Show Me Qualia

[Dancing David]

Since the other thread is about showing the neural correlates of qualia, and I don't want to spam.

Show me qualia with out a brain, show me qualia with out the physical process that support the brain. Show me how there are just qualia and no external reality. Can you will you, I am open minded, jsut show me.

Peace

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Everything you experience is just qualia. There is no external reality, except as created by your own subjective experience. It is your subjective experience that exists; the rest is illusion.

A rock has qualia, too, but we can't experience them directly.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Since the other thread is about showing the neural correlates of qualia, and I don't want to spam.

Show me qualia with out a brain, show me qualia with out the physical process that support the brain. Show me how there are just qualia and no external reality. Can you will you, I am open minded, jsut show me.

Peace

David,

You need to demonstrate that it is logically impossible for qualia to exist without a brain, not merely physically impossible.

[Upchurch]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

You need to demonstrate that it is logically impossible for qualia to exist without a brain, not merely physically impossible. Why? He's asking to see qualia that does exist without a brain.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Upchurch
Why? He's asking to see qualia that does exist without a brain.

In order for materialism to be true, then we're committed to holding that once we have certain physical processes, the qualia are logically necessitated, rather than merely naturally necessitated, as in say epiphenomenalism.

Maybe within this empirical reality qualia only ever occur with concommitant physical processes. However, this doesn't show that such physical processes are one and the same thing as qualia, or that one logically entails the other.

"A" is correlated with "B". How does this demonstrate "A" is "B" or is logically entailed by "B"? If "B" is reducible to "A" we need some reasons to suppose this! Especially if "A" and "B" seem quite characteristically unlike each other.

[jasonmccoy]

Author,researcher and neurologist, R.S. Ramachandran does what I think is a very good job of defining qualiais his book Phantoms in the Brain. Here, Ramachandran argues "three laws of qualia" which follow coincidentally an empirical framework and not a philisophical or theological. He argues that languageis ultimately to blame for this seeming divide between mind and matter- between the activity (neurochemically and neuroelectrically speaking)
of sensing an object that reflects a 650 nanometer wavelenght and our subjective, third person perception (qualia) of "red." In an effort to solve this conundrum, Ramachandram suggests skipping spoken lanuage as a medium of communication. He writes:
"what if we hook a cable of neural pathways (taken from tissue culture or from another person) fromthe color-processing areas in my brain directly into the color-processing regions of your brain (remember that your brain has the machinery to see color even though your eyes cannot discriminate wavelengths because you do not have color receptors-hypothetically). The cable allows the color information to go straight from my brainto neruons in yourbrain without intermediate translation. This is a farfetched scenario, but there is nothing logically impossible about it.
The following is less of a thought experiment and more of an actual activity slated for investigation:
In the seventeenth centurey the English astronomer William Molyneux poseda challenge. What would happen, he asked, if a child were raised incomplete darkness frombirth to age 21 and werethen suddenly allowed to see a cube? Would he recognize the cube? Indee, what would happen if the child werre suddenly allowed to see ordinary daylight? Would he experience the light, saying, "Aha! I now see what people mean by light!" or would he act utterly bewildered and continue to be blind? According to Ramachandran, the question can be answered scientifically. He writes: Some unfortunate individuals are born with such serious damage to their eyes...they have never seen the world...It is now possible to stimulate small parts of their brains directly with a device called a TRANSCRANIAL MAGNETIC STIMULATOR. What if one were to stimulate the visual cortex of such a person with powerful magnetic pulses, thereby bypassing the nonfunctional optics ofthe eye? I can imagine twopossible outcomes. Hey might say "I feel something funny zapping the back of my head... or Oh, my God, this is extraordinary! I now understand what all of you are talking about...that is red!"

[Dancing David]

Thats a great post but it still does not show how qualia can exist without a brain, in fact it supports it by saying that you can stimulate the brain into producing qualia.

