Free will redux: What is true free will? [Archive]

Piggy

9th September 2006, 02:54 AM

Free will - choice.

Do you have choice?
I have no clue.

It certainly seems that way. It certainly seems, to me, once I've made a choice, that I could have chosen some different course of action.

But is that really the case?

Perhaps not. After all, this feeling I have -- of having made a "free" choice on the basis of "my decision" -- necessarily comes with some time lag, if only some fraction of a second, after the action. Perhaps this feeling is merely a function of the reflective mind, and perhaps the action which my body performed (speaking the word "paper", for example) is entirely the result of mechanistic processes and not in any sense a "free, conscious decision" at all.

To illustrate this point, let's consider an ordinary series of apparent mental events.

I suddenly realize my mother's birthday is tomorrow and I haven't bought her a card or gift. I ask myself what I should get her. I consider several options, rejecting flowers because I know my brother will get her one of those big arrangements he always sends, rejecting chocolates because she doesn't eat sweets anymore, perhaps some gourmet coffee or a day at the spa.... The spa. Yeah, she'd like that. Yeah, she's had a lot of stress lately, definitely the spa. I'd better stop by and get her a gift certificate. Oh, cool, it's on my way. In fact, I better move into the other lane if I want to make that turn. (Piggy shifts the blinker lever, checks his blind spot, steers into the other lane.)

From my POV, it certainly seems like I'm deciding.

But is there anything in that string of mental event objects (MEOs -- a Piggyism derived loosely from object-oriented programming which provides a convenient way of treating mental events as objects nominally for the purposes of discussion) which necessarily implies a free-will choice?

I don't think so.

Where did the thought that it was my mother's birthday come from? I certainly didn't decide to think it. In fact, it's hard to see how we could, in any meaningful sense, "decide" to think any of our thoughts. That model leads to infinite regression, as I decide to make the decision to think the thought. (Ditto for physical actions? Avoiding the infinite regression is one of the big obstacles in free-will models of apparently consciously-determined action.)

No, obviously I did not decide to realize my mother's birthday was tomorrow. It must be the case that my brain is processing information and making connections in ways that are not accessible to the subjective entity which I think of as my "conscious self". And in fact, this is experimentally verifiable.

So what happened is that this notion "occured to me". It "popped into my head" as we say. Something triggered it, but I don't know what.

The next MEO is wondering what I should get her for her birthday. Did I decide to ponder this? No. That's what my brain started doing. I'm aware that I'm doing it, but it's difficult to imagine how this could be a choice of any kind.

I reject flowers and chocolates. But why did I even consider them, when I know my brother always gets her the former and she no longer cares for the latter? It seems my brain is churning away deep below deck, and I'm just along for the ride.

Coffee or the spa? Now here, it seems, I really am making a free-will choice. I consider the options and I choose.

Or do I? We've already seen that my brain is capable of non-consciously generating thoughts and, metaphorically speaking, serving them to my conscious self. When the moment comes that I "know" that yes, the spa's the right thing, did I choose, or did I become aware that I'd made a choice?

It's not at all clear.

And why did I "choose" the spa over the coffee? Could it be that the below-deck association machine -- which is also driving the car during this time -- in the process of its continual evaluation of my progress and concurrent mental mapping, dragged in an association with the spa which is on my route? It's certainly possible. Perhaps my reflection that she's been stressed lately was an after-the-fact justification. And even if not, where did that MEO come from?

Have I really made any sort of choice at all? Or does it just seem that way?

I "realize" I should move over into the other lane. I flick the blinker bar and check my blind spot. Choices? The same problems crop up.

So this feeling we have that we "consider" and "choose", that it "could have been different"... is it accurate?

I don't know.

Piggy

9th September 2006, 03:02 AM

I hope Piggy will regale us with his ideas about "true" or "genuine" free will, which is called libertarian free will in the philosophy biz.
Sorry to dissapoint you, Paul. No regalia yet. At this point in my thinking and reading, I believe that there may very well be a meaningful model of "free will" with the potential to avoid the perennial thorny problems. But that's jumping the gun for now, and who knows, after reading everyone's input and considering further, I may have to scrap it. Plus it's 5 in the morning. More to come. More to hear and read and consider.

Brainache

9th September 2006, 03:19 AM

So far I've seen examples of "choices" that are fairly neutral, but what about people who make truly bad choices.
Like taking heroin and doing it again and again until they are totally addicted. Once addicted the drug takes over forcing the junky to get more drugs, but the initial choice was(perhaps peer influenced) not the effect of the drug.
Was the first taste the act of a free will?
Are we to think that some people become drug addicts because of the laws of physics or chemistry?
Could a criminal use it as a defense?

Piggy

9th September 2006, 03:26 AM

So to me the question of free will is irrelevant, because I have to act as if I have free will, whether I do or not.
I'm not with you there.

To me, this is one of the most important questions of our time.

The death of soul-theory (there are hangers-on, I know, but their arguments are merely sound and fury) and the success of the mind-as-activity-of-the-brain model has forced the question. And perhaps that model also provides an answer.

When speaking of the actions of the brain with relation to what matters most to human beings in everyday life -- thoughts, emotions, decisions, memories, plans -- it's clear that no complete meaningful model can be produced on the purely neural level. That is to say, we can't merely speak of chains of neurons.

To make sense of these phenomena, we have to speak in terms of larger structures, such as the amygdala, hippocampus, corpus callosum, and so forth. These structures are not merely places where neurons hang out. Their configurations are significant to their functions -- their macro-level architecture, above the mere neural level, matters.

We know that these macro-level structures, working as a unit, give rise to at least one significant emergent phenomenon -- the subjective self, the apparent experiencer that we all feel ourselves to be. For convenience, I'll call this the "i".

For me, the crux of the issue of free will is this: Does the interaction of brain "parts" operate in a manner which can be fully described without reference to i, or is i necessary?

In other words, do these non-conscious structures send all the chemicals and impulses whizzing around in a mechanistic (presumably deterministic in some ways, presumably random in other ways) fashion, while the i experiences an illusory sense of control? Or can it be said that i is ever the "cause" of action in these brain modules?

Or put yet another way, is this emergent phenomenon of "self" capable -- in real terms -- of "pushing" actions into the loop, or is it passive?

Brainache

9th September 2006, 05:00 AM

OK.

I get the feeling that the "i" is a product of the various different components of the brain having to average out a lot of different inputs.
If I was aware of all the inputs at once I would be paralised not knowing what to react to and what to ignore. Some kind of filter is needed to make sense of it all.
The fact that this filter creates the illusion of free will or the fact that this filter actually has free will is irrelevant.

I can't step outside my "i" and behave differently either way.

If I do have complete free will, I will make certain choices.

If I do not have complete free will, I have no control over the choices I make.

So I choose to believe that the choices I make are my own.

Whether or not the particular shape of the neurone structures within my skull determine what kind of choices I make is beyond my control. They might be different choices if my brain had different structures, or chemicals in there, or different neurons firing in different sequences.
I can't see how that means I am somehow forced to choose coke instead of pepsi.
I think the complex stucture of the brain allows many solutions to any given problem and our memories and experiences influence which solution we chose in any given situation.
If I accept that I have no free will, what is the point of doing anything?
I must act as if I have free will. There is no other way to make it through the day.

But I am not a philosopher or a scientist. So what would I know?

RandFan

9th September 2006, 06:54 AM

If I do have complete free will, I will make certain choices.

If I do not have complete free will, I have no control over the choices I make.

So I choose to believe that the choices I make are my own. (emphasis mine) Not necassarily. It might just be an illusion that you choose it.

I'm with you Brainache. The debate of free will was interesting to me to a point and then when I realized it makes no difference whatsoever whether I have the illusion of making choices or whether I actually make choices it ceased to be an interesting proposition.

Brainache

9th September 2006, 07:04 AM

(emphasis mine) Not necassarily. It might just be an illusion that you choose it.

I'm with you Brainache. The debate of free will was interesting to me to a point and then when I realized it makes no difference whatsoever whether I have the illusion of making choices or whether I actually make choices it ceased to be an interesting proposition.

I wonder if it would make a difference if I said "prefer" instead of "choose".
Yeah you're right Randfan. Pointless.

elliotfc

9th September 2006, 07:50 AM

I don't know. I doubt anyone does but it involves the complex interaction of billions of neurons. Do I need to know that exact composition of a decision to know that it is dependant on chemicals?

I'd agree that without chemicals you couldn't make decisions. I couldn't play me violin if I didn't have hands. I'm saying that decisions aren't solely entirely and exclusively chemical, just like playing an instrument is not solely the manipulation of fingers. There's a lot more to it than that.

If a decision isn't chemical, what is it then?

A process in which the brain chooses something over another thing, or other things. Or the actual moment when the choice is made. Do chemicals have something to do with that? Of course. Could a decision be made without chemicals? No, or, Idon't think so.

What is the difference between a decision and a chemical reaction so complex that you can't predict it's outcome?

Freedom. Chemical reactions don't freely decide what to do, whereas humans who make decisions can actually choose between pathways. You and I can change our minds. Several times. We can weigh outcomes and apply a variety of filters and philosophies, we can align ourselves with our strongest emotion or instinct or go against those things.

You are positing the existance of something that can alter the course of chemical events but is not a chemical event itself. How is that any different than a soul?

I dunno, what is a soul? You bring up the idea of soul, so tell me exactly what you are talking about.

-Elliot

elliotfc

9th September 2006, 07:52 AM

Goodness, I've been away for three years and this thread is still going.

"Free will" is a subjective notion. The End. ;)

All notions are dependent on the existence of minds. There are no objective notions. Without brains/minds, there would be no notions. Therefore all notions (contingent on the existence of individual brains/minds) are subjective.

-Elliot

chriswl

9th September 2006, 08:02 AM

When speaking of the actions of the brain with relation to what matters most to human beings in everyday life -- thoughts, emotions, decisions, memories, plans -- it's clear that no complete meaningful model can be produced on the purely neural level. That is to say, we can't merely speak of chains of neurons.

To make sense of these phenomena, we have to speak in terms of larger structures, such as the amygdala, hippocampus, corpus callosum, and so forth. These structures are not merely places where neurons hang out. Their configurations are significant to their functions -- their macro-level architecture, above the mere neural level, matters.

We know that these macro-level structures, working as a unit, give rise to at least one significant emergent phenomenon -- the subjective self, the apparent experiencer that we all feel ourselves to be. For convenience, I'll call this the "i".

For me, the crux of the issue of free will is this: Does the interaction of brain "parts" operate in a manner which can be fully described without reference to i, or is i necessary?

In other words, do these non-conscious structures send all the chemicals and impulses whizzing around in a mechanistic (presumably deterministic in some ways, presumably random in other ways) fashion, while the i experiences an illusory sense of control? Or can it be said that i is ever the "cause" of action in these brain modules?

Or put yet another way, is this emergent phenomenon of "self" capable -- in real terms -- of "pushing" actions into the loop, or is it passive?
This is very simple to answer. The lowest level building blocks of nature behave according to the laws of physics. However complex the structure they are a part of they still do nothing more than operate according to these laws. If they ever behaved differently we would be able to observe it and we don't.

If we ignore quantum physics, then the world is deterministic, which means all human actions are deterministic. Whether this means free will is illusory depends on what you mean by free will.

elliotfc

9th September 2006, 08:16 AM

This is very simple to answer. The lowest level building blocks of nature behave according to the laws of physics. However complex the structure they are a part of they still do nothing more than operate according to these laws. If they ever behaved differently we would be able to observe it and we don't.

What do you mean by "behave differently"? Do humans behave just like the lowest building blocks of nature?

If we ignore quantum physics, then the world is deterministic, which means all human actions are deterministic.

Do you mean that before we "discovered" quantum physics, the world was deterministic? And that a discovery made for an instantaneous polarity switch? I don't think you mean that. What do you mean exactly?

Whether this means free will is illusory depends on what you mean by free will.

The ability to make decisions is what I mean by it.

-Elliot

Mercutio

9th September 2006, 09:36 AM

Implies choice.
Only if you have already decided that choice requires free will. So, your post should read "circularly implies choice. More below...
Free will - choice.

Do you have choice?
There is quite an extensive literature on "choice" in behavioral journals, all assuming that choice is not a function of free will, but a function of environmental variables. Any time there is more than one option, there is a choice situation. We can manipulate the situation, and find that organisms (including, but not limited to, people) lawfully respond to these manipulations, altering their choices accordingly. The choices are, demonstrably, constrained and not "free".

(We can also demonstrate that one's awareness of the contingencies is not needed; indeed, in some circumstances one's actions may be believed to be under the control of one thing, when they are demonstrably under the control of another.)
All notions are dependent on the existence of minds. There are no objective notions. Without brains/minds, there would be no notions. Therefore all notions (contingent on the existence of individual brains/minds) are subjective.

-ElliotAgain, nicely circular, and dependent on the assumption in your first sentence.

Piggy

9th September 2006, 10:52 AM

Brainache, I would like to address some points of one of your posts, and then put my 2 cents in about why it matters.
I get the feeling that the "i" is a product of the various different components of the brain having to average out a lot of different inputs.
If I was aware of all the inputs at once I would be paralised not knowing what to react to and what to ignore. Some kind of filter is needed to make sense of it all.
The fact that this filter creates the illusion of free will or the fact that this filter actually has free will is irrelevant.
When we talk about the mind as the product of brain activity, we have to be very careful with our terms and make sure we're describing what's actually going on. Of course, given the early stage of research we're at, there are a lot of gaps in our understanding, so we must be careful to be up front about these and not fill them in with concepts from previous debunked models.

And to my eye, there's some theoretical Bond-o in your assessment here which bears scrutiny.

"Averaging out inputs" does not appear to be a function of the brain. Rather, it's more accurate (tho still somewhat metaphorical, but I don't object to that as long as we know what we're up to) to say that the "input" is "routed" (it flows via neural pathways to distinct brain regions/structures) and "processed". Some input is stored, some of it "dies" (that is, it leaves no discernable lasting impression). Some of it -- in a highly "processed" form -- becomes, we could say, available to the conscious self, or known to the "i".

Yes, threshold values are an important concept in understanding the activity of the neural network, but on a macro level, inputs aren't "averaged out". We could compare it (with the strong caution that this is highly metaphorical and dangerously homuncular) to secretaries and office managers in the front office of a CEO's suite deciding which people, postal mail, and email is forwarded to the boss, and whether certain data is passed on as-is or must be summarized into reports.

The paralysis (again, metaphorical) you refer to is certainly genuine. When the brain's pre-conscious/co-conscious structures and processes don't do their job in adequately processing and routing the input, the result can be a barrage of stimulus, absent emotional cues which help us prioritize, that has the effect of making all stimuli emotionally equivalent. This is the permanent condition of a few unfortunate people, and a temporary experience undergone by many at various times.

In fact, this may be an important phenomenon to scrutinize when trying to answer the question of whether the i is capable, under normal circumstances, of actually generating or pushing further stimulus back into the loop.

But even though a malfunction (or maladaptive functioning) of the routing/processing/associative "modules" of the brain can result in this kind of choice-paralysis, I don't think it's warranted to say that the "filter has free will" (or potentially could have it), although it might be meaningful to say that the illusion of free will is generated in part by the filtering apparatus of the brain.

If anything has free will, I think it can only be the experienced self, the i. I think that's what universally understood by the term "free will".

As far as relevance, it may be irrelevant in the sense that you personally aren't interested in the topic, but it's certainly relevant to an understanding of the brain and the nature of the experienced self which we all intuitively feel to be "us", even though certainly an understanding of what's real doesn't change what's real.

Whether or not the particular shape of the neurone structures within my skull determine what kind of choices I make is beyond my control. They might be different choices if my brain had different structures, or chemicals in there, or different neurons firing in different sequences.
I can't see how that means I am somehow forced to choose coke instead of pepsi.
You're right. The question of free will isn't answered by the fact that different brains do different things. It's certainly correct that, just because I would almost definitely live a very different life if certain brain structures regulating emotions were more "normal" in my head than they are, it does not follow that the choices I actually make are somehow "forced".

The issue is whether the activity of these structures -- in any brain at all -- is solely responsible for choice, with the felt experience of "I did that" being a post-fact illusion, or whether the emergent "i" is an active component in the process.

I think the complex stucture of the brain allows many solutions to any given problem and our memories and experiences influence which solution we chose in any given situation.
If I accept that I have no free will, what is the point of doing anything?
I must act as if I have free will. There is no other way to make it through the day.
Well, I'm not a philosopher or scientists either, but I can tell you why it matters to me.

The bottom line, however unsatisfying, is that it matters to me because I feel like it does.

Reading Skinner's "Beyond Freedom and Dignity" as a kid had a profound effect on me, because it challenged my notion of, if not who I was, then certainly what I was. It changed my life. And for years afterward, my reading in cognitive science and my college courses in the subject all were colored by Skinner's ideas, the questions he raised, and the questions I had about both.

Personally, I don't think there is a point to doing anything, whether we have free will or not. But still, I wake up every morning, and I either kill myself or I get on with what needs to be done. So far, it's been the latter.

And maybe that's why it matters to me. When the normal human motivations -- family, God, social aspiration -- are unimportant to a person, there's very little left to care about. Trying to crack as much of the code of this world as I can, to understand as much as possible about myself and what's happening around me, is just about the only thing that gives me any sense of purpose and direction at all.

And in the end, I think a clearer understanding of reality helps me (and all of us) make better decisions, whether or not the "i" is doing the deciding, or is just along for the ride.

Piggy

9th September 2006, 10:59 AM

The lowest level building blocks of nature behave according to the laws of physics. However complex the structure they are a part of they still do nothing more than operate according to these laws. If they ever behaved differently we would be able to observe it and we don't.
Yes.

If we ignore quantum physics, then the world is deterministic, which means all human actions are deterministic.
Why ignore QM?

But aside from that, this does not follow. It is not true that higher-level structures must follow the same types of rules as the lower-level structures which comprise them. Or, if you know of a reason why this must be true, please explain.

Whether this means free will is illusory depends on what you mean by free will.
I'll stick with the definition I've used thus far. Free will would exist if the emergent entity "i", the experienced or conscious self present for all of us, can meaningfully be said to be responsible for altering the chemistry of the brain in ways that, for all practical purposes, result in directed choice, such as opting for paper over plastic, or moving an arm.

Piggy

9th September 2006, 11:00 AM

The ability to make decisions is what I mean by it.
This definition is insufficient. We must be more specific than this. I can build an apparatus that makes decisions. But no one would say that it has free will.

chriswl

9th September 2006, 11:47 AM

Why ignore QM?
Just as a simplification, because the question you were asking about the ralationship between high level and low level descriptions of the brain is not really affected by it.

But aside from that, this does not follow. It is not true that higher-level structures must follow the same types of rules as the lower-level structures which comprise them. Or, if you know of a reason why this must be true, please explain.
Are you suggesting that the low level rules could be deterministic and the emergent, high level ones might not be? That seems impossible to me.

For example, we know we cannot produce truly random behaviour from a deterministic system. This is why computers cannot produce truly random numbers, because they are deterministic. But a non-deterministic system would appear random to an outside observer and so would be something that you couldn't produce using a deterministic mechanism.

I'll stick with the definition I've used thus far. Free will would exist if the emergent entity "i", the experienced or conscious self present for all of us, can meaningfully be said to be responsible for altering the chemistry of the brain in ways that, for all practical purposes, result in directed choice, such as opting for paper over plastic, or moving an arm.
By that definition, I'd say there is no free will. It that would mean the physical brain acting contrary to the laws of physics. Or the brain containing some as yet undiscovered quantum mechanism that was brought into play to generate random behaviour in those circumstances where we made what we consider to be free choices. I don't think there's any evidence that this happens.

chriswl

9th September 2006, 12:23 PM

The ability to make decisions is what I mean by it [free will].
But your decisions are surely informed by the information you have, the skills you have learnt in handling it, your feelings, aims, desires, etc. These things are what "determine" the decision you make.

Sometimes the decisions may not be clear cut. We may chose one option but accept that on an other day our decision may have gone the other way. But just because we are consciously unaware of why we chose one course of action over an other doesn't mean that this choice was undetermined. It may have been determined by brain activity that is below the level of conscious awareness. In fact it surely must have been determined in this way - our decisions lead to actions, actions are physical and all physical things have physical causes. So there are physical causes for our decisions which means they are determined (or maybe sometimes random).

Jimbo07

9th September 2006, 01:23 PM

Piggy

9th September 2006, 03:27 PM

Are you suggesting that the low level rules could be deterministic and the emergent, high level ones might not be? That seems impossible to me.
Yes, I am. Not suggesting that it necessarily is, but that it could be. It might seem impossible to you. But is it? Must it be?

For example, we know we cannot produce truly random behaviour from a deterministic system. This is why computers cannot produce truly random numbers, because they are deterministic. But a non-deterministic system would appear random to an outside observer and so would be something that you couldn't produce using a deterministic mechanism.
Wolfram seems to think we can. If Wolfram is right, then it's possible that a set of deterministic rules, when iterated and reiterated, could give rise to randomness within higher-level structures which eventually emerge from the continued elaboration of the program, so to speak.

This is not something we've been able to do with computers at this stage, of course. And perhaps Wolfram will turn out to be wrong.

But I don't see any reason to assume, given what we currently know, that it is impossible that a set of deterministic underlying fundamental laws of nature could indeed give rise to a universe in which true randomness was a characteristic of some of the macro-level structures and processes.

And if that's possible for a universe, then why not for a smaller-scale emergent entity which relies on deterministic structures.

It seems clear that the deterministic or random qualities inherent in x-scale entities do not "bleed over" into x+-scale phenomena emerging from them.

In other words, quantum randomness at the subatomic level doesn't imply that there will be randomness of a similar nature at the molecular-chemical level, even though the agents of chemical processes are ultimately composed of "stuff" which is subject to quantum randomness.

Similarly, merely examining the motions of individual molecules does not yield a complete and coherent explanation of larger-scale phenomena such as tides, waves, and vortices. Indeed, we can discuss these macro-scale phenomena with reference to macro-scale properties alone, such as temperature zones and viscosity, without reference to the micro-scale properties at all, despite the undeniable fact that these macro-scale properties depend upon the very different types of properties, such as chemical bonds, inherent to the micro-scale components of the physical substances that give rise to the emergent phenomena under consideration.

There's no doubt that activity at the neural level is pretty straightforward action/reaction deterministic stuff. And yet when we discuss the behavior of human beings, which depends on the mind, which is nondifferent from the supraneural activity of the brain (activity of brain structures such as those mentioned in an earlier post) we must speak in probabilistic terms.

So from level to level it seems apparent that we indeed move from probabilistic behavior to deterministic behavior to probabilistic behavior.

