How does the neural correlate = qualia ?

[davidsmith73]

I'm starting this thread because I am trying to pin down, more specifically, materialistic interpretations I have read here about conscious experience in terms of physical processes.

I am not interested in the specifics of the neural processes involved, but by all means refer to them if they are needed.

I am more interested in the meaning of the suggestion than qualia are in some way the same thing as a specific physical process as described by mathematical principles.

I am aware that some "anti-materialists" have been accused of applying vague terminology to this topic but I bet this thread may produce its fair share of ambiguity from the other side ;)

Edited:

Just a word of warning to start. This is the opening statement of a recent article by (probably materialists, I haven't asked them in person) Francis Crick and Cristophe Koch entitled "a framework for consciousness" :

"The most difficult aspect of consciousness is the so-called "hard problem" of qualia - the redness of red, the painfullness of pain and so on. No one has produced any plausable explanation as to how the experience of the redness of red could arise from the actions of the brain. It appears fruitless to address this problem head on. Instead, we are attempting to find the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the hope that when we can explain the NCC in causal terms, this will make the problem of qualia clearer."

nature neuroscience, vol 6 no. 2, 119-126

[MRC_Hans]

I have participated in a couple of these discussions and I am still at a loss here. I am simply unable to see the problem. What makes qualia something special and mystical?

I see it simply as a form of pattern recognition. We might use that literally, like "roundness" (a qualia in itself?): My brain is trained to recognize shapes with a certain approximation to circle shape as round. When I percieve a shape, my brain compares it to some template in my memory and decides whether it qualifies as "round".

Perhaps I fail to understand the concept of qualia.

Hans

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
I have participated in a couple of these discussions and I am still at a loss here. I am simply unable to see the problem. What makes qualia something special and mystical?

I see it simply as a form of pattern recognition. We might use that literally, like "roundness" (a qualia in itself?): My brain is trained to recognize shapes with a certain approximation to circle shape as round. When I percieve a shape, my brain compares it to some template in my memory and decides whether it qualifies as "round".

Perhaps I fail to understand the concept of qualia.

Hans

What does fear feel like ? If you actually try to answer this question to me I think you will understand how it is not possible to fully describe qualia in terms outside of a direct reference. In other words fear feels like fear. This is what makes them special.


Whether or not the brain recognises a best fit to a learned template, I do not think is relevant. After all, the original template in your memory had to manifest as qualia at some point. So here you are just moving the problem back in time to a previous point in brain development.

So, how do you equate the original neuronal template with the feeling of fear that it correlates with ?

[Janus]

I too dont understand what it is with quala. The way people use the word, it seems as if quala is just a particular type of information and experience is just a particular type of information processing.

As for the redness of red, by the time the signals have passed from the retina, passed the visual processing layers of the brain, the redness factor has been distilled and encoded in a useful Manor, along side other information such as shape, distance, etc. After this all that remains is interpretation.

A minimal complement of states and triggers must be built in. From these higher level behaviours can be extrapolated. [I would like to make this clearer, but I lack the time]

edit: ok that last paragraph is very bad. What I mean is that motivators such as fear, hunger, happieness would need to be built in. These are then extended through experiance.

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
What does fear feel like ? If you actually try to answer this question to me I think you will understand how it is not possible to fully describe qualia in terms outside of a direct reference. In other words fear feels like fear. This is what makes them special.

I can easily describe the feeling of fear (beating heart, queasy stomack, sweaty hands, etc.). You can also describe the condition pathologically (increased blood pressure, contraction of small blood vessels, release of adrenalin, etc.). These are outside references, of course, but can you describe anything without outside references?

Whether or not the brain recognises a best fit to a learned template, I do not think is relevant. After all, the original template in your memory had to manifest as qualia at some point. So here you are just moving the problem back in time to a previous point in brain development.

I don't see the problem. The template is created by learning. As an infant, I am taught what round means. First time you tell an infant that "this is round", it won't know that "round" is a qualia, but later as it is presented to many different objects and patterns and is told that they are "round", it understands that "round" is an abstract property that can apply to many things, so it gets stored under abstract templates.

Pain. I feel pain and react to it; later I learn the word for it, so if somebody tells me "don't walk barefoot on a sunny beach, you will burn your feet", I will be able to imagine what it feels like, even if I never tried it: The template has been established.

So, how do you equate the original neuronal template with the feeling of fear that it correlates with ?

I don't understand the question.

Hans

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
I have participated in a couple of these discussions and I am still at a loss here. I am simply unable to see the problem. What makes qualia something special and mystical?



If we have A and B with thier states being correlated with each other, but which appear to be utterly characteristically different from each other, then why would A be something special and mystical by supposing that it is distinct (albeit perhaps dependent) on B?

[hammegk]

IMO, the redness of red is more apt than emotions with their very strong tie to the perceived *me*.

Red? I know it's "red" by training, and so do you. The question I think is "are the colors we experience the same?" That is, my perception of red -- if you could see it -- might look like the color color I'd call "green". Of course when we look at an object that the world has named "red" that's what we each call the color we actually experience, its qualia to each of us.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Janus
I too dont understand what it is with quala. The way people use the word, it seems as if quala is just a particular type of information


Then they're not using it in the correct sense! Who are these people?


As for the redness of red, by the time the signals have passed from the retina, passed the visual processing layers of the brain, the redness factor has been distilled and encoded in a useful Manor, along side other information such as shape, distance, etc. After this all that remains is interpretation.

A minimal complement of states and triggers must be built in. From these higher level behaviours can be extrapolated. [I would like to make this clearer, but I lack the time]

edit: ok that last paragraph is very bad. What I mean is that motivators such as fear, hunger, happieness would need to be built in. These are then extended through experiance. [/B]

How does any of this make the redness of red the very same thing as a physical process?? :confused:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
I can easily describe the feeling of fear (beating heart, queasy stomack, sweaty hands, etc.).



They are not the feeling of fear. That's the outward manifestation of fear.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
I don't see the problem. The template is created by learning. As an infant, I am taught what round means. First time you tell an infant that "this is round", it won't know that "round" is a qualia, but later as it is presented to many different objects and patterns and is told that they are "round", it understands that "round" is an abstract property that can apply to many things, so it gets stored under abstract templates.



Just to say here that there's 2 different types of roundness which you appear to be conflating. There's roundness as experienced, or the qualia, which certainly isn't an abstract property. Then there is the mathematical roundness. It's the same with all other things in the world eg redness as experienced and the physical definition of redness etc.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
What does fear feel like? If you actually try to answer this question to me I think you will understand how it is not possible to fully describe qualia in terms outside of a direct reference. In other words fear feels like fear. This is what makes them special.It is perfectly possibly to describe fear from an objective viewpoint. The description looks different from a description from a subjective viewpoint, but describes the same thing.

Qualia are a fiction.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
It is perfectly possibly to describe fear from an objective viewpoint. The description looks different from a description from a subjective viewpoint, but describes the same thing.

Qualia are a fiction.

No, the physical world is a fiction.

[synaesthesia]

I just want everyone to be clear on one philosophical point derivative of Wittgenstein's private language argument.

Nobody has ever 'correlated' intrinsic, ineffable, infallible qualia with anything. There can be no complaint that we have merely correlated qualia to physical brain states because the epistemic divide posited by the question is itself incoherent.

[synaesthesia]

Originally posted by davidsmith73


What does fear feel like ? If you actually try to answer this question to me I think you will understand how it is not possible to fully describe qualia in terms outside of a direct reference... This is what makes them special.


David, you have not argued for your notion that human experience cannot - in principle- be described.

I agree that by definition qualia cannot be described with reference to the outside world, but I do not agree that there is any such thing. Moreover, by it's definition, if we did have them, we would be totally unable to talk about them. That you are sitting here describing your experience means that it can be described.

Yes, some systems are more difficult to capture in natural language. For instance, describing a tear in cardboard is virtually impossible without reference to the piece from which it was taken. On a more germaine note, describing a neural network (psst, the kind between our ears) is exceedingly difficult without the use of specialized scientific language.

The mere fact that natural language is inadequate is beside the point. The best descriptions of many features of perception (Movement, angle, depth, sleep, time sensetive memory) comes from neurobiology, not natural language.

[synaesthesia]

Originally posted by davidsmith73


What does fear feel like ? If you actually try to answer this question to me I think you will understand how it is not possible to fully describe qualia in terms outside of a direct reference. In other words fear feels like fear. This is what makes them special.

Qualia, by definition, cannot be described. If humans did have them, we would be undable to describe our experiences. Obviously human cognition is difficult to describe, for very prosaic and un-spiritual reasons, but that is no argument in principle.

I would say that thought is a lot like torn cardboard. Exceedingly difficult to describe without reference to it's corresponding piece, it remains aminable to scientific description given sufficient time and energies.

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If we have A and B with thier states being correlated with each other, but which appear to be utterly characteristically different from each other, then why would A be something special and mystical by supposing that it is distinct (albeit perhaps dependent) on B?

I don't know, you tell me. But what has this to do with qualia?

They are not the feeling of fear. That's the outward manifestation of fear.

They are certainly also the feeling. Let us not bicker about details; are you seriously saying you can not describe how you feel when you feel fear??

Just to say here that there's 2 different types of roundness which you appear to be conflating. There's roundness as experienced, or the qualia, which certainly isn't an abstract property. Then there is the mathematical roundness. It's the same with all other things in the world eg redness as experienced and the physical definition of redness etc.

Sorry, but I don't see your point. Mathematical roundness can be experienced, described, learnt, like subjective roundness. Where is the special property? It is all just different levels of abstraction.

No, the physical world is a fiction.

Hit youself on the head with a hard object and say that again. (if you're still not convinced, let ME hit you on the head ;) )

... pretty strong fiction, I'd say.



Hans

[Yahzi]

Qualia are a fiction.
Just like temperature. Put your hand on the stove and it burns. But each little molecule is utterly innocent: no heat there.

[synaesthesia]

Originally posted by Yahzi

Just like temperature. Put your hand on the stove and it burns. But each little molecule is utterly innocent: no heat there.

But remember that common definitions of qualia involve characteristics which cannot be so reduced, which serve no possible scientific use.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I haven't read these yet, but they look like interesting papers about qualia.

http://www.lucs.lu.se/ftp/pub/LUCS_Studies/LUCS58.pdf

http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/loar2.htm

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm

~~ Paul

[Peskanov]

Synaethesia,

----
quote:
But remember that common definitions of qualia involve characteristics which cannot be so reduced, which serve no possible scientific use.
----

I find this very interesting.
I feel different types of qualia (sound,color, temperature) simultaneously.
For me this is a indication of a possible reduction, or that maybe I am putting the same name (qualia) to different phenomena.
Not only that; if we look closely the qualia related only to image, for example, we perceive differerent sensations at will (call these sub-qualia if you want). I mean, we have several sub-qualias (light, movement, shape, color) and we can usually amplify some of them at the cost of the rest (feeling the colors instead of shapes for example).
What are the arguements agains reduction?

[Janus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Then they're not using it in the correct sense! Who are these people?

How does any of this make the redness of red the very same thing as a physical process?? :confused:


Again I’m in too much of a hurry to cite sources; its not important who tho'. The issue what quala are suppose to be. I see phrases like `the redness of red' allot, but they don't mean anything to me (your last line confuses me more than I confuse you). I need some sort of framework that I can slot them in to.

Anyway it sounds like quala can't be reduced to information. If so, then what is so special about them that make this true?

[synaesthesia]

Originally posted by Peskanov

I find this very interesting.
I feel different types of qualia (sound,color, temperature) simultaneously.
For me this is a indication of a possible reduction, or that maybe I am putting the same name (qualia) to different phenomena.

In some senses I obviously agree with you. There is something that it is like to feel experiences, and we could call this qualia.

But remember that people often think of qualia as being intrinsic, infallible and ineffable. The problem obviously arises that these two types of 'qualia' are different. One is uncontroversial, one tends to be incoherent.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Reading two of the papers I cited above lead me to realize that I don't seem to understand what qualia are. I always assumed that a quale was what it was like to experience redness when not looking at something red. In other words, the redness quale is redness disembodied from actually seeing red. These papers discuss the qualia that arise when you actually look at something red. That problem seems even less interesting than the problem I thought we were discussing.

Anyhoo, quinqual.htm is Dennett's paper suggesting there ain't no such thing as qualia. LUCS58.pdf is de Leon's paper critiquing and disagreeing with Dennett. Philosophers sure do talk funny.

~~ Paul

[gentlehorse]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Reading two of the papers I cited above lead me to realize that I don't seem to understand what qualia are. I always assumed that a quale was what it was like to experience redness when not looking at something red. In other words, the redness quale is redness disembodied from actually seeing red. These papers discuss the qualia that arise when you actually look at something red. That problem seems even less interesting than the problem I thought we were discussing.

Anyhoo, quinqual.htm is Dennett's paper suggesting there ain't no such thing as qualia. LUCS58.pdf is de Leon's paper critiquing and disagreeing with Dennett. Philosophers sure do talk funny.

~~ Paul

I think of qualia as the living, moment-by-moment experiences we have. I look at a red barn and experience the redness of red directly. It doesn't matter that any number of great thinkers may have defined qualia out of existence when I'm directly experiencing their existence. When I stand close enough to the red barn, I experience a field of red. It's right there. What is this experience that corresponds to the brain processes which accompany it? It exists to the same extent that I do, regardless of whether or not it's been defined out of existence.

I don't have any answers, but I find it odd that folks would say that qualia are fiction. Perhaps I don't understand what qualia are at all.

[Tricky]

Originally posted by gentlehorse
I think of qualia as the living, moment-by-moment experiences we have. I look at a red barn and experience the redness of red directly. It doesn't matter that any number of great thinkers may have defined qualia out of existence when I'm directly experiencing their existence. When I stand close enough to the red barn, I experience a field of red. It's right there. What is this experience that corresponds to the brain processes which accompany it? It exists to the same extent that I do, regardless of whether or not it's been defined out of existence.
But all the time you are "experiencing" your brain is busily sending neural impulses, writing to memory, and doing all sorts of things which may (someday) be quantified. Yeah, I know it removes the romance, but it is certainly going on. Don't get me wrong, though. I love the experience, but I don't feel cheated if it comes down to "chemicals". I am not picky about the particulars.

Originally posted by gentlehorse
I don't have any answers, but I find it odd that folks would say that qualia are fiction. Perhaps I don't understand what qualia are at all.
I'm not sure either. They seem like a human construct to describe something indescribable. I mean, how could you ever describe "redness" without comparing it to something else red? Why do we need to assume that redness is anything other than our perception of something compared to something else. Everything is correlation.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If we have A and B with thier states being correlated with each other, but which appear to be utterly characteristically different from each other, then why would A be something special and mystical by supposing that it is distinct (albeit perhaps dependent) on B?

Hans

I don't know, you tell me. But what has this to do with qualia?



I want to know why qualia is special and mystical.


II
They are not the feeling of fear. That's the outward manifestation of fear.

Hans
They are certainly also the feeling.



They most certainly are not.



Let us not bicker about details; are you seriously saying you can not describe how you feel when you feel fear??



You certainly don't describe it by what you said! Emotions can only be understood because oneself has also experienced such emotions.


II
Just to say here that there's 2 different types of roundness which you appear to be conflating. There's roundness as experienced, or the qualia, which certainly isn't an abstract property. Then there is the mathematical roundness. It's the same with all other things in the world eg redness as experienced and the physical definition of redness etc.
Hans
Sorry, but I don't see your point. Mathematical roundness can be experienced, described, learnt, like subjective roundness.


It can be experienced?? :confused: What do you mean by that. This is not the visual or tactile sensation of roundness, so what other experience of roundness is there??



Where is the special property? It is all just different levels of abstraction.

No, the physical world is a fiction.

Hit youself on the head with a hard object and say that again. (if you're still not convinced, let ME hit you on the head )

... pretty strong fiction, I'd say.



I would say qualia is a pretty strong fiction. Indeed I cannot discern any meaning in declaring qualia is a fiction.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Janus
[B]


Again I’m in too much of a hurry to cite sources; its not important who tho'. The issue what quala are suppose to be. I see phrases like `the redness of red' allot, but they don't mean anything to me



I just mean the experience of redness. I only say the experience of redness because physicists have this propensity of describing a certain wavelength of electromagnetic radiation as being red. This just causes confusion. When I say red I mean red as experienced



Anyway it sounds like quala can't be reduced to information. If so, then what is so special about them that make this true?


Why should there be anything special about qualia because they can't be reduced to information? The physical world is ultimately information. Qualia is not anything physical.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by synaesthesia
[B]

In some senses I obviously agree with you. There is something that it is like to feel experiences, and we could call this qualia.

But remember that people often think of qualia as being intrinsic, infallible and ineffable.



Yes they obviously are. How could it conceivably be denied?


The problem obviously arises that these two types of 'qualia'


What 2 types?



are different. One is uncontroversial, one tends to be incoherent.

How could qualia conceivably be incoherent? Why should one type be coherent the other incoherent. What 2 types of qualia are you talking about?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Reading two of the papers I cited above lead me to realize that I don't seem to understand what qualia are. I always assumed that a quale was what it was like to experience redness when not looking at something red. In other words, the redness quale is redness disembodied from actually seeing red. These papers discuss the qualia that arise when you actually look at something red. That problem seems even less interesting than the problem I thought we were discussing.

Anyhoo, quinqual.htm is Dennett's paper suggesting there ain't no such thing as qualia. LUCS58.pdf is de Leon's paper critiquing and disagreeing with Dennett. Philosophers sure do talk funny.

~~ Paul

What do you mean no such thing as qualia?? Obviously people have the experience of redness. Isn't that qualia?

[Tricky]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


What do you mean no such thing as qualia?? Obviously people have the experience of redness. Isn't that qualia?
One of the things I heard long ago is that the peculiar toxin of the stonefish makes the unfortunate victims who step on it feel hot as cold and cold as hot. I suspect that with the proper electrodes in the proper places, a person could be made to experience red as blue.

It is all activity in the brain. If you can manipulate the brain to change the "experience", then qualia do not effectively exist. In fact they are only a philosophical construct. Qualia are essentially useless as a tool of science. Their only use is in providing philosophy students with thesis material.

[MRC_Hans]

II:

Youck, this multiple quoting sure becoms complicated. I have taken the liberty to abbreviate earlier quotes:


*Snip*

II
I want to know why qualia is special and mystical.

We agree then; I dont find them special or mystical. However some people with mighty fine credentials seem t othink they are.


II
They are not the feeling of fear. That's the outward manifestation of fear.

Hans
They are certainly also the feeling.

II
They most certainly are not.

How do you distinguish between the feeling and its manifestations? I mean, a sharp distinction. Of course, if I feel feeverish, I might be in love or I might have flu, but with the whole picture, I'm rarely in doubt ;)

*snip*
II
You certainly don't describe it by what you said! Emotions can only be understood because oneself has also experienced such emotions.

Agreed! Likewise with colors, pain and everything else. But that's what I'm saying: Everything is about fitting things into templates that exist in our memory, either as a result of previous experience or as fixed programming in form of the relatively few instincts we have.

*snip*

Hans
Sorry, but I don't see your point. Mathematical roundness can be experienced, described, learnt, like subjective roundness.

II
It can be experienced?? What do you mean by that. This is not the visual or tactile sensation of roundness, so what other experience of roundness is there??

I can imagine a perfect circle and understand how it is shaped, and I can draw a good approcimation and see it. That's what I mean. Probably beside the point, though.

II
No, the physical world is a fiction.

*snip*

II
I would say qualia is a pretty strong fiction. Indeed I cannot discern any meaning in declaring qualia is a fiction.

:confused: Physical world=fiction .... Qualia=fiction ..... Qualia=fiction=meaningless :confused:

Uhh sorry, you've completely lost me now :(

Hans

[Peskanov]

synaesthesia,

I think the properties "intrinsic, infallible" does not discard possible reduction.
About "ineffable" I would say that this has never stopped us to try to analize any phenomena. I can't imagine some electromagnetic events, though I know his formal descriptions.
Are you sure it is commonly accepted that qualia is not reducible?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:What do you mean no such thing as qualia?? Obviously people have the experience of redness. Isn't that qualia?
You gotta read Dennett's paper, although it's a truly horrific slog. I think that he is saying that the qualities we assign to qualia that make them magical, such as ineffability, are not really qualities of qualia. So qualia as we think of them are incoherent.

