when did we develop conciousness? [Archive]

Cecil

12th May 2006, 03:41 PM

I think it's important in the context of this discussion to distinguish between primary consciousness, or simple awareness of the environment, and secondary (aka reflective) consciousness, which is the awareness of one's primary consciousness.

As to the question of which animals possess primary consciousness, I think this is an unanswerable question in principle. Since a zombie (an unconscious animal who nevertheless behaves identically to a conscious one) is a logically consistent construction, it seems that it is impossible to prove that a given animal is or is not conscious.

Few animals have reflective consciousness. Only humans are known to have it, though most primates, dolphins, and possibly a bird species or two are suspected of possessing self-awareness. There have been several experiments that have attempted to detect this, including the mirror recognition experiment you mentioned.

This (http://www.phschool.com/science/science_news/articles/unsure_minds.html) experiment (described about halfway down the page) seems to indicate some level of reflective consciousness in rhesus monkeys and bottlenose dolphins. These two animals were shown to be aware of their own uncertainty about the truth of a proposition. This seems indicative that they are aware of themselves in some sense.

I've also heard the theory that reflective consciousness is a logical extension of our brain's modelling abilities. In this theory, a world model is used to test possible courses of action. Primary consciousness occurs when the brain uses sensory input to construct an internal model of the world. Self-awareness occurs when the brain's model is extended to include a model of the organism's brain itself. In fact, it is claimed that one's conscious experience is in fact "located" in the model, and the world that one perceives is not the real world, but the brain's world-model.

Oops. Sorry for rambling so much, it's just that this stuff fascinates me.

GodMark2

12th May 2006, 03:42 PM

we are pretty sure that say a fish has no conciousness as such - it is not aware that it is a fish

The fish in my tank certainly seem to run away from anything that is not like themselves, and school together with things that are like themselves. That would seem to indicate some level of knowing that they are fish, and even what type of fish they are.

Questions to ask: Does consciousness have to be either on or off? Could it perhaps be a continuum? What is the measure of consciousness? Can you prove that I am conscious?

andyandy

12th May 2006, 03:44 PM

Alphaba

12th May 2006, 03:46 PM

As usual, and already noted, all depends on the definition of consciousness used.

Self-recognition in a mirror can only be part of the story (e.g. some marine mammals, and possibly some bats, are capable of sound-based self-recognition). I remember studies on monkeys where self-awareness of arm and hand only were evidenced, providing fuel to the hypothesis of a phylogenetic continuum (of body self-awareness).

aggle-rithm

12th May 2006, 03:47 PM

The next step up might be "self-aware", or capable of recognizing oneself as a distinct individual (as in our chimp)....

One could argue that we are STILL not completely self-aware, in that we have trouble integrating the concept of mind or "self" with our body image -- we tend to see it as a separate entity ( a "soul", for instance ).

Alphaba

12th May 2006, 04:15 PM

Interesting idea aggle-rithm: this is indeed in line with the finding by anthropologists that a form of dualism is present in all societies/cultures, meaning that we are somehow 'hard-wired' to be be spontaneously dualists.

Social performances are also to take into account in a natural history of consciousness: situating oneself in complex, and often mobile, hierarchies, and acting accordingly is indicative of some sense of identity, and sort of a model of the (social) world. Even in cases of failure to classical tests of self-recognition.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

12th May 2006, 04:39 PM

The question is not well formulated. We dont even mean the same thing with the word "consciousness". Sure, even when using words as simple as "table" we can have semantic problems, but when dealing with the big "C" we are lost in space.

Secondly, we do not have a working theory regarding why and how something as "consciousness" may arise, so I believe we are in a pre-copernican era regarding this.

Is like asking if above the firmament there is water and then discussing it ;)

andyandy

12th May 2006, 04:49 PM

The question is not well formulated. We dont even mean the same thing with the word "consciousness". Sure, even when using words as simple as "table" we can have semantic problems, but when dealing with the big "C" we are lost in space.

I'm sorry you didnt like my formulation :D

its a very complex topic - but that doesnt mean we're precluded from talking about it.... :)

Bodhi Dharma Zen

12th May 2006, 04:52 PM

I'm sorry you didnt like my formulation :D

its a very complex topic - but that doesnt mean we're precluded from talking about it.... :)

Oh not at all, besides, how could we learn if we just ignored the term? we need to get in touch with it, see it, taste it, to disect it to try to understand. ;)

Alphaba

12th May 2006, 05:03 PM

Is like asking if above the firmament there is water and then discussing it ;)
If it were as simple as that: there is water above the firmament (http://www.astrobio.net/news/article1905.html).

Buckaroo

12th May 2006, 05:29 PM

Seems to me a useful definitition of consciousness would be the capacity for introspection or the possesion of qualia. It's never been clear to me why the ability to recognize oneself would necessarily figure into it, as I think this ability probably evolved within social animals in order to allow socialization to work at all. Would solitary animals need this ability? What does it mean if they don't have it? And to lift an example from Roger Penrose (who probably got it from somewhere else), is a video camera that is pointed at a mirror self aware? After all, it does contain an internal representation of itself...

The way I approach the question with animals is simple. Do they act like I would expect them to act if they had consciousness as I define it above? Quite a few of them do. For me, then, the simplest explanation is that they actually are conscious. It would be VERY surprising to me if behaviors in many animals that are analogous to behaviors in human beings do not have a similar cause, i.e. the possession of consciousness.

Alphaba

12th May 2006, 07:29 PM

Seems to me a useful definitition of consciousness would be the capacity for introspection or the possesion of qualia.
You've lost me here (I don't want to venture into the 'qualia' philosophical quagmire; just say that "possession of qualia" makes no sense to me. As to "capacity for introspection", I wonder what kind of observable behavior could allow to make robust inferences about its presence or absence in zebras, kangaroos, penguins, spiders, anacondas, cats, tunas, gorillas, frogs, vampires, and [add all known non-human animal species]).

Here's a standard, classical, indicative list of objective features of consciousness, as found in many textbooks:

coherent, integrated, and controlled nature of behavior
capacity to detect novelty and to adapt to it
pursuit of a constant objective in variable conditions
use of a language
use of complex forms of representation like declarative memory
metacognition (~ executive processes, model of the mind, etc.)

Might be a not too unpractical starting point...

CapelDodger

12th May 2006, 07:57 PM

I've posted a simila thread on the religious/phil boards - but i'd like to look at it from a anthropological perspective....
"Anthropoligical" restricts the matter to humans. Philosophy is uniquely human, not self-awareness. That's why we know how a mirror works, and keep asking the hard questions.

Our sense of identity is the hardest question of all.

Outhere

12th May 2006, 08:19 PM

Cecil mentioned that rhesus monkeys and bottle-nosed dolphins were shown to be aware of their own uncertainty about the truth of a proposition.

Does this indicate that skepticism is a sign of higher intelligence?

Buckaroo

12th May 2006, 09:10 PM

Here's a standard, classical, indicative list of objective features of consciousness, as found in many textbooks:

coherent, integrated, and controlled nature of behavior
capacity to detect novelty and to adapt to it
pursuit of a constant objective in variable conditions
use of a language
use of complex forms of representation like declarative memory
metacognition (~ executive processes, model of the mind, etc.)

Might be a not too unpractical starting point...

Maybe a good start, but this list seems overly restrictive and anthropocentic, and would indeed eliminate many humans from the rolls of the conscious. Under this definition, for example, an aphasic would fail the test.

I kinda got the impression that what Andyandy was talking about was more in line with the folk conception of consciousness, which is pretty much the capacity for introspection -- being aware of one's inner cognitive and emotional states. A sufficiently advanced computer program will probably one day reproduce everything in the above list, without necessarily having this ability. Would we have to consider it conscious? Ask Alan Turing. Personally, I don't think so.

In the case of animals, of course there's no unambiguous way to determine that their behavior demonstrates this form of consciousness. You can't prove it in a human, either. But I know that *I* have it, and since I came from the same evolutionary wellspring as animals, I think that it's reasonable to assume that when a dog appears to experience states that seem like happiness or fear, that it probably *is* some analog of my experience. Can't prove it, but I don't see any a priori reason why humans should be different in this respect.

Soapy Sam

13th May 2006, 08:00 AM

Perhaps we should not be asking which animals "pass"a mirror test, but asking whether a mirror test is relevant to any animal but ourselves?

Can any conscious person here think of a test a monkey might give a human to see if he was g'g'zxundf?

( I apologise for my spelling. I lack a monkey keyboard. )

T'ai Chi

13th May 2006, 08:05 AM

so....when did consciousness evolve?

5,84,058,405 BC +- a few years.

I'd like to see a detailed Darwinian pathway of the evolution of consciousness. Anyone got one?

Buckaroo

13th May 2006, 09:35 AM

Can any conscious person here think of a test a monkey might give a human to see if he was g'g'zxundf?

( I apologise for my spelling. I lack a monkey keyboard. )

G'g'zxundf ergo sum.

Who needs a test? :D

Alphaba

13th May 2006, 10:09 AM

this list seems overly restrictive and anthropocentic
...snip...
A sufficiently advanced computer program will probably one day reproduce everything in the above list
If a machine (both logical and material) is one day capable to perform/exhibit all the features listed, wouldn't that somehow render the adjective "anthropocentric" problematic?

[this list] would indeed eliminate many humans from the rolls of the conscious. Under this definition, for example, an aphasic would fail the test.
Well, there always are ceteris paribus clauses in such exercises. Here it is evidently tacitly assumed that it is about awake healthy, non neuropsychologically disabled members of the species.

I kinda got the impression that what Andyandy was talking about was more in line with the folk conception of consciousness, which is pretty much the capacity for introspection -- being aware of one's inner cognitive and emotional states. A sufficiently advanced computer program will probably one day reproduce everything in the above list, without necessarily having this ability. Would we have to consider it conscious? Ask Alan Turing. Personally, I don't think so.
What I have bolded is subsumed under the wider notions of metacognition and executive functions. So having a machine reproducing everything in the list obviously means reproducing metacognition, i.e. your "capacity for introspection".