By that definition, I'd say there is no free will. It that would mean the physical brain acting contrary to the laws of physics. Or the brain containing some as yet undiscovered quantum mechanism that was brought into play to generate random behaviour in those circumstances where we made what we consider to be free choices. I don't think there's any evidence that this happens.
I don't know of any evidence of this either. But I also don't know that it's impossible, or that it would constitute a violation of the laws of physics, even if it seems to violate some assumptions we draw from them. And I don't see any need to invoke or require a quantum mechanism -- how any such thing could apply to the level of the emergent phenomenon of "i"... it just doesn't make sense to me (or to you either, I'm sure).

Perhaps it's time to examine the paper/plastic choice again, and see if there's any wiggle-room for free will there.

At the moment, my stance on free will is that it may be possible. I don't see that it has been proven illusory yet, and I also don't see that we can say with certainty that it's impossible that the emergent i could somehow be influencing the feedback mechanism on which it depends.

But that's a big "somehow".

Piggy

9th September 2006, 04:31 PM

I like Seth Lloyd's (http://www.americanscientist.org/template/InterviewTypeDetail/assetid/52129;jsessionid=baa6gWCz81) take on the issue. It starts to go in the direction of 'only the universe can get to where the universe is going.' To predict where the universe is going you'd need a bigger or faster universe. He invokes the 'Halting Problem' to declare that only by doing the steps can you predict the steps.
Lloyd's logic is invalid regarding free will. Let's take this bit from the Web link:

Free will is safe. Even if the universe is completely deterministic, then we (and computers, and God knows who else) possess free will. At first, the deterministic nature of the laws of physics would seem to forbid free will: No choice is available. In fact, however, the computational nature of the universe actually guarantees free will.

Let me explain. Free will arises when we make decisions—decisions that we and we alone are responsible for. For example, every morning I decide whether to have coffee or tea. The decision is mine, and mine alone. Until I make it, I have no idea whether I will have coffee or tea. My decision process is a kind of computation: I weigh the relative merits of coffee or tea, thinking about my day ahead, and then make a decision.

But exactly because the decision process is a kind of computation, the outcome of this process is intrinsically unpredictable.
First of all, any definition of free will which insists that contemporary computers have it, defies all common-sense understanding of what the term normally implies.

For Lloyd, unpredictability = free will. This is nonsense.

It makes no difference that we can view the coffee/tea choice as "a kind of computation".

The important element is whether our conscious selves (these phenomena which we all inherently feel ourselves to "be") are directing our own actions, or whether the unconscious mechanistic bits of our brains are actually running the show, and it only feels like we're directing anything at all.

That is, Free Will (or at least its appearance) can effectively exist in a completely deterministic universe.
Ignoring the difference between free will and its mere appearance is just silly. Concluding that free will can exist if its appearance exists is like saying that something is a real unicorn because it looks like one.

My summary is that the universe may indeed be entirely physical, including human interactions, but that since we are not outside the universe, our interactions are indistinguishable to us from free will.
This is the same error. If we're discussing "true free will" here, as the stated thread topic stipulates, then it's insufficient to be satisfied with the trivial and obvious truth that, boy, sure seems like we got it.

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

9th September 2006, 05:15 PM

hodgy

9th September 2006, 06:20 PM

Libertarian free will is defined to be will that is not deterministic. Libertarians would also like their free will not to be random. The question is: What does this leave for libertarian free will to be?

~~ Paul

It leaves it to be a logical contradiction. You cannot have your cake and eat it. You cannot have your will directed and constrained by conciousness and simultaneously 'free'.

RandFan

9th September 2006, 06:28 PM

Libertarian free will is defined to be will that is not deterministic. Libertarians would also like their free will not to be random. The question is: What does this leave for libertarian free will to be?

~~ Paul Depends, flip a coin, if it's heads then free will is deterministic, if it is tails then it is not random. BTW, that's how I prove that I have free will. I flip a coin to determine all of my choices.

hodgy

9th September 2006, 06:29 PM

Dave1001

9th September 2006, 06:31 PM

Ultimately there is no 'free'. Even if we allow for a random factor, the random factor is ultimately just another constant pattern that we could not describe beforehand.

'free will' is an anachronism, we may usefully use the term but only if we first describe and agree what it means.

Not necessarily. We could also be wrong on first principles with the logic here, and the common intuition that free will exists as a salient and not just perceptual phenomena could be correct.

hodgy

9th September 2006, 06:38 PM

Not necessarily. We could also be wrong on first principles with the logic here, and the common intuition that free will exists as a salient and not just perceptual phenomena could be correct.

If true=false then you could be right.

Dave1001

9th September 2006, 06:40 PM

If true=false then you could be right.

I think I have more room to be right than that.:p

hodgy

9th September 2006, 06:48 PM

Ok - feel free to expound upon your differentiation of 'salient' and 'perceptual' and explain how that impacts upon the logic under discussion.

Dave1001

9th September 2006, 07:24 PM

Ok - feel free to expound upon your differentiation of 'salient' and 'perceptual' and explain how that impacts upon the logic under discussion.

Although the language may have been awkward, I wasn't actually directing contrasting 'salient' with 'perceptual'. But rather actual free will, meaning one is actually able to make choices between options in a way that isn't predetermined, and solely perceived free will, where all of our "choices" are predetermined but yet we perceive them not to be. I agree with your folding of randomness in to predetermination for the purpose of this discussion, although I do think that's a debatable side topic.*(See footnote at bottom).

I think the common perception is that there is something additional to free will than human-shaped matter energy bouncing around in predetermined ways 20 billion years after the big bang. Just because we've created a neat little logical flowchart that free will is inevitably reduced to that, doesn't mean that it's so. I'm skeptical, even if I can't fully articulate the reasons why. Perhaps by hashing it out in this thread with you I can get a better sense of where I think the weakness is in this model.

I think one starting point is my skepticism that subjective consciousness exists completely within the known materialistic elements of the universe. There seems to me to be an analog projection of reality in the way we experience it from the point of where it's captured (in its own analog way, in our internal synaptic interactions). And in that analog projection there is the subjective experience of agency leave room not for just rote perceived interest maximization but also whimsy.

*(Footnote.) The debatable side topic being whether true randomness occurs in human decision-making, and whether or not "the random factor [being] ultimately just another constant pattern that we could not describe beforehand" means that "Ultimately there is no 'free'."

Piggy

9th September 2006, 09:33 PM

Hey, Dave1001. No offense, but has anyone ever told you that bold red siggie is annoying as hell?

Just asking.

Zombified

9th September 2006, 09:35 PM

All notions are dependent on the existence of minds. There are no objective notions. Without brains/minds, there would be no notions. Therefore all notions (contingent on the existence of individual brains/minds) are subjective.
Do you get that there's a difference between things that are defined operationally and things that aren't?

Dave1001

9th September 2006, 09:37 PM

Hey, Dave1001. No offense, but has anyone ever told you that bold red siggie is annoying as hell?

Just asking.

It exists at the mercy of the moderators and administrators. And you're the first to tell me their opinion on that topic.

Piggy

9th September 2006, 09:37 PM

But rather actual free will, meaning one is actually able to make choices between options in a way that isn't predetermined, and solely perceived free will, where all of our "choices" are predetermined but yet we perceive them not to be. I agree with your folding of randomness in to predetermination for the purpose of this discussion, although I do think that's a debatable side topic.*(See footnote at bottom).

I think the common perception is that there is something additional to free will than human-shaped matter energy bouncing around in predetermined ways 20 billion years after the big bang.
So, do you think predetermination is the sole issue?

I agree, if everything is predetermined, then free will is off the table.

But given the well-establish existence of probabilistic phenomena, I think it's a pretty safe bet that if we rewound the universe from point A to point X and let it run again, it would not evolve back to point A. It would be somehow different.

If that's true, then would you say we have free will if our choices are not predetermined, but they are a product of the non-conscious modules of our brains, and it only seems to us, fractions of a second after the fact, that the decisions were made consciously?

Piggy

9th September 2006, 09:39 PM

It exists at the mercy of the moderators and administrators. And you're the first to tell me their opinion on that topic.
Ok. Well, fwiw, it's annoying as hell. ;)

Not that there's anything wrong with that. :D

Brainache

9th September 2006, 11:29 PM

OK here I go again(I'm enjoying this BTW)

Piggy in your analogy of the CEO and the secretary(s) to define in a simple way the idea of the "i", why is it so difficult to imagine the CEO making choices and giving orders?

OK the processes are determined by physical laws, but I don't understand why the sum of those physical laws interacting with the material in my skull can't produce complex unpredictable (yet directed) results. Once those results are then used as inputs another layer of complexity is tweaked one way or another depending on all kinds of strange personal reasons(what I had for breakfast, was I beaten as a child, am I drunk etc)

I work in television and one of the fun things to do in a studio is to point a camera at a monitor and watch the pretty patterns it produces(especially after you put the signal through a few layers of visual effects). I used to do this regularly. The resulting image is never the same each time(although similar). No one is breaking any laws of physics here and the slightest tweaks in any one of several variables will produce a big difference in the image produced. It is called controlled feed-back.

I don't see why our experience of the self can't be inferred to be a similar phenomenon. An extremely complex picture of great beauty created by tiny variations in input. As the complex picture is experienced by the cognitive regions of the brain all kinds of things can push the individual to do one thing or to do something else.

Does this amount to the "i" changing the brain state or vice versa? Is there a difference? It all happens together. I would suggest that there are sometimes when the "i" has more control and sometimes when it has less. I think it is a delicate balancing act which all too often and easily can tip into chaos or catatonia.

Anyway that's another two cents I won't see again.

Piggy

9th September 2006, 11:34 PM

Piggy in your analogy of the CEO and the secretary(s) to define in a simple way the idea of the "i", why is it so difficult to imagine the CEO making choices and giving orders?
Oh, it's not. I was only using that example with regard to the model of the brain as a mechanism which "averages inputs". Seems to me that's not apt. A model in which inputs are screened, sometimes filed for later use, sometimes trashed, sometimes reformatted and condensed, sometimes sent to the boss as-is... that's a better descriptor.

As I mentioned, we can't go too far w/ the boss analogy b/c we fall into the homunculus trap, the illusion of the Cartesian theater.

But using the metaphor as it is, then yeah, if it turns out that the "i" can indeed somehow push changes into the feedback loop, that would be like the CEO sending memos.

Piggy

9th September 2006, 11:54 PM

Does this amount to the "i" changing the brain state or vice versa? Is there a difference? It all happens together. I would suggest that there are sometimes when the "i" has more control and sometimes when it has less. I think it is a delicate balancing act which all too often and easily can tip into chaos or catatonia.
I believe the model of the feedback loop is right on the money.

I also think it's worth mentioning Dennett's model here of the 2-part brain. According to this model, consciousness arises (or can arise) when you have a dual brain structure -- not the hemispheres, but the stem/cortex.

In short, you build brain A (the reptilian brain) which is merely a "dumb" processor. Then you build (evolve) brain B, the higher level cortex, which takes its input from brain A.

As Dennett puts it, perceptually speaking, brain B "lives inside" brain A. (Even though physically, in humans, the layer of brain B structures is generally located "outside" of brain A structures.)

The feedback loop between A and B is continually tweaked by a constant stream of new data being received and processed by A.

So far, though, there's no apparent agent of free will anywhere in the model.

What I've been labeling with the variable "i" is the conscious self, the feeling, experiencing "me" that we all identify as "who we are".

The "i" is an emergent phenomenon, totally dependent on the activity of brain modules -- not equal to it, but yet nondifferent from it -- kindof in the way that waves are emergent phenomena totally dependent on -- and both not precisely equal to, but yet also nondifferent from -- the water in the ocean.

Seems to me that for free will to exist, this emergent entity, this "i", must be able, in some way, to introduce changes in the feedback loop.

The trouble is, there is no available model to explain any such action on the part of i. At least, not that I know of.

If it could be shown that it is impossible for i to introduce changes in the feedback loop, that could be the death knell of free will. But studies of emergent phenomena as a class are so young... it's hard to say what's possible or not.

hodgy

10th September 2006, 04:06 AM

I think the common perception is that there is something additional to free will than human-shaped matter energy bouncing around in predetermined ways 20 billion years after the big bang. Just because we've created a neat little logical flowchart that free will is inevitably reduced to that, doesn't mean that it's so.
...
I think one starting point is my skepticism that subjective consciousness exists completely within the known materialistic elements of the universe.

I think this is the heart of the issue. Those who propose that free-will is something more than the perception of will being free typically base their argument on the claim that there could be something else other than 'the known materialistic elements of the universe'.

The problem with this is that it does not actually help their position except insofar as it muddies the waters of the discussion and creates opportunities for irrelevant tangents to the argument.

Let us put aside 'materialistic elements' and consider a hypothetical thing, that we will call consciousness, that is able to make decisions. There is no reason why we cannot ask the same logical questions of this immaterial consciousness that we previously asked of a proposed material one.

Given a choice between A and B we can ask why did the consciousness choose A?. Either the decison A was caused by some previous state of the consciousness or it was not (or a combination of the 2). We can go on to examine the reasons for each preceding decision / state in the same way, just as we could with a material consciousness.

The argument against [the common notion of] free will is a logical one, not a physical one. It does not require any laws of the universe to be real, universal or known. The proposition of an immaterial free will does not get the free will proponents off the hook of the logical argument.

Dave1001

10th September 2006, 04:47 AM

So, do you think predetermination is the sole issue?

I agree, if everything is predetermined, then free will is off the table.

But given the well-establish existence of probabilistic phenomena, I think it's a pretty safe bet that if we rewound the universe from point A to point X and let it run again, it would not evolve back to point A. It would be somehow different.

If that's true, then would you say we have free will if our choices are not predetermined, but they are a product of the non-conscious modules of our brains, and it only seems to us, fractions of a second after the fact, that the decisions were made consciously?

I think you missed my footnote. I agreed with Hodgy to also not call that free will, cause I don't think that matches to common intuitive perception of what free will is.

Dave1001

10th September 2006, 05:03 AM

I think this is the heart of the issue. Those who propose that free-will is something more than the perception of will being free typically base their argument on the claim that there could be something else other than 'the known materialistic elements of the universe'.

The problem with this is that it does not actually help their position except insofar as it muddies the waters of the discussion and creates opportunities for irrelevant tangents to the argument.

Let us put aside 'materialistic elements' and consider a hypothetical thing, that we will call consciousness, that is able to make decisions. There is no reason why we cannot ask the same logical questions of this immaterial consciousness that we previously asked of a proposed material one.

Given a choice between A and B we can ask why did the consciousness choose A?. Either the decison A was caused by some previous state of the consciousness or it was not (or a combination of the 2). We can go on to examine the reasons for each preceding decision / state in the same way, just as we could with a material consciousness.

The argument against [the common notion of] free will is a logical one, not a physical one. It does not require any laws of the universe to be real, universal or known. The proposition of an immaterial free will does not get the free will proponents off the hook of the logical argument.

I think this is a false distinction (that the rules of logic somehow inevitably exist outside of the known material universe). You're describing cause and effect, which is a logical principle we base directly off of observations of known reality. In fact, I think a reasonable case can be made to be skeptical that such logical principles even exist outside of our neuroanatomy: we may be precluded from observing many non-logical phenomenon by the limits of our collective brains' current modeling capabilities. However, I think it's worth putting my broad skepticism about logic to the side right now, because I acknowledge it doesn't leave us much to work with.

The reason I'm specifically skeptical about applying such logical principles to the common intuitive experience of free will is that I don't think they provide a convincing explanation of my subjective experience and observation of free will in the field, unlike the very convincing way that Newtonian physics describes the mechanics of objects in motion, or that neuroscience research describes how my brain represents the visual world (it's fascinatingly non-intuitive, but makes complete sense once one learns about it).

This isn't to say that I think it's clearly wrong that functional free will doesn't exist. I'm just unconvinced. And although I understand your neat logic formulation completely, my suspicion is that there might be an error in first principles, not disimilar to trying to apply Newtonian physics to matter interactions at the particle level.

hodgy

10th September 2006, 05:31 AM

So, do you think predetermination is the sole issue?

I agree, if everything is predetermined, then free will is off the table.

But given the well-establish existence of probabilistic phenomena, I think it's a pretty safe bet that if we rewound the universe from point A to point X and let it run again, it would not evolve back to point A. It would be somehow different.

If that's true, then would you say we have free will if our choices are not predetermined, but they are a product of the non-conscious modules of our brains, and it only seems to us, fractions of a second after the fact, that the decisions were made consciously?

I do not think that the 'existence of probabilistic phenomena' changes the basic argument regarding predetermination since, ultimately, everything that exists does so just because it does. The fact that a particular event along a time axis can be shown to have been dependant on previous states of existence (causation) does not explain why the macro existence has a state in the first place. At a certain level of granularity there is no great difference between caused and apparently random events.

President Bush

10th September 2006, 09:50 AM

There is quite an extensive literature on "choice" in behavioral journals, all assuming that choice is not a function of free will, but a function of environmental variables. Any time there is more than one option, there is a choice situation. We can manipulate the situation, and find that organisms (including, but not limited to, people) lawfully respond to these manipulations, altering their choices accordingly. The choices are, demonstrably, constrained and not "free".
Does Behaviorism's process of "manipulate(ing) the situation, and find(ing) that organisms (including, but not limited to, people) lawfully respond to these manipulations, altering their choices accordingly" involve any decision-making?

Piggy

10th September 2006, 11:52 AM

I think you missed my footnote. I agreed with Hodgy to also not call that free will, cause I don't think that matches to common intuitive perception of what free will is.
Gotcha. Thanks.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 12:06 PM

I do not think that the 'existence of probabilistic phenomena' changes the basic argument regarding predetermination since, ultimately, everything that exists does so just because it does. The fact that a particular event along a time axis can be shown to have been dependant on previous states of existence (causation) does not explain why the macro existence has a state in the first place. At a certain level of granularity there is no great difference between caused and apparently random events.
I'm sorry, but I don't follow this line of thought at all. I just don't understand what you're saying. Can you rephrase?

And maybe I didn't explain myself as well as I could have.

It seemed to me that Dave1001 was focusing rather narrowly on predetermination. My understanding of predetermination is "it's gonna be this, and it can't be anything else". You know, clockwork universe kinda stuff.

As far as I understand the term, if the elaboration of a process involves sub-processes which must be described in probabilistic terms (in other words, we would say there is an element of randomness invovled) then one could, in theory, rewind the process to an earlier state, let it run again, and the result would be a different end state to some degree at least from the state it was in at the point where the rewinding began.

So, as far as I can see, the universe we're in is not predetermined, even if it contains certain inevitabilities (such as heat death rather than a big crunch).

That being the case, it does not appear to be a valid argument that free will in humans (i.e., consciously directed choice) is prevented by predetermination, since predetermination is not a quality of our universe.

So that leads us to the question: Is the activity of the brain entirely mechanistic?

Tough question, because the activity of the brain includes activity at the quantum level, molecular level, neural level, modular level, and conscious (emergent) level. And each of these levels of granularity operates by non-identical sets of rules.

The way I see it, the issue of free will depends entirely on whether activity at the conscious level is entirely passive or not.

chriswl

10th September 2006, 12:41 PM

But using the metaphor as it is, then yeah, if it turns out that the "i" can indeed somehow push changes into the feedback loop, that would be like the CEO sending memos.
Again I have to say that this seems obviously crazy to me.

Its all very well talking about emergence and levels of description but we mustn't lose sight of the the fact that the low-level physical reality is all that there really is. Everything else is just high level descriptions the we construct for our own convenience because they are more tractable than a full description of the behaviour of every atom. They add no new information that is not already contained in the low level description.

Free will means freedom to act physically in the world in a certain way. Suppose I am the subject of an experiment where I have to freely choose to press either a red button or a green button every time I hear a buzzer. The scientists observing me have a machine that can somehow predict the state of every atom in my body several seconds in advance. If the world is deterministic at the lowest level then this is logically possible (though it almost certainly will never be a practical proposition, of course).

This means that just before they sound the buzzer the scientists know which button I will press. They know what my body will do in advance because my body is just atoms and they have predicted the position of every one of them. Is there some "higher" level in which I don't press the button that was predicted for me, the button that my fingers actually press? Only if this higher level is actually some sort of delusion.

Mercutio

10th September 2006, 01:11 PM

Mercutio

10th September 2006, 01:24 PM

Libertarian free will is defined to be will that is not deterministic. Libertarians would also like their free will not to be random. The question is: What does this leave for libertarian free will to be?

~~ Paul
Exactly what "free will" is supposed to be--an active, un-influenced, "un-moved mover". The starting point, independent of environment, of our behavior.

There actually would be a very simple way to demonstrate it; we just have to be better predictors of our own behavior than a good knowledge of our environment would allow. It could not thoroughly disprove environmental determinism, as one could always claim there were environmental influences which were not measured, but it is a start. Turns out, though, that we often do not know why we do the things we do. We often are poor predictors of our own private behavior. We often are surprized by our own actions ("I guess I was hungrier than I thought!"), and are unaware of things that do influence our behavior.

If "free will" is what we normally think of it--that is, a conscious free will, in which we actively make decisions and determine our own actions--it
certainly is shy about itself. The more we know about our behavior, the less we see room for the sort of free will that makes a difference. And so, discussions of free will dissolve into "randomness", which is not free will at all, and "unconscious choice", which tends toward the oxymoronic, and lots and lots of "it feels free to me", which is utterly irrelevant. My sister was tone-deaf, and couldn't float a tune in a barge, but she loved to sing; it sounded good to her. Doesn't make it good, doesn't make it free.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 02:37 PM

Again I have to say that this seems obviously crazy to me.

Its all very well talking about emergence and levels of description but we mustn't lose sight of the the fact that the low-level physical reality is all that there really is. Everything else is just high level descriptions the we construct for our own convenience because they are more tractable than a full description of the behaviour of every atom. They add no new information that is not already contained in the low level description.
This is simply not true.

The actions of macro-level phenomena cannot be described by simply aggregating the actions of atoms.

Macro-level objects and phenomena interact based on properties which pertain on a macro-level, which do not even exist on an atomic level.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 02:39 PM

Suppose I am the subject of an experiment where I have to freely choose to press either a red button or a green button every time I hear a buzzer. The scientists observing me have a machine that can somehow predict the state of every atom in my body several seconds in advance. If the world is deterministic at the lowest level then this is logically possible (though it almost certainly will never be a practical proposition, of course).

This means that just before they sound the buzzer the scientists know which button I will press. They know what my body will do in advance because my body is just atoms and they have predicted the position of every one of them. Is there some "higher" level in which I don't press the button that was predicted for me, the button that my fingers actually press? Only if this higher level is actually some sort of delusion.
It is not the case that a knowledge of all atomic states -- with no reference to higher-level information -- will produce an understanding of what you are thinking. That assertion is completely unfounded.

hodgy

10th September 2006, 02:41 PM

I'm sorry, but I don't follow this line of thought at all. I just don't understand what you're saying. Can you rephrase?

