when did we develop conciousness?

[andyandy]

I've posted a simila thread on the religious/phil boards - but i'd like to look at it from a anthropological perspective....

we are pretty sure that say a fish has no conciousness as such - it is not aware that it is a fish....and that we as humans are aware - we are conscious......so....when did consciousness evolve? were homo-sapiens conscious of self? homo habilis? Chimps?

i remember watching a program where scientists showed that chimps could recognise themselves in the mirror - whilst monkeys couldnt. Does this mean that chimps are regarded as having a consciousness?

is there an evolutionary reason for consciousness to evolve?

[Bikewer]

Hopefully we won't get into endless semantics... I suppose you could make a point that nearly any higher organism is "conscious" in that it is aware of it's surroundings, reacts to them, reacts to stimuli, and so forth.

The next step up might be "self-aware", or capable of recognizing oneself as a distinct individual (as in our chimp) and then on up to being capable of abstract thought.
It's increasingly evident that numbers of higher animals may have these qualities, at least to some degree, and that might be the problem with deciding "when".
Surely our perhaps-inarticulate ancestors, Habilus, Erectus, and so forth had a degree of consciousness; they were capable of creating tools and artifacts, and Neanderthal was apparently capable of ritual.

So when? Maybe better would be when did that final leap to the sort of mental activity evidenced by modern humans occur. Some say that this was not immediately upon the appearance of Homo Sapiens Sapiens, but somewhere down the line a bit from that evolutionary jump.
Other anthropologists would say the two events were one and the same.

[Cecil]

I think it's important in the context of this discussion to distinguish between primary consciousness, or simple awareness of the environment, and secondary (aka reflective) consciousness, which is the awareness of one's primary consciousness.

As to the question of which animals possess primary consciousness, I think this is an unanswerable question in principle. Since a zombie (an unconscious animal who nevertheless behaves identically to a conscious one) is a logically consistent construction, it seems that it is impossible to prove that a given animal is or is not conscious.

Few animals have reflective consciousness. Only humans are known to have it, though most primates, dolphins, and possibly a bird species or two are suspected of possessing self-awareness. There have been several experiments that have attempted to detect this, including the mirror recognition experiment you mentioned.

This (http://www.phschool.com/science/science_news/articles/unsure_minds.html) experiment (described about halfway down the page) seems to indicate some level of reflective consciousness in rhesus monkeys and bottlenose dolphins. These two animals were shown to be aware of their own uncertainty about the truth of a proposition. This seems indicative that they are aware of themselves in some sense.

I've also heard the theory that reflective consciousness is a logical extension of our brain's modelling abilities. In this theory, a world model is used to test possible courses of action. Primary consciousness occurs when the brain uses sensory input to construct an internal model of the world. Self-awareness occurs when the brain's model is extended to include a model of the organism's brain itself. In fact, it is claimed that one's conscious experience is in fact "located" in the model, and the world that one perceives is not the real world, but the brain's world-model.

Oops. Sorry for rambling so much, it's just that this stuff fascinates me.

[GodMark2]

we are pretty sure that say a fish has no conciousness as such - it is not aware that it is a fish

The fish in my tank certainly seem to run away from anything that is not like themselves, and school together with things that are like themselves. That would seem to indicate some level of knowing that they are fish, and even what type of fish they are.

Questions to ask: Does consciousness have to be either on or off? Could it perhaps be a continuum? What is the measure of consciousness? Can you prove that I am conscious?

[andyandy]

just checked the "mirror test" passers.....

Humans (older than 18 months), great apes (except for gorillas), and bottlenose dolphins have all been observed to pass the test of recognising themselves in a mirror.

as an add on bonus question....how about computers? Could they "evolve" consciousness (with our help :) )

[Alphaba]

As usual, and already noted, all depends on the definition of consciousness used.

Self-recognition in a mirror can only be part of the story (e.g. some marine mammals, and possibly some bats, are capable of sound-based self-recognition). I remember studies on monkeys where self-awareness of arm and hand only were evidenced, providing fuel to the hypothesis of a phylogenetic continuum (of body self-awareness).

[aggle-rithm]

The next step up might be "self-aware", or capable of recognizing oneself as a distinct individual (as in our chimp)....

One could argue that we are STILL not completely self-aware, in that we have trouble integrating the concept of mind or "self" with our body image -- we tend to see it as a separate entity ( a "soul", for instance ).

[Alphaba]

Interesting idea aggle-rithm: this is indeed in line with the finding by anthropologists that a form of dualism is present in all societies/cultures, meaning that we are somehow 'hard-wired' to be be spontaneously dualists.

Social performances are also to take into account in a natural history of consciousness: situating oneself in complex, and often mobile, hierarchies, and acting accordingly is indicative of some sense of identity, and sort of a model of the (social) world. Even in cases of failure to classical tests of self-recognition.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

The question is not well formulated. We dont even mean the same thing with the word "consciousness". Sure, even when using words as simple as "table" we can have semantic problems, but when dealing with the big "C" we are lost in space.

Secondly, we do not have a working theory regarding why and how something as "consciousness" may arise, so I believe we are in a pre-copernican era regarding this.

Is like asking if above the firmament there is water and then discussing it ;)

[andyandy]

The question is not well formulated. We dont even mean the same thing with the word "consciousness". Sure, even when using words as simple as "table" we can have semantic problems, but when dealing with the big "C" we are lost in space.




I'm sorry you didnt like my formulation :D

its a very complex topic - but that doesnt mean we're precluded from talking about it.... :)

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I'm sorry you didnt like my formulation :D

its a very complex topic - but that doesnt mean we're precluded from talking about it.... :)

Oh not at all, besides, how could we learn if we just ignored the term? we need to get in touch with it, see it, taste it, to disect it to try to understand. ;)

[Alphaba]

Is like asking if above the firmament there is water and then discussing it ;)
If it were as simple as that: there is water above the firmament (http://www.astrobio.net/news/article1905.html).

[Buckaroo]

Seems to me a useful definitition of consciousness would be the capacity for introspection or the possesion of qualia. It's never been clear to me why the ability to recognize oneself would necessarily figure into it, as I think this ability probably evolved within social animals in order to allow socialization to work at all. Would solitary animals need this ability? What does it mean if they don't have it? And to lift an example from Roger Penrose (who probably got it from somewhere else), is a video camera that is pointed at a mirror self aware? After all, it does contain an internal representation of itself...

The way I approach the question with animals is simple. Do they act like I would expect them to act if they had consciousness as I define it above? Quite a few of them do. For me, then, the simplest explanation is that they actually are conscious. It would be VERY surprising to me if behaviors in many animals that are analogous to behaviors in human beings do not have a similar cause, i.e. the possession of consciousness.

[Alphaba]

Seems to me a useful definitition of consciousness would be the capacity for introspection or the possesion of qualia.
You've lost me here (I don't want to venture into the 'qualia' philosophical quagmire; just say that "possession of qualia" makes no sense to me. As to "capacity for introspection", I wonder what kind of observable behavior could allow to make robust inferences about its presence or absence in zebras, kangaroos, penguins, spiders, anacondas, cats, tunas, gorillas, frogs, vampires, and [add all known non-human animal species]).

Here's a standard, classical, indicative list of objective features of consciousness, as found in many textbooks:


coherent, integrated, and controlled nature of behavior
capacity to detect novelty and to adapt to it
pursuit of a constant objective in variable conditions
use of a language
use of complex forms of representation like declarative memory
metacognition (~ executive processes, model of the mind, etc.)


Might be a not too unpractical starting point...

[CapelDodger]

I've posted a simila thread on the religious/phil boards - but i'd like to look at it from a anthropological perspective....
"Anthropoligical" restricts the matter to humans. Philosophy is uniquely human, not self-awareness. That's why we know how a mirror works, and keep asking the hard questions.

Our sense of identity is the hardest question of all.

[Outhere]

Cecil mentioned that rhesus monkeys and bottle-nosed dolphins were shown to be aware of their own uncertainty about the truth of a proposition.

Does this indicate that skepticism is a sign of higher intelligence?

[Buckaroo]

Here's a standard, classical, indicative list of objective features of consciousness, as found in many textbooks:


coherent, integrated, and controlled nature of behavior
capacity to detect novelty and to adapt to it
pursuit of a constant objective in variable conditions
use of a language
use of complex forms of representation like declarative memory
metacognition (~ executive processes, model of the mind, etc.)


Might be a not too unpractical starting point...

Maybe a good start, but this list seems overly restrictive and anthropocentic, and would indeed eliminate many humans from the rolls of the conscious. Under this definition, for example, an aphasic would fail the test.

I kinda got the impression that what Andyandy was talking about was more in line with the folk conception of consciousness, which is pretty much the capacity for introspection -- being aware of one's inner cognitive and emotional states. A sufficiently advanced computer program will probably one day reproduce everything in the above list, without necessarily having this ability. Would we have to consider it conscious? Ask Alan Turing. Personally, I don't think so.

In the case of animals, of course there's no unambiguous way to determine that their behavior demonstrates this form of consciousness. You can't prove it in a human, either. But I know that *I* have it, and since I came from the same evolutionary wellspring as animals, I think that it's reasonable to assume that when a dog appears to experience states that seem like happiness or fear, that it probably *is* some analog of my experience. Can't prove it, but I don't see any a priori reason why humans should be different in this respect.

[Soapy Sam]

Perhaps we should not be asking which animals "pass"a mirror test, but asking whether a mirror test is relevant to any animal but ourselves?

Can any conscious person here think of a test a monkey might give a human to see if he was g'g'zxundf?

( I apologise for my spelling. I lack a monkey keyboard. )

[T'ai Chi]

so....when did consciousness evolve?


5,84,058,405 BC +- a few years.

I'd like to see a detailed Darwinian pathway of the evolution of consciousness. Anyone got one?

[Buckaroo]

Can any conscious person here think of a test a monkey might give a human to see if he was g'g'zxundf?

( I apologise for my spelling. I lack a monkey keyboard. )

G'g'zxundf ergo sum.

Who needs a test? :D

[Alphaba]

this list seems overly restrictive and anthropocentic
...snip...
A sufficiently advanced computer program will probably one day reproduce everything in the above list
If a machine (both logical and material) is one day capable to perform/exhibit all the features listed, wouldn't that somehow render the adjective "anthropocentric" problematic?


[this list] would indeed eliminate many humans from the rolls of the conscious. Under this definition, for example, an aphasic would fail the test.
Well, there always are ceteris paribus clauses in such exercises. Here it is evidently tacitly assumed that it is about awake healthy, non neuropsychologically disabled members of the species.


I kinda got the impression that what Andyandy was talking about was more in line with the folk conception of consciousness, which is pretty much the capacity for introspection -- being aware of one's inner cognitive and emotional states. A sufficiently advanced computer program will probably one day reproduce everything in the above list, without necessarily having this ability. Would we have to consider it conscious? Ask Alan Turing. Personally, I don't think so.
What I have bolded is subsumed under the wider notions of metacognition and executive functions. So having a machine reproducing everything in the list obviously means reproducing metacognition, i.e. your "capacity for introspection".


Ask Alan Turing.
Speaking to defunct persons is against my absence of religion.

[Dustin Kesselberg]

I for one find the "mirror test" absurd. Realizing the reflection in the mirror is you may be proof of "consciousness" but not being able to do it doens't mean you aren't self aware. Being able to do it is more intelligence than being self aware. You can be 100% self aware but simply not intelligent enough to realize the reflection in the mirror is you.


It doesn't take a genius to realize higher animals like cats or dogs or lions or tigers or whatnot are conscious and self aware. Their cognative ability is much different than that of humans but it's there none the less.




When did consciousness evolve? I would guess it first appeared atleast a billion years ago or maybe after the time of the cambrian explosion when higher forms of life started to evolve.

[aggle-rithm]

5,84,058,405 BC +- a few years.

I'd like to see a detailed Darwinian pathway of the evolution of consciousness. Anyone got one?

Do you have reason to believe anyone should?

[T'ai Chi]

Do you have reason to believe anyone should?

Oh, I have reason to believe no one ever will.

[Roboramma]

Oh, I have reason to believe no one ever will.
So do I - because we don't have that data.

[Mercutio]

Dammit, I just lost a really long and thoughtful post...I'll try again.

Consciousness is the result of our language and behavior, of course. It has to be--we cannot learn what we mean by the word "consciousness" by looking at another person's thoughts (if you can, apply for the million), nor can they point to our thoughts to label them. We learn what "consciousness" means by attaching the label to publicly observable behaviors. No, not a behavior--to think that there is some single thing called "consciousness" is just silly--but a fuzzy category of behaviors, perhaps unique to any given individual, but widely overlapping with other members of the language community.

We argue about consciousness in goldfish, chimps, dogs...and realize fairly quickly that we can only infer consciousness from their observable behavior. What we typically fail to realize is that the same constraint holds true for our fellow human beings, and even ourselves. We have absolutely no way of knowing if the private behaviors we associate with our own consciousness are shared with others; what we do have is the publicly observable behavior we associate with the term "consciousness". We see the goldfish approach a familiar person at feeding time, or flee from an unfamiliar person, and infer "some form of consciousness". We see the chimp attend to a mark on its forehead and infer "some form of consciousness". Whether or not a species displays consciousness is wholly dependent on what public behavior that species displays. Indeed, whether or not a given individual person displays a particular "state of consciousness" is wholly dependent on what public behavior he or she displays.

As such, the question of "when did consciousness evolve" has two distinctly different answers. First, there is the question of when these particular behaviors became associated with the term "consciousness"; this is dependent on culture. Our use of the term has changed over the centuries. Secondly, there is the question of the evolution of the behaviors themselves; this is a task for evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology. Some of the behaviors we call "conscious" may be genetically coded, others may be learned within the lifespan of the organism.

[Roboramma]

Merc, another very interesting post. :)

I was thinking about this thread the other day, and I started to wonder about the evolution of conciousness. I had a little hypothesis pop into my head that went something like this:

What if conciousness evolved to aid social interaction. In order to succeed in social situations it helps to be able to think about what other creatures in your social environment are thinking - what do they want, what are their motiviations, what will they do next, etc.
Maybe in order to think about the motivations of others, it helps if we can think about our own motivations. Conciousness is our brain's way of telling itself a story about our social environment - infering desires from behaviors so that we can predict another being's future actions. In order to do this we first need to have a picture of those things we call desires (etc.)

In this (perhaps silly) hypothesis, we are concious so that we can infer conciousness in others.

What d'y'all think?

[MRC_Hans]

*snip*
In this (perhaps silly) hypothesis, we are concious so that we can infer conciousness in others.

What d'y'all think?The way you express it, it is circular, but I think I know what you mean. We developed consciousness because it is an advantage to be able to infer other being's thoughts and intentions. As such, consciousness is the ability to understand that other beings have a will.

This ability is far from restricted to humans; it certainly also exists in many other animals. I have observed obvious conscious behavior in dogs, cats, and birds.

Hans

[Piggy]

andyandy, what would you think of this scheme as a working definition of consciousness? (Adapted from Dennett)

Scenario A: A computer, light sensor, and monitor are rigged up so that when a beam of light in the red spectrum hits the sensor, the monitor displays "I see a red light". A series of different colored lights are flashed. The monitor is blank until a red one is lit, at which point the monitor displays "I see a red light".

Scenario B: I'm asked by an experimentor to look at a screen and say when I see a red light. A series of different colored lights are flashed. I remain silent until a red one is lit, at which point I say "I see a red light".

Why do we think of only B as involving response by a conscious entity?

It has nothing to do w/ response to environment, or discrimination, or following orders of course -- it's because we know that there's an "experience" of "seeing a red light" for the human. We feel instinctively (or argue logically) that there's not for the machine.

So I take your OP to mean something like "At what point did some critters stop merely reacting chemically to the environment and start having some inner experience, a subjective 'feeling' of pain, fear, happiness, etc?"

Tough stuff, since, as others have pointed out, we can't get at that "experience", that "feeling".

But still, to me this is the crux of the issue, not some reflective sense of "I", which may come much later in terms of evolutionary development. To me, it matters if an animal has something like my experience of pain, rather than, say, a computer simulation.