He's not arguing that there isn't some complex conscious experience of red going on. He just doesn't think qualia are a good concept.

Just more fodder for my opinion that we have to wait this one out and give the neurophysiologists time.

~~ Paul

[c4ts]

Excuse me, but what the hell is a qualia? :confused:

[Dancing David]

I agree please define qualia.

I thinl that they are learned rather than inherent.

Peace

[synaesthesia]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Reading two of the papers I cited above lead me to realize that I don't seem to understand what qualia are.

Exactly, the deeper you look into the philosopher-speak meaning of qualia, the less coherent it becomes with the rest of our world-knowledge and itself.

[Dancing David]

In fact from reading in the context of all the posts I can say that qualia are learned attributes that we place upon our perceptions, which if we go back to Mary in the balck and white box, perceptions are learned at a processinf level.

There are no qualia outside of learning.

Peace

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans

I can easily describe the feeling of fear (beating heart, queasy stomack, sweaty hands, etc.). You can also describe the condition pathologically (increased blood pressure, contraction of small blood vessels, release of adrenalin, etc.). These are outside references, of course, but can you describe anything without outside references?

You have described fear but you could not convey what fear actually feels like to someone who has not experienced fear for themselves.


I don't see the problem. The template is created by learning. As an infant, I am taught what round means. First time you tell an infant that "this is round", it won't know that "round" is a qualia, but later as it is presented to many different objects and patterns and is told that they are "round", it understands that "round" is an abstract property that can apply to many things, so it gets stored under abstract templates.

I think you are missing the point. The first time you tell an infant "this is round" you are merely giving the infant a label that will be associated (the learning part) with his/her experience of roundness. You surely must agree that regardless of whether or not the infant is taught to use language to label certain aspects of his experience, he must still first have preceived experiences !

How these experiences are equated with a physical process within a materialistic interpretation is the real question at hand.


Pain. I feel pain and react to it; later I learn the word for it, so if somebody tells me "don't walk barefoot on a sunny beach, you will burn your feet", I will be able to imagine what it feels like, even if I never tried it: The template has been established.


You started by saying "I feel pain and react to it". This is the point I am addressing. The raw feelings - the qualia - are supposed to be equivalent in some explanatory way to the physical neural processes in the brain. In what way are they equivalent if the raw feelings and corresponding physical processes manifest in such different ways to our consciousness?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
It is perfectly possibly to describe fear from an objective viewpoint. The description looks different from a description from a subjective viewpoint, but describes the same thing.

Qualia are a fiction.

I don't fully understand your distinction between an objective description and a subjective one. Furthermore, the "same thing" these descriptions of fear refer to seems to me to be the actual feeling of fear itself - the qualia. How you can then go on to state that qualia are a fiction escapes me. Could you explain your reasoning further ?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

DavidSmith said:I think you are missing the point. The first time you tell an infant "this is round" you are merely giving the infant a label that will be associated (the learning part) with his/her experience of roundness. You surely must agree that regardless of whether or not the infant is taught to use language to label certain aspects of his experience, he must still first have preceived experiences !
Ah, but this is a tricky business, isn't it? We still wonder whether the infant perceives roundness immediately, or has to learn what roundness is. And we wonder how much of the qualia of roundness is dependent on the label that we teach the child. After all, when you think about "roundness," some of the things you think about is the word round and a list of things we label as round and various other linguistic aspects of roundness. It's all of a piece.

A really neat example of learning qualia is size constancy. Someone did an experiment with the Ba Mbuti tribe that lives in thick jungle: They took them out of the jungle and showed them a car in the distance. The tribespeople asked what kind of insect it was.

~~ Paul

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by synaesthesia


David, you have not argued for your notion that human experience cannot - in principle- be described.

I agree that by definition qualia cannot be described with reference to the outside world, but I do not agree that there is any such thing.

I'm saying that qualia cannot be fully described - just as we cannot fully describe reality in terms of physical theories. Do you not find it compelling that a true reality we ascribe to being ineffable with respect to physical theory is also the case with qualia ?

Yet we know what qualia feel like :eek:

To me, this places qualia above the level of physical description in terms of the true nature of reality and relegates the physical world, not the mental, to the league of fiction.


Moreover, by it's definition, if we did have them, we would be totally unable to talk about them. That you are sitting here describing your experience means that it can be described.

I'm not denying that they can be described. But a description is not the actual thing it refers to and can only take you so far. Think again of a physical theory - it is a mathematical description but it is not the actual reality. Similarly, a description of redness is not the actual raw feeling itself.


The mere fact that natural language is inadequate is beside the point. The best descriptions of many features of perception (Movement, angle, depth, sleep, time sensetive memory) comes from neurobiology, not natural language.

ANY language is inadequate. The true nature of redness cannot be described.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans

Ian: No, the physical world is a fiction.

Hans: Hit youself on the head with a hard object and say that again. (if you're still not convinced, let ME hit you on the head )

... pretty strong fiction, I'd say.



Hans, how does does this hammer manifest itself ? When you hit yourself, you see the hammer lower onto your head and you feel the pain. All qualia.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Tricky

But all the time you are "experiencing" your brain is busily sending neural impulses, writing to memory, and doing all sorts of things which may (someday) be quantified. Yeah, I know it removes the romance, but it is certainly going on. Don't get me wrong, though. I love the experience, but I don't feel cheated if it comes down to "chemicals". I am not picky about the particulars.


So can you go any way to answering my question as to in what respect is "redness" equivalent to the physical process supposedly responsible for it ?


I'm not sure either. They seem like a human construct to describe something indescribable. I mean, how could you ever describe "redness" without comparing it to something else red? Why do we need to assume that redness is anything other than our perception of something compared to something else. Everything is correlation.

To most:
I think a lot of people are missing the point of my question. I don't want to try to provide a definition of qualia. I can certainly give you examples of qualia like redness or fear and if you don't know what I am refering to then there is no point in carrying on the discussion. I want to know how a materialist can equate a physical process with qualia and what they really mean when they say this.

[jasonmccoy]

Originally posted by Yahzi

Just like temperature. Put your hand on the stove and it burns. But each little molecule is utterly innocent: no heat there.

Moreover, place your hand around two conduits (one with warm running water, the other with cold). While neither stimulus will elicit the perception of "hot" much less "pain" individually, you will find it difficult if not impossible to grasp them simaltaneously for very long! The neural correlate here relates to the fact that the simaltaneous activation of hot and cold somatosensory receptors
(nerve ending beneath our hand) is interpreted and perceived by the cortex as "discomfort" at minimum. Where exactly this "discomfort" as it were is registered eludes us and where exactly the feeling of knowing the sensation of pain (qualia) is occuring is equally elusive! Right?

[jasonmccoy]

Originally posted by davidsmith73



So can you go any way to answering my question as to in what respect is "redness" equivalent to the physical process supposedly responsible for it ?



To most:
I think a lot of people are missing the point of my question. I don't want to try to provide a definition of qualia. I can certainly give you examples of qualia like redness or fear and if you don't know what I am refering to then there is no point in carrying on the discussion. I want to know how a materialist can equate a physical process with qualia and what they really mean when they say this.

Have you read any of Antonio Damasio's three books? Perhaps this will help.

[jasonmccoy]

Originally posted by davidsmith73



So can you go any way to answering my question as to in what respect is "redness" equivalent to the physical process supposedly responsible for it ?



To most:
I think a lot of people are missing the point of my question. I don't want to try to provide a definition of qualia. I can certainly give you examples of qualia like redness or fear and if you don't know what I am refering to then there is no point in carrying on the discussion. I want to know how a materialist can equate a physical process with qualia and what they really mean when they say this.

Let me try to put your question differently. Are you in fact asking if it is possible that a person be made to experience qualia (redness) without looking at an object she has already learned is supposed to be red? In other words, can a scientist, using some type of electro or chemical stimulus create a qualia in another?


Just trying to ensure I understand your question.

[Dancing David]

So can you go any way to answering my question as to in what respect is "redness" equivalent to the physical process supposedly responsible for it ?
<><><><><><><><><><>
A. There is a wavelength of light that can be labeled red, if humans had never labeled it it would just be a wavelegth of an electromagetic photon.

B. There are descritions of redness, it's name, it's wavelegth, etc..

C. There is the physical process that leads to the perception of the color red. In Short: certain receptors respond to the wavelength of light while others don't, these signals are parly processed at the retinal level, then passed onto the visual cortex for processing, where they are interpreted 'projected' for the frontal cortex.

D. The decriptions which we use to describe red are taught to us.

E. Our brainjs actually have to go through a learning process in percieving color. In the Mary and B/W room, I suggested that she will not percieve the redness of red the first time she is presented with the color red. Assuming that the neural pathways for color perception don't atrophy she will not percieve the red as red, she will at first percieve it as grey or black. Until her brain has time to adjust to the new sensation, her perception will not be of red.


Peace

[billydkid]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I'm starting this thread because I am trying to pin down, more specifically, materialistic interpretations I have read here about conscious experience in terms of physical processes.

I am not interested in the specifics of the neural processes involved, but by all means refer to them if they are needed.

I am more interested in the meaning of the suggestion than qualia are in some way the same thing as a specific physical process as described by mathematical principles.

I am aware that some "anti-materialists" have been accused of applying vague terminology to this topic but I bet this thread may produce its fair share of ambiguity from the other side ;)

Edited:

Just a word of warning to start. This is the opening statement of a recent article by (probably materialists, I haven't asked them in person) Francis Crick and Cristophe Koch entitled "a framework for consciousness" :

"The most difficult aspect of consciousness is the so-called "hard problem" of qualia - the redness of red, the painfullness of pain and so on. No one has produced any plausable explanation as to how the experience of the redness of red could arise from the actions of the brain. It appears fruitless to address this problem head on. Instead, we are attempting to find the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the hope that when we can explain the NCC in causal terms, this will make the problem of qualia clearer."

nature neuroscience, vol 6 no. 2, 119-126


This is my basic problem with the "qualia are unique" bunch. If you except the premise of cause and effect then everything must have a cause. If the experience of qualia are not attributable to the underlying neural mechanisms which invariably occur coincidentally with the qualia, then to what mechanism do you attribute the experience?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

People often ask "How can our experience of redness be a product of our brains?" If we agree that we don't have a complete understanding of neurophysiology yet, then we can't answer that question. It does not seem like a good idea, however, to jump to the conclusion that redness cannot be a product of the brain.

All the hand-wringing about how it just doesn't seem possible that we can get redness from brain function is worthless. To be convinced of the miracle of qualia, we need a logical argument that qualia cannot be a product of the brain. I think we've stomped on the Knowledge Argument, so we need another one. Is there one?

If so, the first step in discussing it will be to define quale. I predict we'll be mired in that step for awhile.

~~ Paul

[synaesthesia]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

If so, the first step in discussing it will be to define quale. I predict we'll be mired in that step for awhile.

I agree. The whole concept of qualia seems to have evolved as a way of disguising some extraneous metaphysical theories as common intuitions about consciousness. Look at Interesting Ian, after all this time he can't even comprehend the notion that anyone could have different concepts about the nature of experience.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I don't fully understand your distinction between an objective description and a subjective one. Furthermore, the "same thing" these descriptions of fear refer to seems to me to be the actual feeling of fear itself - the qualia. How you can then go on to state that qualia are a fiction escapes me. Could you explain your reasoning further ? Sure.

"Qualia" is the name you give to the subjective experience of the outcome of a particular physical process. Qualia do not actually exist any more than the number 2 exists. What does exist is the brain and the processes occurring in the brain. When you have fully described this you have described all that is real, and the need for "Qualia" goes away.

You give fear as an example. But it's clear that fear is a biochemical process involving not just the brain but other body functions as well. Fear can only be experienced by virtue of a brain processing the feedback from itself and the rest of the body. There is no isolatable Qualia of fear, only a general and infinitely varied and ongoing and physical process.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
Sure.

"Qualia" is the name you give to the subjective experience of the outcome of a particular physical process. Qualia do not actually exist any more than the number 2 exists. What does exist is the brain and the processes occurring in the brain. When you have fully described this you have described all that is real, and the need for "Qualia" goes away.


You changed your mind Pixy?

I remember your exchange with UndercoverElephant about qualia and it was like you had accepted that qualia existed but at the same time did not exist. :confused:

So, when you have fully described the process occurring in your brain (lets say of "fear"), then there is not need to say that fear is a subjective experience (qualia); which means that the subjective is really objective... :confused:

I wonder if you or any Scientist have been capable of fully describing how this process is generated and even better how we could replicate such process in the brain.

Q-S

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Q-Source
You changed your mind Pixy?

I remember your exchange with UndercoverElephant about qualia and it was like you had accepted that qualia existed but at the same time did not exist. :confused: No, that was UCE deliberately misquoting me. I got very annoyed with him for that.So, when you have fully described the process occurring in your brain (lets say of "fear"), then there is not need to say that fear is a subjective experience (qualia); which means that the subjective is really objective... :confused: The subjective is just the objective viewed from a different angle. The subjective viewpoint is notoriously useless in discussion, because it is, well, subjective. Taking the single axiom of materialism - that the universe is what exists - it is clear that any subjective experience can also be fully described in objective terms.I wonder if you or any Scientist have been capable of fully describing how this process is generated and even better how we could replicate such process in the brain.No. We haven't. It's complicated.

There's a lot of work going on in this field, and it's turning up a lot of interesting results, but our understanding is far from complete. There is no reason whatsoever to think that we can't understand it, though.

[PixyMisa]

By the way, I use the terms "we" and "our" in the "I'm just a computer programmer who happened to take a course in cognitive science at University and have no actual qualifications in this field" sense.

[Argo Nimbus]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
"Qualia" is the name you give to the subjective experience of the outcome of a particular physical process. Qualia do not actually exist any more than the number 2 exists. What does exist is the brain and the processes occurring in the brain. When you have fully described this you have described all that is real, and the need for "Qualia" goes away.

So, are you saying:



(1) Physical processes are real.

(2) Subjective experiences are not real.

(3) What is real exists, but what is not real does not exist.

(4) Once everyone understands that subjective experiences are not real and therefore do not exist, the whole problem goes away.

?

It seems to me that subjective experiences are real, even if they do not exist in the same way physcial objects exist (which of course is why they're referred to as "subjective").

--- Argo

[PixyMisa]

Subjective experience is misunderstood objective reality. When you experience something subjectively, there is something real going on, but it's not what the subjective experience tells you it is.

Your question regards the nature of reality. Subjective experiences are patterns. Are patterns real?

[Dancing David]

Subjective expeiences are the interaction of our frontal lobes and the rest of our brains, the qualia re the interpretation that our frontal lobes place upon the sensory perceptions. Wethere they are color or emotions are immaterial, they are based in the biophysical process in our brains.

It seems to me that this is very somilat to the argument of Plato's that there are things like 'beauty' which are trans substantial because they are qualities that cross time and form.

I'd say we have a pig in a prom dress here.

By the way you immaterialists, the sensory pathways are fairly well understood, there is no major debate in neuropsychology about the way perception works.

Can't wait to see your responses.

Peace

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
The subjective is just the objective viewed from a different angle.

Umm, talking about logic somewhere else...

I would say something is logically impossible if it can be shown to be impossible using only the rules of logic. Example: an object that is simultaneously blue and not blue.

Example: something which is subjective and objective at the same time. :rolleyes:


The subjective viewpoint is notoriously useless in discussion, because it is, well, subjective. Taking the single axiom of materialism - that the universe is what exists - it is clear that any subjective experience can also be fully described in objective terms.

In order for you to say that qualia are really objective processes you have to fully describe (as you said before) such processes. Noone has done that with human beings, so why do you use a materialistic assumption to reach a conclusion?



No. We haven't. It's complicated.

If we haven't, then how can you assert that qualia are objective processes?


There's a lot of work going on in this field, and it's turning up a lot of interesting results, but our understanding is far from complete. There is no reason whatsoever to think that we can't understand it, though.

Of course there is no reason to think that we cannot describe how qualia work, in the mean time, we should be careful to assert something which we still do not understand.

Q-S

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Q-Source
Umm, talking about logic somewhere else...

Example: something which is subjective but objective at the same time. A subjective experience is an objective event. It just looks different. This is necessarily so unless you subscribe to some form of mysticism.In order for you to say that qualia are really objective processes you have to fully describe (as you said before) such processes. Noone has done that with human beings, so why do you use a materialistic assumption to reach a conclusion?We have a vast body of evidence which tells us (by inductive reasoning) that the mind, consciousness, "Qualia", what have you, are the result of brain processes. There is no reliable evidence to the contrary. That the mind is a brain function is more certain than the Theory of Relativity,If we haven't, then how can you assert that qualia are objective processes?Evidence?

I don't need to understand the process to point out the correlation.Of course there is no reason to think that we cannot describe how qualia work, in the mean time, we should be careful to assert something which we still do not understand. I'm not asserting that we understand how subjective experience arises from physical processes, but given the nature of the evidence there is no reason not to point out that they do.

[Dancing David]

Excuse me Q-source but where have you shown that qualia are not objective eperiences, please use mary and the color red.

Peace

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
A subjective experience is an objective event. It just looks different.

Evidence: none.


This is necessarily so unless you subscribe to some form of mysticism.

No, I am just being cautious. I cannot buy that a subjective experience is really an objective event because we haven't described any brain process such as love, fear, redness, or whatever in objective terms.

You are using a materialistic assumption to conclude that qualia "must be" an objective event.


We have a vast body of evidence which tells us (by inductive reasoning) that the mind, consciousness, "Qualia", what have you, are the result of brain processes. There is no reliable evidence to the contrary. That the mind is a brain function is more certain than the Theory of Relativity,Evidence?

Inductive reasoning?, is that the way that Einstein proved the validity of his theory?


I don't need to understand the process to point out the correlation.

But correlation does not imply causation.


I'm not asserting that we understand how subjective experience arises from physical processes, but given the nature of the evidence there is no reason not to point out that they do.

If we don't understand then we cannot be so certain about the causation of such relationship, because until now the only thing we have is a correlation.

Q-S

[Argo Nimbus]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
Subjective experience is misunderstood objective reality. When you experience something subjectively, there is something real going on, but it's not what the subjective experience tells you it is.

Your question regards the nature of reality. Subjective experiences are patterns. Are patterns real?

Suppose I walk out onto my patio this evening to watch the Sun set and I think, "My, what a beautiful sunset!". Are you saying that it is true to say "The Sun is real" and "The Sun exists", but it's false to say "My thought is real" or "My thought exists". Somehow saying "My thought is real" is not quite the same thing as saying "A pattern exists".

It seems to me that my thoughts or subjective experiences are just as much a part of the universe as the Sun, even if they are not physical objects. Furthermore, I don't have to explain the relation between minds and brains in order to know that my thoughts exist and are real. It's one thing to say that a particular theory about the relation of minds to brains is false, but quite wrong, it seems to me, to make an issue out of whether subjective experience is real.

I can always be wrong about what causes my subjective experience, but it's hard to see how I could be wrong about having the experience. If I step on a stonefish and then touch an object that to me feels cold, I would be wrong if I said the experience of "coldness" was caused by a cold object. According to Tricky, the cause would be a hot object + stonefish toxin.

To summarize: I can be wrong about causes and relations, but that doesn't make subjective experience non-existent or not real.

--- Argo


Tricky wrote:
One of the things I heard long ago is that the peculiar toxin of the stonefish makes the unfortunate victims who step on it feel hot as cold and cold as hot.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Excuse me Q-source but where have you shown that qualia are not objective eperiences, please use mary and the color red.

Peace

I am not saying that Qualia are not objective processes, I don't know if they are or not. I am just asking why people assert that they are objective when in fact there is no evidence to support such assertion.