Sorry - I was a bit opaque. My point is that even if everything we observe has an apparent cause, and so is apparently not random, there is a larger random factor which is that the universe exists at all (or exists with a starting state of x rather than y). Events at the micro level may apparently have a cause but at the macro level existence itself is random (a random selection of existence over non-existence or of existence like x over existence like y).

So far, my argument implies that every event is (at least in a macro context) random, even in a
n apparently causal universe - so you might ask me how this suports predetermination. There are several approaches I could take here but I'll try the one that I think is the simplest.

In a universe in which both random and caused events are possible, the caused events must be determined - a choice event is the result of preceeding state and events. Whilst an agent may be able to predict (given all relevant data) an event, they cannot prevent it since it is by definition the result of all causal variables.

Does the possibility of random events break determinism? No. A random event is by defintion unpredictable by any agent. If the agent cannot predict the event they cannot prevent it, therefore it is no different in practice from a caused event.

The only real difference between a random and caused event in such a system is that the caused event occurs within a pattern sequence of at least 2 whilst the random event occurs within a pattern sequence of only 1.

As far as I understand the term, if the elaboration of a process involves sub-processes which must be described in probabilistic terms (in other words, we would say there is an element of randomness invovled) then one could, in theory, rewind the process to an earlier state, let it run again, and the result would be a different end state to some degree at least from the state it was in at the point where the rewinding began.

But you have introduced 'rewinding' - this is the what gives opportunity for difference in your model. The universe prior to the rewind is determined to be x and the universe x rewound and re-run is determined y.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 02:48 PM

If "free will" is what we normally think of it--that is, a conscious free will, in which we actively make decisions and determine our own actions--it certainly is shy about itself. The more we know about our behavior, the less we see room for the sort of free will that makes a difference. And so, discussions of free will dissolve into "randomness", which is not free will at all, and "unconscious choice", which tends toward the oxymoronic, and lots and lots of "it feels free to me", which is utterly irrelevant.
Very well put. I think this is an excellent summary of the perils currently beseting the notion of free will.

The only thing I see which could possibly save the idea is a model of the emergent "entity" of the "conscious self" (that is, the emergent phenomenon of consciousness) which could explain how this emergent phenomenon is able to add information to the loop, or influence the neural activity of the brain.

We don't have any such model. But the field of inquiry is so young, I don't believe we can say that the possibility has yet been eliminated.

In any case, before we can officially recognize a thing called "free will" or write out its death certificate, our models of consciousness (and of emergent phenomena) are going to have to be much more complete than they are.

And that's why I say that it ain't dead.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 02:52 PM

In a universe in which both random and caused events are possible, the caused events must be determined
Ok, here's where you lose me.

Random does not mean uncaused.

All events have causes. Deterministic events have only one possible outcome for a given set of causes (including environmental variables). Random events do not have only one possible outcome, requiring that the range of outcomes be expressed in terms of probabilities.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 03:04 PM

To illustrate my point that macro-level entities and phenomena are not explicable merely by reference to the actions of lower-level entities, let's consider vortices.

The development of hurricanes and tornadoes, for example, is only explicable with reference to macro-level entities with macro-level properties, such as pressure zones, temperature zones, and winds.

It is not the case (as everyone here will readily admit) that these things happen because all the atoms happen to be going in the right direction.

Why do these atoms form the patterns they do in these events?

We cannot find the answer exclusively within the atomic-level actions and interactions. If we try to do this, we find that each atom in the vortex is acting the same as atoms that are not in the vortex.

So why have they formed a vortex?

The vortex forms because macro-level "objects" (to use the term loosely) are interacting with one another at that level of granularity. The qualities of these objects are properties of these objects at that level, and only of objects at that level. They are not even present at the micro level (what's the pressure and viscosity of an atom?).

By the same token, essential properties of the lower-level constituents are effectively invisible at the macro level. We can speak meaningfully of the behavior of vortices whether they are composed of gases such as air, liquids such as milk and coffee, or stars -- all of which have very different lower-level properties.

Clearly then, the notion of aggregate explanations is false.

hodgy

10th September 2006, 04:23 PM

Ok, here's where you lose me.
Random does not mean uncaused.

I agree, a random event can be said to have caused itself.

All events have causes.

In which case determinism wins

Deterministic events have only one possible outcome for a given set of causes (including environmental variables). Random events do not have only one possible outcome, requiring that the range of outcomes be expressed in terms of probabilities.

I contend that what you are proposing here is a determined event with a random variable - that's fine but I do not see how a random element supports free will.

hodgy

10th September 2006, 04:34 PM

Also, 'probabilities' are a construct based on observation, not logic. I am reminded of IQ and similar tests in which we are asked to complete a sequence:

Given 2,4,6,x - what is x? Of course the answer is 8 but there is no logical reason why it should be so. The answer is 47 if the sequence runs 2,4,6,47,2,4,6,47....

'Probablity' means one of 2 things:

1 - there are factors we do not understand and that offers a range of results.
2 - there is a random element to the outcome.

Either way (as I have previously explained) determinism wins,

Piggy

10th September 2006, 04:50 PM

I agree, a random event can be said to have caused itself.
That's not true either.

Random actions have causes other than themselves. Cause is not the issue at all.

It's a matter of outcomes, not causes.

If cause A within context B will always yeild result X, then the action thus described is entirely deterministic.

If cause A within context B will yeild result X in 60% of trials, result Y in 30% of trials, and result Z in 10% of trials, then the action thus described is to some extent random.

Chemical reactions are deterministic because we know what we're going to get when the reagents and environments are strictly controlled.

Quantum behavior is to some extent random because no matter how strictly we control the initial conditions and environment, we can only describe the outcomes in terms of probabilities.

Rolling dice at a craps table is random because the results can only be described in terms of probabilities. However, this case is different from controlled quantum experiments (or appears to be) because the randomness arises from variations in B (the environmental variables) at each trial. If B were held perfectly constant (e.g. identical motion of the throwing hand, identical starting position of the die, identical wind currents, etc.), it is assumed that the results would be identical every time.

To define random as "having no cause or being its own cause" is a highly unorthodox, even idiosyncratic, definition of the term. Seems to me that events which have no cause or are their own cause would be some type of singularity.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 04:58 PM

I do not see how a random element supports free will.
Me, neither.

That is not my contention.

My argument is based on the locus of change within the brain/mind system.*

If the conscious "i" is only "along for the ride" -- that is, if non-conscious modules are doing 100% of the work, and it only seems to us like we consider and decide, for example, that we want paper instead of plastic -- then there's no free will.

On the other hand, if the "i" is not merely passive, but may be meaningfully said to be an active element in the feedback loop that underlies the activity of the mind and gives rise to the emergent phenomenon of consciousness itself, then free will is possible.

*"Mind" being defined here as a particular subset of brain activity, specifically that which we identify with what may be commonly called "the conscious self".

Jimbo07

10th September 2006, 05:01 PM

The important element is whether our conscious selves (these phenomena which we all inherently feel ourselves to "be") are directing our own actions, or whether the unconscious mechanistic bits of our brains are actually running the show, and it only feels like we're directing anything at all.

Oh, if he's anything like predisposed to how I feel, then this is a political smoke screen for, "We have no free will, just the illusion of it." Personally, I've been sliding more toward the camp that consciousness itself is an illusion.

Ignoring the difference between free will and its mere appearance is just silly. Concluding that free will can exist if its appearance exists is like saying that something is a real unicorn because it looks like one.

No... remember walks like a duck, talks like a duck... I think he's getting at, 'we can't tell.' It feels like free will to us... even if it's not, in some sort of fluffy metaphysical sense.

This is the same error. If we're discussing "true free will" here, as the stated thread topic stipulates, then it's insufficient to be satisfied with the trivial and obvious truth that, boy, sure seems like we got it.

Oh. Well, whether one is satisfied or not... sure seems like we got it. :boggled:

I'm a fan of the whole, 'illusion of free will' thing, I guess...

Piggy

10th September 2006, 05:20 PM

Also, 'probabilities' are a construct based on observation, not logic.
Ok. But that's not really important. What's important is that, for random events, we must resort to this "construct based on observation" because identical trials don't yield identical results.

We can't just do it once and then know what's going to happen every time, so we're forced to run multiple trials, observe the results, and calculate the probabilities.

Now, the craps game I mentioned above, this would be an example of random results arising from a "random element" (variation in environmental variables and initial conditions from trial to trial) within a deterministic system.

Quantum experiments, however, are another thing altogether. I haven't read any QM papers in many years, but when I was studying the subject, the mainstream interpretation was that identical initial conditions and identical environments will result in different outcomes from trial to trial.

In fact, this is exactly what made QM so shocking, and sparked Einstein's famous retort that God does not play dice.

And yet, as predictions were made and further tests constructed and carried out, it seemed that there was indeed true randomness at the quantum level: identical initial conditions, identical environment, identical stimulus, variable results. True randomness. And, if that were true, the end of the model of the clockwork universe which had stood for centuries.

1 - there are factors we do not understand and that offers a range of results.
2 - there is a random element to the outcome.

Either way (as I have previously explained) determinism wins.
It has been proposed that quantum randomness may be a situation like #1 above -- the result of some hidden variable that our current technology can't detect. But I don't believe that's the mainstream interpretation. Perhaps some of the physics folks can chime in here.

But now we get into the issue at hand -- human behavior.

If we were to rewind the day to several hours ago, and somehow quell all random factors in the environment, so that nothing in the universe would happen differently unless I did something different... would I end up sitting here again typing these exact words? Would "I" be capable of "doing something different"?

Truth is, we don't know.

Quantum mechanics has shown that we can be surprised, and discover what is apparently true randomness where we never expected it.

Can the conscious mind introduce true randomness into the world on an entirely different level of magnification?

I don't think we understand enough about consciousness, and about the qualities and behaviors of emergent systems in general, to know for certain at this point one way or the other.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 05:34 PM

No... remember walks like a duck, talks like a duck... I think he's getting at, 'we can't tell.' It feels like free will to us... even if it's not, in some sort of fluffy metaphysical sense.
Talk about political smoke screens.

I can't believe you'd come onto a board like this and actually put forth the argument "walks like a duck, talks like a duck" and expect to be taken seriously.

What you're proposing is that the illusion of X is the same as X itself. Or that "Sure seems that way to me" is a valid way to decide the truth of a proposition. That's patent nonsense.

Now, maybe you don't care whether true free will exists, but since that's the topic of this forum, saying that it doesn't matter to you is not particularly productive.

And I'm not talking fluffy metaphysics. I'm talking about the brain.

Go back to the story of my mother's birthday. If, at each stage, my conscious self has no active part in what's going on, if it's something of a passive witness to the activity of non-conscious modules of my brain, then "I" (this conscious entity which I consider myself to be) didn't choose anything at all. And if that's the case, it makes no sense to say I had any free will in the matter.

You might find the distinction not worth looking into, but if so, why are you posting here?

Piggy

10th September 2006, 05:37 PM

I'm a fan of the whole, 'illusion of free will' thing, I guess...
Oops. Sorry. Should have read that before I barked at you.:o

<Emily Litella voice> Nevermind. </Emily Litella>

chriswl

10th September 2006, 06:08 PM

This is simply not true.
Yes it is.
The actions of macro-level phenomena cannot be described by simply aggregating the actions of atoms.
Yes they can. This is such a basic idea in physics that it is people seldom ever bother to express it but believe me (or talk to a scientist) it is absolutely the truth. I mean that, take your statement and change the "cannot" to "can" and it becomes perfectly correct. Same with your comments about vortices - where did you get that stuff from? Not only is it not true its quite impressive how precisely opposite to the truth it is. If you doubt this you are rejecting physics and you are out there with Lifegazer in the distant lands of woo. I'm sorry, I don't mean to be rude but that's just the way it is.

Macro-level objects and phenomena interact based on properties which pertain on a macro-level, which do not even exist on an atomic level.
Not really. We can describe them as doing so but this is just shorthand for our convenience. We could predict their behaviour just as accurately, in fact actually more accurately, if we calculated the trajectory of each atom individually but this would of course be hopelessly impractical.

President Bush

10th September 2006, 06:11 PM

Does Behaviorism's process of "manipulate(ing) the situation, and find(ing) that organisms (including, but not limited to, people) lawfully respond to these manipulations, altering their choices accordingly" involve any decision-making?
Is "decision-making" the same thing as "choice"? If so, then yes, it does. It involves choices, or decisions, that are every bit as constrained by environmental variables as are the ones they are studying. Skinner's book "Cumulative Record", reprinting his earlier experimental work, makes this point explicitly (thus the title).
What are you talking about?

A behaviorist "manipulate(ing) the situation, and find(ing) that organisms (including, but not limited to, people) lawfully respond to these manipulations, altering their choices accordingly" is not every bit as constrained by environmental variables as the subjects they study.

Subjects being manipulated, responding lawfully to these manipulations, and altering their choices accordingly are in the process of having their environment constrained by the behaviorist her/himself. To the point, at least, of the behaviorist being in charge of her/his controlled experiment.

chriswl

10th September 2006, 06:15 PM

Piggy

10th September 2006, 06:27 PM

This is such a basic idea in physics that it is people seldom ever bother to express it but believe me (or talk to a scientist) it is absolutely the truth.
Well, educate me, then. Telling me that this is just the way it is doesn't help me much. This issue is important to me. Can you provide some resources that would help a non-scientist get the skinny on the topic in a reasonable time?

I wish I could cite my sources, but I had to sell almost all my books when I moved 3 years ago, and all the science went.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 06:40 PM

It is not the case that a knowledge of all atomic states -- with no reference to higher-level information -- will produce an understanding of what you are thinking. That assertion is completely unfounded.I was talking about physical actions, not thoughts. Are you now claiming we may have freedom of thought but something prevents us acting on it? Like I could freely choose to press the red button but find myself inexplicably forced to press the green one, as predicted by the scientists? That's not much of a free will.

In any case, thoughts are surely the result of with activity in the brain and this is physical. And so it is determined.
Sorry, my mistake. I imposed the notion of thought, but if our thoughts have no causitive role in our actions -- if, as suggested in the "mother's birthday" example, they are an after-effect -- then they don't matter here. According to your model, the scientists would also be able to predict the thoughts that arose in your mind as you heard the buzzer and pressed the button. {ETA: Assuming, for the sake of the example, that our knowledge of brain processes was advanced enough for us to completely understand the correlation between physical states of the brain and conscious thoughts.}

But for me to accept that model, I'm going to have to have an understanding of why it must be true that all information is present at the lowest level of granularity. Looking forward to getting more info on this.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 07:47 PM

chriswl, I think you might want to hold off before you slap a woo label on the notion that aggregation is insufficient to fully explain the behavior of macro-level systems.

It seems like some sane folks are interested in the theory.

In the search for a "theory of everything," scientists scrutinize ever-smaller components of the universe.... Stanford physics professor [Robert] Laughlin, awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize for Physics, argues that smaller is not necessarily better. He proposes [that] if we try to analyze things too closely, we risk not understanding how they work on a macro level. In many cases, the whole exhibits properties that can't be explained by the behavior of its parts.

"Emergence" is the notion that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. John Holland, a MacArthur Fellow known as the "father of genetic algorithms," says this seemingly simple notion will be at the heart of the development of machines that can think for hemselves.
Woo?

Some other interesting links:

EmerNet: Emergent neural computational architectures based on neuroscience (http://www.his.sunderland.ac.uk/emernet/)

Self-Organized Biological Dynamics and Nonlinear Control: Toward Understanding Complexity, Chaos and Emergent Function in Living Systems (http://www.amazon.com/Self-Organized-Biological-Dynamics-Nonlinear-Control/dp/0521624363/sr=1-10/qid=1157936517/ref=sr_1_10/104-3717646-0478346?ie=UTF8&s=books)

The Dynamical Systems Approach to Cognition: Concepts and Empirical Paradigms Based on Self-Organization, Embodiment, and Coordination Dynamics (http://www.amazon.com/Dynamical-Systems-Approach-Cognition-Self-Organization/dp/9812386106/sr=1-3/qid=1157936517/ref=sr_1_3/104-3717646-0478346?ie=UTF8&s=books)

Piggy

10th September 2006, 08:05 PM

A couple more resources on emergence:

The Emergent Systems Meeting page (http://emergent.brynmawr.edu/emergent/EmergentSystemsMeeting1) and Emergence Reading List (http://emergent.brynmawr.edu/emergent/EmergenceReadingList)

And much as I hate to cite an Encyclopedia of Philosophy, here's the Emergent Properties (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/) page from Stanford's.

Reductionism, Emergence, and Effective Field Theories - full text available in PDF format here (http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0101039).

Still want to call it woo?

Mercutio

10th September 2006, 08:18 PM

What are you talking about?

A behaviorist "manipulate(ing) the situation, and find(ing) that organisms (including, but not limited to, people) lawfully respond to these manipulations, altering their choices accordingly" is not every bit as constrained by environmental variables as the subjects they study.
Because you say so? The environmental variables they are constrained by are not being systematically varied, but that does not mean they are not there. Being ignorant of a factor is not the same as being uninfluenced by it. (This is not merely a statement of faith; we can easily demonstrate that behavior may be constrained by variables the behaver is unaware of.)

Subjects being manipulated, responding lawfully to these manipulations, and altering their choices accordingly are in the process of having their environment constrained by the behaviorist her/himself. To the point, at least, of the behaviorist being in charge of her/his controlled experiment.Ok. Yes. Agreed.

How does this make the behaviorist any less controlled? Even the role of "being in charge of [the] experiment" comes with its own constraints, structures, reinforcers & punishers...different in arrangement than those in other areas of her/his life, but there is nothing magical about being an experimenter that makes one immune from environmental influence.

The lab/real world difference is a bit like the difference between systematic breeding and natural selection. The former is organized systematically, but both are the same process at work.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 08:35 PM

We could predict their behaviour just as accurately, in fact actually more accurately, if we calculated the trajectory of each atom individually but this would of course be hopelessly impractical.
If it is hopelessly impractical to actually test this theory of the sufficiency of lowest-level information to describe all higher-level behavior, then why do you assert that it is true?

As I went back and scanned some of the books and papers on the topic, I came back to the conclusion I had reached a few years ago when I was reading on it. The notion that all information resides at the smallest granular level, and that all higher-level information is a mere statistical summary of this, is not a conclusion based on a sufficient body of evidence. It is an assumption derived from incomplete information, just as the clockwork-universe model was.

I predict that the reductionist model will be overturned by research in dynamic/emergent systems just as the clockwork model was overturned by research in quantum mechanics.

Piggy

10th September 2006, 09:51 PM

To define random as "having no cause or being its own cause" is a highly unorthodox, even idiosyncratic, definition of the term.
Hmmm... I'm seeing the term defined this way on the parent thread. So maybe I'm wrong here.

Sure don't understand this definition, though.

Can anyone enlighten me?

President Bush

10th September 2006, 11:33 PM

Because you say so? The environmental variables they are constrained by are not being systematically varied, but that does not mean they are not there. Being ignorant of a factor is not the same as being uninfluenced by it. (This is not merely a statement of faith; we can easily demonstrate that behavior may be constrained by variables the behaver is unaware of.)
You got my point after the next paragraph, right?

Ok. Yes. Agreed.

How does this make the behaviorist any less controlled? Even the role of "being in charge of [the] experiment" comes with its own constraints, structures, reinforcers & punishers...different in arrangement than those in other areas of her/his life, but there is nothing magical about being an experimenter that makes one immune from environmental influence.

The lab/real world difference is a bit like the difference between systematic breeding and natural selection. The former is organized systematically, but both are the same process at work.
I wish you would be more specific about what constaints, reinforcers, punishers you are talking about.

Is the phenomenon sometimes called countercontrol one? Sometimes the objects of study may resist. Or is that a bad subject, given that this phenomenon seemingly undermines behaviorist theory of choice being a function of environmental variables.

I'll let Skinner explain it by some lines he wrote (in Science and Human Behavior):

". . . control is frequently aversive to the controllee. Techniques based upon the use of force, particularly punishment, or the threat of punishment, are aversive, by definition, and techniques which appeal to other processes are also objectionable when, as is usually the case, the ultimate advantage to the controller is opposed to the interest of the controllee."

"One effect upon the controllee is to induce him to engage in countercontrol. He may show an emotional reaction of anger or frustration including . . . behavior which injures or is otherwise aversive to the controller."

"Because of the aversive consequences of being controlled, the individual who undertakes to control other people is likely to be countercontrolled by all of them."

"The opposition to control is likely to be directed toward the most objectionable forms -- the use of force and conspicuous instances of exploitation, undue influence, or gross misrepresentation -- but it may extend to any control which is 'deliberately' exerted because of the consequences to the controller."

"The countercontrol exercised by the group and by certain agencies may explain our hesitancy in discussing the subject of personal control frankly and in dealing with the facts in an objective way. But it does not excuse such an attitude or practice. This is only a special case of the general principle that the issue of personal freedom must not be allowed to interfere with the scientific analysis of human behavior. As we have seen, science implies prediction and, insofar as the relevant variables can be controlled, it implies control. We cannot expect to profit from applying the methods of science to human behavior if for some extraneous reason we refuse to admit that our subject matter can be controlled."
What happens to the behaviorist theory that reinforcement is what controls behavior if the behaviorist who tries to control/reinforce his subject is likely to be repaid in kind? Who would be controlling whom given this circumstance?

But that has little to do with my original question in all of this. You said:

There is quite an extensive literature on "choice" in behavioral journals, all assuming that choice is not a function of free will, but a function of environmental variables.
How does the behaviorist/scientist chose to propose his specific hypothesis as an explanation of natural phenomena (behavior), designing experimental studies that test this prediction/concept for accuracy, etc, if the environmental variables controlling this process of proposing, designing, and testing are not in his control?

Oh, but of course: Skinner found invoking terms such as "hypotheses", "concepts", or "experimental studies" not relevant in functional analysis as the mental activity these terms imply is really just behavior and that the only non-circular way to explain behavior is to appeal to something non-behavioral like the environment.

Mercutio, is our dialogue here really better understood within Skinner's construct (forgive the "mentalistic' term) of control/countercontrol? Theoretically, (again, forgive the "mentalistic" term) that would be me, attempting to control the situation by pointing out the apparent incoherence (damn, not another "mentalistic" term) of your position, and you, countercontrolling through vague and evasive answers?

Is the only way the controller can escape from the possibility of countercontrol to give up trying to control the actions of someone else?

Probably.

Piggy

11th September 2006, 12:40 AM

President Bush, I think to get to what Mercutio is saying, you have to step out of the experimental situation. I don't think he's referring to the potential circularity of the behaviorist model.

As an analogy, consider instead a chemical experiment. The variables are controlled and the results are predictable. Now, the researchers conducting the experiment, and all their equipment, and the lab, and the building it's in, etc. ad infinitum are all subject to the same laws as are the materials in the experiment -- it's just that, for them, the variables aren't as controlled. So it becomes impossible to deduce the laws and predict the outcomes for these entities from their behavior, whereas it is possible for the chemicals in the controlled reaction.