Why? For the same reason we ask questions like "Can Fetuses Feel Pain? (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=55368&highlight=fetus+pain)". For the same reason it mattered whether Terry Schiavo did or didn't have any higher brain function. For the same reason it matters whether comatose patients can sense their environment.

It matters to me if, say, a cricket is just a bundle of wires like a machine, or if a fish is experiencing pain in something like the way I do.

It's just my opinion, but I think Dennett is very likely to be right when he proposes that a dual brain structure underlies the emergent phenomenon that we call conscious experience or feeling. In short, the model is: Build brain A (brain stem, lymbic system, cerebrum) to process input, then build brain B (cerebellum) to "live inside" brain A. That is, brain B receives processed data from brain A, so that brain A's output becomes brain B's environment. The feedback loops between these "2 brains" produces the sense of the world "being like" something.

If that's correct, then the bug my cat is chasing is just an organic machine, but my cat is a "feeling" animal. The bug has no experience of panic, but my cat has an experience of excitement.

[Mercutio]

The way you express it, it is circular, but I think I know what you mean. We developed consciousness because it is an advantage to be able to infer other being's thoughts and intentions. As such, consciousness is the ability to understand that other beings have a will.
(emphasis mine.) Or to understand that their environment will have the same effects on them as it would on you, such that without the circularly defined explanatory fiction "will", we can still use our observations of them to infer their probable actions.

This ability is far from restricted to humans; it certainly also exists in many other animals. I have observed obvious conscious behavior in dogs, cats, and birds.

HansIf we observe our language, we also observe obvious conscious behavior in cars and computers. "My car doesn't like cold mornings." "My car likes to go faster than the speed limit." "My computer hates me." These are all phrases that imply consciousness of a sort, and are part of how we have learned the words that go with consciousness. (which makes no sense if we define consciousness subjectively, but then we have every bit as much ability to look at the private thoughts of a car as we do another human. In both cases, all we have is the public behavior to go by.)

[Darat]

Don't know why but this thread makes me think of a great expression I first heard from my high school biology teacher

"The brain is a parasitical outgrowth of the spinal column".

[MRC_Hans]

(emphasis mine.) Or to understand that their environment will have the same effects on them as it would on you, such that without the circularly defined explanatory fiction "will", we can still use our observations of them to infer their probable actions.

Yes, good definition!

If we observe our language, we also observe obvious conscious behavior in cars and computers. "My car doesn't like cold mornings." "My car likes to go faster than the speed limit." "My computer hates me." These are all phrases that imply consciousness of a sort, and are part of how we have learned the words that go with consciousness. (which makes no sense if we define consciousness subjectively, but then we have every bit as much ability to look at the private thoughts of a car as we do another human. In both cases, all we have is the public behavior to go by.)
Well, that is just antropomorphism (sp?). Much of the time when we assign consciousness to animals, it is also antropomorphism, but with higher animals, we can observe behavioral patterns that are difficult to explain as anything but consciousness.

I have a personal example:

I was wisiting a (large florist's) shop that had a parrot on display. Rather, I suppose the owner had a parrot and kept it in the room. It had a large cage, but on this occasion was sitting freely on the top of the cage. I like animals and rarely miss an opportunity to "communicate" with a responsive-looking animal. So I stood in front of the parrot and ... I don't remember exactly what, said "hello" or something.

The parrot eyed me carefully, then climbed down on the front of the cage to the height of my shoulder, took a good grip at the cage with its beak, and pivoted around, hanging by its beak, displaying its feet. After a moment, I realized the purpose of the gesture and stepped close so it could climb onto my shoulder, which it did. It then proceeded immidiately to bend down and bite a button off the collar of my shirt.

Now, it makes perfect sense to interpret this as it seeing the, apparantly interesting, button, and planning a sequence of actions that would give it access to it. A sequence that included eliciting a specific, predictable, reaction from me. Which would require it to be aware of me as a seperate entity with a behavioral pattern of my own.

Hans

[Piggy]

Now, it makes perfect sense to interpret this as it seeing the, apparantly interesting, button, and planning a sequence of actions that would give it access to it. A sequence that included eliciting a specific, predictable, reaction from me. Which would require it to be aware of me as a seperate entity with a behavioral pattern of my own.
Would it, tho? You don't think a complex robot could ever be built that could do something like this?

I agree that parrots are conscious, btw. But again, for me, the question is one of "felt experience" rather than complexity of interaction with the world.

[Mercutio]

Well, that is just antropomorphism (sp?). Much of the time when we assign consciousness to animals, it is also antropomorphism, but with higher animals, we can observe behavioral patterns that are difficult to explain as anything but consciousness.

We are quick to recognise the connection in that direction, but slow to recognise that this is part of how we learn the language (including how we label our private experience). We use the consciousness-type words, whether for people, other animals, or machines, when the environmental causes are sufficiently subtle as to not telegraph to us what the specific causes of a behavior are. When causes are self-evident, we are less apt to say a behavior was "conscious", and more likely to call it "reflexive". But the salience of external causes is continuous--that is, there is no bright line separating conscious and reflexive behaviors (or, more accurately, no bright line separating the behaviors which we would infer are either conscious or reflexive).

So, I would argue it is not merely anthropomorphism, and that dismissing it as such artificially dichotomizes between our own "real" consciousness and other forms which are some cheap anthropomorphic imitation. Rather, our labeling of other and own consciousness is part of the same process. We have merely (but understandably) attached the label to behaviors which are much more apt to be performed by humans (and a wide variety of those behaviors).

[Mercutio]

I agree that parrots are conscious, btw. But again, for me, the question is one of "felt experience" rather than complexity of interaction with the world.
Again I must ask, then, if it is "felt experience", and no one but you can feel your experience (and you can feel no others' experience), how is it that you learned to label this "consciousness"?

The public behaviors you used as referents are how you learned the term. Your "felt experience" is one degree further removed, not closer, to how you learned the word, as your felt experience is imperfectly correlated with the word as learned (iow, not every time you felt a particular way was there someone there to notice and provide a label, and not every time someone used a particular word were you feeling that particular experience. This is the natural result of our inability to read one another's minds.).

This is part of the reason that discussions of consciousness get bogged down so quickly. The focus on "felt experience", while perfectly understandable, glosses over how we learn to speak about this experience, and how we learn to label our own feelings. It leaves us with poorly defined terms and no framework within which to discuss.

[Piggy]

Mercutio, I have a hard time teasing out your meaning b/c you seem to drift between discussion of language and discussion of objects as if there were no distinction.

Again I must ask, then, if it is "felt experience", and no one but you can feel your experience (and you can feel no others' experience), how is it that you learned to label this "consciousness"?
What are you asking about, exactly, here? Are you asking why I use that word to refer to felt experience? Are you asking something about language acquisition?

The public behaviors you used as referents are how you learned the term.
You're saying that I learned the term "consciousness" via "public behaviors"? I don't understand this.

Your "felt experience" is one degree further removed, not closer, to how you learned the word, as your felt experience is imperfectly correlated with the word as learned (iow, not every time you felt a particular way was there someone there to notice and provide a label, and not every time someone used a particular word were you feeling that particular experience. This is the natural result of our inability to read one another's minds.).
You've totally lost me here. How does language acquisition come into this in the first place? And even if it did, your statements about lacking a label-provider for every instance are incomprehensible to me.

This is part of the reason that discussions of consciousness get bogged down so quickly. The focus on "felt experience", while perfectly understandable, glosses over how we learn to speak about this experience, and how we learn to label our own feelings. It leaves us with poorly defined terms and no framework within which to discuss.
Why do we need to concern ourselves with how we learn to speak?

I'm sorry, but I can't make heads or tails of all this.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

For all purposes, Vervet monkes do appear to have some "mental states", heck, they even have their own protolanguage. Seyfarth and Cheney have some papers regarding them.

And I agree with Piggy in that consciousness should be used in a more general way. I would say that of course animals (at least those with similar neural structures) experience pain and even some (human like*) emotional states. And this is merely a deduction based on evolution.


* Its more than we animals share the feelings, not that we humans anthropomorphize their behavior.

[Mercutio]

Mercutio, I have a hard time teasing out your meaning b/c you seem to drift between discussion of language and discussion of objects as if there were no distinction.
This discussion is about both, of course. The meaning is perfectly clear when we speak of publicly available objects and learning the words we use to refer to them; it is when we apply the same analysis to our private experience that we begin to treat things differently.

What are you asking about, exactly, here? Are you asking why I use that word to refer to felt experience? Are you asking something about language acquisition?
In a sense, yes. You are discussing something that no one else has access to, and which you have no access to anyone else's. And yet, we understand one another (most of the time). How is this possible? Unless you think we somehow have access to some magical collective unconscious or Platonic Ideal, the only way to explain it is through learning via public referent. As such, examining how it is that one learns a word is very enlightening in terms of what the word means.

You're saying that I learned the term "consciousness" via "public behaviors"? I don't understand this.
I am saying exactly that. Are you saying you learned it some other way? Was someone able to access your consciousness and tell you "there, that is what we call 'consciousness'"? Did the word just spring forth like Athena from the head of Zeus, fully grown and armored? If so, what an amazing coincidence that we have similar conceptions of the term.

You've totally lost me here. How does language acquisition come into this in the first place? And even if it did, your statements about lacking a label-provider for every instance are incomprehensible to me.
Language acquisition came into this because it is a useful way to examine the question. It de-mystifies the term and re-frames the question in a much more reasonable manner. Some of the apparent difficulties in understanding consciousness are, in my opinion, merely artifacts of our improper assumptions about what consciousness is; critically and skeptically examining our assumptions about consciousness is the first step in examining the question more productively.
Why do we need to concern ourselves with how we learn to speak?

I'm sorry, but I can't make heads or tails of all this.It is a very different view from traditional linguistics (which, as one critique put it, relies on magic). But unless you can figure a way for us to have direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience, the only other option is to learn through publicly available referents--in this case, observable behaviors.

What are your own assumptions about consciousness? Starting from how you learned the term, to why you see consciousness in some things (people, at least, I assume) and not in others.

[Piggy]

This discussion is about both, of course. The meaning is perfectly clear when we speak of publicly available objects and learning the words we use to refer to them; it is when we apply the same analysis to our private experience that we begin to treat things differently.
Why?

In a sense, yes. You are discussing something that no one else has access to, and which you have no access to anyone else's. And yet, we understand one another (most of the time). How is this possible? Unless you think we somehow have access to some magical collective unconscious or Platonic Ideal, the only way to explain it is through learning via public referent. As such, examining how it is that one learns a word is very enlightening in terms of what the word means.
Enlightening how? Why should that be enlightening? Why are we discussing "what the word means"? Why are we discussing learning? Why are we discussing language acquisition? How is any of this relevant?

All I've said is that I find it meaningful to consider consciousness in terms of the presence of "felt experience" rather than a sense of an understanding of the "I/thou" distinction or in terms of functional definitions such as certain types of interactions with the environment. And suddenly, we're launching into discussions of language acquisition (laid out in terms that don't seem very clear or coherent, btw).


I am saying exactly that. Are you saying you learned it some other way? Was someone able to access your consciousness and tell you "there, that is what we call 'consciousness'"? Did the word just spring forth like Athena from the head of Zeus, fully grown and armored? If so, what an amazing coincidence that we have similar conceptions of the term.
I don't know that we have similar conceptions of the term at all.

As for the definition I'm using here, I came to it through a combination of reading, introspection, observation, and reasoning.

In any case, I still don't see the relevance of discussing language acquisition.

Language acquisition came into this because it is a useful way to examine the question. It de-mystifies the term and re-frames the question in a much more reasonable manner. Some of the apparent difficulties in understanding consciousness are, in my opinion, merely artifacts of our improper assumptions about what consciousness is; critically and skeptically examining our assumptions about consciousness is the first step in examining the question more productively.
I don't see that examining language acquisition is going to help us examine the question at all. I think it's much more effective and efficient to focus on the object of discussion. And I wasn't aware that the term was "mystified" to begin with.

If you want to talk about assumptions and why they may be incorrect, then please, put them on the table.

It is a very different view from traditional linguistics (which, as one critique put it, relies on magic). But unless you can figure a way for us to have direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience, the only other option is to learn through publicly available referents--in this case, observable behaviors.
Again, you're sliding back and forth between discussions of language and discussions of things as though there were no difference.

Do you have some non-traditional linguistics to propose? And if so, why is that important?

"Direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience" is not needed for our purposes here. We all have human bodies and brains. We all came from the same evolutionary processes. We all behave essentially the same. There's no reason to believe that we somehow have radically different conscious apparati.

Are you claiming that some of us have felt experience and others don't (excepting people in vegetative states and other such obvious exceptions)?

If so, then you're merely kicking up trivial objections. If not, then I'm not following you.

What are your own assumptions about consciousness? Starting from how you learned the term, to why you see consciousness in some things (people, at least, I assume) and not in others.
How I learned the term is immaterial. That's like saying that a wool sweater may not be wool, depending on where you bought it. To determine if it's wool, you examine the fabric, not the provenance. And in any case, how the heck am I going to remember anything about my learning this word as a child?

You want an inventory of assumptions? Please.

Again, all I've said is that what's most important to me is whether another being has, for lack of a better term, "the experience of experience". I don't care what happens to a computer with a monitor and light sensor because I don't believe it has any awareness of what happens to it. But I'm sickened by reports of abuse of horses, dogs, and cats because I believe that they -- like humans -- do have "felt experience".

And I believe that Dennett's A/B-Brain model is very likely a correct and useful one.

If you're interested in why I believe that, then why not just ask me directly?

[Mercutio]

Why?
Because some choose to treat the processes of experience as qualitatively different from the things that happen on the other side of our skin. Thus, dualism...

Enlightening how? Why should that be enlightening? Why are we discussing "what the word means"? Why are we discussing learning? Why are we discussing language acquisition? How is any of this relevant?

All I've said is that I find it meaningful to consider consciousness in terms of the presence of "felt experience" rather than a sense of an understanding of the "I/thou" distinction or in terms of functional definitions such as certain types of interactions with the environment. And suddenly, we're launching into discussions of language acquisition (laid out in terms that don't seem very clear or coherent, btw).
Yes...you have chosen to consider consciousness in terms which cannot be shared by any other. This is why "what the word means" is important. If you do not find my approach relevant, you don't have to use it.

I don't know that we have similar conceptions of the term at all.

As for the definition I'm using here, I came to it through a combination of reading, introspection, observation, and reasoning.
Reading and observation are the sorts of public referents I refer to. Introspection and reasoning, unless you are quite different from the rest of us, build upon these public referents.

In any case, I still don't see the relevance of discussing language acquisition.
Then don't.
I don't see that examining language acquisition is going to help us examine the question at all. I think it's much more effective and efficient to focus on the object of discussion. And I wasn't aware that the term was "mystified" to begin with.
Focusing on the object of discussion is wonderful, as soon as we have agreement on what it is.

If you want to talk about assumptions and why they may be incorrect, then please, put them on the table.

Again, you're sliding back and forth between discussions of language and discussions of things as though there were no difference.
When we have a way of discussing things without using language to do so, then the language question will be irrelevant.

Do you have some non-traditional linguistics to propose? And if so, why is that important?
My point was simply that my point of view, while well established within behaviorism, is very likely not familiar to you.

"Direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience" is not needed for our purposes here. We all have human bodies and brains. We all came from the same evolutionary processes. We all behave essentially the same. There's no reason to believe that we somehow have radically different conscious apparati.

Are you claiming that some of us have felt experience and others don't (excepting people in vegetative states and other such obvious exceptions)?

If so, then you're merely kicking up trivial objections. If not, then I'm not following you.
I am actually trying to examine what it is that this "felt experience" is--which is what I thought you were trying to do. I find my approach quite useful. You do not.
How I learned the term is immaterial. That's like saying that a wool sweater may not be wool, depending on where you bought it. To determine if it's wool, you examine the fabric, not the provenance. And in any case, how the heck am I going to remember anything about my learning this word as a child?
It is not immaterial in this case--this is not where you bought the sweater, but how it was made, and from what.