Also a child deprived of visual stimulation is going to have atrophy in the visual areas, that is why im The Mary and the Balck and White room scenario, you have to axiom that her brain does not atrophy.

It will take time for you tp process red, I am not sure if a person blind from birth would see color due to brain stimulation.

[Yahzi]

Dancing David
I am not sure if a person blind from birth would see color due to brain stimulation
Scientific American last month ran an article on synthesia (the disorder of mixed senses, not our favorite poster). They talked about man who is color-blind (has no cones, cannot see red) but still experiences red when he looks at certain numbers.

[Dancing David]

I have heard about synesthesia nad numbers but why is it the color red, is he color blid to the red/green or the blue/yellow?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by jasonmccoy
In the seventeenth centurey the English astronomer William Molyneux poseda challenge. What would happen, he asked, if a child were raised incomplete darkness frombirth to age 21 and werethen suddenly allowed to see a cube? Would he recognize the cube

It was a cube and a sphere that Molyneux was talking about. If a person was blind from birth he would recognise the sphere and cube by touch. The question was if he suddenly could get to see for the very first time ever, whether he would be able to distinguish the cube and sphere purely from the physical appearance alone. People like Berkeley and Locke said no. I think Liebnitz said yes (but don't quote me!). I, in common with Berkeley and Locke, would say no. I am in agreement with Berkeley that our tactile and visual qualia are heterogenous. Mind you I don't know if this issue has been settled in modern times.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

My reply to David's original question was in the guise of a mental monist (or whatever the right term is). No one has remarked on that fact. Is that interesting?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
My reply to David's original question was in the guise of a mental monist (or whatever the right term is). No one has remarked on that fact. Is that interesting?

~~ Paul

Nah, no-one could tell! :D

[Max560]

A Meme ate my qualia

[aggle_rithm]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


In order for materialism to be true, then we're committed to holding that once we have certain physical processes, the qualia are logically necessitated, rather than merely naturally necessitated, as in say epiphenomenalism.



Maybe you're looking at this backwards. Rather than say that certain physical processes entail qualia, you could say that qualia exist because of certain physical processes. The question is whether there are any other physical processes that could produce qualia.

Of course, many people believe there are supernatural processes that could generate qualia (such as self-generating, free-floating qualia), but this is pure speculation and doesn't lend itself to a rational discussion.

[Dancing David]

Wrong thread Ian , this is the thread for the immaterialist to show how qualia could be free floating.

The whole logic thing is specious anyhow, gravity doesn't make any logical sense either. I still am attracted to other masses.

So far.... no qualia... breep,breep,breep

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Dancing David

So far.... no qualia... breep,breep,breep

Think of it this way: I cannot show you a qualia, nor can you show me a qualia of yours.

We agree what the spectrum "looks like" in that red is red, green is green, yet for all either of us will ever know is that a "grey scale" to me may be what you see as the spectrum. See the problem?

Furthermore, as I understand qualia, it is definitely -- for humans -- based on physical brain function. I certainly don't suggest qualia in human guise exist outside an *I=thought*/*me=perceived as physical* unit.

[Jethro]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
[/i]

It was a cube and a sphere that Molyneux was talking about. If a person was blind from birth he would recognise the sphere and cube by touch. The question was if he suddenly could get to see for the very first time ever, whether he would be able to distinguish the cube and sphere purely from the physical appearance alone. People like Berkeley and Locke said no. I think Liebnitz said yes (but don't quote me!). I, in common with Berkeley and Locke, would say no. I am in agreement with Berkeley that our tactile and visual qualia are heterogenous. Mind you I don't know if this issue has been settled in modern times. Why not do it the other way. Show someone a few unusual and distinct shapes, then blindfold them and ask them to properly identify them. It would be difficult, but the person would probably be able to do it.

