Are free will and determinism compatible?

[andyandy]

For the purposes of the poll;

Compatibilist = one who believes free will and determinism are compatible

Incompatibilist = one who believes that free will and determinism are not compatible

Libertarian incompatibilist = one who believes that at least some persons have free will and that, therefore, determinism is false

Hard determinist = one who believes thatdeterminism is true and that no persons has free will.

agnostic incompatibilist, one who remain agnostic as to whether people have free will

hard incompatibilist = one who belives that there is no free will regardless of determinism's truth or falsity

and it's necessary to have a stab at defining free will and determinism while we're at it.....

1.1 Free Will
What is needed, then, as a starting point, is a gentle, malleable notion that focuses upon special features of persons as agents. Hence, as a theory-neutral point of departure, free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in a manner necessary for moral responsibility.[2] Clearly, this definition is too lean when taken as an endpoint; the hard philosophical work is about how best to develop this special kind of control. But however this notion of control is developed, its uniqueness consists, at least in part, in being possessed only by persons.

1.3 Determinism
A standard characterization of determinism states that every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events.[4] Within this essay, we shall define determinism as the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future. According to this characterization, if determinism is true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time. Notice that an implication of determinism as it applies to a person's conduct is that, if determinism is true, there are (causal) conditions for that person's actions located in the remote past, prior to her birth, that are sufficient for each of her actions.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ has a comprehensive essay on the subject which is well worth reading.....)

So, what do you think? Are you a compatibilist or an incompatibilist?

[sphenisc]

I don't follow your definitions of 'Compatibilist' and 'Libertarian Compatibilist'.
It seems that a 'Libertarian Compatibilist' is an Incompatibilist, is that correct?

ETA: I've read the poll now - did you mean 'Libertarian Incompatibilist'?

[AtaraX]

I'm with Dan Dennett on this one. Read Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves. To boil it down. The universe is deterministic and there is obviously something we are refering too when we talk about free will. So free will exists in our determinist universe. Dennett argues that the idea of inderministic universe is inconsistent and it becomes even more so if you try to graft the idea of free will on top of it.
I wrote an essay on my blog about this issue last year:
http://xspecs.blogspot.com/2005/10/free-will.html
I hadn't discovered forums or blogs at that point and living in a foreign country it was the first chance I had to express my philosophical side in awhile. So please excuse the excessively flowery language.

[andyandy]

I've voted compatibilist to get the poll running - though I'm certainly open to persuasion....

My general thinking about this is that at any given moment at which i carry out an action, that action is a consequence of my brain's interpretation of data.
This action will be wholly a result of internal processes- chemical/genetic/"knowledge"/memory....etc.) - any external stimuli/limiting factors will be incorporated within this internal process.

Therefore if I was able to fully clone my brain (andyandy's brain in a vat)
which received all the same information to draw upon as my brain, then the action it decided upon would be the same.

Therefore, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time.....

nevertheless, free will still exists - it is merely incorporated within the internal processess for the brain in a vat whilst it decides upon an action....that is to say free will is compatible with determinism.

hmmm...
a bit of a weak tie up there.....it's a toughie to argue :)

[andyandy]

I don't follow your definitions of 'Compatibilist' and 'Libertarian Compatibilist'.
It seems that a 'Libertarian Compatibilist' is an Incompatibilist, is that correct?

ETA: I've read the poll now - did you mean 'Libertarian Incompatibilist'?

edited to change :)

[Darat]

...snip...

Therefore, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time.....


...snip...

But if there is some "true" randomness in those "fixed laws of nature" you mention then can't you say that the reality is both 100% deterministic yet unpredictable i.e. you can't predict the future (or for that matter reconstruct the past)?

[andyandy]

But if there is some "true" randomness in those "fixed laws of nature" you mention then can't you say that the reality is both 100% deterministic yet unpredictable i.e. you can't predict the future (or for that matter reconstruct the past)?

hmmm....but you could argue that free will does exist, but it's just one of the variables that need to be taken into account when making a deterministic prediction for the future....

My brain in a vat1 and my brain in a vat2 both have a spectrum of actions which they can chose - nevertheless they will both chose the same one.....

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hence, as a theory-neutral point of departure, free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in a manner necessary for moral responsibility.
This sounds like a fuzzy compatibilist definition of free will, not an incompatibilist/ libertarian definition. It comes down to what "exercise control over their conduct" actually means.

Things might be clearer if someone would define libertarian free will. I dare ya.

~~ Paul

[Almo]

1.3 Determinism
A standard characterization of determinism states that every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events.[4] Within this essay, we shall define determinism as the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future. According to this characterization, if determinism is true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time. Notice that an implication of determinism as it applies to a person's conduct is that, if determinism is true, there are (causal) conditions for that person's actions located in the remote past, prior to her birth, that are sufficient for each of her actions.

Well, Quantum Mechanics invalidates this definition of determinism.

define determinism as the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.

Under Quantum Mechanics, this can be true. However, the truth about the future is probabalistic, so

given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible

QM invalidates this hypothesis. Nice try though, and I see what you are getting at.

I would say that Free Will doesn't exist as we think of it. Our responses are results of what goes on in our brains at a physical level, but since QM may be involved, that does not necessitate that our actions are predictable in the Classical Mechanics Determinism sense (which is the type of determinism you've outlined above).

As such, I can't really select one of your poll options.

[Upchurch]

I don't see my option up there either, as defined. As pointed out above, I know determinism is false, but I am undecided on the quesiton of free will.


eta: Oh, wait. there is a planet X option. that'll do.

[andyandy]

I don't see my option up there either, as defined. As pointed out above, I know determinism is false, but I am undecided on the quesiton of free will.


eta: Oh, wait. there is a planet X option. that'll do.

If both free will and determinism are false then what is left?


<derail>
with regards to QM, as has been discussed before, philosophy does seem rather rooted in the classical - perhaps because philosophy relies on metaphor and on the microscopic level these metaphors are inadequate to truly describe that which occurs....
</derail>

perhaps one could regard the definition of determinism as for that of the macroscopic.....

or take the definition of determinism as

The facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.....

[Upchurch]

If both free will and determinism are false then what is left?
A structured but chaotic system

[Overman]

Philosophy like this is muddled soup crap to me.

I am Matt Radowski.

[Mercutio]

From Ambrose Bierce's Devil's Dictionary
DECIDE, v.i. To succumb to the preponderance of one set of influences over another set.

A leaf was riven from a tree,
"I mean to fall to earth," said he.

The west wind, rising, made him veer.
"Eastward," said he, "I now shall steer."

The east wind rose with greater force.
Said he: "'Twere wise to change my course."

With equal power they contend.
He said: "My judgment I suspend."

Down died the winds; the leaf, elate,
Cried: "I've decided to fall straight."

"First thoughts are best?" That's not the moral;
Just choose your own and we'll not quarrel.

Howe'er your choice may chance to fall,
You'll have no hand in it at all.
—G. J.Hard determinist here. Yes, there is a thing we speak of as free will. There is also a thing we speak of as a sunrise, but the sun does not rise, the earth turns. We may speak of the illusion of a thing as if it were the thing itself...that does not make it the thing itself.

eta your definition of determinism is not the one most determinists would choose. Do not confuse determinism with predestination.

[gentlehorse]

Incompatibilist = one who believes that free will and determinism are not compatible

I voted "No. I am an Incompatibilist," in that I don't see free will existing in a deterministic universe.

The universe, however, is observably not deterministic...

[chriswl]

Hard determinist here. Yes, there is a thing we speak of as free will. There is also a thing we speak of as a sunrise, but the sun does not rise, the earth turns. We may speak of the illusion of a thing as if it were the thing itself...that does not make it the thing itself.
But surely when we talk about free will we mean the freedom to act (or to attempt to act, we are talking about freedom of will not necessarily of action) in accordance with our "dispositions" as Hume put it. To choose something not in accordance with our "dispositions" is not the kind of thing we want the freedom to do - it wouldn't really count as freedom. In fact it couldn't be a choice at all. Our dispositions are, by definition, those things that we would choose so, tautologically, all our choices are in accordance with our dispositions.

I make exactly the choices I am disposed to make - that's free will. I can make only the choices I am disposed to make - that's determinism. These statements are compatible - that's compatibilism.

[I less than three logic]

Incompatibilist = one who believes that free will and determinism are not compatible

I voted "No. I am an Incompatibilist," in that I don't see free will existing in a deterministic universe.

The universe, however, is observably not deterministic...
Not deterministic, or not predictable? I’d concede that the universe is observably not predictable, but that by no means implies that it is observably not deterministic.

[Dave1001]

I'm shocked that I'm the only person so far who voted agnostic incompatibilist on a forum of skeptics.

ETA: I missed the undecided option. I should've voted for that, since although I don't see how non-illusory free will would be compatible with a completely deterministic universe, that doesn't preclude it from being the case.

[sphenisc]

I'm shocked that I'm the only person so far who voted agnostic incompatibilist on a forum of skeptics.


