Is free will a paranormal concept?

[Skiltch]

www.dilbertblog.typepad.com

There have been several posts in the last few days about the concept of free will. The writer, Scott Adams (does Dilbert cartoons) does not believe in it and has actually classified it in paranormal. The current fight started when he basically said, 'It is not the Islamic fundamentalists' fault for attacking us and killing us anymore than it is our fault for responding in kind. We are all just doing what our biology says we will do.' (Paraphrased).
Here's one of the relevant quotes:

"I could weasel out of this by noting that the EXISTENCE of free will is the extraordinary claim, since it implies the supernatural, and so the burden of proof is on those who would claim it."

I was curious what you all thought, since paranormal is dealt with regularly over here.
Free will is generally defined over there as having the ability to do something even if your brain chemistry, genes, nature, nurture, everything physical says not to do it. Another way of looking at it might be as a soul that could resist what the corporeal parts of you want to do. Adams defined it as:

"Free will is an individual’s ability to change the physics of the material world in such a way that the normal chain of cause and effect is broken. In the case of free will, this change happens to the physics of the brain. Furthermore, the initial cause of this change can not itself be deterministically caused by something else, but it can be informed.

["]So in this definition, if a lawnmower had free will, it could decide whether or not the gasoline would be ignited by the spark plug. The decision would not be based on the normal laws of physics. But a lawnmower has no free will, so we need not worry about it."

Do y'all believe in free will? If so, do you think it's paranormal by definition?

[tkingdoll]

Well if you define it that way, then you are looking at examples like 'mind over matter', faith healing, etc, so yes, that would be paranormal. The mind cannot overrule the body in the way that some people like to believe. I can put off urinating but eventually I will have no choice.

But I define free will simply as the absence of fate or pre-ordained outcomes to actions by an intelligent, active higher power. In other words, I am not 'meant' to do something - my actions have no 'meaning' in the universe.

I don't dispute that I am a slave to certain instincts or bodily functions, but I wouldn't claim that having to urinate whether I 'choose' to or not negates free will by my definition of it.

How quickly will this thread turn into a metaphysics/existentialism debate?

And how sorry are we all that Interesting Ian isn't here to join in? :D

Of course, I typed that of my own free will. I was not pre-ordained to type it.

[Apathia]

Well if you define it that way, then you are looking at examples like 'mind over matter', faith healing, etc, so yes, that would be paranormal. The mind cannot overrule the body in the way that some people like to believe. I can put off urinating but eventually I will have no choice.

But I define free will simply as the absence of fate or pre-ordained outcomes to actions by an intelligent, active higher power. In other words, I am not 'meant' to do something - my actions have no 'meaning' in the universe.

I don't dispute that I am a slave to certain instincts or bodily functions, but I wouldn't claim that having to urinate whether I 'choose' to or not negates free will by my definition of it.

How quickly will this thread turn into a metaphysics/existentialism debate?

And how sorry are we all that Interesting Ian isn't here to join in? :D

Of course, I typed that of my own free will. I was not pre-ordained to type it.


Not believeing in a metaphysical free will doesn't give you a Get Out of Responsibility Free Card.
"But Judge, I could help myself. I don't have a free will, so the only thing I could do was beat my wife to death. That's just Biology. You can't send me to prison for that!"

Won't hold up in a court of law!

[Dogdoctor]

So was Gandhi exercising free will since he did not respond in kind?

[tkingdoll]

Not believeing in a metaphysical free will doesn't give you a Get Out of Responsibility Free Card.
"But Judge, I could help myself. I don't have a free will, so the only thing I could do was beat my wife to death. That's just Biology. You can't send me to prison for that!"

Won't hold up in a court of law!

Well it's a good job that's not what I said then, isn't it?

[Skiltch]

Not neccesarily implied, Hyparix. Even if 'guilt' was thrown out of law (because of there being no free will, no choice, and thus no way to be 'guilty') punishments could still happen based on deterence. Some people could have cautious genes/brain waves/whatever that would only let them committ crimes if they wouldn't be punished for it.

[Apathia]

Well it's a good job that's not what I said then, isn't it?

I accidently responded to the OP in the wrong post.

[tkingdoll]

I accidently responded to the OP in the wrong post.

Hee hee :D

[Dancing David]

It is a rather weak argument, and perhaps sarcastic.

Even under materialism free will can exist, it is under determinism that free will does not exist.

I recognise that free will may be an illusion, but given the random and chaotic nature of human biology, I doubt that determinism will prevail.

[Jeff Corey]

Isn't like saying that given the chaotic nature of planetary weather conditions that you doubt determinism will prevail there?

[PopeTom]

Free will is generally defined over there as having the ability to do something even if your brain chemistry, genes, nature, nurture, everything physical says not to do it. Another way of looking at it might be as a soul that could resist what the corporeal parts of you want to do. Adams defined it as:


So, would using birth control qualify as an exercise in free will?
Biology is not even remotely my strong point, but I was under the impression that living organisms pretty much exist to pass on their genetic information to the next generation? So by over riding that base biological imperative just for the sake of experiencing sex for the pleasure of sex does that meet the qualification of free will as outlined by the above quote?

[Skiltch]

Not necessarily, at least not by the Adams definition. If someone is 'wired' or raised to not want to have kids, for instance, it wouldn't be free will but would instead be their biology having them use birth control.

[simonmaal]

The findings of Libet (1985) are interesting. They suggest that when we make a decision, unconscious processes precede (temporarily) the moment at which we decide we are about to act. In other words, the ‘brain’ makes a decision and then 350 milliseconds later, we become aware of the decision and attribute a conscious, personal agency to it.


Still can't post links to my references, so I'll expand on these findings when I've posted enough messages! I hate not being able to sustantiate my arguments.

[simonmaal]

Not believeing in a metaphysical free will doesn't give you a Get Out of Responsibility Free Card.
"But Judge, I could help myself. I don't have a free will, so the only thing I could do was beat my wife to death. That's just Biology. You can't send me to prison for that!"

Won't hold up in a court of law!

Ah but what about the case of the man who murdered his partners' parents while sleepwalking? Amazingly, that did hold up in a court of law!

PS Sorry again for lack of references, I'm yet to get to 15 posts! I'll come back and edit this message to include a link as soon as I get permission to do so!

[Rufo]

I have thought quite a lot about this and have found that free will is something that people are very sensitive about. If you imply that there is no free will, people get upset. Some feel like they are just a cog in a machinery without their precious free will, and are terribly insulted when their thoughts are compared to other chemical processes. I've also noticed that this can easily get even more important to some people who have abandoned other supernatural beliefs, as if they are trying to compensate for that by valuing free will above all. People on these forums, however, tend to be above such vanity.

However...

What we might have to ask ourselves is whether or not it matters if we have free will. Most people I know about experience that they are making decisions, which means that there clearly is at least an illusion of free will. And practically, what exactly is the difference between Free Will™ Real Edition and Free Will™ Illusion Edition?

Not that it's not an interesting question, not that I don't love theoretical philosophy, but if we come to the conclusion that there is no free will, what exactly will the difference be?

[simonmaal]

Hi Rufo

As you demonstrate, the question of free will is not merely a scientific one, it is also a moral and political issue. My own thoughts are that, by identifying those things we cannot control, we can focus on those we can. By doing this, we can at least gain a conscious experience of autonomy (even if this might be an illusion).

[DeviousB]

So, would using birth control qualify as an exercise in free will?

No, since (in Adams view) the chemistry of your brain is the driving force in this case.

What Adams is proposing is that if the brain is an entirely deterministic and naturalistic mechanism, then your every action and reaction will be precisely determined by some combination of the sum of your nature and nurture to that point - even input from some quantumly undecidable source would merely be another 'nurture' input. Alternatively, if other factor allows a person the 'free will' to decide something, then that factor is non-naturalistic - i.e. not produced by the chemical/electrical state and activity of the brain - hence would be supernatural.

Basically, if all thought is a product of the entirely naturalistic processes of the brain, then free-will is an illusion. You would be physically incapable of ever thinking or deciding anything other than what the output of the hypercomplex state-machine in your head was inflexibly bound to do.

Three problems: -

1) If we assume that no action of a human being can ever really be 'voluntary', then any claim to hold copyright on a creative work is non-sensical. Scott Adams didn't create Dilbert, it is merely the inevitable consequence of his biology, he has no more creative rights to it than over the exhalations from his lungs. Yet on every cartoon he produces he puts a little copyright symbol, does he not believe his own argument then?

2) We can empirically determine that we have free-will. Present an individual with two identical coins. Ask him to choose one to keep. Which did he choose and why? Reverse the experiment. Give the subject two identical coins and have him hold both out towards you. Choose which he may keep and take back the other. Which did you choose and why? We act as though we have free will. We believe we have free will. To claim that these actions are deterministic is to put upon oneself the burden of proof. Our apparent free-will is the empirically observed phenomena to be explained. Saying it is deterministic, means proving it is deterministic; otherwise it is an argument from ignorance/incredulity.

3) http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~jas/one/freewill-theorem.html

:D

[Dancing David]

Isn't like saying that given the chaotic nature of planetary weather conditions that you doubt determinism will prevail there?

It is a personal belief, and I am mainly basing it on the potential for cognition to have a non-determinist influence on behavior.

It is a belief, not a scientific premise. I don't have a belief on if the weather will be deterministic. More likely chaotic without the potential for free will. As I said , I aknowledge that free will could very likely be an illusion.

[DeviousB]

As I said , I aknowledge that free will could very likely be an illusion.

I liken it to the atheist's argument against agnosticism.

If you have a universe that is, to all intents and purposes, indistinguishable from a conceptal universe devoid of god, why behave as if it is anything other than devoid of god.

If you behave in a way that in imperceptibly different from a being with free will, why treat this as anything other than free will?

Science says, "We don't know what causes (the illusion of*) free will." [* Delete as applicable]. Scott Adams says, "Science tells us there is no such thing as free will."

Scott Adams is wrong.

[simonmaal]

Scott Adams says, "Science tells us there is no such thing as free will."

A more sound position to take would have been, "Science suggests there is no such thing as free will."

Note: I'm not arguing for or against the existence of free will (did I just choose to write that statement); I am objecting to binary thinking based on incomplete data.

[Thinktoomuch]

Basically, if all thought is a product of the entirely naturalistic processes of the brain, then free-will is an illusion. You would be physically incapable of ever thinking or deciding anything other than what the output of the hypercomplex state-machine in your head was inflexibly bound to do.



In my ignorance, it appears to me that this "free will" equates to a supernatural ( I use this term loosely to indicate anything for which there is not yet a physical explanation) "mind" separate to the physical brain. Unless there have been recent developments in brain research of which I am not aware, it is still uncertain how (if) the brain produces thougth. Does not this discussion then hinge on whether there is now undisputed evidence that the brain actually produces thought?

If nurture is a factor that modifies the physical structure of the brain, not the hypothetical mind capable of independent thought (~= free will), would not this imply that we all remain passive recipients of external stimuli even after our brain has developed the capacity to avoid stimuli that we perceive as bad? This would appear to me to be a contradiction in terms.

[simonmaal]

Does not this discussion then hinge on whether there is now undisputed evidence that the brain actually produces thought?

An interesting example is the blunted emotions reported by quadraplegics and paraplegics; consequently, it would seem that the subjective experience of emotional states is related to physiological changes in places other than the brain. Because cognition and emotion have a reciprocal relationship (e.g. mood congruent memory), I would have to say that thought is not entirely divorced from the body.

However, identifying the cause, the first step in this relationship, is rather more problematic.

[IllegalArgument]

It is a personal belief, and I am mainly basing it on the potential for cognition to have a non-determinist influence on behavior.