Ask Alan Turing.
Speaking to defunct persons is against my absence of religion.

Dustin Kesselberg

13th May 2006, 09:54 PM

I for one find the "mirror test" absurd. Realizing the reflection in the mirror is you may be proof of "consciousness" but not being able to do it doens't mean you aren't self aware. Being able to do it is more intelligence than being self aware. You can be 100% self aware but simply not intelligent enough to realize the reflection in the mirror is you.

It doesn't take a genius to realize higher animals like cats or dogs or lions or tigers or whatnot are conscious and self aware. Their cognative ability is much different than that of humans but it's there none the less.

When did consciousness evolve? I would guess it first appeared atleast a billion years ago or maybe after the time of the cambrian explosion when higher forms of life started to evolve.

aggle-rithm

15th May 2006, 07:13 AM

5,84,058,405 BC +- a few years.

I'd like to see a detailed Darwinian pathway of the evolution of consciousness. Anyone got one?

Do you have reason to believe anyone should?

T'ai Chi

15th May 2006, 09:39 PM

Do you have reason to believe anyone should?

Oh, I have reason to believe no one ever will.

Roboramma

15th May 2006, 09:49 PM

Oh, I have reason to believe no one ever will.
So do I - because we don't have that data.

Mercutio

15th May 2006, 10:24 PM

Dammit, I just lost a really long and thoughtful post...I'll try again.

Consciousness is the result of our language and behavior, of course. It has to be--we cannot learn what we mean by the word "consciousness" by looking at another person's thoughts (if you can, apply for the million), nor can they point to our thoughts to label them. We learn what "consciousness" means by attaching the label to publicly observable behaviors. No, not a behavior--to think that there is some single thing called "consciousness" is just silly--but a fuzzy category of behaviors, perhaps unique to any given individual, but widely overlapping with other members of the language community.

We argue about consciousness in goldfish, chimps, dogs...and realize fairly quickly that we can only infer consciousness from their observable behavior. What we typically fail to realize is that the same constraint holds true for our fellow human beings, and even ourselves. We have absolutely no way of knowing if the private behaviors we associate with our own consciousness are shared with others; what we do have is the publicly observable behavior we associate with the term "consciousness". We see the goldfish approach a familiar person at feeding time, or flee from an unfamiliar person, and infer "some form of consciousness". We see the chimp attend to a mark on its forehead and infer "some form of consciousness". Whether or not a species displays consciousness is wholly dependent on what public behavior that species displays. Indeed, whether or not a given individual person displays a particular "state of consciousness" is wholly dependent on what public behavior he or she displays.

As such, the question of "when did consciousness evolve" has two distinctly different answers. First, there is the question of when these particular behaviors became associated with the term "consciousness"; this is dependent on culture. Our use of the term has changed over the centuries. Secondly, there is the question of the evolution of the behaviors themselves; this is a task for evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology. Some of the behaviors we call "conscious" may be genetically coded, others may be learned within the lifespan of the organism.

Roboramma

16th May 2006, 04:17 AM

Merc, another very interesting post. :)

I was thinking about this thread the other day, and I started to wonder about the evolution of conciousness. I had a little hypothesis pop into my head that went something like this:

What if conciousness evolved to aid social interaction. In order to succeed in social situations it helps to be able to think about what other creatures in your social environment are thinking - what do they want, what are their motiviations, what will they do next, etc.
Maybe in order to think about the motivations of others, it helps if we can think about our own motivations. Conciousness is our brain's way of telling itself a story about our social environment - infering desires from behaviors so that we can predict another being's future actions. In order to do this we first need to have a picture of those things we call desires (etc.)

In this (perhaps silly) hypothesis, we are concious so that we can infer conciousness in others.

What d'y'all think?

MRC_Hans

16th May 2006, 04:48 AM

*snip*
In this (perhaps silly) hypothesis, we are concious so that we can infer conciousness in others.

What d'y'all think?The way you express it, it is circular, but I think I know what you mean. We developed consciousness because it is an advantage to be able to infer other being's thoughts and intentions. As such, consciousness is the ability to understand that other beings have a will.

This ability is far from restricted to humans; it certainly also exists in many other animals. I have observed obvious conscious behavior in dogs, cats, and birds.

Hans

Piggy

16th May 2006, 06:00 AM

andyandy, what would you think of this scheme as a working definition of consciousness? (Adapted from Dennett)

Scenario A: A computer, light sensor, and monitor are rigged up so that when a beam of light in the red spectrum hits the sensor, the monitor displays "I see a red light". A series of different colored lights are flashed. The monitor is blank until a red one is lit, at which point the monitor displays "I see a red light".

Scenario B: I'm asked by an experimentor to look at a screen and say when I see a red light. A series of different colored lights are flashed. I remain silent until a red one is lit, at which point I say "I see a red light".

Why do we think of only B as involving response by a conscious entity?

It has nothing to do w/ response to environment, or discrimination, or following orders of course -- it's because we know that there's an "experience" of "seeing a red light" for the human. We feel instinctively (or argue logically) that there's not for the machine.

So I take your OP to mean something like "At what point did some critters stop merely reacting chemically to the environment and start having some inner experience, a subjective 'feeling' of pain, fear, happiness, etc?"

Tough stuff, since, as others have pointed out, we can't get at that "experience", that "feeling".

But still, to me this is the crux of the issue, not some reflective sense of "I", which may come much later in terms of evolutionary development. To me, it matters if an animal has something like my experience of pain, rather than, say, a computer simulation.

Why? For the same reason we ask questions like "Can Fetuses Feel Pain? (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=55368&highlight=fetus+pain)". For the same reason it mattered whether Terry Schiavo did or didn't have any higher brain function. For the same reason it matters whether comatose patients can sense their environment.

It matters to me if, say, a cricket is just a bundle of wires like a machine, or if a fish is experiencing pain in something like the way I do.

It's just my opinion, but I think Dennett is very likely to be right when he proposes that a dual brain structure underlies the emergent phenomenon that we call conscious experience or feeling. In short, the model is: Build brain A (brain stem, lymbic system, cerebrum) to process input, then build brain B (cerebellum) to "live inside" brain A. That is, brain B receives processed data from brain A, so that brain A's output becomes brain B's environment. The feedback loops between these "2 brains" produces the sense of the world "being like" something.

If that's correct, then the bug my cat is chasing is just an organic machine, but my cat is a "feeling" animal. The bug has no experience of panic, but my cat has an experience of excitement.

Mercutio

16th May 2006, 06:03 AM

The way you express it, it is circular, but I think I know what you mean. We developed consciousness because it is an advantage to be able to infer other being's thoughts and intentions. As such, consciousness is the ability to understand that other beings have a will.
(emphasis mine.) Or to understand that their environment will have the same effects on them as it would on you, such that without the circularly defined explanatory fiction "will", we can still use our observations of them to infer their probable actions.

This ability is far from restricted to humans; it certainly also exists in many other animals. I have observed obvious conscious behavior in dogs, cats, and birds.

HansIf we observe our language, we also observe obvious conscious behavior in cars and computers. "My car doesn't like cold mornings." "My car likes to go faster than the speed limit." "My computer hates me." These are all phrases that imply consciousness of a sort, and are part of how we have learned the words that go with consciousness. (which makes no sense if we define consciousness subjectively, but then we have every bit as much ability to look at the private thoughts of a car as we do another human. In both cases, all we have is the public behavior to go by.)

Darat

16th May 2006, 06:04 AM

Don't know why but this thread makes me think of a great expression I first heard from my high school biology teacher

"The brain is a parasitical outgrowth of the spinal column".

MRC_Hans

16th May 2006, 07:10 AM

(emphasis mine.) Or to understand that their environment will have the same effects on them as it would on you, such that without the circularly defined explanatory fiction "will", we can still use our observations of them to infer their probable actions.

Yes, good definition!

If we observe our language, we also observe obvious conscious behavior in cars and computers. "My car doesn't like cold mornings." "My car likes to go faster than the speed limit." "My computer hates me." These are all phrases that imply consciousness of a sort, and are part of how we have learned the words that go with consciousness. (which makes no sense if we define consciousness subjectively, but then we have every bit as much ability to look at the private thoughts of a car as we do another human. In both cases, all we have is the public behavior to go by.)
Well, that is just antropomorphism (sp?). Much of the time when we assign consciousness to animals, it is also antropomorphism, but with higher animals, we can observe behavioral patterns that are difficult to explain as anything but consciousness.

I have a personal example:

I was wisiting a (large florist's) shop that had a parrot on display. Rather, I suppose the owner had a parrot and kept it in the room. It had a large cage, but on this occasion was sitting freely on the top of the cage. I like animals and rarely miss an opportunity to "communicate" with a responsive-looking animal. So I stood in front of the parrot and ... I don't remember exactly what, said "hello" or something.

The parrot eyed me carefully, then climbed down on the front of the cage to the height of my shoulder, took a good grip at the cage with its beak, and pivoted around, hanging by its beak, displaying its feet. After a moment, I realized the purpose of the gesture and stepped close so it could climb onto my shoulder, which it did. It then proceeded immidiately to bend down and bite a button off the collar of my shirt.

Now, it makes perfect sense to interpret this as it seeing the, apparantly interesting, button, and planning a sequence of actions that would give it access to it. A sequence that included eliciting a specific, predictable, reaction from me. Which would require it to be aware of me as a seperate entity with a behavioral pattern of my own.

Hans

Piggy

16th May 2006, 08:09 AM

Now, it makes perfect sense to interpret this as it seeing the, apparantly interesting, button, and planning a sequence of actions that would give it access to it. A sequence that included eliciting a specific, predictable, reaction from me. Which would require it to be aware of me as a seperate entity with a behavioral pattern of my own.
Would it, tho? You don't think a complex robot could ever be built that could do something like this?

I agree that parrots are conscious, btw. But again, for me, the question is one of "felt experience" rather than complexity of interaction with the world.

Mercutio

16th May 2006, 08:11 AM

Well, that is just antropomorphism (sp?). Much of the time when we assign consciousness to animals, it is also antropomorphism, but with higher animals, we can observe behavioral patterns that are difficult to explain as anything but consciousness.

