New guidelines for the treatment of detainees

[Pardalis]

It's better late than never.

http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/09/06/detainee.policy.ap/index.html

[Kopji]

The announcement from Bush is the first time the administration has acknowledged the existence of CIA prisons, which had been reported in the media and the subject of friction between Washington and some allies in Europe. The administration has come under criticism for its treatment of terrorism detainees.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14689359/

"Masters of understatement".
I guess that We the Stupid People derserve this kind of 'official admission' that our government has been maintaining secret prisons all along.

Oh, the President is on TV again...

[BPSCG]

Note that despite the Supreme Court's Hamdi decision inviting it, Congress still hasn't passed any new legislation regarding the treatment of enemy combatants.

So the administration has to come up with new guidelines on its own, which, I'm sure, all its congressional opponents will be quick to criticize.

[Cylinder]

Note that despite the Supreme Court's Hamdi decision inviting it, Congress still hasn't passed any new legislation regarding the treatment of enemy combatants.

It was actually Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-184.ZO.html). The Hamdi opinion (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-6696.ZO.html) declared the executive power to detain US citizens declared to be enemy combatants "is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the President to use." It's an easy mistake to make.

[WildCat]

"Masters of understatement".
I guess that We the Stupid People derserve this kind of 'official admission' that our government has been maintaining secret prisons all along.

Oh, the President is on TV again...
Do you think everything the CIA does should be public record? Might as well disband it then.

[TragicMonkey]

Will that counter this?

The US War Crimes Act of 1996 makes it a felony to commit grave violations of the Geneva Conventions. The Washington Post recently reported that the Bush administration is quietly circulating draft legislation to eliminate crucial parts of the War Crimes Act. Observers on The Hill say the Administration plans to slip it through Congress this fall while there still is a guaranteed Republican majority--perhaps as part of the military appropriations bill, the proposals for Guantánamo tribunals or a new catch-all "anti-terrorism" package.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/thenation/20060905/cm_thenation/20060918brecher_1

[Kopji]

Do you think everything the CIA does should be public record? Might as well disband it then.
I don't think that such an extremist view of government transparency is warranted at this time. That's a tentative guess though; how could I ever conclusively decide that we are not secretly doing something so repulsive, disbanding the CIA would not seem like a good idea in comparison?

That's the problem with not running government transparently.
I should have faith and trust in them, LOL.

Seriously, we have a right to know a lot more. A system of secret prisons and prisoners around the world falls into something I think Americans had a right to know about. It does bother me that many of us seem to desire ignorance, that seems like a historical failure we've tried before.

[Kopji]

Oh, that last paragraph did not come out very well. How about...

...a worldwide system of prisons where prisoners were treated in a manner that many civilized people would find violates commonly held ethical and moral values.

[drkitten]

Do you think everything the CIA does should be public record? Might as well disband it then.

I think there are certain acts that the CIA should not take -- acts, for example, that as agents of the US government they are prohibited by law from taking would fall into that camp.

I believe that as much of the CIA's activities as necessary to confirm that the CIA are not taking those acts should be public record. It's not necessary for the public to know that the CIA safehouse is located at 1313 Mockingbird Lane. It is, however, necessary for the public to know that people aren't being tortured inside whatever house the CIA safehouse happens to be.

[Pardalis]

I think this is all encouraging that the US government is opening up a little and taking steps to undo some of its mistakes.

[WildCat]

It is, however, necessary for the public to know that people aren't being tortured inside whatever house the CIA safehouse happens to be.
And by what mechanism will the public know this?

[WildCat]

Oh, that last paragraph did not come out very well. How about...

...a worldwide system of prisons where prisoners were treated in a manner that many civilized people would find violates commonly held ethical and moral values.
It's well known that Khalid Sheik Mohammed has been in US custody for several years, but exactly where he's been is classified. Same w/ Saddam - nobody knows where he's been held at. And there are good reasons for this, for example if a high-ranking enemy is captured it is to our advantage to keep it secret. See who's calling him on his satellite phone, who's sending him emails and what is in them. If it is known he's in custody you don't get that intelligence.