You want an inventory of assumptions? Please.

Again, all I've said is that what's most important to me is whether another being has, for lack of a better term, "the experience of experience". I don't care what happens to a computer with a monitor and light sensor because I don't believe it has any awareness of what happens to it. But I'm sickened by reports of abuse of horses, dogs, and cats because I believe that they -- like humans -- do have "felt experience".
All I am doing is examining why you believe that, and why others either do or do not agree with you. An analysis of how we have learned the terms is very useful in this. Again, you are free to disagree.

And I believe that Dennett's A/B-Brain model is very likely a correct and useful one.
I happen to agree.

If you're interested in why I believe that, then why not just ask me directly?self-reports are notoriously unreliable. Besides, I have been addressing the question from the OP--my response to your post was as much to andyandy as to you.

[Piggy]

Mercutio, you and I are obviously talking at right angles.

You say that I "have chosen to consider consciousness in terms which cannot be shared by any other".

I am considering consciousness in terms of the presence or absence of felt experience, as you correctly observe. And it's true that we can't be directly aware of each other's felt experience. But there's no doubt that we all have some type of felt experience. So I see no problem here.

I'm not concerned here with that's in it, just whether it's there.

We cannot share our inner experiences directly, but we can certainly share an understanding of what I'm referring to. And nothing beyond this is needed for our purposes here.

So I have 2 questions for you:

1. Do you have some real doubt about what it is I'm referring to?

2. Do you want to know why I believe that computers are not "conscious" under the definition I propose?

That might get us at least talking parallel. ;)

[andyandy]

im really enjoying reading the posts guys :D i'd love to contribute more but i'm kinda out of my depth on this one lol:)

i guess my original post was kinda looking at consciousness from a human perspective....as has been established it's pretty hard to know how much cats or goldfish are aware....and indeed what "awareness" or consciousness even means.....
but it seems to me that humans possess something extra...even if that something extra is hard to quantify....
i guess my working definition of consciousness would involve
1) self awareness - a concept of self, of existence...
2) cognition on a level beyond instinct - ie. an ability to over-ride instinct when necessary
3) the ability to create pictures, stories or abstract thought - which requires an awareness of "reality" - this is a tougher one to nail down - maybe the ability to dream is a precursor to or first sign of a developed consciousness....i dont know any theory on this - so any info would be great - are there any animals who dream? is it even logical to equate the unconscious(?) action of dreaming with a sign of consciousness?

i guess for this rather arbitary definition of consciouness then only humans (and maybe great apes??) would fit the bill - but this might just be because i'm looking at it from a very anthropocentric perspective....
i suppose in evolutionary terms, levels of consciousness have continually evolved - maybe (1) came first, then this allowed (2)....etc....
maybe there's more to come - a higher state we haven't reached yet (at least not drug free) :D

[Raphael]

andyandy- I to am enjoying this thread, but as it is outside my field of expertise, I hesitate to contribute as well.

Mediasite Presentation Catalog (http://streamer.perimeterinstitute.ca:81/mediasite/viewer/?cid=11c6ed02-c9d9-4be4-961b-a8085fc24e07)

The link is to a lecture by Jay Ingram (2nd from the top entitled "Are you Conscious?") It's an hour in duration, but quite accessible for those not familiar with behavioural jargon.

[Interesting Ian]

I've posted a simila thread on the religious/phil boards - but i'd like to look at it from a anthropological perspective....

we are pretty sure that say a fish has no conciousness as such - it is not aware that it is a fish....and that we as humans are aware - we are conscious......so....when did consciousness evolve? were homo-sapiens conscious of self? homo habilis? Chimps?

i remember watching a program where scientists showed that chimps could recognise themselves in the mirror - whilst monkeys couldnt. Does this mean that chimps are regarded as having a consciousness?

is there an evolutionary reason for consciousness to evolve?

You're confusing consciousness with self-consciousness.

[Interesting Ian]

Mercutio, I have a hard time teasing out your meaning b/c you seem to drift between discussion of language and discussion of objects as if there were no distinction.


What are you asking about, exactly, here? Are you asking why I use that word to refer to felt experience? Are you asking something about language acquisition?


You're saying that I learned the term "consciousness" via "public behaviors"? I don't understand this.


You've totally lost me here. How does language acquisition come into this in the first place? And even if it did, your statements about lacking a label-provider for every instance are incomprehensible to me.


Why do we need to concern ourselves with how we learn to speak?

I'm sorry, but I can't make heads or tails of all this.

He's simply expressing Wittgenstein's arguments against a private language. However it is more obvious than anything could be that we learn we are conscious from our own consciousness rather than observing the behaviour of others.


Mercutio
Again I must ask, then, if it is "felt experience", and no one but you can feel your experience (and you can feel no others' experience), how is it that you learned to label this "consciousness"?


By having the experience, and assigning a word to name this experience. Nothing could be more simple. Analytical behaviourists are all round the bend (as was Wittgenstein).

[andyandy]

You're confusing consciousness with self-consciousness.

yeah....for my working definition i'm kinda lumping the two together....ie. consciousness requires a consciousness of self.....:D

could you provide a definition of the two? what does it mean to be "conscious" as compared to "self-conscious" ??

[DanishDynamite]

im really enjoying reading the posts guys :D i'd love to contribute more but i'm kinda out of my depth on this one lol:)

i guess my original post was kinda looking at consciousness from a human perspective....as has been established it's pretty hard to know how much cats or goldfish are aware....and indeed what "awareness" or consciousness even means.....
but it seems to me that humans possess something extra...even if that something extra is hard to quantify....
i guess my working definition of consciousness would involve
1) self awareness - a concept of self, of existence...
Personally I see the mental abilities of the animal kingdom as a sliding scale. We (humans) try and divide these abilities into categories, which is fine, but in my view perhaps a bit arbitrary.

The OP concerns itself with what I think is self-awareness. The "mirror-test" has been mentioned, and I think that for animals who rely greatly on their sense of vision (such as humans) it is a fair test for self-awareness. Several species of primates (including humans) and dolphins pass this test. They know they are not seeing another creature, but just a reflection of themself. In order to realize you are seeing a reflection of yorself, you must be aware of yourself as seperate being. You must be self-aware.
2) cognition on a level beyond instinct - ie. an ability to over-ride instinct when necessary
Lemmings can override instincts. :)

Seriously, at what point does the ill-defined "instincts" stop and cognitive abilities take over?
3) the ability to create pictures, stories or abstract thought - which requires an awareness of "reality" - this is a tougher one to nail down - maybe the ability to dream is a precursor to or first sign of a developed consciousness....i dont know any theory on this - so any info would be great - are there any animals who dream? is it even logical to equate the unconscious(?) action of dreaming with a sign of consciousness?
Animals dream, as any owner of a dog or cat knows.

The thing I suspect you are getting at is the "abstract thought" bit. The problem is how to define this.

[Piggy]

could you provide a definition of the two? what does it mean to be "conscious" as compared to "self-conscious" ??
It could be said that a rhesus monkey is conscious, in that -- unlike, say, a rock -- it is awake and aware, has emotions, feels pain, etc. But it might or might not be self-conscious, which is to say, capable of some rudimentary awareness of its own existence as a unique conscious entity within a world composed of other conscious and non-conscious entities.

A friend of mine summed it up once by saying, "I don't think a dog ever had the thought 'I'."

[Jeff Corey]

... Analytical behaviourists are all round the bend (as was Wittgenstein).
I suspect you wouldn't know what a behavior analyst was if it bit you in the tuchis.

[andyandy]

andyandy- I to am enjoying this thread, but as it is outside my field of expertise, I hesitate to contribute as well.

Mediasite Presentation Catalog (http://streamer.perimeterinstitute.ca:81/mediasite/viewer/?cid=11c6ed02-c9d9-4be4-961b-a8085fc24e07)

The link is to a lecture by Jay Ingram (2nd from the top entitled "Are you Conscious?") It's an hour in duration, but quite accessible for those not familiar with behavioural jargon.

cheers for the link - it's a great lecture :D - seems like there's a whole load of other interesting topic videos there too....
:) :)

[Kaylee]

A friend of mine summed it up once by saying, "I don't think a dog ever had the thought 'I'."

That might be true -- but I do wonder if it can be proven conclusively one way or the other.

FWIW, I suspect that at least some dogs I've seen had the concept of "ME!" down pat -- but I'm willing to bet that none of them contemplated their places in life -- beyond identifying their places in their "packs". ;)

[Roboramma]

1. Do you have some real doubt about what it is I'm referring to? I think there may be some real doubt in some way, though certainly not to the degree of "You feel pain? What's that?"
But rather, what does it mean to feel something? To experience something? We have an intuitive understanding of this, which is probably accurate to a certain degree, but intuition is often wrong, especially when we're talking about our own experiences.
I think Mercutio is basically saying that introspection isn't a very good method for finding out about conciousness or the activities of the brain. As such he's looking for a more objective approach; find out how the word is acquired in order to understand what it refers to. I'm not sure that is the best approach, but it seems like it will probably be useful, anyway.

But it seems like just an attempt to look at the question from another angle, because he doesn't trust introspection. I don't think he's suggesting that you and he have qualitatively different "felt experiences", rather I think he's suggesting that the term itself is rather vague and possibly inaccurate if we're talking about what's actually going on. I think he may have a point.

(And Mercutio, I'm sure I've just massacred that point in this jumble, if so... sorry for trying to help! :) )

[Jeff Corey]

Merc,
Fine with me.
The position of the philosophy of science called behavior analysis is that while observable behavior is the proper subject matter of a science of behavior, there are publically unobservable private behaviors which are not. Consciousness, thought, cognitions - these are things we experience, but cannot quantify in a way that can be dealt with scientifically. These are called private events. There is no way any of you can tell how I think in word/picture/emotional/memory anymore than I can tell about you.
What Merc has been saying about language is that it's how we learn to label our internal states. Skinner talked about his toothache. How do we know?

[Dustin Kesselberg]

It could be said that a rhesus monkey is conscious, in that -- unlike, say, a rock -- it is awake and aware, has emotions, feels pain, etc. But it might or might not be self-conscious, which is to say, capable of some rudimentary awareness of its own existence as a unique conscious entity within a world composed of other conscious and non-conscious entities.

A friend of mine summed it up once by saying, "I don't think a dog ever had the thought 'I'."


"I" is a human construct.


It's obviously however dogs realize they are an individual or else they wouldn't act the way they do. Why would for instance my dog steal my other dogs rawhide when he isn't looking unless he had some concept of self. Without a concept of self how could he do something with the intent for self pleasure?

[MRC_Hans]

Would it, tho? You don't think a complex robot could ever be built that could do something like this?

I agree that parrots are conscious, btw. But again, for me, the question is one of "felt experience" rather than complexity of interaction with the world.Of course we could build a robot that could do that. It wouldn't even have to be very complicated. But it would be a replica of our reactions (or of those of the parrot, so parroting the parrot .. sorry, carry on ...). We would have to predefine, perhaps not the specific action, but the pattern of behavior of the robot. So the actions of the robot would only be proof that we are conscious, not that the robot is.

The parrot on the other hand, is not a robot. I cannot be certain, of course, that it was not carefully trained to perform this stunt, but I find it more likely, based on other behavor shown by parrots and other intelligent animals, that it acted on its own account.

Hans

[Darat]

As an anecdotal point - watch people interacting with a Sony AIBO dog (which is a robot dog) , it is quite amazing that after a little bit of interaction with the robot what they start to "project" onto the robot.

I used to programme mine so I knew what it was programmed to do and how it would react to certain stimulus yet people would constantly "fill in" a personality for it which would include traits such as "desires", "motivations", "likes and dislikes" which were demonstratively not part of its programming or strictly speaking even its behaviour.

Did these people consider it to be alive? No - BUT if you could replace the body of it with flesh and fur I suspect people would then feel quite comfortable with saying "it has some form of consciousness".

I'm adding this into the mix because I think it starts to demonstrate that how we informally determine whether something else apart from "me" is conscious or not is probably not a good indication whether that other thing does share the same "private behaviours" as we all seem to think we do.

[Dustin Kesselberg]

You can "replicate" the actions of consciousness but creating it is a whole different deal.


We even have robots that completly mimic human reactions. And even more complex "chat bots" that are so complex they seem to be another person talking to you. As if they are conscioius. But they aren't.

Just because we can replicate the actions consciousness of other animals or humans without resorting to "real consciousness" doesn't mean real consciousness doesn't exist.

Get what i'm saying?

[MRC_Hans]

On the subject of anthromorphism (but otherwise somewhat off topic):

Some years back, there was often, at electronics or computer fairs, a little "robot", roughly in R2D2 style roaming the aisles, handing out brochures, chatting to people in a mechanical, toneless voice, and generally attracting attention. At that time, technology was hardly ripe for making an autonomous machine like that, and sure enough, a guy would be sauntering along nearby, holding one hand in a large bag, and the other near the corner of his mouth.

The point is, because the thing was vaguely andriod in shape (or a shape that had otherwise, through the Star Wars films, been established in the common consciousness as an android), people, certainly including me, were willing to at least contemplate the possibility that it was an autonomous robot. Had it been built in the shape of, say, a small car, everybody would immidiately have assumed it was remote-controlled.

And in fact, now that we do have autonomous robots roaming factory floors and other places, even private homes, they are generally carefully made in non-android shapes, probably to make people less insecure about them.

Hans

[Nick Bogaerts]

And even more complex "chat bots" that are so complex they seem to be another person talking to you. As if they are conscious. But they aren't.

I think on the contrary, early chatterbots (ELIZA, PARRY) demonstrated that a very simple program could give a superficial illusion of 'conscience', as did Darat's AIBO.

[Piggy]

"I" is a human construct.


It's obviously however dogs realize they are an individual or else they wouldn't act the way they do. Why would for instance my dog steal my other dogs rawhide when he isn't looking unless he had some concept of self. Without a concept of self how could he do something with the intent for self pleasure?
Btw, I'm not arguing in favor of my buddy's observation. I was just giving an example of the distinction.

[Interesting Ian]

Merc,
Skinner talked about his toothache. How do we know?

We know through his behaviour -- particularly the fact he tells us he is experiencing toothache.

[Piggy]

I think there may be some real doubt in some way, though certainly not to the degree of "You feel pain? What's that?"
But rather, what does it mean to feel something? To experience something? We have an intuitive understanding of this, which is probably accurate to a certain degree, but intuition is often wrong, especially when we're talking about our own experiences.
Yes, I see that point. But I don't see the relevance. All I'm saying is that the question of whether another critter has "felt experience" is meaningful, even if there's no clear and sure method to provide an answer at the moment. It's worth investigating. And I think Dennett's model is one good way to proceed.

Intuition is certainly often wrong. But I wouldn't call it mere "intuition" that I have felt experience and rocks don't.

I think Mercutio is basically saying that introspection isn't a very good method for finding out about conciousness or the activities of the brain.
I agree.

As such he's looking for a more objective approach; find out how the word is acquired in order to understand what it refers to. I'm not sure that is the best approach, but it seems like it will probably be useful, anyway.
Doesn't seem useful to me, but I'm willing to wait and see if anything comes of it.


But it seems like just an attempt to look at the question from another angle, because he doesn't trust introspection.
Neither do I. Maybe that's the confusion here. I didn't intend to suggest any sort of peering into the quality and content of felt experience. What I am saying is that it is meaningful to pose the question of consciousness in animals in terms of the existence of "felt experience" of the sort we have, as opposed to mere chemical reaction which, I believe, is all that bacteria are capable of.


I don't think he's suggesting that you and he have qualitatively different "felt experiences", rather I think he's suggesting that the term itself is rather vague and possibly inaccurate if we're talking about what's actually going on. I think he may have a point.
It's certainly not a scientific term. But I seriously doubt that anyone doesn't know what I'm referring to. If so, maybe they'll ask.

Also, Merc and others are certainly correct in saying that observation of behavior will necessarily play a part in any study of consciousness in animals. But a purely behavioral definition coupled with a purely behavioral investigative method is, I believe, impossible. When talking about consciousness we can't get around the fact that we're talking about this sticky business of being aware, of having a sense of things that is not merely reaction, not merely behavior. Regardless of what that is (I think it's probably the result of a feedback loop) I don't think there's any doubt that it's real.