It is a belief, not a scientific premise. I don't have a belief on if the weather will be deterministic. More likely chaotic without the potential for free will. As I said , I aknowledge that free will could very likely be an illusion.

Susan Blackmore basically made the point at the 2005 Skeptics conference, that free will is an illusion, it's more like we have will won't.

I interpret that as the agent that most people associate as them has some veto power over the other agents.

I hope Merc see this thread, he's much more informed on this subject.

You should get the 2005 conference DVD is was fascinating.

[DeviousB]

A more sound position to take would have been, "Science suggests there is no such thing as free will."

I'm not even sure science goes that far. I think science sticks its nose in the paper and loudly 'harrumph's when the subject of free will comes up.

Besides, I thought Scott Adams believed all his good fortune had come about by using 'affirmations' ("Hundreds of people have told me affirmations worked for them in incredible ways that seem beyond their own doing."), and that not only does he have a free-will, but that the exercise of it changes reality ("Every day it gets harder for me to believe my thoughts are separate from reality."). I hate to 'poison the well', but Adams thinks he's an uber-skeptic because he doubts things other skeptics don't. Scientific skepticism is the view that some things have been demonstrated beyond reasonable (n.b., not all) doubt and should be accepted as facts, Scottadamsian skepticism is little more than better-dressed solipsism.

[EGarrett]

People always bring topics like this up, and it seems so simple.

Free will and determinism aren't necessarily opposed.

If I put a rat in a tunnel with a pile of cheese on one side and a visible rattlesnake on the other. The rat is FREE to go either way. But I can also predict with all reasonable certainty what he will choose.

You can be free to choose, while also having your choices be totally predictable...or having it already known or "decided" what that free choice will be.

[DeviousB]

If nurture is a factor that modifies the physical structure of the brain, not the hypothetical mind capable of independent thought (~= free will), would not this imply that we all remain passive recipients of external stimuli even after our brain has developed the capacity to avoid stimuli that we perceive as bad? This would appear to me to be a contradiction in terms.

If we perceive a stimulus as bad, and have recognised or inferred enough precursor stimuli to be able to avoid that stimulus, and if this behaviour is not instinctive, then the stimulus must have had an effect on the state/structure of our brians.

[DeviousB]

People always bring topics like this up, and it seems so simple.

Seems, is right.

If I put a rat in a tunnel with a pile of cheese on one side and a visible rattlesnake on the other. The rat is FREE to go either way. But I can also predict with all reasonable certainty what he will choose.

If I put a heat seeking robot in a tunnel with a block of dry-ice on one side and a hot-plate on the other. The robot is FREE to go either way (certainly no part of his mechanism prevents him from doing so). But I can also predict with all reasonable certainty what he will chose.

Ergo, robots have free will.

[EGarrett]

The robot is FREE to go either way (certainly no part of his mechanism prevents him from doing so). That's the hole in the paragraph. The robot is not free to go either way. It has no brain that can override the mechanism. It is pure mechanism.

[simonmaal]

That's the hole in the paragraph. The robot is not free to go either way. It has no brain that can override the mechanism. It is pure mechanism.

But is the rat's response due to free will or reflex?

[DeviousB]

That's the hole in the paragraph. The robot is not free to go either way. It has no brain that can override the mechanism. It is pure mechanism.

What part of a rat's brain, or yours for that matter, is not mechanism? The whole point of the argument is that a purely reductionist and/or naturalistic approach would conclude that neither you nor the rat has any more freedom than the robot in terms of the responses.

By this view, you are merely a more complex robot.

[jskowron]

If I understand things correctly- and I may not- at the quantum level, free will (or, more specifically the absence of super-determinism), would require what Einstein called "spooky action at a distance." This involves one particle instantaneously affecting another distant particle, thus requiring action at faster than the speed of light. An alteranative to this faster than light effect is that everything has already been determined. Both options seem quite paranormal, until you do the math. Unfortunately, very few people actually understand the math! I certainly don't.

c.f.: Gribbin, J. (1990) The man who proved Einstein was wrong. New Scientist, 24, 43-45.

[Jekyll]

3) http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~jas/one/freewill-theorem.html

:D

Yeh, what's going on there is summed up quite well by the end Q&A.


When the floor was opened for questions, one member of the audience questioned Dr Conway's use of the term "Free Will". She asked whether Dr Conway was "confusing randomness and free will".

In a passionate reply, Dr Conway said that what he had shown, with mathematical precision, that if a given property was exhibited by an experimenter than that same property was exhibited by particles. He had been careful when constructing his theorem to use the same term "free will" in the antecedent and consequent of his theorem. He said he did not really care what people chose to call it. Some people choose to call it "free will" only when there is some judgment involved. He said he felt that "free will" was freer if it was unhampered by judgment - that it was almost a whim. "If you don't like the term Free Will, call it Free Whim - this is the Free Whim Theorem".

Secondly, this is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for Free Whim (i.e. just because particles move randomly it doesn't mean that people will).

Thirdly, I'm stealing that picture for my avatar :D .

[Thinktoomuch]

If we perceive a stimulus as bad, and have recognised or inferred enough precursor stimuli to be able to avoid that stimulus, and if this behaviour is not instinctive, then the stimulus must have had an effect on the state/structure of our brians.

Yes, I do not argue with that. What I am laboriously trying to say is:
- we are born with instincts etc (nature)
- in infancy we receive external stimuli that affect our brain (nurture)
- at a certain time our brain develops to the point of establishing patterns of behaviour (abilities). One such ability is the ability to choose on the basis of "recognised or inferred precursor stimuli"
- after achieving this ability to choose, "nurture" is what we decide to be exposed to, not something on which we have no control.

What I find difficult to accept is the proposition that this ability to choose is only imaginary because our thought is produced by the brain "nurtured" to produce what appears to be a decision but is instead only the response determined by the state of the neurons at the time of establishing the imaginary ability. Probably I am trying to express my understanding of what Dancing David calls "the potential for cognition to have a non-determinist influence on behavior".


Both the examples of the rat and the robot appear illogical to me: the rat has only instinct, is unable to choose the rattlesnake for being aware of having a terminal illness and wanting to die on its own terms; the robot can not choose to contradict its heat seeking mechanism. Have I missed something?

[Mercutio]

Science says, "We don't know what causes (the illusion of*) free will." [* Delete as applicable]. Scott Adams says, "Science tells us there is no such thing as free will."

Scott Adams is wrong.I would argue that science assumes, axiomatically, that there is no free will. It must. If this assumption is shown to be unsupported, science will be forced to abandon it, but we cannot even begin to do behavioral science without the assumption of determinism.

Consider: If there was an element of free will involved in, say, gravity, we would not have Newton's Laws of motion. We couldn't. Remember, inertia and gravity replaced animistic ideas, where things fell to earth because they wanted to be closer to it...but if something could literally choose not to fall, we would not have the systematic, lawful observations of bodies in motion from which to generate our Laws.

If our goal is to predict human behavior, we cannot begin by positing that it is not predictable, and this is precisely what the assumption of free will does. We must begin with an assumption of determinism, or there is no reason to continue. If this assumption is wrong, we will soon know it; the lawful relationship of reinforcement schedule to behavior, for instance, will not hold true for humans as it does for, say, rats. But it does, predictably enough that we can build entire cities (Las Vegas is a particularly salient example) on the strength of the Variable Ratio Schedule of Reinforcement.

The conference that IllegalArgument refers to demonstrated that research in many areas (cognitive neuroscience in particular) is pointing to the same conclusion: our assumption of "no free will" has been a very fruitful one, and is leading to a greater and greater understanding of our actions and of ourselves.

[EGarrett]

What part of a rat's brain, or yours for that matter, is not mechanism?I could bring up the "experiencer," but truth is we're now moving into an area of science that none of us understand enough to properly discuss.

(you could say that that alone makes us different than our robots)

The whole point of the argument is that a purely reductionist and/or naturalistic approach would conclude that neither you nor the rat has any more freedom than the robot in terms of the responses.

By this view, you are merely a more complex robot.Well, I'm only referring to free will as it's normally imagined. Being able to choose to do something or not...can be experienced at the same time as our actions being determined.

Things can be set up so that you're free to choose what you do, but I already know beforehand what you'll choose (with reasonable certainty).

For people who like to argue religion...a Deity could have given you free choice while already knowing everything we'll choose to do.

[simonmaal]

- we are born with instincts etc (nature)
- in infancy we receive external stimuli that affect our brain (nurture)

There is research to support the idea that stimuli affect our brain before infancy (i.e. in the womb). Check The Cat in The Hat study by DeCasper and Spence (1994), and also consider the effect that certain chemicals have on the physical development of the brain (e.g. fetal alcohol syndrome). However, Fantz found that newborn babies had an attraction towards human faces, which cannot be due to pre-birth environmental influences.

The point is that there is a huge problem in identifying 'genetic predispositions' as the cause of behaviours and cognition in neonates.

[DeviousB]

I could bring up the "experiencer," but truth is we're now moving into an area of science that none of us understand enough to properly discuss.

(you could say that that alone makes us different than our robots)

Well, I'm only referring to free will as it's normally imagined. Being able to choose to do something or not...can be experienced at the same time as our actions being determined.

Things can be set up so that you're free to choose what you do, but I already know beforehand what you'll choose (with reasonable certainty).

For people who like to argue religion...a Deity could have given you free choice while already knowing everything we'll choose to do.

In other words, free will involves an appeal to the supernatural and hence is no more scientific than other woo.

[simonmaal]

If our goal is to predict human behavior, we cannot begin by positing that it is not predictable, and this is precisely what the assumption of free will does. We must begin with an assumption of determinism, or there is no reason to continue.

But should pyschologists be content to predict and describe behaviour, or should they also be involved in explaining it? Nomothetic epistemology should be in the business of explaining before describing should it not?

[DeviousB]

- after achieving this ability to choose, "nurture" is what we decide to be exposed to, not something on which we have no control.

Decide on the basis of existing nature/nurture. Which (a) is beyond our control, and (b) rigidly deterministic of our responses.

What I find difficult to accept is the proposition that this ability to choose is only imaginary because our thought is produced by the brain "nurtured" to produce what appears to be a decision but is instead only the response determined by the state of the neurons at the time of establishing the imaginary ability. Probably I am trying to express my understanding of what Dancing David calls "the potential for cognition to have a non-determinist influence on behavior".

All physical and chemical processes in science are believed to be either deterministic or stochastic. We might not be predictable (because of random input into our 'state' from quantum effects), but no part of us known to science obeys anything other than the strict physical laws. That we appear (to ourselves and others) to practise free will is either (a) evidence of a non-stochastic, non-deterministic, pyschomorphic effect, or (b) the most amazing emergent behaviour ever.

Both the examples of the rat and the robot appear illogical to me: the rat has only instinct, is unable to choose the rattlesnake for being aware of having a terminal illness and wanting to die on its own terms; the robot can not choose to contradict its heat seeking mechanism. Have I missed something?

Well, you've assumed quite a lot about rat behaviour to start with, but more importantly you have assumed that you can contradict your mechanism i.e. have free-will. You have therefore proved that there is free-will by assuming there is free will. Have a cookie.

[DeviousB]

I would argue that science assumes, axiomatically, that there is no free will. It must. If this assumption is shown to be unsupported, science will be forced to abandon it, but we cannot even begin to do behavioral science without the assumption of determinism.

Except that we empirically experience free will every day of our lives. To have FW fit with an entirely deterministic/stochastic, we rationalise this evidence as an 'illusion'. The argument that it is an illusion is supported by the lack of any mechanism that is not deterministic/stochastic to provide for FW (i.e. argument from ignorance).