[WildCat]

Will that counter this?



http://news.yahoo.com/s/thenation/20060905/cm_thenation/20060918brecher_1
The Geneva Conventions do not prohibit taking prisoners of war, nor trying them for recognized war crimes.

[Azure]

I think this is all encouraging that the US government is opening up a little and taking steps to undo some of its mistakes.

Of course. The 2008 election is approaching. :D

[Azure]

The Geneva Conventions do not prohibit taking prisoners of war, nor trying them for recognized war crimes.

Although the detainiees held under the Patriot Act wouldn't be considered POW.

(I think its the Patriot Act) :blush:

One must abide by the Geneva Conventions to be protected by it as well.

[BPSCG]

It was actually Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-184.ZO.html). The Hamdi opinion (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-6696.ZO.html) declared the executive power to detain US citizens declared to be enemy combatants "is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the President to use." It's an easy mistake to make.Oh, bugger the goddam towelheads. Why can't they have normal names like Ralph or Steve or PaulCAnagnastopoulousolos...

[FreeChile]

Note that despite the Supreme Court's Hamdi decision inviting it, Congress still hasn't passed any new legislation regarding the treatment of enemy combatants.

So the administration has to come up with new guidelines on its own, which, I'm sure, all its congressional opponents will be quick to criticize.
So now the President tells Congress what to do and when to do it?

I assume you are referring to the case of Hamdam, the driver. In both Hamdam and Hamdi, the Supreme Court did not rule against Congress, it found the President to be a criminal, in violation of the law.

Congress works according to its own schedule, not the President's.

[BPSCG]

So now the President tells Congress what to do and when to do it?Go back to 7th grade and pay attention to the "How a bill becomes a law..." part this time. Presidents ask Congress for legislation. Please tell me you didn't need that explained to you.

I assume you are referring to the case of Hamdam, the driver.No, I'm referring to the case of Hamdan. (Hey, if I'm gonna get nicked on confusing names, so is everyone else...)

Then explain what you think the following (http://www.irnnews.com/commentaries/m_brannan/070306.asp) means, paying particular attention to the section I highlighted:
The essence of this latest ruling is that President Bush’s military commission for dealing with enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, as constituted, is not consistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice; therefore, if the administration wishes to pursue military commission trials, the procedures to be followed by those bodies will have to be revised in order to conform to the procedures applicable in ordinary courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

Because the Court based its ruling on language that Congress included in UCMJ Article 36(b) (i.e., rules and regulations made for both military commissions and courts-martial must be “uniform insofar as practicable”), there would be a requirement for additional legislation by Congress. The Court virtually invited that option. Justice Kennedy noted, “Because Congress has prescribed these limits, Congress can change them.” Justice Breyer noted also, “nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”
In both Hamdam and Hamdi, the Supreme Court did not rule against Congress, it found the President to be a criminal, in violation of the law.Please cite the relevant portion of the Court's decision that said the President was a criminal.
Congress works according to its own schedule, not the President's.So anti-terrorism legislation isn't near the top of the list, then...

[Crossbow]

And by what mechanism will the public know this?

Uhem!

There are US Congressional committees that are supposed to review various classified programs and operations. This process (or mechanism), is used to provide the necessary public oversight of these secret programs.

[Charlie Monoxide]

I think this is all encouraging that the US government is opening up a little and taking steps to undo some of its mistakes.Especially after the Supreme Court forces them.

I am concerned at the vast amount of untruths and deceptions that have yet to come to light.

We should all thank the current adminstration for "opening up a little and taking steps to undo some of its mistakes".

Charlie (they really are a great bunch of guys) Monoxide

[Pardalis]

Well, it's still better than nothing. So much for that "police state". :rolleyes:

[drkitten]

There are US Congressional committees that are supposed to review various classified programs and operations. This process (or mechanism), is used to provide the necessary public oversight of these secret programs.

And in the event that Congress fails in its responsibility (or the Executive branch fails in its responsibility to report), then the Judiciary has the authority to force their hands, as in the Hamdan case.

[FreeChile]

Go back to 7th grade and pay attention to the "How a bill becomes a law..." part this time. Presidents ask Congress for legislation. Please tell me you didn't need that explained to you.
Is asking the same as telling? I did say tell, didn’t I?

