a continuity that is separate from memory then we can never know that this is true. In fact I'd argue that this concept of "continuity" is incoherent.

Geoff: Why?
Because I think all the feeling of continuity comes from the narrative self, not the minimal self which as you said "has no real sense of past or future".

Put it this way, continuity implies that the minimal-self experiences events that are ordered in a particular sequence. If it makes as much sense to say that we subjectively experienced our lives backwards instead of forwards (or even that we experience days in a random order) then our intuition of continuity would be in doubt. But actually, I think we can claim that the "real" experienced order of events is arbitrary.

Imagine experiencing a world where time ran backwards. Actually, we couldn't tell the difference if everything was reversed. The way we can tell the past from the future is that we have memories of one and not the other. At any given moment we would have knowledge of the (actual) past and ignorance of the (actual) future. Whether the "next" moment in line to be experienced was from the past or the future would make no difference to how we experienced the "now". We can imagine consciousness alighting on these nows in any order, perhaps experiencing some repetitively, and avoiding others completely. We can never know anything about the particular sequence of experiences. We can't actually experience the sequence, just the individual moments, so in what sense can the sequence be said to be real? There are just moments, linked by memory and other psychological states.

[UndercoverElephant]

Contemporary, alive philosophers. What were you thinking? Google helps of course, but as you are a philosopher I guess you know them personally, so you seem to be a reliable source of info regarding who is doing seriours work.

Still angry or something???

I am not sure whether you are asking me to point you to spiritual teachers or philosophers. If it is the former, then go here:

http://www.well.com/~jct/

If the latter, go here:

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195056442/102-2832524-8208962?v=glance&n=283155

or here:

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/DRPC.htm

[UndercoverElephant]

The immunity principle says that what you are experiencing at this very moment is your experiences, no one else's. It doesn't guarantee that the experiences that you remember having were really yours. What can it mean anyway, to say that the minimal self that experienced the things you remember is the same minimal self that is experiencing things right now? How do you make the comparison. Minimal selves aren't personal in that way, they only seem to be defined by what they experience.


I still don't understand why there need be more than one minimal self. My minimal self is not defined by what it experiences. It is defined as the thing which is the subject of those experiences. There are not the same.


Because I think all the feeling of continuity comes from the narrative self, not the minimal self which as you said "has no real sense of past or future".

Put it this way, continuity implies that the minimal-self experiences events that are ordered in a particular sequence. If it makes as much sense to say that we subjectively experienced our lives backwards instead of forwards (or even that we experience days in a random order) then our intuition of continuity would be in doubt. But actually, I think we can claim that the "real" experienced order of events is arbitrary.


This doesn't invalidate the idea of a continuous minimal self. What you are talking about is central to Kant's theory of causality - that we have to experience empirical causality, that time is a mode of our cognition. I don't see what it has to do with the fact that there is always a subject of experience.


Imagine experiencing a world where time ran backwards. Actually, we couldn't tell the difference if everything was reversed. The way we can tell the past from the future is that we have memories of one and not the other. At any given moment we would have knowledge of the (actual) past and ignorance of the (actual) future. Whether the "next" moment in line to be experienced was from the past or the future would make no difference to how we experienced the "now". We can imagine consciousness alighting on these nows in any order, perhaps experiencing some repetitively, and avoiding others completely. We can never know anything about the particular sequence of experiences. We can't actually experience the sequence, just the individual moments, so in what sense can it be said to be real? There are just moments, linked by memory and other psychological states.

I think you are confusing the first and third person perspective. If you try to objectify the self, then you will see it as a series of events existing in time. But from the first-person perspective itself, there is merely an ever-present NOW. Even when we are thinking about the past, it is NOW that we are doing the thinking. Therefore even at this point, it is the narrative self that constructs the sense of the past and the future - but nothing changes the continuousness of the minimal self. When is it not present?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Spiritual teachers???? LOL :D thanks! Yes, I dont know anything about anything, thanks for the vote of confidence!!!

Or were you trying to be sarcastic? I have problems to understand that humor. Your last link is something like what I was asking anyway, so thanks.

[UndercoverElephant]

Your last link is something like what I was asking anyway, so thanks.

Well, in that case it is indeed somebody I know personally.

[Robin]

To confuse these two things would be to fail to distinguish between Chalmers hard and easy problems of consciousness.
I have asked before and nobody has been able to answer – just what precisely is the “hard problem of consciousness”?

[UndercoverElephant]

I have asked before and nobody has been able to answer – just what precisely is the “hard problem of consciousness”?

Chalmers invented the term "hard problem" to distinguish between the problem of explaining which bits of brain activity correspond to which bits of mental activity (and a whole load of other "easy" problems which aren't easy but aren't impossible either) and the problem of explaining why there are such things as "minds" at all. The first problem is theoretically answerable by science, the second looks suspiciously conceptual/metaphysical/ontological/philosophical.

[chriswl]

I still don't understand why there need be more than one minimal self. My minimal self is not defined by what it experiences. It is defined as the thing which is the subject of those experiences.
It's defined by what it experiences in the sense that it is nothing more than the experience of those things. What is it about that subject that makes it constant from one experience to the other? It's a pure subject and that's it (a nothingness, as Sartre would have said). Only its participation in the narrative self ties it into anything continuous.

I think you are confusing the first and third person perspective. If you try to objectify the self, then you will see it as a series of events existing in time.
I'm trying to get at what you mean when you say our minimal consciousness is continuous, above and beyond the fact that we have a narrative self that we are conscious of. As far as I can see that claim is completely empty, it has no implications at all. We can't tell the difference between it being true and it not being true. At every moment we experience our narrative self which assures us that we do in fact have a continuous conscious existence. You seem to be going beyond this and saying that we also apprehend this truth in a more direct way through the very fact of our consciousness. Well, I don't think I experience that.

But from the first-person perspective itself, there is merely an ever-present NOW. Even when we are thinking about the past, it is NOW that we are doing the thinking.
We could be just re-using the label NOW for a succession of different events. I can see how, over a period of a second or two there is a feeling of continuity, otherwise we could not directly experience motion or any change at all. If I swing my racquet at a tennis ball the entire movement seems like a single continuous experience. But the entire game is only a continuous experience for me because of my memory. It is not one big indivisible NOW.

[UndercoverElephant]

It's defined by what it experiences in the sense that it is nothing more than the experience of those things. What is it about that subject that makes it constant from one experience to the other? It's a pure subject and that's it (a nothingness, as Sartre would have said). Only its participation in the narrative self ties it into anything continuous.


...but the narrative self is a fiction!?


I'm trying to get at what you mean when you say our minimal consciousness is continuous, above and beyond the fact that we have a narrative self that we are conscious of.


I am saying that prior to being concious of a narrative self our australopethicine ancestors were merely concious of objects. They were not self-conscious. Our own minimal selves are no less continuous than those of australopithecus (or my cat).


As far as I can see that claim is completely empty, it has no implications at all. We can't tell the difference between it being true and it not being true. At every moment we experience our narrative self which assures us that we do in fact have a continuous conscious existence.


I disagree. There are many occasions when we become lost in the moment and lose any sense of self-consciousness or narrative self.


You seem to be going beyond this and saying that we also apprehend this truth in a more direct way through the very fact of our consciousness. Well, I don't think I experience that.


I never mentioned "truth".

[chriswl]

...but the narrative self is a fiction!?
I wouldn't say that. Not all stories are fictional.

I am saying that prior to being concious of a narrative self our australopethicine ancestors were merely concious of objects. They were not self-conscious. Our own minimal selves are no less continuous than those of australopithecus (or my cat).
I agree up until the bit where you say they are continuous. Gallagher says it perfectly for me:

“This is a momentary self without long-term continuity, and thus, without a history – a ‘bare locus of consciousness, void of personality’”.