If our goal is to predict human behavior, we cannot begin by positing that it is not predictable, and this is precisely what the assumption of free will does. We must begin with an assumption of determinism, or there is no reason to continue.

Many aspects of modern physics are inherently unpredictable, radioactive decay for example. It does not stop physicists from investigating and explaining physical phenomena. In psychology, we enter Seldon's world, predicting average group behaviour, not individual responses. As you say, with some success.

[Cuddles]

For people who like to argue religion...a Deity could have given you free choice while already knowing everything we'll choose to do.

This is precisely the flaw that shoots down a lot of religious philosophy. If a deity is omniscient then it must know everything we will do, and therefore we don't have free will, even if it seems so to us. Equally, if we have free will the any deity cannot know what will happen next, which contradicts at least the Christian view of god. The only way around this is to impose limits on the power of god, such as saying it can know everything now, but somehow lacks the ability to work out what will happen next. Either way, the concept of an all-knowing, all-powerful god is fundamentally incompatible with free will.

[DeviousB]

This is precisely the flaw that shoots down a lot of religious philosophy. If a deity is omniscient then it must know everything we will do, and therefore we don't have free will, even if it seems so to us. Equally, if we have free will the any deity cannot know what will happen next, which contradicts at least the Christian view of god. The only way around this is to impose limits on the power of god, such as saying it can know everything now, but somehow lacks the ability to work out what will happen next. Either way, the concept of an all-knowing, all-powerful god is fundamentally incompatible with free will.

Ah, but an omnipotent God isn't limited by mere logical constraints, hence can perfectly know the future even though it has yet to be determined by the actions of our free-will!

(Yes, I know this is nonsense, but I've had such an argument trotted out against me more than once!)

[IXP]

It seems to me that all discussion of a free will has the implicit assumption that there is some entity different than the physical body that possesses the free will. Science has no evidence of such an entity. If fact there is evidence that consciousness is more like a journal of what the brain has perceived and decided rather then the process itself.

IXP

[Mercutio]

But should pyschologists be content to predict and describe behaviour, or should they also be involved in explaining it? Nomothetic epistemology should be in the business of explaining before describing should it not?
Unless we can predict it, we have no business trying to explain it. Freud could "explain" behavior, after the fact, in a manner which was incredibly popular for a time. The problem was, with so many things "explained" by, say, an unresolved Oedipal complex, there was no way to predict, given an unresolved Oedipal complex, which of these many things might occur. The theory was crap. It is only when we are able to predict behavior that we are able to see what things might begin to explain it. If we are able to say "when A happens, a person will do B" (or better yet, manipulate A under controlled conditions and demonstrate that B follows), only then can we start to suggest explanations for that connection.

As a general rule, we progress from being able to describe, to predicting, to controlling, to finally explaining. If we try to explain first...like Freud, we may be creating a fanciful and elaborate fiction, and nothing more.

[PopeTom]

2) We can empirically determine that we have free-will. Present an individual with two identical coins. Ask him to choose one to keep. Which did he choose and why? Reverse the experiment. Give the subject two identical coins and have him hold both out towards you. Choose which he may keep and take back the other. Which did you choose and why? We act as though we have free will. We believe we have free will. To claim that these actions are deterministic is to put upon oneself the burden of proof. Our apparent free-will is the empirically observed phenomena to be explained. Saying it is deterministic, means proving it is deterministic; otherwise it is an argument from ignorance/incredulity.


Would this be the same as saying "You have free will because you are capable of deciding between two equally good choices"?

[Mercutio]

Except that we empirically experience free will every day of our lives. Not by any definition I have ever seen. What definition do you use? "If it feels like free will, it must be"? We experience sunrise and sunset, too, but the truth is that these are illusions brought about by earth-rotation.
To have FW fit with an entirely deterministic/stochastic, we rationalise this evidence as an 'illusion'. The argument that it is an illusion is supported by the lack of any mechanism that is not deterministic/stochastic to provide for FW (i.e. argument from ignorance).It is not merely a lack of mechanism; it is also a lack of evidence that would require said mechanism. And plenty of evidence of determinism.

If we had free will of the variety we often claim, we would be much better at predicting our own behavior. We are too often "not as hungry as I thought I was" for me to think I have libertarian free will.

Many aspects of modern physics are inherently unpredictable, radioactive decay for example. It does not stop physicists from investigating and explaining physical phenomena. In psychology, we enter Seldon's world, predicting average group behaviour, not individual responses. As you say, with some success.Radioactive decay is quite predictable in the aggregate. We may use that model to look at human behavior as well. Only rarely are we able to predict a specific instance of a specific behavior (except in the case of reflexes and classical conditioning), but changes in rate of behavior are every bit as much evidence of determined behavior, and as you say, we are fairly successful at predicting group behavior.

It is not unlike other complex systems, such as weather. We are good at predicting what tomorrow's temps and precip are likely to be, and we are very good at knowing that summer will be warmer than winter...but whether or not it will rain on this particular field on the 3rd of September of next year? No. And yet, we do not claim that the weather has free will.

[Stellafane]

I tried to avoid this thread, but no matter how hard I tried I couldn't.

[Mercutio]

2) We can empirically determine that we have free-will. Present an individual with two identical coins. Ask him to choose one to keep. Which did he choose and why? Reverse the experiment. Give the subject two identical coins and have him hold both out towards you. Choose which he may keep and take back the other. Which did you choose and why? We act as though we have free will. We believe we have free will. To claim that these actions are deterministic is to put upon oneself the burden of proof. Our apparent free-will is the empirically observed phenomena to be explained. Saying it is deterministic, means proving it is deterministic; otherwise it is an argument from ignorance/incredulity.
There is a classic demonstration in social psych--we present people with 5 samples of hosiery--nylon stockings, labeled 1 through 5. We ask them to choose which is the softest and silkiest. A majority of them choose #5. Why? Do they freely choose that one, because it is indeed softest? The trick, of course, is that the samples are randomized between subjects, and are all the same brand in the first place! It is the situation, not the softness, that induces people to choose #5. (I would search for a citation, but I am at work, and I realized that if I put "hidden camera" and "stockings" into a google search, I would probably lose my job.)

It looks like your coin choice, but when systematically reviewed we see that the choice is determined. Indeed, have you actually done your coin experiment? Perhaps people choose one hand over the other significantly more often.

In your thought experiment, you ask people why they chose the coin they did. In the hosiery experiment they are also asked...they do not say "because it was the one on the right" or "because it was the last one" or anything of the sort--they say "because it was softest and silkiest". You are trusting our subjective experience as evidence of free will, when our subjective experience may be every bit as determined as our public behavior.

[simonmaal]

Unless we can predict it, we have no business trying to explain it.

An important example here is the Babylonian astronomy system. It was able to predict the 'movement' of the sun and stars with staggering accuracy. Its predictive value was commendable, but is explanatory power was lacking (it was based on the heavens moving, which we now know to be incorrect).

Now, for reasons relating to the 'nature of knowledge', biological and cognitive accounts of psychology are more concerned with explanations than descriptions. For example, evolutionary theory looks at the functional and adaptive relevance of a given behaviour; how this explains homosexuality is a problem, but I don't want to digress too far! What I am saying is the cause-effect relationship is the very core of an explanation. This is not necessarily the same thing as prediction: remember, the Babylonians could predict movements but were on the wrong horse completely when it came to explaining them.

Freud could "explain" behavior, after the fact, in a manner which was incredibly popular for a time.
And it fitted in with the Western European worldview of the time; we have to acknowledge the social and historical context in order to see where grandaddy Freud was coming from. He did start of from a scientific base, but he drifted into hermeneutic epistemology as a result of his clinical work with neurotic people. His theories evolved as he went along, which many use to attack him.

The problem was, with so many things "explained" by, say, an unresolved Oedipal complex, there was no way to predict, given an unresolved Oedipal complex, which of these many things might occur. The theory was crap.
Freud was trying to do both: explain and predict. He could predict that an unresolved Oedipal conflict would express itself in a person 'marrying his mother' as a result of unconscious motives. In actual fact, modern psychodynamics, object relations and systemic theory support this notion, and there is an impressive body of research to suggest we choose people who are similar to us. Perhaps Freud's knowledge was best described as partial.

It is only when we are able to predict behavior that we are able to see what things might begin to explain it. If we are able to say "when A happens, a person will do B" (or better yet, manipulate A under controlled conditions and demonstrate that B follows), only then can we start to suggest explanations for that connection.
The only problem with that line of thought is that people often change as a result of being studied (this is particularly true in clinical rather than academic psychology). In other words, we are not simply measuring the effect of one variable on the other. This should lead us to question whether psychology can be described as a science. Certainly, there are questions arising on whether the findings in the laboratory can be generalised to real life settings. There are severe problems with the ecological validity of experimental psychology.

As a general rule, we progress from being able to describe, to predicting, to controlling, to finally explaining. If we try to explain first...like Freud, we may be creating a fanciful and elaborate fiction, and nothing more.
One thing I would add is that Freud could cover all his bases: because psychodynamics is not amenable to testing, it can never be proven or disproven. So we are stuck with hypothetical constructs based on inductive use of clinical evidence. In short, the perfect circular argument.

[davidsmith73]

There is a classic demonstration in social psych--we present people with 5 samples of hosiery--nylon stockings, labeled 1 through 5. We ask them to choose which is the softest and silkiest. A majority of them choose #5. Why? Do they freely choose that one, because it is indeed softest? The trick, of course, is that the samples are randomized between subjects, and are all the same brand in the first place! It is the situation, not the softness, that induces people to choose #5.

There could be a further possibility - that a deterministic process (the situation) presents an "illusion" to conscious experience that one of the stockings is softer than the rest, then free will comes into play and intervenes to choose it. Thoughts?

(I put "illusion" in inverted commas because the experience that a stocking is softer is obviously not an illusion, but the extrapolation to objective reality would be)

[Jeff Corey]

[QUOTE=simonmaal;1968163]... Certainly, there are questions arising on whether the findings in the laboratory can be generalised to real life settings. There are severe problems with the ecological validity of experimental psychology...[QUOTE]

Not in behavior analysis. The laboratory analysis of behavior has been sucessfully exported to the appled setting for decades. After all, the laboratory is just a more controlled enviroment and part of the "real world".

[DeviousB]

Not by any definition I have ever seen. What definition do you use? "If it feels like free will, it must be"? We experience sunrise and sunset, too, but the truth is that these are illusions brought about by earth-rotation.

Free will is (i) the ability or discretion to choose, (ii) the doctrine that ascribes that ability to individuals.

To flirt with solipsism, your experiences are the only evidence you will have of anything. EP may allow us to identify bias in our perceptions, but it does dispute that they are perceptions. If you perceive yourself as making a free choice, it may very well be true that in fact you are obeying a preconditioned bias that led you to that choice. To go from that to hard determinism is a hasty generalization.

It is not merely a lack of mechanism; it is also a lack of evidence that would require said mechanism. And plenty of evidence of determinism. [...] Radioactive decay is quite predictable in the aggregate. We may use that model to look at human behavior as well. Only rarely are we able to predict a specific instance of a specific behavior (except in the case of reflexes and classical conditioning), but changes in rate of behavior are every bit as much evidence of determined behavior, and as you say, we are fairly successful at predicting group behavior.
So the fact that the radioactive decay of an atom is not deterministic does not stop us predicting decay behaviour quite well for groups of atoms. That we can predict the behaviour of groups of humans quite well is evidence that the behaviour of an individual human is deterministic. Ri-i-ight.