Can anyone provide a scientific paper where the experience of fear, love and redness is fully described?

Q-S

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Q, I think what people are saying is that they cannot think of a reason why qualia can't be a product of the brain. The term has so much mystery woven into it that it just begs to be taken as something that cannot be a product of the physical brain, but a lot of that mystery is fabricated.

We have two choices. Come up with a logical explanation for why qualia cannot be physical, or wait until we understand what they really are and how they work. The former project requires a good definition of quale, which I haven't seen yet.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dancing David


By the way you immaterialists, the sensory pathways are fairly well understood, there is no major debate in neuropsychology about the way perception works.

Can't wait to see your responses.

Peace [/B]

What do you want me to respond to?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by synaesthesia


I agree. The whole concept of qualia seems to have evolved as a way of disguising some extraneous metaphysical theories as common intuitions about consciousness. Look at Interesting Ian, after all this time he can't even comprehend the notion that anyone could have different concepts about the nature of experience.

I wasn't aware that I had a concept about the nature of experience. Ok I admit I hold that people have the raw experience of redness and yes I do not understand anyone who would deny this. Are you denying this? If not then what is your point of contention with me?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Excuse me Q-source but where have you shown that qualia are not objective eperiences, please use mary and the color red.

Peace

One doesn't need to show it as the phrase "objective experience" is an oxymoron.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Q, I think what people are saying is that they cannot think of a reason why qualia can't be a product of the brain.

Materialists, you mean. Because Science says nothing about it.


We have two choices. Come up with a logical explanation for why qualia cannot be physical, or wait until we understand what they really are and how they work. The former project requires a good definition of quale, which I haven't seen yet.


I think that we only have one choice, if we say that qualia are objective then we have to prove it, otherwise let's hold an agnostic position.

[Yahzi]

Q-Source
I think that we only have one choice, if we say that qualia are objective then we have to prove it, otherwise let's hold an agnostic position.
Wouldn't that argument apply to God? And to Invisible Pink Unicorns?

Skepticism is not believing in things that have no evidence. Until you have evidence, you don't believe. Show us evidence, and we will believe. Until then, we won't.

Suspending judgement for your sacred cows (while passing judgement on everyone else's) is not agnosticism or open-mindedness, it's just hypocrisy.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Q, I think what people are saying is that they cannot think of a reason why qualia can't be a product of the brain. The term has so much mystery woven into it that it just begs to be taken as something that cannot be a product of the physical brain, but a lot of that mystery is fabricated.

We have two choices. Come up with a logical explanation for why qualia cannot be physical, or wait until we understand what they really are and how they work. The former project requires a good definition of quale, which I haven't seen yet.

~~ Paul

There are people in this thread claiming that qualia do not exist eg Synaesthesia.

You ask for a definition so I shall quote from my oxford companion to philosophy:


qualia. The subjective qualities of conscious experience (plural of the Latin singular quale). Examples are the way sugar tastes, the way vermilion looks, the way coffee smells, the way a cat's purr sounds, the way it feels too stub your toe. Accounting for these features of mental states has been one of the biggest obstacles to materialist solutions to the mind-body problem, because it seems impossible to analyse the subjective character of these phenomena, which are comprehensible only from the point of view of certain types of conscious being, in objective physical terms which are comprehensibility to any rational individual independently of his particular sensory faculties.


Bearing in mind that definition it seems to me that anybody who denies the existence of qualia are barking mad.

[Dancing David]

So:
as I have said before why is there objection to saying that qualia are the labels put on the perceptions brought to our frontal cortex. The labels are placed thier by the thinking parts of our brains, ie the parts that represent silent speech.

I agree that qualia as such exist but that they are stiil part of the neurochemical process in our brains.

There is an awful lot of research on how the brain percieves the color red, seriously it is getting pretty well defined, even in the eighties they were mapping the exact ares where the neural processing occured to create the 'projected' images that our frontal cortex then labels.

It is that we don't have the exact steps in how silent speech (IE thought) occurs?

Peace
PS Thank You for discussing this.


Interesting Ian: why is objective experience oxymoronic? We do seem to have good models for how the brain arrives at the visual perception of red.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Q said:I think that we only have one choice, if we say that qualia are objective then we have to prove it, otherwise let's hold an agnostic position.
Our brain is physical. It does all sorts of wonderful things, including having subjective experiences. There is no evidence for any nonphysical aspects of our brains so I see no reason why qualia should be any different, unless you simply proclaim them so.

qualia. The subjective qualities of conscious experience (plural of the Latin singular quale). Examples are the way sugar tastes, the way vermilion looks, the way coffee smells, the way a cat's purr sounds, the way it feels too stub your toe. Accounting for these features of mental states has been one of the biggest obstacles to materialist solutions to the mind-body problem, because it seems impossible to analyse the subjective character of these phenomena, which are comprehensible only from the point of view of certain types of conscious being, in objective physical terms which are comprehensibility to any rational individual independently of his particular sensory faculties.
Say what?

Bearing in mind that definition it seems to me that anybody who denies the existence of qualia are barking mad.
What we're denying is that qualia needs to be this magical thing that just can't possibly be explained in terms of the brain. Even if I understood the above definition, note the use of the word seems.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I think that we only have one choice, if we say that qualia are objective then we have to prove it, otherwise let's hold an agnostic position.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Our brain is physical. It does all sorts of wonderful things, including having subjective experiences. There is no evidence for any nonphysical aspects of our brains I see no reason why qualia should be any different, unless you simply proclaim them so.



Errr . . .I think that you're attributing to me that which was actually said by Q-Source. She'll be livid! LOL



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
qualia. The subjective qualities of conscious experience (plural of the Latin singular quale). Examples are the way sugar tastes, the way vermilion looks, the way coffee smells, the way a cat's purr sounds, the way it feels too stub your toe. Accounting for these features of mental states has been one of the biggest obstacles to materialist solutions to the mind-body problem, because it seems impossible to analyse the subjective character of these phenomena, which are comprehensible only from the point of view of certain types of conscious being, in objective physical terms which are comprehensibility to any rational individual independently of his particular sensory faculties.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Say what?



Oh come on Paul! How simple do you want a definition to be? :eek:



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bearing in mind that definition it seems to me that anybody who denies the existence of qualia are barking mad.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


What we're denying is that qualia needs to be this magical thing that just can't possibly be explained in terms of the brain. Even if I understood the above definition, note the use of the word seems.


Some people are denying the existence of qualia such as Synaesthesia (sp?).

Anyway, wasn't David Smith originally asking how qualia can be the same thing as neurons firing?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:Errr . . .I think that you're attributing to me that which was actually said by Q-Source. She'll be livid! LOL
Oopsie doopsie!

Oh come on Paul! How simple do you want a definition to be?
The last sentence of the definition ain't even gots proper grammer.

Some people are denying the existence of qualia such as Synaesthesia (sp?).
I think he is denying that qualia are a coherent concept. He is not denying that we have complex subjective experiences that we don't completely understand yet. The term qualia is laden with mystical trappings.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos


The last sentence of the definition ain't even gots proper grammer.


Actually there's 2 mistakes there (although not my fault. It's this ar*ehole voice recognition software! Easier to just type the damn thing out). Anyway, it should be to stub your toe and not "too". In the last sentence it should be comprehensible rather than comprehensibility. The last sentence is rather long and unweildy I agree.


I think he is denying that qualia are a coherent concept.


And if qualia are incoherent then they don't exist!




He is not denying that we have complex subjective experiences that we don't completely understand yet. The term qualia is laden with mystical trappings.


Mystical trappings?? :confused: Not according to the definition I've supplied! How can the taste of sugar be mystical?? :confused:

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's not that the subjective experiences are laden with mystical trappings, it's the definition and attributes of the concept of qualia that are, what with all the ineffability and intrinsicality and what-not.

I'm not suspicious of the idea that subjective experience is complex and interesting. I'm suspicious of the philosophical masturbation surrounding the discussion of qualia.

~~ Paul

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Q-Source
Evidence: none. Wrong.

As Paul pointed out, the brain is a physical thing. All evidence - and it's an absolutely huge amount of evidence from neuroscience, clinical psychology, biochemistry, general medicine and everyday life - all of this evidence tells us that the mind is a function of the brain. There is no reliable evidence to suggest otherwise.

If the mind is a brain function, so are "Qualia". It's that simple.No, I am just being cautious. I cannot buy that a subjective experience is really an objective event because we haven't described any brain process such as love, fear, redness, or whatever in objective terms. Doesn't matter. The only alternative is some form of mysticism. It is hugely unlikely that any such thing is true; we have never seen anything to suggest it.You are using a materialistic assumption to conclude that qualia "must be" an objective event.I'm using evidence. If you have any evidence to suggest that "Qualia" are not the result of objective events, present it. If you're right, you'll probably win multiple Nobel prizes, because you'll have overturned the fields of Physics, Chemistry and Medicine at the very least.Inductive reasoning?, is that the way that Einstein proved the validity of his theory?Yes. Or rather, it is how researchers have shown the Theory of Relativity to be correct.But correlation does not imply causation.It can do. Look at what the correlations are. Trying to suggest anything other than mind being a brain function is just trying to push water uphill. With a fork.

Just look for a moment at how things that effect the brain also effect the mind.

Drugs.
Injuries.
Hypoxia.
Electrical stimuli.

None of this would make the slightest sense if the mind wasn't a function of the brain.If we don't understand then we cannot be so certain about the causation of such relationship, because until now the only thing we have is a correlation. "A" correlation? A vast body of related and self-consistent evidence is what we have.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Argo Nimbus
Somehow saying "My thought is real" is not quite the same thing as saying "A pattern exists".Why?It seems to me that my thoughts or subjective experiences are just as much a part of the universe as the Sun, even if they are not physical objects.Why do suggest that subjective experiences are not physical?Furthermore, I don't have to explain the relation between minds and brains in order to know that my thoughts exist and are real. It's one thing to say that a particular theory about the relation of minds to brains is false, but quite wrong, it seems to me, to make an issue out of whether subjective experience is real.All the evidence we have shows that the mind is a result of a physical process. You can't see the physical process, because "You" are in fact the result of the process. All your thoughts are really patterns of neurons firing in your brain. If you won't say that a pattern is real, then your thoughts aren't real either. If you accept a pattern as a real thing, then your thoughts are real.I can always be wrong about what causes my subjective experience, but it's hard to see how I could be wrong about having the experience. If I step on a stonefish and then touch an object that to me feels cold, I would be wrong if I said the experience of "coldness" was caused by a cold object. According to Tricky, the cause would be a hot object + stonefish toxin.The problem is, if you deny reality to patterns, you have also denied it to your own thoughts on a subjective level.To summarize: I can be wrong about causes and relations, but that doesn't make subjective experience non-existent or not real.No, it's your definition of real that does that.

Again: Are patterns real?

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Q-Source
Materialists, you mean. Because Science says nothing about it.Wrong. Science has a hell of a lot to say about it. Try reading something on the subject.I think that we only have one choice, if we say that qualia are objective then we have to prove it, otherwise let's hold an agnostic position.Q-S, you seem to be looking fo a deductive proof. You don't get that in the real world. You get inductive support for theories. You can get conclusive evidence which falsifies a theory, but you can't prove one.

The support for a physical origin of mind is overwhelming, if you take the time to look at some of it. It's not proven, and will never be proven. But we'll continue piling up more supporting evidence and more detailed theories, because that's is what Science does.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
And if qualia are incoherent then they don't exist!That would follow, yes.Mystical trappings?? :confused: Not according to the definition I've supplied! How can the taste of sugar be mystical?? :confused: It isn't. It's a brain function. I mean, you can follow the nerve pathways from the tongue to the brain and watch the neurons firing. To believe that the taste of sugar is not a brain function requires you to believe in some form of Dualism or something even more nonsensical.

[Victor Danilchenko]

I decided to drop by philo forum again, and the ridiculous qualia insanity is still going on...

davidsmith73

I want to know how a materialist can equate a physical process with qualia and what they really mean when they say this.As far as I am concerned, qualia -- the introspective experience of experience, sans the silly ineffability dongle -- is simply the mind's introspection on itself. Mind can examine itself, its own processes, and the sense of this examination is what we label as "qualia". Qualia are simply the result of our ability to introspect, a quale is an instance of the mind observing its own process.

Complaining that qualia cannot be described linguistically but only through reference ("see the red barn? this is what red feels like!") is stupid: all descriptions are thusly limited, every description in any language is ultimately rooted in some sort of sensory reference. Until you can point at a tree and say "this is a tree" to a child, you cannot describe the tree either, except in terms of other previously-referenced sensory objects. "The feel of red" in this regard is no more mysterious than "the look of a tree", there are simply more levels of indirection going on.

[Argo Nimbus]

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Originally posted by Argo Nimbus
Somehow saying "My thought is real" is not quite the same thing as saying "A pattern exists".
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Originally posted by PixyMisa
Why?


One difference is that I only learn about physical "patterns", or processes, in my brain by reading about them.


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Originally posted by Argo Nimbus
It seems to me that my thoughts or subjective experiences are just as much a part of the universe as the Sun, even if they are not physical objects.
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Originally posted by PixyMisa
Why do suggest that subjective experiences are not physical?


What I said is that they are not physical objects like the Sun. I would classify them as physical processes, not objects.


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Originally posted by Argo Nimbus
Furthermore, I don't have to explain the relation between minds and brains in order to know that my thoughts exist and are real. It's one thing to say that a particular theory about the relation of minds to brains is false, but quite wrong, it seems to me, to make an issue out of whether subjective experience is real.
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Originally posted by PixyMisa
All the evidence we have shows that the mind is a result of a physical process. You can't see the physical process, because "You" are in fact the result of the process. All your thoughts are really patterns of neurons firing in your brain. If you won't say that a pattern is real, then your thoughts aren't real either. If you accept a pattern as a real thing, then your thoughts are real.


I don't deny that physical processes in my brain are real. I just don't learn about them in the same way that I learn about my thoughts.


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Originally posted by Argo Nimbus
I can always be wrong about what causes my subjective experience, but it's hard to see how I could be wrong about having the experience. If I step on a stonefish and then touch an object that to me feels cold, I would be wrong if I said the experience of "coldness" was caused by a cold object. According to Tricky, the cause would be a hot object + stonefish toxin.
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Originally posted by PixyMisa
The problem is, if you deny reality to patterns, you have also denied it to your own thoughts on a subjective level.


I haven't denied reality to physical processes, so I'm sure you'll grant that I haven't denied the reality of my own thoughts.


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To summarize: I can be wrong about causes and relations, but that doesn't make subjective experience non-existent or not real.
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Originally posted by PixyMisa
No, it's your definition of real that does that.


Let me make the point about subjective experience in another way. Consider a block of metal. Based on what I have read in textbooks, this block of metal is made up of smaller units of matter called molecules that are held more or less in alignment by the forces acting between the molecules. I accept this as a description of reality. However, the block of metal also appears solid to the touch (or at least I personally can't pass my hand through it), so by your logic, the "solidity" of the metal is "not real" and "doesn't exist". This is so, by your logic, because both my hand and the metal can be resolved conceptually into smaller units and the interaction of hand and metal can be explained in terms of molecules and molecular forces. As for me, rather than say that the "solidity" of metal is non-existent or not real, I would say that how the metal appears to me is just as much a part of reality as the molecules in my hand, the molecules in the metal, and the forces of interaction between them.

--- Argo

P.S. Keep in mind that I was (and still am) responding to the post in which you said that subjective experiences do not exist.


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Originally posted by PixyMisa
"Qualia" is the name you give to the subjective experience of the outcome of a particular physical process. Qualia do not actually exist any more than the number 2 exists. What does exist is the brain and the processes occurring in the brain. When you have fully described this you have described all that is real, and the need for "Qualia" goes away.
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So, are you saying:



(1) Physical processes are real.

(2) Subjective experiences are not real.

(3) What is real exists, but what is not real does not exist.

(4) Once everyone understands that subjective experiences are not real and therefore do not exist, the whole problem goes away.

?

It seems to me that subjective experiences are real, even if they do not exist in the same way physcial objects exist (which of course is why they're referred to as "subjective").

[Victor Danilchenko]

Q-Source

I am not saying that Qualia are not objective processes, I don't know if they are or not. I am just asking why people assert that they are objective when in fact there is no evidence to support such assertion.I think what people are really asserting is that the incredulous arguments of the dualist brigade are simply BS. The assertion is not that qualia are material, but rather than there is nothing bizarre or inexplicable or inconceivable about matrialistic nature of qualia. Qualia, despite all the hand-waving, are pretty mundane -- they are no more exciting and bizarre than any number of other cognitive objects, and in fact they are quite a bit less so. Now that's pretty damn exciting if you are a cognitive scientist of some stripe or another, but that's no reason to classify those objects as being materialistically inexplicable.

You know what's bizarre and exciting? the fact that we can learn a complex structured language with amazing speed. The fact that we can look at an incredibly complex image, and simply notice a face hidden in the jumble. The fact that we can abstract incredibly complex rules into compact and unbelievably efficient heuristics (think go). These are bizarre and exciting; qualia are just stiocking stuffers of sophomoric philosophy discussions.

The core question -- what do we mean when we say that qualia are materialistic -- is what is being answered. the answer is not the proof that qualia are real, but the proof that there is nothing mystically inexplicable about qualia above and beyond other cognitive processes.

[The One called Neo]

Ah Victor! So good of you to contribute to R&P. I'll use my sock puppet since you have me on ignore.

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
[b]Q-Source

I think what people are really asserting is that the incredulous arguments of the dualist brigade are simply BS.



So what? What people assert and what actually is the case do not necessarily coincide.




The assertion is not that qualia are material,



Good, then your argument is with the materialists. Materialists definitely assert qualia are material.




but rather than there is nothing bizarre or inexplicable or inconceivable about matrialistic nature of qualia.



If qualia are not material then it follows they do not have a materialistic nature ;) Got your story straight Victor me boy before you come bursting in.


Qualia, despite all the hand-waving, are pretty mundane



Yea, I agree. But tell me how they are one and the same thing as physical processes.


-- they are no more exciting and bizarre than any number of other cognitive objects, and in fact they are quite a bit less so. Now that's pretty damn exciting if you are a cognitive scientist of some stripe or another, but that's no reason to classify those objects as being materialistically inexplicable.


Materialistically inexplicable is a nonsensical phrase since materialism doesn't explain anything in anycase, and nor could it ever do so in principle. I presume you man scientifically inexplicable. Well I'm afraid they are. If you think otherwise then explain them.

Snip irrelevancies



The core question -- what do we mean when we say that qualia are materialistic -- is what is being answered. the answer is not the proof that qualia are real, but the proof that there is nothing mystically inexplicable about qualia above and beyond other cognitive processes.

Cognitive processes as that which can be ascertained from a third person perspective? I'm afraid not. Qualia are intrinsically subjective. My qualia cannot be known from a third person perspective in contrast to all physical processes.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Argo Nimbus
One difference is that I only learn about physical "patterns", or processes, in my brain by reading about them.What, you mean you've never seen (or heard) a pattern?What I said is that they are not physical objects like the Sun. I would classify them as physical processes, not objects.Yes.I don't deny that physical processes in my brain are real. I just don't learn about them in the same way that I learn about my thoughts.Yes.I haven't denied reality to physical processes, so I'm sure you'll grant that I haven't denied the reality of my own thoughts.As I said, it depends on your definition of "real". If you give processes and patterns the benefit of reality, then yes, your thoughts are real. Because that's what they are (depending on whether you are looking at them over time or at a particular instant.)Let me make the point about subjective experience in another way. Consider a block of metal. Based on what I have read in textbooks, this block of metal is made up of smaller units of matter called molecules that are held more or less in alignment by the forces acting between the molecules. I accept this as a description of reality. However, the block of metal also appears solid to the touch (or at least I personally can't pass my hand through it), so by your logic, the "solidity" of the metal is "not real" and "doesn't exist". This is so, by your logic, because both my hand and the metal can be resolved conceptually into smaller units and the interaction of hand and metal can be explained in terms of molecules and molecular forces. As for me, rather than say that the "solidity" of metal is non-existent or not real, I would say that how the metal appears to me is just as much a part of reality as the molecules in my hand, the molecules in the metal, and the forces of interaction between them.I would say that solidity does not exist. It's a property of things that do. It's a concept, the same way "Qualia" are concepts, the same way the number 2 is a concept. If you are extending your definition of reality out this far, you are including a whole lot of things that simply aren't there when you actually understand what is going on.