Also, part of the issue with your comments is that the Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld case is strictly about the legality of the military commissions and not about new guidelines for the treatment of all detainees. We should not get the two things confused. So even if the court indeed invited Congress to legislate, they would be legislating on the commissions and not on the overall treatment of detainees, which is what the new documents are about. The court decision also says that the Geneva convention applies.

No, I'm referring to the case of Hamdan. (Hey, if I'm gonna get nicked on confusing names, so is everyone else...)
That was meant to state my assumption. Knowing that it was an assumption on my part, and not knowing what you really meant by Hamdi. I wanted to be clear and it appears my assumption was correct. You did mean Hamdan.

Then explain what you think the following (http://www.irnnews.com/commentaries/m_brannan/070306.asp) means, paying particular attention to the section I highlighted:
Why should I focus on your selective quote? The article begins by calling names, just like you did on your post. The article also ignores the decision of the court and focuses on an invented concept: invited. Nothing in the decision says the court is inviting Congress to do anything. An invitation is not a decision or a ruling.

Please cite the relevant portion of the Court's decision that said the President was a criminal.
Firstly, refer back to what I meant by criminal, in violation of the law. If you prefer, here’s the dictionary definition.
crime 1 : an act or the commission of an act that is forbidden or the omission of a duty that is commanded by a public law and that makes the offender liable to punishment by that law; especially : a gross violation of law

Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary
Since your link mischaracterizes Kennedy’s decision, here it is directly from the horse’s mouth and not from a biased secondary source. Nothing needs to be invented from it.

Kennedy’s Concurrence: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-184.ZC1.html

Against this background, the Court is correct to conclude that the military commission the President has convened to try Hamdan is unauthorized. Ante, at 62, 69–70, 72. The following analysis, which expands on the Court’s discussion, explains my reasons for reaching this conclusion.
…
In sum, as presently structured, Hamdan’s military commission exceeds the bounds Congress has placed on the President’s authority in §§836 and 821 of the UCMJ. Because Congress has prescribed these limits, Congress can change them, requiring a new analysis consistent with the Constitution and other governing laws. At this time, however, we must apply the standards Congress has provided. By those standards the military commission is deficient.

So anti-terrorism legislation isn't near the top of the list, then...
Who says it should be? Why should it be? Who decides that? Is it more important than, say healthcare or the Embargo on Cuba?

[Cylinder]

Also, part of the issue with your comments is that the Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld case is strictly about the legality of the military commissions and not about new guidelines for the treatment of all detainees. We should not get the two things confused. So even if the court indeed invited Congress to legislate, they would be legislating on the commissions and not on the overall treatment of detainees, which is what the new documents are about. The court decision also says that the Geneva convention applies.

Not true. While Hamdan's attorneys argued the narrow point that Common Article 3 forbids executive military tribunals, that fact has no real bearing on the scope of the opinion. In finding that Common Article 3 applies to the US war against al Qaeda and the Taliban, the court placed very real restrictions on detainee treatment- since that article proscribes not only certain judicial proceedings but manners of treatment.

First, the finding of the court (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-184.ZO.html) (see iii):

Common Article 3, then, is applicable here and, as indicated above, requires that Hamdan be tried by a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”

Common Article 3 (http://www.globalissuesgroup.com/geneva/convention3.html):

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

As you can plainly see, that lion's share of Article 3 deals with non-judicial treatment of a class of persons which include combatant detainees. In fact, the Hamdan opinion prompted DOD to issue a memorandum titled Application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense (http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/genevaconsmemo.pdf).

The Supreme Court has determined that Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies as a matter of law to the conflict with Al Qaeda. The Court found that the military commissions as constituted by the Department of Defense are not consistent with Common Article 3.

The memo does assert that existing DOD treatment policies already conform to Common Article 3 to the Conventions but, without very specific definitions by Congress, terms like "degrading," "humiliating," and "cruel treatment" will be left up to lower federal courts to decide.

Is it degrading that one be allowed to shower only once per week?