Your obviously insufficently sceptical of other people's claims to be sceptics. Not that it's your fault - I blame the distribution of quanta at Big Bang...


:)

And GET BACK TO WORK!

[Dave1001]

I'm with Dan Dennett on this one. Read Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves. To boil it down. The universe is deterministic and there is obviously something we are refering too when we talk about free will. So free will exists in our determinist universe. Dennett argues that the idea of inderministic universe is inconsistent and it becomes even more so if you try to graft the idea of free will on top of it.
I wrote an essay on my blog about this issue last year:
http://xspecs.blogspot.com/2005/10/free-will.html
I hadn't discovered forums or blogs at that point and living in a foreign country it was the first chance I had to express my philosophical side in awhile. So please excuse the excessively flowery language.

What about the distinction between apparent free will and actual free will? I think few would argue that apparent free will exists in our possibly deterministic universe. That doesn't mean that it actually is free will, it could be illusory.

[Dave1001]

Your obviously insufficently sceptical of other people's claims to be sceptics. Not that it's your fault - I blame the distribution of quanta at Big Bang...


:)

And GET BACK TO WORK!

today's wit, tomorrow's uniform, homogenous, matter-energy. :p

[Dave1001]

I make exactly the choices I am disposed to make - that's free will. I can make only the choices I am disposed to make - that's determinism. These statements are compatible - that's compatibilism.

Why is that free will? They both sound like determinism to me.

[Dave1001]

From Ambrose Bierce's Devil's DictionaryHard determinist here. Yes, there is a thing we speak of as free will. There is also a thing we speak of as a sunrise, but the sun does not rise, the earth turns. We may speak of the illusion of a thing as if it were the thing itself...that does not make it the thing itself.


Well put. I'm less certain that we exist in a deminist reality than you are, but I lean in the same direction. That free will is illusory. I have no idea why we have it, perhaps it's a non-essential artifact of more essential cognitive processes.

[roger]

What about the distinction between apparent free will and actual free will? I think few would argue that apparent free will exists in our possibly deterministic universe. That doesn't mean that it actually is free will, it could be illusory.That's where the title Elbow Room comes from. His argument is that all our behavior is deterministic (in a 20th century QM sense, not a 19th century classical sense), but that since the way our mind works lends the illusion of free will, it is adequate to assume free will. For example, if we are trying to figure out the morality of a given situation, we assume that the agents in the scene have free will, since in practice they act as they do. They judge cost/benefits, put values on things like human life, honor, stealing, etc. Free will is a emergent behavior of our brains by his argument, and mine.

Sort of the same way we talk about "solid" objects. We know the desk we are setting at is not some kind of "solid", but that it resists our hand sinking into what is essentially a vacuum via the electomagnetic force between widely dispersed particles. It's tiring and unnecessary to say that or consider that in classical mechanics or everyday life, so we just talk about solids in most cases.

[roger]

A structured but chaotic systemIf you are using the term chaotic in a mathematical sense, I believe you are using it incorrectly. Chaotic systems are deterministic, yet unpredictable.

[Darth Rotor]

For the purposes of the poll;

Compatibilist = one who believes free will and determinism are compatible

Incompatibilist = one who believes that free will and determinism are not compatible

Libertarian incompatibilist = one who believes that at least some persons have free will and that, therefore, determinism is false

Hard determinist = one who believes thatdeterminism is true and that no persons has free will.

agnostic incompatibilist, one who remain agnostic as to whether people have free will

hard incompatibilist = one who belives that there is no free will regardless of determinism's truth or falsity

and it's necessary to have a stab at defining free will and determinism while we're at it.....

1.1 Free Will
What is needed, then, as a starting point, is a gentle, malleable notion that focuses upon special features of persons as agents. Hence, as a theory-neutral point of departure, free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in a manner necessary for moral responsibility.[2] Clearly, this definition is too lean when taken as an endpoint; the hard philosophical work is about how best to develop this special kind of control. But however this notion of control is developed, its uniqueness consists, at least in part, in being possessed only by persons.

1.3 Determinism
A standard characterization of determinism states that every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events.[4] Within this essay, we shall define determinism as the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future. According to this characterization, if determinism is true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time. Notice that an implication of determinism as it applies to a person's conduct is that, if determinism is true, there are (causal) conditions for that person's actions located in the remote past, prior to her birth, that are sufficient for each of her actions.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ has a comprehensive essay on the subject which is well worth reading.....)

So, what do you think? Are you a compatibilist or an incompatibilist?
Why is it necessary for a physical characteristic (1.3), in micro, to be assumed as globally applicable in macro?

Why is free will assumed to be thus comparable to 1.3, and a 100% physical phenomenon?

Where is your allowance for synergy?

DR

[andyandy]

Why is it necessary for a physical characteristic (1.3), in micro, to be assumed as globally applicable in macro?

Why is free will assumed to be thus comparable to 1.3, and a 100% physical phenomenon?

Where is your allowance for synergy?

DR

the first line of the essay is

It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in the philosophical work devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it.

equally what people understand by "determinism" appears to be contentious.....

What definitions would you choose instead? Or would you choose not to ask the OP question? :)

by synergy, do you mean emergent behaviour?
Ie. a property, law, or phenomenon which occurs at macroscopic scales (in space or time) but not at microscopic scales....?

Could you expand on how this relates to compatibilism?

[Dave1001]

That's where the title Elbow Room comes from. His argument is that all our behavior is deterministic (in a 20th century QM sense, not a 19th century classical sense), but that since the way our mind works lends the illusion of free will, it is adequate to assume free will. For example, if we are trying to figure out the morality of a given situation, we assume that the agents in the scene have free will, since in practice they act as they do. They judge cost/benefits, put values on things like human life, honor, stealing, etc. Free will is a emergent behavior of our brains by his argument, and mine.

Sort of the same way we talk about "solid" objects. We know the desk we are setting at is not some kind of "solid", but that it resists our hand sinking into what is essentially a vacuum via the electomagnetic force between widely dispersed particles. It's tiring and unnecessary to say that or consider that in classical mechanics or everyday life, so we just talk about solids in most cases.

With all due respect, I think the desk is a terrible analogy to illusory free will "if we are trying to figure out the morality of a given situation". We don't even need to factor in free will, illusory or not, when making cost benefit analyses to put values on things. As a law student, I find it mucks up the analysis anyways, and departs from what I think are the more useful principles of empirically determined social objectives and social aesthetics that underlie the social contract that law should be.

As a side note, I don't think one needs a concept of free will to still look at concepts like incentives and a variety of other things that indicate knowledge that humans and human organizations tend to make influenceable choices, since very basic computer programs (flow charts even) can have choice trees as well.

[andyandy]

With all due respect, I think the desk is a terrible analogy to illusory free will "if we are trying to figure out the morality of a given situation". .

i think the desk is given as an example of the argument

"that all our behavior is deterministic but that since the way our mind works lends the illusion of free will, it is adequate to assume free will."

[Dave1001]

i think the desk is given as an example of the argument

"that all our behavior is deterministic but that since the way our mind works lends the illusion of free will, it is adequate to assume free will."

I disagree. I think the example of the sun rising and setting by Mercutio is more apropos.
That our mind lends to us the illusion of free will may lead us towards bad models for analysis and decision making (for example, in determining the best punishment mechanisms). Another example would be how our mind lends the illusion that vivid dangers are to be avoided more than less vivid but objectively more harmful ones.

In contrast, the molecules in our hand objectively do not pass through the molecules in the table, in that sense the table is solid. It's not an illusion our hand can't pass through it (or that it's vanishingly improbable that it would). But it may be an illusion that we have free will, in the same sense that it's an illusion that vivid dangers are necessarily the more harmful ones.

[andyandy]

I disagree. I think the example of the sun rising and setting by Mercutio is more apropos.
That our mind lends to us the illusion of free will may lead us towards bad models for analysis and decision making (for example, in determining the best punishment mechanisms). Another example would be how our mind lends the illusion that vivid dangers are to be avoided more than less vivid but objectively more harmful ones.

In contrast, the molecules in our hand objectively do not pass through the molecules in the table, in that sense the table is solid. It's not an illusion our hand can't pass through it (or that it's vanishingly improbable that it would). But it may be an illusion that we have free will, in the same sense that it's an illusion that vivid dangers are necessarily the more harmful ones.

what do you disagree with? My comment that I think the desk is given as an example of the assumptions that our mind makes rather than as an example of judging morality? :)

[Darth Rotor]

the first line of the essay is
equally what people understand by "determinism" appears to be contentious.....
Indeed, not the world's simplest concept to nail down. :)
What definitions would you choose instead? Or would you choose not to ask the OP question? :)
There are times that I consider the question a false dillemma, in the either-or sense, though I find this path of inquiry intriguing. I am not an ace at philosophy, so I walk with care around it. What the hell, I'll take the plunge:
Could you expand on how this relates to compatibilism?
My concern is that determinism and free will as an apples to apples tension, or a dialectic, is dependent on precise definitions to ensure two like qualities are being considered.
by synergy, do you mean emergent behaviour?
Ie. a property, law, or phenomenon which occurs at macroscopic scales (in space or time) but not at microscopic scales....?
By synergy I mean the matter of the whole being greater than the sum of its parts due to dynamic interaction of all parts (multichannel interaction? multimode interaction? the best fit term term escapes me.) Your emergent behavior is a term I am not familiar with. Learn a new concept each day, so I will ask: what is that exactly?