It is not unlike other complex systems, such as weather. We are good at predicting what tomorrow's temps and precip are likely to be, and we are very good at knowing that summer will be warmer than winter...but whether or not it will rain on this particular field on the 3rd of September of next year? No. And yet, we do not claim that the weather has free will.
But do we claim it is deterministic? (Answer: Yes and no; forcast models can be either deterministic or stochastic, with the later rapidly gaining popularity
).

Without determinism, there is no support for hard determinism; and determinism is not a given.



[* I had this argument with a guy at CERN, does the fact that the numerical models of weather systems are chaotic mean the weather is chaotic? Or is the weather deterministic, but too incompletely described to be accurately modelled?]

[Jeremy]

Devious B,
1) If we assume that no action of a human being can ever really be 'voluntary', then any claim to hold copyright on a creative work is non-sensical. Scott Adams didn't create Dilbert, it is merely the inevitable consequence of his biology, he has no more creative rights to it than over the exhalations from his lungs. Yet on every cartoon he produces he puts a little copyright symbol, does he not believe his own argument then?

Utility in no way proves or disproves this theory. Gravity does not occur because we need it to hold ourselves to the ground.

Besides, their is a perfectly good explanation for this and other utility disputations (most notably the concept of fault and justice).
The reason we use these concepts as a society is because they are useful to us, not because they describe the nature of reality. Just because you own a ball, nothing changes about the ball. All these concepts exist only on the human level, the only physical correlation is found in human brains.

That does not mean we should abandon them, however. We simply should not mistake such things as justice, ownership, and various other ethical concepts as actually descriptive of nature.

[DeviousB]

Besides, their is a perfectly good explanation for this and other utility disputations (most notably the concept of fault and justice).

An explanation Adams specifically rejected in the linked-to discussion (apparently).

[simonmaal]

[quote=simonmaal;1968163]... Certainly, there are questions arising on whether the findings in the laboratory can be generalised to real life settings. There are severe problems with the ecological validity of experimental psychology...

Not in behavior analysis. The laboratory analysis of behavior has been sucessfully exported to the appled setting for decades.
Examples, please?

the laboratory is just a more controlled enviroment and part of the "real world".

Experimental methodology has trouble in accessing and understanding internal states. Also, what about demand characteristics? Experimenter effects? Tautological reasoning?

[Thinktoomuch]

You have therefore proved that there is free-will by assuming there is free will. Have a cookie.

No, I tried (unsuccessfully, it seems) to express my (poor) reasoning for liking to assume it.

Not much different from your statement "we empirically experience free will every day of our lives", methinks.

Thanks for the cookie.

[Jeff Corey]

[quote=Jeff Corey;1968284]
Examples, please?
Experimental methodology has trouble in accessing and understanding internal states. Also, what about demand characteristics? Experimenter effects? Tautological reasoning?

Examples include articles published in the Jounal of Applied Behavior Analysis. I tried for a link, but my connection is fubar today.
And behavior analysis typically studies reliably observable behavior, not private events.
Other areas of experimental psych have studied sensation and perception for over 100 years, Apparently they have had no problem with measuring internal states.

[Thinktoomuch]

Anyway, the discussion has expanded a lot, but it seems to me that the original question "is free will a paranormal concept" has essentially been answered in the positive by everybody. Should the thread now become "is a scientifically baseless acceptance of the concept of free will compatible with skepticism?"?

[Mercutio]

An important example here is the Babylonian astronomy system. [snip]

[T]he Babylonians could predict movements but were on the wrong horse completely when it came to explaining them.
Remember... how we know they bet on the wrong horse, was that further predictions failed to come true. That is always the bottom line.

[snip]
Freud was trying to do both: explain and predict. He could predict that an unresolved Oedipal conflict would express itself in a person 'marrying his mother' as a result of unconscious motives. In actual fact, modern psychodynamics, object relations and systemic theory support this notion, and there is an impressive body of research to suggest we choose people who are similar to us. Perhaps Freud's knowledge was best described as partial.
First off, you must be reading different sources than I am. I have read an awful lot of Freud; I must have missed where he predicted any such thing. A source would be appreciated. Subsequent researchers have tried using Freud to predict... it is not pretty.

The only problem with that line of thought is that people often change as a result of being studied (this is particularly true in clinical rather than academic psychology). In other words, we are not simply measuring the effect of one variable on the other. This should lead us to question whether psychology can be described as a science. Certainly, there are questions arising on whether the findings in the laboratory can be generalised to real life settings. There are severe problems with the ecological validity of experimental psychology.
Heh...each of these problems was discovered as the result of partial failures to predict--systematic failures. These systematic failures to predict led to the inclusion of additional variables, but always the bottom line is whether or not we can predict. We simply cannot say we have explained something, if we cannot use that explanation to predict.

Some of the problems with the validity of experimental psych are due to cognitive psychology's attempt to explain before they can predict...as Corey suggests, not all experimental psych is created equal.

One thing I would add is that Freud could cover all his bases: because psychodynamics is not amenable to testing, it can never be proven or disproven. So we are stuck with hypothetical constructs based on inductive use of clinical evidence. In short, the perfect circular argument.
You will not see me argue against the notion of psychoanalysis as pseudoscience.

[Mercutio]

So the fact that the radioactive decay of an atom is not deterministic does not stop us predicting decay behaviour quite well for groups of atoms. That we can predict the behaviour of groups of humans quite well is evidence that the behaviour of an individual human is deterministic. Ri-i-ight.Heh... my comment about radioactivity being predictable in the aggregate addressed your comment that, although radioactive decay was random, it was nonetheless scientifically studied. I agree--it is studied, and it is not unpredictable in the aggregate.

I note that neither randomness nor determinism--the two explanations being tossed about here--are "free will". Arguing for free will puts one in the interesting position of arguing against both randomness and determinism. The burden of proof is on one who suggests that something more is at work.

[Jeremy]

An explanation Adams specifically rejected in the linked-to discussion (apparently).

Perhaps I am misunderstanding you, or maybe you are misunderstanding me.

I am arguing against free will, and I attempted to dispute an argument you used earlier in the thread about copy-right being voided by a lack of free will.
I was unaware that Adams had adressed similar arguments in his blog.

[simonmaal]

[quote=simonmaal;1968658]

Examples include articles published in the Jounal of Applied Behavior Analysis. I tried for a link, but my connection is fubar today.

And behavior analysis typically studies reliably observable behavior, not private events.
Other areas of experimental psych have studied sensation and perception for over 100 years, Apparently they have had no problem with measuring internal states.
Until we look at specific examples, any discussion is far too subjective for my liking. So I would appreciate it if you would cite one or two when you sort out your internet problems, please. Then I can get a true feel or where you're coming from. Thanks

[simonmaal]

Remember... how we know they bet on the wrong horse, was that further predictions failed to come true. That is always the bottom line.

I know where you're coming from, but this might not always be the case. Let's consider evolution for a moment: it has great explanatory power, but how strong is its predictive power? We would have to say that it needs to be strongly predictive. But what of the objections over the peppered moth study, an interesting one being this:

http://www.millerandlevine.com/km/evol/Moths/moths.html

There are questions over the methodology, but the researcher failed to predict what would happen. Does this mean the explanation (industrial melanism) is wrong? As the author of the article I cited says, no. The main problem with Kettlewell's study, to me, comes down to lack of ecological validity again. In this particular example, the original naturalistic observation was enough; the subsequent experiment was a much less reliable testbed.

First off, you must be reading different sources than I am. I have read an awful lot of Freud; I must have missed where he predicted any such thing. A source would be appreciated.
Sure:

"Object-choice, the step forward in the development of the libido which is made after the narcissitic stage, can take place according to two different types: either according to the narcissistic type, where the subject's own ego is replaced by another one that is as similar as possible, or according to the attachment type, where people who have become precious through satisfying the other vital needs are chosen by the libido as well. A strong libidinal fixation to the narcissistic type of object-choice is to be included in the predisposition to manifest homosexuality." Freud, S. (1962) Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis London, Penguin, pp. 476-7.

Freud is making some rather brave hypotheses here (note, though, how this kind of hemeneutic epistemology employs methods that are untestable). Of course, we have to remember that he didn't have access to techology such as fMRI scans; if he had, I guess that his theories would have been rather different!

Additionally, Freud's deterministic account of development (e.g. psychosexual stages) is intinsically predictive as well as descriptive. Explanation=biological drives (the pleasure principle), Prediction=oral, anal and phallic stages.

To stay within the subject matter of the thread, Freud is saying here that unconscious motives are driving our choice of sexual partner; we do not consciously choose, but our choice is made for us by a dynamic unconscious. In other words, free will is illusory.

Subsequent researchers have tried using Freud to predict... it is not pretty.
Heh...each of these problems was discovered as the result of partial failures to predict--systematic failures. These systematic failures to predict led to the inclusion of additional variables,
Indeed. But Attempts to predict (e.g. psychosexual stage theory) are not the same thing as ability to predict.

Some of the problems with the validity of experimental psych are due to cognitive psychology's attempt to explain before they can predict...as Corey suggests, not all experimental psych is created equal.
Yes, especially if that work is carried out in the laboratory. But this does not apply to all cognitive-experimental work. Asch (1952), Lewin (1947) and the Sherif's summer camp experiments were all carried out in the field. Yes, we know that a researcher can influence the findings by clever design, but I wouldn't say that criticism applies to all cognitive-experimental work.

[Darat]

I know where you're coming from, but this might not always be the case. Let's consider evolution for a moment: it has great explanatory power, but how strong is its predictive power? We would have to say that it needs to be strongly predictive.

...snip...

Evolutionary theory is very strongly predictive. For instance Darwin original work in which he deduced that chimpanzees are humans closest "evolutionary cousins" has been confirmed by studies of the DNA of both species. Just following on from that when I was googling for a source I came across this newspaper report that mentions further predictions:


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/25/AR2005092501177.html

...snip...

When scientists announced last month they had determined the exact order of all 3 billion bits of genetic code that go into making a chimpanzee, it was no surprise that the sequence was more than 96 percent identical to the human genome. Charles Darwin had deduced more than a century ago that chimps were among humans' closest cousins.

But decoding chimpanzees' DNA allowed scientists to do more than just refine their estimates of how similar humans and chimps are. It let them put the very theory of evolution to some tough new tests.

If Darwin was right, for example, then scientists should be able to perform a neat trick. Using a mathematical formula that emerges from evolutionary theory, they should be able to predict the number of harmful mutations in chimpanzee DNA by knowing the number of mutations in a different species' DNA and the two animals' population sizes.

"That's a very specific prediction," said Eric Lander, a geneticist at the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard in Cambridge, Mass., and a leader in the chimp project.

Sure enough, when Lander and his colleagues tallied the harmful mutations in the chimp genome, the number fit perfectly into the range that evolutionary theory had predicted.

...snip...


In effect evolutionary theory relies on (as far as we can currently determine ;) ) "random" events its "resolution of prediction" is quite coarse (but is being constantly refined). So whilst we cannot say that "Species X will develop spots in Y years" we can predict that "If Species X is to survive in environment B it will evolve". (An analogy is radioactive decay in that the "resolution of prediction" can be no finer then the half-life of the isotope.)


Sure:

"Object-choice, the step forward in the development of the libido which is made after the narcissitic stage, can take place according to two different types: either according to the narcissistic type, where the subject's own ego is replaced by another one that is as similar as possible, or according to the attachment type, where people who have become precious through satisfying the other vital needs are chosen by the libido as well. A strong libidinal fixation to the narcissistic type of object-choice is to be included in the predisposition to manifest homosexuality." Freud, S. (1962) Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis London, Penguin, pp. 476-7.