I still don't understand your objection to that.

I disagree. There are many occasions when we become lost in the moment and lose any sense of self-consciousness or narrative self.
Yes, but at those moments are we aware of any long-term continuity?

[Robin]

Chalmers invented the term "hard problem" to distinguish between the problem of explaining which bits of brain activity correspond to which bits of mental activity (and a whole load of other "easy" problems which aren't easy but aren't impossible either) and the problem of explaining why there are such things as "minds" at all. The first problem is theoretically answerable by science, the second looks suspiciously conceptual/metaphysical/ontological/philosophical.
But you could ask why of anything at all - it is open ended. Why are there slugs? Why are there quarks?

So there is an easy and hard problem of everything. We could have the easy and hard question of gravity. Why is there gravity at all?

What is so special about consciousness in this respect?

[UndercoverElephant]

But you could ask why of anything at all - it is open ended. Why are there slugs? Why are there quarks?

So there is an easy and hard problem of everything. We could have the easy and hard question of gravity. Why is there gravity at all?

What is so special about consciousness in this respect?

http://esophy.com/consciousnessplacenature.html



“Newtonian science reveals no causal nexus by which gravitation works, for example; rather, the relevant laws are simply fundamental. The same goes for basic laws in other physical theories. And the same, presumably, applies to fundamental psychophysical laws: there is no need for a causal nexus distinct from the physical and mental properties themselves.”

[David Chalmers]

From Newton’s point of view gravity has the capacity to effect things both instantaneously and at distance, something for which Newton had no explanation, and about which he (usually) refused to even speculate. So could the mysterious interactionist mechanisms be no more mysterious than gravity? It might be pointed out that gravity remains mysterious to this day, modern physics having failed to produce a quantum theory of gravity even though such a theory has been sought for nearly a century - but our failure to resolve the relationship (or “causal nexus”) between quantum mechanics and gravity doesn’t seem to be such a great problem; we simply accept that we are yet to understand how these things are related and that some future theory will yet unite them. Why should the relationship between physical and mental things be any different?

Whilst it is true that Newton’s theories leave the mechanism by which gravity “causes” things unspecified, it is still the case that the action of gravity belongs unmistakably in the domain of the physical. The same cannot be said of qualia or of mental causation. So I don’t think that we can use examples of currently “unconnectable” physical theories to downplay the intractability of trying to connect the Cartesian mental and physical realms.

The obvious temptation here is to turn to quantum mechanics, which does appear to offer a potential bridge of this sort because it already challenges earlier physical theories at the point of observation. It seems to allow for the possibility of mental things affecting physical things at the point of the “collapse of the wave function”, thus allowing for mental --> physical interaction without contradicting physics. While this is conceptually possible, I think the biggest problem is that most of the people who reject materialism because of QM do not turn to traditional type-D dualism in response, because most non-materialistic interpretations of QM do not suggest type-D dualism. Nearly all of the founders of QM were either idealists or neutral monists.

[UndercoverElephant]

I wouldn't say that. Not all stories are fictional.



Surely our own narratives are fictional?


I agree up until the bit where you say they are continuous. Gallagher says it perfectly for me:

“This is a momentary self without long-term continuity, and thus, without a history – a ‘bare locus of consciousness, void of personality’”.

I still don't understand your objection to that.


The second part is a quote from Strawson, which I do not contest. My problem is with the claim there are lots of momentary minimal selves rather than one continuous one.



Yes, but at those moments are we aware of any long-term continuity?

No. We are not self-aware. But there is a continuity of awareness regardless.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Whilst it is true that Newton’s theories leave the mechanism by which gravity “causes” things unspecified, it is still the case that the action of gravity belongs unmistakably in the domain of the physical. The same cannot be said of qualia or of mental causation.
Can you spell "just so"? Why is gravity unmistakably in the domain of the physical? Why can't we say the same of mental things?

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

It's an interesting question. The answer may depend on universe vs multiverse, huh? Which one is correct, Paul?

[chriswl]

Surely our own narratives are fictional?
But, in as far as we are not mistaken, they are true. True stories are not really fictional (fictionalised, perhaps?)

No. We are not self-aware. But there is a continuity of awareness regardless.
There is a continiuity of awareness but we are not actually directly aware of this continuity? So we are not talking about a subjective, first-person thing. There is no feeling of the continuity of our awareness. You must mean that our awareness is objectively continuous. But how can this be, our awareness does not exist as an objective thing?

Unless you are simply saying that because at every moment, we have this minimal consciousness, we can in a sense call it continuous. But you still haven't answered the question of why we can say it is one thing that persists and not many different things? If the minimal self has no concept of time then it seems obvious to me that it has no way of making that distinction, no way that it can know about its previous experiences (assuming they are its own previous experiences).

[UndercoverElephant]

There is a continiuity of awareness but we are not actually directly aware of this continuity?


Something like that, yes.



So we are not talking about a subjective, first-person thing. There is no feeling of the continuity of our awareness.


No, I wouldn't describe it as "a feeling of continuity". It is more fundamental than that.


You must mean that our awareness is objectively continuous. But how can this be, our awareness does not exist as an objective thing?


I am not sure what you mean by "objectively continuous". It is not continuous in the sense that spatio-temporal objects seem to have a continuous existence, no.


Unless you are simply saying that because at every moment, we have this minimal consciousness, we can in a sense call it continuous.


I'd prefer to use the term "minimal self", but basically yes.


But you still haven't answered the question of why we can say it is one thing that persists and not many different things?


I have no idea why anyone would claim there are many different subjects of experience. Whenever we are conscious, there is a subject. There is also always only one of them. So why posit that there are many? You are asking me to prove that X is not many things when we have no reason to believe that X is many things. If you want to suggest there are multiple minimal selves then the burden of proof is on you to explain why we need more than one.


If the minimal self has no concept of time then it seems obvious to me that it has no way of making that distinction, no way that it can know about its previous experiences (assuming they are its own previous experiences).

"It" doesn't make this distinction. The narrative self does this - it happens during our thought processes about "ourselves".

[UndercoverElephant]

Can you spell "just so"? Why is gravity unmistakably in the domain of the physical? Why can't we say the same of mental things?

~~ Paul

Because nothing about it is subjective. Gravity is the name of a force which acts between physical objects. That's why it is unmistakably physical. If there were no things with minds, there would still be gravity, would there not? The same cannot be said of anything we normally identify as "mental".

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Because nothing about it is subjective. Gravity is the name of a force which acts between physical objects. That's why it is unmistakably physical. If there were no things with minds, there would still be gravity, would there not? The same cannot be said of anything we normally identify as "mental".
No idea whether there would still be gravity if there were no minds. Maybe it's controlled by the mindful god of intelligent falling, but we just can't tell.

Indeed, if there were no things with mental capacity, then there would be no minds. Similarly, if there were no furry things, then there would be no fur.

~~ Paul

[UndercoverElephant]

No idea whether there would still be gravity if there were no minds.


So you don't think the Earth would still orbit the sun if every concious creature ceased to exist? Are you sure about that?


Maybe it's controlled by the mindful god of intelligent falling, but we just can't tell.


Is this supposed to be a serious argument?

[chriswl]

No, I wouldn't describe it as "a feeling of continuity". It is more fundamental than that.

I am not sure what you mean by "objectively continuous". It is not continuous in the sense that spatio-temporal objects seem to have a continuous existence, no.
We can't subjectively experience it and it doesn't objectively exist either. I'd say that means it doesn't exist. You're not even trying to justify your position - you just assert that the minimal self has continuity, while implicitly contradicting that in other sentences. I understand that we habitually think of the minimal self in this way, but does that mean it must be true? Does your philosophy allow any higher authority than gut intuition? If something just seems right it must always be right, whatever facts or logic say (they can always be finessed with a clever enough argument) is that it? That would be a position that prevents you from ever discovering new things or being surprised. All you could ever do is develop ever more refined arguments in favour of what you believe now.

