Theism and the problem of other minds

[ceo_esq]

(I’ll take epistemology for $1000, Alex.)

In his oft-cited study God and Other Minds (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0801497353/qid=1057837445/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_1/104-0139184-3736707?v=glance&s=books&n=507846 ), the theistic philosopher Alvin Plantinga (http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga) develops the so-called “parity argument”. I don’t have ready access to the original work, and my recollection of precisely how Plantinga proceeds is a hazy at best, so I’ll rely on some Web-available commentaries to convey the gist:Plantinga examines several important arguments for and against God's existence (cosmological, teleological, and ontological), and then does the same with respect to arguments for and against belief in other minds. Plantinga argues that whilst the arguments for belief in God and other minds are far from conclusive, neither are the objections to such arguments very formidable. Arguments for God's existence and other minds have a similar dialectical structure. As proofs, they succeed and fail in similar ways. Hence, there is a dialectical parity between theistic belief and belief in other minds. These considerations support Plantinga's contention that if belief in other minds is rational, then so is belief in God. (Source (http://academics.smcvt.edu/philosophy/faculty/Sudduth/3_main.htm))
For Plantinga, the “problem of other minds” raises fundamental questions about the relationship between evidence and belief:"What is evidence?" he asks, "What relation holds between a person and a proposition when the person has evidence for the proposition? Must a rational person have evidence or reason for all of his beliefs? Presumably not. But then what properties must a belief have for a person to be justified in accepting it without evidence? Is a person justified in believing a proposition only if it can be inferred inductively or deductively from (roughly) incorrigible sensory beliefs? Or propositions that are obvious to common sense and accepted by everyone?"

These make up some of the most difficult and persistent problems of epistemology. According to Plantinga, we can work on these questions through an analogous problem, i.e. the problem of other minds, which can be put as follows: "Each of us believes that he is not alone in the universe; that there are other beings who think and reason, hold beliefs, have sensations and feelings. And while a person can observe another's behavior and circumstances, he cannot perceive another's mental states."

For example, we cannot know that another person is in pain in the way in which we can learn that he has red hair, because unlike his hair, his pain cannot be perceived. On the other hand, some propositions ascribing pain to a person is only incorrigible for him, and is not incorrigible for anyone else. Since we cannot observe the thoughts and feelings of another person, we cannot determine by observation that another person is in pain. The question here is: how do we know that another person is in pain? Or in more direct words, what is our evidence to determine that another person is in pain? The fact is that sometimes we can actually see a person is in pain, and we will determine that a person is in pain by just seeing he is. In this case, we do use the language that we see a person is in pain as if it is in the same way that he has red hair.

Despite the ordinary use of our language, the question still lies there: how can we know about other minds? What is our evidence? According to Plantinga, the most important answer to the question of other minds in Western history is probably the analogical position. "According to this position one cannot determine by observation that someone else is in some mental state or other; neither are propositions ascribing mental states to others incorrigible for anyone. Nevertheless, it holds, each of us has or can easily acquire evidence for such beliefs. Each of us can construct a sound inductive argument for the conclusion that he is not the only being that thinks and reasons, has sensations and feelings; an argument whose premises state certain facts about his own mental life and about physical objects (including human bodies), but do not entail the existence of minds or mental states that are not his own." So how we know the thoughts and feelings of another person, the answer seems to be in the analogical position. (Source (http://www.geocities.com/zongkunliu/Plantinga.txt))Is Plantinga right? Is the problem of other minds really a problem? Is there a “dialectical parity” between belief in God and belief in other minds?

[Giz]

Whooaah! Seems like there's a rather big difference between:

A Might other people who behave like us, react like us, are born of the same parents etc. think like us (sounds just like inductive reasoning to me).

and

B If we cannot actually see their cogs turning as they are thinking then all the circumstantial evidence counts for nothing and we would be unjustified in constructing any hypothesis.


If there was compelling circumstantial evidence for the existence of God then this might be a fair analogy, but there isn't (any).