Also, interesting aside: blind people use their visual cortexes while reading braile. Google it up for references.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Jethro
It was a cube and a sphere that Molyneux was talking about. If a person was blind from birth he would recognise the sphere and cube by touch. The question was if he suddenly could get to see for the very first time ever, whether he would be able to distinguish the cube and sphere purely from the physical appearance alone. People like Berkeley and Locke said no. I think Liebnitz said yes (but don't quote me!). I, in common with Berkeley and Locke, would say no. I am in agreement with Berkeley that our tactile and visual qualia are heterogenous. Mind you I don't know if this issue has been settled in modern times.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Why not do it the other way. Show someone a few unusual and distinct shapes, then blindfold them and ask them to properly identify them. It would be difficult, but the person would probably be able to do it.

Also, interesting aside: blind people use their visual cortexes while reading braile. Google it up for references.


Yes you could do it the other way. But it wouldn't demonstrate anything whatsoever :rolleyes:

[Jethro]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Yes you could do it the other way. But it wouldn't demonstrate anything whatsoever :rolleyes: Why not?

[Dancing David]

Doing it the other way does not support the Knowledge Argument,..
The answer is NO the blind persom would not recognise the shapes because his/her brain still has to learn how to see, give them at least six weeks to learn and they might. Outside of the atrophy of the visual system.

[Dancing David]

Still waiting.

[synaesthesia]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Still waiting.

David,

The question was posed as an empirical one, but, as you realize, it is a conceptual one. In point of fact, to be able to show, see, talk about, act upon the knowlege of qualia would be to contradict the meaning of qualia.

Intrinsic, ineffable and infallible qualia are just that; Nothing about them can be discerned as a relationship to the world, nothing extentionally referring to them can be said.

The fact that qualia constitute a wittgenstinian private language implies not only, as hammegk points out, that YOU cannot show ME qualia, but that various agencies in your cognition cannot show them to eachother.

In other words, not only can I not show you my own qualia, I can't even show them to myself!:eek:

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Since the other thread is about showing the neural correlates of qualia, and I don't want to spam.

Show me qualia with out a brain, show me qualia with out the physical process that support the brain. Show me how there are just qualia and no external reality. Can you will you, I am open minded, jsut show me.

Peace

A slightly ill-posed question I think. The mental monist viewpoint, as paraphrased by Paul, is to supposed that the physical realm is a fiction, a construct, and not real. So when you ask to be "shown" qualia without the physical brain, you must first realise that a mental monist views the brain, or any other physical concept for that matter, as only being manifest in reality as qualia. So your question really must be - how do you show the physical world to be a fiction ?

There is one article I found interesting which tries to do this:

http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~ursa/philos/ty99.htm#mind

[Dancing David]

No the question is not ill posed, I understand the idea that qualia are the perception in ultimate. however How does this refure physical reality. You can't have qualia without reality. But there seems to be this idea out there that there can be qualia without physical reality.

Show me the qualia that is divorced from physical reality.

Where is red without the photon to be percieved?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Dancing David

Show me the qualia that is divorced from physical reality.

Where is red without the photon to be percieved?

I can "see" (well,visualize) red with my eyes closed. How about you?

That's only a remembered response you say? Consider that for a bit. What is being remembered if not a qualia? Or what is the concept "red" if not a qualia?

Do all living entities have qualia, or is it confined to homo sap?

Hard to discuss, let alone demonstate, the undefinable; sorry.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I cannot see red in my mind. Are you really sure you're actually seeing red?

I agree that we can call that a quale, for lack of another term, but I don't understand why it has to be anything other than your memory triggering the red portion of your visual rainbow, just as would happen if you looked at something red.

~~ Paul

[Tricky]

Originally posted by hammegk


I can "see" (well,visualize) red with my eyes closed. How about you?

That's only a remembered response you say? Consider that for a bit. What is being remembered if not a qualia? Or what is the concept "red" if not a qualia?

Do all living entities have qualia, or is it confined to homo sap?