DR

[Dave1001]

what do you disagree with? My comment that I think the desk is given as an example of the assumptions that our mind makes rather than as an example of judging morality? :)

I disagree with* your leap from something being an artifact of our mind to the conclusion that we can treat it as if it is reality. Just as it would be unwise for our linguistic shorthand to be "vivid dangers are more harmful than less vivid ones" -although we're wired to intuit that, it may be unwise for our linguistic shorthand for illusory free will** to be "free will", if in fact, it is as illusory as the notion that vivid dangers are more harmful. With calling a table solid, I don't see the same danger in promoting a belief that could lead to harmful social results.***

*(what I perceive to be)

**(if it is illusory)

***( although I suppose that position could be revised if the future requires a utilitarian purpose for the masses to pass objects through tables.:) )

[hammegk]

A structured but chaotic systemSomeone once asked, "And how often do you randomly run red lights?".;)

[andyandy]

By synergy I mean the matter of the whole being greater than the sum of its parts due to dynamic interaction of all parts (multichannel interaction? multimode interaction? the best fit term term escapes me.) Your emergent behavior is a term I am not familiar with. Learn a new concept each day, so I will ask: what is that exactly?

DR

i think "emergent behaviour" may just be a different term for synergy as you are using it....it's kinda a new term for me too :)

here's wiki's take on it.....



An emergent behaviour or emergent property can appear when a number of simple entities (agents) operate in an environment, forming more complex behaviours as a collective. If emergence happens over disparate size scales, then the reason is usually a causal relation across different scales. In other words there is often a form of top-down feedback in systems with emergent properties. These are two of the major reasons why emergent behaviour occurs: intricate causal relations across different scales and feedback. The property itself is often unpredictable and unprecedented, and may represent a new level of the system's evolution. The complex behaviour or properties are not a property of any single such entity, nor can they easily be predicted or deduced from behaviour in the lower-level entities: they are irreducible. No physical property of an individual molecule of air would lead one to think that a large collection of them will transmit sound. The shape and behaviour of a flock of birds or shoal of fish are also good examples.



In physics, emergence is used to describe a property, law, or phenomenon which occurs at macroscopic scales (in space or time) but not at microscopic scales, despite the fact that a macroscopic system can be viewed as a very large ensemble of microscopic systems. Some examples include:

Color. Elementary particles such as protons or electrons have no color; it is only when they are arranged in atoms that they absorb or emit specific wavelengths of light and can thus be said to have a color.
Friction. Elementary particles are frictionless, or more precisely the forces between these particles are conservative. However, friction emerges when considering more complex structures of matter, whose surfaces can convert mechanical energy into heat energy when rubbed against each other. Similar considerations apply to other emergent concepts in continuum mechanics such as viscosity, elasticity, tensile strength, etc.
Classical mechanics. The laws of classical mechanics can be said to emerge as a limiting case from the rules of quantum mechanics applied to large enough masses. This may be thought of as puzzling, because quantum mechanics is generally thought of as more complicated than classical mechanics- whereas lower level rules are generally less complicated (or at least less complex) than the emergent properties. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergent_behavior

[Darth Rotor]

This sort of fits where I think free will meshes with reality. ETA: At the mind level, what I will is what I do. Thus I do what I rationally desire to the limit of my rationality with perfect fidelity of control. The freedom of will is self-evident from our current understanding.
I would add to that that human exercise of free will, or of will, is necessarily bounded by the set of inherent human limitations.

DR

[Darth Rotor]

i think "emergent behaviour" may just be a different term for synergy as you are using it....it's kinda a new term for me too :)

here's wiki's take on it.....

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergent_behavior

Thanks, I'll chew on that for a bit. Some things take a bit of time to digest.

DR

[Mercutio]

But surely when we talk about free will we mean the freedom to act (or to attempt to act, we are talking about freedom of will not necessarily of action) in accordance with our "dispositions" as Hume put it. To choose something not in accordance with our "dispositions" is not the kind of thing we want the freedom to do - it wouldn't really count as freedom. In fact it couldn't be a choice at all. Our dispositions are, by definition, those things that we would choose so, tautologically, all our choices are in accordance with our dispositions.

I make exactly the choices I am disposed to make - that's free will. I can make only the choices I am disposed to make - that's determinism. These statements are compatible - that's compatibilism.
Your post here describes you as exactly as free as the leaf in Bierce's definition. I humbly suggest that this redefines "free will" into something very different from what we commonly mean. If we define "free will" as "doing what we want to do" (to paraphrase your definition--if I oversimplify, please correct me), then we are easy prey for the determinist who can figure out how to make you want to do something. Defining free will as a feeling is, frankly, dangerous. It means that we will not recognize the influence of others on our actions, so long as they can be sufficiently subtle in their manipulation of our desires. ...if he be so resolved,
I can o'ersway him, for he loves to hear
That unicorns may be betray'd with trees,
And bears with glasses, elephants with holes,
Lions with toils, and men with flatterers:
But when I tell him he hates flatterers,
He says he does, being then most flattered.
Let me work;
For I can give his humor the true bent,
And I will bring him to the Capitol.

Julius Caesar, II ii

[Mercutio]

This sort of fits where I think free will meshes with reality.
I would add to that that human exercise of free will, or of will, is necessarily bounded by the set of inherent human limitations.

DR
"Necessarily"? Or simply circularly?

Read this excellent thread (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=34330) for a discussion of circularity in the concept of "will".

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Folks, this is a classic mush-bag free will thread. As Merc says, stop talking about feelings.

Are we discussing a compatibilist free will, where my actions are compatible with determinism but otherwise appear to be my own free choices? Or are we discussing a libertarian free will where my actions are "truly free," something more than entirely deterministic or random?

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Paul, your computer exhibits compatabilist free will. Is that the best you can do?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Paul, your computer exhibits compatabilist free will. Is that the best you can do?
It does? It might be psychologically disposed to make different choices, yet always chooses to do what I program it to do? Who knew?

I'd love to have libertarian free will, if only someone could define it for me.

~~ Paul

[Kopji]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15759622/

Plane crash kills man who skipped Lidle flight
After avoiding fatal trip with Yankee pitcher, Californian meets same fate:

A 68-year-old man who almost accompanied Cory Lidle on his fatal flight in New York City last month died in a plane crash in California on Tuesday...


bad luck

[Dave1001]

Folks, this is a classic mush-bag free will thread. As Merc says, stop talking about feelings.

Are we discussing a compatibilist free will, where my actions are compatible with determinism but otherwise appear to be my own free choices? Or are we discussing a libertarian free will where my actions are "truly free," something more than entirely deterministic or random?

~~ Paul

Good questions. I don't think we know enough to know yet, but given that the general empirical trend seems to be to show that that what appeared to be our own free choices have had deterministic elements due to things ranging from pheromones to group psychology, I think it's more likely that libertarian free will is an illusory artifact of the imperfect way our brain interacts with its environment.

[hammegk]

It does? It might be psychologically disposed to make different choices, yet always chooses to do what I program it to do? Who knew?
I don't believe you wrote all the code on any computer.:)


I'd love to have libertarian free will, if only someone could define it for me.

You have at least one other thing you can't define, consciousness, Or I should say, you think you do. Thought, of course, exists.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't believe you wrote all the code on any computer.
You mean there's some code somewhere that wasn't written by a person or generated by a program written by a person? Who knew?

~~ Paul

[Tez]

Well, Quantum Mechanics invalidates this definition of determinism.



Under Quantum Mechanics, this can be true. However, the truth about the future is probabalistic, so



QM invalidates this hypothesis. Nice try though, and I see what you are getting at.

I would say that Free Will doesn't exist as we think of it. Our responses are results of what goes on in our brains at a physical level, but since QM may be involved, that does not necessitate that our actions are predictable in the Classical Mechanics Determinism sense (which is the type of determinism you've outlined above).

As such, I can't really select one of your poll options.

The problem with invoking QM in discussions of free will etc is that whether or not one thinks the indeterminism of QM is "intrinsic" (e.g some kind of propensity) or simply "epistemic" (due to our lack of knowledge about some underlying reality) is predicated on which particular interpretation is being used. For instance, Bohmian Mechanics reproduces QM exactly, and the indeterminism is of this latter form. In fact these issues run smack into problems of interpreting probabilities (quantum or classical) - see e.g. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/ .

With regards to the definition of emergence, I have to say that wikipedia article is terrible! Classical mechanics is emergent from QM? WTF? If one accepts that the equations of QM go over in some limit to those of classical mechanics, then that is *not* emergence, that is reductionism to its very core.