We are quick to recognise the connection in that direction, but slow to recognise that this is part of how we learn the language (including how we label our private experience). We use the consciousness-type words, whether for people, other animals, or machines, when the environmental causes are sufficiently subtle as to not telegraph to us what the specific causes of a behavior are. When causes are self-evident, we are less apt to say a behavior was "conscious", and more likely to call it "reflexive". But the salience of external causes is continuous--that is, there is no bright line separating conscious and reflexive behaviors (or, more accurately, no bright line separating the behaviors which we would infer are either conscious or reflexive).

So, I would argue it is not merely anthropomorphism, and that dismissing it as such artificially dichotomizes between our own "real" consciousness and other forms which are some cheap anthropomorphic imitation. Rather, our labeling of other and own consciousness is part of the same process. We have merely (but understandably) attached the label to behaviors which are much more apt to be performed by humans (and a wide variety of those behaviors).

Mercutio

16th May 2006, 08:20 AM

I agree that parrots are conscious, btw. But again, for me, the question is one of "felt experience" rather than complexity of interaction with the world.
Again I must ask, then, if it is "felt experience", and no one but you can feel your experience (and you can feel no others' experience), how is it that you learned to label this "consciousness"?

The public behaviors you used as referents are how you learned the term. Your "felt experience" is one degree further removed, not closer, to how you learned the word, as your felt experience is imperfectly correlated with the word as learned (iow, not every time you felt a particular way was there someone there to notice and provide a label, and not every time someone used a particular word were you feeling that particular experience. This is the natural result of our inability to read one another's minds.).

This is part of the reason that discussions of consciousness get bogged down so quickly. The focus on "felt experience", while perfectly understandable, glosses over how we learn to speak about this experience, and how we learn to label our own feelings. It leaves us with poorly defined terms and no framework within which to discuss.

Piggy

16th May 2006, 09:07 AM

Mercutio, I have a hard time teasing out your meaning b/c you seem to drift between discussion of language and discussion of objects as if there were no distinction.

Again I must ask, then, if it is "felt experience", and no one but you can feel your experience (and you can feel no others' experience), how is it that you learned to label this "consciousness"?
What are you asking about, exactly, here? Are you asking why I use that word to refer to felt experience? Are you asking something about language acquisition?

The public behaviors you used as referents are how you learned the term.
You're saying that I learned the term "consciousness" via "public behaviors"? I don't understand this.

Your "felt experience" is one degree further removed, not closer, to how you learned the word, as your felt experience is imperfectly correlated with the word as learned (iow, not every time you felt a particular way was there someone there to notice and provide a label, and not every time someone used a particular word were you feeling that particular experience. This is the natural result of our inability to read one another's minds.).
You've totally lost me here. How does language acquisition come into this in the first place? And even if it did, your statements about lacking a label-provider for every instance are incomprehensible to me.

This is part of the reason that discussions of consciousness get bogged down so quickly. The focus on "felt experience", while perfectly understandable, glosses over how we learn to speak about this experience, and how we learn to label our own feelings. It leaves us with poorly defined terms and no framework within which to discuss.
Why do we need to concern ourselves with how we learn to speak?

I'm sorry, but I can't make heads or tails of all this.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

16th May 2006, 09:50 AM

For all purposes, Vervet monkes do appear to have some "mental states", heck, they even have their own protolanguage. Seyfarth and Cheney have some papers regarding them.

And I agree with Piggy in that consciousness should be used in a more general way. I would say that of course animals (at least those with similar neural structures) experience pain and even some (human like*) emotional states. And this is merely a deduction based on evolution.

* Its more than we animals share the feelings, not that we humans anthropomorphize their behavior.

Mercutio

16th May 2006, 11:03 AM

Mercutio, I have a hard time teasing out your meaning b/c you seem to drift between discussion of language and discussion of objects as if there were no distinction.
This discussion is about both, of course. The meaning is perfectly clear when we speak of publicly available objects and learning the words we use to refer to them; it is when we apply the same analysis to our private experience that we begin to treat things differently.

What are you asking about, exactly, here? Are you asking why I use that word to refer to felt experience? Are you asking something about language acquisition?
In a sense, yes. You are discussing something that no one else has access to, and which you have no access to anyone else's. And yet, we understand one another (most of the time). How is this possible? Unless you think we somehow have access to some magical collective unconscious or Platonic Ideal, the only way to explain it is through learning via public referent. As such, examining how it is that one learns a word is very enlightening in terms of what the word means.

You're saying that I learned the term "consciousness" via "public behaviors"? I don't understand this.
I am saying exactly that. Are you saying you learned it some other way? Was someone able to access your consciousness and tell you "there, that is what we call 'consciousness'"? Did the word just spring forth like Athena from the head of Zeus, fully grown and armored? If so, what an amazing coincidence that we have similar conceptions of the term.

You've totally lost me here. How does language acquisition come into this in the first place? And even if it did, your statements about lacking a label-provider for every instance are incomprehensible to me.
Language acquisition came into this because it is a useful way to examine the question. It de-mystifies the term and re-frames the question in a much more reasonable manner. Some of the apparent difficulties in understanding consciousness are, in my opinion, merely artifacts of our improper assumptions about what consciousness is; critically and skeptically examining our assumptions about consciousness is the first step in examining the question more productively.
Why do we need to concern ourselves with how we learn to speak?

I'm sorry, but I can't make heads or tails of all this.It is a very different view from traditional linguistics (which, as one critique put it, relies on magic). But unless you can figure a way for us to have direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience, the only other option is to learn through publicly available referents--in this case, observable behaviors.

What are your own assumptions about consciousness? Starting from how you learned the term, to why you see consciousness in some things (people, at least, I assume) and not in others.

Piggy

16th May 2006, 12:13 PM

This discussion is about both, of course. The meaning is perfectly clear when we speak of publicly available objects and learning the words we use to refer to them; it is when we apply the same analysis to our private experience that we begin to treat things differently.
Why?

In a sense, yes. You are discussing something that no one else has access to, and which you have no access to anyone else's. And yet, we understand one another (most of the time). How is this possible? Unless you think we somehow have access to some magical collective unconscious or Platonic Ideal, the only way to explain it is through learning via public referent. As such, examining how it is that one learns a word is very enlightening in terms of what the word means.
Enlightening how? Why should that be enlightening? Why are we discussing "what the word means"? Why are we discussing learning? Why are we discussing language acquisition? How is any of this relevant?

All I've said is that I find it meaningful to consider consciousness in terms of the presence of "felt experience" rather than a sense of an understanding of the "I/thou" distinction or in terms of functional definitions such as certain types of interactions with the environment. And suddenly, we're launching into discussions of language acquisition (laid out in terms that don't seem very clear or coherent, btw).

I am saying exactly that. Are you saying you learned it some other way? Was someone able to access your consciousness and tell you "there, that is what we call 'consciousness'"? Did the word just spring forth like Athena from the head of Zeus, fully grown and armored? If so, what an amazing coincidence that we have similar conceptions of the term.
I don't know that we have similar conceptions of the term at all.

As for the definition I'm using here, I came to it through a combination of reading, introspection, observation, and reasoning.

In any case, I still don't see the relevance of discussing language acquisition.

Language acquisition came into this because it is a useful way to examine the question. It de-mystifies the term and re-frames the question in a much more reasonable manner. Some of the apparent difficulties in understanding consciousness are, in my opinion, merely artifacts of our improper assumptions about what consciousness is; critically and skeptically examining our assumptions about consciousness is the first step in examining the question more productively.
I don't see that examining language acquisition is going to help us examine the question at all. I think it's much more effective and efficient to focus on the object of discussion. And I wasn't aware that the term was "mystified" to begin with.

If you want to talk about assumptions and why they may be incorrect, then please, put them on the table.

It is a very different view from traditional linguistics (which, as one critique put it, relies on magic). But unless you can figure a way for us to have direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience, the only other option is to learn through publicly available referents--in this case, observable behaviors.
Again, you're sliding back and forth between discussions of language and discussions of things as though there were no difference.

Do you have some non-traditional linguistics to propose? And if so, why is that important?

"Direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience" is not needed for our purposes here. We all have human bodies and brains. We all came from the same evolutionary processes. We all behave essentially the same. There's no reason to believe that we somehow have radically different conscious apparati.

Are you claiming that some of us have felt experience and others don't (excepting people in vegetative states and other such obvious exceptions)?

If so, then you're merely kicking up trivial objections. If not, then I'm not following you.

What are your own assumptions about consciousness? Starting from how you learned the term, to why you see consciousness in some things (people, at least, I assume) and not in others.
How I learned the term is immaterial. That's like saying that a wool sweater may not be wool, depending on where you bought it. To determine if it's wool, you examine the fabric, not the provenance. And in any case, how the heck am I going to remember anything about my learning this word as a child?

You want an inventory of assumptions? Please.

Again, all I've said is that what's most important to me is whether another being has, for lack of a better term, "the experience of experience". I don't care what happens to a computer with a monitor and light sensor because I don't believe it has any awareness of what happens to it. But I'm sickened by reports of abuse of horses, dogs, and cats because I believe that they -- like humans -- do have "felt experience".

And I believe that Dennett's A/B-Brain model is very likely a correct and useful one.

If you're interested in why I believe that, then why not just ask me directly?

Mercutio

16th May 2006, 01:41 PM

Why?
Because some choose to treat the processes of experience as qualitatively different from the things that happen on the other side of our skin. Thus, dualism...

Enlightening how? Why should that be enlightening? Why are we discussing "what the word means"? Why are we discussing learning? Why are we discussing language acquisition? How is any of this relevant?

All I've said is that I find it meaningful to consider consciousness in terms of the presence of "felt experience" rather than a sense of an understanding of the "I/thou" distinction or in terms of functional definitions such as certain types of interactions with the environment. And suddenly, we're launching into discussions of language acquisition (laid out in terms that don't seem very clear or coherent, btw).
Yes...you have chosen to consider consciousness in terms which cannot be shared by any other. This is why "what the word means" is important. If you do not find my approach relevant, you don't have to use it.