I have no idea why anyone would claim there are many different subjects of experience. Whenever we are conscious, there is a subject. There is also always only one of them.
At any given moment there is only one, of course, but that's not the question, is it? The claim is that the minimal self, which is our most basic, fundamental sort of consciousness, actually lacks something that we would have thought to be fundamental to consciousness - a sense of continuous existence in time. "I think therefore I am" can only refer to this instant in time. We can't say "I thought therefore I was". This is important because it makes Descartes's cogito (and other stuff that derives from it like phenomenology) a far less sturdy foundation for philosophy than people often suppose.

[UndercoverElephant]

We can't subjectively experience it and it doesn't objectively exist either.


Does the fact that you cannot take a picture of the camera which is taking the picture lead to the claim that the camera which is taking the picture does not exist? We cannot experience the thing which is doing the experiencing.


I'd say that means it doesn't exist.


In a way, this is correct. "Existence" is not a predicate that can be attached to it. Because the minimal self is minimal, this would end up being a claim of "Existence exists" - which is a category error.


At any given moment there is only one, of course, but that's not the question, is it? The claim is that the minimal self, which is our most basic, fundamental sort of consciousness, actually lacks something that we would have thought to be fundamental to consciousness - a sense of continuous existence in time.


Why would we have thought that?


"I think therefore I am" can only refer to this instant in time.


Why? I don't see any reason why this follows.


We can't say "I thought therefore I was".


Why not? Sounds perfectly reasonable to me.

[hammegk]

In a way, this is correct. "Existence" is not a predicate that can be attached to it. Because the minimal self is minimal, this would end up being a claim of "Existence exists" - which is a category error.
I'd suggest that's a linguistics problem. How about "Existence is."?


Why not? Sounds perfectly reasonable to me.
Without that attribute how could the narrative self be said to exist? And note that drawing the line where narrative self disappears is no easier than drawing the line that divides the physicalists' non-life from life.

[UndercoverElephant]

I'd suggest that's a linguistics problem. How about "Existence is."?


Is is? :con2:



Without that attribute how could the narrative self be said to exist? And note that drawing the line where narrative self disappears is no easier than drawing the line that divides the physicalists' non-life from life.

The narrative self is a fiction. Apart from that, I don't understand the question.

[hammegk]

Is is?
Hmm. You prefer "Is Isn't"?

LOL. May so. mu



The narrative self is a fiction. Apart from that, I don't understand the question.
Agreeing that narrative selves are fiction, my question addresses the requisite complexity of a perceived-as-physical existent before that fiction occurs. Now we enter the realm of Time, perhaps?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

No, I wouldn't describe it as "a feeling of continuity". It is more fundamental than that.


LOL, now the man talks exactly like I do, yet, has the guts to be angry at me! of insulting me! Wow, Im perplexed. Unless, yes! thats it! He was expressing his admiration, but wanted all the glory for himself! without shadows following his steps!

Im delighted. :D

Seriously Geoff. Nice work. Completely irrelevant for anyone, but thats another matter.

[chriswl]

Chris: "I think therefore I am" can only refer to this instant in time.

Geoff: Why? I don't see any reason why this follows.
Because the "thinking" that Descartes assumed he could be absolutely certain he was engaged in was the thinking at that moment. He knew that at the very instant that he questioned whether he was thinking he was, indeed, thinking.

Chris: We can't say "I thought therefore I was".

Geoff: Why not? Sounds perfectly reasonable to me.
The idea that we have been conscious all our lives up until this moment is a very reasonable idea. But it is not beyond doubt, in the same way that my being conscious at this moment is beyond doubt. If we want to build on the certainty of "I think therefore I am" and provide certainty about our past consciousness then we need some way of establishing that our memories are memories of real past experiences.

[UndercoverElephant]

Hmm. You prefer "Is Isn't"?


Absolutely! :D

http://www.peaceful-spirit.org/images/yin-yang1.jpg

Is isn't.

[UndercoverElephant]

hammegk

http://www.victorshepherd.on.ca/Course/Philosophy/philosophy_for_understanding_theology13.htm


What, then, does Tillich mean when he says God doesn't "exist"? Is being-itself less real than any being?


Paul Tillich:

http://www.theology.ie/theologians/tillich.htm
http://www.religion-online.org/showbook.asp?title=1630

Geoff

[UndercoverElephant]

Because the "thinking" that Descartes assumed he could be absolutely certain he was engaged in was the thinking at that moment. He knew that at the very instant that he questioned whether he was thinking he was, indeed, thinking.


My problem with this is that it is the very act of thinking (in language) which sets up the narrative self.


The idea that we have been conscious all our lives up until this moment is a very reasonable idea. But it is not beyond doubt, in the same way that my being conscious at this moment is beyond doubt. If we want to build on the certainty of "I think therefore I am" and provide certainty about our past consciousness then we need some way of establishing that our memories are memories of real past experiences.

So the act of thinking about our lives in language leads to the construction of a narrative self. I think it all depends on the exact usage of the first person pronoun. This is what the discussion about the immunity principle was about. When you say "I" you can use it to mean "my minimal self - the subject of my conscious experiences" or you can use it to mean "Chris - this person - this body - and all that it has lived".

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Is ain't.

~~ Paul

[Robin]

http://esophy.com/consciousnessplacenature.html
I am not sure why the subject of gaps in scientific knowledge is brought up here. Since you framed the HPC as a "why" question this would not be relevant. Even if we had all the knowledge about the "how" it would not help us with the "why".

Also I can't see that metaphysics has any bearing either. Switching your metaphysic does not help with "why" questions. If the question "why are there minds at all?" is intractable in the materialist metaphysic is does not become answerable by switching to Dualism or Idealism or any other metaphysic. (Non materialism does not guarantee purpose, and materialism is not necessarily inconsistent with purpose).

So the question "why is there gravity at all?" is still equivalent to "why are there minds at all?"

In general this seems to suggest that the HPC is not so much hard as imprecisely framed. It is not necessarily a problem that we don't know the "why" of something. It only becomes a problem if you know of a good reason why not.

Do you know of any good reason why there should not be minds?

[Robin]

It's always "now" for my cat, but he has no narrative self.
How do you know? It seems that a cat says "this person gave me food before, so I will try him again". Or "I left a mouse in this corner, I will go and get it now"
If there was only "now" a cat could not do these things. Also have you seen a cat in a new house? It will explore every corner of every room on first entering the house. In case of trouble it already knows of a bolt hole where it will not be found. So a cat appears to have a past, present and future and tells itself stories about this.

By the way, if the narrative self is a fiction, who is the author?

[UndercoverElephant]

How do you know? It seems that a cat says "this person gave me food before, so I will try him again".


You think he says that to himself? You think cats talk to themselves? Does he think in English? Or do cats have a silent thinking-language?



If there was only "now" a cat could not do these things.


A cat cannot do those thing (talk, that is). I am not saying that animals do not have memories. Squirrels can remember the location of thousands of buried nuts, for example. But I do not think this means they have a narrative self or any real conception of the past or the future. They just "know" where the nuts are.


By the way, if the narrative self is a fiction, who is the author?

Good question. :)

[UndercoverElephant]

I am not sure why the subject of gaps in scientific knowledge is brought up here. Since you framed the HPC as a "why" question this would not be relevant. Even if we had all the knowledge about the "how" it would not help us with the "why".