Freud is making some rather brave hypotheses here (note, though, how this kind of hemeneutic epistemology employs methods that are untestable). Of course, we have to remember that he didn't have access to techology such as fMRI scans; if he had, I guess that his theories would have been rather different!



I have to plead ignorance not having read any Freud for a long, long time but just what is the above passage predicting?

[The Atheist]

Wouldn't proof of free will be as simple as being in a house with a fully-stocked pantry and refrigerator, being hungry and choosing not to eat for 24 hours?

Far too obvious.

[DeviousB]

I note that neither randomness nor determinism--the two explanations being tossed about here--are "free will". Arguing for free will puts one in the interesting position of arguing against both randomness and determinism. The burden of proof is on one who suggests that something more is at work.

I already answered this. I observe in myself and others the ability to make conscious choices, you assert that this perceived free-will is an illusion. Assertions are not proof, what evidence do you have that all my choices are the results of pre-determined bias?

I observe free-will. You claim that this is an illusion. Since you are the one proposing an explanation, I would suggest that you back it up.

So far the arguments seem to be "there is no mechanism for free-will" (arguments from ignorance), and "there is no evidence for an unknown mechanism" (because the phenomenon is an illusion, circular reasoning).

Yes, there is a problem with free-will under the laws of physics as we understand them. None of the laws actually provide for any mechanism that would allow it. This does not preclude there being such a mechanism. Nor does it prove that free-will does not exist. Secundum quid.

[Darat]

I already answered this. I observe in myself and others the ability to make conscious choices, you assert that this perceived free-will is an illusion. Assertions are not proof, what evidence do you have that all my choices are the results of pre-determined bias?

I observe free-will. You claim that this is an illusion. Since you are the one proposing an explanation, I would suggest that you back it up.

...snip..

What about Libet's work (see: http://www.consciousentities.com/experiments.htm#decisions) this shows that some apparent "decisions" are made before we are "consciously" aware we have made them. In these circumstance your "entity of freewill" i.e "conscious choices" is shown to be an illusion.

[DeviousB]

In Libet's work, what causes the readiness potential?

Also is every readiness potential converted into an action or does the 'conscious mind' act as a censor?

Are 'awareness' and 'choice' the same thing?

[DeviousB]

Also is every readiness potential converted into an action or does the 'conscious mind' act as a censor?

Apparently, this is called Free Won't. :D

[Cuddles]

To take things back towards the OP, all this is completely irrelevant. Either free will exists or the illusion of free will exists. Either it is entirely normal and is constantly used by all of us or it doesn't exist at all. Either way there is nothing paranormal involved at any point.

[simonmaal]

I have to plead ignorance not having read any Freud for a long, long time but just what is the above passage predicting?

Human development: it is identifying common laws of cause and effect that apply to all people. In other words, a person is born with certain biological urges that are slowly curtailed by society. Alongside this interaction, discreet stages occur throughout human development. In other words, Freud is predicting how every person will develop. This is the biggest criticism I have of Freud: he created a set of theories based on white, Western European Judaic-Christian culture and then assumed they were universal. Even his notion of super-ego, ego and ID can be related to the concept of God (the restritions imposed on our desires), the person in the middle and the devil (the base instincts of the ID).

Much water has passed under the bridge since then, but Freud has still left an indelible mark on our societies (we still use the terms 'anal retentive', 'hysterical' and so on). Anyway, I'm starting to digress here so I'll stop.

Did I answer your question there?

[simonmaal]

To take things back towards the OP, all this is completely irrelevant. Either free will exists or the illusion of free will exists. Either it is entirely normal and is constantly used by all of us or it doesn't exist at all. Either way there is nothing paranormal involved at any point.

I just thought I'd bring something else into the fray here:

What are your views on near death experiences?

[simonmaal]

Are 'awareness' and 'choice' the same thing?

This is a moral/political as well as a scientific question. It has the potential to undermine the very foundation of libertarian individualism. I mention this because I would say that this moral/political issue is likely to affect the interpretation of any data.

[IllegalArgument]

I just thought I'd bring something else into the fray here:

What are your views on near death experiences?

Since, you didn't ask my opinion. ;)

NDEs are an interesting side effect of brain when it's starved of oxygen.

Penn and Teller on one episode of B*llsh!t talked to a man who had multiple NDEs.

He worked on G-force stress tests, the ones they give to pilots.

Susan Blackmore has done a lot of good research in this area. Look her up.

[simonmaal]

Since, you didn't ask my opinion. ;)

No problem, the more the merrier :)

NDEs are an interesting side effect of brain when it's starved of oxygen.

This area of study is a nightmare, because we don't yet have the technology to study every pattern of neural activity in the detail we need to. Even worse, it doesn't lend itself to a controlled study! Can't imagine that one ever getting past an ethics committee :jaw-dropp

Susan Blackmore has done a lot of good research in this area. Look her up.

The problem is Blackmore takes a Buddhist-like position; in fact I think she is a Zen Buddhist. I'm surprised you mentioned her name! I haven't had much chance to read her work first-hand, but I'll take a deeper look after
I get my final exam out of the way on October 19th!

[Dancing David]

If I understand things correctly- and I may not- at the quantum level, free will (or, more specifically the absence of super-determinism), would require what Einstein called "spooky action at a distance." This involves one particle instantaneously affecting another distant particle, thus requiring action at faster than the speed of light. An alteranative to this faster than light effect is that everything has already been determined. Both options seem quite paranormal, until you do the math. Unfortunately, very few people actually understand the math! I certainly don't.

c.f.: Gribbin, J. (1990) The man who proved Einstein was wrong. New Scientist, 24, 43-45.


I think that thios points out where some of the debate is occuring, although it does not need superluminal things.

Premise: If the action of the brain is mechanical,as it were, then there is no free will.

I am in disagreement with the premise, mainly because the action of neuron is not totaly determined, it is more probablistic. So in that complex interaction there is a chance that a particular neuron will fire. there is achance that the organism will exhibit a certain behavior. granted that some of these behaviors are very likely to happen.

But there is a difference between the three position which are likely:

a. Free will exists and people are free to make choices (free will)

b. People can make some choices under the constraints of biology (partial free will)

c. All behaviors are detremined and could be predicted with absolute accuracy(determinism)

There is no need for magical intervention for free will to exist. I think that is the flaw in the argument. terrorist are not determined by thier biology to make acts of terrorism, my opinion.

[IllegalArgument]

The problem is Blackmore takes a Buddhist-like position; in fact I think she is a Zen Buddhist. I'm surprised you mentioned her name! I haven't had much chance to read her work first-hand, but I'll take a deeper look after
I get my final exam out of the way on October 19th!

Most of her heavy NDE research was done years ago. Dying to Live, I think is her main book on it. It's been years, but I don't remember anything in that book, talking about Buddhism, it may pre-date her interest.

Here's she states that she is not a Zen Buddhist. I would agree she is using Buddhist ideas in her current work.
http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Zen/intro.htm

I have always been fond of her, she's quite a character in person.

Just curious why do you have a concern about her Buddhist leanings? I'm always interested in criticism of Buddhism.

[Mercutio]

I already answered this. I observe in myself and others the ability to make conscious choices, you assert that this perceived free-will is an illusion. Assertions are not proof, what evidence do you have that all my choices are the results of pre-determined bias?
Um...at this point, we are at one assertion each.

I observe free-will. You claim that this is an illusion. Since you are the one proposing an explanation, I would suggest that you back it up.
You assert free will. You observe choice. The behavioral literature on choice is very rich. The fact that you choose one option over another does not mean that you do so freely; by manipulating the options, we can demonstrate that we systematically and lawfully respond differently to different sets of choices.

(parenthetically...by recognizing the extent to which we are controlled by our environment, we are given the opportunity to arrange our environment to facilitate our long-term best interests. By recognizing that we are not free, we can arrange our world to be more, well, free of punishers. Practically speaking, recognizing that we are not free in the libertarian sense makes us more free in the pragmatic sense.)

So far the arguments seem to be "there is no mechanism for free-will" (arguments from ignorance), and "there is no evidence for an unknown mechanism" (because the phenomenon is an illusion, circular reasoning).
It is considerably more than an argument from ignorance. We have very good evidence of learning (changes in behavior due to interaction with the environment) in absence of conscious awareness (if you wish to argue that free will is unconscious, you are arguing for quite a different interpretation of it than the traditional), in both classical and operant conditioning. Indeed, blindsight and anterograde amnesia studies are teaching us tremendous amounts about how much we can learn without any conscious awareness. So, we have great evidence for mechanisms of learning that do not require free will. We have experiments that demonstrate that conscious awareness is not a prerequisite for learning. Depending on one's definition of free will, these experiments could have provided evidence for it, but did not. Yes, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, but the notion of free will, given these experiments, is edging closer and closer to unfalsifiability and pseudoscience.

Yes, there is a problem with free-will under the laws of physics as we understand them. None of the laws actually provide for any mechanism that would allow it. This does not preclude there being such a mechanism. Nor does it prove that free-will does not exist. Secundum quid.Ah, yes...this verifies that the burden of proof is on the person who claims a meaningful place for free will. The explanation of free will being an illusion is consistent with the known laws of physics. The evidence, from blindsight and anterograde amnesia to Libet, is consistent with environmental determinism and not conscious free will. What you are arguing here is a free-will-of-the-gaps, negatively defined as that which is left over after what we can explain is explained. This is a far cry from the traditional view of an active, conscious free will that intelligently guides our decision-making. That view, I think, is long dead.

[Cuddles]

I just thought I'd bring something else into the fray here:

What are your views on near death experiences?

Basically the same as IllegalArgument's. I would say that there is the possibility that something paranormal could be involved, although there is no evidence for this. Was this related to the free will argument or was it a complete derail? I don't see the two as related since free will must be normal if it exists, whereas NDEs could potentially be paranormal if other paranormal things, such as an afterlife, prove to be true.

Unfortunately I haven't been able to take NDEs too seriously since I read a Gary Larson cartoon with a group of doctors standing over a patient and shining a torch in his eyes. :p

[Mercutio]

I have to plead ignorance not having read any Freud for a long, long time but just what is the above passage predicting?
It is saying that, after we observe whether someone grows up homo- or heterosexual, we may infer back as to what their object-choice was, and whether it was according to the narcissistic type or the attachment type.

It "explains" that, at this point in development, either you will grow up hetero or you will grow up homo. But at least it says why. Um...

I do not agree that this is an actual prediction. If this is considered evidence of Freud predicting, I suggest that we have two different usages of the term.

[Jono]

Free will is just an abstract way of not saying that no matter how badly we want to flap our arms and fly away freely and physically, we can't because we are not birds.

[DeviousB]

Free will is just an abstract way of not saying that no matter how badly we want to flap our arms and fly away freely and physically, we can't because we are not birds.

I've always imagined that if I could only wish for it hard enough, my arms would grow feathers and I'd soar into the skies like an eagle. Only I've never been sure, would that be an example of "freak will" or "free quill"?
:rolleyes:

[jskowron]

Free will and determinism were common topics of the behavioral scientist B.F. Skinner. In his biography of Skinner, Daniel Bjork writes

"He (Skinner), like most Americans for much of our history, preferred to
emphasize the ability of people to shape their environments- except
that he reversed the relationship: Environment determined how people
acted, rather than people freely creating their environments." (p231)

This seems contradictory to me- Our behavior is determined by the environments that we shape.