That's why we bother to do the experiment -- to make the laws (which were and are always operating anyway, everywhere and at all times) become apparent.

So, if we assume that it's true that human behavior is indeed a function of environmental variables, then artificially restricting the variables and controlling them yields predictable results.

The same would be true of the experimenters. But it would not be true that their environmental variables are strictly limited and controlled, so the ability to predict (to discern the pattern) vanishes, even though the identical forces are at work.

Something like that, Mercutio?

Btw, I think M's premise is wrong, but if we assume his premise, this would be the result, if I'm not mistaken.

.13.

11th September 2006, 04:13 AM

A question for Mercutio: What does twin studies tell us about free will? Or do they tell us anything?

I tried some googling but didn't find anything relevant, just some anecdotes. I'm asking you because I assume you work in the field of behaviorism. Or am I wrong about that?

AWPrime

11th September 2006, 04:42 AM

If some people are more predictable than others, do they have less free will?

elliotfc

11th September 2006, 09:01 AM

Again, nicely circular, and dependent on the assumption in your first sentence.

My first sentence was that notions were dependent on the existence of minds.

You disagree apparently. May I ask why? I guess I just did.

-Elliot

elliotfc

11th September 2006, 09:18 AM

This definition is insufficient. We must be more specific than this. I can build an apparatus that makes decisions. But no one would say that it has free will.

Well I can't speak for everyone, if you say "no one" I guess you know more people than I know.

When we build apparatuses that make decisions we intentionally design them to mimic the way in which we act. In this way we would say that such appartuses do not have free will, because they were designed with the particular intent to appear to actually have free will.

Just by your stating that there exist apparatuses that make decisions that do not have free will (I'm sure some people would disagree) means that we know what we're talking about when we use the phrase "free will".

As for fine tuning my definition, I don't think that appartuses do make decisions, but I'm guessing you disagree with me there. Oh well.

-Elliot

elliotfc

11th September 2006, 09:23 AM

But your decisions are surely informed by the information you have, the skills you have learnt in handling it, your feelings, aims, desires, etc. These things are what "determine" the decision you make.

I determine what decisions I make, and all that I am is what I am. If you're saying that *everything that I am* determines the decisions that I make, I would agree, while using the word "I" in place of the phrase *everything that I am*.

Sometimes the decisions may not be clear cut. We may chose one option but accept that on an other day our decision may have gone the other way. But just because we are consciously unaware of why we chose one course of action over an other doesn't mean that this choice was undetermined.

It is not "conscious unawareness" that brings me to say we have free will. Actually...it would be the OPPOSITE of that...but I haven't actually articulated that either.

-Elliot

elliotfc

11th September 2006, 09:30 AM

Libertarian free will is defined to be will that is not deterministic. Libertarians would also like their free will not to be random. The question is: What does this leave for libertarian free will to be?

~~ Paul

In my appreciation of libertarian free will, it appears to be a construct (a construct based on an existing construct) to suit a need. The need is for *individual responsibility*.

Now, I personally believe in such a thing as individual responsibility, as do most people (to varying degrees...) so I find the idea a bit superfluous.

I think libertarian free will would reject necessary and singular causation, right? This would be the free will part of it. The individual, then, would be the wild card, the instrument that would put the lie to necessary and singular causation. The institution and application of the idea is to hold the wild card responsible.

It sounds alright to me, but again I think it's superfluous. Is there a concise set of objections?

-Elliot

Piggy

11th September 2006, 10:41 AM

Just by your stating that there exist apparatuses that make decisions that do not have free will (I'm sure some people would disagree) means that we know what we're talking about when we use the phrase "free will".

As for fine tuning my definition, I don't think that appartuses do make decisions, but I'm guessing you disagree with me there.
Well, when you get right down to it, the Magic 8 Ball makes decisions. Of course, those decisions are extremely limited and totally random.

But we don't need to get as silly as the Magic 8 Ball. Take any sort of business decision software, for example. In this case, you have an application which is programmed to weigh variables and come to conclusions. In other words, you have an apparatus which makes relevant and informed decisions.

Would you really propose that the program has free will?

I mean seriously.

It's easy to say, well, you don't know what everyone would say. But are you really proposing that "making decisions" is a sufficient criterion for free will? We've seen one commentator (from a link above) who indeed defined free will in such a way as to grant free will to contemporary computers, but that seems patently outrageous to me, because my computer (at least) merely performs rote calculations. It makes decisions, but isn't free to choose.

If there's no conscious component -- if there's just a dumb apparatus weighing inputs and selecting options and churning out the inevitable result -- where's the "will" and where's the "free"?

Seems to me that a simple machine or program which makes decisions really does violate the most basic notions commonly associated with "free will".

If "free will" = "decision-making", plain and simple, then the issue is trivial.

Or when you say "making decisions" do you mean, specifically, "consciously making decisions and having the option to come to more than one conclusion" or something like that?

Piggy

11th September 2006, 10:44 AM

I determine what decisions I make, and all that I am is what I am. If you're saying that *everything that I am* determines the decisions that I make, I would agree, while using the word "I" in place of the phrase *everything that I am*.
But do you really determine what decisions you make? Or is that just the feeling you get? Consider the "mother's birthday" scenario earlier in the thread. If it's true that unconscious modules of the brain are doing all the processing, and the conscious self merely has the illusory sense that it has a role, would you still call that "free will"?

If so, in what sense is it "free" or the product of "will"?

elliotfc

11th September 2006, 10:58 AM

Well, when you get right down to it, the Magic 8 Ball makes decisions. Of course, those decisions are extremely limited and totally random.

The Magic 8 Ball comes up with words, right? Those aren't decisions. Those are words.

*WE* decide what to make of those words. If you decide to *do* what the Magic 8 Ball says, you are using free will to do that. But the Magic 8 Ball has no awareness of what it says, nor does it place any value on what it says. It's just an 8 Ball. It isn't even magical!

But we don't need to get as silly as the Magic 8 Ball. Take any sort of business decision software, for example. In this case, you have an application which is programmed to weigh variables and come to conclusions. In other words, you have an apparatus which makes relevant and informed decisions.

The software or program or whatever decides nothing. *We* decide whether or not to value the output.

Would you really propose that the program has free will?

I mean seriously.

No, but maybe some people would, I dunno. Or they could propose that, or accept it, without putting any value on it.

It's easy to say, well, you don't know what everyone would say. But are you really proposing that "making decisions" is a sufficient criterion for free will?

I am, yes.

We've seen one commentator (from a link above) who indeed defined free will in such a way as to grant free will to contemporary computers, but that seems patently outrageous to me, because my computer (at least) merely performs rote calculations. It makes decisions, but isn't free to choose.

I don't think that it makes decisions, it manipulates numbers, and that is all.

If there's no conscious component -- if there's just a dumb apparatus weighing inputs and selecting options and churning out the inevitable result -- where's the "will" and where's the "free"?

I agree, but I'm not sure if everyone agrees.

If "free will" = "decision-making", plain and simple, then the issue is trivial.

Again, I think we disagree on what is a decision and what isn't a decision.

Or when you say "making decisions" do you mean, specifically, "consciously making decisions and having the option to come to more than one conclusion" or something like that?

Making decisions means being aware about a multipicity of choices, sure.

-Elliot

elliotfc

11th September 2006, 11:07 AM

But do you really determine what decisions you make?

I insist *yes*. I base this answer on experience. It's not *someone else* who determines the decisions that I make. It's me.

Or is that just the feeling you get?

It's *also* that.

Do you mean it like...let's say someone...errr...hijacks my brain, and manipulate me so I think that I am burning up, but in physcial reality I'm not burning up, so I just have the feeling. In that case it's *just* the feeling, but I can say that because I am aware of the actual situation (someone has hijacked me brain).

Now...I do admit that I suppose it's possible that it could *just* be the feeling. I don't have the information to confirm or verify that however. But is there a "feeling" component? Sure.

Consider the "mother's birthday" scenario earlier in the thread. If it's true that unconscious modules of the brain are doing all the processing, and the conscious self merely has the illusory sense that it has a role, would you still call that "free will"?

I don't think that a decision is equivalent to a brain process. But if it was, the conscious self may affect the unconscious modules, no?

-Elliot

Piggy

11th September 2006, 11:12 AM

The Magic 8 Ball comes up with words, right? Those aren't decisions. Those are words.

*WE* decide what to make of those words. If you decide to *do* what the Magic 8 Ball says, you are using free will to do that. But the Magic 8 Ball has no awareness of what it says, nor does it place any value on what it says. It's just an 8 Ball.
Ok, so then by "makes decisions" you don't just mean "churns out conclusions when asked questions", you mean "consciously makes decisions", right?

That's an important extra little word there.

Piggy

11th September 2006, 11:16 AM

I don't think that it makes decisions, it manipulates numbers, and that is all.
Well, you can't have it both ways. You can't squeeze out a definition as vague and high-level as "makes decisions" and yet complain that certain methods of arriving at decisions don't qualify.

In other words, it seems to me you've left out the most important points.

Business decision software does make decisions. If it didn't, no one would buy it. That's why people use it, so they don't have to pay human beings to make certain sets of decisions. This stuff literally takes the place of human decision-makers.

So again, am I correct in saying that by "makes decisions" you mean "consciously makes decisions in a manner that allows for more than one possible conclusion from a given set of data and circumstances"?

Piggy

11th September 2006, 11:25 AM

I insist *yes*. I base this answer on experience. It's not *someone else* who determines the decisions that I make. It's me. Or something else.
Well, in this case, you're dodging one of the central issues by using the term "me". When the doctor hits my knee with a mallet, my leg jumps. When I sneeze, my eyes close. When a fast-moving object suddenly looms in my immediate field of view, I flinch. When my bladder gets sufficiently full, I pee, whether I want to or not. When I'm overwhelmed by emotion, I cry, whether I want to or not.

Now obviously, "I" do these things. No one else does them. But there's no free will involved. It's reflex.

If everything we do is akin to reflex, but in some cases it merely seems like it's not (see the "mother's birthday" post, for example), then we cannot salvage free will by pointing out that the decisions were made by something we call "me".

I don't think that a decision is equivalent to a brain process. But if it was, the conscious self may affect the unconscious modules, no?
Well, that's been my position here. I think we have to say the jury is still out on whether the "i" can affect the non-conscious modules, or whether that's not possible.

And for me, answering that question is at the heart of the question of free will.

hammegk

11th September 2006, 11:54 AM

The only thing I see which could possibly save the idea is a model of the emergent "entity" of the "conscious self" (that is, the emergent phenomenon of consciousness) which could explain how this emergent phenomenon is able to add information to the loop, or influence the neural activity of the brain.
Just so. The better question imo is "What is real, and what is the emergent phenomena?"

We don't have any such model. But the field of inquiry is so young, I don't believe we can say that the possibility has yet been eliminated.
I'd say scientism/materialism states that possibility is exactly -zero-.

Of course, a materialist can always "choose" to remain a closet dualist .... :)

elliotfc

11th September 2006, 12:20 PM

Ok, so then by "makes decisions" you don't just mean "churns out conclusions when asked questions", you mean "consciously makes decisions", right?

That's an important extra little word there.

I guess I took the word "consciously" for granted.

And you are saying that "consciously" would be an illusion (I mean, God knows most people think they consciously make decisions).

Now. Do we *have* to be wrong about this...let's call it an assumption? Or are we *definitely* wrong? Might we be right?

Consciousness, or self-awareness, certainly exists (right?). Since we debate the word decision, I think we also agree that decisions also exist (although maybe our definitions aren't exactly the same). Apparently my definition would have consciousness associated with decision making. That sounds alright to me.

-Elliot

elliotfc

11th September 2006, 12:27 PM

Well, you can't have it both ways. You can't squeeze out a definition as vague and high-level as "makes decisions" and yet complain that certain methods of arriving at decisions don't qualify.

First, I'm not complaining, I never even seriously considered the notion of Magic 8 Ball and decisions, you brought it up.

Second, I've never considered the 8 Ball a method of arriving at decisions. People arrive at decisions, for various reasons. If they use the 8 Ball, they have decided to use the 8 ball, and that's the *effective* decision. The words on the 8 ball are just words. They wouldn't mean anything to a person who couldn't understand the language.

Business decision software does make decisions. If it didn't, no one would buy it.

In buying it, you have the decision. If you allow the business decision software...to what, buy stocks on its own?...you've also decided that. Kind of like if I let the sprinkler run all day. Is the sprinkler deciding to sprinkle all day? No, I decided to let it sprinkle all day.

That's why people use it, so they don't have to pay human beings to make certain sets of decisions.

Right. *That* was the decision that was made.

This stuff literally takes the place of human decision-makers.

I agree that it takes the place of people who would otherwise make decisions in that role.

So again, am I correct in saying that by "makes decisions" you mean "consciously makes decisions in a manner that allows for more than one possible conclusion from a given set of data and circumstances"?

I *think* so.

-Elliot

elliotfc

11th September 2006, 12:31 PM

Well, in this case, you're dodging one of the central issues by using the term "me". When the doctor hits my knee with a mallet, my leg jumps. When I sneeze, my eyes close. When a fast-moving object suddenly looms in my immediate field of view, I flinch. When my bladder gets sufficiently full, I pee, whether I want to or not. When I'm overwhelmed by emotion, I cry, whether I want to or not.

Now obviously, "I" do these things. No one else does them. But there's no free will involved. It's reflex.

Sure. Why can't both *reflex* and *free will* exist? Does it have to be one or the other?

You say that I can't have it both ways. Why not? Because you say so? If in reality it is both ways, then it doesn't matter what you say I can or can't have? I'd rather talk about what it is, as opposed to any limit you would subjectively impose.

ANOTHER DICHOTOMY! It's one or the other, or, better yet, is HAS to be one or the other. 5th dichotomy I've encountered today. I didn't need to say that. I just did!

If everything we do is akin to reflex, but in some cases it merely seems like it's not (see the "mother's birthday" post, for example), then we cannot salvage free will by pointing out that the decisions were made by something we call "me".

I agree that if everything is akin to reflex, then you are correct, nothing would be akin to free will. I mean...that kind of follows, doesn't it?

Well, that's been my position here. I think we have to say the jury is still out on whether the "i" can affect the non-conscious modules, or whether that's not possible.

I don't have a problem with that, I'm just giving my opinion, and it will be of variable worth, or of no worth at all. :)

And for me, answering that question is at the heart of the question of free will.

If "conscious" in fact exists...I don't know why it wouldn't be able to affect the non-conscious modules. Are we assuming or agreeing that there is such a thing as consciousness, or self-awareness?

-Elliot

Mercutio

11th September 2006, 12:32 PM

You got my point after the next paragraph, right?
Agreeing that the behaviorist controls particular variables in an experimental situation is not the same as agreeing that the behaviorist is not also being controlled.

I wish you would be more specific about what constaints, reinforcers, punishers you are talking about.
Ay, there's the rub. The whole reason for studying them in an experimental context is that it it much too uncontrolled to study them adequately in vivo. I do not, though, think it improbable that the laws of behavior stop working at the lab door. (I imagine someone challenging a chemist: "sure, the chemicals react that way in your lab, but not in my body!")

Is the phenomenon sometimes called countercontrol one? Sometimes the objects of study may resist. Or is that a bad subject, given that this phenomenon seemingly undermines behaviorist theory of choice being a function of environmental variables.

I'll let Skinner explain it by some lines he wrote (in Science and Human Behavior):
Please note that Skinner is speaking there about reactivity, with emphasis on reactivity to aversive control. Aversive control (which our society uses, and which Skinner advocates against in "Beyond Freedom and Dignity) is, in part because of a subject's reactivity to it, not nearly as effective as control through reinforcement. That is the point of Skinner's quote. He can state it rather confidently, because there is excellent evidence.

It is not utterly irrelevant to our current question, but it is only a small part of it. We react against negative control, in part because it is salient. Control through reinforcement may be much more subtle, and because it is not seen (by our society) as a threat to our freedom, it is more acceptable. (When it is excessive, it is seen as a threat--bribes, the "love bombing" of cults, etc., but in general, positive reinforcement is far less prone to countercontrol than is punishment.) In addition, much control of our behavior comes about through the establishment of stimulus control, rather than the simple manipulation of consequences.
What happens to the behaviorist theory that reinforcement is what controls behavior if the behaviorist who tries to control/reinforce his subject is likely to be repaid in kind? Who would be controlling whom given this circumstance?
Are you assuming that in any relationship, "control" is a one-way thing? It most certainly is not. Also, why are you artificially removing the behaviorist from her/his environment? There are other factors, aside from the behavior of the subject, that influence the behaviorist's actions. The fact that some come from outside the lab situation does not make them, while inside the lab, part of the behaviorist's "free will".

(minor quibble: "the behaviorist theory that reinforcement is what controls behavior"...incomplete. The environment is what controls behavior. It does so through reinforcement, punishment, stimulus control, etc.)

But that has little to do with my original question in all of this. You said:

How does the behaviorist/scientist chose to propose his specific hypothesis as an explanation of natural phenomena (behavior), designing experimental studies that test this prediction/concept for accuracy, etc, if the environmental variables controlling this process of proposing, designing, and testing are not in his control?
In another thread, you listened to Skinner's lecture on having a poem. How does a mother have a baby if the chromosomes are not under her control?

A behaviorist's experiment-running behavior is determined by her/his interaction with environment; it is both shaped by contingencies and an instance of "rule-governed" behavior (an entirely different can of worms we can get into if you would like--the cliff-notes version is that we are reinforced for following rules, which allows us to learn the gist of some complex behaviors very quickly). What it is not, is a freely chosen spontaneous creation, independent from environmental influences.

Oh, but of course: Skinner found invoking terms such as "hypotheses", "concepts", or "experimental studies" not relevant in functional analysis as the mental activity these terms imply is really just behavior and that the only non-circular way to explain behavior is to appeal to something non-behavioral like the environment.
Other authors find the terms helpful, as part of the rules one learns to follow in order to engage in such behavior.

Mercutio, is our dialogue here really better understood within Skinner's construct (forgive the "mentalistic' term) of control/countercontrol? Theoretically, (again, forgive the "mentalistic" term) that would be me, attempting to control the situation by pointing out the apparent incoherence (damn, not another "mentalistic" term) of your position, and you, countercontrolling through vague and evasive answers?
Your failure to understand could be the result of the form of my answers, certainly. It could also be due to prior learning. Without adequate controls, it is mere speculation.

Is the only way the controller can escape from the possibility of countercontrol to give up trying to control the actions of someone else?

Probably.One does not have to *try* to control the actions of someone else in order to actually control them; nor does "not trying" guarantee escape from countercontrol. Also, control is not always something that one tries to escape from (my classes are full of people who have paid good money to have someone attempt to control and influence their behavior; therapists, personal trainers, investment consultants, etc., can all say the same).

The biggest bit of advice (based on the research, of course) for someone trying to "escape from the possibility of countercontrol" would be to A) use positive reinforcement rather than punishment to control, and B) to use natural, rather than artificial, reinforcers whenever possible. And to keep up to date on the behavioral literature.

Mercutio

11th September 2006, 12:42 PM

A question for Mercutio: What does twin studies tell us about free will? Or do they tell us anything?
An interesting question...

On first thought...I think they are essentially irrelevant. Determining that a particular characteristic is more genetic than learned is interesting, but for the free will debate, I think most people would call both options "determined". Something may be genetically determined, or determined by your environmental interactions, but still not be freely chosen. (In truth, one's genes may be said to have been determined by environmental interactions as well, through natural selection. Random variability in genes is then subject to environmental selection, just as random variability in behavior is subject to reinforcement or punishment.)

Of course, I may have missed something...but that's my initial thought, anyway. (and yes, I am a behaviorist. I have worked in a couple of institutions, but currently teach behavioral classes at a University.)

Jimbo07

11th September 2006, 12:58 PM

As far as your second quote goes, I will never mind in terms of taking any personal offence. Being a fan of the 'illusion of free will' means I probably don't have much to add in terms of defining the true nature of true free will. In that regard, you can probably disregard my posts as far as this thread is concerned.

As an aside, then, I'll address a few of your points:

Talk about political smoke screens.

That's what I am saying. You can't have a prominent scientist telling a nation of believers that freewill as they imagine it to be does not exist. Frankly, I think it's unfortunate for someone to have asked him this, because I think the argument has some religious connotation.

I can't believe you'd come onto a board like this and actually put forth the argument "walks like a duck, talks like a duck" and expect to be taken seriously.

Pardon me for being glib. In this model the illusion of free will is absolute. Free will, as we experience it, would be indistinguishable from true free will. You said that:

unpredictability = free will

is absurd. Maybe, in terms of wishful thinking, but in effect, unpredictability is the only measure of free will! If we could predict the outcome of every choice, we would actually have a demonstration against free will!

What you're proposing is that the illusion of X is the same as X itself.

No, the illusion of X to us is indistinguishable from X. Unless we can simulate the universe (and we can't, according to Lloyd), indistinguishable is effectively, but not truely the same.

Now, maybe you don't care whether true free will exists, but since that's the topic of this forum, saying that it doesn't matter to you is not particularly productive.

I don't care. However, having just come across Lloyd's thoughts, I felt this was opportune, rather than starting a new thread, "Read between the lines: free will doesn't exist (but you have to act like it does)."

Go back to the story of my mother's birthday. If, at each stage, my conscious self has no active part in what's going on, if it's something of a passive witness to the activity of non-conscious modules of my brain, then "I" (this conscious entity which I consider myself to be) didn't choose anything at all. And if that's the case, it makes no sense to say I had any free will in the matter.

Right. And that was the second part of what feels 'right' to me. Both "free will" and "consciousness" are illusory. My question is: how else to act? If I decree that free will does not exist and decide to plop myself down in a chair, and not move, then according to my model, that is not an act of consciousness either! Never mind physical needs motivating one to move later...

You might find the distinction not worth looking into, but if so, why are you posting here?

Same reason as many others... to see my words in print! :D

Piggy

11th September 2006, 07:17 PM

I guess I took the word "consciously" for granted.
Well, in a context like this, you can't take such critical points for granted. There are folks with all kinds of different views around here, and if you don't bother to say "conscious" then someone reading your post has no basis for assuming that it's what you meant.

Anyway, ok, now we're more clear. Thanks.

And you are saying that "consciously" would be an illusion
No, just that it might. Then again, it might not. To me that's the issue that has to be determined, and I can't say that enough is known at this point to make the call.

Consciousness, or self-awareness, certainly exists (right?). Since we debate the word decision, I think we also agree that decisions also exist (although maybe our definitions aren't exactly the same).
There is no doubt that consciousness exists, even though there's no clear model of how it arises or how it is sustained. And there's no doubt that decisions exist.