[Yahzi]

Consider a block of metal
Isn't that just my temperature argument in different clothes?

Yet oddly, he intends this argument to refute the materialist position, where I cite it to support the materialist position.

What a strange world we live in.

[Argo Nimbus]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
I would say that solidity does not exist. It's a property of things that do.


I would say that properties exist and are real. It sounds rather strange and incoherent to say, as you do, that things have properties that are non-existent. Consider an Army. The Army is made up of soldiers equipted with weapons, but you're not going to be taken seriously if you say that the Army is not real and does not exist.


It's a concept, the same way "Qualia" are concepts, the same way the number 2 is a concept. If you are extending your definition of reality out this far, you are including a whole lot of things that simply aren't there when you actually understand what is going on.

My subjective experiences exist and are real. If I speculate (based on my subjective experiences) about causes and relations, then I'm forming concepts. As I've already said, I can be wrong about causes and relations, so any concepts I form can be false.

--- Argo

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Argo Nimbus
I would say that properties exist and are real. It sounds rather strange and incoherent to say, as you do, that things have properties that are non-existent. Consider an Army. The Army is made up of soldiers equipted with weapons, but you're not going to be taken seriously if you say that the Army is not real and does not exist.Take a good look at the organisational structure of the U.S. Army and then come back and tell me it's real.

And in what way is a concept real? It's certainly not real the same way a rock is.

You seem to have a very poor grasp of the word "real".

[Argo Nimbus]

Originally posted by Yahzi

Isn't that just my temperature argument in different clothes?


Wouldn't know. Haven't seen your temperature argument.


Yet oddly, he intends this argument to refute the materialist position, where I cite it to support the materialist position.


You're mistaken. He isn't attempting to refute the materialist position, just PixyMisa's incoherent version of it.

--- Argo

[Janus]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

How does any of this make the redness of red the very same thing as a physical process?? :confused:

You keep asking this question. Do you agree with this (http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/qualia.html) definition.

Plural for quale. "Quale" is a technical term introduced by C.I. Lewis (1929). A quale is an introspectible and seemingly monadic property of a sense-datum. For example, the qualia of a visual sense-datum of a rose would include the experienced red-ness, and the qualia of an olfactory sense-datum of a rose would include the sweet-ness of the scent.

If this is all qualia are, then the answer is only more complex form of the answer to the question: How is "War and Peace" the exact same thing as this big thing of paper and ink. If you don't know what words are and how they can be represented then it seems just as unsolvable.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Argo Nimbus
[Nothing of interest.]

The difference between an army and your "Qualia" is this:

An army is an organisation of things which are ultimately real.

"Qualia" are either:

1) Brain processes, and thus an organisation of things that are ultimately real; or
2) A pattern that is not made up from any real thing, and thus purely a concept, like Sherlock Holmes, virtue, or the number 2, and not real.

If you deny that "Qualia" are brain processes, then they have no reality whatsoever.

And if you accept that they are brain processes, then "Qualia" are really just thoughts, that is, patterns of neurons firing. In which case, the concept of "Qualia" is of no use to anyone.

[synaesthesia]

Originally posted by PixyMisa

You seem to have a very poor grasp of the word "real".

Have you read Daniel Dennett's paper, "Real Patterns"? It's one of his shorter, simpler ones, but it is so central to so much of his philosophy that perhaps 70% of the attacks on him miss this facet of his thinking. (Even though I think it's clear enough from his other work).

How did Issamov put it? (Paraphrase alert!!)

"People used to think that the earth was flat. They were wrong. People used to think that the earth was round. They were also wrong. But if you think that thinking the earth is round is as wrong as thinking it's flat, you're wronger than both of them put together!"

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by synaesthesia
Have you read Daniel Dennett's paper, "Real Patterns"? It's one of his shorter, simpler ones, but it is so central to so much of his philosophy that perhaps 70% of the attacks on him miss this facet of his thinking. (Even though I think it's clear enough from his other work).I don't think so. I've read some Dennett, but that one doesn't ring a bell. I've been meaning to see if I can find more of his work. By the title, it sounds like it's central to what I'm arguing here, and I expect that Dennett has put more thought into it than me ;)How did Issamov put it?Um, Asimov?(Paraphrase alert!!)

"People used to think that the earth was flat. They were wrong. People used to think that the earth was round. They were also wrong. But if you think that thinking the earth is round is as wrong as thinking it's round, you're wronger than both of them put together!" From the essay "The Relativity of Wrong", which I just happened to read last Christmas.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Yahzi
Q-Source

Wouldn't that argument apply to God? And to Invisible Pink Unicorns?

Exactly. If we have NO EVIDENCE that God or Unicorns exist then WE CANNOT assert that they exist!

People here are saying the qualia are objective proccesses without any evidence to back up. Show me a fully objective description of how fear takes place in the brain.


Skepticism is not believing in things that have no evidence. Until you have evidence, you don't believe. Show us evidence, and we will believe. Until then, we won't.

I agree with you, Yahzi.

But are you seriously asking me that I should provide evidence that qualia ARE NOT objective???

It is you and Pixy Misa who are claiming that they are objective, so show us the evidence.

A scientific reference please :rolleyes:


Suspending judgement for your sacred cows (while passing judgement on everyone else's) is not agnosticism or open-mindedness, it's just hypocrisy.

Why is hypocrisy????

I am not making any judgement about qualia, I am just asking why we should say that qualia are objective proccesses when we still do not know how they work??

I am trying to avoid using any methaphysical belief (materialism or idealism).

Q-S

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Q said:
Our brain is physical. It does all sorts of wonderful things, including having subjective experiences. There is no evidence for any nonphysical aspects of our brains so I see no reason why qualia should be any different, unless you simply proclaim them so.



Exactly!

But you are making the same mistake that you erroneously think I am making. Your positionion is like: o.k. the brain is physical, we have subjective experiences, then qualia must really be an objective proccess.

However, the problem is that we still do not know whether or not your unsupported conclusion is true, because we haven't described such proccesses. Why??, I wonder why Scientists haven't described and replicated such proccesses yet?

Q-S

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by PixyMisa

As Paul pointed out, the brain is a physical thing. All evidence - and it's an absolutely huge amount of evidence from neuroscience, clinical psychology, biochemistry, general medicine and everyday life - all of this evidence tells us that the mind is a function of the brain. There is no reliable evidence to suggest otherwise.

Just provide a reference to any scientific description of a subjective experience that was really objective (fear, love, taste, sadness, etc.)


If the mind is a brain function, so are "Qualia". It's that simple.Doesn't matter.

If, if, if, can you get rid of the word "if"?

If it is so simple, why people are having these discussions over and over again?. Just provide the damn reference.


The only alternative is some form of mysticism. It is hugely unlikely that any such thing is true; we have never seen anything to suggest it.

I do not agree that mysticism is the other alternative. I would say that the more realistic alternative should be that we do not know yet whether or not qualia are an objective proccess.

I am not a mystic, so you cannot say that I am defending mysticism or suggesting that it must be the solution to this problem.


I'm using evidence. If you have any evidence to suggest that "Qualia" are not the result of objective events, present it.

Which evidence is that?, all we have are correlations between chemicals changes in our brains and the mental states. Even if Science recognises the existence of mental states, it cannot describe or replicate them.



If you're right, you'll probably win multiple Nobel prizes, because you'll have overturned the fields of Physics, Chemistry and Medicine at the very least. Yes. Or rather, it is how researchers have shown the Theory of Relativity to be correct.It can do. Look at what the correlations are. Trying to suggest anything other than mind being a brain function is just trying to push water uphill. With a fork.

Did I mention that qualia are not a product of the brain? or did I suggest that they were non-physical?

I do not know what they are, when I heard you saying that they are objective proccesses then I just wanted to ask you for the evidence.


Just look for a moment at how things that effect the brain also effect the mind.
Drugs.
Injuries.
Hypoxia.
Electrical stimuli.

and what is the scientific definition of mind?


"A" correlation? A vast body of related and self-consistent evidence is what we have.

I know that they correlate.

Did you know that there is a high correlation between black criminals and the consumption of white bread in prisons? :D

In some cases, correlations only suggest that there might be a causation, but that's it. In the mean time, we cannot affirm that it is in fact a causation. I think that Scientists do not say that, only some materialists.

Q-S

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
Wrong. Science has a hell of a lot to say about it. Try reading something on the subject.

Do you know how the scientific method works?
Do you know that a scientific theory should hold with empirical evidence?

You have subjective experiences, I wonder if they can be replicated in someone else's brain to support the non-existence theories about qualia.


Q-S, you seem to be looking fo a deductive proof. You don't get that in the real world. You get inductive support for theories. You can get conclusive evidence which falsifies a theory, but you can't prove one.

:confused:


The support for a physical origin of mind is overwhelming, if you take the time to look at some of it. It's not proven, and will never be proven. But we'll continue piling up more supporting evidence and more detailed theories, because that's is what Science does.

It is not proven and will never be proven? that makes you affirm that qualia are an objective stuff?

I missed this one:


If you have any evidence to suggest that "Qualia" are not the result of objective events, present it.

Why should I present evidence to support that qualia are not the result of objective events?, should I prove a negative?
I am not saying that qualia are objective, all I know is that I am having this subjective experiences and noone can explain them in objective terms, not even myself.

Q-S

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
I decided to drop by philo forum again, and the ridiculous qualia insanity is still going on...

davidsmith73

As far as I am concerned, qualia -- the introspective experience of experience, sans the silly ineffability dongle -- is simply the mind's introspection on itself. Mind can examine itself, its own processes, and the sense of this examination is what we label as "qualia". Qualia are simply the result of our ability to introspect, a quale is an instance of the mind observing its own process.

Complaining that qualia cannot be described linguistically but only through reference ("see the red barn? this is what red feels like!") is stupid: all descriptions are thusly limited, every description in any language is ultimately rooted in some sort of sensory reference. Until you can point at a tree and say "this is a tree" to a child, you cannot describe the tree either, except in terms of other previously-referenced sensory objects. "The feel of red" in this regard is no more mysterious than "the look of a tree", there are simply more levels of indirection going on.

I don't see how this helps at all. The look of a tree is qualia as well. We have on the one hand the objective world as described by physics, on the other we have qualia. With what reason do you suppose a quale is an instance of the mind observing its own process rather than being constitutive of reality itself?

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Q-Source
Just provide a reference to any scientific description of a subjective experience that was really objective (fear, love, taste, sadness, etc.)I have already pointed out that I don't have one.If, if, if, can you get rid of the word "if"?Yes.

"Qualia" are baloney. Thoughts are brain processes.

Happy now?If it is so simple, why people are having these discussions over and over again?. Just provide the damn reference.Because the "damn reference" you are asking for is an Operational Theory of Consciousness, and you you damn well we don't have one.

If you want a neurological discussion of taste, then I'd suggest you read The Neurobiology of Taste and Smell (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0471257214/104-4908101-8028709?vi=glance). For the emotions, try The Emotional Brain (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0684836599/qid=1053949579/sr=8-2/ref=sr_8_2/104-4908101-8028709?v=glance&s=books&n=507846). You should also read The Synaptic Self (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0142001783/ref=pd_sim_books_1/104-4908101-8028709?v=glance&s=books).I do not agree that mysticism is the other alternative. I would say that the more realistic alternative should be that we do not know yet whether or not qualia are an objective proccess.Wrong. We know they come from somewhere. It is completely obvious that that somewhere is the brain. There is no support in neurology, biology or the laws of physics for the mind to come from anywhere else. To claim that we don't know where mind comes from is stupid. To claim that it comes from somewhere other than the brain - in the face of all scientific knowledge and with no supporting evidence whatsoever - is mysticism.I am not a mystic, so you cannot say that I am defending mysticism or suggesting that it must be the solution to this problem.You may simply be ignorant. What on earth leads you to think that we can't be sure that mind comes from the brain?Which evidence is that?, all we have are correlations between chemicals changes in our brains and the mental states. Even if Science recognises the existence of mental states, it cannot describe or replicate them.Can. Does. Read up on the icky electrical implant experiments being conducted, like this one involving an artificial hippocampus (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/2843099.stm).Did I mention that qualia are not a product of the brain? or did I suggest that they were non-physical?You suggest that we don't know we they come from. Where do you think they might come from, Q-S?I do not know what they are, when I heard you saying that they are objective proccesses then I just wanted to ask you for the evidence."Qualia" exist only in the mind. Mind arises from brain. QED.and what is the scientific definition of mind?This one looks good to me:The human consciousness that originates in the brain and is manifested especially in thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination.I know that they correlate.So why all the fuss?Did you know that there is a high correlation between black criminals and the consumption of white bread in prisons?Big deal. Take a look at the nature of the correlations. Start with Yahzi's Bat. Get drunk. Take a nap. Read something on the subject rather than sitting there spouting nonsense.In some cases, correlations only suggest that there might be a causation, but that's it. In the mean time, we cannot affirm that it is in fact a causation. I think that Scientists do not say that, only some materialists.Yes we can. Yes they do.

You're looking for proof again. You won't get it. We have enough evidence that we can - and scientists in the field do - say that beyond the shadow of a doubt, the mind arises from the brain.

All you ever get in life is correlations. If you want proof, go study geometry.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Q-Source
But are you seriously asking me that I should provide evidence that qualia ARE NOT objective???

It is you and Pixy Misa who are claiming that they are objective, so show us the evidence.If you are seriously so unaware of the field, then why are you making claims about it? You didn't come in with a question, you came in with the statement that we don't know qualia are the result of objective processes.

If you want evidence, read something on the subject. You don't seem to have any grounding in it at all. If you want to find a good neuroscience text, ask your library. Stop asking for things that you have been told don't exist.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Q-Source
It is not proven and will never be proven? that makes you affirm that qualia are an objective stuff?Yes.
The Laws of Motion are not proven and will never be proven.
The Laws of Thermodynamics are not proven and will never be proven.
The Theory of Relativity is not proven and will never be proven.
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle is not proven and will never be proven.

Science doesn't prove things.

They all work though.

The emprical evidence for the physical origin of consciousness is just as good as the empirical evidence for any of the "Laws" of Physics. The theory doesn't currently measure up. That doesn't mean, nor even imply, that consciousness doesn't have a physical origin. We know perfectly well that it does. It just means that we don't fully understand the process.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
Q-Source
I think what people are really asserting is that the incredulous arguments of the dualist brigade are simply BS. The assertion is not that qualia are material, but rather than there is nothing bizarre or inexplicable or inconceivable about matrialistic nature of qualia.

And how could they know for sure that there is nothing bizzare and inexplicable about qualia?
Let me guess... maybe because they are speaking from their matelistic points of view.

I do have a metaphysical belief, I would say that I am a reductive materialist, but that is just a belief system :( .
No one here (or anyone who calls himself a Scientist) should make an assertion about qualia from materialism point of view. That is not Science.


Qualia, despite all the hand-waving, are pretty mundane -- they are no more exciting and bizarre than any number of other cognitive objects, and in fact they are quite a bit less so. Now that's pretty damn exciting if you are a cognitive scientist of some stripe or another, but that's no reason to classify those objects as being materialistically inexplicable.

As a materialist, I would agree with that. However, have any cognitive scientist explained how qualia works?


You know what's bizarre and exciting? the fact that we can learn a complex structured language with amazing speed. The fact that we can look at an incredibly complex image, and simply notice a face hidden in the jumble. The fact that we can abstract incredibly complex rules into compact and unbelievably efficient heuristics (think go). These are bizarre and exciting; qualia are just stiocking stuffers of sophomoric philosophy discussions.

I am almost sure that men will be capable of describing complex processes as those which occur in our brains. Maybe Scientists will find out that in fact qualia are really objective processes. Until then...


The core question -- what do we mean when we say that qualia are materialistic -- is what is being answered. the answer is not the proof that qualia are real, but the proof that there is nothing mystically inexplicable about qualia above and beyond other cognitive processes.

At this moment, I also think that there must be nothing mystically inexplicable about qualia, however I wonder why there is nothing in the Scientific field that explains without a doubt how a subjective experiences arises from the brain?

Q-S

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Janus


You keep asking this question. Do you agree with this (http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/qualia.html) definition.



If this is all qualia are, then the answer is only more complex form of the answer to the question: How is "War and Peace" the exact same thing as this big thing of paper and ink. If you don't know what words are and how they can be represented then it seems just as unsolvable.

We can quite clearly understand how "war and peace" can be a big thing of paper and ink. The following (in blue) is what I have stated on this subject before (although without employing the term qualia).

"To have a scientific understanding of our behaviour it is sufficient that we have knowledge of all facts accessible from the third person perspective. By a third person perspective I mean that anyone with unimpaired sense and instruments could potentially corroborate. This would then include neurons firing in a living brain, but would not include mental states such as emotions. This is because a person cannot literally partake in another person's conscious experiences. So the totality of our behaviour can be explained with reference to third person facts.

As an aside this is why minds can never be scientifically explained. Minds can neither be perceptually sensed nor play a fruitful role in our theories describing the world, therefore from a scientific perspective they are superfluous. Thus within any materialist based understanding of the world, it simply has to be arbitrarily stipulated that they are identical to, or are a function of, or are somehow derived from physical processes within the brain. Sort of like a faith if you will".

So in the context of qualia they are superflous in explaining the world. They are not analogically akin to the information in a book or computer software since we are simply talking about qualitative experiences. It is nonsensical to say they are a fiction. In tasting sugar I have a certain qualitative experience, and it is meaningless if not blatently false to say that experience is either a fiction or doesn't exist.

In short then qualia are not implied by any third person facts. They cannot fit into scientific theory or account of reality. This makes them unique! And yet on the other hand qualia are the only things that matter. From our perspective they are the only reality, at least qualia and the experiencing mind. And yet they are unique in that they cannot in principle fit into a scientific description of reality!

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko

The assertion is not that qualia are material, but rather than there is nothing bizarre or inexplicable or inconceivable about matrialistic nature of qualia.


I think this gem deserves to be nominated for BillHoyt's illogic prize! :D

[Q-Source]

Pixy,

I don't like the abusive tone of your posts. If you cannot control your emotions, then I cannot hold any discussion with you.

Q-S

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Q-Source
Do you know how the scientific method works?
Do you know that a scientific theory should hold with empirical evidence?Yes. You don't seem to.You have subjective experiences, I wonder if they can be replicated in someone else's brain to support the non-existence theories about qualia.If we know that mind arises from the brain - and we do - we know that "Qualia" arise from physical processes. Stating that fact doesn't require a fully descriptive theory.:confused:Yes, you're confused.Why should I present evidence to support that qualia are not the result of objective events?, should I prove a negative?Because you are suggesting that they are not objective processes.

You say, Qualia might not be objective processes.
We say, All the evidence shows that they are.
You say, Show me a theory that explains exactly how Qualia occur.
We say, We don't have one. You know that.
You say, Then you can't claim that they are objective processes.
We say, You are confusing facts with explanations.
You say, If you don't understand it, you can't claim it's true!
We say, Well, what the hell else do you think qualia might be?
You say, Why should I have to tell you?
We say, Go away until you're prepared to talk sense.
I am not saying that qualia are objective, all I know is that I am having this subjective experiences and noone can explain them in objective terms, not even myself.Exactly.

Which doesn't change for a moment the fact that we know perfectly well where they come from.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Q-Source
I don't like the abusive tone of your posts. If you cannot control your emotions, then I cannot hold any discussion with you.I'll ask you a simple, perfectly polite question then.

Did you know that science doesn't prove things?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
[B]Yes. You don't seem to.If we know that mind arises from the brain - and we do -


We know no such thing.




You say, Qualia might not be objective processes.
We say, All the evidence shows that they are.