I don't know that we have similar conceptions of the term at all.

As for the definition I'm using here, I came to it through a combination of reading, introspection, observation, and reasoning.
Reading and observation are the sorts of public referents I refer to. Introspection and reasoning, unless you are quite different from the rest of us, build upon these public referents.

In any case, I still don't see the relevance of discussing language acquisition.
Then don't.
I don't see that examining language acquisition is going to help us examine the question at all. I think it's much more effective and efficient to focus on the object of discussion. And I wasn't aware that the term was "mystified" to begin with.
Focusing on the object of discussion is wonderful, as soon as we have agreement on what it is.

If you want to talk about assumptions and why they may be incorrect, then please, put them on the table.

Again, you're sliding back and forth between discussions of language and discussions of things as though there were no difference.
When we have a way of discussing things without using language to do so, then the language question will be irrelevant.

Do you have some non-traditional linguistics to propose? And if so, why is that important?
My point was simply that my point of view, while well established within behaviorism, is very likely not familiar to you.

"Direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience" is not needed for our purposes here. We all have human bodies and brains. We all came from the same evolutionary processes. We all behave essentially the same. There's no reason to believe that we somehow have radically different conscious apparati.

Are you claiming that some of us have felt experience and others don't (excepting people in vegetative states and other such obvious exceptions)?

If so, then you're merely kicking up trivial objections. If not, then I'm not following you.
I am actually trying to examine what it is that this "felt experience" is--which is what I thought you were trying to do. I find my approach quite useful. You do not.
How I learned the term is immaterial. That's like saying that a wool sweater may not be wool, depending on where you bought it. To determine if it's wool, you examine the fabric, not the provenance. And in any case, how the heck am I going to remember anything about my learning this word as a child?
It is not immaterial in this case--this is not where you bought the sweater, but how it was made, and from what.

You want an inventory of assumptions? Please.

Again, all I've said is that what's most important to me is whether another being has, for lack of a better term, "the experience of experience". I don't care what happens to a computer with a monitor and light sensor because I don't believe it has any awareness of what happens to it. But I'm sickened by reports of abuse of horses, dogs, and cats because I believe that they -- like humans -- do have "felt experience".
All I am doing is examining why you believe that, and why others either do or do not agree with you. An analysis of how we have learned the terms is very useful in this. Again, you are free to disagree.

And I believe that Dennett's A/B-Brain model is very likely a correct and useful one.
I happen to agree.

If you're interested in why I believe that, then why not just ask me directly?self-reports are notoriously unreliable. Besides, I have been addressing the question from the OP--my response to your post was as much to andyandy as to you.

Piggy

16th May 2006, 02:18 PM

Mercutio, you and I are obviously talking at right angles.

You say that I "have chosen to consider consciousness in terms which cannot be shared by any other".

I am considering consciousness in terms of the presence or absence of felt experience, as you correctly observe. And it's true that we can't be directly aware of each other's felt experience. But there's no doubt that we all have some type of felt experience. So I see no problem here.

I'm not concerned here with that's in it, just whether it's there.

We cannot share our inner experiences directly, but we can certainly share an understanding of what I'm referring to. And nothing beyond this is needed for our purposes here.

So I have 2 questions for you:

1. Do you have some real doubt about what it is I'm referring to?

2. Do you want to know why I believe that computers are not "conscious" under the definition I propose?

That might get us at least talking parallel. ;)

andyandy

16th May 2006, 02:42 PM

im really enjoying reading the posts guys :D i'd love to contribute more but i'm kinda out of my depth on this one lol:)

i guess my original post was kinda looking at consciousness from a human perspective....as has been established it's pretty hard to know how much cats or goldfish are aware....and indeed what "awareness" or consciousness even means.....
but it seems to me that humans possess something extra...even if that something extra is hard to quantify....
i guess my working definition of consciousness would involve
1) self awareness - a concept of self, of existence...
2) cognition on a level beyond instinct - ie. an ability to over-ride instinct when necessary
3) the ability to create pictures, stories or abstract thought - which requires an awareness of "reality" - this is a tougher one to nail down - maybe the ability to dream is a precursor to or first sign of a developed consciousness....i dont know any theory on this - so any info would be great - are there any animals who dream? is it even logical to equate the unconscious(?) action of dreaming with a sign of consciousness?

i guess for this rather arbitary definition of consciouness then only humans (and maybe great apes??) would fit the bill - but this might just be because i'm looking at it from a very anthropocentric perspective....
i suppose in evolutionary terms, levels of consciousness have continually evolved - maybe (1) came first, then this allowed (2)....etc....
maybe there's more to come - a higher state we haven't reached yet (at least not drug free) :D

Raphael

16th May 2006, 03:02 PM

andyandy- I to am enjoying this thread, but as it is outside my field of expertise, I hesitate to contribute as well.

Mediasite Presentation Catalog (http://streamer.perimeterinstitute.ca:81/mediasite/viewer/?cid=11c6ed02-c9d9-4be4-961b-a8085fc24e07)

The link is to a lecture by Jay Ingram (2nd from the top entitled "Are you Conscious?") It's an hour in duration, but quite accessible for those not familiar with behavioural jargon.

Interesting Ian

16th May 2006, 03:51 PM

I've posted a simila thread on the religious/phil boards - but i'd like to look at it from a anthropological perspective....

we are pretty sure that say a fish has no conciousness as such - it is not aware that it is a fish....and that we as humans are aware - we are conscious......so....when did consciousness evolve? were homo-sapiens conscious of self? homo habilis? Chimps?

i remember watching a program where scientists showed that chimps could recognise themselves in the mirror - whilst monkeys couldnt. Does this mean that chimps are regarded as having a consciousness?

is there an evolutionary reason for consciousness to evolve?

You're confusing consciousness with self-consciousness.

Interesting Ian

16th May 2006, 04:15 PM

Mercutio, I have a hard time teasing out your meaning b/c you seem to drift between discussion of language and discussion of objects as if there were no distinction.

What are you asking about, exactly, here? Are you asking why I use that word to refer to felt experience? Are you asking something about language acquisition?

You're saying that I learned the term "consciousness" via "public behaviors"? I don't understand this.

You've totally lost me here. How does language acquisition come into this in the first place? And even if it did, your statements about lacking a label-provider for every instance are incomprehensible to me.

Why do we need to concern ourselves with how we learn to speak?

I'm sorry, but I can't make heads or tails of all this.

He's simply expressing Wittgenstein's arguments against a private language. However it is more obvious than anything could be that we learn we are conscious from our own consciousness rather than observing the behaviour of others.

Mercutio
Again I must ask, then, if it is "felt experience", and no one but you can feel your experience (and you can feel no others' experience), how is it that you learned to label this "consciousness"?

By having the experience, and assigning a word to name this experience. Nothing could be more simple. Analytical behaviourists are all round the bend (as was Wittgenstein).

andyandy

16th May 2006, 04:22 PM

You're confusing consciousness with self-consciousness.

yeah....for my working definition i'm kinda lumping the two together....ie. consciousness requires a consciousness of self.....:D

could you provide a definition of the two? what does it mean to be "conscious" as compared to "self-conscious" ??

DanishDynamite

16th May 2006, 04:25 PM

im really enjoying reading the posts guys :D i'd love to contribute more but i'm kinda out of my depth on this one lol:)

i guess my original post was kinda looking at consciousness from a human perspective....as has been established it's pretty hard to know how much cats or goldfish are aware....and indeed what "awareness" or consciousness even means.....
but it seems to me that humans possess something extra...even if that something extra is hard to quantify....
i guess my working definition of consciousness would involve
1) self awareness - a concept of self, of existence...
Personally I see the mental abilities of the animal kingdom as a sliding scale. We (humans) try and divide these abilities into categories, which is fine, but in my view perhaps a bit arbitrary.

The OP concerns itself with what I think is self-awareness. The "mirror-test" has been mentioned, and I think that for animals who rely greatly on their sense of vision (such as humans) it is a fair test for self-awareness. Several species of primates (including humans) and dolphins pass this test. They know they are not seeing another creature, but just a reflection of themself. In order to realize you are seeing a reflection of yorself, you must be aware of yourself as seperate being. You must be self-aware.
2) cognition on a level beyond instinct - ie. an ability to over-ride instinct when necessary
Lemmings can override instincts. :)

Seriously, at what point does the ill-defined "instincts" stop and cognitive abilities take over?
3) the ability to create pictures, stories or abstract thought - which requires an awareness of "reality" - this is a tougher one to nail down - maybe the ability to dream is a precursor to or first sign of a developed consciousness....i dont know any theory on this - so any info would be great - are there any animals who dream? is it even logical to equate the unconscious(?) action of dreaming with a sign of consciousness?
Animals dream, as any owner of a dog or cat knows.

The thing I suspect you are getting at is the "abstract thought" bit. The problem is how to define this.

Piggy

16th May 2006, 04:29 PM

could you provide a definition of the two? what does it mean to be "conscious" as compared to "self-conscious" ??
It could be said that a rhesus monkey is conscious, in that -- unlike, say, a rock -- it is awake and aware, has emotions, feels pain, etc. But it might or might not be self-conscious, which is to say, capable of some rudimentary awareness of its own existence as a unique conscious entity within a world composed of other conscious and non-conscious entities.

A friend of mine summed it up once by saying, "I don't think a dog ever had the thought 'I'."

Jeff Corey

16th May 2006, 05:11 PM

... Analytical behaviourists are all round the bend (as was Wittgenstein).
I suspect you wouldn't know what a behavior analyst was if it bit you in the tuchis.

andyandy

16th May 2006, 05:35 PM

Kaylee

16th May 2006, 05:37 PM

A friend of mine summed it up once by saying, "I don't think a dog ever had the thought 'I'."

That might be true -- but I do wonder if it can be proven conclusively one way or the other.