Hard to discuss, let alone demonstate, the undefinable; sorry.
And I can visualize words with my eyes closed. I can remember tastes and smells and a whole range of senses I have sensed before, but I can never visualize a color, smell or taste I have not seen, smelled or tasted before. What you are calling "qualia" are simple memories. There is an enormous amount of evidence that memories have a physical basis.

Would it be possible to excise very specific parts of your brain such that you could not remember "red"? Certainly not with current technology, but I do not find the concept impossible.

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Tricky

And I can visualize words with my eyes closed. I can remember tastes and smells and a whole range of senses I have sensed before, but I can never visualize a color, smell or taste I have not seen, smelled or tasted before. What you are calling "qualia" are simple memories. There is an enormous amount of evidence that memories have a physical basis.

Would it be possible to excise very specific parts of your brain such that you could not remember "red"? Certainly not with current technology, but I do not find the concept impossible.

Well said, Tricky...if I could make one change, I would suggest a small but significant change in language. You say these are memories; indeed, that is how we talk about the process. But it is actually a behavior--the behavior of remembering, rather than seeing a memory. I know it seems silly, but when, in our language, we make nouns out of processes (ironic that "processes" is a noun), we give them an "existence" that they do not actually have. Certainly we do see, we smell, we hear, both in the presence of extenal stimuli and later, in their absence, we re-see, re-smell, re-hear them.

When we speak of seeing "sights" (as opposed to simply "seeing") or "having memories" (as opposed to simply "remembering"), we give metaphorical substance to the insubstantial. It should not be confusing, but it obviously is; we have people on this forum claiming that "consciousness" (another noun I have problems with) is self-evident. It is not; it is an inferred phenomenon that we build from seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking. These are things we do, not mental manipulation of mental objects.

sheesh...reading this, it looks like I disagree with what you wrote--I absolutely do not. You said what I wanted to, but you got there first.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dancing David
No the question is not ill posed, I understand the idea that qualia are the perception in ultimate. however How does this refure physical reality. You can't have qualia without reality. But there seems to be this idea out there that there can be qualia without physical reality.

Show me the qualia that is divorced from physical reality.

Where is red without the photon to be percieved?


Still ill-posed. The photon is still there. Its just that the photon is not part of a physical "outer" world. Its part of the mental realm. This is why we don't have to throw away all our scientific knowledge just because we revert to mental monism. We just have to change the meaning of what we are refering to when we talk about physical descriptions. The physical descriptions still hold as predictors for future observations.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Tricky

And I can visualize words with my eyes closed. I can remember tastes and smells and a whole range of senses I have sensed before, but I can never visualize a color, smell or taste I have not seen, smelled or tasted before.


You must have done the first time you experienced them.


What you are calling "qualia" are simple memories. There is an enormous amount of evidence that memories have a physical basis.

This thread has nothing to do with memory ! I really don't get the relevance of memory here.

We must have had the experience of redness for the first time. Here, there is no memory for redness. Lets take the argument from here !

[davidsmith73]

has anyone read my link ?

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

Still ill-posed. The photon is still there. Its just that the photon is not part of a physical "outer" world. Its part of the mental realm. This is why we don't have to throw away all our scientific knowledge just because we revert to mental monism. We just have to change the meaning of what we are refering to when we talk about physical descriptions. The physical descriptions still hold as predictors for future observations.

Erk, what? You lost me there. the photon existed before it ineracted with the recpetors in the eye. In current theories, if that is a photon of reflected sunlight it may have existed for quite a while in the sun before it zoomed across space to reflect off the object and then enter my eye. When I look at the Andromeda galaxy I am seeing photons that have existed for a very long time prior to my interaction with them.

When they interact with my eye then they become part of the mental realm.

Point one: Qualia re learned at some level, a baby does not experience red the first time they are exposed to it, the neural pathways and the visual cortex have to developp in response to exposure to the stimuli. No stimuli, no pathways, and a child who will not percieve color.

