Epiphenomenalism

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I posted a question about epiphenomenalism over in the Science forum, but I don't want to hijack that thread by pressing the issue.

I've read three or four descriptions of epiphenomenalism in the past couple of days. The concept seems utterly incoherent. What am I missing?

~~ Paul

[Yahweh]

Philosophically speaking:
To me, its always sounded like epiphenomenalism is thought to explain human consciousness as a byproduct of neural brain activity.

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Paul,

Try a google on "Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy" and "epiphenomenalism" for a fair summary.

Regards.

Muck

p.s. If you've already researched it,apologies for wasting your time

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Thanks, Yahweh and LMoG. Yes, it's incoherent.

There is something, call it consciousness, that is an epiphenomenon of the brain, but has no affect on the brain. Since it has no effect on the brain, we don't have any memories of the experience of it nor of anything else relating to it. Therefore we cannot think or talk about it. Therefore it is as good as nonexistent and there is no reason the concept of epiphenomenalism would ever have arisen.

~~ Paul

[Dancing David]

man I thought it was somewhere between an oboe and a saxaphone!

[DialecticMaterialist]

It's a philosophy not science.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Does that mean it doesn't have to be logical?

~~ Paul

[DialecticMaterialist]

No I'm just explaining why it didn't take off in the Science forum.

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Paul,

I gather your chief interests lie elsewhere, but , if you want to spend a few dollars to find out about current ideas in the philosophy of mind , there is a "reader", "Mind and Cognition", edited by William Lycan and published by Blackwell.Physicalism,in one form or another , is well represented.

Regards.

Muck

[Lord Muck oGentry]

I've just seen Dancing David's post.

Stuff and nonsense !As any fule kno,epiphenomenalism is a condition brought on by excessive hypostatization.

Muck

[Nucular]

Clearly, consciousness has some kind of effect on the brain, or else we wouldn't be able to talk about it.

I don't think that means it didn't arise 'by accident' as a result of a sufficiently complex brain though. If it did though, why we kept it is another matter.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Oh, sorry Dialectic, didn't mean to jump on you so.

What is it with philosophers? Do they just try to enumerate all possible philosophical concepts, regardless of coherence?

~~ Paul

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Paul,

What is it with philosophers? Do they just try to enumerate all possible philosophical concepts, regardless of coherence?

Basically, yes. It is all part of a desperate attempt to come up with a framework in which all of their beliefs can simultaneously be true.

That is what happens when you take the approach of trying to logically justify your beliefs, rather than using logic to determine what you should believe.

Some people are just always trying to ice-skate up-hill.

Dr. Stupid

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by Lord Muck oGentry
*snip*Muck

Sockpuppet alert :rolleyes:

Hans

[Lord Muck oGentry]

MRC Hans,

What have I stumbled into here?If I have achieved a record by being accused of sockpuppetry after a few posts,I'm not proud of it.After a few months' lurking,I can guess whose puppet you suppose me to be,and the implication is not flattering!

However, you may want to consider a few points:

1.I've posted 3 times on this thread; 1 joke and 2 references,both,I hope,offered courteously

2.One of my earliest posts was to Asthmatic Camel(on a thread he started about the value of philosophy) mentioning Russell and Popper with respect

3.My next post was to ask whether he had taken offence at a lighthearted comment in the first post(he had not) and to apologize if he had

4.I admire science as a rational enterprise, and regret deeply that some have tried to use arguments dredged up from the history of philosophy to discredit it.To do so without even trying to understand what scientists have to say , and why they think it worth saying ,is impertinent and foolish.

Please think it over.Does any of this seem,in substance or manner,the work of the puppetmaster?

Regards.

Muck

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Oh, sorry Dialectic, didn't mean to jump on you so.

What is it with philosophers? Do they just try to enumerate all possible philosophical concepts, regardless of coherence?

~~ Paul
Philosopher Yahweh will answer that question...

Yes, any concept we invent in our heads becomes philosophy, regardless of coherence. Philosophy is not based on science or empirical data, it is based entirely on logic.

When I debate, I first accept or deny (usually I do both) the claim using logic and general philosophies. Then I use what I know about to science to validate or invalidate the claim. Usually, science and philosophy work pretty well together in that manner.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Does that mean it doesn't have to be logical?

~~ Paul
All philosophy has to be logical. Any logical contradictions found turn that particular philosophy into a false adage.

[Titus Rivas]

Epiphenomenalism is indeed an incoherent position, as I try to show on these pages:
Exit Epiphenomenalism (http://www.emergentmind.org/rivas-vandongen.htm) (Please note the analytical argumentation, which should be independent from one's degree of skepticism on PSI-phenomena),
Why the Efficacy of Consciousness Cannot Be Limited to the Mind (http://members.lycos.nl/Kritisch/limitedefficacy.html).

My argumentation has important implications for skepticism in that as soon as we accept the reality of consciousness, we must also admit that consciousness necessarily has an impact on our cognition. This impact is no less 'mysterious' than any kind of impact postulated by parapsychologists, which means we should basically be open-minded about their evidence rather than dismissing it out of hand. Any real impact of a non-physical consciousness on any part of reality implies that physicalism is simply wrong. Therefore, any type of skepticism which is based on physicalism and cannot be reconciled with the reality of psychogenic causality is misguided.
The only logically coherent alternative to the rational acceptance of at least some kind of psychogenic influence is that taken by Daniel C. Dennett, namely reductionism (the denial that there is an irreducible conscious mind). In fact, that position is held by the well-known skeptical parapsychologist Susan Blackmore (http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/jcs02.htm) . But one must admit it is rather surprising that skepticism about any impact of our irreducible conscious minds upon reality can only be coherently upheld within a reductionistic framework. Time to think the philosophical foundations of skepticism through I'd say!

By the way, inspired by James Randi's challenge and the counter-challenge by Victor Zammit (http://www.victorzammit.com/skeptics/challenge.html) , I opened a page on my website with a challenge to Dutch skeptics (http://members.lycos.nl/Kritisch/index-5.html) to show my argumentation against physicalism is incoherent (unlike the prizes of the other two challenges, the reward is in this case purely intellectual). I opened it on June 1st 2003 and still haven't received any reply that I was allowed to place on the site (permanently). Perhaps this is related to flaws in my communicative skills. But then again, that shouldn't prevent them from meeting such an important intellectual challenge! Or is this just the dumb, naive or even insane opinion of someone who still hasn't seen the light of all-round, non-zetetic skepticism :wink: ?