In fact there is not only no evidence whatsoever, and indeed there couldn't be. Saying qualia is a brain process is, and can only ever be, an arbitrary stipulation.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
We know no such thing.Well, I know that you don't, Ian.In fact there is not only no evidence whatsoever, and indeed there couldn't be. Saying qualia is a brain process is, and can only ever be, an arbitrary stipulation. That's false. "Qualia" occur in the mind, yes? If we show that mind comes from the brain, if follows that so do "Qualia", yes?

As for evidence of mind coming from the brain, we know that physical, chemical and electrical interaction with the brain produces changes in the mind. I'm not just talking input and ouput here (the senses and motor control). I'm talking about changes in the way the mind thinks.

And we have mapped the exact type of interaction and the various regions of the brain, and we know what stimuli applied to what regions produce what mental changes.

You want to induce pain? Fear? Lust? Pleasure? You want to induce hallucinations? Sleep? All trivially easy, with a few little electrodes, a few cheap drugs.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by gentlehorse


I don't have any answers, but I find it odd that folks would say that qualia are fiction. Perhaps I don't understand what qualia are at all.

Well saying that qualia are a fiction is simple devoid of any meaning. The point is you have the experience of redness. What meaning is actually being conveyed in describing your qualitative experience as a fiction? Surely none at all!

[Victor Danilchenko]

Q-Source

And how could they know for sure that there is nothing bizzare and inexplicable about qualia?Because each "bizarre and inexplicable" aspect of qualia, when closely examined, simply vanishes. Read Dennett's "Quining Qualia (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm)" -- it takes the "bizarre an inexplicable" properties of qualia apart, one by one, and he does it with style, grace, and evidence.

Let me guess... maybe because they are speaking from their matelistic points of view. No, Because they care about facts instead of maintaining a wishy-washy pseudo-agnostic stance.

I do have a metaphysical belief, I would say that I am a reductive materialist, but that is just a belief system :( .
No one here (or anyone who calls himself a Scientist) should make an assertion about qualia from materialism point of view. That is not Science.As Pixy said, why do you jump into discussing a subject -- and making authoritative-sounding assertions on the subject -- without actually knowing anything about the said subject?

As a materialist, I would agree with that. However, have any cognitive scientist explained how qualia works?No; they haven't explained how minds work, and introspection is pretty high up in the hierarchy of cognitive artifacts. However, they have explained how qualia don't work -- and the "bizarre and inexplicable" properties of qualia got totally flushed in the process.

I am almost sure that men will be capable of describing complex processes as those which occur in our brains. Maybe Scientists will find out that in fact qualia are really objective processes. Until then... As Pixy noted, you apparently aren't familiar with epistemology and philosophy of science either.

Science is never "sure" about anything. Any scientific result always necessarily falls into "almost sure" category -- all of them are provisional, contexctual, and amenable to future evidence.

At this moment, I also think that there must be nothing mystically inexplicable about qualia, however I wonder why there is nothing in the Scientific field that explains without a doubt how a subjective experiences arises from the brain?We have great conceptual explanations for how subjective experiences arise from mental processes -- they are mind's own interpretation of introspection. We don't have mechanistic explanation of introspection, because we don't yet understand brains and minds well enough; but we have mountains of evidence indicating that subjective experiences are functions of brains.

It doesn't take complete understanding of brain's functioning in order to induce subjective experiences at will -- and we have done that. There are mountains of experiemnts that tie subjectivity to brain processes in a pretty much incontrovertible fashion.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
[b]Q-Source

Because each "bizarre and inexplicable" aspect of qualia, when closely examined, simply vanishes.



Who has claimed tjhis about qualia?



Read Dennett's "Quining Qualia (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm)" -- it takes the "bizarre an inexplicable" properties of qualia apart, one by one, and he does it with style, grace, and evidence.



I will read it. In fact I've already read the first third of the page. He's a good writer.




No; they haven't explained how minds work, and introspection is pretty high up in the hierarchy of cognitive artifacts. However, they have explained how qualia don't work --



Why does there need to be an explanation for qualia?



and the "bizarre and inexplicable" properties of qualia got totally flushed in the process.



Who has said qualia has bizarre and inexplicable properties??



Science is never "sure" about anything. Any scientific result always necessarily falls into "almost sure" category -- all of them are provisional, contexctual, and amenable to future evidence.



The existence of phenomenal consiousness cannot in principle be explained by science. It cannot play a fruitful role in any theory.



We have great conceptual explanations for how subjective experiences arise from mental processes -- they are mind's own interpretation of introspection. We don't have mechanistic explanation of introspection, because we don't yet understand brains and minds well enough; but we have mountains of evidence indicating that subjective experiences are functions of brains.



No we don't. We have absolutely none whatsoever. Nor in principle could we ever have any. I've explained this before. Read and understand.



It doesn't take complete understanding of brain's functioning in order to induce subjective experiences at will -- and we have done that. There are mountains of experiemnts that tie subjectivity to brain processes in a pretty much incontrovertible fashion.

We have correllations yes. But how does this constitute any evidence that (phenomenal) consciousness is a function??

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:Who has said qualia has bizarre and inexplicable properties??
...
No we don't. We have absolutely none whatsoever. Nor in principle could we ever have any. I've explained this before. Read and understand.
You're a tiring fellow sometimes, Ian.

~~ Paul

[Dancing David]

So the discussion seems to be proceding, there has been the bare minimum of name calling which is good.

Q-source, oh yes , philsophicaly speaking we can say that there is no absolute proof that the brain is the seat of consiousness. And so we should be agnostic on the qualia. OKAY, I suspend my belief that there is anything extraordinary about qualia until the immaterialsts show it.

Q-source: your point is valid but absurd to the extreme. The psychology of perception is not is dispute. The neural pathways of perception are very well documented, any search engine will show you that.
The only area that could be in dispute is that, the neural pathways of cognition are not mapped out. HOWEVER there is a huge body of evidence concerning the way brain injury effects cognition, alot of it started in world war two and has carried on since then. For almost every cognitive process there is someone who has been injured and had that cognitive process messed up.
This is very compelling evidence that the brain is the seat of cognition.
I do disagree respectfuly with Pixy, subjective experiences are physical processes, but they are real. They are based in the reality of neurochemestry. The question is if they are valid.

The issue is not if we should be agnostic in the abcense of final proof of causation but what can be done with concepts that gives them scientific validity. Mess with someones brain and they will loose the ability to percieve qualia.

Where is any prooof that qualia are not brain processes?

Peace

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Dancing David
I do disagree respectfuly with Pixy, subjective experiences are physical processes, but they are real. They are based in the reality of neurochemestry. The question is if they are valid.I can accept that subjective experiences are real; the important question is real what. So, as you say, they are real brain processes. I'm fine with that.

Qualia, though... Qualia are either brain processes too, or are pure concepts and therefore not real at all. People seem to want to claim that qualia are both real and not tied to reality in any way. That doesn't work.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dancing David
So the discussion seems to be proceding, there has been the bare minimum of name calling which is good.

Q-source, oh yes , philsophicaly speaking we can say that there is no absolute proof that the brain is the seat of consiousness. And so we should be agnostic on the qualia. OKAY, I suspend my belief that there is anything extraordinary about qualia until the immaterialsts show it.

Q-source: your point is valid but absurd to the extreme. The psychology of perception is not is dispute. The neural pathways of perception are very well documented, any search engine will show you that.
The only area that could be in dispute is that, the neural pathways of cognition are not mapped out. HOWEVER there is a huge body of evidence concerning the way brain injury effects cognition, alot of it started in world war two and has carried on since then. For almost every cognitive process there is someone who has been injured and had that cognitive process messed up.
This is very compelling evidence that the brain is the seat of cognition.
I do disagree respectfuly with Pixy, subjective experiences are physical processes, but they are real. They are based in the reality of neurochemestry. The question is if they are valid.

The issue is not if we should be agnostic in the abcense of final proof of causation but what can be done with concepts that gives them scientific validity. Mess with someones brain and they will loose the ability to percieve qualia.

Where is any prooof that qualia are not brain processes?

Peace

The proof is that they are utterly uncharacteristically unlike each other, and we have absolutely no reason to either say one is the very same thing as the other, or one is caused by the other. A only can be said to cause B if both A and B are elements in some theory descrihbing the world. Qualia can never ever play any role in any such theory because qualia are causally inefficaceous.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
I can accept that subjective experiences are real; the important question is real what. So, as you say, they are real brain processes. I'm fine with that.

Qualia, though... Qualia are either brain processes too, or are pure concepts and therefore not real at all. People seem to want to claim that qualia are both real and not tied to reality in any way. That doesn't work.

Qualia is reality. At least of the external world. There is nothing over and above qualia and selves.

[Dancing David]

I think I understand the point:
It is that our perceptions bound our understanding of reality. Is that close?

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Qualia is reality. At least of the external world. There is nothing over and above qualia and selves. Time for Yahzi's Bat again, I think.

The problem with your theory is simple: The world just doesn't act that way. It stubbornly persists in existing. Thoughts do not affect the world, but the world affects thoughts. Minds act as though they arise from brains. Every test that we try confirms all of this.

As far as the world is concerned, Qualia and Selves are utterly irrelevant. Selves die and the world continues. You say yourself that Qualia are not causally efficaceous, that in simpler terms they don't do anything.

The world, on the other hand, is, and does. You may find this rude and presumptuous, but that's the way it is.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

All qualia discussions have now become circular. No need to continue. Alert! Everyone to get from street!

~~ Paul

[PixyMisa]

Uh-oh, the thread is imploding! I'm off to Banter in my handy escape capsule!

[Yahzi]

Q-Source
I am trying to avoid using any methaphysical belief (materialism or idealism).
I think that makes you a materialist.

Not having any metaphysical belief by default classes you as a materialist.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahzi
[B]Q-Source-/B]

I think that makes you a materialist.

Not having any metaphysical belief by default classes you as a materialist.

You're so hopelessly wrong about everything Yahzi. It's more like not having any metaphysical belief by default classes you as an idealist.

Noumena is a preposterous concept.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko

No, Because they care about facts instead of maintaining a wishy-washy pseudo-agnostic stance.

I also care about facts and...descriptions.


As Pixy said, why do you jump into discussing a subject -- and making authoritative-sounding assertions on the subject -- without actually knowing anything about the said subject?

Did I make an authoritative-sounding assertion? where?.

I recognise that I may not know anything the subject, if you read my posts you will see that I have been making questions to the people who seem to know a lot about the subject.

They answer that because physical interactions in the brain produce changes in our minds, then the mind comes from the brain. And qualia must also be physical processes ocurring in the brain but we cannot understand and explain how these processes work. However, this is enought to assert that qualia are objective. :rolleyes:


No; they haven't explained how minds work, and introspection is pretty high up in the hierarchy of cognitive artifacts. However, they have explained how qualia don't work -- and the "bizarre and inexplicable" properties of qualia got totally flushed in the process.

Really?, I am not defending the existence of "bizarre and inexplicable" properties of qualia (those were your words not mine).


As Pixy noted, you apparently aren't familiar with epistemology and philosophy of science either.

Science is never "sure" about anything. Any scientific result always necessarily falls into "almost sure" category -- all of them are provisional, contexctual, and amenable to future evidence.

Yes.
Science is never sure about anything, but the purpose of Science is to describe how the Universe works, including our brains and all the by-products of it. I am just asking for a damn reference that explains how the experience of fear takes place.

I saw that Pixy posted some links to books that may talk about it. So, I am going to take a look at them.


We have great conceptual explanations for how subjective experiences arise from mental processes -- they are mind's own interpretation of introspection. We don't have mechanistic explanation of introspection, because we don't yet understand brains and minds well enough; but we have mountains of evidence indicating that subjective experiences are functions of brains.

I agree with you. So, if Science cannot provide a mechanistic explanation of introspection, then can we still claim that a subjective experience is really an objective event?, does that mean that subjective experiences do not exist as such?, that they are an illusion?.


It doesn't take complete understanding of brain's functioning in order to induce subjective experiences at will -- and we have done that. There are mountains of experiemnts that tie subjectivity to brain processes in a pretty much incontrovertible fashion.

Good, Victor.
Science cannot explain a subjective experience but it can induce one at will. And I guess that makes the subjective experience to be really an objective experience... :rolleyes:

Q-S

[Jethro]

A rock would likely be unable to explain to me what it is like to be a rock. In fact, I would probably be unable to know what it is like to be a rock without being a rock myself. Does this mean that rocks experience qualia?

I guess I'm still unclear as to why qualia are important. I mean, yes it is impossible for me to explain to a person who has been blind since birth what seeing is like. So what? I still have a pretty good idea what happens when I see something. I don't, however, have any idea where the "qualia come in" so to speak. As best I can tell, qualia are either "the brain processes related to sensory information, from the perspective of the brain sensing said information," or they are a fiction invented by people who are uncomfortable with the concept of materialism.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Good point, Jethro. The argument that I can't know what it's like to experience things like another person, so therefore there must be something magical about qualia, is silly. I can't know exactly what it's like to experience things like anything else does, including myself at any time but the present.

I really should get from street.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Good point, Jethro. The argument that I can't know what it's like to experience things like another person, so therefore there must be something magical about qualia, is silly. I can't know exactly what it's like to experience things like anything else does, including myself at any time but the present.

I really should get from street.

~~ Paul

Why do all the materialists keep claiming that the non-materialists are saying that qualia are "magical" or "mystical" or whatever?? Who is claiming these things about qualia??:confused:

[Argo Nimbus]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
Take a good look at the organisational structure of the U.S. Army and then come back and tell me it's real.


LOL Why don't you try telling the Iraqis that the U.S. Army is not real?


Originally posted by PixyMisa
You seem to have a very poor grasp of the word "real".

Well, then, let's take it from the top. Animals are logically reducible to their component parts, legs, teeth, etc. right on down to cells and molecules, but that doesn't mean the animal doesn't exist or is not real. The same thing applies to an automobile, i.e. it's logically reducible to its component parts, but it still exists and is real. Moving right along, a forest is reducible to its component trees, but it still exists. An army is reducible to it's component parts, and [you fill in the blank].

If I say that animals, automobiles, forests, and armies are real and exist, then (since I speak English proficiently) I'm likely to be understood by almost anyone who speaks English.

--- Argo

[Argo Nimbus]

Originally posted by PixyMisa

The difference between an army and your "Qualia" is this:

An army is an organisation of things which are ultimately real.

"Qualia" are either:

1) Brain processes, and thus an organisation of things that are ultimately real; or

2) A pattern that is not made up from any real thing, and thus purely a concept, like Sherlock Holmes, virtue, or the number 2, and not real.


If you accept (1) then you haven't specified any difference between an army and "Qualia", since both, as you say, are "organizations of things which are ultimately real". I would say then that both an army and "Qualia" are real and exist, but if you think that the name "Qualia" is unnecessary because we already have a better name, I wouldn't disagree.

Option (2) is a non-starter, but it explains why you wrote this:


PixyMisa wrote on 05-23-2003 03:49 AM
"Qualia" is the name you give to the subjective experience of the outcome of a particular physical process. Qualia do not actually exist any more than the number 2 exists.


Notice that here you seem to be saying that both (1) and (2) are true. First you say "Qualia" is a name for the outcome of a particular physical process, which agrees with (1), but then you turn around and make "Qualia" a concept like the number 2 (option (2)).


If I seem to be confused, perhaps it's because you haven't been very clear.

--- Argo

[Victor Danilchenko]

Q-Source

Did I make an authoritative-sounding assertion? where?.You kept asserting that we don't know -- but we do know, with pretty damn high degree of certainty.

They answer that because physical interactions in the brain produce changes in our minds, then the mind comes from the brain. And qualia must also be physical processes ocurring in the brain but we cannot understand and explain how these processes work. However, this is enought to assert that qualia are objective.Yes, indeed it is. Just as the fact that we don't fully understand the mechanics of QM, does not prevent us from making perfectly valid assertions about quantum non-determinism. We can make limited statements about, and limited uses of, the given area of inquiry, without fully understandig it. We've been doing so since the dawn of science. Darwin didn't know anything about genetics, but that didn't stop the formation of his theory of evolution, did it?

Really?, I am not defending the existence of "bizarre and inexplicable" properties of qualia (those were your words not mine).but without those properties, qualia are not the sort of things that would make reasonably possible a non-materialistic explanation. Without those bizarre and inexplicable properties, materialistic objective nature of qualia is not in question at all.

Science cannot explain a subjective experience but it can induce one at will. And I guess that makes the subjective experience to be really an objective experience... :rolleyes:When the said induction is highly controlled, repeatable, and reliable -- yes, it does.

Your eye-rolling is highly misplaced, and moderately amusing.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Argo Nimbus
If I seem to be confused, perhaps it's because you haven't been very clear.You may be right. But you'll notice that certain people here argue that Qualia are not related to brain processes in any way and yet are still somehow real. I could argue that you confused me with your rationality ;)

If you accept that Qualia are brain processes, then they are real, in a sense. They still aren't real the way an animal is real; after all, a dead animal is still a real dead animal, but you can't have a dead Quale. (Or a stopped Quale or anything of the sort.)

Accepting proposition 1, Qualia can be said to be real in the sense that turbulence is real, or shadows. But, yes, I'd suggest that we already have a better term for them in this case: thoughts.

As for my remark about the U.S. Army: There are units within the U.S. Army that, according to the organisational structure, belong to other units which do not in fact exist. It's really just a hisorical artifact, of course.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko

Q-Source

However, this is enought to assert that qualia are objective.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victor
Yes, indeed it is.



You have yet to provide any evidence or reasons to suppose qualia are objective. That Dennet guy hasn't said anything relevant whatsoever. He's just attacking strawman using a differing defintion of qualia than the definitions I have read. Indeed what on earth could it mean to say that qualia are objective?? No-one can literally partake of my qualia so it is simply false to state they are objective.




Q-Source
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Really?, I am not defending the existence of "bizarre and inexplicable" properties of qualia (those were your words not mine).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victor
but without those properties, qualia are not the sort of things that would make reasonably possible a non-materialistic explanation. Without those bizarre and inexplicable properties, materialistic objective nature of qualia is not in question at all.



If the mere fact of not being material makes something bizarre and inexplicable, then the totality of empirical reality is "bizarre and inexplicable" since the notion of the material is vacuous. Scarcely useful to state that though is it?? :rolleyes:

[davidsmith73]

Christ, people post quickly in this forum ! been away for a few days and I'm replying to posts a little further back.

Originally posted by Dancing David
So can you go any way to answering my question as to in what respect is "redness" equivalent to the physical process supposedly responsible for it ?
<><><><><><><><><><>
A. There is a wavelength of light that can be labeled red, if humans had never labeled it it would just be a wavelegth of an electromagetic photon.

B. There are descritions of redness, it's name, it's wavelegth, etc..

C. There is the physical process that leads to the perception of the color red. In Short: certain receptors respond to the wavelength of light while others don't, these signals are parly processed at the retinal level, then passed onto the visual cortex for processing, where they are interpreted 'projected' for the frontal cortex.

D. The decriptions which we use to describe red are taught to us.

E. Our brainjs actually have to go through a learning process in percieving color. In the Mary and B/W room, I suggested that she will not percieve the redness of red the first time she is presented with the color red. Assuming that the neural pathways for color perception don't atrophy she will not percieve the red as red, she will at first percieve it as grey or black. Until her brain has time to adjust to the new sensation, her perception will not be of red.

Peace

This has spectacularly missed the point of my question. The only slightly relevant bits of your answer are C,D and E. However, here you have essentially said - brain processes produce the qualia we call redness. Whether or not Mary learns gradually to experience red from an initial grey is not relevant in the slightest.

I repeat:

How do you equate the physical process that correlates with the feeling of redness with the qualia itself.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by jasonmccoy


Let me try to put your question differently. Are you in fact asking if it is possible that a person be made to experience qualia (redness) without looking at an object she has already learned is supposed to be red? In other words, can a scientist, using some type of electro or chemical stimulus create a qualia in another?


Just trying to ensure I understand your question.