The only sensible article I've ever read about emergence is by the philosopher of physics Don Howard, and is available here:
www.nd.edu/~dhoward1/Reduction%20and%20Emergence.pdf
At least he is precise about defining the concept of emergence, unlike most physicists who simply bandy it around willy nilly...

[andyandy]

The problem with invoking QM in discussions of free will etc is that whether or not one thinks the indeterminism of QM is "intrinsic" (e.g some kind of propensity) or simply "epistemic" (due to our lack of knowledge about some underlying reality) is predicated on which particular interpretation is being used. For instance, Bohmian Mechanics reproduces QM exactly, and the indeterminism is of this latter form. In fact these issues run smack into problems of interpreting probabilities (quantum or classical) - see e.g. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/ .

With regards to the definition of emergence, I have to say that wikipedia article is terrible! Classical mechanics is emergent from QM? WTF? If one accepts that the equations of QM go over in some limit to those of classical mechanics, then that is *not* emergence, that is reductionism to its very core.

The only sensible article I've ever read about emergence is by the philosopher of physics Don Howard, and is available here:
www.nd.edu/~dhoward1/Reduction%20and%20Emergence.pdf
At least he is precise about defining the concept of emergence, unlike most physicists who simply bandy it around willy nilly...

Thanks Tez...

good old wiki :)

i'll check don howard out....

[andyandy]

The only sensible article I've ever read about emergence is by the philosopher of physics Don Howard, and is available here:
http://www.nd.edu/~dhoward1/Reductio...0Emergence.pdf
At least he is precise about defining the concept of emergence, unlike most physicists who simply bandy it around willy nilly...


a little derail....but an interesting one :)

A brief part of the article.....


For our purposes, entanglement is important because it is the clearest example known to me from any domain of investigation of a failure of supervenience. How and why the properties of the two individual systems taken separately is perfectly well understood and today routinely demonstrated in the laboratory, as in experimental tests of Bell’s theorem. Even with perfect, complete knowledge of the states of the separate systems, one cannot account for the
correlations between those systems characteristic of entangled joint states.10 That it must be so in the quantum domain is shown by a simple and straightforward mathematical demonstration set as an exercise for every graduate student in a foundations of quantum mechanics course. Here is holism of a very deep kind, and here is emergence in the sense of a failure of supervenience.11 By my lights, the quantum correlations characteristic of entangled joint states have a better claim to the status of emergent properties than do any of the other properties elsewhere in nature so far nominated for the
prize.

snip

If thermodynamics does not reduce to classical statistical mechanics, then we should not expect condensed matter physics to reduce to particle physics. If emergence is a failure of reduction, then condensed matter physics would be emergent with respect to particle physics. But I have argued that the question of intertheoretic reduction is not the right question. The right question is the
question of supervenience, and what I now want argue is that there is good reason to think that condensed matter physics supervenes on particle physics, once the latter is understood properly as
assuming quantum entanglement as the most fundamental physical property of microphysical systems.

The examples of superfluidity and superconductivity suggest that success in explaining phenomena in condensed matter physics will typically depend upon our making clear
precisely the connection to quantum mechanical entanglement. That means that, far from such
phenomena being emergent with respect to particle physics, they are proven to supervene on particle physics. The properties of entangled composite systems do not supervene on the properties of the
individual components, but the molar properties of mesoscopic condensed matter systems, properties like superfluidity and superconductivity do supervene on the most basic property of the quantum
mechanical microrealm, namely, entanglement. The only emergence is, ironically, that found at the particle physics level itself.
The connection of superfluidity and superconductivity to Bose-Einstein condensation and the connection of the latter to entanglement is no secret. I’m not here asserting a radically heterodox point of view. How, then, could the idea that condensed matter physics is emergent with respect to particle physics have become so deeply entrenched in the community of condensed matter physicists? Frankly, I’m puzzled by this phenomenon.http://www.nd.edu/~dhoward1/Reduction%20and%20Emergence.pdf

edited paragraphs from pages 9-18 - which seem (to me :) ) to represent the key thrust of the argument.....

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

With regards to the definition of emergence, I have to say that wikipedia article is terrible! Classical mechanics is emergent from QM? WTF? If one accepts that the equations of QM go over in some limit to those of classical mechanics, then that is *not* emergence, that is reductionism to its very core.

The only sensible article I've ever read about emergence is by the philosopher of physics Don Howard, and is available here:
http://www.nd.edu/~dhoward1/Reductio...0Emergence.pdf
At least he is precise about defining the concept of emergence, unlike most physicists who simply bandy it around willy nilly...
Thank you, Sir Tez. I shall read this article. I've never had the vaguest notion what emergence is really supposed to mean.

~~ Paul

[chriswl]

Your post here describes you as exactly as free as the leaf in Bierce's definition. I humbly suggest that this redefines "free will" into something very different from what we commonly mean.
A leaf doesn't have a will, free or otherwise. What is the common definition of free will that I'm supposedly replacing? Libertarian free will? As Paul says, no one seems to be able to define what that is. Or even hint at what it might be without saying obviously absurd things.

But we talk all the time about doing things "of our own free will" and this is not meant as a piece of metaphysics, it just means that we are not coerced.

I cannot will my heart to stop beating, but I can will my lungs to stop breathing (for a short time at least). Even though both my heart and lungs are part of the deterministic universe there seems to be an important difference here a difference that deserves a word to identify it.

If we define "free will" as "doing what we want to do" (to paraphrase your definition--if I oversimplify, please correct me), then we are easy prey for the determinist who can figure out how to make you want to do something.

Defining free will as a feeling is, frankly, dangerous. It means that we will not recognize the influence of others on our actions, so long as they can be sufficiently subtle in their manipulation of our desires.
Compatibilists accept that while we are free to do what we want, we do not choose those wants (or if we do, we choose them according to other wants and at the bottom are fundamental wants we didn't choose). So there is no problem understanding that we can be manipulated even when we are acting freely.

Advertising does not take away your free will, being mugged at gunpoint does. One manipulates you by altering your wants, the other leaves those wants unchanged and forces you to act contrary to them.

[Mercutio]

Compatibilists accept that while we are free to do what we want, we do not choose those wants (or if we do, we choose them according to other wants and at the bottom are fundamental wants we didn't choose). So there is no problem understanding that we can be manipulated even when we are acting freely.

Advertising does not take away your free will, being mugged at gunpoint does. One manipulates you by altering your wants, the other leaves those wants unchanged and forces you to act contrary to them.

Thank you for illustrating my point. This is precisely why I said that defining free will this way is dangerous. We resist being mugged at gunpoint even if we can afford the loss; it is the process, not the outcome, that we attend to (and of course, we blame the mugger). If we gamble away more than we can afford, we do so with gusto; again, the process rather than the outcome dictates our attention (and we blame the gambler for a lack of willpower, rather than the lottery that uses a carrot rather than a stick to take our money).

In both cases, your environment dictates a particular behavior; in both cases, this behavior may be against your long-term best interest. Focusing on free will as a feeling means that you will only complain about one of them. A more thorough understanding of the causes of our behavior would lead to a focus not on feeling, but on long-term best interest. We should protest being manipulated not because it feels wrong, but because it is bad for us, whether or not it feels wrong.

[Tez]

This is a somewhat pithy observation, but it has kept me amused thinking about it:

As I see it, one of the things that makes us uncomfortable about the possibility of free will in a completely mechanistic universe (say one governed by Newtonian mechanics) is the feeling that the fact that our future (and past) actions could then be perfectly calculated by some "uber-being" (or even another human), and this, it seems, is in direct conflict with that instantaneous freedom we feel.

Now, what if the only computer which was physically capable of performing that calculation was at least as large as the universe itself, and provably so. That is, imagine the ``algorithmic complexity'' of the computation is so high that there is no way to make such predictions with any physical objects that are a subset of the full universe. This is not implausible - we cannot actually simulate three massive particles moving under the influence of Newtonian gravity very well at all, and no one expects we ever will be able to. The possible existence of an uber-being (at least one who is in this universe - which is best defined as the set of all physical objects capable of having or having had an influence upon us and thus all we should be concerned about) is relegated to metaphysical status at best, and we can all go on choosing whether or not to end our sentences in periods as we please

[hammegk]

Assuming that supervenience lies on entanglement, a materialist loses "emergent properties" as explanations for any just-so-story and has seen his worldview disintegrate into "magic" to explain what he perceives and what he does.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

As I see it, one of the things that makes us uncomfortable about the possibility of free will in a completely mechanistic universe (say one governed by Newtonian mechanics) is the feeling that the fact that our future (and past) actions could then be perfectly calculated by some "uber-being" (or even another human), and this, it seems, is in direct conflict with that instantaneous freedom we feel.
Do you think that's what makes people uncomfortable? I think people simply want to know that their actions were "decided by them," not by purely deterministic and random processes. They are concerned about personal responsibility: How is it my responsibility for murder when it was all predetermined? Who will be the first murderer to use materialism as a defense?