Apparently my definition would have consciousness associated with decision making. That sounds alright to me.
Well, I don't think it's justifiable to define "decision" exclusively in terms of consciousness. But it doesn't sound to me like that's exactly what you want to do, anyway. If I read your posts aright (tell me if I don't) then what you're saying is that free will exists when consciousness is the agency of decisions.

If one is conscious, but has no power to make decisions, no free will. Imagine, for example, someone who's completely paralyzed but is aware of what he's feeling and hearing. He's conscious, but can't do anything at all. That person may be said to have free will as far as his thoughts, but no free will as far as what his body does.

On the other hand, the business decision software discussed earlier would not have free will, by your definition, because even though it decides among options, it's not aware of what it's doing, so there's no choice -- it's going to come to the same decision every time if you feed it the same information. It could not freely choose to do otherwise, so no freedom, no will.

Is that correct?

Piggy

11th September 2006, 07:29 PM

First, I'm not complaining, I never even seriously considered the notion of Magic 8 Ball and decisions, you brought it up.
Right, but I brought it up to demonstrate that your definition -- the short one you first proposed -- had problems because it appeared to grant free will to Magic 8 Balls.

I've never considered the 8 Ball a method of arriving at decisions. People arrive at decisions, for various reasons. If they use the 8 Ball, they have decided to use the 8 ball, and that's the *effective* decision. The words on the 8 ball are just words. They wouldn't mean anything to a person who couldn't understand the language.
Yeah, I see what you mean. But look at it this way. Suppose I'm given the job of translating a short article from English to Spanish. Instead of doing it myself, I decide to outsource the job. I send the English manuscript to a friend in Colombia. He sends me back a manuscript in Spanish, which I submit to my client.

Who did the translation?

My friend, of course, because I decided to do nothing and to give the job to someone else. The fact that I decided to outsource it doesn't mean I made any of the decisions regarding which Spanish words to use in place of the English words. Those decisions weren't made by me, but by my friend. The decision regarding outsourcing was not the same as the decision regarding what the Spanish text would be.

Now, suppose that instead of giving the article to a friend, I cut-and-pasted it into Babelfish, clicked "Translate", then cut-and-pasted the resulting Spanish text into a Word document and sent it to my client.

Who did the translation?

The Babelfish program, of course, because I decided not to translate it myself and to have the software do it instead. I don't even know what the article said. The people who developed the Babelfish software didn't do the translation either, because they never even saw the manuscript. The decisions regarding which Spanish words to use in place of the English words in the article were made by the software. True, the programmers established the rules that the program would follow, but they did not perform the task, they did not make the decisions -- the decisions for this specific task were made by the software they created (and created for the explicit purpose of performing such tasks).

By the same token, if I'm asked a question involving a decision, and instead of thinking it through myself, I shake the Magic 8 Ball and simply use the response I recieve as my answer, then who or what made the decision?

Not me. I did nothing. The Magic 8 Ball was the apparatus which yielded the decision. A dumb, irrelevant, unreliable decision to be sure. But still, the agent of decision was the Magic 8 Ball.

Piggy

11th September 2006, 07:43 PM

In buying it, you have the decision. If you allow the business decision software...to what, buy stocks on its own?...you've also decided that. Kind of like if I let the sprinkler run all day. Is the sprinkler deciding to sprinkle all day? No, I decided to let it sprinkle all day.
That's a good point, and it bears examination.

In the case of the sprinkler, it's not designed to make any decisions.

I have a sprinkler that can be set to allow a certain volume of water thru, then shut off, for example, and to distribute water in various patterns.

But every one of those decisions is made consciously by me. I tell it exactly how much water to use, and I place it on the lawn, and I set the spray pattern.

Business decision software is different.

For example, I can use BDS to answer a question such as "What percentage of next year's budget goes to R&D?"

If I like, I can rely entirely on the software, allow it to arrive at a decision regarding these numbers. If I do that, then I haven't made the decision. Yes, I decided to purchase this software and use it, but that's not the same thing. Just as, if I decide to ask you to decide what shoes I should wear today, it's true that I decided to abide by your decision, but that doesn't change the fact that you made the decision about the shoes.

Piggy

11th September 2006, 07:57 PM

Sure. Why can't both *reflex* and *free will* exist? Does it have to be one or the other?
Oh, I won't argue that both can exist. But considering a single action, it's not possible for it to be both. In other words, human beings can (in theory) exhibit reflexive actions and voluntary (free will) actions. But an action cannot be both reflexive and voluntary. Either I consciously intended to move my leg, or it was a reflex. I can't make a free will choice to move my leg by reflex.

Well, you can't have it both ways. You can't squeeze out a definition as vague and high-level as "makes decisions" and yet complain that certain methods of arriving at decisions don't qualify.You say that I can't have it both ways. Why not? Because you say so? If in reality it is both ways, then it doesn't matter what you say I can or can't have? I'd rather talk about what it is, as opposed to any limit you would subjectively impose.
No, not because I say so. Because there's a logical contradiction. I think this is moot now, but if you define "free will" so loosely as to include any decision at all, then you can't turn around and complain that some decisions aren't the result of free will. Why not? Beause your definition necessarily includes them as actions of "free will".

This is a very important point. If when asked to define a term, you say it's X, and X logically includes a, b, and c, you can't then complain that b and c aren't what you meant by X. Because it X was your definition.

I'm sorry, I want to respond to the rest of the posts, but I haven't been sleeping well lately and I absolutely must go to bed now.

More later.

President Bush

12th September 2006, 12:28 AM

Agreeing that the behaviorist controls particular variables in an experimental situation is not the same as agreeing that the behaviorist is not also being controlled.
This response (or is it a stimulis?) seems a straw dog as it doesn't really follow what I said:

A behaviorist "manipulate(ing) the situation, and find(ing) that organisms (including, but not limited to, people) lawfully respond to these manipulations, altering their choices accordingly" is not every bit as constrained by environmental variables as the subjects they study.

Subjects being manipulated, responding lawfully to these manipulations, and altering their choices accordingly are in the process of having their environment constrained by the behaviorist her/himself. To the point, at least, of the behaviorist being in charge of her/his controlled experiment.
For the sake of experiment, I think I'll see if your behavior might be best understood within the four contexts of Skinner's operant conditioning. Wouldn't any behaviorist worth his salt be attempting to manipulate the situation?

1 Positive reinforcement occurs when a behavior (response) is followed by a favorable stimulus (commonly seen as pleasant) that increases the frequency of that behavior. In the Skinner box experiment, a stimulus such as food or sugar solution can be delivered when the rat engages in a target behavior, such as pressing a lever.
2 Negative reinforcement occurs when a behavior (response) is followed by the removal of an aversive stimulus (commonly seen as unpleasant) thereby increasing that behavior's frequency. In the Skinner box experiment, negative reinforcement can be a loud noise continuously sounding inside the rat's cage until it engages in the target behavior, such as pressing a lever, upon which the loud noise is removed.
3 Positive punishment (also called "Punishment by contingent stimulation") occurs when a behavior (response) is followed by an aversive stimulus, such as introducing a shock or loud noise, resulting in a decrease in that behavior.
4 Negative punishment (also called "Punishment by contingent withdrawal") occurs when a behavior (response) is followed by the removal of a favorable stimulus, such as taking away a child's toy following an undesired behavior, resulting in a decrease in that behavior.
I chose Positive punishment as the most likely context for your first non-response (stimulis) here. It is frustrating to have questions other the one you asked answered.

Is this adverse stimulis one the environment had anticipated? Perhaps Skinner was onto something after all.

I wish you would be more specific about what constaints, reinforcers, punishers you are talking about.
Ay, there's the rub. The whole reason for studying them in an experimental context is that it it much too uncontrolled to study them adequately in vivo. I do not, though, think it improbable that the laws of behavior stop working at the lab door. (I imagine someone challenging a chemist: "sure, the chemicals react that way in your lab, but not in my body!")
Can't be Negative reinforcement as the adverse stimulus doesn't seem to have been entirely removed. Leaving Positive punishment once again?

Or perhaps you intended to withhold reinforcement in hopes of eliminating my behavior of asking questions, most of which you seem unwilling to answer in a straightforward fashion.

Is the phenomenon sometimes called countercontrol one? Sometimes the objects of study may resist. Or is that a bad subject, given that this phenomenon seemingly undermines behaviorist theory of choice being a function of environmental variables.

I'll let Skinner explain it by some lines he wrote (in Science and Human Behavior):
Please note that Skinner is speaking there about reactivity, with emphasis on reactivity to aversive control. Aversive control (which our society uses, and which Skinner advocates against in "Beyond Freedom and Dignity) is, in part because of a subject's reactivity to it, not nearly as effective as control through reinforcement. That is the point of Skinner's quote. He can state it rather confidently, because there is excellent evidence.

It is not utterly irrelevant to our current question, but it is only a small part of it. We react against negative control, in part because it is salient. Control through reinforcement may be much more subtle, and because it is not seen (by our society) as a threat to our freedom, it is more acceptable. (When it is excessive, it is seen as a threat--bribes, the "love bombing" of cults, etc., but in general, positive reinforcement is far less prone to countercontrol than is punishment.) In addition, much control of our behavior comes about through the establishment of stimulus control, rather than the simple manipulation of consequences.
In this response (stimulis) you speak against aversive control (Positive punishment) while simultaneously employing it?

What sort of behaviorist employs irony?

What happens to the behaviorist theory that reinforcement is what controls behavior if the behaviorist who tries to control/reinforce his subject is likely to be repaid in kind? Who would be controlling whom given this circumstance
Are you assuming that in any relationship, "control" is a one-way thing? It most certainly is not. Also, why are you artificially removing the behaviorist from her/his environment? There are other factors, aside from the behavior of the subject, that influence the behaviorist's actions. The fact that some come from outside the lab situation does not make them, while inside the lab, part of the behaviorist's "free will".
Guess I'm out of luck hoping for a Positive reinforcement.

That's one thing behaviorists don't like to talk about. Before you can use use Positive reinforcement to control behavior, you must often first deprive the subject of whatever is planned to be used as a reinforcer.

But that has little to do with my original question in all of this. You said:

How does the behaviorist/scientist chose to propose his specific hypothesis as an explanation of natural phenomena (behavior), designing experimental studies that test this prediction/concept for accuracy, etc, if the environmental variables controlling this process of proposing, designing, and testing are not in his control?
A behaviorist's experiment-running behavior is determined by her/his interaction with environment; it is both shaped by contingencies and an instance of "rule-governed" behavior (an entirely different can of worms we can get into if you would like--the cliff-notes version is that we are reinforced for following rules, which allows us to learn the gist of some complex behaviors very quickly). What it is not, is a freely chosen spontaneous creation, independent from environmental influences.
A non-answer I find much less irritating. I sense an extinction stimulis.

Oh, but of course: Skinner found invoking terms such as "hypotheses", "concepts", or "experimental studies" not relevant in functional analysis as the mental activity these terms imply is really just behavior and that the only non-circular way to explain behavior is to appeal to something non-behavioral like the environment.
Other authors find the terms helpful, as part of the rules one learns to follow in order to engage in such behavior
You know, this response (stimulis) is actually pretty funny. I'll give it a Negative reinforcement.

Mercutio, is our dialogue here really better understood within Skinner's construct (forgive the "mentalistic' term) of control/countercontrol? Theoretically, (again, forgive the "mentalistic" term) that would be me, attempting to control the situation by pointing out the apparent incoherence (damn, not another "mentalistic" term) of your position, and you, countercontrolling through vague and evasive answers?
Your failure to understand could be the result of the form of my answers, certainly. It could also be due to prior learning. Without adequate controls, it is mere speculation.
Nothing there. Definitely extinction. But withholding reinforcement for behavior previously reinforced (in order to eliminate that behavior) must be done consistently for it to work effectively, Mercutio.

Is the only way the controller can escape from the possibility of countercontrol to give up trying to control the actions of someone else?

Probably.
One does not have to *try* to control the actions of someone else in order to actually control them; nor does "not trying" guarantee escape from countercontrol. Also, control is not always something that one tries to escape from (my classes are full of people who have paid good money to have someone attempt to control and influence their behavior; therapists, personal trainers, investment consultants, etc., can all say the same).

The biggest bit of advice (based on the research, of course) for someone trying to "escape from the possibility of countercontrol" would be to A) use positive reinforcement rather than punishment to control, and B) to use natural, rather than artificial, reinforcers whenever possible. And to keep up to date on the behavioral literature.
I found your previous extinction stimulus to be a positive compared to this Positive punishment.

Thinking about it, would that make this response (stimulis) a Negative punishment?

elliotfc

12th September 2006, 08:49 AM

Well, I don't think it's justifiable to define "decision" exclusively in terms of consciousness. But it doesn't sound to me like that's exactly what you want to do, anyway.

I think that when we're talking about decisions, what is and what ain't, the entity in question has to appreciate the fact that a decision is being made. This appreciation, I guess, would be contingent on *something* that is present in a person and not in a magic eight ball. It appears I'm not prepared to precisely nominate something for that something.

If I read your posts aright (tell me if I don't) then what you're saying is that free will exists when consciousness is the agency of decisions.

That sounds good at the moment (and thanks for supplying it!) but I reserve the right to tweak in the future, with your help no doubt!

If one is conscious, but has no power to make decisions, no free will. Imagine, for example, someone who's completely paralyzed but is aware of what he's feeling and hearing. He's conscious, but can't do anything at all. That person may be said to have free will as far as his thoughts, but no free will as far as what his body does.

From a religious perspective the thought is enough. We may or may not be interested in that, just throwing it out there.

Free will...if it's a *mental* thing...well...thoughts are also mental sorts of things. If the mind is unable to effect bodily movements that doesn't mean a decision hasn't been made. Rather, a decision has been made, but it is effectively futile. Kind of like if someone wants to kill someone, gets a gun, pulls the trigger, but there's no bullet so he doesn't kill someone, but the decision and the "will" were still operating.

On the other hand, the business decision software discussed earlier would not have free will, by your definition, because even though it decides among options, it's not aware of what it's doing, so there's no choice -- it's going to come to the same decision every time if you feed it the same information. It could not freely choose to do otherwise, so no freedom, no will.

Well...it might not come to the same decision every time as there could be random number generating at play or something. I'm not sure if that would be helpful or beneficial in that kind of software, but maybe it would be, even if it's just to add some mutations or variation to general rules that could later be analyzed.

I relate it to a glorified calculator. You press the buttons, it spits something out, but what does it actually spit out? Digital lines. Those lines don't mean anything except to us. The meaning exists for humans, who see the arrangement of microscopic dots. Then we do something about what we see. A calcuator that produces a product or sum in a vacuum...it may lead to later steps (with a given product, then it might activate another machine which could do something like fire a nuclear warhead) but all of that is determined by *humans*, even if it's just in the creation of such machines.

Value and meaning are just as vital to my definition of free will it appears, so it's getting more complicated.

-Elliot

Mercutio

12th September 2006, 08:59 AM

[eta--sorry, Elliot--this addresses Pres. Bush's post above yours]

Ah, very helpful! It seems clear now, I was overestimating your understanding of behaviorism. It is nice to see you trying to use the vocabulary, but you keep missing key elements, as you did earlier in your reading of Skinner.

Your examples here of positive and negative reinforcement and punishment, for instance, miss a key, defining element. You do look at whether something is presented or removed; this is good. This defines the "positive" or "negative" portion, respectively. But then you dwell on whether something is "frustrating", "irritating" or "funny" in determining whether to call it punishment or reinforcement. This is quite wrong; those characteristics are utterly irrelevant in defining a reinforcer or punisher. Rather, a reinforcer is defined by an increase in (or maintainance of) rate of behavior, and a punisher is defined by a decrease in rate of behavior. Your behavior of responding to my post was not punished by my post; one could (although the sample size is small) argue that it was in fact reinforced by it, as you did continue responding.

It is encouraging to see that you are attempting to employ the proper vocabulary; I hope you continue to work on it. Not understanding the vocabulary is, of course, quite an obstacle in trying to understand the points made. Perhaps once you understand them, then you can disagree with them coherently. Or better yet, you might agree with them.

elliotfc

12th September 2006, 09:32 AM

The fact that I decided to outsource it doesn't mean I made any of the decisions regarding which Spanish words to use in place of the English words. Those decisions weren't made by me, but by my friend. The decision regarding outsourcing was not the same as the decision regarding what the Spanish text would be.

I clipped the background of the example which can be seen I think three posts above.

Yes, you are correct, the decision to outsource is certainly different from the, most likely, partially subjective decisions regarding translation done by a human.

Now, suppose that instead of giving the article to a friend, I cut-and-pasted it into Babelfish, clicked "Translate", then cut-and-pasted the resulting Spanish text into a Word document and sent it to my client.

Who did the translation?

If you had any sense, you'd blame Babelfish via a disclaimer attached to the result! And as such, someone would associate Babelfish to the result. If you didn't credit Babelfish (or anyone/anything else for that matter), someone would assume it was you.

By the same token, if I'm asked a question involving a decision, and instead of thinking it through myself, I shake the Magic 8 Ball and simply use the response I recieve as my answer, then who or what made the decision?

This is a decent analogy.

Regarding the translations...you can't make sense of the *result*, which is why you ask someone to produce it for you. The desired result is outside of your capacity, so you can't decide to do a translation. Because you don't even know how. So you can only make one decision, and that decision is to outsource, be it to a person or a program.

Now...is the Babelfish translation a decision? I think it's more like a calculation made by a calculator. The input can only result in a pre-determined output.

The 8 ball is quite different from an automated translator. First, it's it is not influenced by *meaning*. The translator attaches two things together based on an association created by humans. The 8 ball is influenced...not exactly by randomness, right? The force with which it's shaken, gravity, fluid dynamics, all that *determine* which word pops up. But no meaning is involved. Meaning is not inherent to the 8 ball system, whereas meaning is in the design of the translator. And when does meaning enter the 8 ball system? When we recognize the word and apply it for a particular result.

I'm not sure if I made any substantial point in the previous paragraph, that's just my impression from thinking about the two entities.

Not me. I did nothing. The Magic 8 Ball was the apparatus which yielded the decision. A dumb, irrelevant, unreliable decision to be sure. But still, the agent of decision was the Magic 8 Ball.

What decision did it yield? You mean yes or no?

If the 8 Ball comes up yes...yes what? Yes to what? Let's say I'm sitting at my desk and just for the hell of it I shake the 8 ball, and it comes up no. No? No to what? No to me just shaking the 8 ball? But I just shook the 8 ball, what does no mean? In a vacuum, the word means *nothing*, or, the meaning of the word can be incomprehensible or irrelevant.

The 8 ball doesn't care whether or not there is a *reason* for being shook. If I am playing catch with my brother and I use the 8 ball, the 8 ball will produce a result. An irrelevant result. If I ask a question and the shake the 8 ball, the 8 ball behaves in the same way. What, all of a sudden it's relevant? How can that be? Did it know it was supposed to be relevant in that situation? If so, why didn't it know that when it was being tossed back and forth? But it knows nothing, it does things based on shaking, and it has no meaning inherently.

Again I don't know if I'm making any points, perhaps you could glean them for me and tell me what I'm trying to say. :)

-Elliot

(Mercutio, your conversation with the President is beyond my ken, and I'm grateful that Piggy deigns to speak to me at my level.)

chriswl

12th September 2006, 01:20 PM

chriswl, I think you might want to hold off before you slap a woo label on the notion that aggregation is insufficient to fully explain the behavior of macro-level systems.

It seems like some sane folks are interested in the theory.

Originally Posted by Publishers Weekly review of A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down:
"In the search for a "theory of everything," scientists scrutinize ever-smaller components of the universe.... Stanford physics professor [Robert] Laughlin, awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize for Physics, argues that smaller is not necessarily better. He proposes [that] if we try to analyze things too closely, we risk not understanding how they work on a macro level. In many cases, the whole exhibits properties that can't be explained by the behavior of its parts."

Originally Posted by Amazon review of Emergence: From Chaos to Order:
"Emergence" is the notion that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. John Holland, a MacArthur Fellow known as the "father of genetic algorithms," says this seemingly simple notion will be at the heart of the development of machines that can think for hemselves.

Woo?
No. In fact I don't necessarily disagree with any of that. But you were going much further.

You have to understand the perspective from which scientists are writing when they make statements like "the whole exhibits properties that can't be explained by the behavior of its parts." It is taken for granted that they have physicalist conception of the universe. They don't feel they need to spell that out (though in their popular writings perhaps they should).

I know you don't like philosophy, but philosophers are the ones who study the various nuances of meaning in cases like this. What you are proposing, in philosophical terms is known as strong emergence, and the passages you quoted are scientists arguing for weak emergence.

Two concepts of emergence

The term ‘emergence’ often causes confusion in science and philosophy, as it is used to express at least two quite different concepts. We can label these concepts strong emergence and weak emergence. Both of these concepts are important, but it is vital to keep them separate.

We can say that a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain.1 Strong emergence is the notion of emergence that is most common in philosophical discussions of emergence, and is the notion invoked by the British emergentists of the 1920s.

We can say that a high level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing the low-level domain. Weak emergence is the notion of emergence that is most common in recent scientific discussions of emergence, and is the notion that is typically invoked by proponents of emergence in complex systems theory.
http://consc.net/papers/emergence.pdf#search=%22emergence%20downward%20cau sation%22

What you are proposing is strong emergence with an extra twist - the emergent properties somehow cause changes in the underlying level. This has a name too, downward causation and it is even less likely to be supported by scienists. Downward causation makes little sense - it would require atoms to cease to be simple primitive elements responding in simple ways to fundamental forces but to be somehow aware of the "bigger picture".

hammegk

12th September 2006, 04:10 PM

Piggy

12th September 2006, 05:30 PM

What you are proposing is strong emergence with an extra twist - the emergent properties somehow cause changes in the underlying level. This has a name too, downward causation and it is even less likely to be supported by scienists. Downward causation makes little sense - it would require atoms to cease to be simple primitive elements responding in simple ways to fundamental forces but to be somehow aware of the "bigger picture".
Gotcha. No, I'm not advocating downward causation. I am saying that (1) downward causation would have to be true for free will to exist, and (2) it hasn't been eliminated yet.

I don't see why in the world an atom would have to be "aware" of anything for downward causation to occur.

As I said before, there does not exist any model which allows the emergent "i" to add information to the brain's feedback loop. But the field is young, and we don't know what we'll find.

Remember, the discoveries of QM at one time also "made little sense".

That's all I'm saying.

If downward causation were proven impossible, and therefore true free will as well, I would hardly be surprised.

I do support theories of strong emergence, however, although these are as yet only possibilities. Nothing's ready for the chisels and tablets, by a long shot.

Piggy

12th September 2006, 05:33 PM

Value and meaning are just as vital to my definition of free will it appears, so it's getting more complicated.
Ok, well, that's really all I was getting at originally. You left these out of your definition. If they're vital, you have to put them in. That's all.