Is it humiliating to be subject to a nice cavity search at your local detainee reception center?

Is it cruel treatment to be interrogated for 12 hours in a single day? 8 hours? 6 hours?

Is it an "adverse distinction" to disallow jihadis to plot attacks against allied interests as dictated by hadith?

These are now questions for Congress to place into the United States Code rather than ad hoc definition by DOD and à la carte challenge in US federal court.

[BPSCG]

These are now questions for Congress to place into the United States Code rather than ad hoc definition by DOD and à la carte challenge in US federal court.Oh, hell, that's not so important. Do you really think it's "more important than, say healthcare or the Embargo on Cuba?"

Is it really more important than prohibiting the export of horses for Europeans' dining pleasure?

[BPSCG]

It is, however, necessary for the public to know that people aren't being tortured inside whatever house the CIA safehouse happens to be.Well, now you're touching on an interesting point.

Bush outlined yesterday, in considerable detail, how the CIA secret prisons produced a lot of valuable information (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601425.html).

But we all "know" that torture doesn't yield useful information, because a guy will confess to anything when he's being tortured.

Seems we might have to rethink that. Or conclude that nobody was being tortured in the CIA "black houses."

Or that maybe that people will give up useful information, under torture, if they have it.

[drkitten]

Bush outlined yesterday, in considerable detail, how the CIA secret prisons produced a lot of valuable information (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601425.html).

I have no reason to believe that this statement of his is any more accurate than a number of other statement's he's made about this conflict, such as the existence of WMD, the links between Al-Qaeda and Iraq, the attempt to buy "yellowcake," and so forth.



But we all "know" that torture doesn't yield useful information, because a guy will confess to anything when he's being tortured.

Seems we might have to rethink that. Or conclude that nobody was being tortured in the CIA "black houses."

Or that maybe that people will give up useful information, under torture, if they have it.

Or, alternatively, we might simply believe that Bush misspoke. Again.

After all, if he had instead "outlined, in considerable detail," how unemployment and low industrial productivity is caused by pixies, I wouldn't feel compelled to re-think my view of the Fair Folk..

[JamesDillon]

Bush outlined yesterday, in considerable detail, how the CIA secret prisons produced a lot of valuable information (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601425.html).

But we all "know" that torture doesn't yield useful information, because a guy will confess to anything when he's being tortured.

This "considerable detail"?
BUSH: Within months of September 11, 2001, we captured a man named Abu Zubaydah. We believed that Zubaydah was a senior terrorist leader and a trusted associate of Osama bin Laden.

Our intelligence community believes he had run a terrorist camp in Afghanistan where some of the 9/11 hijackers trained and that he helped smuggle Al Qaida leaders out of Afghanistan after coalition forces arrived to liberate that country.

Zubaydah was severely wounded during the firefight that brought him into custody. And he survived only because of the medical care arranged by the CIA.

After he recovered, Zubaydah was defiant and evasive. He declared his hatred of America.

During questioning, he, at first, disclosed what he thought was nominal information and then stopped all cooperation.

Well, in fact, the nominal information he gave us turned out to be quite important.

Hmm... where else have we heard the name Abu Zubaydah before?
Abu Zubaydah, his captors discovered, turned out to be mentally ill and nothing like the pivotal figure they supposed him to be. CIA and FBI analysts, poring over a diary he kept for more than a decade, found entries "in the voice of three people: Hani 1, Hani 2, and Hani 3" -- a boy, a young man and a middle-aged alter ego. All three recorded in numbing detail "what people ate, or wore, or trifling things they said." Dan Coleman, then the FBI's top al-Qaeda analyst, told a senior bureau official, "This guy is insane, certifiable, split personality."

Abu Zubaydah also appeared to know nothing about terrorist operations; rather, he was al-Qaeda's go-to guy for minor logistics -- travel for wives and children and the like. That judgment was "echoed at the top of CIA and was, of course, briefed to the President and Vice President," Suskind writes. And yet somehow, in a speech delivered two weeks later, President Bush portrayed Abu Zubaydah as "one of the top operatives plotting and planning death and destruction on the United States." And over the months to come, under White House and Justice Department direction, the CIA would make him its first test subject for harsh interrogation techniques.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/19/AR2006061901211_pf.html
If this is the best Bush can offer in defense of interrogation by torture, then one wonders why he's defended the practice for so long, not to mention why Bush neglected to mention these facts about Mr. Zubaydah. Surely the president wasn't trying to mislead the nation?