If we do relegate consciousness to mere reaction and behavior, then we've effectively dodged the issue.

[Darat]

...snip...

If we do relegate consciousness to mere reaction and behavior, then we've effectively dodged the issue.

Or actually acknowledged what "it" is.

(I'm not saying that it is "mere reaction and behaviour" just pointing out that just because it's an answer we don't like the feel ;) of it isn't really a reason to avoid the correct conclusion.)

[Jeff Corey]

I really don't see what it could be beside behavior.

[Interesting Ian]

Or actually acknowledged what "it" is.

(I'm not saying that it is "mere reaction and behaviour" just pointing out that just because it's an answer we don't like the feel ;) of it isn't really a reason to avoid the correct conclusion.)

It's not a question of not liking the feel of it. We know with absolute certainty that the notion that consciousness is literally behaviour is false. Otherwise there would be no distinction between p-zombies and real people.

[Jeff Corey]

No. We don't know that with absolute certainty. You're spouting nonsense again.

[Piggy]

Or actually acknowledged what "it" is.

(I'm not saying that it is "mere reaction and behaviour" just pointing out that just because it's an answer we don't like the feel ;) of it isn't really a reason to avoid the correct conclusion.)
I was probably unclear above.

As far as I can tell, the phenomenon of conscious experience appears to be entirely an emergent phenomenon arising from the physical activity of the brain.

But this emergent phenomenon is not entirely equivalent to this physical activity.

There exists in the universe the phenomenon of "felt experience". And while it arises from, is dependent on, and is never separate from brain activity (as far as we know), and therefore can be presumed to be explainable entirely in terms of brain activity, it is not necessarily always associated with the activity of any sort of brain.

It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider how this phenomenon may arise, what sorts of brains may produce it, and which animals may engage in it, and to what degrees.

And it is not only worthwhile for mere scientific curiosity, but also for ethical reasons. It matters whether a fetus has a felt experience of pain. It matters if a cat or dog does, and if a cricket doesn't.

That being the case, it is worthwhile to attempt to develop ways of determining whether other critters are subject to this phenomenon. If we can come to understand how this sense of experience is produced by the brain, then we may be able to answer some ethical questions regarding appropriate treatment of animals, for example.

If a cricket has no more experience of the world than a computer, then using it for bait cannot be said to be cruel. If there is no "felt experience" occurring at that point in the universe defined by the body of the cricket, then there is no suffering there either.

If a puppy "feels" pain (and doesn't just physically react to it) in much the same way that you and I do, then certainly it is cruel to burn its ears off. If whales feel emotional pain, then there are ethical implications to capturing them and penning them up to perform in theme parks.

If we do not make reference to this most salient feature of our own consciousness, then we do dodge the issue.

Perhaps I'm wrong, but at the moment I can't see how a purely behavioral approach can effectively address this issue. If it can, then this will be a good thing b/c it will make research much easier.

[Piggy]

Re the role of behaviorism and introspection in answering questions about consciousness....

It seems clear at this point that introspection is going to be a vital component in investigating the relationship between conscious ("felt") experience and brain activity.

For example, look at recent studies into the relationship between average differences in male v. female brain activity and the conscious experience of pain.

Studies like these rely on personal reports by test subjects regarding their experience. These reports can then compared to scans of activity in various areas of the brain.

Similarly, introspection is a key component to studying certain brain pathologies, such as those present in people who show many physical signs of emotion, but who have short-circuits in critical feedback systems of the brain and so have no felt experience of these emotions.

From this type of methodology, combining introspection and neuroscience, we're likely to get insights into the nature of conscious experience that a purely behavioral approach is unlikely ever to produce.

As we learn more, we may be able to describe in greater detail exactly how the phenomenon of felt experience is created, and therefore to begin making informed conclusions regarding when conscious experience arose and which animals participate in it and to what degree.

[Interesting Ian]

No. We don't know that with absolute certainty. You're spouting nonsense again.

Consciousness is the felt experience, therefore it cannot be literally the same thing as behaviour. This is just so obvious. For example I could have toothache but give no sign of it whatsoever in my behaviour or facial expression.

[Jeff Corey]

More nonsense.

[Mercutio]

Consciousness is the felt experience, therefore it cannot be literally the same thing as behaviour. This is just so obvious. For example I could have toothache but give no sign of it whatsoever in my behaviour or facial expression.
Remember, Ian, that Radical Behaviorists define behavior differently than you do; your definition is more in tune with Methodological Behaviorism, which has not been Behaviorism in decades. Radical Behaviorism defines behavior simply as "what you do"; this includes private behavior as well as the public behavior you are speaking of.

(this is beyond the scope of the current thread question, though, and if I recall correctly, Ian, you were one who did read the behaviorism links a year or so ago, so I don't really need to go into it. If I recall, you understood the position, but did not agree with it. Which is fine; just recall that if "feeling pain" is something you do, then it is behavior. Would you agree that feeling pain is something you do?)

[Mercutio]

Piggy, I will address more of this later--I agree, though, we were talking at cross purposes, and agree far more than we disagree. I do still think my approach is useful to address some of the things said here, but real life will prevent me from elaborating for the moment.

[Darat]

...snip.. Otherwise there would be no distinction between p-zombies and real people.

And your point is?

[Piggy]

Piggy, I will address more of this later--I agree, though, we were talking at cross purposes, and agree far more than we disagree. I do still think my approach is useful to address some of the things said here, but real life will prevent me from elaborating for the moment.
Cool. I also think behaviorist approaches have something to contribute. And I'm not deying that other definitions of consciousness are worth considering and investigating also, of course. Looking forward to your later posts.

[Interesting Ian]

Remember, Ian, that Radical Behaviorists define behavior differently than you do;



I don't know what "radical behaviourism" is. If they mean something different by the word "behaviour" as it is commonly employed, then you must provide the definition.



your definition is more in tune with Methodological Behaviorism, which has not been Behaviorism in decades.



No.

Methodological Behaviorism is just the recognition that it is only behaviour which can be scientifically studied. It does not commit itself to any philosophical position on what consciousness actually is in itself. This is in contrast with analytical behaviourism which holds that consciousness just is behaviour.



Radical Behaviorism defines behaviour simply as "what you do"; this includes private behavior as well as the public behavior you are speaking of.



And I've told you before that private behaviour is an oxymoron. By definition behaviour is that which is potentially observable -- that which potentially can be determined from the 3rd person perspective.


just recall that if "feeling pain" is something you do, then it is behavior. Would you agree that feeling pain is something you do?)

Absolutely not. Not only do I not agree, but it is transparently false. Appropriate physical processes in the brain might elicit or cause or generate pain, but pain itself is numerically distinct from the physical processes which give rise to it.

[Interesting Ian]

And your point is?

The point is that some thing that looks exactly like a human being, and behaves indistinguishably from a human being, does not entail by definition that the thing in question is conscious.

No matter how incredibly implausible and unlikely you might feel it is, it is not the case that all other apparent people are by definition conscious. Another person's feelings, pains, thoughts etc, are not by definition constituted by your visual observations of their behaviour. It is conceivable (albeit arguably incredibly unlikely) that no one apart from you is actually conscious.

An analytical behaviourist, on the other hand, says that other people by definition are conscious. This is clearly utterly absurd.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Appropriate physical processes in the brain might elicit or cause or generate pain, but pain itself is numerically distinct from the physical processes which give rise to it.

How distinct? why "numerically" distinct? Physical processes in the brain are certainly behaviour, so, if you agree in that those processes are the cause of the pain, why do you object that when explaining such mechanism one could explain pain in purely physical terms?

Unless you can demonstrate that "pain" is different from "brain processes" you are expressing wishful thinking, not doing philosophy nor science.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

An analytical behaviourist, on the other hand, says that other people by definition are conscious. This is clearly utterly absurd.

Clearly utterly absurd... why exactly. I want to see the argument, not only the emotional part.

[Interesting Ian]

Clearly utterly absurd... why exactly. I want to see the argument, not only the emotional part.

You cannot logically maintain that your consciousness is utterly distinct from your behaviour, but that other peoples' consciousness are one and the very same thing as their behaviour.

[Interesting Ian]

How distinct? why "numerically" distinct? Physical processes in the brain are certainly behaviour, so, if you agree in that those processes are the cause of the pain, why do you object that when explaining such mechanism one could explain pain in purely physical terms?


This has absolutely nothing to do with behaviourism -- the topic iunder discussion.

[Mercutio]

I don't know what "radical behaviourism" is. If they mean something different by the word "behaviour" as it is commonly employed, then you must provide the definition.
It is quite apparent that you do not know radical behaviorism. Too bad, as it is the current school of thought within behaviorism. If you are going to argue against it, you might wish to argue against it, and not against a strawman.

I did define behavior. It is what you do.


No.

Methodological Behaviorism is just the recognition that it is only behaviour which can be scientifically studied. It does not commit itself to any philosophical position on what consciousness actually is in itself. This is in contrast with analytical behaviourism which holds that consciousness just is behaviour.
Perhaps we differ in that you approach this from the philosophy angle, whereas I approach it from the experimental science angle. John B. Watson, the preeminent methodological behaviorist, thought that consciousness was "talking to yourself"; purely an objective behavior, initially (kids talk themselves through problems all the time), but more and more subtle as we learn to hide the behavior. He even tried putting electrodes on a person's larynx to measure their vestigal speech while thinking.
And I've told you before that private behaviour is an oxymoron. By definition behaviour is that which is potentially observable -- that which potentially can be determined from the 3rd person perspective.
You admit above that you do not know Radical Behaviorism, but you dismiss its definitions out of hand. Private behavior differs from public behavior only in the number of potential observers. Both are natural events; both are appropriate for scientific study; both are under the control of their antecedent and consequential stimuli.

You are giving your definition of behavior, not radical behaviorism's. It is only an oxymoron to you because you define behavior incompletely.
Absolutely not. Not only do I not agree, but it is transparently false. Appropriate physical processes in the brain might elicit or cause or generate pain, but pain itself is numerically distinct from the physical processes which give rise to it.You do not feel pain? How do you know when you have a toothache, let alone when another person does?

[Interesting Ian]

It is quite apparent that you do not know radical behaviorism. Too bad, as it is the current school of thought within behaviorism. If you are going to argue against it, you might wish to argue against it, and not against a strawman.



Mercutio, I have read numerous books and papers on the mind-body problem. They are all united in their conclusion that analytical behaviourism, i.e metaphysical behaviourism, is dead and buried. I have never come across this "radical behaviourism"; not ever, apart from you.

So the question here is whether it is a scientific position on how best to study consciousness, or whether it is a metaphysical position on the mind-body problem. If the former then it is completely uninteresting. If the latter I want to know how it differs from analytical behaviourism.

You say that consciousness exists, but that it is a private behaviour. How is an experience of toothache a behaviour? It is simply flat out false. A pain is simply that, and never anything more. It might well be caused or generated by physical processes, but that of course does not make pain a behaviour. If you're saying pain is the very same as these physical processes, then that's identity theory, not any type of behaviourism (and identity theory, at least type identity theory, is also dead and buried).



I did define behavior. It is what you do.
Perhaps we differ in that you approach this from the philosophy angle, whereas I approach it from the experimental science angle.



I just don't have any interest whatsoever in approaching it from an experimental science angle. Science could only ever in principle study behaviour and not consciousness itself.



John B. Watson, the preeminent methodological behaviorist, thought that consciousness was "talking to yourself";



Well you can certainly talk to yourself in your head. But that's one thing that consciousness does, not what it is.




purely an objective behavior, initially (kids talk themselves through problems all the time),



Oh, you mean talking out loud to yourself . . . That certainly isn't consciousness no.



but more and more subtle as we learn to hide the behavior. He even tried putting electrodes on a person's larynx to measure their vestigal speech while thinking.
You admit above that you do not know Radical Behaviorism, but you dismiss its definitions out of hand.


Yes I do indeed dismiss it's definitions out of hand. This is because by definition consciousness is not constituted by behaviour. Otherwise a p-zombie by definition would be conscious. But by definition it is not conscious. Thus we get a logical inconsistency.

The only way you can get out of that is to assert p-zombies are logically impossible. But if you maintain this you need to say the entirety of a person's behaviour (and if you like we can include brain processes here) is actually wholly constitutive or equates to their consciousness. But this is flat out false since in addition to everything I ever do or say there are the actual conscious experiences themselves.

So you see all behaviourist positions are flat out absurd. Indeed all reductive materialist positions are flat out absurd. There are no 2 ways about it I'm afraid.



Private behavior differs from public behavior only in the number of potential observers.


Hang on a sec. We don't observe our own conscious states. They are just immediately given or experienced.



Both are natural events; both are appropriate for scientific study; both are under the control of their antecedent and consequential stimuli.



Consciousness certainly isn't appropriate for any scientific study. Not unless you rely upon subjective reports. According to science we should all be p-zombies. But we're not. So much for the scientific study of consciousness!



You are giving your definition of behavior, not radical behaviorism's.



It doesn't matter about my definition of behaviour. What you are not allowed to do is to redefine the word behaviour to refer to conscious experiences. By doing this you're abusing the English Language. And it's going to make communication with me rather difficult since I resolutely refuse to embrace any of the materialists redefining of words.


It is only an oxymoron to you because you define behavior incompletely.
You do not feel pain? How do you know when you have a toothache, let alone when another person does?

I know I have toothache because it is immediately given. I do not observe the pain. It is not a process, least of all a behaviour. It is simply that, a pain. Moreover it is never anything more than a pain. Playing around with words can never alter this fundamental truth.

[Piggy]

I just don't have any interest whatsoever in approaching it from an experimental science angle. Science could only ever in principle study behaviour and not consciousness itself.

<snip>

Consciousness certainly isn't appropriate for any scientific study. Not unless you rely upon subjective reports. According to science we should all be p-zombies. But we're not. So much for the scientific study of consciousness!

Good God, man, you don't even understand science.

[Interesting Ian]

Good God, man, you don't even understand science.

Eh . .I rather think I do. At least the philosophical underpinnings of science. I got a first in the history and philosophy of science module at University, and a first in the empiricist module, and a first in the origins of modern science module (although only a 2.1 in the mind-body problem module). Moreover my understanding was minuscule then as compared to now.

So my suggestion is that, in common with almost everyone else on here, it is you who do not know what you are talking about.

[Roboramma]

Ian, why do you think science should conclude that we are all p-zombies?

[Piggy]

Eh . .I rather think I do. At least the philosophical underpinnings of science. I got a first in the history and philosophy of science module at University, and a first in the empiricist module, and a first in the origins of modern science module (although only a 2.1 in the mind-body problem module).
Any actual science mixed in there, brother?

[Darat]

Ian, why do you think science should conclude that we are all p-zombies?

Because p-zombies are defined to be without something that science can't describe.

It's actually nothing more then a circular argument; p-zombies are only logically coherent if you start with the premise that reality is dualistic.

Despite what some people claim p-zombies can't be used to refute or show that non-dualist concepts of what consciousness "is" are logically incoherent.

[Interesting Ian]

Ian, why do you think science should conclude that we are all p-zombies?

The world is supposed to be physically closed. This means that all change can be explained by reference to physical chains of causes and effects. This means that the totality of our behaviour is due to such physical chains of causes and effects. In particular, everything that occurs in the brain is solely due to prior states of the brain plus input from the environment evolving deterministically according to physical laws (the randomness due to QM is unimportant). Thus the ultimate origin of our behaviour is no different in kind from the Earth as it orbits the Sun, or a boulder as it rolls down a hill.

But this then means that consciousness is completely causally inefficacious since it is the firing of neurons etc which wholly causes our behaviour. But if consciousness has absolutely no affect upon the world whatsoever then science cannot conclude it exists. Science by definition can only deal with that which is causally efficacious. It has no need to appeal to the existence of consciousness since everything we ever do, can be, in principle, completely explained by measurable events in our brains and our environment.

Science is not in the business of postulating entitites or processes which do not affect the world one iota. Therefore from a scientific perspective we are all p-zombies.