Point two: I will try to read the stuff about Berkley, I think I understand the basic premise , that we limited to the sensation our brain percieves. However we do not percieve reality in a raw sense. Perception are a product of learning and development. If a child is never exposed to the color red or orange or purple, or any color that will stimulate the red percieving receptors. They will not percieve red when exposed to it.

Point three: visualization is an interesting case. I can visualize many things that I have never seen, such as hobbits in the Lord of the Rings. But that is because I have something to reference the words to when I read the book.


It is still not an ill posed question: your response seems to assume that I already understand mental monism. I am asking you to bridge the gap and show me where the qualia are.

Your response does not explain where qualia are, it just makes reference to the article on Berkley. That is not even trying to explain qualia as the free floating 'thing'.

I did not post this thread to try to disprove any thing or fight with people, just to try to understand where the monism camp comes from. To quote my mother ' If you can't explain something then you don't really understand it' , I would like to understand your point of view.

So where are the qualia? Where is the perception of the photon without the photon. they are learned and developed responses to stimuli.

Peace

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Since the other thread is about showing the neural correlates of qualia, and I don't want to spam.

Show me qualia with out a brain, show me qualia with out the physical process that support the brain. Show me how there are just qualia and no external reality. Can you will you, I am open minded, jsut show me.

Peace

Heck, I'm open minded too. Can you show me "external reality" without qualia?

You prefer to choose "objective reality", which leads to various problems including HPC, free will, any reason for life itself, etcetc.

A mental monist at least can accept there may be underlying design rather than randomness. (My world doesn't seem random to me.) And who/what is *I*, the selector of some parts of the *me* stream-of-consciousness?

Originally posted by Tricky
There is an enormous amount of evidence that memories have a physical basis.
Of course, once you accept your worldview is completely formed by "external reality". And how did your *I* arrive at that conclusion, other than by accepting what you wish to demonstrate as an axiom?

[Tricky]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
You must have done the first time you experienced them.
That is just "sensing". The first time you sense something, you write it to your memory. When you "recall redness", you are simply accessing that memory, but you cannot recall redness until you have first sensed it.

Originally posted by davidsmith73
This thread has nothing to do with memory ! I really don't get the relevance of memory here.
Because what you call "qualia" are actually just another word for "memories'.

Originally posted by davidsmith73
We must have had the experience of redness for the first time. Here, there is no memory for redness. Lets take the argument from here !
And that is exactly what I am saying. The "qualia" for redness did not exist until you experienced it for the first time. A person totally blind from birth has no "qualia" for redness, just as you have no qualia for the sound of a bat's sonar.

Here's a little experiment. Try to describe redness without comparing it to something else. You might try giving the wavelength, but that would mean nothing to a person who had not seen a graphic representation of wavelength vs. color. Or try to describe redness to a blind person. Since they have none of the memories you have, it will be impossible.

Originally posted by hammegk

Of course, once you accept your worldview is completely formed by "external reality". And how did your *I* arrive at that conclusion, other than by accepting what you wish to demonstrate as an axiom?
Empirically. The fact that I have never observed anything other than "external reality" makes me question the existence of anything else. Perhaps it exists, but since there is no evidence for it, I decline to philosophize about what it "might be like".

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by hammegk


Heck, I'm open minded too. Can you show me "external reality" without qualia?

You prefer to choose "objective reality", which leads to various problems including HPC, free will, any reason for life itself, etcetc.

A mental monist at least can accept there may be underlying design rather than randomness. (My world doesn't seem random to me.) And who/what is *I*, the selector of some parts of the *me* stream-of-consciousness?


Of course, once you accept your worldview is completely formed by "external reality". And how did your *I* arrive at that conclusion, other than by accepting what you wish to demonstrate as an axiom?