[IllegalArgument]

Free will and determinism were common topics of the behavioral scientist B.F. Skinner. In his biography of Skinner, Daniel Bjork writes

"He (Skinner), like most Americans for much of our history, preferred to
emphasize the ability of people to shape their environments- except
that he reversed the relationship: Environment determined how people
acted, rather than people freely creating their environments." (p231)

This seems contradictory to me- Our behavior is determined by the environments that we shape.


Feedback loop, our enviroments shape our behavior, which causes "us" to shape our enviroment, etc etc.

Evolution works on the same principal.

[ceptimus]

Your brain is made of atoms. Atoms obey the laws of physics. :D

No room for free will there. Perhaps atoms don't quite obey the laws of physics, when they're part of a brain.

[EGarrett]

In other words, free will involves an appeal to the supernatural and hence is no more scientific than other woo.Actually, if you go from what I said, determinism requires an equal amount of woo. Simply because of the chaos in the universe.

To understand how we make our choices also requires a knowledge of how the brain functions that we don't yet have.

[EGarrett]

This is precisely the flaw that shoots down a lot of religious philosophy. If a deity is omniscient then it must know everything we will do, and therefore we don't have free will, even if it seems so to us. Equally, if we have free will the any deity cannot know what will happen next, which contradicts at least the Christian view of god. The only way around this is to impose limits on the power of god, such as saying it can know everything now, but somehow lacks the ability to work out what will happen next. Either way, the concept of an all-knowing, all-powerful god is fundamentally incompatible with free will.You're assuming that just because something is predictable that it isn't a free choice.

If you know that your buddy is going to open all the windows in the morning and close them at night...because he always does it...does that suddenly mean that it's not something he chooses to do? Of course not.

[Jeff Corey]

Free will and determinism were common topics of the behavioral scientist B.F. Skinner. In his biography of Skinner, Daniel Bjork writes

"He (Skinner), like most Americans for much of our history, preferred to
emphasize the ability of people to shape their environments- except
that he reversed the relationship: Environment determined how people
acted, rather than people freely creating their environments." (p231)

This seems contradictory to me- Our behavior is determined by the environments that we shape.

I haven't read Bjork, but I have read a lot of Skinner. Our enviroments shape our behavior because when we respond, our environment changes. We respond and get or lose stimuli. Sometimes these changes operantly change the behavior that produced those changes.
No contradiction.

[Ericka]

Unlike animals people have the capacity to learn how-to learn. We aren't just programmed by our environment and our genetic instincts. If we want to sit down are read a book on C++ we can choose to do it, and then become a programmer. Or instead we can choose to waste time in front of the television (On any of the 500 channels without anything on). Animals have needs, but people have desires and opinions. To one person working as a lawyer might be what they decide to do and to another person working as a doctor might be what they decide to do.

Somewhere people make a choice. No one is predisposed to becoming either a lawyer or a doctor, and you can't force anyone to make such a choice. In fact if you tell someone they have to become a doctor, they might decide to become a musician instead. Animals don't have these kinds of choices, and they only learn because someone trains them to behave differently than they naturally would, with rewards and punishments. People on the other hand have a natural desire to learn how to improve themselves and create their surroundings in a way that appeals to them.

If we didn't have free will then no one would be responsible for their actions. But somewhere along the line people make a choice to become criminals, and we hold them responsible for it. It is possible that if they wanted to, they could have become a doctor instead. But obviously in some cases people are mentally ill, and can't control their behavior. And we say these people don't have free will, but that doesn't mean the brain is so simple that you can anticipate where any person will be 10 or 20 years from now. But a dog will still be drinking from its dish, and pooping in the neighbors yard.

[Jeff Corey]

Unlike animals people have the capacity to learn how-to learn...

Sorry, when you start out by stating something false, I just stop reading the rest. Animal behaviorists have been studying learning sets (learning how to learn) in animals ranging from rats to college students for over 50 years.

[Garrette]

Unlike animals people have the capacity to learn how-to learn. We aren't just programmed by our environment and our genetic instincts. If we want to sit down are read a book on C++ we can choose to do it, and then become a programmer. Or instead we can choose to waste time in front of the television (On any of the 500 channels without anything on). Animals have needs, but people have desires and opinions. To one person working as a lawyer might be what they decide to do and to another person working as a doctor might be what they decide to do.

Somewhere people make a choice. No one is predisposed to becoming either a lawyer or a doctor, and you can't force anyone to make such a choice. In fact if you tell someone they have to become a doctor, they might decide to become a musician instead. Animals don't have these kinds of choices, and they only learn because someone trains them to behave differently than they naturally would, with rewards and punishments. People on the other hand have a natural desire to learn how to improve themselves and create their surroundings in a way that appeals to them.

If we didn't have free will then no one would be responsible for their actions. But somewhere along the line people make a choice to become criminals, and we hold them responsible for it. It is possible that if they wanted to, they could have become a doctor instead. But obviously in some cases people are mentally ill, and can't control their behavior. And we say these people don't have free will, but that doesn't mean the brain is so simple that you can anticipate where any person will be 10 or 20 years from now. But a dog will still be drinking from its dish, and pooping in the neighbors yard.This is what many (or even most) people who are uninformed in this area believe, but as Jeff Corey pointed out, it is unsubstantiated.

Read the rest of this thread, particularly the posts of Mercutio and you may learn a bit. I rarely participate in threads such as this one because I have no expertise in the subject, but I always learn a lot by reading them.

[Ericka]

I'm not saying that animals don't have free will, I only said that humans have more free will. I migth also say that plants have free will, but much less than animals or humans do. But saying animals didn't have any free will wasn't something I said.

[Garrette]

I'm not saying that animals don't have free will, I only said that humans have more free will. I migth also say that plants have free will, but much less than animals or humans do. But saying animals didn't have any free will wasn't something I said.Try reading the posts a bit more carefully then try a new response that addresses what was actually said.

Additionally, you might want to cite some evidence (as opposed to new age beliefs and wishful thinking) about plants having free will.

[Mercutio]

Unlike animals people have the capacity to learn how-to learn. We aren't just programmed by our environment and our genetic instincts. If we want to sit down are read a book on C++ we can choose to do it, and then become a programmer. Or instead we can choose to waste time in front of the television (On any of the 500 channels without anything on). Animals have needs, but people have desires and opinions. To one person working as a lawyer might be what they decide to do and to another person working as a doctor might be what they decide to do.
Corey addressed this...

Somewhere people make a choice. No one is predisposed to becoming either a lawyer or a doctor, and you can't force anyone to make such a choice. In fact if you tell someone they have to become a doctor, they might decide to become a musician instead. Social psychologists call this "reactance", and have shown that it varies systematically with changes in the sorts of choices that are offered and denied.
Animals don't have these kinds of choices, and they only learn because someone trains them to behave differently than they naturally would, with rewards and punishments. People on the other hand have a natural desire to learn how to improve themselves and create their surroundings in a way that appeals to them.
This "natural desire" is circularly inferred. The nice thing about a systematic analysis of behavior is that we do not have to circularly infer; we can actually demonstrate causal relationships.

If we didn't have free will then no one would be responsible for their actions. But somewhere along the line people make a choice to become criminals, and we hold them responsible for it. It is possible that if they wanted to, they could have become a doctor instead. Hmm... consider, please... an emphasis on "free will" is a tremendous tool for a society. Individuals are much easier to manipulate when the focus is on the consequences of their actions, rather than on the antecedents. If we were to focus on the antecedents to criminal behavior, we would be forced to acknowledge that the environment *does* play a causal role, and that if we truly wanted to reduce crime we would actually have to take action ourselves, rather than simply waiting until someone committed a crime and punishing that person.

It is in our government's best interest to emphasize "free will"; that way we don't have to take responsibility for the environments we have created.
But obviously in some cases people are mentally ill, and can't control their behavior. And we say these people don't have free will, but that doesn't mean the brain is so simple that you can anticipate where any person will be 10 or 20 years from now. But a dog will still be drinking from its dish, and pooping in the neighbors yard.We have the most complex brains we know of, but also the most complex environments. "Free will" suggests that we can never understand human behavior scientifically; fortunately, if we start out with the assumption that we can, we don't have to give up before we begin. And if you take that 10 or 20 years, I think you will find that over any given 10 or 20 year period, we have come to know more and more about our behavior. "Free will" would suggest that should not be the case.

[Thinktoomuch]

My apologies for presuming to butt in again.

The statement
"If we were to focus on the antecedents to criminal behavior, we would be forced to acknowledge that the environment *does* play a causal role, and that if we truly wanted to reduce crime we would actually have to take action ourselves, rather than simply waiting until someone committed a crime and punishing that person."
appears to imply that a majority still does not acknowledge this. Am I deluded in thinking that it does, at least conceptually, but it is not prepared to back it up in practice? I would have thought that widespread acceptance of a traumatic past as a mitigating circumstance in judgment was sufficient evidence.

Does the statement
"Free will" suggests that we can never understand human behavior scientifically"
imply that statistical analysis of collective human behaviour has no heuristic value?

[Jeff Corey]

\

Does the statement
"Free will" suggests that we can never understand human behavior scientifically"
imply that statistical analysis of collective human behaviour has no heuristic value?

Yes to the first part and no to the second.
The implication does not follow.

[The Atheist]

I see pages of thread, yet nobody has addressed post 65 yet.

Am I to presume that such a simple concept and one sentence explanation just doesn't fit into the world of Freud, Libet, Skinner, et al?

Or is it really just far too obvious?

I'm not trying to be a smart-arse; it just looks like a very easily answered question. Maybe Antipodeans' minds work at a different level and I have no idea what I'm typing. The compulsion I've had to keep an eye on this thread clearly negates my thinking in one way, but I am getting BLOODY HUNGRY HERE, so will someone please answer the post before I starve! I really like food and have a house full of it, but my free will is about to overtaken by my stomach which is protesting that my throat has been cut.

[Thinktoomuch]

Well, ThAt, I could never forgive myself if you died of starvation because everybody ignored you.

My guess is that all those here with postgraduate studies in psychology and those deluding themselves as having an equivalent understanding find your antipodean cultured English logic (there, I deeply insulted you :D !) ((private joke, others ignore us please)) too mundane to warrant an answer.

Given that mine are in more numerate subjects, I think I can add up as follows:

1) nobody knows enough about brain function yet to say with reasonable certainty how thought is produced
2) free will implies that thought is not produced by the physical brain
3) therefore we can not yet say whether free will is real and produced by a hypothetical "mind" or a fiction produced by our brain.
(oops - that looks dangerously similar to a sillogism - maybe I have stepped out of line!)

The unpleasant part is that, by the same logic, free will is a matter of belief, therefore by accepting its existence you have to make an exception to your skepticism... Did somebody mention something about casting first stones?

[Thinktoomuch]

Well, ThAt, I could never forgive myself if you died of starvation because everybody ignored you.

My guess is that all those here with postgraduate studies in psychology and those deluding themselves as having an equivalent understanding find your antipodean cultured English logic (there, I deeply insulted you :D !) ((private joke, others ignore us please)) too mundane to warrant an answer.

Given that mine are in more numerate subjects, I think I can add up as follows:

1) nobody knows enough about brain function yet to say with reasonable certainty how thought is produced
2) free will implies that thought is not produced by the physical brain
3) therefore we can not yet say whether free will is real and produced by a hypothetical "mind" or a fiction produced by our brain.
(oops - that looks dangerously similar to a sillogism - maybe I have stepped out of line!)

The unpleasant part is that, by the same logic, free will is a matter of belief, therefore by accepting its existence you have to make an exception to your skepticism... Did somebody mention something about casting first stones?

[The Atheist]

Well, ThAt, I could never forgive myself if you died of starvation because everybody ignored you.