[Interesting Ian]

Any actual science mixed in there, brother?

Science is not relevant to the question of whather consciousness can be scientifically explained. It is the philosophy of science which is relevant.

[Beerina]

just checked the "mirror test" passers.....

Humans (older than 18 months), great apes (except for gorillas), and bottlenose dolphins have all been observed to pass the test of recognising themselves in a mirror.

as an add on bonus question....how about computers? Could they "evolve" consciousness (with our help :) )


I don't know, some dogs bark at themselves in a mirror, others, like my Pekingese, completely ignore themselves. And my dog barks at anything that moves, including other dogs, so I know she must be recognizing it as herself. That she doesn't recognize it as a dog is not possible, unless they require scent and/or sound to make it real. Scent I can't see being needed as an animal could be upwind of the animal its looking at. Sound may be another issue though. But they have similar issues with things on TV, it's like they don't exist. TV, though, doesn't provide a 3D world; a mirror does.

[Interesting Ian]

Because p-zombies are defined to be without something that science can't describe.

It's actually nothing more then a circular argument; p-zombies are only logically coherent if you start with the premise that reality is dualistic.



Can I just clarify here. Dualism holds that consciousness exists and the physical world. By the physical world we mean a reality whose existence does not depend upon the mind.

But I'm actually only starting from the premise that consciousness exists. The physical world can be exhaustively defined in terms of various perceptual qualia by subjects. Thus a table is nothing more than a family of tactile and visual qualia in addition to the causal impact it has upon the environment.



Despite what some people claim p-zombies can't be used to refute or show that non-dualist concepts of what consciousness "is" are logically incoherent.

My axiom I start with is that consciousness exists ie qualia of various types such as emotions, pains, visual experiences, tastes and so on. If you do not accept this axiom and suppose that consciousness does not exist, then obviously materialism in all its guises works.

Indeed analytical behaviours and eliminative materialists do deny that anyone has ever been conscious.

I assert I know with complete certainty that I myself am conscious. I cannot prove this however, I take it an an axiom. But once you accept this axiom (or at least the axiom that you are conscious) then reductive materialism fails.

[Mercutio]

I was probably unclear above.

As far as I can tell, the phenomenon of conscious experience appears to be entirely an emergent phenomenon arising from the physical activity of the brain.

But this emergent phenomenon is not entirely equivalent to this physical activity.
I would argue that it is an emergent property of the physical activity of the entire body (including the brain). Our nervous system evolved as part of our bodies, and are entirely dependent on processing that happens in the body. Of course, this is a minor point. The emergent property, though, is not purely formed of brain activity, but of bodily activity as well, and of the language we use in describing and referring to this activity. Unlike Ian, I do not think that there is a thing we can call consciousness that is separate from our own behavior and experience. Rather, there are things we do which have been dumped into the category "bodily actions", others in the category "mental events", and others (the categories do overlap) into "consciousness". And yes, I continue to use the proper Radical Behaviorist definition of behavior, which includes private behavior. "Seeing a tree" is something you do; it is behavior, and it is as well understood as the behavior of walking--that is, neither is understood down to the individual nerve pathways in the brain, but each is understood pretty damned well considering the complexity of the system.)

There exists in the universe the phenomenon of "felt experience". And while it arises from, is dependent on, and is never separate from brain activity (as far as we know), and therefore can be presumed to be explainable entirely in terms of brain activity, it is not necessarily always associated with the activity of any sort of brain.
Agreed entirely. Two points: First, this "awareness of seeing a tree" (one example of a felt experience) may well be the result of a secondary neural pathway, the stimulus for which is the firing of the first neural pathway. So, in addition to "seeing a tree" we have "seeing the seeing of a tree". I think you, Piggy, have talked about Dennett's analysis of this earlier in the thread. But secondly...there is perfectly good reason it is not necessarily always associated withthe activity of any given portion of the brain (although new research shows spindle cells firing when we experience "awareness" of something): we do not learn the term based on the firing of brain areas, but based on behavior. Our referents for consciousness are not the brain firings, but actions which are imperfectly correlated with them. (this is why the analysis of how we learn the word is important--if one critique of the brain activity explanation is that the correlation between brain activity and felt experience is imperfect, this analysis renders that critique irrelevant.) Although the felt experience is (in part) an emergent property of a wide range of brain activities, our understanding of it is an emergent property of an even wider range of publicly observable behaviors which are imperfectly correlated with those brain activities.

It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider how this phenomenon may arise, what sorts of brains may produce it, and which animals may engage in it, and to what degrees.

And it is not only worthwhile for mere scientific curiosity, but also for ethical reasons. It matters whether a fetus has a felt experience of pain. It matters if a cat or dog does, and if a cricket doesn't.
Have you read Dennett's Kinds of Minds? Chapter 4's discussion of pain in both rhesus monkeys and cephalopods is worth examining here.

That being the case, it is worthwhile to attempt to develop ways of determining whether other critters are subject to this phenomenon. If we can come to understand how this sense of experience is produced by the brain, then we may be able to answer some ethical questions regarding appropriate treatment of animals, for example.

If a cricket has no more experience of the world than a computer, then using it for bait cannot be said to be cruel. If there is no "felt experience" occurring at that point in the universe defined by the body of the cricket, then there is no suffering there either.

If a puppy "feels" pain (and doesn't just physically react to it) in much the same way that you and I do, then certainly it is cruel to burn its ears off. If whales feel emotional pain, then there are ethical implications to capturing them and penning them up to perform in theme parks.
I would argue that these questions are independent of ethics. Although I would not wish to cause pain and suffering, where I draw the line is independent of knowledge of "felt pain". (and, of course, comparing to Dennett's ch. 4 I mention above, it is behavioral similarity to our behavior that is the deciding factor, rather than phylogenetic similarity; cephalopods behave sentiently, despite being more closely related to clams than to vertebrates.)

If we do not make reference to this most salient feature of our own consciousness, then we do dodge the issue.
Of course we make reference to it. But we do so based on what we can actually observe and infer, not on what we assume.

Perhaps I'm wrong, but at the moment I can't see how a purely behavioral approach can effectively address this issue. If it can, then this will be a good thing b/c it will make research much easier.I think you are, like, Ian, still treating "behavior" as "publicly observable behavior only". Including private behavior expands the range of things we can explore scientifically, but does not necessarily make the research easier! We still have the problem of its being private; although we can demonstrate that it is amenable to the manipulation of antecedents and consequences, we cannot demonstrate it to a third party. But at least we have no reason to believe that it is different in kind from other natural processes. No reason to turn to dualism...

[Roboramma]

The world is supposed to be physically closed. This means that all change can be explained by reference to physical chains of causes and effects. This means that the totality of our behaviour is due to such physical chains of causes and effects.
I don't see how science makes this assumption. If there was some evidence that showed that this is not true, science as a body of knowledge would be able to grow and expand based on that evidence.

In particular, everything that occurs in the brain is solely due to prior states of the brain plus input from the environment evolving deterministically according to physical laws (the randomness due to QM is unimportant). Thus the ultimate origin of our behaviour is no different in kind from the Earth as it orbits the Sun, or a boulder as it rolls down a hill. Well, that's certainly my stance, but I don't think that science would grind to a halt if it were shown to be wrong. I get the impression that you're suggesting (above) that it would, but maybe I'm misreading you?

But this then means that consciousness is completely causally inefficacious since it is the firing of neurons etc which wholly causes our behaviour.
Unless we assume that conciousness is just our way of modelling the firing of those neurons. That is, conciousness is a property of the brain, rather than existing outside of it. I don't think we know enough right now to say what conciousness is, but I also don't think we can say yet that it isn't that.

But if consciousness has absolutely no affect upon the world whatsoever then science cannot conclude it exists. Science by definition can only deal with that which is causally efficacious. It has no need to appeal to the existence of consciousness since everything we ever do, can be, in principle, completely explained by measurable events in our brains and our environment. Maybe. Except you're forgetting that one of the things we do is be concious, something for which every one of those scientists has evidence. And ignoring that evidence would go against science. In other words it would be unscientific to conclude that conciousness does not exist in the face of evidence (your own conciousness) that it does. What might be done is shown that our understanding of what conciousness is is very different from what it actually is, however.

Science is not in the business of postulating entitites or processes which do not affect the world one iota. Therefore from a scientific perspective we are all p-zombies. You're forgetting that I (and all those scientists) am a part of the world. My conciousness affects me, whatever "me" is, in that I can experience it. To ignore that phenomenon would be the unscientific route. What we can do is study it - hopefully as objectively as possible, find out what our misconceptions about it may be, where it comes from, what parts of the brain affect it or affect what aspects of it, etc. That's scientific. Pretending that it doesn't exist at all, is not.
Of course, if one were to conclude that conciousness is an illusion, that would be very different - after all, illusions exist, just not as what they appear to be.

[Roboramma]

Merc, the idea of private behavior seems interesting. Could you expand on what it is exactly? (I'm sure this is a much bigger question than I realise, so feel free to ignore if I've just asked you to write a textbook :) ).

Oh, I just realised you may have already, but if so I can't find it, so could someone point me to the post number?

I ask because everything I know about behaviorism I learned from Steven Pinker talking about how much he doesn't like it and from your posts. Needless to say you've given me a new perspective on it and I've become quite interested in what you guys have to say. Hoping to learn more. (Pretty please?)

[Mercutio]

Merc, the idea of private behavior seems interesting. Could you expand on what it is exactly? (I'm sure this is a much bigger question than I realise, so feel free to ignore if I've just asked you to write a textbook :) ).

Oh, I just realised you may have already, but if so I can't find it, so could someone point me to the post number?

I ask because everything I know about behaviorism I learned from Steven Pinker talking about how much he doesn't like it and from your posts. Needless to say you've given me a new perspective on it and I've become quite interested in what you guys have to say. Hoping to learn more. (Pretty please?)Heh....you asked for it.

Actually, I will first point you to this behaviorism tutorial. (http://psych.athabascau.ca/html/Behaviorism/) It does an excellent job of presenting behaviorism as it was and is--how it developed, philosophical underpinnings, conflicts with other areas...the whole 9 yards.

From the tutorial, a brief answer to your "private behavior" question. It will make more sense in context, and after you complete the tutorial you will be more equipped to understand the finer points. Then, ask me anything! Some part of the environment is private, in the sense that it is accessible only to one individual. Events in this part are important, but they are important as events in the behavioral dimension, not in the mental dimension. The term subjective, as contrasted with objective, is concerned with these same sorts of events. These private or subjective behavioral events are the sorts of phenomena identified in everyday language by such terms as "thinking," "problem solving," "recalling," and "imagining." Thus, radical behaviorism will accept that some behavioral phenomena are private, but not that their ontology is that of a mental or subjective dimension that differs from the physical or objective dimension. In particular, they do not need to be analyzed according to a different conceptual scheme, simply because they are not accessible to more than one individual. Any particular usage of a "mental" or "subjective" term in everyday language is to be analyzed to determine in what respects it is occasioned by behavioral, but not necessarily publicly observable, relations. The important questions are (a) what contingencies are responsible for the development of private events, and (b) what contingencies are responsible for any influence that private events exert on subsequent behavior. For example, as verbal behavior under the control of a private stimulus, introspection is an instance of behavior that needs to be explained. Introspection does not explain other behavioral phenomena. What contingencies make it possible to give introspective reports?

[Piggy]

Science is not relevant to the question of whather consciousness can be scientifically explained. It is the philosophy of science which is relevant.
That is the silliest thing I've heard in weeks. One of the silliest things I've heard ever.

[Piggy]

But this then means that consciousness is completely causally inefficacious since it is the firing of neurons etc which wholly causes our behaviour. But if consciousness has absolutely no affect upon the world whatsoever then science cannot conclude it exists.
There's your problem right there. That's like saying that because waves are the aggregate motions of molecules in the ocean, therefore waves can't affect physical matter. As a former resident of the Florida panhandle, I can assure you this isn't the case.

I think you need to emerge from your philosophies and join the real world.

[Piggy]

I assert I know with complete certainty that I myself am conscious. I cannot prove this however, I take it an an axiom. But once you accept this axiom (or at least the axiom that you are conscious) then reductive materialism fails.
No, it doesn't. Or at least, it doesn't if you are willing to peek beyond your limited philosophy and consider the overwhelming and incontrivertible evidence that an objective reality exists, and the overwhelming evidence that consciousness is indeed an emergent phenomenon arising from brain activity.

[Piggy]

My lunch hour's ending, so I don't have time to consider everything in your post, Merc. I'll say, tho, that I am totally with you and in agreement up to here....

But secondly...there is perfectly good reason it is not necessarily always associated with the activity of any given portion of the brain (although new research shows spindle cells firing when we experience "awareness" of something): we do not learn the term based on the firing of brain areas, but based on behavior.

After the :, you shake me. Somehow I'm just going to have to figure out why you continually shift discussion back to the acquisition of terms. To me, this seems like a tangent, a red herring.

I'll ponder on it.

[Mercutio]

After the :, you shake me. Somehow I'm just going to have to figure out why you continually shift discussion back to the acquisition of terms. To me, this seems like a tangent, a red herring.

I'll ponder on it.
Lemme throw an analogy at you; that might help.

There have been threads here trying to explore the physiological substrate of NDE's (near-death experiences), no? In my experience, these threads have gotten bogged down because there is no one physiological cause that suffices to explain the variety of NDE's that have been reported. Some will then argue that, since there is no cause that fits all the examples, there must be no physiological cause of the phenomenon.

Ah, but that is the rub; the use of "phenomenon", singular, presumes that NDE's are of a kind. They may vary from one another, but all are assumed (by this logical line, anyway) to be variations on the same theme. As such, it is legitimate to look for a single cause.

My approach, then, would be to examine the term NDE, to see what sorts of things we put into that fuzzy category. In various threads here and on believer sites, we get everything from automobile accidents in which someone was not even injured, but "had [his] life pass before [his] eyes", to cases of stopped hearts, to cases in which no measureable brain activity could be detected. (Not to mention, we get widely varying clinical situations, from casual observation to individuals hooked up to various monitors in hospitals.) It seems, sometimes, like the only thing they have in common is the label NDE. It seems foolish to me to expect this wide variety of situations to all somehow have the same cause. The lack of a single explanation for this wide range of experiences is perfectly understandable (especially when various subsets are perfectly well explained by known processes, although the same processes are irrelevant to other subsets), and does not beg the question at all.

It seems to me that it seems to you that I conflate language and behavior, but in cases like this it is necessary. "NDE's" are an emergent property of the various different experiences that we lump together as NDE's, but the term itself is also an emergent property of the various ways we speak of the experiences. If asked to "explain NDE's", both sorts of emergence are important. The first can only be examined after the second has been (we cannot explain a category of NDE's until we have delimited it; if the second sort of emergent property throws together two physiologically distinct processes, there can be no analysis that shows one process to explain them both.)

Back to consciousness for a bit. Suppose we limit ourselves to "awareness" as a subset of conscious experience, just to make things more manageable. We then look to find a physiological substrate underpinning "awareness" as a felt experience. So far, all well and good. But as you say, we may find no area of the brain firing consistently with awareness. Now would be the time to examine what we mean by awareness, and whether we are looking at several different processes which we have labeled, emergently, with one term. It could be (purely hypothetical here) that awareness of seeing something results in spindle-cell firing, but awareness of pain does not. If "awareness" is seen as monolithic, this is a problem. If, however, we realize that we have "awareness" as the label for a number of different referents, there is no reason that the physiological underpinnings of one should be the physiological underpinnings for all.

Any who look at "awareness" as a unitary thing (even if it is viewed as an emergent property of a set of neural firings) will see no clear substrate, and will be able to argue a dualism-of-the-gaps and say that any one explanation is insufficient. Which it is...but only because the assumption of a unitary awareness (or, by extension, consciousness) is a flawed assumption.