Now I understand where you're coming from. Thanks.

Piggy

12th September 2006, 05:36 PM

Regarding the translations...you can't make sense of the *result*, which is why you ask someone to produce it for you. The desired result is outside of your capacity, so you can't decide to do a translation. Because you don't even know how. So you can only make one decision, and that decision is to outsource, be it to a person or a program.
I speak Spanish and have taught it and done translations, so actually, I could have chosen to do the work in this example. Perhaps I should have explained. FWIW.

President Bush

12th September 2006, 11:14 PM

Your behavior of responding to my post was not punished by my post; one could (although the sample size is small) argue that it was in fact reinforced by it, as you did continue responding.
Call it a spontaneous recovery from your extinction stimulis. A phrase like that ought to baffle just about everybody.

Who else here is arguing the dogma of radical behaviorism, anyhow?

You seem to think (damn those "mentalistic" terms) that this - the validity of radical behaviorism, the very point at issue (between you and I, at least) - has been conceded. You seem entirely unaware that any argument assuming a controversial point not agreed to by the other side constitutes a fallacy, Mercutio.

Do you actually believe that all practice must be in accord with Skinner's theories? Guess I should be grateful you're not quoting the Bible to justify religious superstition.

Why are you arguing for radical behaviorism on a Religion and Philosophy thread, anyhow? This belief system seems just awful philosophically. No freedom or creative innovation, no dignity, a lack of respect for the autonomy of others... here's a line of Skinner's I neglected to bold from a couple posts back:

This is only a special case of the general principle that the issue of personal freedom must not be allowed to interfere with the scientific analysis of human behavior. As we have seen, science implies prediction and, insofar as the relevant variables can be controlled, it implies control. We cannot expect to profit from applying the methods of science to human behavior if for some extraneous reason we refuse to admit that our subject matter can be controlled.
Or this, concerning his concept of reinforcement (from BF Skinner's The Behavior of Organisms: An Experimental Analysis):

The simplest contingencies involve at least three terms -- stimulus, response, and reinforcement -- and at least one other variable (the deprivation associated with the reinforcement) is implied.
Ah, who really cares about partially starving pigeons until they learn to play ping-pong (http://www.trivia-library.com/b/utopian-society-thinkers-b-f-skinner-part-1.htm)?

hodgy

16th September 2006, 07:14 PM

Ok, here's where you lose me.
Random does not mean uncaused.

In the context of this discussion it does. We are drawing a distinction between a caused event and an uncaused event (random).

All events have causes.

I am inclined to agree but can accept a logical objection.

Deterministic events have only one possible outcome for a given set of causes (including environmental variables). Random events do not have only one possible outcome, requiring that the range of outcomes be expressed in terms of probabilities.

I agree, please apply your logic to your own observations.

hodgy

16th September 2006, 07:26 PM

That's not true either.
If cause A within context B will always yeild result X, then the action thus described is entirely deterministic.

If cause A within context B will yeild result X in 60% of trials, result Y in 30% of trials, and result Z in 10% of trials, then the action thus described is to some extent random.

Agreed - there is a random factor in your second scenario.

Quantum behavior is to some extent random because no matter how strictly we control the initial conditions and environment, we can only describe the outcomes in terms of probabilities.

So. as per my original analysis, there is either a genuine random element or an unknown factor. I bet on the unknown factor but that is beside the point.

Rolling dice at a craps table is random

No it isn't - it only has the appearance of being random to an observer who is not cognisent of all the causal factors. That is not the same as truly random.

To define random as "having no cause or being its own cause" is a highly unorthodox, even idiosyncratic, definition of the term. Seems to me that events which have no cause or are their own cause would be some type of singularity.

I can drop the use of the term 'random' if you like - we can say 'uncaused' instead. It doesn't change the logic though.

hodgy

16th September 2006, 07:31 PM

Me, neither.

That is not my contention.

My argument is based on the locus of change within the brain/mind system.*

If the conscious "i" is only "along for the ride" -- that is, if non-conscious modules are doing 100% of the work, and it only seems to us like we consider and decide, for example, that we want paper instead of plastic -- then there's no free will.

On the other hand, if the "i" is not merely passive, but may be meaningfully said to be an active element in the feedback loop that underlies the activity of the mind and gives rise to the emergent phenomenon of consciousness itself, then free will is possible.

*"Mind" being defined here as a particular subset of brain activity, specifically that which we identify with what may be commonly called "the conscious self".

It doesn't matter how many addtional loops you propose, you are still ultimately referring to the same concsiousness. Why do you not consider the causes operating on or within your "i"?

Piggy

16th September 2006, 07:45 PM

In the context of this discussion it does. We are drawing a distinction between a caused event and an uncaused event (random).

Huh? What's wrong with the terms "caused" and "uncaused" if that's the distinction you're trying to draw.

ETA: I see that you propose this in a later post. Sorry for jumping the gun.

I agree, please apply your logic to your own observations.
Can you be more specific, please?

Piggy

16th September 2006, 07:47 PM

It doesn't matter how many addtional loops you propose, you are still ultimately referring to the same concsiousness. Why do you not consider the causes operating on or within your "i"?
I'm sorry, I don't understand this.

Mercutio

16th September 2006, 07:48 PM

Sorry, missed this before. I will only comment on a couple of things...
Call it a spontaneous recovery from your extinction stimulis. A phrase like that ought to baffle just about everybody.
When you use technical terms incorrectly, don't be surprised when people are baffled. This is not the fault of the vocabulary, but the speaker. The vocabulary of quantum mechanics is well understood by some, but used as a smokescreen by others. Same here.

Who else here is arguing the dogma of radical behaviorism, anyhow?

You seem to think (damn those "mentalistic" terms) that this - the validity of radical behaviorism, the very point at issue (between you and I, at least) - has been conceded. You seem entirely unaware that any argument assuming a controversial point not agreed to by the other side constitutes a fallacy, Mercutio.
"Think" is not a mentalistic term. Thinking is a behavior, albeit a private one.

As far as I can see, I am not engaged in a debate with you. When you misrepresent behaviorism, I try to point it out.
Do you actually believe that all practice must be in accord with Skinner's theories? Guess I should be grateful you're not quoting the Bible to justify religious superstition.
Skinner is dead; Radical Behaviorism is still a living science. So far, your statements are still getting the basics wrong; if you would like to move on to post-Skinner topics, you will have to master the basics first.

Why are you arguing for radical behaviorism on a Religion and Philosophy thread, anyhow? This belief system seems just awful philosophically. No freedom or creative innovation, no dignity, a lack of respect for the autonomy of others... here's a line of Skinner's I neglected to bold from a couple posts back:
You cite it, you quote it, but you show no signs of understanding it. In a nutshell, he basically comments on your paragraph above: You reject this view out of hand, and have blinkered yourself from the evidence that threatens your world-view.
Or this, concerning his concept of reinforcement (from BF Skinner's The Behavior of Organisms: An Experimental Analysis):
Thanks for that! That is very early Skinner, of course; since then, other researchers have greatly expanded our knowledge about reinforcement. Food deprivation (despite your complaint below, lab pigeons on deprivation schedules are at equivalent weights to wild pigeons; the "free-feeding weight" is the uncommon state) is still used, but not always, and Premack's principle does not rely on deprivation at all.
Ah, who really cares about partially starving pigeons until they learn to play ping-pong (http://www.trivia-library.com/b/utopian-society-thinkers-b-f-skinner-part-1.htm)?
Took a quick look at your link; you have used it before, and I complained about it then, too. It was written in 1975, updated in 1981...does not even have a death date for Skinner. The first paragraph contains one glaring error ("behaviorism, a branch of psychology that likens human (sic) to machines"-- Cognitive psych does that, of course...but behaviorism likens humans to...other animals), and the last paragraph (only 4 paragraphs? And they choose these examples to represent his whole career?) misrepresents the Aircrib as a modified operant chamber. It was not. It was closer to a modified crib. Tremendously practical, but misrepresented horribly.

Hmmm... a trend. In order to dismiss Behaviorist claims, opponents have consistently misrepresented them. ("Case histories in the great power of steady misrepresentation." (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1482006&dopt=Citation)

Piggy

16th September 2006, 07:54 PM

misrepresents the Aircrib as a modified operant chamber. It was not. It was closer to a modified crib. Tremendously practical, but misrepresented horribly.
Hey, that reminds me... didn't he raise his daughter in a Skinner box?

(Sorry, couldn't resist.)

Mercutio

16th September 2006, 09:47 PM

Hey, that reminds me... didn't he raise his daughter in a Skinner box?

(Sorry, couldn't resist.)

bastard.

Actually, I know someone who was raised using an aircrib; a perfectly normal person....

oh, well...

President Bush

16th September 2006, 10:17 PM

A behaviorist's experiment-running behavior is determined by her/his interaction with environment; it is both shaped by contingencies and an instance of "rule-governed" behavior (an entirely different can of worms we can get into if you would like--the cliff-notes version is that we are reinforced for following rules, which allows us to learn the gist of some complex behaviors very quickly). What it is not, is a freely chosen spontaneous creation, independent from environmental influences.
Have it your way. Radical behaviorism explains away acts of creativity, including those
including information impossible for the individual to have previously known.

:p

Piggy

16th September 2006, 10:22 PM

Radical behaviorism explains away acts of creativity, including those including information impossible for the individual to have previously known.
Got any examples of those?

President Bush

16th September 2006, 10:44 PM

Got any examples of those?
Einstein's Theory of Relativity. Handel's Messiah. Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

President Bush

16th September 2006, 10:56 PM

Just thought of this (http://www.armstrongwynne.org/kekule.html). And this (http://home.gil.com.au/~bredshaw/tesla.htm), too.

Piggy

16th September 2006, 11:43 PM

Einstein's Theory of Relativity. Handel's Messiah. Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.
Where's the previously unknown information?

hodgy

17th September 2006, 06:09 AM

I'm sorry, I don't understand this.

I'll try to be more detailed...

My argument is based on the locus of change within the brain/mind system.*

If the conscious "i" is only "along for the ride" -- that is, if non-conscious modules are doing 100% of the work, and it only seems to us like we consider and decide, for example, that we want paper instead of plastic -- then there's no free will.

Ok

On the other hand, if the "i" is not merely passive, but may be meaningfully said to be an active element in the feedback loop that underlies the activity of the mind and gives rise to the emergent phenomenon of consciousness itself, then free will is possible.

Your conscious 'i' having an effect on your non-conscious elements does not provide for free will. Suppose 'i' chooses paper instead of plastic - we can ask why did 'i' choose paper?. The choice could either be completely pre-determined by prior state or not (in which case we can say there is a random element to the choice).

You have said on this thread that a totally determined choice does not allow free will. You have also said that free will is not simply the possibility of random events. There is nothing else left for it to be other than simply the appearance of free will.

Piggy

17th September 2006, 07:36 AM

Thanks for the bump, hodgy.

Your conscious 'i' having an effect on your non-conscious elements does not provide for free will. Suppose 'i' chooses paper instead of plastic - we can ask why did 'i' choose paper?. The choice could either be completely pre-determined by prior state or not (in which case we can say there is a random element to the choice).

You have said on this thread that a totally determined choice does not allow free will. You have also said that free will is not simply the possibility of random events. There is nothing else left for it to be other than simply the appearance of free will.
Gotcha.

I have an answer but it's fuzzy. Will have to make sure I get it down in a way that's not sloppy and vague.

But be forewarned, I'm not saying that this model will be likely to be true. Just that it is not yet disallowed by what we know.

President Bush

17th September 2006, 07:58 AM

Where's the previously unknown information?
Have you broken your glasses?

Piggy

17th September 2006, 08:01 AM

Have you broken your glasses?
No, but thanks for asking.

Now, you gonna answer the question?

Seems like you're looking at flour, sugar, and eggs going into a pan and being put in an oven, then when it comes out of the oven asking, "Hey, where'd that cake come from?!"

Infinite

17th September 2006, 08:11 AM

Some people obviously have or feel they have more free will than others. In that I mean the ability to do as they feel whenever they feel it.
It's all about the brain and your particular genetics. If you a mentally ill "crazy" person/killer than you may feel you have the free will to kill. If you are a person who suffers from the anxiety disorder agoraphobia you will feel that you do not have the free will even to leave your own home. Your brian chemistry and genetics determine how your brain thinks and responds to various situations. There it is in a nut-shell, free will.

President Bush

17th September 2006, 08:45 AM

Seems like you're looking at flour, sugar, and eggs going into a pan and being put in an oven, then when it comes out of the oven asking, "Hey, where'd that cake come from?!"
Cake?

I was certain that it was a cheese danish which first stated an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum.

Piggy

17th September 2006, 09:01 AM

I was certain that it was a cheese danish which first stated an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum.
Does this mean you don't understand my analogy? Or am I not understanding yours?

AmateurScientist

17th September 2006, 09:09 AM

Does this mean you don't understand my analogy? Or am I not understanding yours?

I think he takes his moniker and avatar and runs with them from time to time, and he's taking yours and running as well. "...broken your glasses?"

I see it as all in good fun.

I get your analogy; so does he.

AS

Piggy

17th September 2006, 09:12 AM

I get your analogy; so does he.
Well, ok. The babble at the end made it seem to me that he was portraying my analogy as gibberish.

hammegk

17th September 2006, 09:22 AM

It was, and is. Category errors do seem to excite you.

RandFan

17th September 2006, 11:46 AM

Well, ok. The babble at the end made it seem to me that he was portraying my analogy as gibberish. I got your analogy also. Flight is another good one and perhaps in some ways better. Emergence, see Dennett.

Mercutio

17th September 2006, 06:24 PM

Have it your way. Radical behaviorism explains away acts of creativity, including those
including information impossible for the individual to have previously known.

:pI am very sorry to say that you have dissappointed me. I had had such hopes. You listened to the entire lecture on having a poem (major points there), but your post here demonstrates that you continue to either misunderstand or misrepresent.

Shaping through successive approximation (this is elementary stuff, Pres.!) routinely results in behaviors well beyond the starting repertoire of the individual. Scientific discovery, like shaping, builds upon what has come before ("shoulders of giants", anyone?); your claim that behaviorism and acts of creativity are incompatible misrepresents either behaviorism or creativity...or both.

Could you perhaps simply be straightforward and state what it is that bothers you about [your understanding of] behaviorism? You seem to find it offensive far above and beyond your understanding of it. You seem so certain, yet make very elementary mistakes. I would honestly expect someone with your level of understanding to be more uncertain, to acknowledge a lack of complete understanding. You demonstrate a certainty out of proportion to your understanding.

Have you recently taken a class in cognitive psychology?

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

17th September 2006, 07:02 PM

I don't have the patience to read my own thread. Did we figure out what libertarian free will is?

~~ Paul

Piggy

17th September 2006, 07:20 PM

I got your analogy also. Flight is another good one and perhaps in some ways better. Emergence, see Dennett.
Hmmm... I didn't think PB was going for the emergence angle. Anyway, I'll lurk and wait for a response.

Note to hodgy: Thanks much for your post. I'd been treating the "i" as a black box, which is sloppy. Now that I try to formulate the idea more completely, the entire model may fall apart, even if strong emergence (including downward causation) were granted.

I still haven't thought it all through -- tricky stuff to get the head around. But muchas gracias for pointing me to that door.

RandFan

18th September 2006, 01:49 AM

Hmmm... I didn't think PB was going for the emergence angle.Hmmm.... me neither. I thought you were.

It seems to me that a cake is more than simply the sum of its parts. If we put the ingredients together, throw in some chaos (mixer) and add a bit of energy (heat), something emerges that isn't easily recognizable as its constituent parts. I apologize if I misunderstood your analogy.

Piggy

18th September 2006, 06:41 AM

Hmmm.... me neither. I thought you were.

It seems to me that a cake is more than simply the sum of its parts. If we put the ingredients together, throw in some chaos (mixer) and add a bit of energy (heat), something emerges that isn't easily recognizable as its constituent parts. I apologize if I misunderstood your analogy.
Oh, no, I wasn't referencing emergence there. I just wanted to know where he thought the missing information was. Given his examples, I don't see anything inexplicable from a behaviorist perspective. Seemed to me like he was merely looking at the outcome, not seeing it in the inputs, and inferring some "missing information" that's not actually missing.

RandFan

18th September 2006, 08:35 AM

Oh, no, I wasn't referencing emergence there. I just wanted to know where he thought the missing information was. Given his examples, I don't see anything inexplicable from a behaviorist perspective. Seemed to me like he was merely looking at the outcome, not seeing it in the inputs, and inferring some "missing information" that's not actually missing. Cool, thanks. I agree with you.

President Bush

18th September 2006, 08:40 AM

I am very sorry to say that you have dissappointed me. I had had such hopes. You listened to the entire lecture on having a poem (major points there), but your post here demonstrates that you continue to either misunderstand or misrepresent.

Shaping through successive approximation (this is elementary stuff, Pres.!) routinely results in behaviors well beyond the starting repertoire of the individual. Scientific discovery, like shaping, builds upon what has come before ("shoulders of giants", anyone?); your claim that behaviorism and acts of creativity are incompatible misrepresents either behaviorism or creativity...or both.
Assuming controversial points not agreed to by the other side is known as begging the question, Mercutio.

That you're disappointed has little to do with my understanding of Skinner's point in on having a poem. When it comes to acts of creativity of real magnitude Skinner's lecture IMO doesn't come mean a thing.

Can you explain - using the theories of Radical behaviorism - how Nikola Tesla came up with his idea of a rotating magnetic field?

President Bush

18th September 2006, 08:43 AM

I just wanted to know where he thought the missing information was.
Prior to an act of creativity what is, subsequently, created is missing?

Piggy

18th September 2006, 11:18 AM

Prior to an act of creativity what is, subsequently, created is missing?
Funny you should phrase that as a question b/c that's my question to you.

This is like saying that when a 6 year old assembles a square with tinker toys, this can't be explained, because there was no square earlier, just tinker toys.

I ask you again -- what information is missing?

Don't just point to the poem and say there was no poem before. That's obvious.

What information is unaccounted for in the process?

Mercutio

18th September 2006, 12:10 PM

Assuming controversial points not agreed to by the other side is known as begging the question, Mercutio.
Controversial? We haven't reached those yet--this is the elementary stuff still.

That you're disappointed has little to do with my understanding of Skinner's point in on having a poem. When it comes to acts of creativity of real magnitude Skinner's lecture IMO doesn't come mean a thing.
Is "of real magnitude" moving the goalposts? Are creative leaps "of real magnitude" distinguishable from those that are incrementally achieved, but which you are ignorant of the incremental progress?

Can you explain - using the theories of Radical behaviorism - how Nikola Tesla came up with his idea of a rotating magnetic field?Funny thing...I am far out of my field on this one, and thought about simply saying "I don't know enough about it". Still don't, really, but I do want to comment just a bit. First, it appears that he had been working for some time on "trying to solve the puzzle of rotating magnetic field". The work on induction had already been well established, since Faraday and before.

Perhaps one of our resident experts knows more about the particular story of this discovery, but it appears to me to be the result of lots of hard work by an intelligent person building on what had been discovered previously.

If you can get me more information about what was going on in his life and in his lab, I can try to translate it to behaviorism for you.

President Bush

19th September 2006, 12:27 AM

Funny you should phrase that as a question b/c that's my question to you.

This is like saying that when a 6 year old assembles a square with tinker toys, this can't be explained, because there was no square earlier, just tinker toys.

I ask you again -- what information is missing?

Don't just point to the poem and say there was no poem before. That's obvious.

What information is unaccounted for in the process?
Who's going to win the NFL Denver at New England game this weekend?

President Bush

19th September 2006, 12:44 AM

Funny thing...I am far out of my field on this one, and thought about simply saying "I don't know enough about it". Still don't, really, but I do want to comment just a bit. First, it appears that he had been working for some time on "trying to solve the puzzle of rotating magnetic field". The work on induction had already been well established, since Faraday and before.
Who holds this (http://patimg2.uspto.gov/.piw?Docid=00381968&homeurl=http%3A%2F%2Fpatft.uspto.gov%2Fnetacgi%2Fn ph-Parser%3FSect1%3DPTO1%2526Sect2%3DHITOFF%2526d%3DP ALL%2526p%3D1%2526u%3D%25252Fnetahtml%25252FPTO%25 252Fsrchnum.htm%2526r%3D1%2526f%3DG%2526l%3D50%252 6s1%3D0381968.PN.%2526OS%3DPN%2F0381968%2526RS%3DP N%2F0381968&PageNum=&Rtype=&SectionNum=&idkey=NONE&Input=View+first+page)? The international unit of magnetic flux density is not called a Faraday, is it?

Can you explain - using the theories of Radical behaviorism - how Nikola Tesla came up with his idea of a rotating magnetic field?
Why don't you just say 'no'?

Piggy

19th September 2006, 03:09 AM

Who's going to win the NFL Denver at New England game this weekend?
Why do you respond to my questions with babble? If you just pulled the "new information" business out of your ear, just say so, and I'll drop it.

Piggy

19th September 2006, 03:11 AM

Why don't you just say 'no'?
Because to say "no" would give the impression that he could describe this event, but not explain it behavioristically. It would be misleading.

I'm starting to think you're just trolling now.

Mercutio

19th September 2006, 06:05 AM

Any explanation, after the fact, would be a sort of "just-so story". This would include Tesla's own account; it is easily demonstrated that we are often unaware of influences on our behavior. In order to adequately establish causality, one would have to be able to manipulate the variables, not merely observe correlations.

So in that sense, not only can behaviorism not explain the event, but neither can any other theory. But that, while true, is trivial. We constantly try to make attributions about behavior in the absence of sufficient information. So I interpreted the question as "would it be possible to explain it, if one had access to the information?" It could, after all, be the case that someone with no training in physics, no experience with the problem, no exposure to the volumes of information available to Tesla, happened to be drinking schnapps at a local pub when it hit him: the answer to the rotating magnetic field! In this case, the more we know about the person in question, the more improbable the discovery becomes. With Tesla, though, each new bit of information shows a piece of his puzzle solved here, another there...it was still one of the greatest discoveries of all time, but the myth of it springing from his head like Athena from Zeus is just a myth.

And the benefit of this particular "just-so story" is that, unlike some of the previous explanations of human behavior (say, Freud), this one generates testable hypotheses. What is more, these testable hypotheses have yielded substantial results. When we treat human behavior scientifically (which includes the working assumption of "no free will"--after all, if gravity had free will, Newton's laws would never have been discovered), we harness the same process that made Tesla's discovery possible to the problems of human behavior. By assuming, until evidence points otherwise, that our behavior is lawfully controlled by our environment, we have made lives better.

"Free will" as an assumption might make some feel better about their special status, but it is a dead end. Clinging to it does not allow progress to be made in understanding one another. In a world where we can easily see problems brought about by our behavior, I would much rather understand its reality than take comfort in an illusion.