My guess is that all those here with postgraduate studies in psychology and those deluding themselves as having an equivalent understanding find your antipodean cultured English logic (there, I deeply insulted you :D !) ((private joke, others ignore us please)) too mundane to warrant an answer.

Given that mine are in more numerate subjects, I think I can add up as follows:

1) nobody knows enough about brain function yet to say with reasonable certainty how thought is produced
2) free will implies that thought is not produced by the physical brain
3) therefore we can not yet say whether free will is real and produced by a hypothetical "mind" or a fiction produced by our brain.
(oops - that looks dangerously similar to a sillogism - maybe I have stepped out of line!)

The unpleasant part is that, by the same logic, free will is a matter of belief, therefore by accepting its existence you have to make an exception to your skepticism... Did somebody mention something about casting first stones?
:dl:

Mate! I am disgusted! If I'd known you were watching this thread I wouldn't have bothered. I was lmfao when I read your reply. That's it, that's going to cost you a 10k raise. Back to Community!

Man, I hate guys like you.

[SirPhilip]

Do y'all believe in free will? If so, do you think it's paranormal by definition? Well, in the context of human sentience, intelligence and control over base impulses define that. However, someone with free will, technically, would be completely at rest.

[steenkh]

1) nobody knows enough about brain function yet to say with reasonable certainty how thought is produced
2) free will implies that thought is not produced by the physical brain
3) therefore we can not yet say whether free will is real and produced by a hypothetical "mind" or a fiction produced by our brain.
(oops - that looks dangerously similar to a sillogism - maybe I have stepped out of line!)
I believe that "free will" is simply a human way of abstracting all the probably deterministic factors that make up our behaviour. We will never know down to the last quantum particle what makes us decide to do one or the other thing, and that is why the decision feels "free".

I do not believe it is necessary to discout the experience of having a free will, just because we also believe that the world is deterministic, because the world is at the same time impossibly complex.

[simonmaal]

Here's she states that she is not a Zen Buddhist. I would agree she is using Buddhist ideas in her current work.
http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Zen/intro.htm

Thanks for the link; it's nice for someone to do the 'spadework' for me when I'm in the middle of all this revision. Saves my contibution to the debate fizzling out!

I have always been fond of her, she's quite a character in person.

At this stage, I haven't read her first hand so I can't comment

Just curious why do you have a concern about her Buddhist leanings? I'm always interested in criticism of Buddhism.

Ok, we could end up hijacking the thread on this one if we're not careful, so I'll try to stay relevant to the topic. A basic premise of Buddhism is the influence of karma inherited from previous lives. This has implications for free will, because it could be argued (as Blackmore does, I think) that free will is illusory because of karmic imprints from previous incarnations. In other words, metaphysical and spiritual issues are being given a validity claim.

[simonmaal]

If this is considered evidence of Freud predicting, I suggest that we have two different usages of the term.

I was thinking along the same lines. Symbolic epistemology does not lend itself to the formulation of experimental hypotheses. I don't want to get into a drawn-out debate on Freud, so I think I can finish by saying that Freud was trying to have a foot in both the objective and subjective camps.

[simonmaal]

Free will and determinism were common topics of the behavioral scientist B.F. Skinner. In his biography of Skinner, Daniel Bjork writes

"He (Skinner), like most Americans for much of our history, preferred to
emphasize the ability of people to shape their environments- except
that he reversed the relationship: Environment determined how people
acted, rather than people freely creating their environments." (p231)

This seems contradictory to me- Our behavior is determined by the environments that we shape.

I'm typing this reply to you using a PC composed of hundreds of parts. From start to finish, there have been hundreds of people involved in the manufacture, delivery and usage of this PC. Behind me are 3 bookcases, upon which are hundreds of books, from which I've inherited a considerable amount of knowledge. I'm looking out of the window and seeing houses as far as the eye can see. I am saturated every day with advertisements using powerful imagery and emotional appeal that someone created with the intention of influencing my buying decisions. I also see people driving around in their vehicles polluting the environment.

I hope you meant that we shape our environment as well as it shaping us, thus referring to a reciprocal relationship.

[simonmaal]

Unlike animals people have the capacity to learn how-to learn. We aren't just programmed by our environment and our genetic instincts.

I have one word for you: epigenesis.

[simonmaal]

Does the statement
"Free will" suggests that we can never understand human behavior scientifically"
imply that statistical analysis of collective human behaviour has no heuristic value?

I would say that if you were referring to measurement, reliability and objectivity, then we have to hold our hands up and admit we do not yet have the understanding we seek (and if we include non-scientific inquiry, the search has taken thousands of years so far).

To answer your question directly, do we need to separate consciousness from behaviour in order to get a grasp of its possible purpose? If so, we would need to separate out biological perspectives from experimental. In biology, there is no dispute about adopting the methods of the natural sciences, it is an inherent part of the subject matter. We can observe activity in certain brain regions to make (relatively crude) inferences about the brain regions responsible for different functions (although we have to be very careful not to extrapolate causal factors from correlations). Consequently, the field of cognitive neuropsychology is making some tremendous progress towards improving the human condition following brain damage (e.g. Wilson's neuropager being an aid to memory loss). CNP gives us a living, breathing snapshot of brain structure and function at the same time as a certain thought or behaviour is occurring (instead of relying upon post-hoc data following brain trauma). The only problem with this level of analysis is that it takes place at an almost exclusively intra-personal level.

In contrast, psychology has a veritable gamut of perspectives to draw upon; a number of methodological approaches is available. Experimental psychology can go beyond the intra-personal and analyse at an inter-personal, group and societal level. But then comes in the question: what should psychology be trying to do? Are we content with looking for general laws of cause and effect, or do we need to gather a more diverse range of data? For example, experiential and humanistic approaches can examine the qualia of human existence. We can merge these different kinds of data with the material data uncovered by the kinds of studies I mentioned in the previous paragraph. To date, Baars' global workspace theory provides, to me, one of the most coherent accounts based on this kind of approach.

But our understanding of consciousness and free will is still very rudimentary. Simply stating that there is no free will or there is definitely free will at this stage is an extremely premature conclusion to propose.

[Jekyll]

Actually, if you go from what I said, determinism requires an equal amount of woo. Simply because of the chaos in the universe.


Deterministic (-ness) and predictability are very different things. It is very easy to inductively create deterministic chaotic functions in which their next step forward is based on their current state. It's just very hard to predict where they will be in k steps time.

[DeviousB]

1) nobody knows enough about brain function yet to say with reasonable certainty how thought is produced

Probably true, depending on what you mean.

2) free will implies that thought is not produced by the physical brain

No, because apparently "nobody knows enough about brain function" to say that.:)

3) therefore we can not yet say whether free will is real and produced by a hypothetical "mind" or a fiction produced by our brain.

Or real and produced by our brain.

The unpleasant part is that, by the same logic, free will is a matter of belief, therefore by accepting its existence you have to make an exception to your skepticism... Did somebody mention something about casting first stones?

No (again). As a skeptic, I expect science to explain the phenomenon of free will as I empirically experience it. It may well be an illusion emerging from the fantastically complex activities of our mechanistic brain. It could equally be the product of an unknown (but natural) process. It could be angels dancing on our neurons for all I care, as long as the hypothesis is properly constructed, tested and validated. How many angels can dance on the head of a dendrite anyway?

N.b. while I can find bias in my choices, particularly if summed over time. I have no evidence or experience that all of those choices are precisely constrained by external agencies. If they are, I'd like proof that they are.

The brain does not behave mechanistically unless proven otherwise. Nor does it exhibit supernatural behaviour until explained by science. The brain behaves as it does. Gather your data. Make you hypothesis. Test and confirm them. Publish.

[DeviousB]

"Free will" suggests that we can never understand human behavior scientifically; fortunately, if we start out with the assumption that we can, we don't have to give up before we begin. And if you take that 10 or 20 years, I think you will find that over any given 10 or 20 year period, we have come to know more and more about our behavior. "Free will" would suggest that should not be the case.

Straw man. In what way would free will invalidate the study of human behaviour? That the brain inherently retains a mechanism to resist its internal biases, however strong, does not prevent research into these biases. That the probability of a particular response never rises to 1, or falls to 0, does not stop you studying it. In fact, even without free will, the brain may still ignore any strength of bias, and respond or not respond regardless of whatever the circumstances driving it. A few molecules of GABA diffusing in the wrong direction and suddenly the brain comes down on the wrong side of a tipping point and the predicted behaviour goes *poof*. Free will suggests that we cannot study ourselves about as much as Brownian motion does.

[Thinktoomuch]

Thank you DB, I totally agree with your analysis.

The reason for the apparent stupidity of the second premise is that I relied on your statement


Basically, if all thought is a product of the entirely naturalistic processes of the brain, then free-will is an illusion. You would be physically incapable of ever thinking or deciding anything other than what the output of the hypercomplex state-machine in your head was inflexibly bound to do.


supported by others to that effect (excuse me for not going back to pick them all, those like brain = atoms etc)

to infer, not seeing them disputed (or missing/not understanding the contrary arguments if there were any), that this was part of the bits of brain function about which we DO know about. My reading in this area is very limited, it seemed to agree with my vague recollections.

[DeviousB]

My reading in this area is very limited, it seemed to agree with my vague recollections.

Mine is probably woefully out of date. For example, who the 'far canal' are Martin, Wallace and Fuchs
?

:confused:

[* My copy of From Neuron To Brain is my Kuffler and Nichols, period!]

[Thinktoomuch]

Not much new Latin literature in recent years, so I'm a bit more up to date here: is it "discinctus atque in otia natus"? If you do not claim copyright, I might use it myself...

[DeviousB]

Not much new Latin literature in recent years, so I'm a bit more up to date here: is it "discinctus atque in otia natus"? If you do not claim copyright, I might use it myself...

I'd love to, but Ovid said it first... ( http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/ovid/lboo/lboo15.htm ), and thanks for spotting the typo!

[hammegk]

Even under materialism free will can exist ...


How did you arrive at that conclusion?

[Jeff Corey]

Straw man. In what way would free will invalidate the study of human behaviour? ...
I see no straw here. It's just that any science tries to discover the causes of the phenomena it studies. Psychological science assumes behavior is caused and then looks for causes. If free will were true and behavior had no causes, then there would be no point in looking for them.

[jskowron]

I hope you meant that we shape our environment as well as it shaping us, thus referring to a reciprocal relationship.

That is what I believe (or should I say, have observed). My job is to alter environments in such a was as to increase the future probability that another human being will engage in specific behaviors while nopt engaging in other behaviors. It is my perception that I have free will, especially in situations where what I know about my environment is sufficient to give me reasonable certainty about the consequences of my behavior, but I also question whether or not my perception is reality.

Though I somewhat understand the atomic/particle level observations that contraindicate super-determinism, I still find it difficult to understand the role of true "free-will" in human behavior.

Another quote from Skinner:

"We act in such ways because our environments have determined that we shall do so. It is always the environment which must be taken into account. A culture is an environment an if it induces people to behave in ways which strengthen the culter it will be more likely to solve its problems, meet emergencies and survive....You and I are both strongly inclined to act with respect to the future of mankind because we have lived in an environment which has hit upon devices which strengthen such behavior. If our culture fail to induce others to do the same it is on its way out."*

I believe that Skinner acknowledges environmental accidents, but felt humans were programmed to respond to such accidents in a manner that promoted survival, but also chang the environment so that affects futures behaviors differently.

*from a 1972 communication between Skinner and a 16-year old who had recently read Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Cited from: Bjork, D.W. (1993) B.F. Skinnner. New York: BasicBooks.