Hammegk,

I think I understand that qualia are the ultimate perception, ie the experince of the red square as a red sequare. This is something that I feel is presented by our visual cortex to the frontal cortex.

How can there be the qualia without the external stimuli. it seems to me that the two are linked.

And in this thread the assumption is that external reality exists. the goal is to come to a mutual language that we can understand.

peace

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dancing David


Erk, what? You lost me there. the photon existed before it ineracted with the recpetors in the eye. In current theories, if that is a photon of reflected sunlight it may have existed for quite a while in the sun before it zoomed across space to reflect off the object and then enter my eye. When I look at the Andromeda galaxy I am seeing photons that have existed for a very long time prior to my interaction with them.

When they interact with my eye then they become part of the mental realm.



You are talking about mathematical descriptions of our experiences the latter of which are manifest in the realm of consciousness i.e, qualia. In the mental monist view, the concept of physical reality lies within the realm of the mental. It is a fictional contruction. Yes, the photon can be described as travelling across this conceptual framework we call space/time and interact with your "physical body" but all these "things" cannot be regarded as having a separate ontological existence from the qualia they have been contructed from.


Point one: Qualia are learned at some level, a baby does not experience red the first time they are exposed to it,


Since we cannot "see" inside someone elses hypothetical consious experience, this is untestable.


the neural pathways and the visual cortex have to developp in response to exposure to the stimuli. No stimuli, no pathways, and a child who will not percieve color.


To generalise your point: our nervous systems develop from a single cell and at some point there will develop the appropriate neural circuitry that hypothetically generates certain qualia.

This is merely a re-statement of the title of the other thread: Physical neural processes are equivalent to qualia. If you can explain to me how this is so I'll be impressed.


Point two: I will try to read the stuff about Berkley, I think I understand the basic premise , that we are limited to the sensation our brain percieves.


Erm, I don't think so. His basic premise is that the concept of a physical ontology is a fiction.


However we do not percieve reality in a raw sense. Perception are a product of learning and development. If a child is never exposed to the color red or orange or purple, or any color that will stimulate the red percieving receptors. They will not percieve red when exposed to it.



The point of the link I gave was to show that physical concepts such as your photons, receptors and neural processes existing as a separate ontology from the experience we have of them is a fiction. Physical reality is not there to be percieved, it is constructed from the ultimate reality which is the mental realm.


Point three: visualization is an interesting case. I can visualize many things that I have never seen, such as hobbits in the Lord of the Rings. But that is because I have something to reference the words to when I read the book.


I don't see the relevance of this at all.



It is still not an ill posed question: your response seems to assume that I already understand mental monism. I am asking you to bridge the gap and show me where the qualia are.


What do mean by "show me where the qualia are" ? Do you want me to point to one ;)


Your response does not explain where qualia are, it just makes reference to the article on Berkley. That is not even trying to explain qualia as the free floating 'thing'.


Free floating thing !? What do you mean ? How would you respond if I asked you to explain what matter is ?


So where are the qualia? Where is the perception of the photon without the photon. they are learned and developed responses to stimuli.


Ok, well they don't have time and space dimensions because these are concepts derived from the notion of physical reality. Does that help ?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Tricky

That is just "sensing".


Thats what the materialist is talking about when they refer to the "neural correlate of consciousness" ie. conscious perception
That is what the debate is all about isn't it ?


The first time you sense something, you write it to your memory. When you "recall redness", you are simply accessing that memory, but you cannot recall redness until you have first sensed it.


From a materialistic perspective, the first time you sense (are conscious of) something, a particular physical neural process somehow generates qualia. We are talking about a physical process generating or being equivalent to qualia. Recalling the qualities of redness at a later date to me is irrelavent to the original perception with regards to this debate.



And that is exactly what I am saying. The "qualia" for redness did not exist until you experienced it for the first time. A person totally blind from birth has no "qualia" for redness, just as you have no qualia for the sound of a bat's sonar.