[Yahweh]

These considerations support Plantinga's contention that if belief in other minds is rational, then so is belief in God.
Don't you hate the way philosophy works? All rational people know that belief in God/other minds/etc. is no more valid of a belief than believing in Pixies. All beliefs are valid, its just when they are scrutinized by logic and science, they can be judged to be rational or irrational. And irrational beliefs tend to fall apart.

"Each of us believes that he is not alone in the universe; that there are other beings who think and reason, hold beliefs, have sensations and feelings. And while a person can observe another's behavior and circumstances, he cannot perceive another's mental states."
That statement is over literalized. It is rationalized because of the fact that you cannot scan a human's brain into a computer and immediately generate every thought and feeling he will have in the next 10 years. The statement uses the logic "I am not person X, so I cannot know how person X is feeling". That kind of logic often leads to paranoia. While I am not another person, I can use deductive reasoning, medicine, and science to percieve their mental state (i.e. psychology, psychiatry, etc.). Philosophy has a bad habit of over literalizing the so-called "unknown" principle.

[Lord Kenneth]

Originally posted by ceo_esq
(I’ll take epistemology for $1000, Alex.)

In his oft-cited study God and Other Minds (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0801497353/qid=1057837445/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_1/104-0139184-3736707?v=glance&s=books&n=507846 ), the theistic philosopher Alvin Plantinga (http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga) develops the so-called “parity argument”. I don’t have ready access to the original work, and my recollection of precisely how Plantinga proceeds is a hazy at best, so I’ll rely on some Web-available commentaries to convey the gist:
For Plantinga, the “problem of other minds” raises fundamental questions about the relationship between evidence and belief:Is Plantinga right? Is the problem of other minds really a problem? Is there a “dialectical parity” between belief in God and belief in other minds?

The reason we know someone is feeling pain is the way their body expresses it-- it can be faked and manipulated, but it's all we can go buy in terms of what someone is feeling. If someone gets kicked in the face and they then start exhibiting actions that indicate he or she is feeling pain, then it is safe to decide he or she is indeed feeling pain.

If someone just sits around with a blank expression on their face, what do we assume? If there are no other variables to consider (like if you know they were just in a conversation with someone), you would not know what they are thinking, and you shouldn't come to a conclusion unless evidence guides you to one particular one.

However, if someone shows an expression on their face that we associate with pain, then we usually assume they are in pain for some reason. If they say they are not really in pain, we take that into consideration. We cannot achieve 100% certainity-- but we must do the best we can.

It's possible that they are somehow special and don't feel pain-- however, that is an abnormal circumstance and evidence would be needed to show how in fact they differ, and in what exact ways so we know they do not actually feel pain like we would.

It seems this argument implies dualism. If materialism, what I favor (shut up, Ian) is true (or mostly true) then the argument becomes completely irrelevent, as it is possible to determine if someone truly feels pain by monitoring brain and nerve activity.

What is evidence? Evidence is something apparently objective that helps us determine if a statement is true (or false, as the case may be). Someone, or a majority of people, thinking a god exists does not make that god exist objectively.

[Yahweh]

If someone just sits around with a blank expression on their face, what do we assume?
... high?...

[Fun2BFree]

this is utter nonsense--Solipsism - I believe is the term and it is the first and last refurge of a position with no foundation in fact....if the facts are against you, pound the whole idea of facts...the pain question....you can actually reproduce pain, in a reproducible way in some circumstances, meeasure nerve impulses, etc..it is measurable, verifiable at times and therefore has nothing to do with the whimsical wishes of the God Squads.

[ceo_esq]

The thing is, Plantinga doesn't advocate solipsism or think that we are unjustified in drawing conclusions about the mental states of others. He regards beliefs about other minds as fully rational. What he's asserted is that the arguments for and against those beliefs are very similar to arguments for and against belief in God.

Unfortunately, we don't have access to this crucial part of his argumentation, so it's a little hard to critique it. I'll see if I can dig up a copy of the book.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Are his arguments also similar to those for belief in pink zombies dancing the tango in the moonlight?