~~ Paul

[Dave1001]

This is a somewhat pithy observation, but it has kept me amused thinking about it:

As I see it, one of the things that makes us uncomfortable about the possibility of free will in a completely mechanistic universe (say one governed by Newtonian mechanics) is the feeling that the fact that our future (and past) actions could then be perfectly calculated by some "uber-being" (or even another human), and this, it seems, is in direct conflict with that instantaneous freedom we feel.

Now, what if the only computer which was physically capable of performing that calculation was at least as large as the universe itself, and provably so. That is, imagine the ``algorithmic complexity'' of the computation is so high that there is no way to make such predictions with any physical objects that are a subset of the full universe. This is not implausible - we cannot actually simulate three massive particles moving under the influence of Newtonian gravity very well at all, and no one expects we ever will be able to. The possible existence of an uber-being (at least one who is in this universe - which is best defined as the set of all physical objects capable of having or having had an influence upon us and thus all we should be concerned about) is relegated to metaphysical status at best, and we can all go on choosing whether or not to end our sentences in periods as we please

there seems to be a good amount of redundancy in the universe, such that if randomness generators didn't exist, it could be completely modeled by something significantly less large than the universe.

[Dave1001]

Do you think that's what makes people uncomfortable? I think people simply want to know that their actions were "decided by them," not by purely deterministic and random processes. They are concerned about personal responsibility: How is it my responsibility for murder when it was all predetermined? Who will be the first murderer to use materialism as a defense?

~~ Paul

some liability theories would survive fine if we found the universe to be deterministic and random (for example, when you break a contract illegally for great profit and the court determines your damages to be a portion of your profits to restore the other party to where they were prior to the breach + what they would have made if they had contracted with someone else). It's just a matter of accounting. But other liability theories might rightfully end. For example, if a completely random wind blows you into another person, killing that other person, you won't be liable to their estate for wrongful death.

[President Bush]

As I see it, one of the things that makes us uncomfortable about the possibility of free will in a completely mechanistic universe (say one governed by Newtonian mechanics) is the feeling that the fact that our future (and past) actions could then be perfectly calculated by some "uber-being"
Laplace's Demon (http://www.pha.jhu.edu/~ldb/seminar/laplace.html)

[69dodge]

Do you think that's what makes people uncomfortable? I think people simply want to know that their actions were "decided by them," not by purely deterministic and random processes. They are concerned about personal responsibility: How is it my responsibility for murder when it was all predetermined? Who will be the first murderer to use materialism as a defense?If I were the judge, I'd say, "that's all very well, Mr. Murderer, but in that case it was also predetermined that I would send you to prison, so off to prison you go."

[chriswl]

As I see it, one of the things that makes us uncomfortable about the possibility of free will in a completely mechanistic universe (say one governed by Newtonian mechanics) is the feeling that the fact that our future (and past) actions could then be perfectly calculated by some "uber-being" (or even another human), and this, it seems, is in direct conflict with that instantaneous freedom we feel.
This is how I like to look at it: the uberbeing's predictions would only be accurate if it kept them to itself. If it acts on that information in ways that change the universe at all then it has invalidated its predictions because it hasn't included its own behaviour in the predictions - they are predictions of the universe outside of itself.

Instead of an "uberbeing" I usually think of a scientist with vastly powerful computer. In predicting the entire future of the world he would actually be predicting the world outside his laboratory, assuming no interaction with it on his part. The scientist could attempt to get round the problem of his inability to act on the predictions without invalidating them by getting the computer to include the scientist in its predictions. But the computer couldn't then include the effect of telling the scientist the results of the calculation in its predictions because it would need to know what those results were to calculate the effect they would have on the scientist's behaviour but it wouldn't know the results until it has worked out the scientist's response.

If the computer could predict literally everything in the universe including itself then there would be no problem. But it would then have to predict itself predicting itself, predicting itself... to an infinite regress.

So basically, even in a completely deterministic universe, you can never predict with complete, guaranteed accuracy what your own future choices will be because your hearing the prediction introduces something new that was not taken into account in the prediction itself and risks invalidating it.

Come to think of it, this could be a definition of free will - our ability to act contrary to our predictions of our own behaviour, however accurate those predictions may be.

[AtaraX]

But surely when we talk about free will we mean the freedom to act (or to attempt to act, we are talking about freedom of will not necessarily of action) in accordance with our "dispositions" as Hume put it. To choose something not in accordance with our "dispositions" is not the kind of thing we want the freedom to do - it wouldn't really count as freedom. In fact it couldn't be a choice at all. Our dispositions are, by definition, those things that we would choose so, tautologically, all our choices are in accordance with our dispositions.

I make exactly the choices I am disposed to make - that's free will. I can make only the choices I am disposed to make - that's determinism. These statements are compatible - that's compatibilism.

Well Put

[AtaraX]

This is a somewhat pithy observation, but it has kept me amused thinking about it:

As I see it, one of the things that makes us uncomfortable about the possibility of free will in a completely mechanistic universe (say one governed by Newtonian mechanics) is the feeling that the fact that our future (and past) actions could then be perfectly calculated by some "uber-being" (or even another human), and this, it seems, is in direct conflict with that instantaneous freedom we feel.

I agree that this worry of a super being is the concern. But if we being the super being into a concrete example this fear can be dispelled, I believe. Imagine you see a painter, painting a tall building knock over a bucket of paint from the vantage point of another building. You see a pedestrian walk into the path of the falling paint below.

Do you as the observer do you think the pedestrian has no free will because he walked into the path of the falling paint? As the now paint-covered pedestrian would you feel your free will had been compromised?

My answer is no so I am a compatiblist.

[H'ethetheth]

This is how I like to look at it: the uberbeing's predictions would only be accurate if it kept them to itself. If it acts on that information in ways that change the universe at all then it has invalidated its predictions because it hasn't included its own behaviour in the predictions - they are predictions of the universe outside of itself.

Instead of an "uberbeing" I usually think of a scientist with vastly powerful computer. In predicting the entire future of the world he would actually be predicting the world outside his laboratory, assuming no interaction with it on his part. The scientist could attempt to get round the problem of his inability to act on the predictions without invalidating them by getting the computer to include the scientist in its predictions. But the computer couldn't then include the effect of telling the scientist the results of the calculation in its predictions because it would need to know what those results were to calculate the effect they would have on the scientist's behaviour but it wouldn't know the results until it has worked out the scientist's response.

If the computer could predict literally everything in the universe including itself then there would be no problem. But it would then have to predict itself predicting itself, predicting itself... to an infinite regress.

So basically, even in a completely deterministic universe, you can never predict with complete, guaranteed accuracy what your own future choices will be because your hearing the prediction introduces something new that was not taken into account in the prediction itself and risks invalidating it.

Come to think of it, this could be a definition of free will - our ability to act contrary to our predictions of our own behaviour, however accurate those predictions may be.Heh! Nice post. The words "don't" and "panic" spring to mind in large friendly letters.

[Dave1001]

This is how I like to look at it: the uberbeing's predictions would only be accurate if it kept them to itself. If it acts on that information in ways that change the universe at all then it has invalidated its predictions because it hasn't included its own behaviour in the predictions - they are predictions of the universe outside of itself.


Not necessarily. For example, let's posit one thing about the uberbeing: it will at some point cease to exist if it doesn't make the most perfect attempt it can to maintain its existence. By the way, that's the position, more or less, that I think we self-reflective parts of the universe apparently are in. Even if the history of the universe is predetermined, part of it's predetermination is that as we understand the universe better, we will either use that knowledge to try to persist, or we will in effect commit suicide. That can all be incorporated into a prediction mechanism.


Instead of an "uberbeing" I usually think of a scientist with vastly powerful computer. In predicting the entire future of the world he would actually be predicting the world outside his laboratory, assuming no interaction with it on his part. The scientist could attempt to get round the problem of his inability to act on the predictions without invalidating them by getting the computer to include the scientist in its predictions. But the computer couldn't then include the effect of telling the scientist the results of the calculation in its predictions because it would need to know what those results were to calculate the effect they would have on the scientist's behaviour but it wouldn't know the results until it has worked out the scientist's response.


Once again, I think the computer could more or less do that if the two choice options for the scientist ended up being more likely to lead to cessation of existence, and less likely to lead to cessation of existence. Either the scientist is suicidal or they are not. An alternative is the scientist programming into the computer his social aesthetics. Given the relative incomplexity of our brains compared to the vastness of the universe's resources, our social aesthetics and the premium we place on survival can probably be completely incorporated into a computer much smaller than the universe. Of course, we're ignoring the possibilty that humans have built in randomness generators.


If the computer could predict literally everything in the universe including itself then there would be no problem. But it would then have to predict itself predicting itself, predicting itself... to an infinite regress.

So basically, even in a completely deterministic universe, you can never predict with complete, guaranteed accuracy what your own future choices will be because your hearing the prediction introduces something new that was not taken into account in the prediction itself and risks invalidating it.