Also I can't see that metaphysics has any bearing either. Switching your metaphysic does not help with "why" questions. If the question "why are there minds at all?" is intractable in the materialist metaphysic is does not become answerable by switching to Dualism or Idealism or any other metaphysic. (Non materialism does not guarantee purpose, and materialism is not necessarily inconsistent with purpose).

So the question "why is there gravity at all?" is still equivalent to "why are there minds at all?"


I don't agree. There is a question "Why is there anything at all?", of which all the other are a subcategory, but the question "Why are there minds at all?" has an implied supposition i.e. it really meant "Why are there minds in addition to the physical Universe, which we have implicitly assumed self-exists."



In general this seems to suggest that the HPC is not so much hard as imprecisely framed.


More like our concepts of mind and matter are both inadequate as things currently stand....


Do you know of any good reason why there should not be minds?

Not until one makes the claim that the physical universe self-exists and is all that exists. Only then is there a good reason why there should not be minds. It looks like p-zombies should be possible, but most people are convinced that this must be wrong. So it looks like there is something wrong with our current concepts of mind and/or matter because as things currently stand they allow something to seem possible which can't be possible.

[Ducky]

My philosophical conception of self :

I'm Batman.

[Robin]

I don't agree. There is a question "Why is there anything at all?", of which all the other are a subcategory, but the question "Why are there minds at all?" has an implied supposition i.e. it really meant "Why are there minds in addition to the physical Universe, which we have implicitly assumed self-exists."
What is your definition of “physical”?
Not until one makes the claim that the physical universe self-exists and is all that exists. Only then is there a good reason why there should not be minds.
OK, then tell me what that good reason is.
It looks like p-zombies should be possible, but most people are convinced that this must be wrong.
I imagine that most people that consider the idea will be convinced that p-zombies are possible but that we are not p-zombies – which we are clearly not.

You see the problem is not what materialists have implicitly assumed but what you have implicitly assumed. You have simply assumed that it is not possible for the mind to be a physical thing.

You need to work up some justification for that assumption, and a good starting point would be a definition of “physical”.

[Robin]

You think he says that to himself? You think cats talk to themselves? Does he think in English? Or do cats have a silent thinking-language?
Of course – just as we do. Do you think that a narrative must be verbal? Think of eating your favourite meal. Did you think of it in terms of words or in terms of remembered sense data? Think standing in a field in a cold day, and someone throws a ball, and you run and catch it. Do you describe this scene to yourself linguistically? Or do you describe it to yourself in images and remembered sense data?
A cat cannot do those thing (talk, that is).
But as I have just established narrative does not need to be verbal. Have you never watched a cat asleep and twitching as though it was dreaming? It probably really is dreaming.

Does you cat never mew at the back door to get out? Do you think that your cat really has no concept of what is on the other side of that door, or what it will do when it gets there? If your cat mews at the back door then it has a plan. It has a narrative.

People always seem to make the mistake that we are categorically unique among animals, or that the similarities we have with other mammals end sharply with the mind.

[UndercoverElephant]

Of course – just as we do.


There's no "of course" about that. You have made a claim which would be disputed by most cognitive scientists and most philosophers.


Do you think that a narrative must be verbal?


Yes.


Think of eating your favourite meal. Did you think of it in terms of words or in terms of remembered sense data?


Both.

Sometimes we do not even "think". When an ant pushes along a morsel of food, does it think "Here's some food, I'll push it home."? I doubt it. And when I see a scantily clad young lady walk past, I don't think "There's a cute young thing." - I react on the level of the ant instead. But that isn't part of the narrative.


Think standing in a field in a cold day, and someone throws a ball, and you run and catch it. Do you describe this scene to yourself linguistically? Or do you describe it to yourself in images and remembered sense data?

But as I have just established narrative does not need to be verbal. Have you never watched a cat asleep and twitching as though it was dreaming? It probably really is dreaming.


Sure, no narrative self involved. I am certain that cats, dogs and pigs all dream, for the reasons you stated.


Does you cat never mew at the back door to get out?


The front door, continually.


Do you think that your cat really has no concept of what is on the other side of that door, or what it will do when it gets there? If your cat mews at the back door then it has a plan. It has a narrative.


No, the cat has merely got a memory. So has an ant.

[UndercoverElephant]

What is your definition of “physical”?


My definition of physical isn't the problem. It is the physicalists definition of physical which has got problems - because they cannot define it. I spent 45 pages demonstrating that physicalists can't coherently define physical and also define anything mental.

You tell me what your definition of physical is and I'll tell you why it doesn't work unless you are going to deny the existence of minds. I think we may have been here before......


OK, then tell me what that good reason is.


Do we really have to have a rerun of the thread where all the materialists flap around trying to define "physical" without denying their minds exists and merely succeed in tying themselves in logical knots for 45 pages?



I imagine that most people that consider the idea will be convinced that p-zombies are possible but that we are not p-zombies – which we are clearly not.


If you admit they are possible, I think you are in logical trouble.



You see the problem is not what materialists have implicitly assumed but what you have implicitly assumed. You have simply assumed that it is not possible for the mind to be a physical thing.



At least that is the mistaken belief of just about every materialist I talk to. They appear to be quite incapable of figuring out that is they and not I who have assumed their conclusion. I have assumed NOTHING.


You need to work up some justification for that assumption, and a good starting point would be a definition of “physical”.

Yep - you just go ahead.

Define:

Objective
Subjective
Physical
Mental

I cannot believe I am having to do this all over again. Anyone who understood that monster thread will surely not be silly enough to make the same mistakes all over again? Or would they?

[Giz]

People always seem to make the mistake that we are categorically unique among animals, or that the similarities we have with other mammals end sharply with the mind.

Yep, one would assume - given evolution - that there would be a continuum* of cognition observed. In which case what hope for any non-physical explanation for the human mind?


*(or just very very many discrete stages)

[UndercoverElephant]

Robin,

Sorry if that last reply was a bit weary. There is, as you probably know, a big argument going on in cognitive science. There is a hardcore of people who are still trying to defend the old reductionist physicalist theories of mind, whilst at the same time (in the past 15-20 years) there has been a whole new movement of people who have basically called time on the whole enterprise of trying to defend traditional functionalism. It has failed. The remaining hardcore, which is represented by Dennett and the eliminativists, continues to try to make out there is no problem.

Next week I have to present a paper which summarises the current state of play very nicely indeed. It is written by Thomas Nagel and is available online:

http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1172/conceiving.pdf

Some highlights:


Intuitions based on the first-person perspective can easily mislead us about what is and is
not conceivable.1 This point is usually made in support of familiar reductionist positions on the mind-body problem, but I believe it can be detached from that approach. It seems to me that the powerful appearance of contingency in the relation between the functioning of the physical organism and the conscious mind -- an appearance that depends directly or indirectly on the firs person perspective -- must be an illusion. But the denial of this contingency should not take the form of a reductionist account of consciousness of the usual type, whereby the logical gap between the mental and the physical is closed by conceptual analysis -- in effect, by analyzing the mental in terms of the physical (however elaborately this is done -- and I count functionalism as such a theory, along with the topic-neutral causal role analyses of mental concepts from which
it descends).

In other words, I believe that there is a necessary connection in both directions between
the physical and the mental, but that it cannot be discovered a priori.

So I want to propose an alternative. In our present situation, when no one has a plausible
answer to the mind-body problem, all we can really do is to try to develop various alternatives one of which may prove in the long run to be an ancestor of a credible solution.

This is a new ballgame.