Or that maybe that people will give up useful information, under torture, if they have it.
Who ever denied that? We don't not torture people because torture is ineffective, though it often is. We don't torture people because we're not monsters. Or at least we shouldn't be.

[a_unique_person]

Do you think everything the CIA does should be public record? Might as well disband it then.

Yeah, well, people were ridiculed for saying there were secret prisons and even an airline for moving the inmates around. IIRC, it was Seymour Hersh who said this system existed, and he is being trashed as well.

[BPSCG]

I have no reason to believe that this statement of his is any more accurate than a number of other statement's he's made about this conflict, such as the existence of WMD, the links between Al-Qaeda and Iraq, the attempt to buy "yellowcake," and so forth.Translation: "Nah nah nah, I can't hear you."

You understand, don't you, that this statement was not made based on second- or third- hand intelligence gathering? Or do you just think the whole statement is one long, very detailed, flat-out lie?

[a_unique_person]

Well, now you're touching on an interesting point.

Bush outlined yesterday, in considerable detail, how the CIA secret prisons produced a lot of valuable information (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601425.html).

But we all "know" that torture doesn't yield useful information, because a guy will confess to anything when he's being tortured.

Seems we might have to rethink that. Or conclude that nobody was being tortured in the CIA "black houses."

Or that maybe that people will give up useful information, under torture, if they have it.

It's funny how that article starts off with 9/11. All the information that was needed was already known by ordinary citizens before 9/11. It was just incompetence on the part of the CIA and indifference on the part of the Bush Administration that allowed it to go undetected.

[drkitten]

Or do you just think the whole statement is one long, very detailed, flat-out lie?

The "yellowcake" story was "one long, very detailed, flat-out lie."

So, yes, I do think that.

[BPSCG]

Hmm... where else have we heard the name Abu Zubaydah before?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/19/AR2006061901211_pf.html
For a water boy, he seems to have been involved in some pretty high-up shenanigans (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Zubaydah):
In the late 1990s, Abu Zubaydah played a lead role in one of the 2000 millennium attack plots, and a possible tangential role in a second. There were plans to bomb a fully booked Radisson hotel in Amman, Jordan, and three other sites. This targeted tourists from the United States and Israel. But on November 30, 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a call between Abu Zubaydah and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian militant, and determined that an attack was imminent. Jordanian police arrested 22 conspirators and foiled the attack. Abu Zubaydah was sentenced to death in absentia by a Jordanian court for his role. There is also evidence that Abu Zubaydah approved the Los Angeles airport bomb plot in 2000. This plot was also foiled.

In March of 2001, Condoleezza Rice was informed by the CIA that Zubaydah was planning a major operation in the near future. This was one of the first of many reports in the Spring of 2001 that increased the threat level and indicated that an attack was coming. Many of these reports mentioned Zubaydah by name. The attack finally came in the form of the September 11, 2001 attacks.

If this is the best Bush can offer in defense of interrogation by torture, then one wonders why he's defended the practice for so long, When did Bush defend torture? Please supply a link to your citation.
Or that maybe that people will give up useful information, under torture, if they have it.

Who ever denied that? Try Googling "torture" and "ineffective." 1,080,000 hits in 0.16 seconds.

[a_unique_person]

When did Bush defend torture? Please supply a link to your citation.


It's torture. It's just the military's equivalent of the phone book. Extreme pain, no marks.

[JamesDillon]

For a water boy, he seems to have been involved in some pretty high-up shenanigans (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Zubaydah):
No offense, but I'm going to take the word of the Washington Post and Ron Suskind over Wikipedia.

When did Bush defend torture? Please supply a link to your citation.
Right, my mistake. "Secret CIA prisons" does not equal "torture." Of course...