Not necessarily, as I've written in this post. If the computer can factor in your inevitable responses it can keep going.


Come to think of it, this could be a definition of free will - our ability to act contrary to our predictions of our own behaviour, however accurate those predictions may be.

I disagree, because otherwise free will exists outside of what we consider to be conscious, or even sentient entities. For example, the long term weather is unpredictable with current technology, and it could be those same type of chaotic and complex forces which might make our reaction to what we are told is our predicted behavior unpredictable with current technology, even if it's predetermined.

[Upchurch]

Someone once asked, "And how often do you randomly run red lights?".;)
It was just an example and once this weekend, if you count stop signs.

And do you honestly want to pull from the collective works of Franko?

[chriswl]

Not necessarily. For example, let's posit one thing about the uberbeing: it will at some point cease to exist if it doesn't make the most perfect attempt it can to maintain its existence.
Yikes! Is this some kind of theology? I'm assuming a material, deterministic universe. How can anything "cease to exist"?

An alternative is the scientist programming into the computer his social aesthetics. Given the relative incomplexity of our brains compared to the vastness of the universe's resources, our social aesthetics and the premium we place on survival can probably be completely incorporated into a computer much smaller than the universe. Of course, we're ignoring the possibilty that humans have built in randomness generators.
Yes I'm assuming, for the sake of argument, that the computer could actually be built and be of a manageable size, even though I'm sure you could never really build such a thing. The computer could certainly model the scientists behaviour perfectly. And I'm assuming determinism, so no randomness.

Not necessarily, as I've written in this post. If the computer can factor in your inevitable responses it can keep going.
It can figure out your inevitable responses but it still has a problem. It figures out your responses to being told its predictions about future of the universe. But how did it come up with these predictions in the first place, given that you are part of that universe? It can't predict the future of the universe in which you are told the future of the universe unless it first knows what that future is. It needs to know what the predictions are that it will be telling you to do the calculations in the first place, but this is precisely what it has yet to calculate.

I overstated my case when I said that predictions are only accurate if you don't act on them. Clearly there are lots of cases where you can receive a prediction and then act on it but your actions do not cause any changes that would invalidate that prediction. If I knew next week's lottery numbers then my buying a lottery ticket with those numbers is not going to change the outcome of the draw (or is it - maybe the lottery balls are a chaotic system and my walking to the shops to purchase a ticket is like the butterfly effect?). But how would the computer ensure its predictions were such that this was always the case?

I disagree, because otherwise free will exists outside of what we consider to be conscious, or even sentient entities. For example, the long term weather is unpredictable with current technology, and it could be those same type of chaotic and complex forces which might make our reaction to what we are told is our predicted behavior unpredictable with current technology, even if it's predetermined.
The weather doesn't make predictions of its own behaviour, therefore defining free will as "our ability to act contrary to our predictions of our own behaviour, however accurate those predictions may be" it doesn't make it applicable to the weather.

[Darth Rotor]

"Necessarily"? Or simply circularly?

Read this excellent thread (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=34330) for a discussion of circularity in the concept of "will".
Necessarily.

Human beings in their form as "life forms on earth" are finite beings in capability. That position is consistent with various theist doctrines, and with non theist positions in the limitations of humans.

Finite, have or has bounds. Human exercise of any capacity is finite.

That is what I meant.

DR

[Mercutio]

Necessarily.

Human beings in their form as "life forms on earth" are finite beings in capability. That position is consistent with various theist doctrines, and with non theist positions in the limitations of humans.

Finite, have or has bounds. Human exercise of any capacity is finite.

That is what I meant.

DRFair enough. Now, why I asked: You had said I would add to that that human exercise of free will, or of will, is necessarily bounded by the set of inherent human limitations. My question was how you were defining those "inherent human limitations" (which seems not to have been your point at all); some here have defined human limitations as causal--"we cannot do anything that we do not first possess the ability to do." That, of course, is circular reasoning, and deserves objection. It seems that your point is much more general. Thank you for clarifying.

[Darth Rotor]

Fair enough. Now, why I asked: You had said I would add to that that human exercise of free will, or of will, is necessarily bounded by the set of inherent human limitations. My question was how you were defining those "inherent human limitations" (which seems not to have been your point at all); some here have defined human limitations as causal--"we cannot do anything that we do not first possess the ability to do." That, of course, is circular reasoning, and deserves objection. It seems that your point is much more general. Thank you for clarifying.
Yes.

Pleased to be occasionally clear, even if it takes two (or three) tries. :)

DR

[RandFan]

Do you think that's what makes people uncomfortable? I think people simply want to know that their actions were "decided by them," not by purely deterministic and random processes. They are concerned about personal responsibility: How is it my responsibility for murder when it was all predetermined? Who will be the first murderer to use materialism as a defense?

~~ PaulWhen I first thought about the notion of no free will it caused me some unease but in the end, what does it matter? You seem to make decisions and you live your life as though you make decisions and if you don't have free will it really can't possibly change one damn thing. You can't very easily choose to not have free will if you do have free will and you obviously can't do anything about it if you don't have free will.

I don't get the hand wringing at all. Stay home from work tomorrow or flip a coin to help make your decisions thus demonstrating that you are overriding your internal decision making processes. These things just might reinforce the idea that you truly do have free will. It's BS of course but hey, if it makes you feel better, or, on the other hand, don't... The choice is yours. :)

Oh, and check out what Pinker and Dennett say about free will. There seems to be some room for it in materialism.

[Art Vandelay]

Well, Quantum Mechanics invalidates this definition of determinism.
You are making the very common mistake of confusing a particular interpretation of QM with QM itself. There is no way to use QM to disprove determinism.

[Tricky]

When I first thought about the notion of no free will it caused me some unease but in the end, what does it matter? You seem to make decisions and you live your life as though you make decisions and if you don't have free will it really can't possibly change one damn thing. You can't very easily choose to not have free will if you do have free will and you obviously can't do anything about it if you don't have free will.

I don't get the hand wringing at all. Stay home from work tomorrow or flip a coin to help make your decisions thus demonstrating that you are overriding your internal decision making processes. These things just might reinforce the idea that you truly do have free will. It's BS of course but hey, if it makes you feel better, or, on the other hand, don't... The choice is yours. :)

My feeling exactly. Either we have free will or we have the illusion of free will. If you can't tell the difference, then it doesn't make any difference.

[Mercutio]

My feeling exactly. Either we have free will or we have the illusion of free will. If you can't tell the difference, then it doesn't make any difference.
What a load of tripe.

If we, because we cannot tell a difference, assume that we do have free will, we reject a library full of useful, empirically demonstrable, causal connections between our environments and our actions.

There is enough difference between a sunrise and the illusion of a sunrise to put a man on the moon. The former leads to a maddening set of calculations, the latter to a few simple laws of motion.

If we assume (because we "can't tell the difference") that we have free will, then we accept that we cannot predict our behavior from knowledge about our environment. We accept that we cannot change things for the better. Hey, though, on the plus side, we can blame people for what they do wrong. As long as we are on the winning side, it's all good.

An assumption (oh, hell, let's admit that it is more than this; we have a century of science to back us up) that our behavior is determined, though, allows us to bring science to bear on the big problems of our time. Advertisers already know that we can be predictably manipulated; shall we simply ignore what they know? Or might it be a nice idea to have someone other than Nike or Phillip Morris benefit from the unthinkable assumption that we might, like with geocentrism and special creation, be once more deluding ourselves?

[hammegk]

What a load of tripe.
Sure, but what does your pre-programming & current inputs say isn't?

[Art Vandelay]

If we assume (because we "can't tell the difference") that we have free will, then we accept that we cannot predict our behavior from knowledge about our environment. We accept that we cannot change things for the better. How so? Either the assumption that we have free will is correct, or it's not. If it is, then what's the problem? How can assuming something that turns out to be right cause problems? And if it's not correct, then we had no choice in the matter, anyway, so why worry about it?

[Mercutio]

And if it's not correct, then we had no choice in the matter, anyway, so why worry about it?
Truth may not be decided by popular opinion, but policy often is.

[RandFan]

What a load of tripe.

If we, because we cannot tell a difference, assume that we do have free will, we reject a library full of useful, empirically demonstrable, causal connections between our environments and our actions.

There is enough difference between a sunrise and the illusion of a sunrise to put a man on the moon. The former leads to a maddening set of calculations, the latter to a few simple laws of motion.

If we assume (because we "can't tell the difference") that we have free will, then we accept that we cannot predict our behavior from knowledge about our environment. We accept that we cannot change things for the better. Hey, though, on the plus side, we can blame people for what they do wrong. As long as we are on the winning side, it's all good.