The analogy with the case of mental phenomena should be clear. They too occupy causal
roles, and it has been one of the strongest arguments for some kind of physicalism that those roles may prove upon investigation to be occupied by organic processes. Yet the problem here is much more serious, for an obvious reason: Identifying sounds with waves in the air does not require that we ascribe phenomenological qualities and subjectivity to anything physical, because those are features of the perception of sound, not of sound itself. By contrast, the identification of mental events with physical events requires the unification of these two types of properties in a single thing, and that remains resistant to understanding. The causal argument for identification may make us believe that it is true, but it doesn’t help us to understand it, and in my view, we really shouldn’t believe it unless we can understand it.

I believe that as a matter of fact you can’t have one without the other, and furthermore that the powerful intuition that it is conceivable that an intact and normally functioning physical human organism could be a completely unconscious zombie is an illusion -- due to the limitations of our understanding. Nevertheless those limitations are real. We do not at present possess the conceptual equipment to understand how subjective and
physical features could both be essential aspects of a single entity or process.

If they are the same state, it must be impossible for the one to exist without the other. And while we may have good empirical reasons to believe that that is true, the understanding of such an impossibility requires that the necessity of the connection between the two become intellectually transparent to us. In the case of conscious states and physiological states, it isn’t just that we don’t see such a
necessary connection: it seems in advance that a necessary connection between two such
different things is unimaginable. They seem logically unrelated.

It is very different from trying to imagine the possibility of a physico-chemical analysis
of embryonic development, before one has the slightest inkling of what the analysis might be.

This does seem to call for some revision in our way of conceiving of mind, or matter, or
both. The difficulty is to do this without denying what is in front of your nose. What we need is not a reductionist or eliminative revision but an expansionist one. By this I mean a conception that will permit subjective points of view to have an objective physical character in themselves.

[query > maybe wrong to call it physical.]

Without such an expanded conception of the mental there is no prospect of overcoming
the explanatory gap.

[query> matter also may need an expanded conception]

The big step is the first one, of expanding the concept of experience by the recognition that what it contains explicitly -- including its behavioral or functional implications -- gives an incomplete account of the nature of experience.

Obviously we cannot will a new conceptual framework into existence. It has to result
from trying to think, in light of the evidence, about the subject we want to understand, and devising concepts that do better justice to it than the ones we have. Considered as a form of revisionism rather than analysis, the physicalist-functionalist movement in philosophy of mind might be thought to have had a similar aim, but I believe it has failed because it is too conservative: It has tried to reinterpret mental concepts so as to make them tractable parts of the framework of physical science. What is needed instead is a search for something more unfamiliar, something which starts from the conceptual unintelligibility, in its present form, of the subjective-objective link.

[Giz]

People always seem to make the mistake that we are categorically unique among animals, or that the similarities we have with other mammals end sharply with the mind.

Yep, one would assume - given evolution - that there would be a continuum* of cognition observed. In which case what hope for any non-physical explanation for the human mind?


*(or just very very many discrete stages)

[UndercoverElephant]

Yep, one would assume - given evolution - that there would be a continuum* of cognition observed. In which case what hope for any non-physical explanation for the human mind?


I think this is the essence of the difficulty that materialists have in accepting the possiblity that materialism might be false. It looks like consciousness is a property of evolved creatures, therefore non-physical explanations for the mind are unintelligable. I believe there are other ways to look at the situation.

[Giz]

I think this is the essence of the difficulty that materialists have in accepting the possiblity that materialism might be false. It looks like consciousness is a property of evolved creatures, therefore non-physical explanations for the mind are unintelligable. I believe there are other ways to look at the situation.

Why do you think that playing word games is a better way to understanding than science?

[Robin]

There's no "of course" about that. You have made a claim which would be disputed by most cognitive scientists and most philosophers.
Just no cognitive scientist I have ever heard of. I don’t know of any cognitive scientist who ignores the rather obvious truth that when we remember or plan to perform some physical action we do not do so verbally, but with remembered sense data.
Yes.
Well let me ask you to plan to go and eat your favourite meal. What is the word or phrase that adequately describes the experience that you are about to have? Does “yummy” do it for you? What about “scrummy”? No?

If you cannot supply that adequate word or phrase then the most important part of your narrative is non-verbal. On the other hand if there is some word or phrase that adequately describes the experience of your favourite meal then you really need to get out more.
Both.
But you could plan a complete evening only with remembered sense data, without using a single verbal construct. But it would be impossible to plan a complete evening with only verbal constructs.
Sometimes we do not even "think". When an ant pushes along a morsel of food, does it think "Here's some food, I'll push it home."? I doubt it. And when I see a scantily clad young lady walk past, I don't think "There's a cute young thing." - I react on the level of the ant instead. But that isn't part of the narrative.
Most likely you will imagine yourself in some situation involving her. If narrative means anything at all then this must be a narrative. And I seriously doubt that there is any verbal construct that can adequately encompass this narrative. The verbal narrative is at best secondary.

Someone who fumbles for the right word for any situation has as rich a narrative as the greatest poet in the world. The poet is simply better at verbalising the narrative.
Sure, no narrative self involved. I am certain that cats, dogs and pigs all dream, for the reasons you stated.
Dreams aren’t narrative? Do you mean that only the “now” is encompassed in dreams?
No, the cat has merely got a memory. So has an ant.
I don’t know if an ant has a memory. But a cat has a narrative in addition to a memory as I have shown. Sure a cat’s narrative is not as complex as our own, but a narrative nonetheless.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Do we really have to have a rerun of the thread where all the materialists flap around trying to define "physical" without denying their minds exists and merely succeed in tying themselves in logical knots for 45 pages?

Again, there are no materialists in the forum! You should wake up from this cruzade of yours. Ian attempts to do the same all the time, true, without a single good argument, but still he fights the same war you are trying to fight; One without oponents!!!

People in here deals with the logic of your arguments, and confront you with classical arguments regarding some materialists claims. But no one, not a single individual has claimed to be "a materialist".

Wake up! :D

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

"We do not at present possess the conceptual equipment to understand how subjective and physical features could both be essential aspects of a single entity or process."

Says who?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I don’t know if an ant has a memory. But a cat has a narrative in addition to a memory as I have shown. Sure a cat’s narrative is not as complex as our own, but a narrative nonetheless.

Geoff:

You should be able to explain why a cat has no narrative, otherwise, you are falling in to a wishfull thinking, and not doing philosophy.

[Robin]

My definition of physical isn't the problem. It is the physicalists definition of physical which has got problems - because they cannot define it. I spent 45 pages demonstrating that physicalists can't coherently define physical and also define anything mental.
I have spent many more than 45 pages arguing exactly the same thing. But the problem is that this does not just mean that materialism is meaningless but also that the term “dualism” is meaningless. Also “Idealism”. In fact it appears to render any metaphysics whatsoever rather pointless.
You tell me what your definition of physical is and I'll tell you why it doesn't work unless you are going to deny the existence of minds. I think we may have been here before......
Well I have asked the question many times and most people seem to think that it has something to do with those phenomena that are amenable to study by science.

Now if this is so then it would have to be some theoretical situation in which all the science that can be done has been done. And any such convergence of science would mean that there was a mathematical model for any phenomenon that was capable of being described by a mathematical model. Now science also allows that some phenomena might be genuinely arbitrary.

So from this a working definition of physical might be:

Physical(x) <=> ( ~Mathematisable(x) => Arbitrary(x) )

(Where “Mathematisable” means that there is a mathematical model that describes x).

This, as I say, from the general consensus of the immaterialist, materialists and others in this and other forums.

Now it appears to me to be perfectly coherent that the mind might contain only elements that can be described by some mathematical model and elements that are arbitrary and nothing else besides, so from this definition a purely physical mind does not involve any contradiction at all.