Titus Rivas
The Netherlands

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

I am curious as to why you would think the rejection of epiphenomenalism has any negative connotations for either physicalism or skepticism. The view of the mind currently held by most psychologists and neuroscientists is that consciousness is reducible to physical processes in the brain. Epiphenomenalism is an intrinsically non-scientific position, and should never be taken seriously by anybody who considers himself a skeptic.

Dr. Stupid

[Titus Rivas]

Well, Dr. Stupid,

I personally know of the case of an influential Dutch skeptic who is not a physicalist (I'm not allowed to reveal his name). Besides none other than Paul Kurtz has responded to an inquiry on my part saying that he was a "non-reductive physicalist" himself!

By the way, you're very wrong about 'most psychologists' being reductionists. I'm a graduate of theoretical psychology myself, and at the faculty I studied (not too long ago) most psychologists clearly seemed to agree that consciousness could not be reduced to the (non-conscious) workings of the brain.

Perhaps I'm being very naive about most (non-zetetic) skeptics. But most intellectuals I know (personally or through their works) don't find reductionism a scientific or even rational position at all, as it simply denies the obvious. That isn't acceptable science I would say. At least not in any definition I was taught.

Does that answer your question?

Best wishes,

Titus

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

I personally know of the case of an influential Dutch skeptic who is not a physicalist (I'm not allowed to reveal his name).

And??? I know plenty of skeptics who are not physicalists, and plenty who are. So what? I don't know of any skeptics who are epiphenomenalists.

Besides none other than Paul Kurtz has responded to an inquiry on my part saying that he was a "non-reductive physicalist" himself!

Does he call himself an eliminative physicalist? If so, are you aware that the distinction is purely semantic?

By the way, you're very wrong about 'most psychologists' being reductionists. I'm a graduate of theoretical psychology myself, and at the faculty I studied (not too long ago) most psychologists clearly seemed to agree that consciousness could not be reduced to the (non-conscious) workings of the brain.

Well, I find that very odd, given that all of the research currently being done towards trying to actually understand consciousness, is done from the perspective of it being a physical process of the brain.

Perhaps I'm being very naive about most (non-zetetic) skeptics. But most intellectuals I know (personally or through their works) don't find reductionism a scientific or even rational position at all, as it simply denies the obvious.

And what obvious thing is it denying? Why is reductionism unscientific? I assume that you are only referring to reductionism with respect to the consciousness problem? If not, how do you account for the fact that a considerable amount of science is, in fact, reductionist? Chemistry and Biology are both completely formed within the framework of reductionism.

That isn't acceptable science I would say. At least not in any definition I was taught.

Reductionism is a big part of science. It is all about explaining stuff you don't understand in terms of stuff you do. I see no reason why applying this principle to consciousness would be considered unscientific.


Dr. Stupid

[Titus Rivas]

Stimpson:


>And??? I know plenty of skeptics who are not physicalists, and plenty who are. So what? I don't know of any skeptics who are epiphenomenalists.< Not being a physicalist equals -in this context (of the articles I've linked to my original message)- the acceptance of an impact upon reality (often referred to as efficacy) of a non-physical consciousness. The rejection of physicalism is hard to reconcile with an overall skepticism towards for example PSI-phenomena, as any type of conscious efficacy is basically just as 'mysterious' as PSI.


>Does he [Paul Kurtz] call himself an eliminative physicalist? If so, are you aware that the distinction is purely semantic?< Of course he did not, how could he in this context?! He obviously meant he accepted consciousness cannot be reduced to physiology but does not have any impact on reality.
I've never encountered "eliminative" as a synonym for "non-reductive", though I have seen it as a synonym for reductive!

Besides epiphenomenalism, this position is also sometimes said to be held by identity theory (which by the way is incoherent for the very same analytical reason as epiphenomenalism, as pointed out in my first linked article).


>Well, I find that very odd, given that all of the research currently being done towards trying to actually understand consciousness, is done from the perspective of it being a physical process of the brain.< Perhaps you should surf the internet a bit more on this topic. See for example the websites by David Chalmers (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/).


>And what obvious thing is it denying?< The non-reducible character of consciousness. Subjective, qualitative experiences cannot be reduced to anything non-subjective or merely quantitative.

>Why is reductionism unscientific?< Of course I was only referring to reductionism applied to the ontology of consciousness, according to which consciousness can be reduced to neurology or functional computation.

>I assume that you are only referring to reductionism with respect to the consciousness problem?< That's what I'm saying, yes.

>Reductionism is a big part of science. It is all about explaining stuff you don't understand in terms of stuff you do. I see no reason why applying this principle to consciousness would be considered unscientific.< The initial attempt at applying the principle in this case was not unscientific as such, but it became unscientific the very moment theorists stuck to it, eventhough it had become quite clear already that the principle could not possibly apply in this particular setting.
Within a rational context, one should only reduce something real to the extent that it doesn't lose its defining characteristics. Another example of the application of the principle of reduction which clearly goes too far is ontological nihilism: the reduction of everything to nothing.

Satisfied?

Titus

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

Some friendly advice: Your posts will be much easier to follow if you use the quote feature.

Not being a physicalist equals -in this context (of the articles I've linked to my original message)- the acceptance of an impact upon reality (often referred to as efficacy) of a non-physical consciousness. The rejection of physicalism is hard to reconcile with an overall skepticism towards for example PSI-phenomena, as any type of conscious efficacy is basically just as 'mysterious' as PSI.

This is a rather strange view of skepticism. Skeptics aren't skeptical of PSI because it is "mysterious", but simply because there is no supporting evidence for it.

Even if you (for whatever reason) believe that the mind has some sort of non-physical causally efficacious component, there is no reason to believe in PSI, because there is no evidence that it exists.

>Well, I find that very odd, given that all of the research currently being done towards trying to actually understand consciousness, is done from the perspective of it being a physical process of the brain.< Perhaps you should surf the internet a bit more on this topic. See for example the websites by David Chalmers.

Perhaps I should have been more clear, and said scientific research. I don't consider unverifiable metaphysical speculation to be "research".

>And what obvious thing is it denying?< The non-reducible character of consciousness. Subjective, qualitative experiences cannot be reduced to anything non-subjective or merely quantitative.

This is certainly not obvious to me. Perhaps you meant intuitively obvious? If so, there is nothing unscientific about rejecting something which is intuitively obvious, particularly when there is substantial scientific evidence to justify doing so.