FWIW, I suspect that at least some dogs I've seen had the concept of "ME!" down pat -- but I'm willing to bet that none of them contemplated their places in life -- beyond identifying their places in their "packs". ;)

Roboramma

16th May 2006, 06:33 PM

1. Do you have some real doubt about what it is I'm referring to? I think there may be some real doubt in some way, though certainly not to the degree of "You feel pain? What's that?"
But rather, what does it mean to feel something? To experience something? We have an intuitive understanding of this, which is probably accurate to a certain degree, but intuition is often wrong, especially when we're talking about our own experiences.
I think Mercutio is basically saying that introspection isn't a very good method for finding out about conciousness or the activities of the brain. As such he's looking for a more objective approach; find out how the word is acquired in order to understand what it refers to. I'm not sure that is the best approach, but it seems like it will probably be useful, anyway.

But it seems like just an attempt to look at the question from another angle, because he doesn't trust introspection. I don't think he's suggesting that you and he have qualitatively different "felt experiences", rather I think he's suggesting that the term itself is rather vague and possibly inaccurate if we're talking about what's actually going on. I think he may have a point.

(And Mercutio, I'm sure I've just massacred that point in this jumble, if so... sorry for trying to help! :) )

Jeff Corey

16th May 2006, 08:48 PM

Merc,
Fine with me.
The position of the philosophy of science called behavior analysis is that while observable behavior is the proper subject matter of a science of behavior, there are publically unobservable private behaviors which are not. Consciousness, thought, cognitions - these are things we experience, but cannot quantify in a way that can be dealt with scientifically. These are called private events. There is no way any of you can tell how I think in word/picture/emotional/memory anymore than I can tell about you.
What Merc has been saying about language is that it's how we learn to label our internal states. Skinner talked about his toothache. How do we know?

Dustin Kesselberg

17th May 2006, 03:57 AM

It could be said that a rhesus monkey is conscious, in that -- unlike, say, a rock -- it is awake and aware, has emotions, feels pain, etc. But it might or might not be self-conscious, which is to say, capable of some rudimentary awareness of its own existence as a unique conscious entity within a world composed of other conscious and non-conscious entities.

A friend of mine summed it up once by saying, "I don't think a dog ever had the thought 'I'."

"I" is a human construct.

It's obviously however dogs realize they are an individual or else they wouldn't act the way they do. Why would for instance my dog steal my other dogs rawhide when he isn't looking unless he had some concept of self. Without a concept of self how could he do something with the intent for self pleasure?

MRC_Hans

17th May 2006, 04:16 AM

Would it, tho? You don't think a complex robot could ever be built that could do something like this?

I agree that parrots are conscious, btw. But again, for me, the question is one of "felt experience" rather than complexity of interaction with the world.Of course we could build a robot that could do that. It wouldn't even have to be very complicated. But it would be a replica of our reactions (or of those of the parrot, so parroting the parrot .. sorry, carry on ...). We would have to predefine, perhaps not the specific action, but the pattern of behavior of the robot. So the actions of the robot would only be proof that we are conscious, not that the robot is.

The parrot on the other hand, is not a robot. I cannot be certain, of course, that it was not carefully trained to perform this stunt, but I find it more likely, based on other behavor shown by parrots and other intelligent animals, that it acted on its own account.

Hans

Darat

17th May 2006, 04:43 AM

As an anecdotal point - watch people interacting with a Sony AIBO dog (which is a robot dog) , it is quite amazing that after a little bit of interaction with the robot what they start to "project" onto the robot.

I used to programme mine so I knew what it was programmed to do and how it would react to certain stimulus yet people would constantly "fill in" a personality for it which would include traits such as "desires", "motivations", "likes and dislikes" which were demonstratively not part of its programming or strictly speaking even its behaviour.

Did these people consider it to be alive? No - BUT if you could replace the body of it with flesh and fur I suspect people would then feel quite comfortable with saying "it has some form of consciousness".

I'm adding this into the mix because I think it starts to demonstrate that how we informally determine whether something else apart from "me" is conscious or not is probably not a good indication whether that other thing does share the same "private behaviours" as we all seem to think we do.

Dustin Kesselberg

17th May 2006, 04:43 AM

You can "replicate" the actions of consciousness but creating it is a whole different deal.

We even have robots that completly mimic human reactions. And even more complex "chat bots" that are so complex they seem to be another person talking to you. As if they are conscioius. But they aren't.

Just because we can replicate the actions consciousness of other animals or humans without resorting to "real consciousness" doesn't mean real consciousness doesn't exist.

Get what i'm saying?

MRC_Hans

17th May 2006, 06:00 AM

On the subject of anthromorphism (but otherwise somewhat off topic):

Some years back, there was often, at electronics or computer fairs, a little "robot", roughly in R2D2 style roaming the aisles, handing out brochures, chatting to people in a mechanical, toneless voice, and generally attracting attention. At that time, technology was hardly ripe for making an autonomous machine like that, and sure enough, a guy would be sauntering along nearby, holding one hand in a large bag, and the other near the corner of his mouth.

The point is, because the thing was vaguely andriod in shape (or a shape that had otherwise, through the Star Wars films, been established in the common consciousness as an android), people, certainly including me, were willing to at least contemplate the possibility that it was an autonomous robot. Had it been built in the shape of, say, a small car, everybody would immidiately have assumed it was remote-controlled.

And in fact, now that we do have autonomous robots roaming factory floors and other places, even private homes, they are generally carefully made in non-android shapes, probably to make people less insecure about them.

Hans

Nick Bogaerts

17th May 2006, 06:09 AM

And even more complex "chat bots" that are so complex they seem to be another person talking to you. As if they are conscious. But they aren't.

I think on the contrary, early chatterbots (ELIZA, PARRY) demonstrated that a very simple program could give a superficial illusion of 'conscience', as did Darat's AIBO.

Piggy

17th May 2006, 06:53 AM

"I" is a human construct.

It's obviously however dogs realize they are an individual or else they wouldn't act the way they do. Why would for instance my dog steal my other dogs rawhide when he isn't looking unless he had some concept of self. Without a concept of self how could he do something with the intent for self pleasure?
Btw, I'm not arguing in favor of my buddy's observation. I was just giving an example of the distinction.

Interesting Ian

17th May 2006, 07:08 AM

Merc,
Skinner talked about his toothache. How do we know?

We know through his behaviour -- particularly the fact he tells us he is experiencing toothache.

Piggy

17th May 2006, 07:14 AM

I think there may be some real doubt in some way, though certainly not to the degree of "You feel pain? What's that?"
But rather, what does it mean to feel something? To experience something? We have an intuitive understanding of this, which is probably accurate to a certain degree, but intuition is often wrong, especially when we're talking about our own experiences.
Yes, I see that point. But I don't see the relevance. All I'm saying is that the question of whether another critter has "felt experience" is meaningful, even if there's no clear and sure method to provide an answer at the moment. It's worth investigating. And I think Dennett's model is one good way to proceed.

Intuition is certainly often wrong. But I wouldn't call it mere "intuition" that I have felt experience and rocks don't.

I think Mercutio is basically saying that introspection isn't a very good method for finding out about conciousness or the activities of the brain.
I agree.

As such he's looking for a more objective approach; find out how the word is acquired in order to understand what it refers to. I'm not sure that is the best approach, but it seems like it will probably be useful, anyway.
Doesn't seem useful to me, but I'm willing to wait and see if anything comes of it.

But it seems like just an attempt to look at the question from another angle, because he doesn't trust introspection.
Neither do I. Maybe that's the confusion here. I didn't intend to suggest any sort of peering into the quality and content of felt experience. What I am saying is that it is meaningful to pose the question of consciousness in animals in terms of the existence of "felt experience" of the sort we have, as opposed to mere chemical reaction which, I believe, is all that bacteria are capable of.

I don't think he's suggesting that you and he have qualitatively different "felt experiences", rather I think he's suggesting that the term itself is rather vague and possibly inaccurate if we're talking about what's actually going on. I think he may have a point.
It's certainly not a scientific term. But I seriously doubt that anyone doesn't know what I'm referring to. If so, maybe they'll ask.

Also, Merc and others are certainly correct in saying that observation of behavior will necessarily play a part in any study of consciousness in animals. But a purely behavioral definition coupled with a purely behavioral investigative method is, I believe, impossible. When talking about consciousness we can't get around the fact that we're talking about this sticky business of being aware, of having a sense of things that is not merely reaction, not merely behavior. Regardless of what that is (I think it's probably the result of a feedback loop) I don't think there's any doubt that it's real.

If we do relegate consciousness to mere reaction and behavior, then we've effectively dodged the issue.

Darat

17th May 2006, 07:18 AM

...snip...

If we do relegate consciousness to mere reaction and behavior, then we've effectively dodged the issue.

Or actually acknowledged what "it" is.

(I'm not saying that it is "mere reaction and behaviour" just pointing out that just because it's an answer we don't like the feel ;) of it isn't really a reason to avoid the correct conclusion.)

Jeff Corey

17th May 2006, 07:57 AM

I really don't see what it could be beside behavior.

Interesting Ian

17th May 2006, 09:16 AM

Or actually acknowledged what "it" is.

(I'm not saying that it is "mere reaction and behaviour" just pointing out that just because it's an answer we don't like the feel ;) of it isn't really a reason to avoid the correct conclusion.)

It's not a question of not liking the feel of it. We know with absolute certainty that the notion that consciousness is literally behaviour is false. Otherwise there would be no distinction between p-zombies and real people.

Jeff Corey

17th May 2006, 09:21 AM

No. We don't know that with absolute certainty. You're spouting nonsense again.

Piggy

17th May 2006, 09:29 AM

Or actually acknowledged what "it" is.

(I'm not saying that it is "mere reaction and behaviour" just pointing out that just because it's an answer we don't like the feel ;) of it isn't really a reason to avoid the correct conclusion.)
I was probably unclear above.

As far as I can tell, the phenomenon of conscious experience appears to be entirely an emergent phenomenon arising from the physical activity of the brain.

But this emergent phenomenon is not entirely equivalent to this physical activity.

There exists in the universe the phenomenon of "felt experience". And while it arises from, is dependent on, and is never separate from brain activity (as far as we know), and therefore can be presumed to be explainable entirely in terms of brain activity, it is not necessarily always associated with the activity of any sort of brain.