Partially right. Lets assume that technology has become so advanced that it is possible to produce the same physical process in Bob's brain that occurs in Jane when she experiences redness. Jane has been experiencing red all her life.

Now, upon re-creation of this certain neural firing pattern, Bob experiences redness regardless of whether he has done so before.

This is fine. I am not arguing whether this is possible in principle. I am now asking how the materialist interprets this situation. Many people here think that because a physical process takes place and we experience certain qualia at the same time, the qualia is equivalent to that particular physical process.

I am asking for an elaboration of this view beyond a mere assertion that it is just "common sense".

If qualia = a physical process, how do you account for the fact that we are able to identify two aspects of the same thing ?
Also, if qualia = a physical process, why do materialists assert that the physical is somehow more real than the qualia (they are equivalent after all!). In other words, physical processes could just as well be "nothing but qualia".

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by billydkid



This is my basic problem with the "qualia are unique" bunch. If you except the premise of cause and effect then everything must have a cause. If the experience of qualia are not attributable to the underlying neural mechanisms which invariably occur coincidentally with the qualia, then to what mechanism do you attribute the experience?

To what cause do you attribute the Universe? Perhaps most atheists and materialists would say there is no cause and I would probably go along with that. The materialist philosophy asserts that the Universe is composed of physical "stuff", separate (or equivalent in some undefined way - that is what this thread is trying to pin down) in being to the world of our experience. However, if the primary "stuff" of the Universe is qualia and the physical world is a construction derived from qualia then you do not have to attribute a cause to either of them, just like materialists do with the physical world alone.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
People often ask "How can our experience of redness be a product of our brains?" If we agree that we don't have a complete understanding of neurophysiology yet, then we can't answer that question. It does not seem like a good idea, however, to jump to the conclusion that redness cannot be a product of the brain.

All the hand-wringing about how it just doesn't seem possible that we can get redness from brain function is worthless. To be convinced of the miracle of qualia, we need a logical argument that qualia cannot be a product of the brain. I think we've stomped on the Knowledge Argument, so we need another one. Is there one?

If so, the first step in discussing it will be to define quale. I predict we'll be mired in that step for awhile.

~~ Paul

I sympathise with your position Paul but remember that the majority of materialists will confidently assert that physical processes result in, or are equivalent to, qualia. If the clarity of their explanations matched the zeal of their assertions then I would be more convinced.

To be bold, I don't think that ANY scientific attempt to explain qualia in terms of physical processes will achieve what we all secretly desire - a full understanding of how the transition from the physical to the world of feelings or vice-verse actually happens. IMO, the mistake has already been made before we have begun. An illusionary barrier between the meaning of the physical and mental has been in place for too long. This is what needs to be addressed.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
To what cause do you attribute the Universe?We can't say. The laws of physics are properties of the Universe, and we cannot say (though we can speculate) what lies beyond. Perhaps most atheists and materialists would say there is no cause and I would probably go along with that. The materialist philosophy asserts that the Universe is composed of physical "stuff", separate (or equivalent in some undefined way - that is what this thread is trying to pin down) in being to the world of our experience. However, if the primary "stuff" of the Universe is qualia and the physical world is a construction derived from qualia then you do not have to attribute a cause to either of them, just like materialists do with the physical world alone. Yes you do. Immaterialism is not a magic escape hatch from logic.

Materialism has one postulate: the Universe exists. This is unexplained, and cannot be explained within materialism. Based on that postulate, we can work out everything else using logic and empirical evidence.

Idealism has one postulate: mind exists. The Universe is theoretically explicable within idealism. If materialism can explain mind (not yet shown) but idealism cannot explain the Universe, then materialism is clearly the more powerful system.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:Why do all the materialists keep claiming that the non-materialists are saying that qualia are "magical" or "mystical" or whatever?? Who is claiming these things about qualia??
Ian, you're claiming that everything is mystical, so that would include qualia.

David said:I sympathise with your position Paul but remember that the majority of materialists will confidently assert that physical processes result in, or are equivalent to, qualia. If the clarity of their explanations matched the zeal of their assertions then I would be more convinced.
Clarity of explanation? No one is even able to clearly state what qualia are. The entire argument seems to rest on some sort of appeal to ignorance: I just can't imagine how the physical brain could give rise to subjective experience!

To be bold, I don't think that ANY scientific attempt to explain qualia in terms of physical processes will achieve what we all secretly desire - a full understanding of how the transition from the physical to the world of feelings or vice-verse actually happens. IMO, the mistake has already been made before we have begun. An illusionary barrier between the meaning of the physical and mental has been in place for too long. This is what needs to be addressed.
What barrier, who put it up, and how do we address it?

~~ Paul

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Christ, people post quickly in this forum ! been away for a few days and I'm replying to posts a little further back.



This has spectacularly missed the point of my question. The only slightly relevant bits of your answer are C,D and E. However, here you have essentially said - brain processes produce the qualia we call redness. Whether or not Mary learns gradually to experience red from an initial grey is not relevant in the slightest.

I repeat:

How do you equate the physical process that correlates with the feeling of redness with the qualia itself.

Well again I would like to see a short definition of qualia. I would say that the qualia of red, whatever vauge undined process that may be is:
Most likely the cognitive label applies to the perception of red by the frontal cortex.
Unless you mean the direc5t perception of red?

I am trying although you spectacularly won't say what the heck a qualia is.

Funk On

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
We can't say. The laws of physics are properties of the Universe, and we cannot say (though we can speculate) what lies beyond.


Yes you do. Immaterialism is not a magic escape hatch from logic.

Materialism has one postulate: the Universe exists. This is unexplained, and cannot be explained within materialism. Based on that postulate, we can work out everything else using logic and empirical evidence.

Idealism has one postulate: mind exists. The Universe is theoretically explicable within idealism. If materialism can explain mind (not yet shown) but idealism cannot explain the Universe, then materialism is clearly the more powerful system.


Hang on, I was addressing the cause of the Universe. You have just said that the concept of the existence of the Universe cannot be explained within materialism. When you say this you are refering to the inability of our system of objective knowledge to explain the origin of the Universe in causal terms.
Thats fine.
I am taking a similar but juxtaposed perspective in that one cannot explain the origin of "mind" (as a collective term for all existence) in causal terms if one accepts that qualia are what is real and the physical world is a construction.

So materialism cannot account for the origin of the physical Universe (which the only realm that exists) and idealism cannot account for the origin of mind (which is the only realm that exists). In this sense, materialism is not more powerful as you seem to think. The two perspectives are both unable to explain the cause of their respective realities.

[Dancing David]

It seems on the surface that the cause of the mind is the brain, I can understand that qualia seems to be some sort of word meaning perception. So why not just say , the world we percieve is perception.
This does not mean that perception is the world.

Peace

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by davidsmith73



Partially right. Lets assume that technology has become so advanced that it is possible to produce the same physical process in Bob's brain that occurs in Jane when she experiences redness. Jane has been experiencing red all her life.

Now, upon re-creation of this certain neural firing pattern, Bob experiences redness regardless of whether he has done so before.

This is fine. I am not arguing whether this is possible in principle. I am now asking how the materialist interprets this situation. Many people here think that because a physical process takes place and we experience certain qualia at the same time, the qualia is equivalent to that particular physical process.

I am asking for an elaboration of this view beyond a mere assertion that it is just "common sense".

If qualia = a physical process, how do you account for the fact that we are able to identify two aspects of the same thing ?
Also, if qualia = a physical process, why do materialists assert that the physical is somehow more real than the qualia (they are equivalent after all!). In other words, physical processes could just as well be "nothing but qualia".

I am definitly not following your train of logic here,
first you say that qualia and physical experience are coccuring but perhaps not linked. Care to over an explanation?

Second: why would it be that the neural firing pattern is the same for each person, the neural network is influenced by the enviroment and learning. So I can understand the point only if you assume that the neural patterns are the same for each individual.

The reason that Bob would call it red is because he would talk to other people about it, otherwise he might refer to it as 'that wierd thing I am seeing'.

As for the last part I think you set up the tautology and then used it to say materialism is false. Uh, I think that there is an agreement that qualia are a result of a physical process, I haven't said that they are more real than the qualia, just that they are part of the cognition of the brain.

Oh well, I suppose the best I can hope for is more rudeness and no discussion, oh but thats right, my perception of your rudeness is a qualia, which you keep asserting materialists don't believe in.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Clarity of explanation? No one is even able to clearly state what qualia are. The entire argument seems to rest on some sort of appeal to ignorance: I just can't imagine how the physical brain could give rise to subjective experience!

I think you are misunderstanding me. You have just clarified my point. Some materialists are adamant that certain physical processes (described by the language of mathematics - not directly experienced) are equivalent in some way to certain qualia but somehow the qualia are subservient in existence to their corresponding physical manifestation. If a definition of qualia is so lacking then I fail to see how a materialistic causal explanation will have any clairity. In fact, this lack of clarity is being expressed by the disappointingly incomplete answers to my simple question posed in the title of this thread.



What barrier, who put it up, and how do we address it?

~~ Paul


The barrier that makes us think the physical and mental worlds are different ontological realms. It was put up probably at the time of Descartes, expressed then as dualism. We must address it by seriously looking at the possibility that the physical world is actually a constructed aspect of the mental realm. We might then assess the validity of this approach by looking at what new predictive theories are possible and how they could explain observations like ESP and PK (if they continue to be found in the lab).

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dancing David


Well again I would like to see a short definition of qualia. I would say that the qualia of red, whatever vauge undined process that may be is:
Most likely the cognitive label applies to the perception of red by the frontal cortex.
Unless you mean the direc5t perception of red?

I am trying although you spectacularly won't say what the heck a qualia is.

Funk On

Yes, I mean the direct quality of redness. One can't really define it can one ? This is their principle property IMO. I know what redness is like and I must assume that we are talking about the same qualitative experience when we both refer to redness.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dancing David


I am definitly not following your train of logic here,
first you say that qualia and physical experience are coccuring but perhaps not linked. Care to over an explanation?

Erm, I wasn't saying anything regarding the link between qualia and their corresponding apparent physical manifestation. I was asking for a more clear materialistic viewpoint on this link because I think such clarity is seriously lacking.

Also, you seem to be muddling your concepts.The term "physical experience" doesn't make much sense to me. Qualia are experience. If you want my opinion on the matter, the physical world as a separate ontological reality is an illusion. The primary "stuff" of the Universe is qualia.


Second: why would it be that the neural firing pattern is the same for each person, the neural network is influenced by the enviroment and learning. So I can understand the point only if you assume that the neural patterns are the same for each individual.

The materialistic theoretical point I was addressing is that for each identifiable qualia (eg, redness) there would be a corresponding physical process (now regarded as occuring in the brain) specific to the formation of this qualia.


The reason that Bob would call it red is because he would talk to other people about it, otherwise he might refer to it as 'that wierd thing I am seeing'.

Yes. Your point being ? My point is that Bob would experience redness regardless of whether or not he can put a name to it.


As for the last part I think you set up the tautology and then used it to say materialism is false. Uh, I think that there is an agreement that qualia are a result of a physical process,

Not if you regard a separate physical world as an illusion and really just part of the mental world of qualia.


I haven't said that they are more real than the qualia, just that they are part of the cognition of the brain.

Ok, so they must be equivalent in terms of reality. So are they part of the physical ontological realm ? If so, how do you account for their vastly different manifestation ? What do you specifically mean by "part of the cognition of the brain" ?


Oh well, I suppose the best I can hope for is more rudeness and no discussion, oh but thats right, my perception of your rudeness is a qualia, which you keep asserting materialists don't believe in.

I don't believe I have been rude and I think I am disussing this just fine. Unless you have any specific examples ?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
Your question regards the nature of reality. Subjective experiences are patterns. Are patterns real?


Redness is not a pattern.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
A subjective experience is an objective event. It just looks different. This is necessarily so unless you subscribe to some form of mysticism.We have a vast body of evidence which tells us (by inductive reasoning) that the mind, consciousness, "Qualia", what have you, are the result of brain processes. There is no reliable evidence to the contrary. That the mind is a brain function is more certain than the Theory of Relativity,Evidence?


Only if you regard the ontological realm of the physical as somehow separate from this "inner" realm of experience.

Of course stimulating the brain results in a specific experience, as demonstrated by experiments during brain surgery in the 50's and 60's. However, the "physical" world manifests to us as qualia. We observe the brain and our "physical" manipulations.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

We have two choices. Come up with a logical explanation for why qualia cannot be physical, or wait until we understand what they really are and how they work. The former project requires a good definition of quale, which I haven't seen yet.

~~ Paul

Perhaps we should be concentrating on our notion of the physical realm rather than qualia. I think we have got the physical all wrong.

[Dancing David]

Allright. So if we have a direct perception of the color red. Again there is:
a. the photons enetering the retina and causing a change in the receptors
b. the neural processing in the retina
c. the neural processing in the visual cortex
d. the neural cognition labeling the material in the visual cortex.

If I understand correctly, qualia are the c. the neural processing in the visual cortex, the quality ascribed as red percieved by the visual cortex created by our brains from the sensation in the retina.

So where is the illusionary nature of reality, I agree that we are limited by our perceptions, but the qualia of red is created by the visual cortex after the preliminary sebsation in the retina.
Are the photons illusiory? They are the basis from which the brain generates the qualia.

Now if your argument is based upon the fact that we don't directly percieve reality but are limited by our biochemical senses, and that reality is an illusison that our brain generates, I can agree to that.

But the argument seems to be that qualia are the only reality.

Sorry if I have muddled it, please explain how qualia are seperate from physical reality. Can you have the qualia red without the eyeball?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dancing David

DavidSmith
Partially right. Lets assume that technology has become so advanced that it is possible to produce the same physical process in Bob's brain that occurs in Jane when she experiences redness. Jane has been experiencing red all her life.

Now, upon re-creation of this certain neural firing pattern, Bob experiences redness regardless of whether he has done so before.

This is fine. I am not arguing whether this is possible in principle. I am now asking how the materialist interprets this situation. Many people here think that because a physical process takes place and we experience certain qualia at the same time, the qualia is equivalent to that particular physical process.

I am asking for an elaboration of this view beyond a mere assertion that it is just "common sense".

If qualia = a physical process, how do you account for the fact that we are able to identify two aspects of the same thing ?
Also, if qualia = a physical process, why do materialists assert that the physical is somehow more real than the qualia (they are equivalent after all!). In other words, physical processes could just as well be "nothing but qualia".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Dancing David
I am definitly not following your train of logic here,



:confused: I genuinely find your non-understanding perplexing. I think David Smith is absolutely clear in his question. With what reason are you saying that quale is really a physical process or thing? Do you have any reasons whatsoever??



first you say that qualia and physical experience are coccuring but perhaps not linked. Care to over an explanation?


Did he say this? Where?



As for the last part I think you set up the tautology and then used it to say materialism is false.



I do not think he was explicitly stating materialism is false. He wants to know how materialists extricate themselves from this problem.



Oh well, I suppose the best I can hope for is more rudeness and no discussion, oh but thats right, my perception of your rudeness is a qualia, which you keep asserting materialists don't believe in.


I think you're confusing DavidSmith for me. DavidSmith has never been rude to anyone on this board as far as I am aware.

In fact I don't think I've been rude to you either.

[Dancing David]

So can you have qualia without photons?
Sorry I am not trying to be dense, just stuck in my mechanistic world view, trying to see where qualia are not part of a physical process.
So can you have red without photons?
Can you have taste with out chemical reactions in the tounge?
Etc.,etc.

My spectacular miss was my statement trying to correlate qualia to physical processes, it may be clear to you Ian but I still don't get it. Why aren't qualia part of a physical process, I read the posts, I just don't understand them.

Peace

[Victor Danilchenko]

ian simply assumes that subjective is irreducible. that's all there is to it. Since he makes this assumption, any explanation which shows how subjective is not necessarily irreducible, simply gets outright rejected by him.

You arern't doing anything wrong, DD. The dualist brigade are the ones with comprehension problem.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Victor Danilchenko
ian simply assumes that subjective is irreducible. that's all there is to it. Since he makes this assumption, any explanation which shows how subjective is not necessarily irreducible, simply gets outright rejected by him.

You arern't doing anything wrong, DD. The dualist brigade are the ones with comprehension problem.



No, I do not reject out of hand that qualia can be reduced to the material. But so far no-one has provided any arguments to suppose they can be. Is it unreasonable to question the presumption it can be so reduced in the absence of any arguments which even demonstrate this possibility?

BTW, which people on this thread are proposing dualism?

[ChuckieR]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
... In fact, this lack of clarity is being expressed by the disappointingly incomplete answers to my simple question posed in the title of this thread.The answers are incomplete in the same way that an explanation of gravity is incomplete. We understand that matter is associated with gravity, but we don't really have a "mechanistic" explanation of why/how gravity works. Likewise, it's possible that science may never provide an explanation of "experience" that you will find satisfying (actually, it seems that you do indeed find it satisfying that science can't provide a satisfying answer;)).

As far as the NCC==Qualia question, it seems that the term Qualia is pretty much defined as an unobservable thing (especially if you hold Chalmer's view that two otherwise identical physical systems can differ as to their consciousness), then science is faulted for not being able to observe it. This is different from the gravity situation, where we can very exactly quantify the effects of mass and gravity.

With Qualia, there seems to be no such hope. As far as I understand it (please correct me if I am wrong), Qualia produce no objective observables. Qualia do not interact with the physical universe in any objectively observable way (right?).

I want to throw the ball back in your direction by asking a few questions, which may shed more light on your original question.

Do you hold Chalmers view that it's possible to have two identical physical systems/processes, one of which is conscious and one which is not?
Do you see the discussion of Qualia as part of the furthering of scientific inquiry into consciousness?
If yes to the above question, how would you propose investigating "qualia"? Would you be doing anything differently than current neuroscientists are doing? What specific sorts of experiments would you recommend that might shed more light on the question of qualia?


It seems to me that the term Qualia is often used as a battering ram against the materialist viewpoint (in the same way that Intelligent Design is used against Evolution), rather than as a constructive framework for further inquiry. Maybe you can show me that my dismal outlook on Qualia is incorrect.

I don't put myself in the "denying consciousness" camp. I just don't think we will wind up needing a new force of nature to explain how the brain works. I think it's a bit premature to abandon the physical approach at this point.

We must address it by seriously looking at the possibility that the physical world is actually a constructed aspect of the mental realm.Okay, how do we do that? What tests can we do to rule that possibilitiy in or out? Is there any way to tell? How much money do you need for your research :)

We might then assess the validity of this approach by looking at what new predictive theories are possible and how they could explain observations like ESP and PK (if they continue to be found in the lab). "continue to be found"??? Hmm, we might want to first have a successful, repeatable demonstration of those things before we waste time trying to explain how they work.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

We must address it by seriously looking at the possibility that the physical world is actually a constructed aspect of the mental realm.
If the construction is really good, we won't even be able to tell that the physical world isn't real. That's a bit of a philosophical bummer, no?

I've got an idea for a set of experiments to test this idea. Let's find someone who can override the construction rules and change his physical reality in such a way that the rest of us can tell.

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos


I've got an idea for a set of experiments to test this idea. Let's find someone who can override the construction rules and change his physical reality in such a way that the rest of us can tell.

~~ Paul

Do you have free will? Can you make a plan and follow it?

Idealists can at least postulate that thought does change brain wiring/biochem/etc. Neither is HPC a problem.

It must suck to have faith in materialism. ;)

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:Idealists can at least postulate that thought does change brain wiring/biochem/etc. Neither is HPC a problem.
Well, physicalists can certainly postulate the first thing, too. As for HPC, I don't really understand it, but it smacks of the same overfluffiness as qualia. Maybe it's the same problem:

http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/HARDPROB.html

I think idealists just replace the supposed HPC with the problem of perceptual constancy, which we might call the Hard Problem of Consistency (HPC).

~~ Paul

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by hammegk


Do you have free will? Can you make a plan and follow it?

Idealists can at least postulate that thought does change brain wiring/biochem/etc. Neither is HPC a problem.