>Why is reductionism unscientific?< Of course I was only referring to reductionism applied to the ontology of consciousness, according to which consciousness can be reduced to neurology or functional computation.

Referring to consciousness as an ontological existent is, itself, unscientific. Not only do ontology and metaphysics have no place in scientific research, but to assume that consciousness is ontologically distinct from the rest of reality is to assume, a-priori, that it cannot be a process of the brain. To then reject the scientific theory that it is a process of the brain on that basis, is simply begging the question.

>Reductionism is a big part of science. It is all about explaining stuff you don't understand in terms of stuff you do. I see no reason why applying this principle to consciousness would be considered unscientific.< The initial attempt at applying the principle in this case was not unscientific as such, but it became unscientific the very moment theorists stuck to it, eventhough it had become quite clear already that the principle could not possibly apply in this particular setting.

Can you justify this claim? Are you unaware that the scientific theory that consciousness is a set of physical brain processes is a very successful one, which has led to all sorts of insights into how the mind works, and a considerably better understanding of the nature of things like perception, cognition, memory, and mental illness?

Within a rational context, one should only reduce something real to the extent that it doesn't lose its defining characteristics. Another example of the application of the principle of reduction which clearly goes too far is ontological nihilism: the reduction of everything to nothing.

What do you consider to be the defining characteristics of consciousness? Remember when I said that reductionism and eliminatism only differ semantically? Depending on ho you define consciousness, I am either a reductionist or an eliminatist. If you define it to be those mental processes that we are aware of, and which clearly are causally efficacious, like thought, memory, perception, awareness, and emotions, then I am a reductionist, and that view is backed up by substantial scientific research.

If you define consciousness in terms of vague, inherently dualistic concepts like qualia, "raw feels", perceptual fields, etc..., then I am an eliminatist. I do not think those things exist, and I think that your intuitive notion that they do can be explained entirely in terms of brain processes.


Dr. Stupid

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus Rivas

The only logically coherent alternative to the rational acceptance of at least some kind of psychogenic influence is that taken by Daniel C. Dennett, namely reductionism (the denial that there is an irreducible conscious mind).
I haven't yet read everything Dennett has written, but I'm working on it. Perhaps that characterization of his position will emerge once I've read more, along with that definition of reductionism.

Dennett suggests that epiphenomenalism has a somewhat different meaning to cognitive scientists than it has to philosophers, that the term in its strongest philosophical sense is "of no utility whatsoever", and that cognitve scientists seem to be more cognizant of this than do philosophers.

I do like what you said here:Within a rational context, one should only reduce something real to the extent that it doesn't lose its defining characteristics.

[Titus Rivas]

Dr Stupid:

Some friendly advice: Your posts will be much easier to follow if you use the quote feature.
Thanks for the advice. I had no prior experience with this feature.


This is a rather strange view of skepticism. Skeptics aren't skeptical of PSI because it is "mysterious", but simply because there is no supporting evidence for it.

Even if you (for whatever reason) believe that the mind has some sort of non-physical causally efficacious component, there is no reason to believe in PSI, because there is no evidence that it exists.
This is simply not true. First of all, there is a lot of evidence for PSI, but it is often dismissed because of the supposed improbable nature of its existence. Ever heard of the principle that extraordinary claims need extraordinary evidence? In my opinion, there is rather strong evidence for PSI, but is dismissed all the same, because PSI would require more than just that. If physicalism is wrong, we should leave this principle, as PSI would be just a particular instance of a more general principle of efficacy which should be accepted a priori.
Secondly, any causal impact of the mind upon the brain can be conceptualized as a special instance of the concept of PK (psychokinesis), one of the two components of PSI.


Perhaps I should have been more clear, and said scientific research. I don't consider unverifiable metaphysical speculation to be "research".
That could be a matter of definition. But as a philosopher I consider no theoretical project within any given science as tenable if it is built on shaky metaphysical grounds. Rational metaphysics (meant here as a synonym of ontological theory) is largely about rational analysis of concepts -including the concepts used in scientific theorizing- rather than arbitrary speculation.



This is certainly not obvious to me. Perhaps you meant intuitively obvious? If so, there is nothing unscientific about rejecting something which is intuitively obvious, particularly when there is substantial scientific evidence to justify doing so.
No, I did not mean intuitively obvious, I meant rationally obvious! What we know about consciousness by intro (- or retro)spection can never be reduced to anything else than that same consciousness, either by 'substantial scientific evidence' or by anything else. You cannot prove the incoherent, not even by scientific experimentation :D .


Referring to consciousness as an ontological existent is, itself, unscientific. Not only do ontology and metaphysics have no place in scientific research, but to assume that consciousness is ontologically distinct from the rest of reality is to assume, a-priori, that it cannot be a process of the brain. To then reject the scientific theory that it is a process of the brain on that basis, is simply begging the question. No scientific general theorizing can do without a basis of ontological analysis. So though metaphysics is not empirical science, it is indispensable, being located at its very basis. Only an early neopositivist would deny that. It is simply impossible to do research without metaphysical assumptions, without an (at least implicit) ontological framework. For example: reductionist ontology is just as much a form of ontology as dualism. Begging the question would be the rejection of a metaphysical theory, not on the basis of reasonable arguments, but just because that metaphysical theory turns out to be inconvenient for one's favourite empirical-theoretical project.


Can you justify this claim? Are you unaware that the scientific theory that consciousness is a set of physical brain processes is a very successful one, which has led to all sorts of insights into how the mind works, and a considerably better understanding of the nature of things like perception, cognition, memory, and mental illness?
All this simply has no relevance to our question. Any sound interactionist theory would do the same (meaning any theory which would predict regular interactions between brain processes and mental processes without reduction).


What do you consider to be the defining characteristics of consciousness? Remember when I said that reductionism and eliminatism only differ semantically? Depending on ho you define consciousness, I am either a reductionist or an eliminatist. If you define it to be those mental processes that we are aware of, and which clearly are causally efficacious, like thought, memory, perception, awareness, and emotions, then I am a reductionist, and that view is backed up by substantial scientific research.

If you define consciousness in terms of vague, inherently dualistic concepts like qualia, "raw feels", perceptual fields, etc..., then I am an eliminatist. I do not think those things exist, and I think that your intuitive notion that they do can be explained entirely in terms of brain processes.
Okay, you're entitled to that position. It's a free world (or rather it should be). I'm not impressed, but that ought to have been clear all along ;)
Would you agree if I categorized your stance with that of Dennett and Blackmore?