Try Googling "torture" and "ineffective." 1,080,000 hits in 0.16 seconds.
As I said, torture can be ineffective. But even if it weren't, we shouldn't engage in torture because we are not monsters.

Edit: I would also note that the very Wikipedia article you selectively quoted also discusses Suskind's challenges to the administration's characterization of Abu Zubaydah's role in Al Qaeda.
Sidney Blumenthal summarized the implication of Suskind's findings on the credibility of the Bush Administration on this matter:

But the decision was made to "torture a mentally disturbed man and then leap, screaming, at every word he uttered." He was "waterboarded," simulating drowning. Zubaydah babbled about terrorist threats to shopping malls, nuclear power plants, supermarkets, and about al-Qaida plans to build a nuclear device. The administration sounded alerts on every unconfirmed threat. In May 2002, New York City was put on high alert over Zubaydah's torture-incited ravings that the Brooklyn Bridge and the Statue of Liberty were targets. Cheney went on "Larry King Live" to defend the alerts: "We now have a large number of people in custody, detainees, and periodically as we go through this process we learn more about the possibility of future attacks."

[Cylinder]

This "considerable detail"?

No - this considerable detail:

Within months of September the 11th, 2001, we captured a man known as Abu Zubaydah. We believe that Zubaydah was a senior terrorist leader and a trusted associate of Osama bin Laden. Our intelligence community believes he had run a terrorist camp in Afghanistan where some of the 9/11 hijackers trained, and that he helped smuggle al Qaeda leaders out of Afghanistan after coalition forces arrived to liberate that country. Zubaydah was severely wounded during the firefight that brought him into custody -- and he survived only because of the medical care arranged by the CIA.

After he recovered, Zubaydah was defiant and evasive. He declared his hatred of America. During questioning, he at first disclosed what he thought was nominal information -- and then stopped all cooperation. Well, in fact, the "nominal" information he gave us turned out to be quite important. For example, Zubaydah disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed -- or KSM -- was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, and used the alias "Muktar." This was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM. Abu Zubaydah also provided information that helped stop a terrorist attack being planned for inside the United States -- an attack about which we had no previous information. Zubaydah told us that al Qaeda operatives were planning to launch an attack in the U.S., and provided physical descriptions of the operatives and information on their general location. Based on the information he provided, the operatives were detained -- one while traveling to the United States.

We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking. As his questioning proceeded, it became clear that he had received training on how to resist interrogation. And so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures. These procedures were designed to be safe, to comply with our laws, our Constitution, and our treaty obligations. The Department of Justice reviewed the authorized methods extensively and determined them to be lawful. I cannot describe the specific methods used -- I think you understand why -- if I did, it would help the terrorists learn how to resist questioning, and to keep information from us that we need to prevent new attacks on our country. But I can say the procedures were tough, and they were safe, and lawful, and necessary.

Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures, and soon he began to provide information on key al Qaeda operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11th. For example, Zubaydah identified one of KSM's accomplices in the 9/11 attacks -- a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh. The information Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using these procedures, and he soon provided information that helped us stop another planned attack on the United States. During questioning, KSM told us about another al Qaeda operative he knew was in CIA custody -- a terrorist named Majid Khan. KSM revealed that Khan had been told to deliver $50,000 to individuals working for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambali, the leader of al Qaeda's Southeast Asian affiliate known as "J-I". CIA officers confronted Khan with this information. Khan confirmed that the money had been delivered to an operative named Zubair, and provided both a physical description and contact number for this operative.

Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June of 2003, and he soon provided information that helped lead to the capture of Hambali. After Hambali's arrest, KSM was questioned again. He identified Hambali's brother as the leader of a "J-I" cell, and Hambali's conduit for communications with al Qaeda. Hambali's brother was soon captured in Pakistan, and, in turn, led us to a cell of 17 Southeast Asian "J-I" operatives. When confronted with the news that his terror cell had been broken up, Hambali admitted that the operatives were being groomed at KSM's request for attacks inside the United States -- probably [sic] using airplanes.

During questioning, KSM also provided many details of other plots to kill innocent Americans. For example, he described the design of planned attacks on buildings inside the United States, and how operatives were directed to carry them out. He told us the operatives had been instructed to ensure that the explosives went off at a point that was high enough to prevent the people trapped above from escaping out the windows.