It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider how this phenomenon may arise, what sorts of brains may produce it, and which animals may engage in it, and to what degrees.

And it is not only worthwhile for mere scientific curiosity, but also for ethical reasons. It matters whether a fetus has a felt experience of pain. It matters if a cat or dog does, and if a cricket doesn't.

That being the case, it is worthwhile to attempt to develop ways of determining whether other critters are subject to this phenomenon. If we can come to understand how this sense of experience is produced by the brain, then we may be able to answer some ethical questions regarding appropriate treatment of animals, for example.

If a cricket has no more experience of the world than a computer, then using it for bait cannot be said to be cruel. If there is no "felt experience" occurring at that point in the universe defined by the body of the cricket, then there is no suffering there either.

If a puppy "feels" pain (and doesn't just physically react to it) in much the same way that you and I do, then certainly it is cruel to burn its ears off. If whales feel emotional pain, then there are ethical implications to capturing them and penning them up to perform in theme parks.

If we do not make reference to this most salient feature of our own consciousness, then we do dodge the issue.

Perhaps I'm wrong, but at the moment I can't see how a purely behavioral approach can effectively address this issue. If it can, then this will be a good thing b/c it will make research much easier.

Piggy

17th May 2006, 10:32 AM

Re the role of behaviorism and introspection in answering questions about consciousness....

It seems clear at this point that introspection is going to be a vital component in investigating the relationship between conscious ("felt") experience and brain activity.

For example, look at recent studies into the relationship between average differences in male v. female brain activity and the conscious experience of pain.

Studies like these rely on personal reports by test subjects regarding their experience. These reports can then compared to scans of activity in various areas of the brain.

Similarly, introspection is a key component to studying certain brain pathologies, such as those present in people who show many physical signs of emotion, but who have short-circuits in critical feedback systems of the brain and so have no felt experience of these emotions.

From this type of methodology, combining introspection and neuroscience, we're likely to get insights into the nature of conscious experience that a purely behavioral approach is unlikely ever to produce.

As we learn more, we may be able to describe in greater detail exactly how the phenomenon of felt experience is created, and therefore to begin making informed conclusions regarding when conscious experience arose and which animals participate in it and to what degree.

Interesting Ian

17th May 2006, 10:47 AM

No. We don't know that with absolute certainty. You're spouting nonsense again.

Consciousness is the felt experience, therefore it cannot be literally the same thing as behaviour. This is just so obvious. For example I could have toothache but give no sign of it whatsoever in my behaviour or facial expression.

Jeff Corey

17th May 2006, 11:03 AM

More nonsense.

Mercutio

17th May 2006, 12:18 PM

Consciousness is the felt experience, therefore it cannot be literally the same thing as behaviour. This is just so obvious. For example I could have toothache but give no sign of it whatsoever in my behaviour or facial expression.
Remember, Ian, that Radical Behaviorists define behavior differently than you do; your definition is more in tune with Methodological Behaviorism, which has not been Behaviorism in decades. Radical Behaviorism defines behavior simply as "what you do"; this includes private behavior as well as the public behavior you are speaking of.

(this is beyond the scope of the current thread question, though, and if I recall correctly, Ian, you were one who did read the behaviorism links a year or so ago, so I don't really need to go into it. If I recall, you understood the position, but did not agree with it. Which is fine; just recall that if "feeling pain" is something you do, then it is behavior. Would you agree that feeling pain is something you do?)

Mercutio

17th May 2006, 12:20 PM

Darat

17th May 2006, 01:01 PM

...snip.. Otherwise there would be no distinction between p-zombies and real people.

And your point is?

Piggy

17th May 2006, 01:10 PM

Piggy, I will address more of this later--I agree, though, we were talking at cross purposes, and agree far more than we disagree. I do still think my approach is useful to address some of the things said here, but real life will prevent me from elaborating for the moment.
Cool. I also think behaviorist approaches have something to contribute. And I'm not deying that other definitions of consciousness are worth considering and investigating also, of course. Looking forward to your later posts.

Interesting Ian

17th May 2006, 05:02 PM

Remember, Ian, that Radical Behaviorists define behavior differently than you do;

I don't know what "radical behaviourism" is. If they mean something different by the word "behaviour" as it is commonly employed, then you must provide the definition.

your definition is more in tune with Methodological Behaviorism, which has not been Behaviorism in decades.

No.

Methodological Behaviorism is just the recognition that it is only behaviour which can be scientifically studied. It does not commit itself to any philosophical position on what consciousness actually is in itself. This is in contrast with analytical behaviourism which holds that consciousness just is behaviour.

Radical Behaviorism defines behaviour simply as "what you do"; this includes private behavior as well as the public behavior you are speaking of.

And I've told you before that private behaviour is an oxymoron. By definition behaviour is that which is potentially observable -- that which potentially can be determined from the 3rd person perspective.

just recall that if "feeling pain" is something you do, then it is behavior. Would you agree that feeling pain is something you do?)

Absolutely not. Not only do I not agree, but it is transparently false. Appropriate physical processes in the brain might elicit or cause or generate pain, but pain itself is numerically distinct from the physical processes which give rise to it.

Interesting Ian

17th May 2006, 05:13 PM

And your point is?

The point is that some thing that looks exactly like a human being, and behaves indistinguishably from a human being, does not entail by definition that the thing in question is conscious.

No matter how incredibly implausible and unlikely you might feel it is, it is not the case that all other apparent people are by definition conscious. Another person's feelings, pains, thoughts etc, are not by definition constituted by your visual observations of their behaviour. It is conceivable (albeit arguably incredibly unlikely) that no one apart from you is actually conscious.

An analytical behaviourist, on the other hand, says that other people by definition are conscious. This is clearly utterly absurd.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

17th May 2006, 05:49 PM

Appropriate physical processes in the brain might elicit or cause or generate pain, but pain itself is numerically distinct from the physical processes which give rise to it.

How distinct? why "numerically" distinct? Physical processes in the brain are certainly behaviour, so, if you agree in that those processes are the cause of the pain, why do you object that when explaining such mechanism one could explain pain in purely physical terms?

Unless you can demonstrate that "pain" is different from "brain processes" you are expressing wishful thinking, not doing philosophy nor science.

Bodhi Dharma Zen

17th May 2006, 06:06 PM

An analytical behaviourist, on the other hand, says that other people by definition are conscious. This is clearly utterly absurd.

Clearly utterly absurd... why exactly. I want to see the argument, not only the emotional part.

Interesting Ian

17th May 2006, 06:33 PM

Clearly utterly absurd... why exactly. I want to see the argument, not only the emotional part.

You cannot logically maintain that your consciousness is utterly distinct from your behaviour, but that other peoples' consciousness are one and the very same thing as their behaviour.

Interesting Ian

17th May 2006, 06:34 PM

How distinct? why "numerically" distinct? Physical processes in the brain are certainly behaviour, so, if you agree in that those processes are the cause of the pain, why do you object that when explaining such mechanism one could explain pain in purely physical terms?

This has absolutely nothing to do with behaviourism -- the topic iunder discussion.

Mercutio

17th May 2006, 06:57 PM

I don't know what "radical behaviourism" is. If they mean something different by the word "behaviour" as it is commonly employed, then you must provide the definition.
It is quite apparent that you do not know radical behaviorism. Too bad, as it is the current school of thought within behaviorism. If you are going to argue against it, you might wish to argue against it, and not against a strawman.

I did define behavior. It is what you do.

No.

Methodological Behaviorism is just the recognition that it is only behaviour which can be scientifically studied. It does not commit itself to any philosophical position on what consciousness actually is in itself. This is in contrast with analytical behaviourism which holds that consciousness just is behaviour.
Perhaps we differ in that you approach this from the philosophy angle, whereas I approach it from the experimental science angle. John B. Watson, the preeminent methodological behaviorist, thought that consciousness was "talking to yourself"; purely an objective behavior, initially (kids talk themselves through problems all the time), but more and more subtle as we learn to hide the behavior. He even tried putting electrodes on a person's larynx to measure their vestigal speech while thinking.
And I've told you before that private behaviour is an oxymoron. By definition behaviour is that which is potentially observable -- that which potentially can be determined from the 3rd person perspective.
You admit above that you do not know Radical Behaviorism, but you dismiss its definitions out of hand. Private behavior differs from public behavior only in the number of potential observers. Both are natural events; both are appropriate for scientific study; both are under the control of their antecedent and consequential stimuli.

You are giving your definition of behavior, not radical behaviorism's. It is only an oxymoron to you because you define behavior incompletely.
Absolutely not. Not only do I not agree, but it is transparently false. Appropriate physical processes in the brain might elicit or cause or generate pain, but pain itself is numerically distinct from the physical processes which give rise to it.You do not feel pain? How do you know when you have a toothache, let alone when another person does?

Interesting Ian

18th May 2006, 04:19 AM

It is quite apparent that you do not know radical behaviorism. Too bad, as it is the current school of thought within behaviorism. If you are going to argue against it, you might wish to argue against it, and not against a strawman.

Mercutio, I have read numerous books and papers on the mind-body problem. They are all united in their conclusion that analytical behaviourism, i.e metaphysical behaviourism, is dead and buried. I have never come across this "radical behaviourism"; not ever, apart from you.

So the question here is whether it is a scientific position on how best to study consciousness, or whether it is a metaphysical position on the mind-body problem. If the former then it is completely uninteresting. If the latter I want to know how it differs from analytical behaviourism.

You say that consciousness exists, but that it is a private behaviour. How is an experience of toothache a behaviour? It is simply flat out false. A pain is simply that, and never anything more. It might well be caused or generated by physical processes, but that of course does not make pain a behaviour. If you're saying pain is the very same as these physical processes, then that's identity theory, not any type of behaviourism (and identity theory, at least type identity theory, is also dead and buried).

I did define behavior. It is what you do.
Perhaps we differ in that you approach this from the philosophy angle, whereas I approach it from the experimental science angle.

I just don't have any interest whatsoever in approaching it from an experimental science angle. Science could only ever in principle study behaviour and not consciousness itself.