President Bush

19th September 2006, 10:44 AM

If you just pulled the "new information" business out of your ear, just say so, and I'll drop it.
Take an entirely novel idea: E=MC2... was it "missing" prior to Einstein?

You seem to be saying so and it's hard to take that seriously.

President Bush

19th September 2006, 10:51 AM

By assuming, until evidence points otherwise, that our behavior is lawfully controlled by our environment, we have made lives better.

You're refering to public schooling and autistic children, I assume. Where will uninstitutionalized adults such as you or I benefit from the theories of Radical Behaviorism in our life today?

Not referring to your job teaching Radical Behaviorism, of course. :p

Piggy

19th September 2006, 03:37 PM

Take an entirely novel idea: E=MC2... was it "missing" prior to Einstein?

You seem to be saying so and it's hard to take that seriously.
Let's not change the frame of reference, please. The equation was novel. So if you compare the world prior and the world post, there's a difference. However, when you analyze inputs and outputs, I don't see any "missing information". Again, you're seeing flour, sugar, and eggs go in, and cake come out, and asking where the cake came from.

hammegk

19th September 2006, 04:51 PM

Often materialists' thoughts appear to have no more intrinsic value than flour, sugar, or eggs, and the odd part is -- materialists choose to have faith that is so!

Piggy

19th September 2006, 07:35 PM

Suppose 'i' chooses paper instead of plastic - we can ask why did 'i' choose paper?. The choice could either be completely pre-determined by prior state or not (in which case we can say there is a random element to the choice).
hodgy, let me just say that you are damn inconvenient. I was perfectly happy with my little black box, and you have to go smashing it open.

So far I haven't been able to hold Humpty Dumpty together.

Muchas gracias. I do appreciate a good debu**sh**ifier.

JayT

19th September 2006, 07:43 PM

A thread in the Science section got sidetracked to the question of true free will. It was suggested that we continue that topic here.

I hope Piggy will regale us with his ideas about "true" or "genuine" free will, which is called libertarian free will in the philosophy biz.

~~ Paul

Free will is not knowing or being able to prove one way or the other if someone else is controlling everything you think, do and say.

Women are especially skilled at making you think that you came up with that bright idea that they actually planted in your head from the start.

LOL

President Bush

19th September 2006, 09:35 PM

Let's not change the frame of reference, please. The equation was novel. So if you compare the world prior and the world post, there's a difference. However, when you analyze inputs and outputs, I don't see any "missing information". Again, you're seeing flour, sugar, and eggs go in, and cake come out, and asking where the cake came from.
There seems to be an echo in the conch, Piggy... I'm not following you (been driving my truck all day). Would you please reconcile this with what, I assume, first set you off: this sentence.

Radical behaviorism explains away acts of creativity, including those including information impossible for the individual to have previously known.

Piggy

20th September 2006, 04:36 AM

Would you please reconcile this with what, I assume, first set you off: this sentence.

Radical behaviorism explains away acts of creativity, including those including information impossible for the individual to have previously known.
Sure thing. You are referencing "acts of creativity... including information impossible for the individual to have previously known."

When asked for examples, you merely cited the results of acts of creativity:
Einstein's Theory of Relativity. Handel's Messiah. Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.
When asked specifically what information -- involved in the acts which produced these outcomes -- was "impossible for the individual to have previously known", you again pointed to the outcomes.

As I have said, this is like saying that the known laws of nature cannot explain how we get cake, because at first there was no cake, and now there is cake.

You haven't pointed to any part of the process and explained "Here is where information was introduced which could not possibly have been known to the person developing the theory/composition".

Suppose, for example, I develop the "cat scratched up my sofa" theory. I developed this theory by coming home and seeing my sofa scratched up, noting that the house does not appear to have been entered in my absence, and also noting pieces of upholstery (matching my sofa) clinging to one of the cats' claws. Here we have a new thing in the universe, a new theory which did not before exist. Yet there was no "information impossible for the individual to have previously known" involved.

So I ask you yet again -- where is this information of which you speak?

President Bush

20th September 2006, 07:04 AM

You haven't pointed to any part of the process and explained "Here is where information was introduced which could not possibly have been known to the person developing the theory/composition".
The information impossible for the individual to have previously known - which I referred to in the sentence "acts of creativity including those including information impossible for the individual to have previously known" - is what is composed in the creative act itself.

Have you thought about using some tape to fix those glasses? :duck:

Mercutio

20th September 2006, 09:11 AM

The information impossible for the individual to have previously known - which I referred to in the sentence "acts of creativity including those including information impossible for the individual to have previously known" - is what is composed in the creative act itself.

In shaping through successive approximation, a rat (or pigeon, or dog, or monkey, or person, or group of people) is trained to do something that was not previously in its (or their) behavioral repertoire. Your phrase "impossible for the individual to have previously known" is, of course, an assumption; we could agree that it is at least not something the individual has previously demonstrated. In this case, a history of reinforcement has already been shown, countless times, to result in behavior not previously exhibited.

We can also differentially reinforce novel behavior (or combinations of behaviors); in this case, we do not specify beforehand what is to be reinforced, but simply reinforce any behavior not previously exhibited. Under this schedule, dolphins (as but one example) have performed complex tricks that their trainers had never even considered teaching them.

"Acts of creativity" are not a fatal blow to behaviorism. Not even close.

Piggy

20th September 2006, 09:57 AM

President Bush

20th September 2006, 09:02 PM

In shaping through successive approximation, a rat (or pigeon, or dog, or monkey, or person, or group of people) is trained to do something that was not previously in its (or their) behavioral repertoire. Your phrase "impossible for the individual to have previously known" is, of course, an assumption; we could agree that it is at least not something the individual has previously demonstrated. In this case, a history of reinforcement has already been shown, countless times, to result in behavior not previously exhibited.

We can also differentially reinforce novel behavior (or combinations of behaviors); in this case, we do not specify beforehand what is to be reinforced, but simply reinforce any behavior not previously exhibited. Under this schedule, dolphins (as but one example) have performed complex tricks that their trainers had never even considered teaching them.
What does your occasionally feeding a rat have to do with a self-directed Albert Einstein visualizing a representation of the universe in which he imagines himself racing a beam of light?

I know, Mercutio. Nothing at all.

Radical Behaviorism denies that individuals can act in a self-directed way, much less operate mentally within a creatively-imagined representation of their choosing.

Hey, what happened with this?

Where will uninstitutionalized adults such as you or I benefit from the theories of Radical Behaviorism in our life today?

President Bush

20th September 2006, 09:20 PM

So you're saying that my "cat scratched the sofa" theory involves some information that was impossible for me to have known before I connected the dots?

Again, you're amazed at where this cake came from.
Don't know what you're talking about. If the cake came from Mercutio's lab it comes at a price. :p

Piggy

21st September 2006, 05:23 AM

Don't know what you're talking about.
Then I'll type slowly.

You claim that certain creative processes require the introduction of information which it was impossible for the individual to have previously known.

When asked for examples, you point to outcomes, such as Einstein's Theory of Relativity, Handel's Messiah, and Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

When asked where the previously-unkown information is, you point to Einstein's Theory of Relativity, Handel's Messiah, and Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

This is like me claiming that certain construction projects require the use of materials which could not possibly have existed before the objects were built.

When asked for examples, I cite the statue of Christ Redeemer, the US Capitol building, and the Taj Majal.

When asked specifically where the previously nonexistant materials are, I once again point to the statue of Christ Redeemer, the US Capitol building, and the Taj Majal.

Do you see what I'm getting at, here?

If you're going to make the claim that these results require the introduction of information that would have been impossible for the men creating the results to have known, then you have to at least point out what this information is and where it was introduced.

Otherwise, you're saying nothing at all.

President Bush

21st September 2006, 08:11 AM

If you're going to make the claim that these results require the introduction of information that would have been impossible for the men creating the results to have known, then you have to at least point out what this information is and where it was introduced.
I haven't claimed any introduction of information took place which then resulted in a creative act, Piggy. Read what I wrote.

The information impossible for the individual to have previously known - which I referred to in the sentence "acts of creativity including those including information impossible for the individual to have previously known" - is what is composed in the creative act itself.
Is an assumption that Radical Behaviorism is relevant to the issue muddying the waters here? Radical Behaviorism IMO would add unnecessary steps to the process (to convert thinking into "behavior"). So-called complex behaviors - like "what if E=MC2?" - are acquired through a program of (external) discriminative stimulis and reinforcement.

Similar to this?

the claim that these results require the introduction of information that would have been impossible for the men creating the results to have known

Mercutio

21st September 2006, 08:39 AM

What does your occasionally feeding a rat have to do with a self-directed Albert Einstein visualizing a representation of the universe in which he imagines himself racing a beam of light?
Do we need, once more, to examine this like we did Tesla? If you are right, the more we look at the details, the more amazed we will be--there will be no gradual progression toward the discovery, but rather a leap of insight which could not have been predicted. If the behaviorists are right, the more we know about it, the more his discoveries will be seen as the product of his experience.

So... Other physicists agree that had Einstein not made these discoveries, others would have. We know that his 1905 papers were preceded by three others, from 1902 to 1904, in which his ideas are clearly "in progress". We know that some of the topic areas were current "hot topics" (Brownian motion was one) in which there was a great deal of interest and writing which he would have had access to. We know that he had an active collaborater in his wife (at least one Russian journal lists her (http://www.pbs.org/opb/einsteinswife/science/mquest.htm) as co-author of at least some of the 1905 papers. His dislike of statistics was compensated by her facility with it. We know that he had been exposed to science at the dinner table from a young age, and that he had been thinking about physics at a deep level since his childhood. His environment was clearly one which facilitated and reinforced inquiry.

A hundred years is quite a distance to look back, but we clearly see that the details fill in. Einstein was a remarkable man, but it does not diminish his discoveries to point out the role of his environment in bringing them to fruition.

I know, Mercutio. Nothing at all.
Oh, that's ok. As you asked it, it was a trick question anyway. "A self-directed Albert Einstein", your assertion, is a strawman Einstein. Truly, there is no connection between real science and this fictional character. But, if you asked whether the schedules of reinforcement discovered through rat studies could shed light on the real Albert Einstein's work, then you have another answer altogether. (Of course, what I wrote earlier about "just-so stories" still holds true, although it holds equally true for any attempted explanation of his achievements, even yours.)

Radical Behaviorism denies that individuals can act in a self-directed way, much less operate mentally within a creatively-imagined representation of their choosing.
Oooh, nice choice of words. "Denies" is good; it implicitly frames the problem in terms of something that exists, but is denied. Politicians love this word. How different it is to say that Radical Behaviorism will not, without evidence, invent fictional entities or processes to explain away ignorance. We would rather look to real influences, and leave story-telling to others. When you have any evidence of self-direction in the absence of environmental determinism, get back to me. Evidence, please, not wishful thinking.

Hey, what happened with this?
I was giving it time. I have too many friends with autistic kids (and count many autistic adults among my friends--including at least 3 highly-respected posters to this forum) not to take offense at your marginalization of people with autism.

Certainly, if you are ceding successes in both education and autism (and you would be an idiot not to, with the track record there), behaviorism has already shown its worth. In addition to this, there have been applications to "uninstitutionalized adults" in areas from smoking cessation to athletic performance to automobile safety to medicine (pain management, cardiovascular disease, adherence to medical regimens) to environmental issues, crime prevention, occupational safety...

...In some cases, the methodologies of radical behaviorism are used by others who do not adopt that label; because it works, it is used. Applied Social Psychology often uses the methodology and/or philosophy of behaviorism, in issues from decreasing workplace stress to protesting nuclear war.

Do you have anything beyond arguments from ignorance?

Mercutio

21st September 2006, 08:45 AM

Is an assumption that Radical Behaviorism is relevant to the issue muddying the waters here? Radical Behaviorism IMO would add unnecessary steps to the process (to convert thinking into "behavior"). So-called complex behaviors - like "what if E=MC2?" - are acquired through a program of (external) discriminative stimulis and reinforcement.
Please do not try to tell us what Radical Behaviorism "would add". If there is one thing behaviorism is, it is parsimonious. The accusations against behaviorism are virtually always that we are oversimplifying.

We do not "convert thinking into 'behavior'"; such a step is only necessary if you are assuming that thinking is somehow something more than behavior in the first place. Your "added step" is actually the removal of a superfluous step. You are allowing yourself to be blinkered by mentalistic assumptions.

Piggy

21st September 2006, 09:34 AM

I haven't claimed any introduction of information took place which then resulted in a creative act, Piggy. Read what I wrote.

The information impossible for the individual to have previously known - which I referred to in the sentence "acts of creativity including those including information impossible for the individual to have previously known" - is what is composed in the creative act itself.

Why don't you try reading what you wrote.

"The information impossible for the individual to previously have known ... is what is composed in the creative act itself".

Again, I challenge you to stop making generic references to the results and pony up by getting specific.

I understand what you're saying -- you're claiming that the new configuration of ideas, and resulting insights, is "new" information which didn't exist before, and that behaviorism somehow can't account for this in its models.

Yet you don't seem to be at all concerned that you can't describe why or how, or point to any specifics in the process to demonstrate your claim.

When I come up with my "cat scratched the sofa theory", it's true that the information "the cat shredded my sofa" did not exist before I thought of it.

But where -- oh, where -- in the process of my examining the evidence, considering it, and reaching a conclusion is there anything which is impossible for a behaviorist model to account for?

President Bush

21st September 2006, 08:29 PM

Do we need, once more, to examine this like we did Tesla? If you are right, the more we look at the details, the more amazed we will be--there will be no gradual progression toward the discovery, but rather a leap of insight which could not have been predicted.
Prediction and control are the objectives of science according to Skinner. I guess he wasn't talking about physics.

If the behaviorists are right, the more we know about it, the more his discoveries will be seen as the product of his experience.
Yet not solely the product of his environment as, I believe, Radical Behaviorism would have it. Einstein achieved something beyond his conditioning.

So... Other physicists agree that had Einstein not made these discoveries, others would have. We know that his 1905 papers were preceded by three others, from 1902 to 1904, in which his ideas are clearly "in progress". We know that some of the topic areas were current "hot topics" (Brownian motion was one) in which there was a great deal of interest and writing which he would have had access to. We know that he had an active collaborater in his wife (at least one Russian journal lists her as co-author of at least some of the 1905 papers. His dislike of statistics was compensated by her facility with it. We know that he had been exposed to science at the dinner table from a young age, and that he had been thinking about physics at a deep level since his childhood. His environment was clearly one which facilitated and reinforced inquiry.
That one of his contemporaries was on the verge of formulating an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum is conjecture. That his motivation for working on his theories was partially influenced (not entirely controlled) by his environment isn't being argued (nice straw man).

"A self-directed Albert Einstein", your assertion, is a strawman Einstein. Truly, there is no connection between real science and this fictional character. But, if you asked whether the schedules of reinforcement discovered through rat studies could shed light on the real Albert Einstein's work, then you have another answer altogether.
Skinner believed that that all behavior is externally controlled and that behavior is solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions. To distinguish who I was talking about from an Albert Einstein whose thinking was solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions, I used the term "self-directed".

When you have any evidence of self-direction in the absence of environmental determinism, get back to me.
Think about that sentence a while, Mercutio.

I have too many friends with autistic kids (and count many autistic adults among my friends--including at least 3 highly-respected posters to this forum) not to take offense at your marginalization of people with autism.
I certainly did not intend to marginalize anyone with autism. A close friend of mine has Tourette Syndrome. I'm continually amazed at his imperturbability when confronted by the odd looks.

... there have been applications to "uninstitutionalized adults" in areas from smoking cessation to athletic performance to automobile safety to medicine (pain management, cardiovascular disease, adherence to medical regimens) to environmental issues, crime prevention, occupational safety...

...In some cases, the methodologies of radical behaviorism are used by others who do not adopt that label; because it works, it is used. Applied Social Psychology often uses the methodology and/or philosophy of behaviorism, in issues from decreasing workplace stress to protesting nuclear war.
If these applications are externally controlled and solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions... no thanks.

You are allowing yourself to be blinkered by mentalistic assumptions.
Do you have an example?

Piggy

21st September 2006, 09:07 PM

You are allowing yourself to be blinkered by mentalistic assumptions.
Do you have an example?
Yes. The things that you've said.

How do you like that kind of logic now?

Mercutio

21st September 2006, 09:34 PM

Prediction and control are the objectives of science according to Skinner. I guess he wasn't talking about physics.
And what do you guess the objectives of science are?
Yet not solely the product of his environment as, I believe, Radical Behaviorism would have it. Einstein achieved something beyond his conditioning. Because you say so, I suppose.
That one of his contemporaries was on the verge of formulating an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum is conjecture. That his motivation for working on his theories was partially influenced (not entirely controlled) by his environment isn't being argued (nice straw man).
Please enlighten us as to how you intend to discriminate between what you call "free will" from your ignorance of environmental influence.

I explained my reasoning--that if you were right, closer examination would not reveal more and more environmental factors. Consistent with environmental determinism, the closer we look, the more influence we see; the popular picture of Einstein's ideas as a miraculous is simply a myth. If you remain unconvinced, look to your example; when you choose examples that are 100 years old, do not complain when only "partial" influence is found.
Skinner believed that that all behavior is externally controlled and that behavior is solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions. To distinguish who I was talking about from an Albert Einstein whose thinking was solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions, I used the term "self-directed".Once again, argument from ignorance. Self-direction, in this case, is purely your assertion.
Think about that sentence a while, Mercutio. Have you realized the logical impossibility?
I certainly did not intend to marginalize anyone with autism. A close friend of mine has Tourette Syndrome. I'm continually amazed at his imperturbability when confronted by the odd looks.
I'll take your word for it, and gladly. I have heard too many people say what I thought you were saying; I am very happy to hear I was wrong in my assumption.
If these applications are externally controlled and solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions... no thanks.
No thanks? You'd rather have the illusion of free will without the progress allowed by the assumption of determinism? Do you also prefer the "good old days" before vaccines? Struggle for struggle's sake?

"No thanks." Not an argument against the progress demonstrated by behaviorism, but a dismissal.
Do you have an example?Sure. It's a hypothetical, but perhaps someone who treasures the illusion of free will, when presented with a claim of progress made through environmental manipulation, will neither look for the studies to verify this claim nor look for evidence to counter the claim, but instead simply say "no thanks" and refuse to even consider the evidence at all.

It's a stretch, admittedly, but it could, in theory, happen.

President Bush

22nd September 2006, 09:13 PM

... the popular picture of Einstein's ideas as a miraculous is simply a myth.
To disagree with your mental representation that Albert Einstein's thinking was solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions is not the same as representing them as a miracle, Mercutio.

If you have chosen to mentally represent Einstein's formulation of an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum as solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions, well, that's your decision and I... wait, hold on. That's not right, is it? Let me try it again...

If you are determined to have it your way and... well, I guess that doesn't make sense at all, does it? How about... if your purpose in this is to... hmmm. Can't say that, can I? Suggests free will...

If Radical Behaviorism calls for portraying Einstein's thinking as solely a function of genetic and environmental conditi... goddamnit, this is tricky. No, not Tricky. But you knew that. Wait, how could you? That would have been suggesting a mental representation. And now I've gone and made a mental representation of a mental representation...

One more time... why do you commit yourself to this point of view... holy cow. Did it again. In all honesty, how would you rather I put this? Whoops! That's wrong, too...

Would you prefer I... well, excuse me. How could you, after all. Though I really am trying to single out a way to... oh, man. I've done it, again. No, I haven't. That would be another mental representation...

I'm ready to call it quits and just say, for better or worse, that I opt for Radical Behaviorism. But it won't let me...

How did you get in there?

Piggy

22nd September 2006, 09:29 PM

You ever gonna answer my question there, Bushy, or just admit that you were blowing smoke out your ear?

Mercutio

22nd September 2006, 09:39 PM

To disagree with your mental representation that Albert Einstein's thinking was solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions is not the same as representing them as a miracle, Mercutio.
I did not intend to say that this was your claim. It is, however, referred to as his anni mirabili (year of miracles) by others, but by no means by all.

If you have chosen to mentally represent Einstein's formulation of an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum as solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions, well, that's your decision and I... wait, hold on. That's not right, is it? Let me try it again...
It's ok. What you are doing is arguing from ignorance. You (nor I, nor anyone, without the benefit of some control group and ability to manipulate variables) cannot know what factors influenced his decision. Nor mine to challenge your conclusion. The truth of the matter is that we study such things in controlled conditions, but can only infer that the same descriptive laws are in effect for the historical examples that someone chooses. I cannot conclusively demonstrate that any past event was the result of x, y, or z causes. No one can, for any theory. All we can do is show that under similar conditions, our theory predicts similar behavior, and other theories do not. Behaviorism can do this (and could be falsified, although it has not happened yet), but I do not think that any assumption of Free Will is falsifiable.
If you are determined to have it your way and... well, I guess that doesn't make sense at all, does it? How about... if your purpose in this is to... hmmm. Can't say that, can I? Suggests free will...
No, it suggests ignorance again. Or are you equating the two? Maybe 2 years ago on this forum, I suggested that "any sufficiently subtly determined behavior is indistinguishable from free will".
If Radical Behaviorism calls for portraying Einstein's thinking as solely a function of genetic and environmental conditi... goddamnit, this is tricky. No, not Tricky. But you knew that. Wait, how could you? That would have been suggesting a mental representation. And now I've gone and made a mental representation of a mental representation...
Sorry to say, but you are misrepresenting behaviorism again. You are saying that this requires a "mental representation", when all it requires is thinking. As you must realise, the two are not at all the same thing.
One more time... why do you commit yourself to this point of view... holy cow. Did it again. In all honesty, how would you rather I put this? Whoops! That's wrong, too...

Would you prefer I... well, excuse me. How could you, after all. Though I really am trying to single out a way to... oh, man. I've done it, again. No, I haven't. That would be another mental representation...
Again, it's ok. Like I said, I had assumed that you understood behaviorism better than you did. Your inability to properly use the vocabulary is quite understandable; you apparently have had experience with non-behavioral explanations. (a guess--just a guess: your view of behaviorism is influenced by just one or two profs in psych or philosophy classes, or by one or two books on psych or philosophy. It's just a guess, and based more on other people who have made similar arguments than based on your own.)
I'm ready to call it quits and just say, for better or worse, that I opt for Radical Behaviorism. But it won't let me...
Cute. Understandable, given your reinforcement history... :D
How did you get in there?

So... nothing substantial, then?

President Bush

22nd September 2006, 10:02 PM

So... nothing substantial, then?

Hey, I'll say it again:

... the popular picture of Einstein's ideas as a miraculous is simply a myth.

To disagree with your mental representation that Albert Einstein's thinking was solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions is not the same as representing them as a miracle, Mercutio.