An assumption (oh, hell, let's admit that it is more than this; we have a century of science to back us up) that our behavior is determined, though, allows us to bring science to bear on the big problems of our time. Advertisers already know that we can be predictably manipulated; shall we simply ignore what they know? Or might it be a nice idea to have someone other than Nike or Phillip Morris benefit from the unthinkable assumption that we might, like with geocentrism and special creation, be once more deluding ourselves? I can't speak for Tricky. I largely agree with you however my point wasn't that we can't possibly know but that in the end there is no appreciable difference. Tricky is right, why get bent out of shape about something we can't possibly change? If you are right Mercutio then we will believe or not believe and there is no choice on our part. Tripe?

ETA: Though it is only rhetorical I think the JREF poster who goes by the user name President Bush has an interesting point. You debate as if any of us has a choice.

For the record, I agree with you and not PB.

[President Bush]

that our behavior is determined, though, allows us to bring science to bear on the big problems of our time.
Illustrate?

[chriswl]

You are making the very common mistake of confusing a particular interpretation of QM with QM itself. There is no way to use QM to disprove determinism.
Really? I would define a deterministic world as one that we can in principle predict. Doesn't QM flatly contradict this? The uncertainty principle isn't merely an "interpretation" of QM, is it?

[RandFan]

Really? I would define a deterministic world as one that we can in principle predict. Doesn't QM flatly contradict this? The uncertainty principle isn't merely an "interpretation" of QM, is it? I think you are making the classical error of applying QM to events above both the subatomic and atomic levels. If we couldn't make such predictions then there wouldn't be any point to science. The problem with such predictions (like predicting human behavior) doesn't have anything to do with QM but the sheer large number of variables and our inability to quantify every single one and to understand the relationship of every single variable to every other variable. Complex and dynamic systems are very sensitive to what may seem trivial events. I think the explanation of the problem lies with Chaos Theory and not QM. FWIW, Chaos Theory is a bit of a misnomer.

[chriswl]

I think you are making the classical error of applying QM to events above both the subatomic and atomic levels. If we couldn't make such predictions then there wouldn't be any point to science.
I suspect that's mostly right most of the time. Just because something is fundamentally made of QM stuff doesn't mean it can't act deterministically - computers are clearly very deterministic things, for example. Almost always the randomness averages out on a large scale.

But we can exploit quantum randomness to make truly random macroscopic events. You can make random number generators based on radioactive decay of elements. I believe the UK Premium bonds use such a system to generate winning numbers. Making some random person rich is a pretty large scale event that would violate the determinism of the world.

[RandFan]

But we can exploit quantum randomness to make truly random macroscopic events. You can make random number generators based on radioactive decay of elements. I believe the UK Premium bonds use such a system to generate winning numbers. Making some random person rich is a pretty large scale event that would violate the determinism of the world. I'm simply not qualified to make a rebuttal. I can only say that there is some controversy as to whether QM variables are truly completly random (uninfluenced by any prior cause).

[Art Vandelay]

Really? I would define a deterministic world as one that we can in principle predict. Doesn't QM flatly contradict this? The uncertainty principle isn't merely an "interpretation" of QM, is it?What does "in principle" mean? Does it mean "it's theoretically possible to determine the exact state of the universe, and from that predict the future"? Or does it mean "if we were given the exact state of the universe, we could use that to predict the future"? Because the uncertainty principle just rules out the former.

[chriswl]

What does "in principle" mean? Does it mean "it's theoretically possible to determine the exact state of the universe, and from that predict the future"? Or does it mean "if we were given the exact state of the universe, we could use that to predict the future"? Because the uncertainty principle just rules out the former.
I think that's a misunderstanding of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. It is not a practical problem with measurement (though it is often illustrated as if it was) but a fundamental limit on what we can know about the physical world.

This is more than just a philosophical position. The alternative view, that there is something definite underneath the apparent quantum randomness (Einstein's "hidden variables") was experimentally demonstrated to be false, I think. It's scientific orthodoxy that God does play dice. Unless there's some more up-to-date developments I've missed.

[hammegk]

Bell-Aspect-DCQE-etc say the dice are loaded ... :p

[President Bush]

Bell-Aspect-DCQE-etc say the dice are loaded ... :p
A composite of your posts shows an interference pattern emerging, hammegk. Not thought about they revert to behaving like waves. ;)

[69dodge]

Either the assumption that we have free will is correct, or it's not. If it is, then [...] And if it's not correct, then we had no choice in the matter, anyway, so why worry about it?

Tricky is right, why get bent out of shape about something we can't possibly change? If you are right Mercutio then we will believe or not believe and there is no choice on our part. Tripe?

ETA: Though it is only rhetorical I think the JREF poster who goes by the user name President Bush has an interesting point. You debate as if any of us has a choice.Saying that you don't have free will doesn't mean that you're going to believe whatever you're going to believe, independently of everything else. It is entirely possible, even if you don't have free will, that whether you end up believing in free will depends on what Mercutio tells you. Since he thinks that people don't have free will, and since he thinks that people would be better off if they realized it, he's telling you stuff that he thinks might convince you of it.

No one would argue, "Computers don't have free will. Therefore why bother programming them? They're just going to do whatever they're going to do, anyway." What they're going to do depends on how they're programmed.

[RandFan]

Saying that you don't have free will doesn't mean that you're going to believe whatever you're going to believe, independently of everything else. It is entirely possible, even if you don't have free will, that whether you end up believing in free will depends on what Mercutio tells you. Since he thinks that people don't have free will, and since he thinks that people would be better off if they realized it, he's telling you stuff that he thinks might convince you of it.

No one would argue, "Computers don't have free will. Therefore why bother programming them? They're just going to do whatever they're going to do, anyway." What they're going to do depends on how they're programmed. That's not my point. I, like Mercutio am telling people my opinion for a purpose. To put them at ease about free will. It really is no big deal. I'm only saying one thing, live your life as if you have free will because in the end it doesn't matter.

[Mercutio]

That's not my point. I, like Mercutio am telling people my opinion for a purpose. To put them at ease about free will. It really is no big deal. I'm only saying one thing, live your life as if you have free will because in the end it doesn't matter.
Funny...I wish I had the exact words one of my students used on this; he said it very nicely. Something along the lines of ... True freedom comes from recognizing the things that control your behavior. Ignorance of control is not freedom, it is just ignorance. To him, in the end it really does matter. It is too easy to be taken advantage of by somebody else, or to fall victim to superstitious conditioning, or to follow short-term happiness to your long-term peril, if you are not aware of the things that control your behavior. Recognizing that you are controlled does not make you any more controlled; denying that you are controlled does not make you any less controlled. But knowledge is power, and this is no exception.

[RandFan]

Funny...I wish I had the exact words one of my students used on this; he said it very nicely. Something along the lines of ... True freedom comes from recognizing the things that control your behavior. Ignorance of control is not freedom, it is just ignorance. To him, in the end it really does matter. It is too easy to be taken advantage of by somebody else, or to fall victim to superstitious conditioning, or to follow short-term happiness to your long-term peril, if you are not aware of the things that control your behavior. Recognizing that you are controlled does not make you any more controlled; denying that you are controlled does not make you any less controlled. But knowledge is power, and this is no exception.Please, don't get me wrong. I'm not preaching ignorance at all. I'm telling people not to get bent out of shape about it. I discuss free will or the lack of it with family and friends all of the time. Sometimes people ask me why I bother with such things. I do because I really do care about the truth and we can't know about it by sticking our heads in the sand. I just don't see a reason for it to be a source of unease for anyone. Accept what we know, which isn't absolute, and live as though you have free will. I'm on your side Mercutio.

[Mercutio]

Please, don't get me wrong. I'm not preaching ignorance at all. I'm telling people not to get bent out of shape about it. I discuss free will or the lack of it with family and friends all of the time. Sometimes people ask me why I bother with such things. I do because I really do care about the truth and we can't know about it by sticking our heads in the sand. I just don't see a reason for it to be a source of unease for anyone. Accept what we know, which isn't absolute, and live as though you have free will. I'm on your side Mercutio.

Hmmm... why is "live as though you have free will" supposed to be comforting? (not being confrontative; I am genuinely curious. My own free will implies that others have it too; does that mean I should live as if I have no influence on them?) Why not live with the recognition that we are not free, but interdependent? Live as if the things you do really do matter to other people...

[RandFan]

Hmmm... why is "live as though you have free will" supposed to be comforting? (not being confrontative; I am genuinely curious. My own free will implies that others have it too; does that mean I should live as if I have no influence on them?) Why not live with the recognition that we are not free, but interdependent? Live as if the things you do really do matter to other people... Hey, you can challenge me anytime. Don't worry about it.

Do we have a choice? ;) Sorry for pulling a Presdient Bush but in this one instance he would be right.

Forget the comforting part, it's important to me but that is just an emotional response on my part.

In the end it just doesn't make any difference. If we do have free will, great, we have free will as it intuitively seems that we do, right? Suppose that we don't? What can you do about it? Nothing. What you will do is not up to you, right? The question is meaningless. Whatever the answer is it can't and won't change anything by the very nature of the question.

I'm all for philosophically exploring free will but I can't escape the logical consequence that it doesn't matter.