[Piggy]

Rather, there are things we do which have been dumped into the category "bodily actions", others in the category "mental events", and others (the categories do overlap) into "consciousness". And yes, I continue to use the proper Radical Behaviorist definition of behavior, which includes private behavior. "Seeing a tree" is something you do; it is behavior, and it is as well understood as the behavior of walking--that is, neither is understood down to the individual nerve pathways in the brain, but each is understood pretty damned well considering the complexity of the system.)
Well, then, this "radical behaviorism" is very different from any behaviorism I studied as part of my psych minor in the undergrad days... but that was a couple decades ago, so perhaps things have changed.

Yet it seems to me that folding the mental experience of perceiving a tree into behaviorism violates the most fundamental tenets of the approach, since perceiving a tree by subject A cannot be observed by observer B.

Sounds like behaviorism shoehorning itself into areas where it cannot reasonably go.

But since I've been out of that loop for a while, let's call thought and perception and such things "behavior".

First, this "awareness of seeing a tree" (one example of a felt experience) may well be the result of a secondary neural pathway, the stimulus for which is the firing of the first neural pathway. So, in addition to "seeing a tree" we have "seeing the seeing of a tree".
Ok, let's parse this out a bit b/c the language seems dangerously loose here.

It seems you're drawing a meaningful distinction (which I would also draw) between a physical sort of sight -- that is, biological reception of a light pattern, neural processing, and physical reaction -- and awareness of seeing -- that is, the "felt experience" which is different from reflex or unconscious reaction.

I dislike the phrase "seeing the seeing of a tree" b/c it hints at the homunculus fallacy.

So let's provide a perhaps more case-clarifying example -- perception of a missile.

Suppose you and I are walking across the quad in the late afternoon and suddenly I flinch and duck.

"What happened?", you ask.

"I don't know," I say. "I felt like something was going to hit me." (Most likely, this assessment was performed after the fact.)

"It was probably just the shadow of the frisbee," you say. You point to some students playing frisbee. "I saw the shadow move over your face just as you ducked."

That's non-conscious processing of light stimulus, reaction without awareness. Presumably (tho it's too early to get into the details yet) this is how insects react to light stimulus.

On the other hand, suppose we're walking across the quad in the late afternoon and suddenly I say, "Great catch!" and point to a student descending from the air with a frisbee in his outstretched hand.

That's not mere physical reaction to light stimulus. My voiced appreciation of the deftness of the catch is evidence of something more -- of conscious awareness. The fact that I am able to assess what I see, deduce the referents (so to speak), and provide an emotional evalution is evidence that I have a felt experience associated with these patterns of light which goes beyond biologically programmed reaction.

So I would say, in addition to purely physical sight (physical perception - physical processing- physical reaction, akin or equivalent to a reflex), we have conscious awareness of what is seen, a sense of having personally experienced the event.

Let us call these "physical sight" and "conscious seeing".


I think you, Piggy, have talked about Dennett's analysis of this earlier in the thread. But secondly...there is perfectly good reason it is not necessarily always associated withthe activity of any given portion of the brain (although new research shows spindle cells firing when we experience "awareness" of something): we do not learn the term based on the firing of brain areas, but based on behavior.
This is where I have to break with you.

Suddenly invoking our juvenile acquisition of the term is irrelevant. The only pertinent question is: What do we mean by the term here and now, in this thread?

If you were defining behavior the way I was taught in college psych, you would likely be wrong here. Chances are, most of us did not learn the meaning of the term by observing behavior in the way my profs defined it. Chances are, our mother or father or teacher said something like, "When you're awake, you're conscious; when you're asleep but not dreaming, you're unconscious. Rocks aren't conscious because they never think or feel anything." So we learn what it means by considering our own mental states.

But here you're defining behavior much more broadly. So according to your definition, we learn the term by observing (I suppose) our own "private behavior" and comparing that to the definition we have been provided, and coming up with a workable definition.

But so what?

It doesn't matter what we thought when we learned the term. It only matters what we mean by the term now.

When we learned the term "Santa Claus" most of us thought it referred to an actual magical man. But so what? Now we know better. If we are to discuss Santa Claus, all that matters is what we understand it to mean now.

So even if we do learn the term based on our observation of our own "private behavior", this is still irrelevant.

If we want to discuss the fact that conscious awareness cannot be mapped exclusively to activity in any specific area of the brain, we may do that without appeal to our acquisition of the term. In fact, to avoid falling into needless linguistic traps, I highly recommend that we avoid this unnecessary and unproductive appeal to acquisition.

Our referents for consciousness are not the brain firings, but actions which are imperfectly correlated with them.
By this point, the shoehorned definition of behavior is becoming burdensome.

It reminds me of a certain education course I took, in which "literacy" was defined so loosely as to include distinguishing among cartoons on a cereal box. At that point, the value of the term as meaning "being able to read and write" (as opposed to "not being able to read and write") was lost. Because it meant almost anything, it meant almost nothing.

My referent for consciousness is not the firings. (It is hoped that one day we'll understand the relationships among the firings and conscious events.)

But neither is my referent any sort of "action" in the way the term was defined in my psych courses.

My referent is precisely the "felt experience" which I am aware of, and which I know other human beings must also be aware of. The fact that I infer the presence of felt experience in other humans from their behavior, and from my understanding of the world and of science and evolution, does not in any way transfer the referent of the term "consciousness" to these behaviors by which I deduce the presence of felt experience (the actual true and enduring referent). The referent remains "felt experience".

So yes, by "consciousness" we mean what you call "private behavior" or what others have called "mental events". We mean "seeing" rather than "sight", as explained in the example above.


(this is why the analysis of how we learn the word is important--if one critique of the brain activity explanation is that the correlation between brain activity and felt experience is imperfect, this analysis renders that critique irrelevant.)
Actually, discussion of acquisition of the term has no impact on this critique. This critique must be dealt with by other means, involving comparisons of observed neural activity and reported mental states, combined with analysis of the relationship between the actions of other emergent phenomena and patterns in their underlying components.

The demand for one-to-one correspondence can be shown to be invalid by comparison to other sorts of emergent phenomena such as waves and vortices. It is clear that the actions of the macro-constructs do not precisely correlate with the actions of the micro-constituents and that the latter cannot be predicted or accurately described solely by reference to the former. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that we should see anything different when it comes to the relationship between consciousness and neural firings.

Forays into term acquisition remain irrelevant and ineffective in this arena.

Although the felt experience is (in part) an emergent property of a wide range of brain activities, our understanding of it is an emergent property of an even wider range of publicly observable behaviors which are imperfectly correlated with those brain activities.
If you're saying here that our investigation of the emergent phenomenon of consciousness, which is imperfectly correlated to neural activity in the brain, relies on the emergent phenomenon of consciousness, which is imperfectly correlated to neural activity in the brain, I would classify that observation as trivial.

Have you read Dennett's Kinds of Minds? Chapter 4's discussion of pain in both rhesus monkeys and cephalopods is worth examining here.
No. Can you provide a synopsis?

I would argue that these questions are independent of ethics. Although I would not wish to cause pain and suffering, where I draw the line is independent of knowledge of "felt pain".
Then all you are saying is that these questions are independent of your ethics. They are certainly not independent of mine.

(and, of course, comparing to Dennett's ch. 4 I mention above, it is behavioral similarity to our behavior that is the deciding factor, rather than phylogenetic similarity; cephalopods behave sentiently, despite being more closely related to clams than to vertebrates.)
That's not how I would procede. Behavior can be deceptive. Similar behavior may arise from various sources (e.g., conscious awareness or programming). The study of evolution and the study of emergent phenomena and the study of AI demonstrate that similar effects may arise from very different causes.

Therefore, I would prefer to procede by investigating how our brains produce felt experience, how damage to various areas of the human brain affects felt experience, and begin to tease out the mechanisms, and make deductions from these observations regarding what is likely true of other species, based upon their brain structures.

[Interesting Ian]

There's your problem right there. That's like saying that because waves are the aggregate motions of molecules in the ocean, therefore waves can't affect physical matter. As a former resident of the Florida panhandle, I can assure you this isn't the case.

I think you need to emerge from your philosophies and join the real world.

Waves are nothing but the sum of the motions of all the molecules comprising the waves. The waves causal power is therefore only apparent; that is its causal power is epiphenomonal.

This is the thesis of reductionism. All real causal powers resides in the ultimate entities comprising an object or process. The causal power of the object itself is only apparent. It's apparent causal power is really only the resultant of all the ultimate small entities comprising it.

The same applies to consciousness. According to reductionism everything we ever do is simply due to the interactions of elementary particles because it is only these ultimately small particles which have true causal powers.

So you're right, according to reductive materialism, strictly speaking, neither waves, consciousness or anything else apart from the fundamental smallest particles have real true causal powers.

Thus consciousness is not causally efficacious in a real true sense, even though it is very useful to suppose it does.

But I have argued elsewhere that to suppose consciousness is not truly causally efficacious is incoherent.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian :
I assert I know with complete certainty that I myself am conscious. I cannot prove this however, I take it an an axiom. But once you accept this axiom (or at least the axiom that you are conscious) then reductive materialism fails.

Piggy
No, it doesn't. Or at least, it doesn't if you are willing to peek beyond your limited philosophy and consider the overwhelming and incontrivertible evidence that an objective reality exists, and the overwhelming evidence that consciousness is indeed an emergent phenomenon arising from brain activity.

I don't have any problem with the idea that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon. It does however directly contradict reductionism. I'll just quote from my forthcoming website to try and clarify this concept of reductionism.


If all phenomena can be understood by looking at its component parts and how these parts interact, then this process must continue until we reach the smallest component parts possible. In principle then reductionism entails that the physics of elementary particles – the smallest particles physics deems exists --should in principle be able to explain all things. In practice though reality is far too complex for this to be achieved. For this reason there are many differing branches of science, each with their own distinctive methods of investigation and theories. We have, for example, the sciences of:

Physics
Chemistry
Biology
Psychology
Sociology,

As we descend the list each branch of science deals with phenomena on a progressively greater and greater scale, and each has their own distinctive method of investigation and theories peculiar to that discipline. Nevertheless, in principle, if not in practice, the reductionist must hold that the science dealing with the entities on the smallest scale -- namely physics – can explain and replace all the theories in the other scientific disciplines.

Let us try to illustrate this idea further by referring once more to the example of a clockwork clock. As an example of reduction it was stated above that by looking at the components of that clock - namely the cogs, the springs, and the wheels - and how they all interrelate together, we can actually understand how the hour, the minute and the second hands move. But suppose, for whatever reason, we were unable to understand the intricate mechanism. This need not stop us making certain observations such as noting the respective rotational speeds of the hour, minute and second hands. Indeed we can even formulate a very simple theory regarding the respective rotational speeds of the hands that can be expected to hold in the future.

Likewise, for each branch of science, we can systematically relate various phenomena that the particular science is concerned with, and subsume the data under some appropriate theory concerning how they will relate in the future. But just as we need to appeal to the underlying intricate mechanism to find the real reason for the movement of the hands in the clock, so we have to appeal to physics, indeed elementary particle physics, if we wish to find the real reason why phenomena are related in a certain way. Indeed, even with the example of the clockwork clock, the solidity of the clock's components, and thus the fact that the cogs and wheel can exert forces when in contact with each other, is explained by the mutual electrical repulsion force between the electrons* (an electron is an example of an elementary particle) near the surface of the respective cogs and wheels and the other internal components. Thus the fact that a clock keeps time can ultimately be explained by the properties and motions of elementary particles.

But now we come to the crucial point. If, as reductionism implies, all change in nature and natural phenomena results from alterations in the ultimately smallest particles of matter, then we human beings should of course constitute no exception. Indeed this was understood as far back as the birth of the mechanical philosophy in the 17th-century. Even as long ago as then it was widely debated whether animals could be understood as being, in essence, mere biological machines. More radical thinkers took this to its logical conclusion and advocated that human beings too might simply be elaborate machines.

Let us explore the implications of this. Consider the fact that we have the science of psychology to explain peoples’ behaviour. Now the (reductionist) materialist holds that the usage of psychological concepts is simply one of convenience. To take one example: although a lot of our behaviour is held to be explicable in terms of the desire on our parts to fulfil certain goals we may have, the reductionist materialist holds that the true real causes of a person’s behaviour are the physical processes occurring in my brain. Such physical processes are an inevitable outcome of prior physical states of my brain, which, together with the input to the brain from the environment provided by the 5 senses, evolve or change according to physical laws. And, in addition, the physical state of the brain and its change to other physical states can ultimately be understood, at least in principle, by the properties and interactions of the most fundamental constituents composing our bodies; namely the properties and interactions of the elementary particles subsumed under the subject matter of physics. In short the science of physics is considered to be the most fundamental of the sciences, and is capable, in principle, of completing explaining our behaviour.



OK, now emergence denies this. Even though it holds that consciousness is generated by the brain, consciousness cannot itself be scientifically explained. Imagine that the movements of the hands of a clockwork clock was accompanied by consciousness i.e the clock is conscious. Now by examining the mechanism we might be able to understand how the clocks hands move, but we wouldn't be able to understand why the hands movements was accompanied by consciousness. Thus if clocks were conscious we would need to embrace the idea that the consciousness emerges somehow, rather than being able to be derived as reductionism holds. The same goes for people.

Moreover emergence is quite happy to embrace the idea of downward causation. That is to say that some of our body movements are actually due to consciousness per se rather than the ultimate particles comprising our brains.

So are you sure you wish to hold that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon?

BTW I'm not sure what you mean by your assertion that an objective reality exists. If you mean a reality independent of consciousness then I disagree.

[Piggy]

Waves are nothing but the sum of the motions of all the molecules comprising the waves. The waves causal power is therefore only apparent; that is its causal power is epiphenomonal.
This is not accurate. Waves are not the sum of the motions of all the molecules. Waves cannot be described by referring only to molecular motion. To speak meaningfully of waves, we must refer to mid-level entities such as currents, temperature zones, densities, and the like.

The wave's causal power is not merely "apparent". The wave has very real and measurable effects which cannot be reduced in any meaningful way to an aggregate effect of the molecular motion.

This is the thesis of reductionism. All real causal powers resides in the ultimate entities comprising an object or process. The causal power of the object itself is only apparent. It's apparent causal power is really only the resultant of all the ultimate small entities comprising it.
If that is the thesis of reductionism, then reductionism is fatally flawed and does not deserve consideration. The universe clearly does not operate this way.

The same applies to consciousness. According to reductionism everything we ever do is simply due to the interactions of elementary particles because it is only these ultimately small particles which have true causal powers.
If that's what "reductionism" claims, then reductionism is an absurd philosophy with no basis in science or direct observation.

But I have argued elsewhere that to suppose consciousness is not truly causally efficacious is incoherent.
Ok. But let's try tackling that without setting up this strawman of reductionism as you have described it. It may easily be dispensed with.

[Piggy]

I don't have any problem with the idea that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon. It does however directly contradict reductionism.
Then farewell, reductionism. I find reductionism as you've described it to be patently false anyway.

If all phenomena can be understood by looking at its component parts and how these parts interact, then this process must continue until we reach the smallest component parts possible. In principle then reductionism entails that the physics of elementary particles – the smallest particles physics deems exists --should in principle be able to explain all things.

Since you've made a deadly mistake in the first 2 sentences, I don't feel obliged to read further in this passage.

The materialist stance holds that all phenomena can be understood by working upward from component parts without invoking dualism or supernaturalism.

Emergence fits in very nicely. The materialist POV does not claim that the physics of elementary particles should be able to explain all phenomena at higher levels of magnification and organization. If you understood the workings of science rather than merely your selections from the philosophy of science, you would know this and would not be making such patently false statements.


Imagine that the movements of the hands of a clockwork clock was accompanied by consciousness i.e the clock is conscious.
Why would I imagine something as silly as that? That's like saying, "Imagine that there was a hurricane inside the belly of a hyena", then trying to reason from there whether science is capable of understanding hurricanes.

The same goes for people.
The same does not go for people. People have brains, and scientific investigation into how these brains operate is at last beginning to shed light on how consciousness is created and maintained by the body.

Moreover emergence is quite happy to embrace the idea of downward causation. That is to say that some of our body movements are actually due to consciousness per se rather than the ultimate particles comprising our brains.

So are you sure you wish to hold that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon?
Yes. Quite happy.