[DeviousB]

I see no straw here. It's just that any science tries to discover the causes of the phenomena it studies. Psychological science assumes behavior is caused and then looks for causes. If free will were true and behavior had no causes, then there would be no point in looking for them.

1) Quite a lot of quantum behaviour has no causes; science still studies quantum behaviour. Regardless of whether free will exists or not, not all psychological behaviours will have precise causes because of the stochastic nature of many neurophysiological mechanisms. Of course, psychology no more needs precise causes that QCD needs a mechanism to predict particle decay.

2) Science is constrained to provide naturalistic explanations for phenomena, and not explanations derived from what we already know. Any putative mechanism for true free-will will be required to demonstrate its validity same as everything else. That we know of no such mechanism is not evidence that there is no mechanism. Claiming that the existence of any such mechanism invalidates science is not only an argument from adverse consequences, it is wrong.

[hammegk]

It seems to me that all discussion of a free will has the implicit assumption that there is some entity different than the physical body that possesses the free will.
Welcome to the problem wannabe materialists should examine ... just before they become 100% illogical in-the-closet dualists.

[DeviousB]

just before they become 100% illogical in-the-closet dualists.

Surely you mean "99%"? Nothing is ever certain in science!

[hammegk]

Wouldn't proof of free will be as simple as being in a house with a fully-stocked pantry and refrigerator, being hungry and choosing not to eat for 24 hours?
And where did that 'thought' originate based on your person maximum-perceived-benefit algorithm? Who stuck that in there? And how does that 'thought' communicate with what we perceive as 'brain/neural systems' hardware?

Far too obvious.
;) No. Just not unanswerable.

[Mercutio]

Straw man. In what way would free will invalidate the study of human behaviour? That the brain inherently retains a mechanism to resist its internal biases, however strong, does not prevent research into these biases. That the probability of a particular response never rises to 1, or falls to 0, does not stop you studying it. In fact, even without free will, the brain may still ignore any strength of bias, and respond or not respond regardless of whatever the circumstances driving it. A few molecules of GABA diffusing in the wrong direction and suddenly the brain comes down on the wrong side of a tipping point and the predicted behaviour goes *poof*. Free will suggests that we cannot study ourselves about as much as Brownian motion does.

Nope, not a straw man. The counter-arguments you bring up all rely on random processes, not willful ones. In the aggregate, random processes are quite predictable (ask Las Vegas).

1) Quite a lot of quantum behaviour has no causes; science still studies quantum behaviour. Regardless of whether free will exists or not, not all psychological behaviours will have precise causes because of the stochastic nature of many neurophysiological mechanisms. Of course, psychology no more needs precise causes that QCD needs a mechanism to predict particle decay.
At the level of analysis we are looking at (human behavior), quantum effects are irrelevant; even if we look at your "few molecules of GABA", we are orders of magnitude away from worrying about quantum fluctuations. At our level of analysis, we are perfectly justified in looking for causes. And "precise causes" is an interesting phrase...we are looking for actual causes. This means we are behaving quite differently than, say, a court of law looking for liability. We are not looking for "the cause" of a behavior, but for all the factors which play a causal role. Looking at, say, perceptual fields, where we can have electrodes measuring single neurons and their immediate neighbors, and see exitatory and inhibitory signals to each other as well as signals on down the optic nerve. The extraordinarily complex nature of nerve interaction (thousands of synapses for a given neuron!) may render it practically impossible to understand, but certainly not impossible to understand in principle. (Oh, and of course, we have many different levels of analysis to work with. As Corey will confirm, it is quite useful to look at the level of the behaving organism in its environment. Rather than trying to reduce our behavior to the actions of quarks, it is pragmatic to actually study...our behavior.)

Free will, however, is assumed to be neither determined nor random, but willful. (I reviewed an intro textbook where the author, a prominent physiological psychologist, had written that [paraphrasing] "when sufficient neurotransmitters have stimulated the dendrites of a neuron, it decides to send an action potential down its axon..." The key phrase here is "it decides"; it implied that the neuron, under the exact same circumstances, could have decided not to. If that were the case, there would be no systematic neuron function to study, and there would be no prominent physiological psychologists. Oh...they changed the wording before publication.)

2) Science is constrained to provide naturalistic explanations for phenomena, and not explanations derived from what we already know. Any putative mechanism for true free-will will be required to demonstrate its validity same as everything else. That we know of no such mechanism is not evidence that there is no mechanism. Claiming that the existence of any such mechanism invalidates science is not only an argument from adverse consequences, it is wrong.I am not claiming that the existence of such a mechanism invalidates science; I am claiming that the assumption of such a phenomenon is a dead end. We assume "no free will" because free will is neither random, which we could study, nor determined, which we could study. If our assumption is wrong, it will have to be abandoned. Thus far, it holds up nicely.

In order to argue for free will, people in this thread and others are being forced to re-define the concept. A free will that allows you to always choose what determinism would have forced you to choose anyway is not our understanding of free will (and is superfluous, and has no explanatory power). A free will that is unconscious is not our understanding of free will. Our "free will" is seen as a conscious director of our behavior, free from influences in our environment (see the "choosing not to eat" example). In casual observation, it would be impossible to distinguish true free will from simple ignorance of causal variables. Experimentally, we can manipulate variables and demonstrate changes in behavior without conscious awareness. That is, we know that at least some of our behavior is determined and not freely chosen. So, absolute free will, as it has been traditionally defined, is out. We are left, as I said, with a "free will of the gaps" that is shrinking by the day. The "at least some" gets larger every day. Our struggle to preserve some sort of coherent concept of free will, and the contortions we go through to hold on to that concept, recall the same dismay that we were not the center of the universe, nor god's special creation. The creationists are still fighting that one; I don't expect the defenders of "free will" to go gentle into that dark night anytime soon.

[Mercutio]

And where did that 'thought' originate based on your person maximum-perceived-benefit algorithm? Who stuck that in there? And how does that 'thought' communicate with what we perceive as 'brain/neural systems' hardware?
Heh. I would have chosen a different just-so story, about the power of social reinforcers, but whatever...

;) No. Just unanswerable....I agree. Too many uncontrolled variables. Heck, even Freud could "explain" it.

[hammegk]

LOL. Try again with the amendment. "Not answerable".

[Cuddles]

You're assuming that just because something is predictable that it isn't a free choice.

If you know that your buddy is going to open all the windows in the morning and close them at night...because he always does it...does that suddenly mean that it's not something he chooses to do? Of course not.

But that is not absolutely predictable, only probable. You cannot predict that one day he will suddenly decide not to do this. If something is entirely mechanical you can predict exactly what it will do in the future, so it can't have any choice. Somthing being unpredictable doesn't always mean it is a free choice, but something being predictable does always mean that it is not a free choice.

2) free will implies that thought is not produced by the physical brain

No. At the most fundamental level the behaviour of the particles making up the brain are probablistic and chaotic. This does not neccessarily mean that free will exists, but it does mean that it is possible for our thoughts to be unpredictable, which could mean either free will or just something that appears to be free will.

I think Azimov's psychohistory in the Foundation series covers the idea of predicting human behaviour quite well., where large groups of people can be predicted statistically, but indiviuals cannot be. We can do this to a certain extent now, such as knowing the majority of people will turn right on entering a shop, but not being able to know which way any specific individual will turn.

I think the question of why individual behaviour is unpredictable is probably impossible to answer, and in any case is largely irrelevant. Whether we have free will or just an inherent randomness from basic physical processes, the same observations of unpredictable individual behaviour and probablistic group behaviour will be seen. If we can't tell the difference then does it really matter?

[DeviousB]

Nope, not a straw man. The counter-arguments you bring up all rely on random processes, not willful ones. In the aggregate, random processes are quite predictable (ask Las Vegas).

So might human behaviour be, without being entirely deterministic (which it plainly is not), or entirely non-willful.

The straw man is that you paint free-will as some omnipotent arbiter of behaviour rather than part of the processes of the brain. The existence of free-will does not invalidate bias, false perception, or reflex, instinctive, learned or reinforced behaviour. At no point would free will stop you from investigating the causes of a behaviour, however it may mean that the causes of a behaviour cannot be completely described. BFD, the same is true of any stochastic process.

[IllegalArgument]

So might human behaviour be, without being entirely deterministic (which it plainly is not), or entirely non-willful.

The straw man is that you paint free-will as some omnipotent arbiter of behaviour rather than part of the processes of the brain. The existence of free-will does not invalidate bias, false perception, or reflex, instinctive, learned or reinforced behaviour.

What is a brain, if it is not a complex mix of just the things you mentioned. Where does free will fit in?

[DeviousB]

What is a brain, if it is not a complex mix of just the things you mentioned. Where does free will fit in?

Bias, false perception, or reflex, instinctive, learned or reinforced behaviour, and free will. (<--- There.)

[IllegalArgument]

Bias, false perception, or reflex, instinctive, learned or reinforced behaviour, and free will. (<--- There.)

Non-answer. Everytime I read one of these thread, free-will is always circularly defined.

It would great for us layman, if someone could define it non-circularly.

Otherwise, to me, it's a term with about as much meaning as God.

[steenkh]

In order to argue for free will, people in this thread and others are being forced to re-define the concept. A free will that allows you to always choose what determinism would have forced you to choose anyway is not our understanding of free will (and is superfluous, and has no explanatory power).
Being one of those who re-defines the concept, I think I should say that I do not think it is superfluous, and I do think it has explanatory power! My re-defined free will is simply what we experience as free will, the higher expression of accumulated effect of all the little deterministic influences. It has explanatory power because you can use it as a short-hand to explain why people are making a non-obvious choice, for which you would otherwise have to know the entire neurological setup of their brains with all possible external influences.

I think we should continue to use the concept of free will because we feel it as free - when we do not otherwise know what caused it. (Free will of the gaps anyone :) )

[steenkh]

So might human behaviour be, without being entirely deterministic (which it plainly is not), or entirely non-willful.
What do you mean with "which it plainly is not"? I do not see it so plainly!

[DeviousB]

What do you mean with "which it plainly is not"? I do not see it so plainly!

Some of the physical processes of the brain are stochastic (i.e. random or probabilistic, determined by the laws of statistics and probability), some are chaotic (develop in a way that is unpredictable with respect to small pertubations of the initial conditions).

[IllegalArgument]

Some of the physical processes of the brain are stochastic (i.e. random or probabilistic, determined by the laws of statistics and probability), some are chaotic (develop in a way that is unpredictable with respect to small pertubations of the initial conditions).

Which ones? You don't have to give a detailed explaination, just the general categories.

If they are random, that doesn't seem to imply they have intent? Still try to figure where the "will" in free will comes in.

[Mercutio]

Being one of those who re-defines the concept, I think I should say that I do not think it is superfluous, and I do think it has explanatory power! My re-defined free will is simply what we experience as free will, the higher expression of accumulated effect of all the little deterministic influences. It has explanatory power because you can use it as a short-hand to explain why people are making a non-obvious choice, for which you would otherwise have to know the entire neurological setup of their brains with all possible external influences.

I think we should continue to use the concept of free will because we feel it as free - when we do not otherwise know what caused it. (Free will of the gaps anyone :) )
Hmmm... Taking your example, if you call that "explanatory", it is a textbook example of what Skinner called "explanatory fiction"; its "explanation" is filling in for either a very complex explanation, or an honest "I don't know", or both. Not so much explanation as smokescreen.
I agree with you wholeheartedly, that this is the way we do use the word. If we all recognised this, we'd be better off. We would no longer have to try to invoke, say, quantum mechanics, or microtubules, or homunculi, in order to "explain how free will works". We would recognise that it is shorthand, as accurate as "sunrise", describing how it seems to us but not pretending to be more than that description.