Naturalistic reasoning self-referentially unreliable?

[HeavyAaron]

The following argument comes from an article in Wikipedia on appologetics:

"Plantinga contends that if philosophical naturalism denies that reality is guided or directed somehow (say, toward the creation of humans with reliable cognitive faculties) and if evolution selects only for survival value, it is highly unlikely that evolutionary naturalism would yield cognitive faculties that accurately perceive reality. Plantinga does not deny that evolutionary naturalism could have produced reliable cognitive faculties, he simply argues that they provide no reason for believing that we have reliable cognitive faculties. Thus, asserting that naturalistic evolution is true is also asserting that one has a low probability of being right in any of his assertions. This, Plantinga argues, epistemically defeats the belief that naturalistic evolution is true. Ascribing truth to naturalism and evolution becomes self-referentially incoherent."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga

I find myself lacking a good counter argument.

The weak link seems to be the assertion "[evolutionary mechanisms] provide no reason for believing that we have reliable cognitive faculties." While my intuition tells me that this is the weak link, I can't find a reason for considering it false.

Aaron

[Nick Bogaerts]

The weakness is in the assumption that there is a low probability for evolution to produce reliable cognitive faculties. You can't do that. You have to demonstrate it within a naturalistic framework for there to be a self-referential incoherency.

[HeavyAaron]

The weakness is in the assumption that there is a low probability for evolution to produce reliable cognitive faculties. You can't do that. You have to demonstrate it within a naturalistic framework for there to be a self-referential incoherency.

I think that's easy to do. In Earth's long biological history there is only one species that MIGHT possess the intellect required. In fact it's an issue of some debate among SETI thinkers (is there a evolutionary drive for intelligence.) I tend to concur with the author here. There doesn't seem to be. You seem to believe the burden of proof is on the person claiming that there isn't compelling reasons to believe that evolutionary mechinisms to generate reliable cognitive faculties. I'm not sure that that's really fair.

The whole point of the argument is that we may not be able to trust our own congition. So... aside from the existance of humanity can you provide a compelling reason from evolutionary mechnisms for reliable cognition to result?

Aaron

[chriswl]

The weak link seems to be the assertion "[evolutionary mechanisms] provide no reason for believing that we have reliable cognitive faculties." While my intuition tells me that this is the weak link, I can't find a reason for considering it false.
Daniel Dennett gives a wonderful answer to this very question in his lecture Faith in the Truth (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/faithint.htm):

Right now, as I speak, billions of organisms on this planet are engaged in a game of hide and seek. It is not just a game for them. It is a matter of life and death. Getting it right, not making mistakes, has been of paramount importance to every living thing on this planet for more than three billion years, and so these organisms have evolved thousands of different ways of finding out about the world they live in, discriminating friends from foes, meals from mates, and ignoring the rest for the most part. It matters to them that they not be misinformed about these matters--indeed nothing matters more--but they don't, as a rule, appreciate this. They are the beneficiaries of equipment exquisitely designed to get what matters right but when their equipment malfunctions and gets matters wrong, they have no resources, as a rule, for noticing this, let alone deploring it. They soldier on, unwittingly. The difference between how things seem and how things really are is just as fatal a gap for them as it can be for us, but they are largely oblivious to it. The recognition of the difference between appearance and reality is a human discovery. A few other species--some primates, some cetaceans, maybe even some birds--shows signs of appreciating the phenomenon of "false belief"--getting it wrong. They exhibit sensitivity to the errors of others, and perhaps even some sensitivity to their own errors as errors, but they lack the capacity for the reflection required to dwell on this possibility, and so they cannot use this sensitivity in the deliberate design of repairs or improvements of their own seeking gear or hiding gear. That sort of bridging of the gap between appearance and reality is a wrinkle that we human beings alone have mastered.

We are the species that discovered doubt. Is there enough food laid by for winter? Have I miscalculated? Is my mate cheating on me? Should we have moved south? Is it safe to enter this cave? Other creatures are often visibly agitated by their own uncertainties about just such questions, but because they cannot actually ask themselves these questions, they cannot articulate their predicaments for themselves or take steps to improve their grip on the truth. They are stuck in a world of appearances, making the best they can of how things seem and seldom if ever worrying about whether how things seem is how they truly are.(1)

We alone can be wracked with doubt, and we alone have been provoked by that epistemic itch to seek a remedy: better truth-seeking methods. Wanting to keep better track of our food supplies, our territories, our families, our enemies, we discovered the benefits of talking it over with others, asking questions, passing on lore. We invented culture. Then we invented measuring, and arithmetic, and maps, and writing. These communicative and recording innovations come with a built-in ideal: truth. The point of asking questions is to find true answers; the point of measuring is to measure accurately; the point of making maps is to find your way to your destination. There may be an Island of the Colour-blind (allowing Oliver Sacks his usual large dose of poetic license), but no Island of the People Who Do Not Recognize Their Own Children. The Land of the Liars could exist only in philosophers' puzzles; there are no traditions of False Calendar Systems for mis-recording the passage of time. In short, the goal of truth goes without saying, in every human culture.