[Art Vandelay]

Saying that you don't have free will doesn't mean that you're going to believe whatever you're going to believe, independently of everything else.If the world is determinstic, then what meaning does "independently" have? Everything either happens or it doesn't.

It is entirely possible, even if you don't have free will, that whether you end up believing in free will depends on what Mercutio tells you.If the world is determistic, then what Mercution tells me depends on prior events, and so what Mercution tells me can't be the ultimate cause of anything that I do.

Since he thinks that people don't have free will, and since he thinks that people would be better off if they realized it, he's telling you stuff that he thinks might convince you of it.But if he has no free will, the he isn't really choosing to do this.

No one would argue, "Computers don't have free will. Therefore why bother programming them? They're just going to do whatever they're going to do, anyway." What they're going to do depends on how they're programmed.The problem with your analogy is that we're not discussing whether a particular person has free will, we're discussing whether free will in general exists. If no one has free will, then no one has a choice whether to program computers.

[Ivor the Engineer]

My position is that of a hard determinist. Doesn't Mach's principle (the universe is not given twice...etc.) come into play for discussions like this?

Just because the universe is deterministic does not imply it is possible to perfectly predict events within it in a finite period of time. However we do manage to make quite good predictions with limited information all the time.

I think what stops most people from accepting determinism is our very limited view of cause-effect relationships and our desire to attach meaning/blame to events/people.

[Tez]

I think that's a misunderstanding of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. It is not a practical problem with measurement (though it is often illustrated as if it was) but a fundamental limit on what we can know about the physical world.

This is more than just a philosophical position. The alternative view, that there is something definite underneath the apparent quantum randomness (Einstein's "hidden variables") was experimentally demonstrated to be false, I think. It's scientific orthodoxy that God does play dice. Unless there's some more up-to-date developments I've missed.

You havent missed them - I think you have just misinterpreted what we do and dont know.

Whether the HUP is fundamental *is* a matter of interpretation - e.g. in Bohmian mechanics the particles always have definite positions and momenta. In fact I have designed local theories with a completely classical ontology that obey the HUP "fundamentally" (i.e. its provable that no object in such a universe can be constructed so as to violate the HUP). THis tells me the HUP only has a little to tell us about the true mysteries of QM.

It has only been shown that if something definite lies under quantum mechanics then it must be nonlocal. It has not been shown that it cannot exist - and in fact Bohmian mechanics is a counterexample. (n.b. I am not a fan of Bohmian mechanics per se, but it is a useful philosophical filter of quantum claptrap, and anyone who wants to talk about what QM does or doesn't say should learn something about it).

[Soapy Sam]

According to my computer's random number function, I'm a hard determinist.
I think.
Who knew?

[President Bush]

I wish I had the exact words one of my students used on this; he said it very nicely. Something along the lines of ... True freedom comes from recognizing the things that control your behavior. Ignorance of control is not freedom, it is just ignorance. To him, in the end it really does matter.
Sounds like an acknowledgement of self-determination, through the medium of internal control... free will.

What is it that is mattering to your student here?

[chriswl]

It has only been shown that if something definite lies under quantum mechanics then it must be nonlocal. It has not been shown that it cannot exist - and in fact Bohmian mechanics is a counterexample.
If it must be non-local what does this mean - that I can predict when a radioactive nucleus will decay but I need to include the whole universe in my calculations? Then we'd just be exchanging uncertainty for intractability.

[Tez]

If it must be non-local what does this mean - that I can predict when a radioactive nucleus will decay but I need to include the whole universe in my calculations? Then we'd just be exchanging uncertainty for intractability.

no, of course thats not what it means.

Google "Bell's theorem" or "Bell inequalities", do some reading, and then I'll be happy to answer questions...

[chriswl]

no, of course thats not what it means.
Why "of course not"? How non-local is non-local? Are you saying there is a method of actually predicting when a radioactive nucleus will decay? What things would we have to measure? I'm interested in how a deterministic non-local universe would be any more predictable, in practice, than a random one.

Google "Bell's theorem" or "Bell inequalities", do some reading, and then I'll be happy to answer questions...
I've read stuff on it before and never got close to an answer on what this idea of "non-locality" idea is supposed to mean in practice. Though I have noticed how few physicists have any time for Bohm's ideas.

[Tez]

Well the short answer is there is nothing in principle preventing a hidden variable description of QM - Bell provided some simple examples for spin systems, Bohm provided another. Moreover, if all you care about is local predictions (such as your radioactive nucleus decay) then all you have to worry about is the local "hidden variable" physics. This covers almost all the use of QM in practice. (i.e no need to look at the "rest of the universe" etc)

What Bell showed, however, is that if you compare measurements on separated systems, and look for correlations in the data then (for specially prepared systems) you must invoke some sort of nonlocal (i.e. "action at a distance type) effect in order to explain the observed correlations. This is not an objection to all hidden variables, just to the local kind. These nonlocal effects do not allow superluminal signalling (otherwise they'd be incompatible with my assertion above about local predictions etc)

[Art Vandelay]

no, of course thats not what it means.

Google "Bell's theorem" or "Bell inequalities", do some reading, and then I'll be happy to answer questions...Ah, argumentum ad Google. Why can't you present what you think is a valid argument? The first page that I got on Google was this: http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Quantum/bells_inequality.html

It makes several arguments that I consider to be invalid, such as

"Yet, one could imagine the two measurements were so far apart in space that special relativity would prohibit any influence of one measurement over the other."

"they are separated by light years of space and far too little time has passed for information to have travelled to it according to the rules of special relativity"

If the universeis deterministic, then it's possible for both of them to be determined by some other cause which does have time to travel between them.

[hammegk]

Sounds like an acknowledgement of self-determination, through the medium of internal control... free will.

My thought exactly based on M's comment. A hard behavorist has gone through the camel's eye to achieve ... free will. ROTFL. ;)

[69dodge]

If the world is determinstic, then what meaning does "independently" have? Everything either happens or it doesn't.

If the world is determistic, then what Mercution tells me depends on prior events, and so what Mercution tells me can't be the ultimate cause of anything that I do.

But if he has no free will, the he isn't really choosing to do this.

The problem with your analogy is that we're not discussing whether a particular person has free will, we're discussing whether free will in general exists. If no one has free will, then no one has a choice whether to program computers.I'm not quite sure what to make of this post. I guess I don't actually disagree with any of it, but ... so what? Is it supposed to convince me that people do have free will? I don't see why it should do that.

[69dodge]

Hmmm... why is "live as though you have free will" supposed to be comforting? (not being confrontative; I am genuinely curious. My own free will implies that others have it too; does that mean I should live as if I have no influence on them?) Why not live with the recognition that we are not free, but interdependent? Live as if the things you do really do matter to other people...Yes, I agree. And yet ... there does still seem to be a problem.

It's easy enough to live as though other people don't have free will, but what could it mean for me to live as though I myself have no free will? What would I be thinking to myself as I try to make any sort of decision? The whole idea of making a decision would appear to be nonsensical. I'd be forever second-guessing myself, and never reach any decision at all, if I always kept in mind the fact that actually I have no free will. In order for me to get on with the business of choosing a course of action, I have to pretend, at least for the moment, that I can choose. Or, perhaps better, that I can choose.

This doesn't mean that I really do have free will, of course. But it's still kind of annoying.

[Tez]

Ah, argumentum ad Google. Why can't you present what you think is a valid argument? The first page that I got on Google was this: http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Quantum/bells_inequality.html

It makes several arguments that I consider to be invalid, such as

"Yet, one could imagine the two measurements were so far apart in space that special relativity would prohibit any influence of one measurement over the other."

"they are separated by light years of space and far too little time has passed for information to have travelled to it according to the rules of special relativity"

If the universeis deterministic, then it's possible for both of them to be determined by some other cause which does have time to travel between them.
Sorry, I'm lost as to your point/question.

I was responding to a claim that there cant be a deterministic theory underling QM, by saying that in fact there can be - though it needs to be nonlocal. Bell's theorem clarifies in what way it needs to be nonlocal. So what I was saying is only indirectly related to the thread topic, and was directly related to correcting a (common) misunderstanding of a previous poster.

But it is a very interesting (though not really to do with my original point) that what physicists often call "Super-determinism" can be used to remove the need for nonlocality in a hidden variable theory, by forcing a sort of conspiracy of systems since the big bang to eventually perform experiments which make them *think* the world is nonlocal. It always turns out to seem highly contrived when you try and do it quantitatively, but its not impossible.

[hammegk]

But it is a very interesting (though not really to do with my original point) that what physicists often call "Super-determinism" can be used to remove the need for nonlocality in a hidden variable theory, by forcing a sort of conspiracy of systems since the big bang to eventually perform experiments which make them *think* the world is nonlocal.
Is it not equally plausible to conclude that at least in the domains under discussion by Bell-Aspect-etc that reality is neither deterministic nor local?

[UndercoverElephant]

Hi everybody.

It was me who voted for libertarian non-compatibilism.

Geoff