~~ Paul

[ceo_esq]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Are his arguments also similar to those for belief in pink zombies dancing the tango in the moonlight?
It's a little hard to say without looking at them in the original. On the other hand, since this fellow is not exactly the village idiot, I'm inclined to assume (without evidence) that the answer is no.

[whitefork]

I prefer to turn the argument around and say that we infer (or better create) our own minds based on what we observe about the behavior of those around us.
The problem is not whether other minds exist - that's a given. The fact that we have language and generally represent our mental processes linguistically, and didn't create that language ourselves, means that other minds must exist.
You try and extend that to the existence of god, we'd be speaking and thinking in Hebrew.

[Yahzi]

Originally posted by ceo_esq
Arguments for God's existence and other minds have a similar dialectical structure.

Right.

As proofs, they succeed and fail in similar ways.

Wrong.

The argument for god fails because of lack of evidence. Not because indirect evidence is inadequate: our arguments for electrons and photons are equally indirect, as both are impossible to have direct personal experience of (they are too small to touch or see). There is no particular problem with using indirect evidence to establish the existance of god, save for the tiny fact that there isn't any to use.

Must a rational person have evidence or reason for all of his beliefs? Presumably not.

Incorrect presumption. To be rational, you must have evidence and reason for all of your beliefs. That's what the word means.

Plantinga might wish to argue that it is impossible to be compeletly rational: but destroying the definition so that his god-beliefs are magically redefined to be rational is just plain stupid.

Just because these guys have PHD's doesn't mean they aren't full of crap.

I am a rational person. I have evidence and reason for every belief I hold that has ever been challenged. I might have some unexamined believes that don't stand up to critical scrutiny, but so what? When they are subject to scrutiny, they will be required to meet the demands of reason, and in any case the question of god can hardly be in the same class.

As Lord Kenneth points out, we have tons of evidence for other people's pain, and in the abscence of that evidence - if they don't show facial expressions even when their legs are broken - we conclude not that their leg isn't broken, but rather that they don't feel any pain.

Where is the similar evidence for god?

[whitefork]

We can probably conclude that god's leg isn't broken, since we can't see his expression of pain.

[triadboy]

Originally posted by Kullervo
We can probably conclude that god's leg isn't broken, since we can't see his expression of pain.

I assume you haven't seen the Ice Follies?

[whitefork]

They skate with broken legs?

[Lord Kenneth]

We assume people have minds because they are physical life forms in front of us. They are as we (in my case, "I") are. They have brains and thus think as well.

God, however, isn't even a physical form. It's a mind without a brain, a being that just "is". As such, it is not the same as assuming that other people have minds.

Also, God is usually defined as an "omnipotent conciousness". What "God" is may differ from person to person, but that's basically what the main philosophical construct is.

Just because people have conciousness doesn't mean there is a bodiless omnipotent conciousness out there-- it's not even evidence or a suitable argument.

[Loki]

ceo_esq,

He regards beliefs about other minds as fully rational. What he's asserted is that the arguments for and against those beliefs are very similar to arguments for and against belief in God.

One area I think where the "other minds"/"god" analogy breaks down is "alternative explanations".

I look at my daughter and see behaviour (evidence) that suggests she is another human mind. This explanation seems both intuitive, and consist with other 'facts' of existence. If I try to find an alternative explanation for the apparent behaviour that *doesn't* involve my daighter being a seaprate human mind, I seem to run into an endless stream of inconsistencies or 'leaps of logic'. This imbalance between explanations seems to weigh heavily in favour of the "other minds exist" alternative.

The "god" hypothesis doesn't seem to have this attribute - there are an enormous (endless?) number of alternative explanations for most "religious evidence", and no clear way to show why one is better than any other.

Analogies are useful to the degree that the things being 'compared' share the same attibutes. In this case, it seems the analogy is flawed, making the conclusion flawed.

[hammegk]

A reasonable discussion of why *I* am not The Solipsist. (Nor are your individual *I*s).

The link to favoring existence of "god" does not work for me, though.