KSM also provided vital information on al Qaeda's efforts to obtain biological weapons. During questioning, KSM admitted that he had met three individuals involved in al Qaeda's efforts to produce anthrax, a deadly biological agent -- and he identified one of the individuals as a terrorist named Yazid. KSM apparently believed we already had this information, because Yazid had been captured and taken into foreign custody before KSM's arrest. In fact, we did not know about Yazid's role in al Qaeda's anthrax program. Information from Yazid then helped lead to the capture of his two principal assistants in the anthrax program. Without the information provided by KSM and Yazid, we might not have uncovered this al Qaeda biological weapons program, or stopped this al Qaeda cell from developing anthrax for attacks against the United States.

These are some of the plots that have been stopped because of the information of this vital program. Terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti -- they were going to use an explosive laden water tanker. They helped stop a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi using car bombs and motorcycle bombs, and they helped stop a plot to hijack passenger planes and fly them into Heathrow or the Canary Wharf in London.

We're getting vital information necessary to do our jobs, and that's to protect the American people and our allies.

Information from the terrorists in this program has helped us to identify individuals that al Qaeda deemed suitable for Western operations, many of whom we had never heard about before. They include terrorists who were set to case targets inside the United States, including financial buildings in major cities on the East Coast. Information from terrorists in CIA custody has played a role in the capture or questioning of nearly every senior al Qaeda member or associate detained by the U.S. and its allies since this program began. By providing everything from initial leads to photo identifications, to precise locations of where terrorists were hiding, this program has helped us to take potential mass murderers off the streets before they were able to kill.

This program has also played a critical role in helping us understand the enemy we face in this war. Terrorists in this program have painted a picture of al Qaeda's structure and financing, and communications and logistics. They identified al Qaeda's travel routes and safe havens, and explained how al Qaeda's senior leadership communicates with its operatives in places like Iraq. They provided information that allows us -- that has allowed us to make sense of documents and computer records that we have seized in terrorist raids. They've identified voices in recordings of intercepted calls, and helped us understand the meaning of potentially critical terrorist communications.

The information we get from these detainees is corroborated by intelligence, and we've received -- that we've received from other sources -- and together this intelligence has helped us connect the dots and stop attacks before they occur. Information from the terrorists questioned in this program helped unravel plots and terrorist cells in Europe and in other places. It's helped our allies protect their people from deadly enemies. This program has been, and remains, one of the most vital tools in our war against the terrorists. It is invaluable to America and to our allies. Were it not for this program, our intelligence community believes that al Qaeda and its allies would have succeeded in launching another attack against the American homeland. By giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, this program has saved innocent lives.


Hmm... where else have we heard the name Abu Zubaydah before?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/19/AR2006061901211_pf.html
If this is the best Bush can offer in defense of interrogation by torture, then one wonders why he's defended the practice for so long, not to mention why Bush neglected to mention these facts about Mr. Zubaydah. Surely the president wasn't trying to mislead the nation?

To the contrary, he very specifically addressed the contributions to the intelligence effort gleaned from debriefing Abu Zubaydah. The two names cited by him as key players, KSM and bin al Shibh (http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/07/alqaeda.911/index.html), have a fair amount of independent verification as to their roles in al Qaeda and involvement in the 9/11 attacks.

[BPSCG]

No offense, but I'm going to take the word of the Washington Post and Ron Suskind over Wikipedia.And yet you expect me to take the word of Sidney Blumethal, a true foaming-at-the-mouth, partisan attack dog hysteric, who would deny the sun rises in the east if Bush said it, that the Bush admin isn't credible on an issue.

Okay...

[a_unique_person]

For a water boy, he seems to have been involved in some pretty high-up shenanigans (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Zubaydah):

When did Bush defend torture? Please supply a link to your citation.


Try Googling "torture" and "ineffective." 1,080,000 hits in 0.16 seconds.