Best wishes,

Titus

[Titus Rivas]

Dymanic,

Dennett suggests that epiphenomenalism has a somewhat different meaning to cognitive scientists than it has to philosophers,
that the term in its strongest philosophical sense is "of no utility whatsoever", and that cognitive scientists seem to be more cognizant of this than do philosophers.
The latter may well be what he suggests, but I'm not sure whether it is true, as the adoption of epiphenomenalism as a supposed reconciliation between introspection and physicalism also appears to be widespread among cognitive scientists. One might do a survey to find out exactly.

Best wishes,

Titus

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:No, I did not mean intuitively obvious, I meant rationally obvious! What we know about consciousness by intro (- or retro)spection can never be reduced to anything else than that same consciousness, either by 'substantial scientific evidence' or by anything else. You cannot prove the incoherent, not even by scientific experimentation
My consciousness is incoherent, and that's why it can't be a product of my brain?

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:Secondly, any causal impact of the mind upon the brain can be conceptualized as a special instance of the concept of PK (psychokinesis), one of the two components of PSI.
So the reason I know about my own consciousness is because it uses PK to store memories in my brain. Interesting. Is that falsifiable in any way?

Can you define psychokinesis? How does a nonphysical entity affect a physical one?

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
....How does a nonphysical entity affect a physical one?

~~ Paul

My question too; a good answer would give me the opportunity switch back to being a dualist. :D

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus Rivas

the adoption of epiphenomenalism as a supposed reconciliation between introspection and physicalism also appears to be widespread among cognitive scientists.
Epiphenomenalism in the strong philisophical sense?

[Titus Rivas]

Hi Paul,

My consciousness is incoherent, and that's why it can't be a product of my brain?
I hope you haven't really misunderstood me like that, have you?:roll:
I obviously meant anything incoherent, in this case reductionism.


So the reason I know about my own consciousness is because it uses PK to store memories in my brain. Interesting. I'm not primarily referring to memory here, but rather to any motor process which would reflect knowledge of consciousness, such as writing and talking about consciousness. See my papers linked in the original message I posted within this thread.

Is that falsifiable in any way? We're talking about ontological analysis here, not about empirical theory. So the (empirical) falsifiability principle does not apply here, only the (analytical) coherence principle. It is a matter of logical entailment. Meaning that it follows from the fact that in order for us to speak about consciousness qua consciousness, consciousness must have had an impact on our speech, via one or more areas in the brain which are affected by our knowledge of consciousness (which in turn must be based on conscious efficacy).

Can you define psychokinesis?
Here a minimal definition would suffice: any psychogenic impact on the physical world, either on our own nervous system or on any other physical structure or process outside the nervous system.

How does a nonphysical entity affect a physical one
Well, that is a different question. But we would need to postulate laws of nature that would causally link mental and physical processes. Not just in one direction as epiphenomenalism would have it, but in two directions. It would be a matter of natural laws of interaction. The impact of a non-physical entity on a physical one is certainly not any more mysterious than the impact of a physical entity upon a non-physical one.

Best wishes,

Titus

[Titus Rivas]

Epiphenomenalism in the strong philosophical sense?

Right, Dynamic.

Titus

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Titus Rivas

Here a minimal definition would suffice: any psychogenic impact on the physical world, either on our own nervous system or on any other physical structure or process outside the nervous system.

Idealism provides a mechanism for "any psychogenic impact on our own nervous system".

Impact elsewhere remains highly speculative imo.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:I hope you haven't really misunderstood me like that, have you? I obviously meant anything incoherent, in this case reductionism.
Yes, I did misunderstand you. Why is reductionism incoherent as far as consciousness is concerned?

Meaning that it follows from the fact that in order for us to speak about consciousness qua consciousness, consciousness must have had an impact on our speech, via one or more areas in the brain which are affected by our knowledge of consciousness (which in turn must be based on conscious efficacy).
And PK seems like a better explanation than that consciousness is a product of the brain?

Well, that is a different question. But we would need to postulate laws of nature that would causally link mental and physical processes. Not just in one direction as epiphenomenalism would have it, but in two directions. It would be a matter of natural laws of interaction. The impact of a non-physical entity on a physical one is certainly not any more mysterious than the impact of a physical entity upon a non-physical one.
They are both quite mysterious. I don't see how you're going to come up with laws of nature that allow a nonphysical entity to affect a physical one, without either (a) requiring that the nonphysical entity become physical; or (b) requiring a supernatural miracle. There is a serious problem of the nexus between the nonphysical and the physical.

~~ Paul

[Loki]

Paul,

Epiphenomenalism is true and correct because Win told me so. If you have any issue with this clear and accurate statement, I suggest you take it up with him (becuase I never could wrap my head around it).

[Titus Rivas]

Idealism provides a mechanism for "any psychogenic impact on our own nervous system".

Impact elsewhere remains highly speculative imo.

Well, in my article Exit Epiphenomenalism (http://www.emergentmind.org/rivas-vandongen.htm) written with Hein van Dongen, I explicitly acknowledge that idealism is one of two coherent positions, together with interactionist dualism.
If one starts from the principle of parsimony, idealism seems to be preferable to dualism, at it makes laws of interaction between physical and non-physical entities superfluous. Philosophers such as John Foster and Lloyd explicitly hold this position in contemporary thought.
However, if parsimony were the only principle we should obey, solipsism would be even better, as it does not even necessitate laws of interaction between individual minds. So obviously apart from parsimony we may also take seriously the strong impression that there is a physical world even if that means postulating physical entities which are unnecessary within idealism.

The essential interaction problems of dualism are also not absent within idealism:
(1) though idealism does not face the problem of how two substantially different kinds of entities can influence one another, it still has to deal with a similar problem of how several kinds of consciousness (for example conscious feelings, conscious thoughts, conscious memories, conscious sensations, conscious perceptions, etc.) can influence each other, while they cannot be reduced to one and the same qualitative category.
(2) More importantly, pluralistic idealism which accepts several minds faces the problem of how different ontological domains or 'substances' (irreducible individual minds) affect each other.