John B. Watson, the preeminent methodological behaviorist, thought that consciousness was "talking to yourself";

Well you can certainly talk to yourself in your head. But that's one thing that consciousness does, not what it is.

purely an objective behavior, initially (kids talk themselves through problems all the time),

Oh, you mean talking out loud to yourself . . . That certainly isn't consciousness no.

but more and more subtle as we learn to hide the behavior. He even tried putting electrodes on a person's larynx to measure their vestigal speech while thinking.
You admit above that you do not know Radical Behaviorism, but you dismiss its definitions out of hand.

Yes I do indeed dismiss it's definitions out of hand. This is because by definition consciousness is not constituted by behaviour. Otherwise a p-zombie by definition would be conscious. But by definition it is not conscious. Thus we get a logical inconsistency.

The only way you can get out of that is to assert p-zombies are logically impossible. But if you maintain this you need to say the entirety of a person's behaviour (and if you like we can include brain processes here) is actually wholly constitutive or equates to their consciousness. But this is flat out false since in addition to everything I ever do or say there are the actual conscious experiences themselves.

So you see all behaviourist positions are flat out absurd. Indeed all reductive materialist positions are flat out absurd. There are no 2 ways about it I'm afraid.

Private behavior differs from public behavior only in the number of potential observers.

Hang on a sec. We don't observe our own conscious states. They are just immediately given or experienced.

Both are natural events; both are appropriate for scientific study; both are under the control of their antecedent and consequential stimuli.

Consciousness certainly isn't appropriate for any scientific study. Not unless you rely upon subjective reports. According to science we should all be p-zombies. But we're not. So much for the scientific study of consciousness!

You are giving your definition of behavior, not radical behaviorism's.

It doesn't matter about my definition of behaviour. What you are not allowed to do is to redefine the word behaviour to refer to conscious experiences. By doing this you're abusing the English Language. And it's going to make communication with me rather difficult since I resolutely refuse to embrace any of the materialists redefining of words.

It is only an oxymoron to you because you define behavior incompletely.
You do not feel pain? How do you know when you have a toothache, let alone when another person does?

I know I have toothache because it is immediately given. I do not observe the pain. It is not a process, least of all a behaviour. It is simply that, a pain. Moreover it is never anything more than a pain. Playing around with words can never alter this fundamental truth.

Piggy

18th May 2006, 06:50 AM

I just don't have any interest whatsoever in approaching it from an experimental science angle. Science could only ever in principle study behaviour and not consciousness itself.

<snip>

Consciousness certainly isn't appropriate for any scientific study. Not unless you rely upon subjective reports. According to science we should all be p-zombies. But we're not. So much for the scientific study of consciousness!

Good God, man, you don't even understand science.

Interesting Ian

18th May 2006, 07:12 AM

Good God, man, you don't even understand science.

Eh . .I rather think I do. At least the philosophical underpinnings of science. I got a first in the history and philosophy of science module at University, and a first in the empiricist module, and a first in the origins of modern science module (although only a 2.1 in the mind-body problem module). Moreover my understanding was minuscule then as compared to now.

So my suggestion is that, in common with almost everyone else on here, it is you who do not know what you are talking about.

Roboramma

18th May 2006, 07:16 AM

Ian, why do you think science should conclude that we are all p-zombies?

Piggy

18th May 2006, 07:23 AM

Eh . .I rather think I do. At least the philosophical underpinnings of science. I got a first in the history and philosophy of science module at University, and a first in the empiricist module, and a first in the origins of modern science module (although only a 2.1 in the mind-body problem module).
Any actual science mixed in there, brother?

Darat

18th May 2006, 07:23 AM

Ian, why do you think science should conclude that we are all p-zombies?

Because p-zombies are defined to be without something that science can't describe.

It's actually nothing more then a circular argument; p-zombies are only logically coherent if you start with the premise that reality is dualistic.

Despite what some people claim p-zombies can't be used to refute or show that non-dualist concepts of what consciousness "is" are logically incoherent.

Interesting Ian

18th May 2006, 07:46 AM

Ian, why do you think science should conclude that we are all p-zombies?

The world is supposed to be physically closed. This means that all change can be explained by reference to physical chains of causes and effects. This means that the totality of our behaviour is due to such physical chains of causes and effects. In particular, everything that occurs in the brain is solely due to prior states of the brain plus input from the environment evolving deterministically according to physical laws (the randomness due to QM is unimportant). Thus the ultimate origin of our behaviour is no different in kind from the Earth as it orbits the Sun, or a boulder as it rolls down a hill.

But this then means that consciousness is completely causally inefficacious since it is the firing of neurons etc which wholly causes our behaviour. But if consciousness has absolutely no affect upon the world whatsoever then science cannot conclude it exists. Science by definition can only deal with that which is causally efficacious. It has no need to appeal to the existence of consciousness since everything we ever do, can be, in principle, completely explained by measurable events in our brains and our environment.

Science is not in the business of postulating entitites or processes which do not affect the world one iota. Therefore from a scientific perspective we are all p-zombies.

Interesting Ian

18th May 2006, 07:48 AM

Any actual science mixed in there, brother?

Science is not relevant to the question of whather consciousness can be scientifically explained. It is the philosophy of science which is relevant.

Beerina

18th May 2006, 07:52 AM

just checked the "mirror test" passers.....

Humans (older than 18 months), great apes (except for gorillas), and bottlenose dolphins have all been observed to pass the test of recognising themselves in a mirror.

as an add on bonus question....how about computers? Could they "evolve" consciousness (with our help :) )

I don't know, some dogs bark at themselves in a mirror, others, like my Pekingese, completely ignore themselves. And my dog barks at anything that moves, including other dogs, so I know she must be recognizing it as herself. That she doesn't recognize it as a dog is not possible, unless they require scent and/or sound to make it real. Scent I can't see being needed as an animal could be upwind of the animal its looking at. Sound may be another issue though. But they have similar issues with things on TV, it's like they don't exist. TV, though, doesn't provide a 3D world; a mirror does.

Interesting Ian

18th May 2006, 08:39 AM

Because p-zombies are defined to be without something that science can't describe.

It's actually nothing more then a circular argument; p-zombies are only logically coherent if you start with the premise that reality is dualistic.

Can I just clarify here. Dualism holds that consciousness exists and the physical world. By the physical world we mean a reality whose existence does not depend upon the mind.

But I'm actually only starting from the premise that consciousness exists. The physical world can be exhaustively defined in terms of various perceptual qualia by subjects. Thus a table is nothing more than a family of tactile and visual qualia in addition to the causal impact it has upon the environment.

Despite what some people claim p-zombies can't be used to refute or show that non-dualist concepts of what consciousness "is" are logically incoherent.

My axiom I start with is that consciousness exists ie qualia of various types such as emotions, pains, visual experiences, tastes and so on. If you do not accept this axiom and suppose that consciousness does not exist, then obviously materialism in all its guises works.

Indeed analytical behaviours and eliminative materialists do deny that anyone has ever been conscious.

I assert I know with complete certainty that I myself am conscious. I cannot prove this however, I take it an an axiom. But once you accept this axiom (or at least the axiom that you are conscious) then reductive materialism fails.

Mercutio

18th May 2006, 09:12 AM

I was probably unclear above.

As far as I can tell, the phenomenon of conscious experience appears to be entirely an emergent phenomenon arising from the physical activity of the brain.

But this emergent phenomenon is not entirely equivalent to this physical activity.
I would argue that it is an emergent property of the physical activity of the entire body (including the brain). Our nervous system evolved as part of our bodies, and are entirely dependent on processing that happens in the body. Of course, this is a minor point. The emergent property, though, is not purely formed of brain activity, but of bodily activity as well, and of the language we use in describing and referring to this activity. Unlike Ian, I do not think that there is a thing we can call consciousness that is separate from our own behavior and experience. Rather, there are things we do which have been dumped into the category "bodily actions", others in the category "mental events", and others (the categories do overlap) into "consciousness". And yes, I continue to use the proper Radical Behaviorist definition of behavior, which includes private behavior. "Seeing a tree" is something you do; it is behavior, and it is as well understood as the behavior of walking--that is, neither is understood down to the individual nerve pathways in the brain, but each is understood pretty damned well considering the complexity of the system.)

There exists in the universe the phenomenon of "felt experience". And while it arises from, is dependent on, and is never separate from brain activity (as far as we know), and therefore can be presumed to be explainable entirely in terms of brain activity, it is not necessarily always associated with the activity of any sort of brain.
Agreed entirely. Two points: First, this "awareness of seeing a tree" (one example of a felt experience) may well be the result of a secondary neural pathway, the stimulus for which is the firing of the first neural pathway. So, in addition to "seeing a tree" we have "seeing the seeing of a tree". I think you, Piggy, have talked about Dennett's analysis of this earlier in the thread. But secondly...there is perfectly good reason it is not necessarily always associated withthe activity of any given portion of the brain (although new research shows spindle cells firing when we experience "awareness" of something): we do not learn the term based on the firing of brain areas, but based on behavior. Our referents for consciousness are not the brain firings, but actions which are imperfectly correlated with them. (this is why the analysis of how we learn the word is important--if one critique of the brain activity explanation is that the correlation between brain activity and felt experience is imperfect, this analysis renders that critique irrelevant.) Although the felt experience is (in part) an emergent property of a wide range of brain activities, our understanding of it is an emergent property of an even wider range of publicly observable behaviors which are imperfectly correlated with those brain activities.

It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider how this phenomenon may arise, what sorts of brains may produce it, and which animals may engage in it, and to what degrees.

And it is not only worthwhile for mere scientific curiosity, but also for ethical reasons. It matters whether a fetus has a felt experience of pain. It matters if a cat or dog does, and if a cricket doesn't.
Have you read Dennett's Kinds of Minds? Chapter 4's discussion of pain in both rhesus monkeys and cephalopods is worth examining here.

That being the case, it is worthwhile to attempt to develop ways of determining whether other critters are subject to this phenomenon. If we can come to understand how this sense of experience is produced by the brain, then we may be able to answer some ethical questions regarding appropriate treatment of animals, for example.