Now it would be simply impossible to do something complex like “think” unless there was some underlying order to our minds. So whatever stuff our minds are made of we know at least that it has order.
Do we really have to have a rerun of the thread where all the materialists flap around trying to define "physical" without denying their minds exists and merely succeed in tying themselves in logical knots for 45 pages?
No. I asked you what you understood by the term “hard problem of consciousness”. You defined it in terms of the physical/mental dichotomy. It is perfectly reasonable for me to ask you what you believed physical means in this context.
If you admit they are possible, I think you are in logical trouble.
I don’t see how. In fact it appears possible that we will be able to manufacture p-zombies in the not-too-distant future.
At least that is the mistaken belief of just about every materialist I talk to. They appear to be quite incapable of figuring out that is they and not I who have assumed their conclusion. I have assumed NOTHING.
You have assumed that there is a dichotomy between the physical and the mental.
Yep - you just go ahead.

Define:

Objective
Subjective
Physical
Mental

I cannot believe I am having to do this all over again. Anyone who understood that monster thread will surely not be silly enough to make the same mistakes all over again? Or would they?
It seems that you used these terms before I did. So why is it my job to define them? My position is that there is no “hard problem of consciousness”, only an “imprecisely defined problem of consciousness”. The fact that the problem is defined in terms of these words and you agree they have no precise meaning seems to suggest there is no hard problem of consciousness.

Only a semantic confusion.

[UndercoverElephant]

I have spent many more than 45 pages arguing exactly the same thing. But the problem is that this does not just mean that materialism is meaningless but also that the term “dualism” is meaningless. Also “Idealism”.


No, just because materialism is incoherent, it does not follow that all metaphysics is incoherent. Physicalists cannot define physical. It does not follow that dualists cannot define physical. They can.


In fact it appears to render any metaphysics whatsoever rather pointless.


No, it renders some metaphysics incoherent.


Well I have asked the question many times and most people seem to think that it has something to do with those phenomena that are amenable to study by science.


Well then, "most people" don't understand the philosophical difficulties in defining what "science" means. It's not this easy.


Now if this is so then it would have to be some theoretical situation in which all the science that can be done has been done. And any such convergence of science would mean that there was a mathematical model for any phenomenon that was capable of being described by a mathematical model. Now science also allows that some phenomena might be genuinely arbitrary.

So from this a working definition of physical might be:

Physical(x) <=> ( ~Mathematisable(x) => Arbitrary(x) )

(Where “Mathematisable” means that there is a mathematical model that describes x).

This, as I say, from the general consensus of the immaterialist, materialists and others in this and other forums.


What you are describing is naturalism, not materialism.


Now it appears to me to be perfectly coherent that the mind might contain only elements that can be described by some mathematical model and elements that are arbitrary and nothing else besides, so from this definition a purely physical mind does not involve any contradiction at all.


Except we have a definition of "physical" which doesn't mean physical. Sure, if you define "physical" to mean "everything" and "everything" includes "minds" then "minds are physical". This demonstrates nothing but the benefit of assuming ones conclusion.


Now it would be simply impossible to do something complex like “think” unless there was some underlying order to our minds. So whatever stuff our minds are made of we know at least that it has order.


Minds supervene on matter. Matter is orderered.


No. I asked you what you understood by the term “hard problem of consciousness”. You defined it in terms of the physical/mental dichotomy. It is perfectly reasonable for me to ask you what you believed physical means in this context.


"Physical" is used by physicalists to mean two different things. It doesn't matter whether I use it to define either one of these things, there will be a contradiction. If one uses it to define both of them then you are left with a false equivocation.


I don’t see how. In fact it appears possible that we will be able to manufacture p-zombies in the not-too-distant future.

You have assumed that there is a dichotomy between the physical and the mental.


I am mightily tired of being told I am assuming my conclusion by a bunch of people who are congenitally incapable of realising that they do this continually and I do it almost never at all. :(

I know you *think* I am assuming my conclusion. I hear you *accusing* me of assuming my conclusion. I have not assumed my conclusion. All I have done is refuse to assume yours.

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff:

You should be able to explain why a cat has no narrative, otherwise, you are falling in to a wishfull thinking, and not doing philosophy.

Cats cannot talk!!!!!! :D

[UndercoverElephant]

Says who?

Says anyone who has tried to do it?

"Mind-body problem? What mind-body problem? We see no mind-body problem!"

Saying there isn't a problem is like trying to argue you didn't eat the chocolate bar when there is chocolate all over your face. You might want to argue that there is a materialistic solution, even though it's not obvious. But don't try to argue that the solution is obvious, because then you would just be being ridiculous.

[UndercoverElephant]

Why do you think that playing word games is a better way to understanding than science?

I think that sorting out semantic and conceptual problems is more than playing word games. And it is not "better than science". Science investigates empirical problems. Philosophy investigates conceptual ones.

[chriswl]

I think this is the essence of the difficulty that materialists have in accepting the possiblity that materialism might be false. It looks like consciousness is a property of evolved creatures, therefore non-physical explanations for the mind are unintelligable. I believe there are other ways to look at the situation.
But you need a way of explaining why mental events are correlated with certain physical world observations (i.e. activity of brains) and not others (activities of weather systems or computers). Otherwise, you have just got rid of an apparently intractable problem by accepting an unsolvable mystery in its place.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

... So from this a working definition of physical might be:

Physical(x) <=> ( ~Mathematisable(x) => Arbitrary(x) )

(Where “Mathematisable” means that there is a mathematical model that describes x).

This, as I say, from the general consensus of the immaterialist, materialists and others in this and other forums.

Now it appears to me to be perfectly coherent that the mind might contain only elements that can be described by some mathematical model and elements that are arbitrary and nothing else besides, so from this definition a purely physical mind does not involve any contradiction at all.

Exactly, its more a semantic problem than a real problem. Wittgenstein anyone!?

No. I asked you what you understood by the term “hard problem of consciousness”. You defined it in terms of the physical/mental dichotomy.

The same point several of us made since the begining. In order to be a problem you have to start from a dualist point of view. But I have yet to find a dualist (and a materialist for that matter) in the forum.

You have assumed that there is a dichotomy between the physical and the mental.

Yes. Geoff, you seem the only one unaware of this.

Only a semantic confusion.

Indeed! Thats why we can call physical or mental. Its the same stuff, and Im certain that, in the end, what we think about it its irrelevant (unless we could jump from just words to a shift in perspective).

Mmm, but nevertheless is fun! ;)

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I am mightily tired of being told I am assuming my conclusion by a bunch of people who are congenitally incapable of realising that they do this continually and I do it almost never at all. :(

Ian could say EXACTLY the same (smiley and everything). Everyone is wrong except him. Right. Why is this a pattern? (yes, remember Iacchus, Lifegazer and the rest).

Maybe, just maybe, could you be wrong about this? Like you are when assuming that people disussing with you IS materialist??

I know you *think* I am assuming my conclusion. I hear you *accusing* me of assuming my conclusion. I have not assumed my conclusion. All I have done is refuse to assume yours.

But stating constantly that it is wrong. So you are the one assuming that our conclusions are wrong, even when you are unaware of them! You point all the time that the materialists of the forum are wrong, when no one, not a single individual has claimed to be a materialist! You even have accused me of not being a Buddhist and not even knowing about what Buddhism is!!! :D

[Mercutio]

Cats cannot talk!!!!!! :D
But they certainly can communicate.

I like the way you define a cat's experience as you wish, then use that experience to support your contentions. I believe you did the same with australopithecus, a page ago. I don't know whether you or Robin are right about cat narratives. I certainly would not use such a thing as an argument, though. You say that a narrative must necessarily be verbal. Fine. This assumption will lead inexorably to the conclusion you wish. I will define flight as requiring feathers, and it will lead to my conclusion that bats, insects, and airplanes do not fly.