So idealist interactionism and dualist interactionism only differ gradually. Add the strong impression that there is a non-mental, external physical world, and it becomes quite easy to understand why some people like myself are dualist interactionists. But you're right that the battle between idealism and dualism cannot be ended either by analysis or empirical evidence.
Perhaps if there is a God, that being may one day tell us who was right. Which would only be important if we believed he was not cheating on us in the first place (Descartes' reason by the way for believing in a physical world).
Either way, if we postulate the reality of the physical world and accept the existence of an irreducible conscious mind, psychokinesis is a logical consequence of the combination of both.

Best wishes,

Titus Rivas

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But why dualism at all, Titus? What are the compelling reasons why consciousness isn't just a product of the brain?

And please, don't mention the Knowledge Argument. :D

~~ Paul

[Titus Rivas]

Hi Paul,

Yes, I did misunderstand you. Why is reductionism incoherent as far as consciousness is concerned?
Well, because consciousness (subjectivity) does not fit in a definition of matter as a non-subjective, non-qualitative entity, so that it cannot be reduced to matter in any conceivable way.

And PK seems like a better explanation than that consciousness is a product of the brain? Huh? I don't get your point here :confused: These are two different issues. PK is not a concept of how consciousness arises, but simply of its impact on the physical world.


They are both quite mysterious. I don't see how you're going to come up with laws of nature that allow a nonphysical entity to affect a physical one, without either (a) requiring that the nonphysical entity become physical; or (b) requiring a supernatural miracle. There is a serious problem of the nexus between the nonphysical and the physical. The first possibility is out of the question as soon as one rejects reductionism. Talking about a supernatural miracle sounds too much as if it were a unique event, whereas we need laws to explain regular mutual influences. Several philosophers have indeed concluded that in order to understand the interaction of irreducible entities we require a system which encompasses those entities without reducing them to anything else. The system is not natural to the irreducible entities themselves, as that would make the system part of the entities. So it would seem the system is extra-natural or if you like supra-natural, which could (according to some) be seen as a socalled teleological argument for a created order. However, be this as it may, the problem arises in any context in which we have irreducible entities which interact with each other. It does not matter whether those entities are irreducible individual spirits, or irreducible atoms (or quanta rather). The only way out would be a kind of idealistic quantitative monism, in other words solipsism. Not a very attractive alternative I would say.

Best wishes,

Titus

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by

the adoption of epiphenomenalism as a supposed reconciliation between introspection and physicalism also appears to be widespread among cognitive scientists.
Dennett:

According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the term "epiphenomenalism" first appears in 1706 as a term in pathology, "a secondary appearance or symptom." The evolutionary biologist Thomas Huxley (1874) was probably the writer who extended the term to its current use in psychology, where it means a nonfunctional property or byproduct. Huxley used the term in his discussion of the evolution of consciousness and his claim that epiphenomenal properties (like the "whistle of the steam engine") could not be explained by natural selection.
In other words, an effect which, while detectable, produces no effects on the system that produced it.

If I understand correctly, the philosophical sense is much stronger -- completely undetectable, therefore not useful for reconciliation or anything else; an effect which produces no effects whatsoever beyond its acting as a sort of philosophical black hole into which countless gigabytes of bandwidth have mysteriously disappeared.

[Titus Rivas]

But why dualism at all, Titus? What are the compelling reasons why consciousness isn't just a product of the brain?
And please, don't mention the Knowledge Argument.

You're mixing up two questions I'm afraid. Dualism literally means the current that states there are two irreducible (kinds of) entities, namely physical and non-physical entities. The reason for dualism is that a philosopher accepts the reality of a non-mental physical world (otherwise he or she would have become an ontological idealist) and thereby defines that physical world in such way that consciousness cannot fit in the definition of the physical world.
The other question is quite different, because some dualists may believe that there is a non-physical mind which is the product of a physical brain. In fact Karl Popper believed in this position which is known as emergent (semi-substantialist) dualism. To a certain extent all property dualists also support a variant of emergent (though non-substantialist) dualism.
My own main philosophical reason for believing that the emergentist theory in general is false, is that I hold that a mere material structure cannot be the source of a so called substantial entity which I hold a psyche (or 'self') to be. The brain can be reduced to its components, but the individual subject can only be himself and no one else. However, I believe this classical argument (already formulated by Plotin for example) should be reserved for a different thread. It even has consequences for the issue of life after death for one thing and therefore also for the theoretical bases of psychical research into this field.

Best wishes,

Titus

[Dymanic]

Titus, I found both of your articles to be fascinating (not the easiest of reading, but well worth the effort). I sincerely hope you will stick around, and look forward to more of your input. I didn't need much persuading of the worthlessness of epiphenomenalism, but your paper does an excellent job of exterminating any lingering doubt. I agree that some of your comments could be excellent thread topics in themselves; for instance, a couple of things that jumped out at me:

Originally posted by Titus Rivas

The brain can be reduced to its components, but the individual subject can only be himself and no one else.
What is your position on multiple personality disorder?

And, from your second article:
consciousness would have an impact upon the mind, but not upon the brain...

...during the mental conceptualisation of consciousness, the supposed neural processes (that would ‘support’ consciousness) or "substrates" cannot themselves be based upon any impact of consciousness.
What about neural plasticity? The structure of dendritic spines can change in a period of seconds.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

This is simply not true. First of all, there is a lot of evidence for PSI, but it is often dismissed because of the supposed improbable nature of its existence.

Just so we are clear, I am talking about reliable scientific evidence, not anecdotal evidence, or subjective interpretation of personal experiences.

Ever heard of the principle that extraordinary claims need extraordinary evidence?

Of course.

In my opinion, there is rather strong evidence for PSI, but is dismissed all the same, because PSI would require more than just that.

No, that is exactly what it requires, no more and no less. Until such evidence is available, any rational skeptic will dismiss it.

If physicalism is wrong, we should leave this principle, as PSI would be just a particular instance of a more general principle of efficacy which should be accepted a priori.

The principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is simple logic. What makes a claim extraordinary? It is the fact that it contradicts other claims for which we already have substantial supporting evidence. Extraordinary evidence is required simply because we already have extraordinary evidence for claims which it contradicts.

Secondly, any causal impact of the mind upon the brain can be conceptualized as a special instance of the concept of PK (psychokinesis), one of the two components of PSI.

I am not interested in speculation about what causal impact of the mind on the brain would imply, under the assumption that the mind is irreducibly non-physical. Such an assumption is inherently anti-science, and would render any scientific explanation of the mind fundamentally impossible. So long as there is no reliable supporting scientific evidence for this view (and there is not), adopting it would be equivalent to simply giving up.