From Wiki



n June 2006, Simon & Schuster (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simon_%26_Schuster) published a book titled The One Percent Doctrine authored by Ron Suskind. In the book, Suskind writes, among other things[5] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Zubaydah#_note-abe)[6] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Zubaydah#_note-subwayattack), that sources in the intelligence community revealed to him that Abu Zubaydah knew nothing about the operations of al-Qaeda, but rather was al-Qaeda's go-to guy for minor logistics such as travel for wives and children. Suskind notes that Zubaydah turned out to be mentally ill, keeping a diary "in the voice of three people: Hani 1, Hani 2, and Hani 3" -- a boy, a young man and a middle-aged alter ego. The book also quotes Dan Coleman, then the FBI's top al-Qaeda analyst, telling a senior bureau official, "This guy is insane, certifiable, split personality."



Sounds a bit like "Curveball".

[Cylinder]

Citing this quote as evidence of Zubaydah's irrelevance kind of betrays your level of knowledge of intelligence gathering operations.

Abu Zubaydah knew nothing about the operations of al-Qaeda, but rather was al-Qaeda's go-to guy for minor logistics such as travel for wives and children.

Putting aside the point that Abu Zubaydah seems to have given all the right names, you also have to consider the fact that he was vetted to the point of having access to family travel plans. That's the sort of information that was key enough that it was even included in the 9/11 Commission Report.

Isane is an appeal to emotion or an ad hominem. Zubaydah's mental health has nothing at all to do with his position inside al Qaeda or his possesion of intelligence information.

[JamesDillon]

And yet you expect me to take the word of Sidney Blumethal, a true foaming-at-the-mouth, partisan attack dog hysteric, who would deny the sun rises in the east if Bush said it, that the Bush admin isn't credible on an issue.

Okay...


Blumethal was simply paraphrasing Suskind's investigation, and in any case I quoted him only to illustrate the point that the Wikipedia article you cited also raises the issue of the crediblity of Bush's characterization of Zubaydah. The primary sources on which I relied are the Post and Suskind, both of which, yes, I do trust more than Wikipedia.

[BPSCG]

Blumethal was simply paraphrasing Suskind's investigation, and in any case I quoted him only to illustrate the point that the Wikipedia article you cited also raises the issue of the crediblity of Bush's characterization of Zubaydah. The primary sources on which I relied are the Post and Suskind, both of which, yes, I do trust more than Wikipedia.See Cylinder's #39 above. Is it your contention that 1) Zubaydah had no important ties to bin Alden and, 2) no significant intelligence was gotten out of him?

[JamesDillon]

See Cylinder's #39 above. Is it your contention that 1) Zubaydah had no important ties to bin Alden and, 2) no significant intelligence was gotten out of him?
It is my contention that Zubadayah was not, as President Bush claimed, a "senior terrorist leader" or "one of the top operatives plotting and planning death and destruction on the United States," that he did not "run" a terrorist camp in Afghanistan, and that the president of the United States has repeatedly and intentionally made misleading statements as to Mr. Zubadayah's significance. If you want to argue that acting as a low-level administrator for al-Qaeda constitutes "important ties to bin Laden," fine, but that's a significantly lower hurdle than the picture painted by President Bush's public statements.

If you want to argue that the fact that Zubadayah was able to name a few other higher-level al Qaeda personnel qualifies as "significant intelligence," again, fine. I'd no doubt sell out my bosses if I was strapped to a board and held underwater, too. But again you're shifting the goal posts here-- the fact remains that Zubadayah's role was neither so important, nor his information so critical, as the president would have us believe.

In response to Cylinder-- the fact that Zubdayah is apparently stark raving mad most certainly is relevant to the credibility of his "intelligence," especially since most of it turned out to be worthless.

[Cylinder]

In response to Cylinder-- the fact that Zubdayah is apparently stark raving mad most certainly is relevant to the credibility of his "intelligence," especially since most of it turned out to be worthless.

Worthless? By whose measure?

"He is the person in charge of the camps. He receives young men from all countries. He accepts you or rejects you. And he takes care of the expenses for the camps. He makes arrangements for you when you travel coming in or leaving."

Ahmed Ressam (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/03/30/attack/main505014.shtml) on Abu Zubdayah - months before the September 11, 2001 attacks.