Oh, let's see, there was one other thing I wanted to address, where was it?

Ah, yes..."Sure, but they have one and the same subject of experience." (in response to "Clearly different moments have different conscious content.") It seems very clear that there are two very different conclusions one could reach from this--A) yours, or B) the "same subject of experience" is something which we can only infer, not know directly. It is an hypothesis, one that works nicely to tie these discrete experiences into a coherent package.

Anyway...I don't think I will dive into this thread.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Cats cannot talk!!!!!! :D

How do you know? Are you certain in that cats do not have propositional attitudes? IMO, the way to answer this is to perform a series of experiments, this would be an empirical question, not metaphysics involved. Merely stating your opinion is useless, wont you agree?

[UndercoverElephant]

How do you know? Are you certain in that cats do not have propositional attitudes? IMO, the way to answer this is to perform a series of experiments, this would be an empirical question, not metaphysics involved. Merely stating your opinion is useless, wont you agree?


OK, cats can actually talk and coffee machines can actually hate me..... :rolleyes:

[UndercoverElephant]

So you are the one assuming that our conclusions are wrong......


AAAARRRRRRGGGGGGGHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!

NO! I have not done this. I have provided numerous arguments as to why materialism is wrong. None of them involved assuming my conclusion. All they involved was the lack of an a priori assumption that materialism is true. Yet it seems that every materialist on this board, including the ones who don't admit to being materialists, cannot distinguish my refusal to assume materialism is true from an assumption that it is false.

[UndercoverElephant]

But you need a way of explaining why mental events are correlated with certain physical world observations (i.e. activity of brains) and not others (activities of weather systems or computers). Otherwise, you have just got rid of an apparently intractable problem by accepting an unsolvable mystery in its place.

I never said the mystery was unsolvable. It's very hard to solve, but not neccesarily impossible. Yes, we need an explanation of why mind supervenes on matter and whether it merely supervenes on brain or supervenes more widely ("the extended mind").

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

OK, cats can actually talk and coffee machines can actually hate me..... :rolleyes:

Mm no need to jump to the opposite conclusion. Im just stating that you cant offer an "absolute answer" for the question, so your answer is merely your opinion, an act of faith, an hypothesis, and nothing else.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

AAAARRRRRRGGGGGGGHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!

:D

Yet it seems that every materialist on this board, including the ones who don't admit to being materialists, cannot distinguish my refusal to assume materialism is true from an assumption that it is false.

Who is a materialist in the forum?

[UndercoverElephant]

Who is a materialist in the forum?

Well, that's a damned good question. You, for example, defend materialism all the time. But when pushed, you won't claim to be a materialist. Same goes for Paul.

[UndercoverElephant]

You say that a narrative must necessarily be verbal. Fine.


A narrative is a story. I guess you can have some sort of non-verbal story, as in a cartoon strip with no words. Possibly even cats and australopithecines may have had a non-verbal beginnning of a narrative self, but only in humans does it reach the full-blown proportions of a full narrative self.


Ah, yes..."Sure, but they have one and the same subject of experience." (in response to "Clearly different moments have different conscious content.") It seems very clear that there are two very different conclusions one could reach from this--A) yours, or B) the "same subject of experience" is something which we can only infer, not know directly. It is an hypothesis, one that works nicely to tie these discrete experiences into a coherent package.

Anyway...I don't think I will dive into this thread.

I'm not sure A and B make that much difference. What reason would we have for believing this minimal self was anything but the same thing at all times. Nobody has provided any reason why we should think this.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Well, that's a damned good question. You, for example, defend materialism all the time. But when pushed, you won't claim to be a materialist. Same goes for Paul.

Yes. And I believe I have stated clear, even in personal messages to you, that I do it because I want to see how do you answer to common questions. I hope this is the last time I have to explain it to you!

That said, even if Im not a physicalism (nor anything that can be put in words and concepts) I have also told you that I recon the explicative power of this "doctrine". Thats all. Whats wrong about using it for daily living?

Quantum mechanics works. No doubt about it. General relativity works, again, no doubt. Still, both are irreconciliable against each other. Does that render obsolete one of the two or even both?

No.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

A narrative is a story. I guess you can have some sort of non-verbal story, as in a cartoon strip with no words. Possibly even cats and australopithecines may have had a non-verbal beginnning of a narrative self, but only in humans does it reach the full-blown proportions of a full narrative self.

That much appear to be correct. Still, one cannot state "what is like to see the world from a cat's view" that will simply not run. And even when I have proposed myself a model which resembles the narrative and minimal selfs, I can also see that the model is still very limited and speculative.

[chriswl]

I never said the mystery was unsolvable. It's very hard to solve, but not neccesarily impossible. Yes, we need an explanation of why mind supervenes on matter and whether it merely supervenes on brain or supervenes more widely ("the extended mind").
But, in the absence of that explanation, why are you so confident (or are you?) that you will discover that minds cannot supervene on computers? Or indeed that they do supervene on all human brains?

[Robin]

Cats cannot talk!!!!!! :D
A narrative does not have to be verbal!!!!!:D

[Robin]

A narrative is a story. I guess you can have some sort of non-verbal story, as in a cartoon strip with no words. Possibly even cats and australopithecines may have had a non-verbal beginnning of a narrative self, but only in humans does it reach the full-blown proportions of a full narrative self.
No, this is pure foolishness. You dodged my questions to you about this. Do you have words or phrases that are adequate to express the important experiences of your life? Do you have a word or phrase that is adequate to express the experience of a good meal (let alone something like love)?

If you cannot answer a confident "Yes" to this question then you must accept plain logic and concede that our verbal narrative is at best a very poor and inadequate approximation of our self as expressed in remembered sense data and emotion. It cannot even begin to compare.

To call the verbal narrative 'full-blown' or 'full' is to ignore all evidence and reason.

Our real narrative is non-verbal.

[Robin]

No, just because materialism is incoherent, it does not follow that all metaphysics is incoherent.
It naturally follows that if “physical” does not have (as you sometimes agree) a precise meaning then any position that defines itself in terms of physical is incoherent
Physicalists cannot define physical. It does not follow that dualists cannot define physical. They can.
Well why don’t they then? Seriously, what is this mysterious definition that you claim exists but that you won’t share?
No, it renders some metaphysics incoherent.
It renders the very concept incoherent. You can have “after the Physic” or “beyond the Physic” unless you have at least a shard of an idea of what the hell the Physic is.
Well then, "most people" don't understand the philosophical difficulties in defining what "science" means. It's not this easy.
The process of deriving testable models that reliably describe rigorous objective observation. That is the easiest part to define.
What you are describing is naturalism, not materialism.
So what is it that you think materialism is? Just what is this philosophy that you accuse us all of holding?
Except we have a definition of "physical" which doesn't mean physical.
This statement must then mean that you have a definition of physical – so what is it?
Sure, if you define "physical" to mean "everything" and "everything" includes "minds" then "minds are physical". This demonstrates nothing but the benefit of assuming ones conclusion.
Except that I didn’t define “physical” to mean “everything”.

There are many in this forum (for example Bri, Interesting Ian and ceo_esq and just about all defenders of the concept of libertarian free will) who will argue that there can be a third way between mathematisable and arbitrary.

It is common for people in this forum to claim, for example, that a free choice is not predictable in the scientific sense, but also not arbitrary.

If the above definition of “physical” means “everything”, then let’s face it, the free will debate is over.
Minds supervene on matter. Matter is orderered.
And you know this how? You claim not to be making any assumptions, but “minds supervene on matter” looks suspiciously like an assumption to me.