Perhaps I should have been more clear, and said scientific research. I don't consider unverifiable metaphysical speculation to be "research".
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That could be a matter of definition. But as a philosopher I consider no theoretical project within any given science as tenable if it is built on shaky metaphysical grounds.

All metaphysics are shaky. What science needs is a solid epistemological framework. It has that.

Rational metaphysics (meant here as a synonym of ontological theory) is largely about rational analysis of concepts -including the concepts used in scientific theorizing- rather than arbitrary speculation.

Great, because such rational investigation of concept quickly results in the conclusion that views like those presented by Chalmers are incoherent.

This is certainly not obvious to me. Perhaps you meant intuitively obvious? If so, there is nothing unscientific about rejecting something which is intuitively obvious, particularly when there is substantial scientific evidence to justify doing so.
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No, I did not mean intuitively obvious, I meant rationally obvious! What we know about consciousness by intro (- or retro)spection can never be reduced to anything else than that same consciousness, either by 'substantial scientific evidence' or by anything else. You cannot prove the incoherent, not even by scientific experimentation.

OK. Let's see your analytic derivation of the above claim. Why is it incoherent to claim that consciousness is a set of physical processes in the brain?

Referring to consciousness as an ontological existent is, itself, unscientific. Not only do ontology and metaphysics have no place in scientific research, but to assume that consciousness is ontologically distinct from the rest of reality is to assume, a-priori, that it cannot be a process of the brain. To then reject the scientific theory that it is a process of the brain on that basis, is simply begging the question.
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No scientific general theorizing can do without a basis of ontological analysis. So though metaphysics is not empirical science, it is indispensable, being located at its very basis. Only an early neopositivist would deny that.

Or somebody who sees the scientific worldview as an epistemological framework, rather than a metaphysical one, like me. Does that make me a neopositivist?

It is simply impossible to do research without metaphysical assumptions, without an (at least implicit) ontological framework. For example: reductionist ontology is just as much a form of ontology as dualism.

I have no idea what is meant by reductionist ontology. Scientific reductionism is epistemological. It claims only that one set of observed phenomena can be described in terms of another set of observable things. I have no interest in the unknowable underlying ontological relationships. I consider such concepts to be inherently meaningless.

Begging the question would be the rejection of a metaphysical theory, not on the basis of reasonable arguments, but just because that metaphysical theory turns out to be inconvenient for one's favourite empirical-theoretical project.

I reject it because speculation about the unknowable is completely and utterly pointless.

Can you justify this claim? Are you unaware that the scientific theory that consciousness is a set of physical brain processes is a very successful one, which has led to all sorts of insights into how the mind works, and a considerably better understanding of the nature of things like perception, cognition, memory, and mental illness?
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All this simply has no relevance to our question. Any sound interactionist theory would do the same (meaning any theory which would predict regular interactions between brain processes and mental processes without reduction).

Ever heard of the principle of parsimony?

If you define consciousness in terms of vague, inherently dualistic concepts like qualia, "raw feels", perceptual fields, etc..., then I am an eliminatist. I do not think those things exist, and I think that your intuitive notion that they do can be explained entirely in terms of brain processes.

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Okay, you're entitled to that position. It's a free world (or rather it should be). I'm not impressed, but that ought to have been clear all along
Would you agree if I categorized your stance with that of Dennett and Blackmore?

I don't know. I am a scientist, not a philosopher. My position is based on a logical understanding of the scientific method, how it works, and its epistemological basis.

Well, that is a different question. But we would need to postulate laws of nature that would causally link mental and physical processes. Not just in one direction as epiphenomenalism would have it, but in two directions. It would be a matter of natural laws of interaction. The impact of a non-physical entity on a physical one is certainly not any more mysterious than the impact of a physical entity upon a non-physical one.

This raises the obvious question of what you think the word "physical" means. If you are presupposing the claim that their are two distinct ontological "substances", physical and mental, then you are presupposing dualism. Under the scientific worldview, the word "physical" refers to anything which interacts with anything else in an observable way.

If consciousness and the physical interact, and natural laws are capable of describing that interaction, then by what reasoning does it make sense to postulate that they are irreducibly distinct "substances"? The distinction is completely arbitrary and meaningless.

Dr. Stupid

[Titus Rivas]

Dear Dr. Stupid,

Just so we are clear, I am talking about reliable scientific evidence, not anecdotal evidence, or subjective interpretation of personal experiences. I did not assume you were talking about anything else. I was also talking about case studies, yes, but primarily about experimental studies, of which so called meta-analyses have been made with surprising results. See for example this article (http://anson.ucdavis.edu/~utts/air2.html) and this one (http://www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~bdj10/psi/delanoy/delanoy.html) . The main reason the results are often not accepted as interesting scientific evidence, is the supposed apriori improbability of PSI which would always carry more weight than any positive experimental outcome.


The principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is simple logic. What makes a claim extraordinary? It is the fact that it contradicts other claims for which we already have substantial supporting evidence. Extraordinary evidence is required simply because we already have extraordinary evidence for claims which it contradicts.
Oh, that's not what I have gathered from the literature. It's not a question of the evidence going against what we already know from other research. If that were the problem, PSI would be probably have been generally accepted a long time ago. What makes PSI so extraordinary is not that it would contradict existing evidence (By the way, what kind of evidence should that be? For instance, I don't see why PSI would 'contradict' evidence for neurological influences on the mind, as both types of evidence would fit perfectly within any interactionist theory), but that at a metaphysical level, consciousness is (apriori) not supposed to have any efficacy whatsoever.



I am not interested in speculation about what causal impact of the mind on the brain would imply, under the assumption that the mind is irreducibly non-physical. Such an assumption is inherently anti-science, and would render any scientific explanation of the mind fundamentally impossible. So long as there is no reliable supporting scientific evidence for this view (and there is not), adopting it would be equivalent to simply giving up.
I'm afraid you're begging the question here. It is only anti-science if you assume that 'real' science depends on physicalism. But that is a meta-scientific assumption, of the exact same kind we're discussing here. By the way, who's talking about 'giving up' science? Giving up physicalism does not equal giving up science, as science can also be interactionistic. Again, there IS scientific evidence for PSI, which you might find too weak, but which certainly shouldn't be dismissed as fundamentally unscientific.