It must suck to have faith in materialism. ;)

Uh , who said that thought does not change the neural firing patterns,
Actually materialism is a relieve, why have to worry about all that stuff, we are here, that it is cool, 'nuff for me.

Idealism must be a theoretical pain in the non-existant ass. :p

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Dancing David


Uh , who said that thought does not change the neural firing patterns,


Few "say" it, since it is another blind alley for materialists.

How would you propose "thought" (mental) reprograms brain (physical)? And forget the crap about photons to retina; *I* at least "think" disregarding the external stimuli du jour, and sorting through the "thoughts" that appear willy-nilly -- appearance I assume courtesy of *me* and my perceived-as-physical-brain. IMO, this aspect of *I* & *me* underlies hpc/qualia (for lack of a better term).

What is mindfullness & meditation ( some would say prayer )?

[Dancing David]

I know you have that view and I respect you for it.

As far as how thought reprograms the brain, neurons are not switches, they change in thier sensitivity to other neurons, that is why we obtain new memories.

As far as what is meditation, for me it is either: learning to focus on one thing or it can be learning to live without thought.( I practise both), oh I forgot the other mindful one where you match your thoughts to your body.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:How would you propose "thought" (mental) reprograms brain (physical)?
By being a physical process, not a nonphyiscal process as you are assuming it is.

Hawking is apparently fairly adept at thinking about hard problems without writing anything down. Do you believe that none of his thinking ends up forming physical memories?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dancing David


Uh , who said that thought does not change the neural firing patterns,


Materialists do. Thought can't if it is the very same thing as neural firing patterns!

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Materialists do. Thought can't if it is the very same thing as neural firing patterns!

Out of left field, excuse me but ... what?

I am a materialist and I maintain that thought can change neural firing patterns, yes neyral patterns can change neural firing patterns, isn't that cool. Otherwise we have no memories of what we think.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Dancing David
I know you have that view and I respect you for it.
Thanks. :)

As far as how thought reprograms the brain, neurons are not switches, they change in thier sensitivity to other neurons, that is why we obtain new memories.
I'd agree but with the comment that neurons may be complex switches. The question materialists must answer is "what" is responsible for inducing the changes. Idealism's axiom of "all-is-mind", or more correctly perhaps "all-is-sentient" starts by providing a mechanism that works in a purposeful way. It's the "why" -- in spite of 2nd Law statement of tendency to disorder -- that everywhere we look what we see consists of combined energy providing more complexity rather than less. And again, is the universe open, or closed?

As far as what is meditation, for me it is either: learning to focus on one thing or it can be learning to live without thought.( I practise both), oh I forgot the other mindful one where you match your thoughts to your body.
Agreed; but what is learning & focusing? Is not *I* always there?

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
By being a physical process, not a nonphyiscal process as you are assuming it is.
Yes I understand you postulate "you exist therefore you think", ignoring the only data point your *I* actually has. A quark is said to "exist"; does it think? How do you know?

Hawking is apparently fairly adept at thinking about hard problems without writing anything down. Do you believe that none of his thinking ends up forming physical memories?
I agree completely that brain reprogramming and memory are occuring in the perceived-as-physical brain of *me* ( & *you*).

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Materialists do. Thought can't if it is the very same thing as neural firing patterns! Thought is neurons firing and sending signals to other neurons. This process reprograms (or, technically, "trains") the neurons involved. So not only can a materialist say that thought reprograms the brain, a materialist can say that though necessarily reprograms the brain.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by hammegk
I'd agree but with the comment that neurons may be complex switches.Yes.The question materialists must answer is "what" is responsible for inducing the changes.We know what. We're working on how.Idealism's axiom of "all-is-mind", or more correctly perhaps "all-is-sentient" starts by providing a mechanism that works in a purposeful way. It's the "why" -- in spite of 2nd Law statement of tendency to disorder -- that everywhere we look what we see consists of combined energy providing more complexity rather than less.That's complete baloney. You clearly have no idea what the second law actually means.And again, is the universe open, or closed?Don't know. Is it relevant? Yes I understand you postulate "you exist therefore you think", ignoring the only data point your *I* actually has. A quark is said to "exist"; does it think? How do you know?We know the propeties of quarks; there is nothing there that can possibly think.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
Thought is neurons firing and sending signals to other neurons. This process reprograms (or, technically, "trains") the neurons involved. So not only can a materialist say that thought reprograms the brain, a materialist can say that though necessarily reprograms the brain.

Sure a materialist can, if one likes chicken-egg conundrums. Is your free-will random? If not what provides the initial "nudge" to start the reprogramming?

"Thought=*I*" reprogramming "thought=*me* could avoid this problem, allthough I agree only if *I* does actually have "free will". If The Laws Of Mind are equally deterministic as TLOP, the free will bet is still off. However *I* still think! ;)

[hammegk]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
....You clearly have no idea what the second law actually means.


Don't know.
I'd say you don't understand the ramifications of 2nd Law: but I already knew that. Maybe WillyNilly can illuminate us on this point once he decides the open vs. closed consideration.



We know the propeties of quarks; there is nothing there that can possibly think.
I'd agree it's a stretch to postulate that current mathematical representations of the "properties" of quarks "think" ( or are sentient ) although it appeared to me UCE was heading in this direction. ;)

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by hammegk
Sure a materialist can, if one likes chicken-egg conundrums. Is your free-will random? If not what provides the initial "nudge" to start the reprogramming?Yes, it's just like the chicken & egg question - a non-problem.

Eggs are produced by all sorts of things other than chickens. The first chicken was born from an egg laid by a non-chicken. The first egg was just a slightly odd cell produced by something that didn't originate from an egg at all.

Similarly, the initial state of the brain is determined by the physical structure of the brain (which is determined by genetics, which is determined by evolution) and raw sensory input. Thought is brain processes. If you have an live brain, it is thinking, and it is reprogramming itself."Thought=*I*" reprogramming "thought=*me* could avoid this problem, allthough I agree only if *I* does actually have "free will".That wasn't even coherent.If The Laws Of Mind are equally deterministic as TLOP, the free will bet is still off.You are aware that the laws of physics are not deterministic, yes?However *I* still think! ;) If you say so.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by hammegk
I'd say you don't understand the ramifications of 2nd Law: but I already knew that.The <strike>first</strike> second law says this: Heat cannot of itself pass from one body to a hotter body. That's it. That's all.

All of your examples are simply examples of the second law in action.I'd agree it's a stretch to postulate that current mathematical representations of the "properties" of quarks "think" ( or are sentient ) although it appeared to me UCE was heading in this direction. ;) Yes, and Franko claimed that gravitons were sentient and that their charge (or sometimes their spin) determined whether they were good or evil. Such suggestions are without any merit whatsoever.

edited to hide the evidence of my saying "first law" when I meant "second law"

[Dancing David]

I might understand the argument that a system of neural reverberations should not be able to reprogram itself. I can see where it doesn't make surface sense.

Potentiation is the process that leads to semi-persistance in the neural network, a single neural cell that is activated/repressed by another neuron is morelikely to be activated/repressed by another neuron in the future. So over time the neuron forms a relationship, IE generally not activated or repressed, generaly activated, generaly repressed. Then ther is the fact that nerons can actualy grow and create new conections or attenuate and remove corrections.

So fortunately the whole system is very sloppy, and there are very likely many many circuts needed to be in agreement for the process to occur at all.

Where does free will come from,? From the fact that I can choose to act or not to act. Unless of course I am off my medication, then I have obsesive compulsions, and I do loose free will to some extent.

I posit a chacter named WillyBilly to counteract your WillyNillY, very funny!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:I agree completely that brain reprogramming and memory are occuring in the perceived-as-physical brain of *me* ( & *you*).
So what we seem to have here is an ideal mind that is conjuring up everything we think of as physical. Except all the physical stuff is a puppet of the mind. For example, my mind is fooling me into believing that I have physical memory, when actually all the memories are in the mind. (Contrary to what some were saying in the previous endless qualia thread, where the mind had no memory. I think that was Win.)

How does this model solve all the hard problems, other than with just-so stories? In particular, how does it solve the HPC other than by declaring it solved by definition?

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
So what we seem to have here is an ideal mind that is conjuring up everything we think of as physical.
In the sense that *you* & *I* are each an infinitesmal part of "mind", ok. Conjuring? I'd postulate "energetic interactions" assume the form we perceive as physical.


Except all the physical stuff is a puppet of the mind. For example, my mind is fooling me into believing that I have physical memory, when actually all the memories are in the mind. (Contrary to what some were saying in the previous endless qualia thread, where the mind had no memory. I think that was Win.)
Er, why fooling? You do have a "perceived physical mind" as part of your meat-machine. *I* call that *me*.


How does this model solve all the hard problems, other than with just-so stories? In particular, how does it solve the HPC other than by declaring it solved by definition?
Nothing gets "solved". What idealism does is provide "possibly logical" answers to questions of "why" that materialism does not. Think first about the "life"/"non-life" interface; does it exist? Umm, there; Why do you think so?

I'd currently agree "just so" is it, just as it is with materialism/atheism.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by PixyMisa
Yes, it's just like the chicken & egg question - a non-problem.

Eggs are produced by all sorts of things other than chickens. The first chicken was born from an egg laid by a non-chicken. The first egg was just a slightly odd cell produced by something that didn't originate from an egg at all. Similarly, the initial state of the brain is determined by the physical structure of the brain (which is determined by genetics, which is determined by evolution) and raw sensory input. Thought is brain processes. If you have an live brain, it is thinking, and it is reprogramming itself.
Well, you sound a lot like a hen in a fluster-cluck; I give you that.


That wasn't even coherent.
I bet you say that a lot.


You are aware that the laws of physics are not deterministic, yes?
As evidenced by most of your thinking, sounds true to me. Do you often run red lights when you don't want to?


The first law says this: Heat cannot of itself pass from one body to a hotter body. That's it. That's all.
Or that energy is neither created nor destroyed.... :cool:

Re 2nd Law; http://www.2ndlaw.com/ has a fair amount of info.

Originally posted by Dancing David
I might understand the argument that a system of neural reverberations should not be able to reprogram itself. I can see where it doesn't make surface sense.
Yup, we agree that that is one of the sticking points materialists need to think through. IMO, it makes --zero-- sense at any level. BTW, consider "life" first.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't understand why the brain should have any more trouble modifying its own memories than a computer does.

~~ Paul

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by hammegk

Yup, we agree that that is one of the sticking points materialists need to think through. IMO, it makes --zero-- sense at any level. BTW, consider "life" first.

Uh, I think that is the sticking point for the imaterialists, doesn't bother me at all.

If neural cells can potentiate and attenuate thier influence on each other than there is potential for change in those relationships, so it's not a problem for me at all.

So is the *I* more than the *me* in the meat machine? I am very comfortable with just being the meat machine, again I think there is enough complexity in the mechanistic brain to allow for all the coool stuff.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
I don't understand why the brain should have any more trouble modifying its own memories than a computer does.

~~ Paul

I'd agree as soon as I was comfortable with the concept of non-life coding itself to be selfcoding life... ;)

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by hammegk
Well, you sound a lot like a hen in a fluster-cluck; I give you that.Yes, that's the level of reasoning I've come to expect from you.I bet you say that a lot.Well, since you choose so often to be incoherent. Or simply abusive.As evidenced by most of your thinking, sounds true to me. Do you often run red lights when you don't want to?Are you aware that the laws of physics are not deterministic? That your precious second law only applies statistically?Or that energy is neither created nor destroyed.That's the first law.Re 2nd Law; http://www.2ndlaw.com/ has a fair amount of info.Indeed it does. It points at that your statements about the second law are pure baloney, and it explains why.Yup, we agree that that is one of the sticking points materialists need to think through. IMO, it makes --zero-- sense at any level. BTW, consider "life" first. It's not a sticking point at all. It's quite clear that thoughts are brain processes and involve the brain reprogramming itself. This is completely consistent with materialism, and given what we know about the mind, anything else would make no sense.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by hammegk
I'd agree as soon as I was comfortable with the concept of non-life coding itself to be selfcoding life... ;) The relevance of this is... what, exactly?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by PixyMisa

The relevance of this is... what, exactly?
To you obviously nothing. No, that doesn't surprise me.


Yes, that's the level of reasoning I've come to expect from you.
As opposed to the drivel you provide?

Well, since you choose so often to be incoherent. Or simply abusive.
Yeah, when one tries to communicate with a jackass, sometimes a 2x4 to the head at least gets their attention. I note nothing works for you.


Are you aware that the laws of physics are not deterministic? That your precious second law only applies statistically?

I'm becoming aware that to expect a rational response from you is waste of time.


quote:
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Or that energy is neither created nor destroyed.
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That's the first law.
Try paying attention. You brought up 1st Law, not me.


Indeed it does. It points at that your statements about the second law are pure baloney, and it explains why.
Well here is your chance to demonstrate why you feel so. As usual your response brings nothing to the discussion.


quote:
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Yup, we agree that that is one of the sticking points materialists need to think through. IMO, it makes --zero-- sense at any level. BTW, consider "life" first.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

It's not a sticking point at all. It's quite clear that thoughts are brain processes and involve the brain reprogramming itself. This is completely consistent with materialism, and given what we know about the mind, anything else would make no sense.
Please advise where you draw the non-life/life boundary, and what makes you believe that. What is clear is that you don't show much comprehension of the topics under discussion here. A parrot could provide equally valid comments.

[PixyMisa]

Originally posted by hammegk
To you obviously nothing. No, that doesn't surprise me.Well, that certainly answers the question.As opposed to the drivel you provide?No, as opposed to my carefully structured, logically rigorous and factually correct anwers.Yeah, when one tries to communicate with a jackass, sometimes a 2x4 to the head at least gets their attention. I note nothing works for you.Which, presumably, is why your answers are content-free?I'm becoming aware that to expect a rational response from you is waste of time.You have to say something rational in the first place if you wish to elicit a rational response.Try paying attention. You brought up 1st Law, not me.Ah crap. Yes, I'll grant you that. I'll now go and remove the evidence.Well here is your chance to demonstrate why you feel so. As usual your response brings nothing to the discussion.OK.

Your statement:Idealism's axiom of "all-is-mind", or more correctly perhaps "all-is-sentient" starts by providing a mechanism that works in a purposeful way. It's the "why" -- in spite of 2nd Law statement of tendency to disorder -- that everywhere we look what we see consists of combined energy providing more complexity rather than less.Reveals a complete lack of understanding of the second law. There is no need for an explanation of how systems become organised, since this doesn't contradict the second law in any way. It's not "in spite of the 2nd Law statment of tendency to disorder", since the second law makes no such generalisation. The second law is quite specific; it says that left to itself, heat will pass from the hotter body to the cooler one. To push heat in the other direction requires an input of work, and to do that requires heat to pass from a hotter body to a cooler one somewhere else. So in any closed dynamic system, you will eventually reach a state where everything is the same temperature and no work can be done. This is known as heat death.

The fact that there are organised systems performing work in this Universe simply tells us that we haven't reached heat death yet.

If you look anywhere and see a system that isn't running down in accordance with the second law, you will find that the system you are looking at is not closed, and that it is drawing energy from another system that is indeed running down. Life on Earth is powered by the Sun, and for all of life's grandeur, when the Sun runs out, it will too.Please advise where you draw the non-life/life boundaryI don't.and what makes you believe that.Life, ill-defined as it is, is clearly a continuum. At one end, we have, say, electrons, and at the other end, cats. Unless you specify exactly what property of life you wish to base the decision on, any fixed dividing line is arbitrary.What is clear is that you don't show much comprehension of the topics under discussion here. A parrot could provide equally valid comments.Even a parrot would eventually tire of refuting the same unfounded assertions over and over.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by PixyMisa

Well, that certainly answers the question.
Ask a question instead of saying "duh".


No, as opposed to my carefully structured, logically rigorous and factually correct anwers.
Good anwer!


Which, presumably, is why your answers are content-free?

I specialize in content-free responses to content-free queries.


You have to say something rational in the first place if you wish to elicit a rational response.
Beginning to appear rationality vs insanity is in the eye of the beholder, huh?


Ah crap. Yes, I'll grant you that. I'll now go and remove the evidence.
Well, it's at least a start.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Idealism's axiom of "all-is-mind", or more correctly perhaps "all-is-sentient" starts by providing a mechanism that works in a purposeful way. It's the "why" -- in spite of 2nd Law statement of tendency to disorder -- that everywhere we look what we see consists of combined energy providing more complexity rather than less.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reveals a complete lack of understanding of the second law. There is no need for an explanation of how systems become organised, since this doesn't contradict the second law in any way. It's not "in spite of the 2nd Law statment of tendency to disorder", since the second law makes no such generalisation. The second law is quite specific; it says that left to itself, heat will pass from the hotter body to the cooler one. To push heat in the other direction requires an input of work, and to do that requires heat to pass from a hotter body to a cooler one somewhere else. So in any closed dynamic system, you will eventually reach a state where everything is the same temperature and no work can be done. This is known as heat death.

The fact that there are organised systems performing work in this Universe simply tells us that we haven't reached heat death yet.

If you look anywhere and see a system that isn't running down in accordance with the second law, you will find that the system you are looking at is not closed, and that it is drawing energy from another system that is indeed running down. Life on Earth is powered by the Sun, and for all of life's grandeur, when the Sun runs out, it will too.
May I then assume you state unequivocally that 2nd Law carries no connotation that randomness rather than structure is the expectation? Heat is an interesting form of energy. What did you say energy is?


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Please advise where you draw the non-life/life boundary
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I don't.
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
and what makes you believe that.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Life, ill-defined as it is, is clearly a continuum. At one end, we have, say, electrons, and at the other end, cats. Unless you specify exactly what property of life you wish to base the decision on, any fixed dividing line is arbitrary.
Okey-dokey, that sounds rational (add quarks maybe?). Does sentience require "life"? How do you justify your position?


Even a parrot would eventually tire of refuting the same unfounded assertions over and over.
Sounds good. When will you stop the parrot act?

[Dancing David]

Bump. (Okay kids, you will have to sit apart if you can't get along)

Life is the consequence of a long series of fortuitous accidents,

I think I understand the question about qualia! It is why would there be any red or green in the first place. Or why do our brains choose to present us with qualia in the first place.

It is a utilitarian thing, for example, red, our brains could present us witha cross hatch to represent that color but then it would interfere with our ability to see a cross hatch, so our brain assigns it a value that doesn't interfere with visual perception but enhances it.

The value of the various senses arose during the evolution of life, so the reason we see red is that it proved useful to our ancestors.

Is that the question?

Peace

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by ChuckieR
The answers are incomplete in the same way that an explanation of gravity is incomplete. We understand that matter is associated with gravity, but we don't really have a "mechanistic" explanation of why/how gravity works. Likewise, it's possible that science may never provide an explanation of "experience" that you will find satisfying (actually, it seems that you do indeed find it satisfying that science can't provide a satisfying answer;)).

False analogy. We can define grafity just fine in physical effects using equations. With qualia we cannot do this.


As far as the NCC==Qualia question, it seems that the term Qualia is pretty much defined as an unobservable thing (especially if you hold Chalmer's view that two otherwise identical physical systems can differ as to their consciousness), then science is faulted for not being able to observe it. This is different from the gravity situation, where we can very exactly quantify the effects of mass and gravity.

I think you are misusing the term observable. I think qualia are unmeasurable by science as we know it today, but the very nature of observation entails the manifestation of qualia. I give a very different meaning to observation and measurement.


With Qualia, there seems to be no such hope. As far as I understand it (please correct me if I am wrong), Qualia produce no objective observables. Qualia do not interact with the physical universe in any objectively observable way (right?).

Depends on your viewpoint of what the physical world really is. Within a mental monistic viewpoint, subjective and objective are part of the same realm.


I want to throw the ball back in your direction by asking a few questions, which may shed more light on your original question.

Do you hold Chalmers view that it's possible to have two identical physical systems/processes, one of which is conscious and one which is not?

If I was coming from the mental monist camp then no.


Do you see the discussion of Qualia as part of the furthering of scientific inquiry into consciousness?

I think so.