BTW I'm not sure what you mean by your assertion that an objective reality exists. If you mean a reality independent of consciousness then I disagree.
You're free to disagree, but don't expect me to get sucked into that tired old discussion.

[Interesting Ian]

This is not accurate. Waves are not the sum of the motions of all the molecules. Waves cannot be described by referring only to molecular motion. To speak meaningfully of waves, we must refer to mid-level entities such as currents, temperature zones, densities, and the like.


We must refer to them? All these "mid-level entities" can simply be derived from the motion and arrangements of more fundamental entities which these "mid-level entities" are made of. Certainly denying this denies reductionism.

[Mercutio]

Ok, I can only touch on a few things here, and I am away from the office so I am away from the Dennett book to summarize below. I will, later, though.
Well, then, this "radical behaviorism" is very different from any behaviorism I studied as part of my psych minor in the undergrad days... but that was a couple decades ago, so perhaps things have changed.
heh...you learned about behaviorism during the heart of the "cognitive revolution". For a number of reasons (many of which are the behaviorists' own fault), this means you probably were exposed to an obsolete form of behaviorism, while the real behaviorists (a very small number, because cognition was hot at the time) were in their labs doing other things.

Yet it seems to me that folding the mental experience of perceiving a tree into behaviorism violates the most fundamental tenets of the approach, since perceiving a tree by subject A cannot be observed by observer B.
Yeah, just as I suspected. Your behaviorism, like Ian's, is a caricature. Accurate as of around 1960, but not at all accurate today. If you have access to "Case studies in the great power of steady misrepresentation" (American Psychologist, 1992 I think) or "Mythmaking: how introductory psychology texts present B.F. Skinner's analysis of cognition" (The Psychological Record, 1997), you will see that what a lot of people know to be true about Radical Behaviorism, simply is not so.

Sounds like behaviorism shoehorning itself into areas where it cannot reasonably go.
It's called science. It progresses. Did Einstein shoehorn physics into areas it could not reasonably go?

But since I've been out of that loop for a while, let's call thought and perception and such things "behavior".
Thought is not behavior--thinking is. But that is the sort of thing that makes perfect sense to a behaviorist (and is a meaningful and important distinction), but is seen as trivial or silly to others.

Ok, let's parse this out a bit b/c the language seems dangerously loose here.

It seems you're drawing a meaningful distinction (which I would also draw) between a physical sort of sight -- that is, biological reception of a light pattern, neural processing, and physical reaction -- and awareness of seeing -- that is, the "felt experience" which is different from reflex or unconscious reaction.
In truth, here I was trying to parse out your example from above, along with a bit of Dennett.

I dislike the phrase "seeing the seeing of a tree" b/c it hints at the homunculus fallacy.
But in this case it is not turtles all the way down. The "awareness" loop is as far as it goes. I can see where you might get the homunculus out of this, but I assure you that behaviorists are even more opposed to homunculi than you are.

That's not mere physical reaction to light stimulus. My voiced appreciation of the deftness of the catch is evidence of something more -- of conscious awareness. The fact that I am able to assess what I see, deduce the referents (so to speak), and provide an emotional evalution is evidence that I have a felt experience associated with these patterns of light which goes beyond biologically programmed reaction.
True...it is learned. Shaped by your environment. Remember that behaviorism is not a simple stimulus-response model.

So I would say, in addition to purely physical sight (physical perception - physical processing- physical reaction, akin or equivalent to a reflex), we have conscious awareness of what is seen, a sense of having personally experienced the event.
Now your own language is getting loose. Is this sense that you speak of here simply something that has emerged from your learning history, or are you assuming it is something more?

This is where I have to break with you.

Suddenly invoking our juvenile acquisition of the term is irrelevant. The only pertinent question is: What do we mean by the term here and now, in this thread?
Which is best answered by how we have acquired the term.

If you were defining behavior the way I was taught in college psych, you would likely be wrong here. Or your college psych was wrong.
Chances are, most of us did not learn the meaning of the term by observing behavior in the way my profs defined it. Chances are, our mother or father or teacher said something like, "When you're awake, you're conscious; when you're asleep but not dreaming, you're unconscious. Rocks aren't conscious because they never think or feel anything." So we learn what it means by considering our own mental states.
I disagree. We could not learn a label which we agree upon with others without reference to publicly observable things. Your example alludes to it with the examples your parents or teachers give you. Of course, that is simplistic--the actual shaping of the word is influenced by many more examples than heavy-handed teaching. And your last sentence does not follow from your example. It should read "so we learn what it means by comparing our [mental states*] to the examples our parents/teachers etc. point out to us." (*private behavior--"mental" implies "not physical", and there is no reason to suspect that.)

But here you're defining behavior much more broadly. So according to your definition, we learn the term by observing (I suppose) our own "private behavior" and comparing that to the definition we have been provided, and coming up with a workable definition.
I guess I should have read ahead.

But so what?

It doesn't matter what we thought when we learned the term. It only matters what we mean by the term now.
[snip]
If we want to discuss the fact that conscious awareness cannot be mapped exclusively to activity in any specific area of the brain, we may do that without appeal to our acquisition of the term. In fact, to avoid falling into needless linguistic traps, I highly recommend that we avoid this unnecessary and unproductive appeal to acquisition.
But if our acquisition of the term included (as with NDE's) different phenomena grouped under one label, the definition is a less precise way of examining the term. Looking at the acquisition allows us to dissect the term into functional units, each of which is then much more accurately studiable.

By this point, the shoehorned definition of behavior is becoming burdensome.
It is not shoehorned. Trust me. I'm a behaviorist. Or ask Jeff Corey.

My referent for consciousness is not the firings. (It is hoped that one day we'll understand the relationships among the firings and conscious events.)

But neither is my referent any sort of "action" in the way the term was defined in my psych courses.

My referent is precisely the "felt experience" which I am aware of, and which I know other human beings must also be aware of. The fact that I infer the presence of felt experience in other humans from their behavior, and from my understanding of the world and of science and evolution, does not in any way transfer the referent of the term "consciousness" to these behaviors by which I deduce the presence of felt experience (the actual true and enduring referent). The referent remains "felt experience".
But you are still defining "felt experience" as one thing--there is absolutely no reason you should. There is every reason to transfer the referent to those behaviors--they more accurately reflect where the word came from, and are more closely tied to it than your private behavior is. This does not deny the importance of your felt experience--it merely chooses a more accurate means of investigating it.

[snip]
Therefore, I would prefer to procede by investigating how our brains produce felt experience, how damage to various areas of the human brain affects felt experience, and begin to tease out the mechanisms, and make deductions from these observations regarding what is likely true of other species, based upon their brain structures.Great. I agree. I just also think that different sorts of "felt experience", because of our learning histories, have been collected under the same label, and that our investigation of felt experience will go much more smoothly if we do not assume that just because a collection of things fits under one label, that they can all be investigated as one thing.

[Interesting Ian]

Emergence fits in very nicely. The materialist POV does not claim that the physics of elementary particles should be able to explain all phenomena at higher levels of magnification and organization.



Reductive materialism certainly does. I don't know about non-reductive materialism. If a thing has properties which are causally efficacious per se, but such properties cannot in principle be derived from all the more fundamental parts composing that thing, then this is holism.

So in the case of consciousness, it cannot be derived from all the parts comprising the brain. Moreover such consciousness is causally efficacious in its own right. In other words the totality of our behaviour cannot in principle be understand by an exhaustive examination of all the arrangements and processes of the ultimate parts comprising the brain. In order to explain some of our behaviour we have to refer to intentions and desires and the like.

But then this is just flat out interactive dualism.






Why would I imagine something as silly as that? That's like saying, "Imagine that there was a hurricane inside the belly of a hyena", then trying to reason from there whether science is capable of understanding hurricanes.


The same does not go for people. People have brains, and scientific investigation into how these brains operate is at last beginning to shed light on how consciousness is created and maintained by the body.



I'm very disappointed. I'm trying to make my website so that intelligent people who have never looked at philosophy can still nevertheless understand it :( I think you're being a bit pig-headed about this.

I'm saying that brains are analogous to any other machine. The parts of a machine and how they interact etc explain the output of the machine in the form of its behaviour or whatever. Once we have a complete understanding of the component parts and their effects on other component parts, we ought to understand everything about its output.

So we understand why the clocks hands moves as it does. This is analogous to understanding people behave as they do -- it's just that they are vastly more complex.

But if the clocks hands were accompanied by consciousness, and if peoples' behaviour is accompanied by consciousness, this consciousness is not something which in principle can be derived from the components of the clock/brain. The components/parts in either case can only ever explain physical happenings in the world e.g the movements of the hands in the case of the clock, and the totality of our behaviour in the case of people.

Just read my website when its finished. I'll let you know when it's completed.

[Interesting Ian]

Forget it

[Piggy]

We must refer to them? All these "mid-level entities" can simply be derived from the motion and arrangements of more fundamental entities which these "mid-level entities" are made of. Certainly denying this denies reductionism.
Yes, we must refer to them.

No, they cannot be adequately described in terms of the motion and arrangements of the constituent particles.

"Reductionism" as you've described it is nonsense, so yes, I deny it.

[Piggy]

Hi, Merc. I'm glad we're hammering out a common language.

Yes, indeed, cognitive theory was the rage during my undergrad days.

A couple of quick notes.

I can see where you might get the homunculus out of this, but I assure you that behaviorists are even more opposed to homunculi than you are.
They couldn't possibly be more opposed than I am. ;) But anyway, I didn't think that you were making this error -- I merely objected to the phrasing b/c it hinted at that error. Carry on....

True...it is learned. Shaped by your environment. Remember that behaviorism is not a simple stimulus-response model.
Yes, I understand that about behaviorism. Even in my day, we were warned against this misunderstanding of behaviorism.

But I need to ask you, what do you mean by "it" here? What is learned?

This may be a point of real divergence in how we're seeing this issue. Or, we could be talking at right angles again and need to keep re-aligning.

Thanks

[Interesting Ian]

Yes, we must refer to them.

No, they cannot be adequately described in terms of the motion and arrangements of the constituent particles.

"Reductionism" as you've described it is nonsense, so yes, I deny it.

I'm not sure what you think reductionism means. Reductionism simply holds that anything can be understood by looking at its componet parts.

Lets look at your examples of mid-level entities which you allege cannot be derived from more fundamental entities:


You said:

To speak meaningfully of waves, we must refer to mid-level entities such as currents, temperature zones, densities, and the like.


But a current is just the sum of all the molecules composing the current. Temperature is just the measure of the dynamics of extremely small particles, the density is simply the number of particles per unit volume.

Nothing here is immune to a reductive analysis.

[I less than three logic]

Nothing here is immune to a reductive analysis.
Nothing here, but consciousness you mean, right? No sense in arguing against yourself. :D

[Piggy]

Now your own language is getting loose. Is this sense that you speak of here simply something that has emerged from your learning history, or are you assuming it is something more?
I don't understand the question.

Here's the difference I mean -- perhaps this will answer.

Suppose we set up an experiment in a sleep lab. We rig people up to brain activity monitors and have someone call out their names at various volumes at various stages of sleep. We do the same when they're awake and engaging in a variety of tasks, and we record the brain activity. We also ask them to describe their experience.

Suppose we discover that at various stages of sleep, the brain and body (an artificial distinction in some important ways, I know) react when the name is called out, but there is never a report of having "heard" the name called out. At other stages of sleep, there is no reaction to the name at all. And in one case, a subject is awakened from REM sleep and reports a dream in which some unseen person was calling his name.

Suppose also that we see something similar in the waking tests. On one end of the scale, when a subject is heavily involved in a task and the name is whispered, there is no discernable reaction in the brain. At the other end, we see all the right circuits lighting up and the subject reports, "I heard my name called". In the middle, when a subject is heavily involved in a task, we see all the circuits active to indicate that the brain is processing the perception of the name, but the subject claims he heard nothing.

Here we have, roughly described, 3 possible states. (Actually, I see them as something more like attractors, but let's not get into that.)

1. No processing of the sound at all.
2. Physical reaction to the sound, but no experience of having heard it.
3. Physical reaction to the sound, plus experience of having heard it.

The difference between 2 and 3 is the difference between mere physical perception-process-reaction (what I expect is happening in insects) and felt experience.

[Piggy]

But a current is just the sum of all the molecules composing the current.
No, it is not. You may well find that every molecule in the current is behaving quite randomly when considered on its own.

[Roboramma]

Yes, we must refer to them.

No, they cannot be adequately described in terms of the motion and arrangements of the constituent particles.

I don't get it, why not? The simplest way to calculate the effect of the earth's gravity on the moon might be to take the earth as a whole object, figure out it's center, and look at how that will effect the moon, but that doesn't mean that this would give a different answer than if we looked at each individual atom that the earth is made up of and calculated it's effect independantly and then added them up. They should both give us the same answer - it's just that the first approach is much simpler, to the point that we aren't even capable of the second approach right now.

Theoretically they should give us the same answers, shouldn't they?

Similarly, just because we can't deduce the laws of chemistry from physics doesn't mean that chemistry isn't just physics - it just means that the level of complexity is greater than our ability to compute.

I'm just not sure what you're saying piggy. There is nothing that the physical properties of water molecules predicts about waves that isn't true - why assume that there are things in waves that aren't predicted by the behavior of water molecules?
That is, why should we think that if we knew everything about those molecules and their interactions and had the computing power to follow through the implications of that knoweldge, that we wouldn't be able to predict a wave?

Why not? What is it about waves that can't be explained by the interaction of those molecules?
Note: I'm not suggesting that we have the knoweldge to make that explanation, just that one should be theoretically possible.

[Piggy]

Temperature is just the measure of the dynamics of extremely small particles, the density is simply the number of particles per unit volume.
Quite right. But the conditions which give rise to the hurricane (an emergent phenomenon) cannot be explained by reference to the physics specific to the molecules. Only when we view the picture at a larger granularity does anything meaningful and explanatory appear. And -- here's the important part -- at that level of magnification the particle-level physics ceases to matter.

This is why we see similar wave action across many types of highly various media. Ditto for vortices.

At this middle level, it doesn't matter much whether the medium is cream in coffee or stars in space.

[Piggy]

Hi, Robo.

I wouldn't use the example of gravity b/c I don't think we're dealing w/ emergent phenomena when we consider it.

I'm just not sure what you're saying piggy. There is nothing that the physical properties of water molecules predicts about waves that isn't true - why assume that there are things in waves that aren't predicted by the behavior of water molecules?
That is, why should we think that if we knew everything about those molecules and their interactions and had the computing power to follow through the implications of that knoweldge, that we wouldn't be able to predict a wave?
What you're proposing and the conclusions you're drawing are different from what Ian is proposing and the conclusions he's drawing.

What you're describing is an upward aggregation of data. That works fine -- keeping in mind, of course, that vital information such as currents, density "fronts", and temperature "fronts" are non-entities at the purely molecular level.

Everything is indeed consistent from level to level. But information at the level of "ocean" is qualitatively different from information at the level of "molecule". And what is vitally important at the molecular level may be unimportant in describing, and predicting, the wave.

What Ian is suggesting is that everything should be explanable entirely from the smallest scale physics. And this is simply not possible. From that claim, Ian moves on to conclude that science is incapable of explaining consciousness, and that consciousness cannot (from a scientific point of view) be considered an agent which acts upon the world.

The action of a hurricane is entirely consistent with atomic physics and with chemistry. But it is not explanable by reference to this level of granularity alone. In order to understand and predict hurricanes, we must make reference to middle-level entitites such as currents and zones of temperature and density.

And these middle-level entities are the prime determiners. Hurricane-like activity could theoretically be produced in media with very different molecular properties from water, if the middle-level conditions were right. Ditto for waves -- you can get very similar behavior if the middle-level stuff is similar, even if the lower-level constituents are not.

[Interesting Ian]

Nothing here, but consciousness you mean, right? No sense in arguing against yourself. :D

Well yes. Remember it suits my purposes to maintain that the whole of reality apart from consciousness can be reductively analysed, because that would be one more thing which makes consciousness uniquely special.

[Interesting Ian]

Hi, Robo.