Great, because such rational investigation of concept quickly results in the conclusion that views like those presented by Chalmers are incoherent. Not quickly I'm afraid, but I agree that he's wrong on one point, namely his views on the impact of consciousness ;), as is shown in my first linked article. However, he's a very important and intelligent philosopher.


OK. Let's see your analytic derivation of the above claim. Why is it incoherent to claim that consciousness is a set of physical processes in the brain
Do I really have to repeat that again? Because of the irreducible subjective, qualitative aspects of consciousness which you eliminate and which cannot be described in terms of matter (or physical reality) as a non-subjective, non-qualitative entity (or set of entities). However, this point is only interesting for someone who doesn't reject or 'eliminate' these aspects in the first place.


Or somebody who sees the scientific worldview as an epistemological framework, rather than a metaphysical one, like me. Does that make me a neopositivist?
I'm not sure about what you mean by 'the scientific worldview' (as there are several, including for example the epiphenomenalist worldview) nor what you mean "epistemological framework". Are you talking about epistemological reductionism which reduces scientific theories to physical theories? We were talking about a philosophicall theory here, physicalism, as an ontological framework for science.
So our discussion runs deeper than what exactly would count as scientific. It is about what types of causality exist, not just about what types of causality could in principle be accepted in scientific theory. In other words, according to your epistemological framework for science as I understand it, there could well be a lot of conscious efficacy out there, but it would simply by definition fall outside the scope of science and no evidence could ever change that -as evidence for conscious efficacy could never be scientific evidence (scientific theories having been defined already as theories which exclude conscious efficacy). Unless one would accept ontological analysis of the kind I have presented as an at least equally important source of rational knowledge (something you wouldn't find viable I understand), that would make one an agnostic about the ultimate reality of conscious efficacy, not an ontological physicalist. If so, adepts of this type of agnosticism should be frank about their position rather than pretending that the question of conscious efficacy can be solved 'scientifically' as defined by themselves.

don't know. I am a scientist, not a philosopher. My position is based on a logical understanding of the scientific method, how it works, and its epistemological basis.
Let's not forget that epistemology is philosophy, not science.

This raises the obvious question of what you think the word "physical" means. If you are presupposing the claim that their are two distinct ontological "substances", physical and mental, then you are presupposing dualism. Under the scientific worldview, the word "physical" refers to anything which interacts with anything else in an observable way. Within an idealistic ontology, you would be right, as everything observed would be 'in the mind', and there would be no external physical reality. However, most scientists still mean by 'physical' something which exists in itself, independent of our observation of it. Thus there is nothing arbitrary about distinguishing subjective consciousness from a non-subjective outside world.

(By the way, there is a lot of confusion about the word 'substance' in a philosophical context. It usually means an independent entity which cannot be reduced to anything else.)

Best wishes,

Titus

[Titus Rivas]

Dear Dymanic (not Dynamic, sorry :p )

I found both of your articles to be fascinating (not the easiest of reading, but well worth the effort).
I sincerely hope you will stick around, and look forward to more of your input. I didn't need much persuading of the worthlessness of epiphenomenalism, but your paper does an excellent job of exterminating any lingering doubt. Thanks a lot :D

What is your position on multiple personality disorder?
Dualist substantialism (my position, also termed personalist dualism or dualist personalism) holds that the subject or self (the entity which undergoes subjectivity) is substantial in that it cannot be reduced to any other independent entity. I can only be me, I cannot be you, him or her. Now, personality is a mental structure I live in, but which doesn't equal my being this particular subject (my being me). My personality can change while I'm still me. My being myself does not depend on the integrity of my personality structures or on their constance. Thus, it is also conceivable that my personality becomes fragmented in more or less separate structures. They would still be MY separate or multiple personality structures, and would not affect my being myself in the sense of my being this particular irreducible subject rather than anyone else. So as long as multiple personalities or subpersonalities or whatever you would call them belong to me as this particular conscious subject, it is me (rather than anyone else) who 'lives' through those personalities.

And, from your second article:
consciousness would have an impact upon the mind, but not upon the brain...
...during the mental conceptualisation of consciousness, the supposed neural processes (that would ‘support’ consciousness) or "substrates" cannot themselves be based upon any impact of consciousness.
What about neural plasticity? The structure of dendritic spines can change in a period of seconds.
The point I tried to make in this context was not that the brain could as such never change because of an impact of consciousness, as I precisely believe that it certainly can and pretend to show that. The point was that within intraphysical physicalism as I call it there, there is no room for any response from the brain to consciousness. The brain could not respond to consciousness, as that would imply it would be affected by information about consciousness which is irreconcilable with intraphysical physicalism.

Best wishes,

Titus

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:Well, because consciousness (subjectivity) does not fit in a definition of matter as a non-subjective, non-qualitative entity, so that it cannot be reduced to matter in any conceivable way.
What do you mean by "reduced to matter"? Are you saying that all emergent properties cannot be reduced to matter? If so, then what it is like to be a rock must be a separate kind of thing. And the macroscopic behavior of the weather must be a separate kind of thing. And the behavior of a computer. We cannot experience these things directly, so they are just as subjective as our own minds.

Now, you may choose to reject those examples and make a special case only out of consciousness. But it is a special case simply because it is the one emergent property that we can experience directly. I don't see why that makes it fundamentally different from everything else.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:Several philosophers have indeed concluded that in order to understand the interaction of irreducible entities we require a system which encompasses those entities without reducing them to anything else. The system is not natural to the irreducible entities themselves, as that would make the system part of the entities. So it would seem the system is extra-natural or if you like supra-natural, which could (according to some) be seen as a socalled teleological argument for a created order. However, be this as it may, the problem arises in any context in which we have irreducible entities which interact with each other.
You've lost me. First of all, it sounds like you've introduced a third kind of entity: the system. How are you going to investigate the properties and workings of this system, if part of it interacts with consciousness, which is presumably outside the domain of scientific investigation?

We have matter, which is investigated with science, and consciousness, which is not matter, yet affects matter. In order to avoid the nexus problem (where consciousness would, by induction, become matter), you introduce an overarching system that is outside both. Yet somehow this system must affect matter, on command from consciousness or some such, without succumbing to the same induction problem. How does this improve the situation?

~~ Paul

[Lord Kenneth]

So, epiphenomenalism is basically the brain makes mental events but those events don't effect anything?

I don't really understand that. What is that trying to explain?

[Lord Kenneth]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Thanks, Yahweh and LMoG. Yes, it's incoherent.