According to the materialistic view of course. And this is why I started the other thread, to try to get someone to explain how this can be so. How can such a intuitively different thing - redness - be generated from a "physical process".


Here's a little experiment. Try to describe redness without comparing it to something else. You might try giving the wavelength, but that would mean nothing to a person who had not seen a graphic representation of wavelength vs. color. Or try to describe redness to a blind person. Since they have none of the memories you have, it will be impossible.

You can't describe redness without comparing it to something else to anyone ! The only way to find out if someone has experienced it is to do the comparison. Also remember that according to mental monism, a blind person does not exist as physically separate from your experiences. I'm not sure what the implications of that are in light of what you have said. Let me think it over !

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dancing David


How can there be the qualia without the external stimuli.


By realising that the external stimuli are themselves qualia.

[Dancing David]

I'm sorry Mr david smith 73 but I just have to beg to disagree with you.

You make these bold assertitions that physical reality is a fiction. Then why do we need bodies? I think I understand the argument that our understanding of reality is nessecarily filtered/generated/constrained by the the nature of our perception.

But it is not incumbent on me to explain your point of view, you make the bold assertions and then don't follow them up.

1. How can it be that the 'physical realm' is a subset of the mental?

I willing to try to understand but it upon you to explain your notions, and I am begining to feel that your beliefs are just that. You seem to act as though you haven't tried to understand the biological explanation of perception. It seems to me that you make some assertion and sweep it under the rug. Just stating that something isn't so doesn't really explain your point of view.(My perception of course not nessecarily your intent)

I think that you understand the premise that you are presenting. Do you understand it well enough to explain it?

We may have to agree to disagree.

peace

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by davidsmith73


By realising that the external stimuli are themselves qualia.

Wow thats a bold perception, so is an unpercieved photon what? Our receptors interact with the receptors and then transmit it to our brains , our brains then process it, making what I think you call qualia. So are you saying that the photon interacting with the cone in my eye is the qualia?


Peace

[Tricky]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Thats what the materialist is talking about when they refer to the "neural correlate of consciousness" ie. conscious perception
That is what the debate is all about isn't it ?
I thought it was about the question of whether qualia exist as something apart from the physical universe.

Originally posted by davidsmith73
From a materialistic perspective, the first time you sense (are conscious of) something, a particular physical neural process somehow generates qualia. We are talking about a physical process generating or being equivalent to qualia. Recalling the qualities of redness at a later date to me is irrelavent to the original perception with regards to this debate.
The first time, and any time, you perceive redness, you are sensing it. If you recall it later, you are reading memories. I don't see in what way qualia, as you are describing them, are any different from sense and memory. Why do we need this extra word?

Originally posted by davidsmith73
According to the materialistic view of course. And this is why I started the other thread, to try to get someone to explain how this can be so. How can such a intuitively different thing - redness - be generated from a "physical process".
I'm guessing that it is because your intuition is lying to you. You may think that redness is different from the physical processes that produce (and remember) it, but it isn't really. Intuition is an unreliable source for information. ;)

Originally posted by davidsmith73
You can't describe redness without comparing it to something else to anyone ! The only way to find out if someone has experienced it is to do the comparison
And that indicates to me that "old redness" (meaning "not currently being sensed") is a product of memory. That's why shades of red are often named things like fire engine red or blood red because it is the memory of what these things look like that make sense to you.

Originally posted by davidsmith73
Also remember that according to mental monism, a blind person does not exist as physically separate from your experiences.
I'm not sure I quite understand you. If you are saying "red doesn't exist to a blind person", I'd agree. All of your senses and memories are personal. In fact, my wife and I argue all the time over what certain shades of things are. Do we perceive them differently, or do we simply define them differently, based on what we individually learned that "charcoal gray" meant?
I think the latter.
Originally posted by davidsmith73
I'm not sure what the implications of that are in light of what you have said. Let me think it over !
I'll think about what you said too.