What you're proposing and the conclusions you're drawing are different from what Ian is proposing and the conclusions he's drawing.



No it's precisely the same.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Well yes. Remember it suits my purposes to maintain that the whole of reality apart from consciousness can be reductively analysed, because that would be one more thing which makes consciousness uniquely special.

There are emotional reasons for this, no logical reasons, but I guess thats not what you want us to read.

Have you read Geoff's threads? You will find pretty good arguments (from all sides) in there. It would be advisable for you to read and learn why your "special" consciousness (one that its independent from the so called physical universe) its not logically sustainable.

[Interesting Ian]

There are emotional reasons for this, no logical reasons, but I guess thats not what you want us to read.



There are emotional reasons and no logical reasons for what?



Have you read Geoff's threads? You will find pretty good arguments (from all sides) in there. It would be advisable for you to read and learn why your "special" consciousness (one that its independent from the so called physical universe) its not logically sustainable.

I have never come across any good arguments from the materialists on here. If you think you've spotted one then post the link to the relevant post and I'll let you know what I think.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I have never come across any good arguments from the materialists on here. If you think you've spotted one then post the link to the relevant post and I'll let you know what I think.

1) There are no materialists in this forum

2) In such threads there are arguments regarding some of the possible explanations of what is called "consciousness" and its relation to what is called "world".

[Darat]

(Not as Admin!)

Could we keep this on track and keep the philosophy and metaphysics ramblings where it belongs - in the "R&P" section? I'm interested in the science that is being discussed.

[Piggy]

Btw, I'm not a Wiki fan, but I do think there's some helpful stuff in Wikipedia's entry on Emergence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence).

[Interesting Ian]

Btw, I'm not a Wiki fan, but I do think there's some helpful stuff in Wikipedia's entry on Emergence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence).

This word emergence is a horribly ambiguous word which has a whole host of differing meanings. But I'll content myself with saying this. It cannot be compatible with reductionism otherwise it would be vacuous to say it is "emergent".

The article states:


One reason why emergent behaviour is hard to predict is that the number of interactions between components of a system increases combinatorially with the number of components, thus potentially allowing for many new and subtle types of behaviour to emerge.


No it's not just hard to predict, it's impossible in principle to predict. Otherwise it's compatible with reductionism and hence not emergent.

What the guy seems to be talking about is simply the fact that many macroscopic phenomena cannot be understood by a reductive analysis due to the enormous complexity, rather than the fact that the phenomenon is not entailed by the interactions of such fundamental particles. But this is not "emergence" at all. Certainly it is not an interesting emergence and it certainly is not how I use the word.

[Piggy]

Ian, why do you keep dredging up this business about reductionism? No one here claims to believe in it -- at least not as you describe it. If you don't stop punching that strawman you're going to give us all hayfever.

[Interesting Ian]

Ian, why do you keep dredging up this business about reductionism? No one here claims to believe in it -- at least not as you describe it. If you don't stop punching that strawman you're going to give us all hayfever.

{shrugs}

To deny reductionism is to deny the spirit of the scientific enterprise.

Let's consider a good old fashioned clockwork clock. We wonder how it manages to keep time. So we study all the cogs and springs and wheels, and how they all interact, and we can work out why the minute and hour hands move as they do. Now that is reductionism! It's just applied common sense. We understand how thing work by breaking them apart and looking at how all the parts interact. Ocean waves and hurricanes aren't any different in this respect.

To deny this would be as if our clock also had a cuckoo come out on the hour, but this event couldn't be traced back to the interactions of the parts (cogs, springs, wheels etc). Yes the cuckoo comes out when these parts are in a particular arrangement, and doesn't when they're not in this particular arrangement, but a causal story is lacking.

Maybe reality is like that for certain macroscopic phenomena. But it would be against one of the implicit assumptions of physics.

[Mercutio]

I don't understand the question.

Here's the difference I mean -- perhaps this will answer.
[snip]
I will return to your example, but I thought I'd share something else first.

So I was looking for a specific study which addresses your example, and found a couple of other things while I was at it. One noted the differences in neurological response to the subject's own name when spoken by either a familiar or unfamiliar voice. Very cool. Stronger reaction to the familiar voice (not surprising). The abstract (all I read) mentioned the use of the subject's own name as a potent stimulus even in sleeping subjects, so I want to find it and see its literature review. I also want to see what the neurological reaction is--that is, which areas represent auditory awareness? Because what I was looking for was an article on visual awareness...and it would be very interesting to see whether the "awareness" part is the same for both senses--or for others as well. (Some evidence suggests that tactile awareness operates differently from visual awareness--I have seen papers on "tactile blindsight" that suggests important differences.)

But what I wanted to post now is separate. It may well be that our difficulty in understanding one another, Piggy, is that we are too close to one another's positions. You may not see the difficulty that I say exists in how we define consciousness. Anyway, here is the abstract from another journal article, from a Hungarian researcher, Kamondi Szirmai:The notion of consciousness in the English scientific literature denotes a global ability to consciously perform elementary and intellectual tasks, to reason, plan, judge and retrieve information as well as the awareness of these functions belonging to the self, that is, being self-aware. consciousness can also be defined as continuous awareness of the external and internal environment, of the past and the present. The meaning of consciousness is different in various languages, but it invariably includes, the conscious person is capable to learn, retrieve and use information. Disturbance or loss of consciousness in the Hungarian medical language indicates decreased alertness or arousability rather than the impairment of the complex mental ability. Awareness denotes the spiritual process of perception and analysis of stimuli from the inner and external world. Alertness is a prerequisite of awareness. Clinical observations suggest that the lesions of specific structures of the brain may lead to specific malfunction of consciousness, therefore, consciousness must be the product of neural activity. "Higher functions" of human mental ability have been ascribed to the prefrontal and parietal association cortices. The paleocerebrum, limbic system and their connections have been considered to be the center of emotions, feelings, attention, motivation and autonomic functions. Recent evidence indicates that these phylogenetically ancient structures play an important role in the processes of acquiring, storing and retrieving information. The hippocampus has a key role in regulating memory, learning, emotion and motivation. Impaired consciousness in the neurological practice is classified based on tests for conscious behavior and by analyzing the following responses: 1. elementary reactions to sensory stimuli--these are impaired in hypnoid unconsciousness, 2. intellectual reactions to cognitive stimuli--these indicate the impairment of cognitive contents in non-hypnoid unconsciousness. Obviously, disturbance of elementary reactions related to alertness and disturbance of intellectual performance overlap. In conditions with reduced ability to react to or to perceive external stimuli the cognitive disturbance of consciousness cannot fully be explored.Note the wide variety of things that "consciousness" covers. I would suggest that there is no way any one physiological process, even broadly defined, could account for all these definitions. Fortunately, there is no need for that, as long as we recognise that one term may be used for multiple processes.

[Jeff Corey]

As William James, functionalist wonk that he was, said about consciousness, "Its meaning we know so long as no one asks us to define it." (1891)

[Mercutio]

Another interesting paper I will have to find a copy of (abstract only, thus far): it appears to agree with Piggy here, if I am understanding both parties. The author is Samsonovich, in the journal Cortex. We start by assuming that the self is implemented in the brain as a functional unit, with a definite set of properties. We deduce the fundamental properties of the self from an analysis of neurological disorders and from introspection. We formulate a functionalist concept of the self based on these properties reduced to constraints. We use the formalism of schemas in our functionalist analysis, i.e. a symbolic level description of brain dynamics. We then reformulate the functionalist model at a connectionist level and address the emergent "context shifting" problem. We suggest how the model might be mapped onto the functional neuroanatomy of the brain, and how it could be used to give an account of a range of neurological disorders, including hippocampal amnesia, various forms of schizophrenia, multiple personality, autism, PTSD, hemineglect, and reversible anosognosia. Finally, we briefly discuss future perspectives and possible applications of computer implementations of the model. Again, what I take issue with is the assumption of the self as a single functional unit.

The nice thing about this is that empirical investigation can evaluate whether my assumptions or theirs hold hold more explanatory weight. If we ask the right questions. It is not merely a philosophical argument.

[Piggy]

Mercutio, please do share the references you dig up.

I have an obligation this afternoon, but I'd like to steer you to a case study of what might be called "emotional blindness" which is really fascinating. I have it here at home, but have to find. Will do that later today.

There's a lot that I don't miss about living in towns with enormous state universities in them, but one thing I do miss is access to those wonderful libraries!


It may well be that our difficulty in understanding one another, Piggy, is that we are too close to one another's positions. You may not see the difficulty that I say exists in how we define consciousness.
Well, certainly the term is mushy. All terms are, when you get right down to it.

I do think it's possible to speak of "consciousness" in several ways, e.g.:

felt experience;
awareness of one's own existence as a unique and separate entity;
the ability to plan and to solve problems;
or simply being awake and not asleep or passed out etc.


But as long as we're agreed which meaning of the word is on the table, the problem of multiple definitions doesn't have to be a thorny one.

Personally, I find the first definition above to be the most important, for reasons I've explained above. But the second and third are compelling and worth investigation and understanding as well.

In my own idiolect, I would use the term "consciousness" generally for the 1st and last definitions above. For #2 I'd be more likely to say "self awareness", and for #3 I'd be more likely to say "problem-solving ability" or "competence" or something like that, depending on the situation.

Clearly, C-1 must be present for C-2 to be present. I am not convinced that C-1 must always be present for C-3 to be present.

[Piggy]

Again, what I take issue with is the assumption of the self as a single functional unit.
No, I wouldn't say that it's proper to call the self a "single functional unit". The way I see it, our own identities are abstractions maintained by the continual and iterative process of association, involving both perception and memory... and imagination as well.

But as I mentioned above, the particular definition of consciousness that I'm mostly concerned with -- in the OP's terms: When did the phenomena of "felt experience" appear, and by extension which creatures can we expect are subject to it today? -- does not even require that there be a persistent sense identity. I believe that if science finds a way to map these things, this experience of identity will be shown to appear later in evolutionary terms than the underlying phenomenon of felt experience.

[Piggy]

A quick note re why emergent phenomena should not be assumed to be explanable entirely in terms of the sum of lower-level phenomena.

First, the idea that lower-level properties (e.g. the physics and chemistry of atoms and molecules) could theoretically -- that is, presuming we could actually know everything there was to know about a system on the subatomic, atomic, and molecular level -- be summed in order to produce a predictive model of behavior on the macro level, is indeed an assumption.

I don't know of any reason to believe that it's true. But I do know of some good reasons to believe that it's not true.

It now seems unavoidably clear that randomness is "built into the system" at many levels. The randomness at the subatomic->molecular scale is a barrier to producing a model (even in theory) at that scale which could predict all of the macro-scale behavior we observe, even if we could know everything there was to know at that scale.

There is also randomness at the macro-scale, which is not directly correlated to the randomness present at the lower scale.

When we look at, say, molecules that make up seawater, there's no way to distinguish a molecule that's part of a wave from one that's not. Their behavior is the same. And the presence of randomness in some aspects of their behavior is a barrier to the possibility of summing up their motions in a way that makes the wave comprehensible on these terms alone.

On the macro-level, we find that large-scale organizations of matter obtain functional qualities that exist only at that scale. And that we can describe these qualities without reference to the small-scale physics.

Oceans, boulders, gelatins, and Labrador retrievers have their own functional logic which we should not expect to arise merely from the sum of what's happening at the smallest scale of granularity.

This is why attempts to map consciousness to brain activity at the strictly neural level are, I believe, doomed to failure. In order to understand consciousness in the human brain, we are forced to talk in terms of larger-scale structures such as the hypothalamus, amygdala, corpus callosum, and cerebral cortex.

These all are composed of a rather limited range of neural stuff. The difference is in how this neural stuff is shaped and connected. Only when we view these larger-scale shapes, connections, and relationships can we begin to discern the loops, echoes, and other processes that are likely to be the key to solving the riddle.

The answer is not in the neurons.

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Again, what I take issue with is the assumption of the self as a single functional unit.

This is a key issue. Extremely naive accounts treat "consciousness" (a term that I object because its referent is not clear) as if it were a whole "entity" of some sort, with a ''self'' as the little (real) person who, simply, ''see it all''. To a big degree, the foundation of this idea, at least in the west, is Christianity, and it is so deeply attached in the mind of common people that it seems natural to think in souls and such stuff.

Neurophysiology has destroyed this notion forever. What we call "consciousness" is an hypercomplex set of behaviors of different brain structures in relation to an environment. The self or "homunculus" (needed to mantain the "unity" of mind) ideas are now rendered absurd. The ghost in the machine was never there in the first place.

I have to point out that this conclusion was already present in some eastern philosophies, but thats another subject. :)

[CFLarsen]

5,84,058,405 BC +- a few years.

I'd like to see a detailed Darwinian pathway of the evolution of consciousness. Anyone got one?

A classic Creationist argument: If we can't see every step of the way, it couldn't have happened through Evolution.

Shermer has described it like this: Creationists demand a transitional fossil between X and Y:

X....?....Y

If it doesn't exist, then, there is a gap. Ergo, Evolution can't be true.

When a transitional fossil is found:

X....XY....Y

the Creationists claim that there are now two gaps. Ergo, Evolution is even less true!

Come up with something better, T'ai Chi.

[Piggy]

If you want to see an interesting, well-produced, non-technical examination of some of the ideas being talked about here, I recommend "The Secret Life of the Brain" by David Grubin, specifically episode 4 "The Adult Brain: To Think by Feeling".

The 2 video clips on this page (http://www.pbs.org/wnet/brain/episode4/video.html), excerpted from the program, are very much to the point, in that they illustrate how macro-level brain structures are involved in physical and conscious processing of emotional response.

Of the 3 chapters within episode 4, the 2 involving emotional blindness and PTSD are particularly relevant here.

The subject being described in the video clips (Marvin), as a result of a stroke, does not consciously experience his emotional responses, even though he undergoes the bodily reactions such as smiling and laughing. This may seem bizarre, but as someone who experiences something similar (albeit for entirely different reasons) I can tell you it's very real.

[Piggy]

Implicit in the model presented in the "Secret Life" excerpts is a version of Dennett's thesis: Consciousness in human beings is supported by an A/B brain structure.

Marvin's stoke, which damaged tissues in his cerebral cortex, does not prevent the physical reactions we associate with emotion, but does block his experience of these emotions.

What's interesting is that it has also become difficult for him to correctly judge others' emotional states.

It should not be merely assumed, however, that this sort of brain structure is the only one which can support consciousness (in the sense of felt experience). And here is the next major hurdle.

<tangent>

This model has enormous implications for how we might come to understand certain social pathologies which may be based in similar physical disconnects, whether caused by genetics, physical trauma, or severe emotional trauma and subsequent reinforcement (which can result in physically measurable atrophy of neural pathways).

The inability to experience one's own emotional reactions not only results in behavioral anomalies, and damages (perhaps even destroys) one's ability to bond with other people, but if it arises from birth or in early childhood it generates profound confusion -- not only because one cannot understand why everyone else behaves the way they do, which is daunting enough, but because the process of socialization is continually frustrated for reasons that are not at all apparent so that the subject cannot comprehend even why he behaves the way he does.

It is my belief that the study of sociopathy could productively be expanded beyond the study of criminal behavior, which it seems to be limited to today. I believe that there are (who knows how many?) "successful sociopaths" who manage to survive adolescence without being killed by risky behavior or suicide and without becoming permanently homeless or wards of the state in mental institutions or prisons. These successful sociopaths compensate for their flat emotional response by developing other means of survival, by regulating the type, length, and context of their social interactions, by learning human facial and bodily cues (which most folks intuit) consciously, and expending a great amount of effort toward continually attending to such details in social situations and learning how to "fake it" so that they can manage their lives.

It's very likely that some may even come to feed off the physical exhiliration of "faking it", and make a career of it. (Heck, Bundy -- a severe criminal sociopath -- did much the same.) For stellar successful sociopaths, "faking it" could become a life's work, with every foray into public an intense "zone" experience, with the added pay-off of making one's life not only challenging but also worthwhile. I'm thinking here of certain politicians first and foremost (and likely not the ones most folks would assume).

</tangent>