If a cricket has no more experience of the world than a computer, then using it for bait cannot be said to be cruel. If there is no "felt experience" occurring at that point in the universe defined by the body of the cricket, then there is no suffering there either.

If a puppy "feels" pain (and doesn't just physically react to it) in much the same way that you and I do, then certainly it is cruel to burn its ears off. If whales feel emotional pain, then there are ethical implications to capturing them and penning them up to perform in theme parks.
I would argue that these questions are independent of ethics. Although I would not wish to cause pain and suffering, where I draw the line is independent of knowledge of "felt pain". (and, of course, comparing to Dennett's ch. 4 I mention above, it is behavioral similarity to our behavior that is the deciding factor, rather than phylogenetic similarity; cephalopods behave sentiently, despite being more closely related to clams than to vertebrates.)

If we do not make reference to this most salient feature of our own consciousness, then we do dodge the issue.
Of course we make reference to it. But we do so based on what we can actually observe and infer, not on what we assume.

Perhaps I'm wrong, but at the moment I can't see how a purely behavioral approach can effectively address this issue. If it can, then this will be a good thing b/c it will make research much easier.I think you are, like, Ian, still treating "behavior" as "publicly observable behavior only". Including private behavior expands the range of things we can explore scientifically, but does not necessarily make the research easier! We still have the problem of its being private; although we can demonstrate that it is amenable to the manipulation of antecedents and consequences, we cannot demonstrate it to a third party. But at least we have no reason to believe that it is different in kind from other natural processes. No reason to turn to dualism...

Roboramma

18th May 2006, 09:16 AM

The world is supposed to be physically closed. This means that all change can be explained by reference to physical chains of causes and effects. This means that the totality of our behaviour is due to such physical chains of causes and effects.
I don't see how science makes this assumption. If there was some evidence that showed that this is not true, science as a body of knowledge would be able to grow and expand based on that evidence.

In particular, everything that occurs in the brain is solely due to prior states of the brain plus input from the environment evolving deterministically according to physical laws (the randomness due to QM is unimportant). Thus the ultimate origin of our behaviour is no different in kind from the Earth as it orbits the Sun, or a boulder as it rolls down a hill. Well, that's certainly my stance, but I don't think that science would grind to a halt if it were shown to be wrong. I get the impression that you're suggesting (above) that it would, but maybe I'm misreading you?

But this then means that consciousness is completely causally inefficacious since it is the firing of neurons etc which wholly causes our behaviour.
Unless we assume that conciousness is just our way of modelling the firing of those neurons. That is, conciousness is a property of the brain, rather than existing outside of it. I don't think we know enough right now to say what conciousness is, but I also don't think we can say yet that it isn't that.

But if consciousness has absolutely no affect upon the world whatsoever then science cannot conclude it exists. Science by definition can only deal with that which is causally efficacious. It has no need to appeal to the existence of consciousness since everything we ever do, can be, in principle, completely explained by measurable events in our brains and our environment. Maybe. Except you're forgetting that one of the things we do is be concious, something for which every one of those scientists has evidence. And ignoring that evidence would go against science. In other words it would be unscientific to conclude that conciousness does not exist in the face of evidence (your own conciousness) that it does. What might be done is shown that our understanding of what conciousness is is very different from what it actually is, however.

Science is not in the business of postulating entitites or processes which do not affect the world one iota. Therefore from a scientific perspective we are all p-zombies. You're forgetting that I (and all those scientists) am a part of the world. My conciousness affects me, whatever "me" is, in that I can experience it. To ignore that phenomenon would be the unscientific route. What we can do is study it - hopefully as objectively as possible, find out what our misconceptions about it may be, where it comes from, what parts of the brain affect it or affect what aspects of it, etc. That's scientific. Pretending that it doesn't exist at all, is not.
Of course, if one were to conclude that conciousness is an illusion, that would be very different - after all, illusions exist, just not as what they appear to be.

Roboramma

18th May 2006, 09:26 AM

Mercutio

18th May 2006, 10:42 AM

Merc, the idea of private behavior seems interesting. Could you expand on what it is exactly? (I'm sure this is a much bigger question than I realise, so feel free to ignore if I've just asked you to write a textbook :) ).

Oh, I just realised you may have already, but if so I can't find it, so could someone point me to the post number?

I ask because everything I know about behaviorism I learned from Steven Pinker talking about how much he doesn't like it and from your posts. Needless to say you've given me a new perspective on it and I've become quite interested in what you guys have to say. Hoping to learn more. (Pretty please?)Heh....you asked for it.

Actually, I will first point you to this behaviorism tutorial. (http://psych.athabascau.ca/html/Behaviorism/) It does an excellent job of presenting behaviorism as it was and is--how it developed, philosophical underpinnings, conflicts with other areas...the whole 9 yards.

From the tutorial, a brief answer to your "private behavior" question. It will make more sense in context, and after you complete the tutorial you will be more equipped to understand the finer points. Then, ask me anything! Some part of the environment is private, in the sense that it is accessible only to one individual. Events in this part are important, but they are important as events in the behavioral dimension, not in the mental dimension. The term subjective, as contrasted with objective, is concerned with these same sorts of events. These private or subjective behavioral events are the sorts of phenomena identified in everyday language by such terms as "thinking," "problem solving," "recalling," and "imagining." Thus, radical behaviorism will accept that some behavioral phenomena are private, but not that their ontology is that of a mental or subjective dimension that differs from the physical or objective dimension. In particular, they do not need to be analyzed according to a different conceptual scheme, simply because they are not accessible to more than one individual. Any particular usage of a "mental" or "subjective" term in everyday language is to be analyzed to determine in what respects it is occasioned by behavioral, but not necessarily publicly observable, relations. The important questions are (a) what contingencies are responsible for the development of private events, and (b) what contingencies are responsible for any influence that private events exert on subsequent behavior. For example, as verbal behavior under the control of a private stimulus, introspection is an instance of behavior that needs to be explained. Introspection does not explain other behavioral phenomena. What contingencies make it possible to give introspective reports?

Piggy

18th May 2006, 10:59 AM

Science is not relevant to the question of whather consciousness can be scientifically explained. It is the philosophy of science which is relevant.
That is the silliest thing I've heard in weeks. One of the silliest things I've heard ever.

Piggy

18th May 2006, 11:06 AM

But this then means that consciousness is completely causally inefficacious since it is the firing of neurons etc which wholly causes our behaviour. But if consciousness has absolutely no affect upon the world whatsoever then science cannot conclude it exists.
There's your problem right there. That's like saying that because waves are the aggregate motions of molecules in the ocean, therefore waves can't affect physical matter. As a former resident of the Florida panhandle, I can assure you this isn't the case.

I think you need to emerge from your philosophies and join the real world.

Piggy

18th May 2006, 11:10 AM

I assert I know with complete certainty that I myself am conscious. I cannot prove this however, I take it an an axiom. But once you accept this axiom (or at least the axiom that you are conscious) then reductive materialism fails.
No, it doesn't. Or at least, it doesn't if you are willing to peek beyond your limited philosophy and consider the overwhelming and incontrivertible evidence that an objective reality exists, and the overwhelming evidence that consciousness is indeed an emergent phenomenon arising from brain activity.

Piggy

18th May 2006, 11:20 AM

My lunch hour's ending, so I don't have time to consider everything in your post, Merc. I'll say, tho, that I am totally with you and in agreement up to here....

But secondly...there is perfectly good reason it is not necessarily always associated with the activity of any given portion of the brain (although new research shows spindle cells firing when we experience "awareness" of something): we do not learn the term based on the firing of brain areas, but based on behavior.

After the :, you shake me. Somehow I'm just going to have to figure out why you continually shift discussion back to the acquisition of terms. To me, this seems like a tangent, a red herring.

I'll ponder on it.

Mercutio

18th May 2006, 12:05 PM

After the :, you shake me. Somehow I'm just going to have to figure out why you continually shift discussion back to the acquisition of terms. To me, this seems like a tangent, a red herring.

I'll ponder on it.
Lemme throw an analogy at you; that might help.

There have been threads here trying to explore the physiological substrate of NDE's (near-death experiences), no? In my experience, these threads have gotten bogged down because there is no one physiological cause that suffices to explain the variety of NDE's that have been reported. Some will then argue that, since there is no cause that fits all the examples, there must be no physiological cause of the phenomenon.

Ah, but that is the rub; the use of "phenomenon", singular, presumes that NDE's are of a kind. They may vary from one another, but all are assumed (by this logical line, anyway) to be variations on the same theme. As such, it is legitimate to look for a single cause.

My approach, then, would be to examine the term NDE, to see what sorts of things we put into that fuzzy category. In various threads here and on believer sites, we get everything from automobile accidents in which someone was not even injured, but "had [his] life pass before [his] eyes", to cases of stopped hearts, to cases in which no measureable brain activity could be detected. (Not to mention, we get widely varying clinical situations, from casual observation to individuals hooked up to various monitors in hospitals.) It seems, sometimes, like the only thing they have in common is the label NDE. It seems foolish to me to expect this wide variety of situations to all somehow have the same cause. The lack of a single explanation for this wide range of experiences is perfectly understandable (especially when various subsets are perfectly well explained by known processes, although the same processes are irrelevant to other subsets), and does not beg the question at all.

It seems to me that it seems to you that I conflate language and behavior, but in cases like this it is necessary. "NDE's" are an emergent property of the various different experiences that we lump together as NDE's, but the term itself is also an emergent property of the various ways we speak of the experiences. If asked to "explain NDE's", both sorts of emergence are important. The first can only be examined after the second has been (we cannot explain a category of NDE's until we have delimited it; if the second sort of emergent property throws together two physiologically distinct processes, there can be no analysis that shows one process to explain them both.)

Back to consciousness for a bit. Suppose we limit ourselves to "awareness" as a subset of conscious experience, just to make things more manageable. We then look to find a physiological substrate underpinning "awareness" as a felt experience. So far, all well and good. But as you say, we may find no area of the brain firing consistently with awareness. Now would be the time to examine what we mean by awareness, and whether we are looking at several different processes which we have labeled, emergently, with one term. It could be (purely