If yes to the above question, how would you propose investigating "qualia"? Would you be doing anything differently than current neuroscientists are doing? What specific sorts of experiments would you recommend that might shed more light on the question of qualia?


ESP and PK type experiments where consciousness is an intergral part of the experimental system.


It seems to me that the term Qualia is often used as a battering ram against the materialist viewpoint (in the same way that Intelligent Design is used against Evolution), rather than as a constructive framework for further inquiry. Maybe you can show me that my dismal outlook on Qualia is incorrect.

I don't put myself in the "denying consciousness" camp. I just don't think we will wind up needing a new force of nature to explain how the brain works. I think it's a bit premature to abandon the physical approach at this point.

How the brain works is not explaining qualia or how qualia equate with a physical process. This is the question which no-one here has yet answered.

[ChuckieR]

The answers are incomplete in the same way that an explanation of gravity is incomplete. We understand that matter is associated with gravity, but we don't really have a "mechanistic" explanation of why/how gravity works. Likewise, it's possible that science may never provide an explanation of "experience" that you will find satisfying (actually, it seems that you do indeed find it satisfying that science can't provide a satisfying answer).


False analogy. We can define grafity just fine in physical effects using equations. With qualia we cannot do this.
Well, yes, that was exactly my point, as I said in the paragraphs following - although we do not have a mechanistic explanation of gravity, we have very precise formulations for the effects of gravity and how it interacts with all other physical phenomena.

I was highlighting the fact that, as you say, with qualia we cannot do this.

We can explain all of the physical activities of the brain - how it interacts with other physical entities, etc. We can show all of the correlations btwn the physical brain and your consciousness, and how your consciousness and the physical activities of the brain are inseperable. But, after all of that, you will say "Yes, but you haven't shown me the qualia." Same with gravity. We explain its properties and interactions, but not its mechanism per se. I can't "show you" gravity, only its effects.

As far as the NCC==Qualia question, it seems that the term Qualia is pretty much defined as an unobservable thing (especially if you hold Chalmer's view that two otherwise identical physical systems can differ as to their consciousness), then science is faulted for not being able to observe it. This is different from the gravity situation, where we can very exactly quantify the effects of mass and gravity.

I think you are misusing the term observable. I think qualia are unmeasurable by science as we know it today, but the very nature of observation entails the manifestation of qualia. I give a very different meaning to observation and measurement.
I meant "observable" in the scientific sense: measurable, quantifiable. And, again, that is my point. It seems that if your position is that qualia are only subjectively knowable, then by this definition they will always remain objectively unmeasurable and unquantifiable even in principle.

So, now I'm confused. Above you agreed that we can't define qualia in terms of its physical effects, but you are now saying that some day we may be able to measure qualia? How could we do this even in principle if qualia are defined to be unmeasurable?

With Qualia, there seems to be no such hope. As far as I understand it (please correct me if I am wrong), Qualia produce no objective observables. Qualia do not interact with the physical universe in any objectively observable way (right?).

Depends on your viewpoint of what the physical world really is. Within a mental monistic viewpoint, subjective and objective are part of the same realm.
No, that's the nice thing about science. It doesn't depend on my viewpoint or opinion. How would my adopting a mental monistic viewpoint allow me to measure and quantify qualia?

I want to throw the ball back in your direction by asking a few questions, which may shed more light on your original question.

Do you hold Chalmers view that it's possible to have two identical physical systems/processes, one of which is conscious and one which is not?

If I was coming from the mental monist camp then no.
Okay, now we are getting somewhere. What would then be the physical difference between a conscious process and a non-conscious process?

Do you see the discussion of Qualia as part of the furthering of scientific inquiry into consciousness?

I think so.

If yes to the above question, how would you propose investigating "qualia"? Would you be doing anything differently than current neuroscientists are doing? What specific sorts of experiments would you recommend that might shed more light on the question of qualia?

ESP and PK type experiments where consciousness is an intergral part of the experimental system.
We've had a couple centuries of ESP and PK type experiments, and we are still waiting for the first repeatable result.

It seems to me that the term Qualia is often used as a battering ram against the materialist viewpoint (in the same way that Intelligent Design is used against Evolution), rather than as a constructive framework for further inquiry. Maybe you can show me that my dismal outlook on Qualia is incorrect.

I don't put myself in the "denying consciousness" camp. I just don't think we will wind up needing a new force of nature to explain how the brain works. I think it's a bit premature to abandon the physical approach at this point.


How the brain works is not explaining qualia or how qualia equate with a physical process. This is the question which no-one here has yet answered.And, as I argued, no one will ever be able to answer it because of the way qualia is defined.

You said above that "We can define grafity just fine in physical effects using equations. With qualia we cannot do this." And now you complain that no one will tell you how to do this. This was exactly the point of my post.

Do you now see why we find this line of discussion tedious and fruitless?

[edited to add more clarification after first quote]

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by ChuckieR
Well, yes, that was exactly my point, as I said in the paragraphs following - although we do not have a mechanistic explanation of gravity, we have very precise formulations for the effects of gravity and how it interacts with all other physical phenomena.

I was highlighting the fact that, as you say, with qualia we cannot do this.

Hence how a materialistic notion that qualia = physical process has not been explained at all adequately !
Gravity is manifest as a physical description and thus can be equated with one. A materialist would say that qualia can be given the exact same treatment. I am asking for this to be shown.


We can explain all of the physical activities of the brain - how it interacts with other physical entities, etc. We can show all of the correlations btwn the physical brain and your consciousness, and how your consciousness and the physical activities of the brain are inseperable. But, after all of that, you will say "Yes, but you haven't shown me the qualia." Same with gravity. We explain its properties and interactions, but not its mechanism per se. I can't "show you" gravity, only its effects.


But you have missed the all important distinction. "Gravity" is defined as a relational set of observations. And these observations manifest as experience. I agree that one cannot be shown gravity, only its effects. Now, qualia are not defined by a relational set of observations. Lets take redness. Which relational set of observations define redness ? None do. Redness is simply not reducable to such a definition.



I meant "observable" in the scientific sense: measurable, quantifiable. And, again, that is my point. It seems that if your position is that qualia are only subjectively knowable, then by this definition they will always remain objectively unmeasurable and unquantifiable even in principle.

So, now I'm confused. Above you agreed that we can't define qualia in terms of its physical effects, but you are now saying that some day we may be able to measure qualia? How could we do this even in principle if qualia are defined to be unmeasurable?

Sorry, I'm not sure what I meant by what I said myself. I meant to say this: because qualia are not quantifiable they are not recognised by science, as we know it today, as being the fundamental nature of reality. Science holds realtiy to be necessarily describable by mathematics. This may not be the case.


No, that's the nice thing about science. It doesn't depend on my viewpoint or opinion. How would my adopting a mental monistic viewpoint allow me to measure and quantify qualia?


Within a mental monistic view, there would be no physical realm. The physical realm would really be a contruction of the mental realm. So when you measure something "objectively" you are not obtaining information about another realm outside of your experience. Rather this information exists within the single realm of qualia. Scientific observation and measurement would exist as part of the mental realm of qualia.


Okay, now we are getting somewhere. What would then be the physical difference between a conscious process and a non-conscious process?

There isn't a difference. Consciousness/qualia is reality. The physical world is a construction composed of qualia. I'm not sure in which context you ask the question.


We've had a couple centuries of ESP and PK type experiments, and we are still waiting for the first repeatable result.

I think the validity and repeatability of these experiments is a topic for another thread. I included them here to answer a question but suffice it to say, I disagree with you ;)


And, as I argued, no one will ever be able to answer it because of the way qualia is defined.

Or perhaps more importnatly, how "physical" is defined. Anyway, are you saying the definition of qualia is wrong ? Can you show how it is wrong ? Can you show me how qualia = physical process ?


You said above that "We can define grafity just fine in physical effects using equations. With qualia we cannot do this." And now you complain that no one will tell you how to do this. This was exactly the point of my post.

So you must conclude that the materialistic notion that qualia = physical process is wrong.

I don't really understand the main point of your post. You seem to agree with me that qualia cannot be reduced to physical descriptions but then say that somehow the whole concept of what qualia are is wrong.


Do you now see why we find this line of discussion tedious and fruitless?

No I don't (surprise ;) ). I think its the most important and interesting discussion one can have about the nature of experience. If thats tedious for you then you can go play golf or something if you like.
:p

[DrMatt]

I don't know a lot of neurology, but a neuroscience researcher recently tried to explain to me some of the latest findings on nerves and quaglia. The example he used suggests that forming categories and classifying experiences into prior categories are pre-wired tendencies reflected by groups of neurons in different parts of the brain firing in phase with each other to reflect different previously-categorized parameters of a single quaglia.

[ChuckieR]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
But you have missed the all important distinction. "Gravity" is defined as a relational set of observations. And these observations manifest as experience. I agree that one cannot be shown gravity, only its effects. Now, qualia are not defined by a relational set of observations. Lets take redness. Which relational set of observations define redness ? None do. Redness is simply not reducable to such a definition.
Are you saying that someone could be perceiving redness and that we would not be able to tell using physical measurements, even in principle? I think this is incorrect.

Someone's perception of redness is always correlated with specific brain activity, no? If we had the right technology (a super MRI machine that can monitor individual neurons, for example, which is in principle possible), we could always tell w/out error when someone was perceiving redness.

Yet this is apparently not satisfying to you. Of course, we don't yet have the technology to do this, but there are no conceptual barriers to this type of experiment.

So, yes, we can describe the correlation btwn redness and brain activity. But, no, as you say, we cannot "quantify" the qualia of redness itself, because that is defined to not be objectively measureable. Qualia is defined to be what you perceive, not what is objectively measureable. Then you complain that we can't objectively measure qualia.

Sorry, I'm not sure what I meant by what I said myself. I meant to say this: because qualia are not quantifiable they are not recognised by science, as we know it today, as being the fundamental nature of reality. Science holds realtiy to be necessarily describable by mathematics. This may not be the case.Then if you accept that science cannot investigate qualia, why do you complain that science cannot investigate qualia? Or are you contending that some day we will be able to quantify qualia? I'm just not sure where you are headed here.

I can conceive of a machine that would allow us to measure the impulses of each neuron and measure the chemical activity of the whole brain. I cannot even conceive of the possibility of a machine that would "measure qualia", because qualia are defined to be unmeasurable. It just becomes a word game.

How would you propose we do this, even in principle? ESP experiments? Fine, how would this help? What sort of experiment would help us investigate qualia? My point is that none are possible even in principle.

Within a mental monistic view, there would be no physical realm. The physical realm would really be a contruction of the mental realm. So when you measure something "objectively" you are not obtaining information about another realm outside of your experience. Rather this information exists within the single realm of qualia. Scientific observation and measurement would exist as part of the mental realm of qualia.This is where I start to get confused and loose interest because, obviously, I do not hold a mental monistic view of the world. To me, this just sounds like the "It's a mystery" answer - a religious answer to what you pose as a philosophical/scientific question.

I'm just curious. Within this viewpoint (mental monistic), will the investigation of qualia be considered science, or will it be something else (meditation, prayer, or some such thing)? And, again, how will simply changing your viewpoint allow you to measure something that you say is unmeasurable scientifically?

There isn't a difference. Consciousness/qualia is reality. The physical world is a construction composed of qualia. I'm not sure in which context you ask the question.
Wait! You left out your original quote, and my question preceeding it:

I want to throw the ball back in your direction by asking a few questions, which may shed more light on your original question.

Do you hold Chalmers view that it's possible to have two identical physical systems/processes, one of which is conscious and one which is not?

If I was coming from the mental monist camp then no.
So here you say "no", they are not the same - meaning that there is a physical difference between a conscious and non-conscious process. Now in your last post, you say there is not a physical difference. Which is it?

If there is a physical difference, then we can measure it. If there is not, then it is undetectable even in principle.

Maybe what you are saying is that from a materialist perspective, they cannot be measured, but from a mental monistic perspective they are measurable? Is this accurate?

If that's the case, then how should we proceed with the investigation of qualia? Are they only investagable from a religious perspective? Maybe that is your point? In your opinion, will qualia ever be able to be investigated scientifically?

I think the validity and repeatability of these experiments is a topic for another thread. I included them here to answer a question but suffice it to say, I disagree with you ;)Okay, we can agree to disagree. But it should not be a matter of opinion or belief whether ESP etc. are valid. If they are valid, you (someone) should be able to design an experiment that would convince "the rest of us". Until that day, ESP will be rightly dismissed by mainstream science. Right now, it seems that only people who believe in ESP believe in ESP, if you get my drift.

Or perhaps more importnatly, how "physical" is defined. Anyway, are you saying the definition of qualia is wrong ? Can you show how it is wrong ? Can you show me how qualia = physical process ?

So you must conclude that the materialistic notion that qualia = physical process is wrong.

I don't really understand the main point of your post. You seem to agree with me that qualia cannot be reduced to physical descriptions but then say that somehow the whole concept of what qualia are is wrong.What I'm saying is that we can (or will be able to in the future) completely describe all of the brain activity that accompanies subjective perceptions. And what I'm further saying is that that will apparently not be enough for you, because the term "qualia" was invented specifically as a counter to materialism, w/out giving any possible way, even in principle, to scientifically investigate the qualia themselves.

No one will ever be able to show that "qualia = physical process" because qualia is defined as the subjective experience that accompanies certain physical processes. It specifically defined to not be the physical process itself. What we will be able to say definitively, IMHO, is that qualia will always result from certain physical processes (just like gravitational attraction will always be present between two masses).

I am not saying that the definition of qualia is wrong. I'm saying that the concept of qualia is not scientifically useful.

No I don't (surprise ;) ). I think its the most important and interesting discussion one can have about the nature of experience. If thats tedious for you then you can go play golf or something if you like.
:p Investigating how the brain works is the frontier of neuroscience. It is extremely important and very interesting to me. There are many questions to be answered.

At the end of the day, when we have a complete physical description of how the brain works, you will still be complaining that qualia have not been adequately addressed, and you will not provide any fruitful method of addressing your own question.

That is what I find tedious.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by ChuckieR
Are you saying that someone could be perceiving redness and that we would not be able to tell using physical measurements, even in principle? I think this is incorrect.

No, I'm not saying that. I'm making a comparison about the nature of qualia and the nature of physical descriptions.

Lets take gravity again. The concept of gravity is manifest as a set of relational observations i.e., two objects being attracted to one another. And we have contructed a mathematical description of the quantitative aspects of those observations. Like you said, gravity cannot be something that can be refered to or "shown" outside of this set of relational observations.

However, qualia can be refered to directly without a constructed set of relational observations. Redness is just that - redness.


Someone's perception of redness is always correlated with specific brain activity, no? If we had the right technology (a super MRI machine that can monitor individual neurons, for example, which is in principle possible), we could always tell w/out error when someone was perceiving redness.

But we would still not have defined redness. This is not a constructed set of relational observations that define redness in the same way a set would define gravity. IMO this is the fundamental difference that separates a physical description from qualia. Materialism tries to marry the two things together in an attempt to say they are equivalent. I don't understand how this can be done.


Yet this is apparently not satisfying to you. Of course, we don't yet have the technology to do this, but there are no conceptual barriers to this type of experiment.

There are only conceptual barriers to the interpretation of the result.


So, yes, we can describe the correlation btwn redness and brain activity. But, no, as you say, we cannot "quantify" the qualia of redness itself, because that is defined to not be objectively measureable. Qualia is defined to be what you perceive, not what is objectively measureable. Then you complain that we can't objectively measure qualia.

Yes, I'm complaining that because this is the case, IMO there is no case for the materialistic notion that physical descriptions refer to and are equivalent to qualia.


Then if you accept that science cannot investigate qualia, why do you complain that science cannot investigate qualia? Or are you contending that some day we will be able to quantify qualia? I'm just not sure where you are headed here.

I'm complaining (I'd call it debating :) ) that some people seem to think that physical descriptions refer to and are equivalent to qualia.


I can conceive of a machine that would allow us to measure the impulses of each neuron and measure the chemical activity of the whole brain. I cannot even conceive of the possibility of a machine that would "measure qualia", because qualia are defined to be unmeasurable. It just becomes a word game.

How would you propose we do this, even in principle? ESP experiments? Fine, how would this help? What sort of experiment would help us investigate qualia? My point is that none are possible even in principle.



I suppose you are right in that no experiment would reveal some "hidden" true nature of qualia. However, I think ESP and PK experiments may help to dissolve the notion that qualia are phenomena that are confined to the locus of each individual nervous system that they are hypothesised to be generated from.




I'm just curious. Within this viewpoint (mental monistic), will the investigation of qualia be considered science, or will it be something else (meditation, prayer, or some such thing)? And, again, how will simply changing your viewpoint allow you to measure something that you say is unmeasurable scientifically?

It would still be science. I don't claim that redness will be given any intrinsic quantification, just that the nature of any physical description would be aknowledged to necessarily be made (for want of a better word) of qualia and not refer to a separate ontological reality. Its a concept I find hard to think about myself, but I'm trying to make it clearer !


Wait! You left out your original quote, and my question preceeding it:
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Do you hold Chalmers view that it's possible to have two identical physical systems/processes, one of which is conscious and one which is not?

If I was coming from the mental monist camp then no.
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So here you say "no", they are not the same - meaning that there is a physical difference between a conscious and non-conscious process. Now in your last post, you say there is not a physical difference. Which is it?

I didn't mean that. I said no to the original question because the concept of a non-conscious vs a consious system would be meaningless because existence is consciousness (qualia). If I perceive another person and they are talking away to me, I might presume they are conscious and if they are lying on the slab, I might presume they are not consious. However, the mistake here is that I first presume that the person is a physical system existing on a separate ontological realm to my perception of them and capable of being in either a "conscious" or "non-conscious" state. Whereas the mental monist view says that everything is manifest as qualia. So I think the problem of attributing a state of consciousness vs non-consciousness to "objects" stems from a notion of the physical vs qualia.


Maybe what you are saying is that from a materialist perspective, they cannot be measured, but from a mental monistic perspective they are measurable? Is this accurate?

I'm on shaky ground when we're talking about measuring qualia. I need a little more time to think about it. Its seems that from either philosophy, qualia can't be quantified. Perhaps it is right to say that nothing can be quantifed without relating it to something else. Isn't that the nature of measurement - comparison ?


What I'm saying is that we can (or will be able to in the future) completely describe all of the brain activity that accompanies subjective perceptions. And what I'm further saying is that that will apparently not be enough for you, because the term "qualia" was invented specifically as a counter to materialism, w/out giving any possible way, even in principle, to scientifically investigate the qualia themselves.


I don't think the term qualia was invented as a block to materialism at all. Qualia exist to be explained by science or understood as a basis for a philosophical framework of reality or both. For reasons I have given, even if we did completely describe all of the brain activity that accompanies subjective perceptions we would still be left with this huge philosophical problem of how qualia can be refered to without a set of relational observations and physical descriptions, like gravity, cannot.


No one will ever be able to show that "qualia = physical process" because qualia is defined as the subjective experience that accompanies certain physical processes.

It specifically defined to not be the physical process itself. What we will be able to say definitively, IMHO, is that qualia will always result from certain physical processes (just like gravitational attraction will always be present between two masses).

But, as I have said, this comparison is not fair. Gravitational attraction is manifest as the relationships between a set of observations. We do not have something else to refer to outside of this description. With redness, we do. We have the physical description in terms of neural processes and we have redness.


Investigating how the brain works is the frontier of neuroscience. It is extremely important and very interesting to me. There are many questions to be answered.

Very interesting to me too. I'm studying and work in this area.


At the end of the day, when we have a complete physical description of how the brain works, you will still be complaining that qualia have not been adequately addressed, and you will not provide any fruitful method of addressing your own question.

That is what I find tedious.


I don't claim to have the answers, I'm just trying to find out the truth. And yes, when we have a complete description of how the brain works, I will be complaining that qualia have not been adequately addressed. However, changing your philosophical viewpoint about the nature of reality can be a very interesting experience. Perhaps it may have no results for science, perhaps it will help someone develop new theories by releasing some of the theoretical constraints emposed by materialism, who knows.