If you have chosen to mentally represent Einstein's formulation of an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum as solely a function of genetic and environmental conditions, well, that's your decision and I... wait, hold on. That's not right, is it? Let me try it again...

If you are determined to have it your way and... well, I guess that doesn't make sense at all, does it? How about... if your purpose in this is to... hmmm. Can't say that, can I? Suggests free will...

If Radical Behaviorism calls for portraying Einstein's thinking as solely a function of genetic and environmental conditi... goddamnit, this is tricky. No, not Tricky. But you knew that. Wait, how could you? That would have been suggesting a mental representation. And now I've gone and made a mental representation of a mental representation...

One more time... why do you commit yourself to this point of view... holy cow. Did it again. In all honesty, how would you rather I put this? Whoops! That's wrong, too...

Would you prefer I... well, excuse me. How could you, after all. Though I really am trying to single out a way to... oh, man. I've done it, again. No, I haven't. That would be another mental representation...

I'm ready to call it quits and just say, for better or worse, that I opt for Radical Behaviorism. But it won't let me...

How did you get in there?

Mercutio

22nd September 2006, 10:13 PM

Thanks for playing.

President Bush

22nd September 2006, 10:22 PM

Thanks for playing.
Indeed.

hodgy

24th September 2006, 05:04 AM

hodgy, let me just say that you are damn inconvenient. I was perfectly happy with my little black box, and you have to go smashing it open.

So far I haven't been able to hold Humpty Dumpty together.

Muchas gracias. I do appreciate a good debu**sh**ifier.

No problem :)

hodgy

24th September 2006, 05:05 AM

Can anyone succintly summarise President Bush's argument? I don't get it.

President Bush

27th September 2006, 07:32 AM

You ever gonna answer my question there, Bushy, or just admit that you were blowing smoke out your ear?
External influences, controlling the sensory apparatus of my body from birth, have caused it to develop in such a way that it would tend to engage in few occasions of repetitive verbal behavior, even while acting as though this were of its (my) own free will.

Alternately, dissimilar external influences having controlled the sensory apparatus of your body from birth caused it to develop in such a way that it would tend to engage in continually repetitive verbal behaviors, even while acting as though these conditioned responses were of its (your) own free will.

That said, what is your question?

Piggy

27th September 2006, 11:20 AM

That said, what is your question?
The external influence causing me to engage in repetitive verbal behavior is your obtuseness and refusal to address a direct question.

The question is simply: Where is the information which was impossible to know before?

And please, don't just say that the theory, theorem, and score are the information which was impossible to know before.

That's like saying that the Taj Majal contains more than simply a recombination of pre-existing materials, and when asked where these "extra" materials are, pointing to the Taj Majal.

If you think there's some part of the process which cannot be explained by behaviorism, as you claim, you can't be taken seriously if you simply repeat the outcomes of the creative process as your example.

You must specify what part of the process, and what information, you are referring to.

That's the question.

hammegk

27th September 2006, 11:44 AM

The real question is "Who posts the silliest nonsense masquerading as thought; coberst or piggy?".

President Bush

27th September 2006, 09:16 PM

If you think there's some part of the process which cannot be explained by behaviorism, as you claim, you can't be taken seriously if you simply repeat the outcomes of the creative process as your example.
Some part of the process which cannot be explained by behaviorism? Those are your words, Piggy. I had suggested that none of it could be explained by behaviorism. But never mind... I'm onboard, now.

Imagine Albert Einstein's mind as a white lab rat, Piggy.

This white lab rat is close to formulating an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum when it accidentally steps on a foot pedal, releasing a St. Galler bratwurst with sauerkraut into the Swiss Patent Office.

(This near formulation of an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum in the lab rat's behavior - or operant of Radical Behaviorism - must occur just before the release of bratwurst with sauerkraut into the Swiss Patent Office - the reinforcer of radical behaviorism.)

In no time at all, the lab rat is continually stepping on the foot pedal and following, of course, a geodesic path to pile its bratwurst in the corner of the Swiss Patent Office. Before you know it, voila, energy equals mass times the constant squared.

Piggy

27th September 2006, 09:29 PM

Imagine Albert Einstein's mind as a white lab rat, Piggy.

This white lab rat is close to formulating an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum when it accidentally steps on a foot pedal, releasing a St. Galler bratwurst with sauerkraut into the Swiss Patent Office.
Troll.

President Bush

27th September 2006, 10:02 PM

:bananapowerslide:

RandFan

27th September 2006, 11:06 PM

Troll.I could have saved you some time and warned you but I was really enjoying the discussion. You and Mercutio did a great job.

Thanks

hammegk

28th September 2006, 07:15 AM

I could have saved you some time and warned you but I was really enjoying the discussion.
?

You and Mercutio did a great job.
Yeah, at preaching to the choir.

Thanks
For apparently agreeing with your wordview?

Piggy

28th September 2006, 10:19 AM

I could have saved you some time and warned you but I was really enjoying the discussion.
With friends like you, RandFan.... ;)

President Bush

28th September 2006, 02:44 PM

Thanks
Eventually a science of the nervous system based upon direct observation rather than inference will describe the neural states and even's which immediately precede instances of behavior. We shall know the precise neurological conditions which immediately precede, say, the response, "Thank you."

BF Skinner
Science and Human Behavior, p 28
Guess I shouldn't come here looking for unprecedented EEG patterns.

hodgy

29th September 2006, 06:40 PM

Piggy

29th September 2006, 06:54 PM

Hammegk, you seem to be supporting President Bush but neither of your arguments (on this thread) are clear.

Please can you state them and we can discuss...

Hint - make an assertion and we will debate it...
I gotta step in and do what RandFan didn't do for me :p .... Hammegk has never made a clear argument. You will not get one out of him. "Thought exists" is about as far as he gets. After that, it's Jabberwocky. Just so's you know....

hammegk

29th September 2006, 06:59 PM

:rub:

Blather on as per usual.

hodgy

29th September 2006, 07:31 PM

I gotta step in and do what RandFan didn't do for me :p .... Hammegk has never made a clear argument. You will not get one out of him. "Thought exists" is about as far as he gets. After that, it's Jabberwocky. Just so's you know....

:) :) :)
I know - got to give the chap a fair chance though...

hodgy

29th September 2006, 07:37 PM

:rub:

Blather on as per usual.

Make an assertion, state the logic behind it with regards to the subject under discussion in this thread.

'Blather...' gets us nowhere.

RandFan

29th September 2006, 10:03 PM

With friends like you, RandFan.... ;):) I do my best.

Hey, it was good material even if you were talking to a bot. This from a former dualist. Not too shabby.

President Bush

29th September 2006, 10:30 PM

Troll.
External influences, controlling the sensory apparatus of my body from birth, caused it to develop in such a way that it posted a parody of Radical Behaviorism's account of Einstein formulating an equivalence between energy and relativistic mass in direct proportion to the square of the speed of light in a vacuum.

This was done as a way of provoking a totally unprecedented EEG pattern (preceding novel verbal behavior in the thread) in order to demonstrate it is possible to make an observation which shows the proposition stating a science of the nervous system based upon direct observation, rather than inference, can describe the neural states and events which immediately precede instances of (verbal) behavior... to fall short of being a tautology.

Skinner wept.

Piggy

30th September 2006, 07:16 AM

Hey, it was good material even if you were talking to a bot. This from a former dualist. Not too shabby.
Well, that's what's so great about forums like this (rare as they are). We never learn anything by seeking out confirmation, after all. There have to be people (like hodgy and Yllanes recently, for me) who are willing to show us where we've got it wrong, if we ever hope to get it right.

This is why I often bristle at supernaturalists who instantly accuse me and other rationalists of being merely dogmatic. I haven't come to my conclusions by assuming them, but by testing them.

And, especially as a young'un, changing my beliefs about what I am and what the world is... it was very difficult, and often (at first blush) psychologically devastating. But if we never open our hand and examine what's in it, we can never know if it is of any value.

Abolitionist

8th October 2006, 04:28 AM

There must be a distinction here between 'willpower' : (both subjective and observed) and 'free-will'.

Willpower exists - and it is dependent on many observable factors.

There is nothing in the universe that exists freely in a vacuum. At least there's no reason to think so.

Piggy

8th October 2006, 06:00 AM

There must be a distinction here between 'willpower' : (both subjective and observed) and 'free-will'.

OK. What is it, then?

RandFan

8th October 2006, 09:38 AM

Willpower exists - and it is dependent on many observable factors. When you say observable are you saying that you are making post hoc conclusions about observed behavior? Do you have any predictable statements you can make about "willpower"?

I think such assumptions about willpower are begging the question.

RandFan

8th October 2006, 09:39 AM

Skinner wept.And the sophists rejoiced.

President Bush

10th October 2006, 08:18 PM

And the sophists rejoiced.
External influences, controlling the sensory apparatus of my body from birth, caused it to develop in such a way that it posted a parody of falsifying BF Skinner's science of the nervous system.

This was done as a way of provoking a series of totally predictable EEG patterns (becoming generalized and synchronous with continuous periodic stereotypic 200-millisecond to 400-millisecond sharp waves at intervals of 0.5-1.0 seconds with myoclonic jerks occurring in association with the sharp waveforms) preceding meaningless verbal behavior in the thread to demonstrate it is not possible, in this instance, to make an observation showing the proposition which states a science of the nervous system based upon direct observation, rather than inference, can describe the neural states and events which immediately precede instances of (verbal) behavior... to fall short of being a tautology.

Skinner wept. On his shoes, RandFan.

Mercutio

10th October 2006, 09:02 PM

This was done as a way of provoking a series of totally predictable EEG patterns (becoming generalized and synchronous with continuous periodic stereotypic 200-millisecond to 400-millisecond sharp waves at intervals of 0.5-1.0 seconds with myoclonic jerks occurring in association with the sharp waveforms) preceding meaningless verbal behavior in the thread to demonstrate it is not possible, in this instance, to make an observation showing the proposition which states a science of the nervous system based upon direct observation, rather than inference, can describe the neural states and events which immediately precede instances of (verbal) behavior... to fall short of being a tautology.

Wrong level of observation.

RandFan

10th October 2006, 09:05 PM

Skinner wept. On his shoes, RandFan. And the sophists are still rejoicing.

President Bush

10th October 2006, 09:54 PM

Wrong level of observation.
Is this a reference to a particular electroencephalograph pattern?

Ichneumonwasp

11th October 2006, 03:15 PM

Piggy

11th October 2006, 03:17 PM

Your oblique and meaningless reference to prion disease, the consequences of severe anoxic injury or profound over-indulgence in Lithium being for what reason precisely?
For the precise reason that he's an intentional troll. Consider yourself advised.

Ichneumonwasp

11th October 2006, 03:24 PM

Actually I'm not really sure why I bothered. Anyone invoking EEG data on either side of such a debate merely shows his/her profound ignorance of the technique.

I like the jab at intentionality, though. That was well placed. Husserl and Heidegger would be proud.

President Bush

11th October 2006, 09:35 PM

External influences, controlling the sensory apparatus of my body from birth, caused it to develop in such a way that it posted a parody of falsifying BF Skinner's science of the nervous system.

This was done as a way of provoking a series of totally predictable EEG patterns (becoming generalized and synchronous with continuous periodic stereotypic 200-millisecond to 400-millisecond sharp waves at intervals of 0.5-1.0 seconds with myoclonic jerks occurring in association with the sharp waveforms) preceding meaningless verbal behavior in the thread to demonstrate it is not possible, in this instance, to make an observation showing the proposition which states a science of the nervous system based upon direct observation, rather than inference, can describe the neural states and events which immediately precede instances of (verbal) behavior... to fall short of being a tautology.
Your oblique and meaningless reference to prion disease, the consequences of severe anoxic injury or profound over-indulgence in Lithium being for what reason precisely?

Sorry if you didn't get the joke. It followed directly from post 217 (http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php?p=1959810&postcount=217) in this thread, where I quoted BF Skinner:

Eventually a science of the nervous system based upon direct observation rather than inference will describe the neural states and even's which immediately precede instances of behavior. We shall know the precise neurological conditions which immediately precede, say, the response, "Thank you."

BF Skinner
Science and Human Behavior, p 28
Just trying to have some fun with such a notion being falsifiable. Why not read the whole thing in context?

Wrong level of observation.
What kind of BF Skinner science of the nervous system, based upon direct observation - rather than inference - describing the neural states and events which immediately precede instances of (verbal) behavior... nevertheless, infers particular states (your "wrong level of observation") of the nervous system?

Ichneumonwasp

12th October 2006, 06:00 AM

Why not read the whole thing in context?

I did. It completely misconstrues the purposes and limitations of EEG and so falls completely flat as a joke. It is a common misperception, and it is one of my big pet peeves. It further demonstrates your (?willful) misrepresentation of Skinner's intended meaning.

Or, as Piggy said, trolling.

President Bush

12th October 2006, 08:19 PM

It further demonstrates your (?willful) misrepresentation of Skinner's intended meaning.
OK, I give... what do you think Skinner's intended meaning was?

Ichneumonwasp

13th October 2006, 06:58 AM

OK, I give... what do you think Skinner's intended meaning was?

One need only look at the words of the man himself...

Eventually a science of the nervous system based upon direct observation rather than inference will describe the neural states and events which immediately precede instances of behavior.

He meant precisely that. A science of the nervous system based on observation should theoretically be able to describe brain states that correlate with and even precede instances of behavior. We can already do this to a very limited extent (in part with MEG and functional MRI). The level of description would necessarily be on the order of neural nets, not the gross conglommeration that comprises the EEG. EEGs do not reflect thinking. They do not reflect brain states in the way that Skinner meant. We can tell if someone is awake, asleep, concentrating on some task (only in certain instances) and disease states with EEG patterns. That is all. The only instance of EEG activity helping in this regard at all is with the mu rhythm and movement or planning for movement, but this particular rhythm is not seen in everyone. There is also a particular type of event related potential that may correlate with forming a neural network in some thinking tasks (the 40 Hz event related potential), but this work is still highly speculative.

In other words, we should theoretically be able to describe the neural activity that underlies particular experiences. The description of that neural activity we give is simply that -- a description. The description is not the experience itself, just as a description of a red ball hitting a blue ball is not the collision. The particular experience is a particular experience because it has an emotional/motivational component to it -- that is what makes an experience an experience. Computers do not have experiences (as we typically mean the term -- "subjective experiences") because they have no emotional/motivational system. Create such an entity and computers can then feel, and their thiking would be more akin to ours. We are only beginning to understand those emotional/motivational systems, though, so no one can speak in any great detail about them. We do know what happens when folks do not have properly working emotional systems -- they don't function very well. Cut out the entire mess of emotional systems and they are unconscious. Remove the ability to learn fear and they continually run the risk of falling to human predators. Remove the link between emotion and rational thought and they cannot function in the real world, cannot plan properly, cannot assign value to tasks, cannot work.

President Bush

13th October 2006, 08:08 PM

One need only look at the words of the man himself...
Eventually a science of the nervous system based upon direct observation rather than inference will describe the neural states and even's which immediately precede instances of behavior. We shall know the precise neurological conditions which immediately precede, say, the response, "Thank you."
... He meant precisely that. A science of the nervous system based on observation should theoretically be able to describe brain states that correlate with and even precede instances of behavior. We can already do this to a very limited extent (in part with MEG and functional MRI). The level of description would necessarily be on the order of neural nets, not the gross conglommeration that comprises the EEG. EEGs do not reflect thinking. They do not reflect brain states in the way that Skinner meant. We can tell if someone is awake, asleep, concentrating on some task (only in certain instances) and disease states with EEG patterns. That is all. The only instance of EEG activity helping in this regard at all is with the mu rhythm and movement or planning for movement, but this particular rhythm is not seen in everyone. There is also a particular type of event related potential that may correlate with forming a neural network in some thinking tasks (the 40 Hz event related potential), but this work is still highly speculative.

In other words, we should theoretically be able to describe the neural activity that underlies particular experiences. The description of that neural activity we give is simply that -- a description. The description is not the experience itself, just as a description of a red ball hitting a blue ball is not the collision. The particular experience is a particular experience because it has an emotional/motivational component to it -- that is what makes an experience an experience. Computers do not have experiences (as we typically mean the term -- "subjective experiences") because they have no emotional/motivational system. Create such an entity and computers can then feel, and their thiking would be more akin to ours. We are only beginning to understand those emotional/motivational systems, though, so no one can speak in any great detail about them. We do know what happens when folks do not have properly working emotional systems -- they don't function very well. Cut out the entire mess of emotional systems and they are unconscious. Remove the ability to learn fear and they continually run the risk of falling to human predators. Remove the link between emotion and rational thought and they cannot function in the real world, cannot plan properly, cannot assign value to tasks, cannot work.
Thanks for your detailed answer, Ichneumonwasp.

In my attempt to parody Skinner's science of the nervous system, I invoked EEGs as reflecting actual thought. That this is, apparently, unsound I will apologize for. Just found the image of unprecedented EEG patterns a humorous way to pose a falsifiability of Skinner's proposition. And, following, the image of distorted and predictable EEGs a confirmation of Skinner's (apparent) tautology.

Couldn't help but notice that you appear more cautious than Skinner in your reply, qualifying your answer (twice) with the words "should theoretically" (bolded in your answer). This seems wise. To me, Skinner's "science" looks quite dogmatic with certainty (his words "will describe" and "shall know" bolded).

So I made fun of it. Soory if I, unnecessarily, ruffled some feathers.

Ichneumonwasp

14th October 2006, 09:13 AM

Well, like I said, this is one of my pet peeves, so I tend to be a little harsh when it comes to misperceptions of EEG. Sorry. Even most physicians don't really know that much about it. I just don't want misinformation about EEG to propagate. Hans Berger, when he developed it, thought that EEG would be a graphical representation of human thought. He was wrong. It is what it is.

As for my reservations, I don't think I rightfully could assume any other position. When we get down to brass tacks, if we want to explain it all, we must take a final position -- is the nature of everything a monism, dualism, or moreism? I tend toward monism. Since monism is "one substance", I think most of the discussion about it is kind of silly. Whatever we say about it, everything must eventually collapse into a single view. Whether the single substance is material, mental, neutral, whatever I simply think we cannot know. I have yet to hear an argument that convinces me of any position. My own position is, therefore, "Meh".

The pseudo-intellectual way of putting this is that I think Plato did us all a great disservice outside of parlor room discussion. I think his attempt to reconcile Parmenides and Heraclitus by creating dualism sent us on a 2500 year wild goose chase. To my thinking it would have been much better had he simply said Parmenides described the totality and Heraclitus the inner workings of the totality.

Essentially all that Skinner is really saying is that there are rules that govern the stuff of existence. He says we will understand those rules. I think we might, but we might very well not, even if there are rules nonetheless. We should always keep in mind that the description of how those rules work is merely description and not the things themselves (or really more properly, the processes since when it comes to thinking and selves, etc, I don't think there are things precisely but processes and activities). That brains working constitute selves seems like a very sturdy foundation. Brains are just neurons working together. Neurons are cells. Cells are colonies of simpler organisms. Simpler organisms are conglomerations of chemicals. Chemicals are atoms linked together. Atoms are quarks and leptons. Quarks and leptons are possibly vibrating strings. Ultimately it all ends in energy. I haven't the slightest freaking idea what that word "energy" is supposed to represent. It all seems to follow rules and be some form of something that interacts with itself -- all the stuff of the universe, the internal workings of it, is based on interaction. Whether we call all that stuff "mental" or "material" or whatever to me just seems like placing a label on something that we don't completely understand. Everything else in these debates looks to me like wishful thinking.

Or, rather, all of these attempts to try and prove that "material" explanations for human thought will not work seem, to me, to fail. Individuals may not like the consequences of the "material approach", since it leads to the thought that we are not individuals from the "perspective" of the universe as a whole (we are merely relations within that universe), but I think there is a kind of grandeur in this view of life.

chriswl

14th October 2006, 12:34 PM

Brains are just neurons working together. Neurons are cells. Cells are colonies of simpler organisms. Simpler organisms are conglomerations of chemicals. Chemicals are atoms linked together. Atoms are quarks and leptons. Quarks and leptons are possibly vibrating strings. Ultimately it all ends in energy. I haven't the slightest freaking idea what that word "energy" is supposed to represent. It all seems to follow rules and be some form of something that interacts with itself -- all the stuff of the universe, the internal workings of it, is based on interaction. Whether we call all that stuff "mental" or "material" or whatever to me just seems like placing a label on something that we don't completely understand.
I agree with everything else you've written here. But I can't accept that "mental" could be a good label for the basic stuff of the universe.

That would leave us with two sorts of mental:

1) the mind-stuff of which everything in the universe (even inanimae objects) is composed.
2) What goes on in the brains very complex creatures.

What would we be trying to say by using the same word for these two very different things?

The stuff that the universe is made out of is physical, because that's what "physical" means. That's all that physical means.

hammegk

14th October 2006, 07:28 PM

The stuff that the universe is made out of is physical, because that's what "physical" means. That's all that physical means.
No, that means you accept materialism=Truth.

All you have to worry about is, for example, life, free-will, on up to and including HPC.

Ichneumonwasp

15th October 2006, 07:24 AM

That would leave us with two sorts of mental:

1) the mind-stuff of which everything in the universe (even inanimae objects) is composed.
2) What goes on in the brains very complex creatures.

What would we be trying to say by using the same word for these two very different things?

What would be trying to say by using the same word for these two very different things? Same thing we generally do in philosophy that Wittgenstein tried to correct -- cheat. Use language to tender magic.

Yes. I am very glad that you noticed that consequence, since that was one of my unspoken underlying points. Using this argument, if one accepts that rules govern whatever the original stuff is, means that human thought is not any more privileged than a rock (they are made of the same stuff; they simply act differently). If one accepts monism with rules governing the "behavior" of its "parts" there is only one consequence as far as free will is concerned -- from the perspective of the universe (the whole), no free will exists in the parts of the whole. Our way of thinking must be a consequence of the way that the uber-stuff interacts with itself no matter what its underlying nature. Or one must admit either that rocks think or that we are not real. There may be some entity that thinks reality, but that would be the only real entity -- the universe itself. Or one does what most people do -- deny dualism while grasping it closely to one's heart. If there is such a thing as libertarian free will it exists only in one being -- the universe. We can't possibly have it. Compatibilist free will, yes, we obviously have.

From our limited perspective I don't see that it makes all that much difference if we decide to view the universe as the dream of some uber-being or the interaction of the stuff we call energy. We're in the same boat regardless. And I don't see how we could tell the difference between the two possibilities. Yes, thought exists, but that only tells us something about how we know anything (by means of mental processes) not the ultimate nature of reality.

If one accepts monism, then Parmenides had it right more than 2500 years ago. Everything that we see is simply "illusion" compared to the Ultimate Reality and Heraclitus was the poet of that illusion.