By the way, do you think you could ever find a physicist that will venture an opinion on what matter is?
"Physical" is used by physicalists to mean two different things. It doesn't matter whether I use it to define either one of these things, there will be a contradiction. If one uses it to define both of them then you are left with a false equivocation.
And yet when I ask what you mean when you use the word “physical” you point blank refuse to tell me (but instead ask me for a definition, which you then say is wrong).

So finally tell me – what are these definitions that physicalists allegedly use?
I am mightily tired of being told I am assuming my conclusion by a bunch of people who are congenitally incapable of realising that they do this continually and I do it almost never at all. :(
You claim for example that there is some reason why mental events cannot be physical, but then refuse to give the definition of physical you are using and the argument you are following.

So either you have this definition and argument and for some reason are not sharing it with us or you have simply assumed it.

Now put yourself in our position and ask which of these would you judge to be the correct evaluation.

And by the way, just what conclusion do you imagine I have assumed?

[Robin]

Yes. Geoff, you seem the only one unaware of this.
Or he is and does not want to concede the point. After all, if there were no mind/body problem then most, if not all, Geoff's arguments in this forum would be rendered meaningless.

[rocketdodger]

I am inclined to support chriswl over geoff. Here is why: too much "star trek."


What that means is that my notions of just what exactly my minimal and narrative self must be were pretty much thrown out the window when I imagined the following scenario:

Suppose you are stranded in space in a particularly dark area, thus the only objects you can use to get a frame of reference are the lights on your own space suit. The Enterprise, from out of your sight, tries to beam you aboard, but there is a malfunction and instead they place an identical copy of you right in front of you. Is there any way to tell, from your perspective, whether you are the original or the copy?

Without any external references that could be accessed to determine who is the original, I say no. But this seems to contradict the notion of a true continuity in the self.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Well, that's a damned good question. You, for example, defend materialism all the time. But when pushed, you won't claim to be a materialist. Same goes for Paul.
I don't defend materialism, I simply ask people why their preferred metaphysic is any better. They take this as a defense of materialism. I presume this is because down deep inside they are shouting "Oh God, anything but materialism!"

If two metaphysics explain reality equally well, then I propose that they are probably equivalent. If the nonequivalence is brought about by introducing someone's favorite "other thing," then I ask for an experiment to distinguish the two.

~~ Paul

[chriswl]

Suppose you are stranded in space in a particularly dark area, thus the only objects you can use to get a frame of reference are the lights on your own space suit. The Enterprise, from out of your sight, tries to beam you aboard, but there is a malfunction and instead they place an identical copy of you right in front of you. Is there any way to tell, from your perspective, whether you are the original or the copy?

Without any external references that could be accessed to determine who is the original, I say no. But this seems to contradict the notion of a true continuity in the self.
I suppose you could argue that both astronauts experience continuity - it's just that the "minimal self" splits in two, both of whom can be said to share the previous past.

I think a good test case is reincarnation. Not the question of whether it could actually happen but whether it is a conceiveable idea at all. For reincarnation to make sense I am supposed to believe that there could be a continuity of consciousness from me to my next life but with no continuity of memory or any other psychological traits. Does it actually make sense to say that the old me and the new me are in any sense the same person? To claim that it could relies on the idea of there being a continuity of consciousness that is independent of anything physical and even independent of any functional equivalence. The only thing the old me and the new me have in common is the possession of consciousness and the suggestion is that this is, in some way, the "same" consciousness.

The idea is that I am about to die, then, instead of all my conscious experience just ceasing I am suddenly aware of being in a different body, although the "I" that is now aware of this has no memories in common with the previous "I" he was and need not have any similarities in personality to his previous incarnation. It strikes me that the highlighted then in the previous sentance is unwarranted - what actually happens is one person dies and an other (different) person is born and there could be no sense in which they are the same person. The continuity of our consciousness is entirely dependent on acual physical or functional continuities. Otherwise, any of us could become anyone else at any moment.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Otherwise, any of us could become anyone else at any moment.

Thats a common argument regarding the "ultimate" state for some eastern traditions. If we all Brahman in the end, why cant this instance (Atman) of Brahman experience the life of another instance? In the end, there should be just one Brahman experiencing all, and so, the (supposedly) independent Atman's would be connected at some point.

[rocketdodger]

I suppose you could argue that both astronauts experience continuity - it's just that the "minimal self" splits in two, both of whom can be said to share the previous past.

I agree but my point was that while both astronauts would experience continuity, their minimal selves wouldn't seem to be continuous in a mathematical sense, which is what I assumed geoff was arguing. Or at least, the dopleganger wouldn't be continuous, since it materialized out of nowhere in an instant.


The idea is that I am about to die, then, instead of all my conscious experience just ceasing I am suddenly aware of being in a different body, although the "I" that is now aware of this has no memories in common with the previous "I" he was and need not have any similarities in personality to his previous incarnation. It strikes me that the highlighted then in the previous sentance is unwarranted - what actually happens is one person dies and an other (different) person is born and there could be no sense in which they are the same person. The continuity of our consciousness is entirely dependent on acual physical or functional continuities. Otherwise, any of us could become anyone else at any moment.

I agree. In fact the first time I thought of this was what I consider the beginning of my path to enlightenment, because it was the first time that I really realized I don't quite know wtf is going on lol.

I didn't want to go to sleep that night because it seemed to me that since there is no continuation of consciousness during sleep, falling asleep could basically be the same as dying. The next morning when you wake up, a new consciousness starts up based on the memories up to that point, and dies that night. And on and on.

That really scared me for awhile but then I concluded that there must be a subconscious part of us that contributes to the narrative self and its perceived continuity, and this part probably exists continually, even during sleep, so I am not as paranoid as I used to be.

Of course, since I am such a lazy arse, these theories of mine didn't cause me to loose much sleep...

[Robin]

"Mind-body problem? What mind-body problem? We see no mind-body problem!"

Saying there isn't a problem is like trying to argue you didn't eat the chocolate bar when there is chocolate all over your face.
No it is more like arguing there isn't a Loch Ness Monster or bigfoot. I am perfectly willing to concede I am wrong when I am introduced to said creature. People with pictures of floating logs or men in gorilla suits need apply.

You have completely misunderstood. I am not saying "What mind-body problem?" because I see a solution. I am saying it because I have never seen the problem yet.

If there is a mind-body problem I would like to see it stated. That is all. If it depends on the concept of physical I would need to see what definition of physical is being used.
You might want to argue that there is a materialistic solution, even though it's not obvious.
Not saying there is a solution. I am saying there is no problem.
But don't try to argue that the solution is obvious, because then you would just be being ridiculous.
Same goes for this sentence. No, I am not arguing that the solution to the problem is obvious, because I have yet to see the problem stated.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I agree. In fact the first time I thought of this was what I consider the beginning of my path to enlightenment, because it was the first time that I really realized I don't quite know wtf is going on lol.

Well, you are not alone. No one knows, we are really just starting to apply science to this field, all we have, for now, are a bunch of confusing beliefs and concepts.

I have to point out that there are other "paths" that lead to other ways of knowledge ;) but the problem is to make those paths compatible with scientific knowledge, and this seems so far impossible.

That really scared me for awhile but then I concluded that there must be a subconscious part of us that contributes to the narrative self and its perceived continuity, and this part probably exists continually, even during sleep, so I am not as paranoid as I used to be.

This is an example of the speculative paraphernalia that we use to try to "explain" what goes on. When I compare this speculations to astronomy, I believe we are still in the pre Copernican era. ;)

[rocketdodger]

This is an example of the speculative paraphernalia that we use to try to "explain" what goes on. When I compare this speculations to astronomy, I believe we are still in the pre Copernican era. ;)

Yep. Thats why Q always makes fun of us.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Yep. Thats why Q always makes fun of us.

What a great character, btw. :)