There is something, call it consciousness, that is an epiphenomenon of the brain, but has no affect on the brain. Since it has no effect on the brain, we don't have any memories of the experience of it nor of anything else relating to it. Therefore we cannot think or talk about it. Therefore it is as good as nonexistent and there is no reason the concept of epiphenomenalism would ever have arisen.

~~ Paul

Wow, that view makes no sense at all. Why would someone hold such a position???

[Titus Rivas]

Hi Paul

You've lost me. First of all, it sounds like you've introduced a third kind of entity: the system. How are you going to investigate the properties and workings of this system, if part of it interacts with consciousness, which is presumably outside the domain of scientific investigation?
Good question. However, by what I've loosely termed the system , I don't mean another substantial, irreducible entity like matter or (individual) mind(s). I meant an order which makes interaction between the various substances possible, i.e. which links those substances to one another. So, it does not lead to an infinite regress. Perhaps the order I'm pointing at could be compared to one possible meaning of the ancient concept of Logos. As I have said before, even pluralistic idealism requires some laws of interaction between the irreducible individual minds.

Interactive laws would be part of reality and irreducible to the laws pertaining to the nature of the individual substances themselves. It does sound a bit mysterious, I admit, but so does for example non-locality in physics. Things seem to be linked to each other, even if they can't be reduced to each other. That's the main gist of what I'm trying to say.

Would you know another solution which would not take refuge in reductionism?

By the way, physical science cannot directly study consciousness, so much is correct. But it can to an important extent study interaction between consciousness and the physical world.

Best wishes,

Titus

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Lord Ken asked:Wow, that view makes no sense at all. Why would someone hold such a position???
Because they are trying to support a belief about consciousness, but don't think too hard about the structure they created.

Titas said:Good question. However, by what I've loosely termed the system , I don't mean another substantial, irreducible entity like matter or (individual) mind(s). I meant an order which makes interaction between the various substances possible, i.e. which links those substances to one another. So, it does not lead to an infinite regress. Perhaps the order I'm pointing at could be compared to one possible meaning of the ancient concept of Logos. As I have said before, even pluralistic idealism requires some laws of interaction between the irreducible individual minds.
But you said "... we require a system which encompasses those entities without reducing them to anything else." This means the system is either a chimera of both entities, or it is a third kind of thing. But let's forget about that. I do not see how these two kinds of entities are going to interact without a nexus that shares the properties of both entities. This means that the nexus is a third kind of thing, or that both entities already share common characteristics.

Would you know another solution which would not take refuge in reductionism?
Nope, and that is precisely the problem.

By the way, physical science cannot directly study consciousness, so much is correct. But it can to an important extent study interaction between consciousness and the physical world.
And how long should we maintain a dualistic view in light of the progress in neurophysiology? Let's revisit the quesiton in 100 years and see where we are.

I still think you are hoisting consciousness on a pedestal just because it happens to be the one emergent property you experience directly.

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Lord Kenneth
...I don't really understand that. What is that trying to explain?

As I understand it, it's a mechanism to allow materialism/atheism to explain "consciousness". That could also be an out to explain "life" under their viewpoint, imo, although abiogenesis is sometimes explained as "whole is greater than sum of parts".

(I.E. reductionism fails in both cases.... ;) )

[Titus Rivas]

And how long should we maintain a dualistic view in light of the progress in neurophysiology? Let's revisit the quesiton in 100 years and see where we are.

I still think you are hoisting consciousness on a pedestal just because it happens to be the one emergent property you experience directly.

Even if you were right in viewing consciousness as no more than an emergent property, you would still have to explain its impact on reality. As long as we don't eliminate consciousness (unlike for example Dr. Stupid) and acknowledge that we know that consciousness is real, we are inevitably faced with the question of interaction. The problem stands regardless of whether we conceive of consciousness as something basic or something emergent!
A nexus which would imply reduction would by definition not explain interaction between irreducible entities. Irreducibility simply implies reduction is impossible.
The only rational, coherent types of ontological reductionism are idealistic, not materialistic. See this paper of mine if you like: Kant's Error (http://members.lycos.nl/Kritisch/index-18.html) , relevant for anyone who still believes (materialist) identity theory would solve the problem. (Though I don't explicitly mention it in this paper, the argumentation also holds for neutral monism. )

Best wishes,

Titus

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:Even if you were right in viewing consciousness as no more than an emergent property, you would still have to explain its impact on reality. As long as we don't eliminate consciousness (unlike for example Dr. Stupid) and acknowledge that we know that consciousness is real, we are inevitably faced with the question of interaction. The problem stands regardless of whether we conceive of consciousness as something basic or something emergent!
I don't understand the problem. Consciousness is my inner experience of the workings of my brain. I know I am conscious because some parts of my brain observe other parts. That's why I can talk about being conscious. You still haven't explained why consciousness cannot be an emergent property of the brain.

I don't believe Stimpson is eliminating consciousness.

A nexus which would imply reduction would by definition not explain interaction between irreducible entities. Irreducibility simply implies reduction is impossible.
I am using the term nexus to describe the interface between these two supposedly irreducible entities. If they affect each other, there must be an interface.

The only rational, coherent types of ontological reductionism are idealistic, not materialistic. See this paper of mine if you like: Kant's Error , relevant for anyone who still believes (materialist) identity theory would solve the problem. (Though I don't explicitly mention it in this paper, the argumentation also holds for neutral monism. )
I don't care to make any ontological assumptions. I don't know what stuff is really made out of, nor do I think the question is meaningful. As I've said before, I'd bet that if you could compose a coherent description of idealism and materialism/physicalism/whatever, you would find that they are equivalent. I'll take a look at your paper.

~~ Paul

[Titus Rivas]

Hi Paul,

I don't understand the problem. Consciousness is my inner experience of the workings of my brain. I know I am conscious because some parts of my brain observe other parts. That's why I can talk about being conscious. You still haven't explained why consciousness cannot be an emergent property of the brain. That would leave out the irreducible qualia, which supposedly woud not exist (as such) according to reductionism.

I don't believe Stimpson is eliminating consciousness. I meant he is reducing the so called qualia of consciousness to workings of the brain and eliminating them as such. See his own message about that within this thread.

I am using the term nexus to describe the interface between these two supposedly irreducible entities. If they affect each other, there must be an interface. Maybe I misunderstood you on this.

I don't care to make any ontological assumptions. I don't know what stuff is really made out of, nor do I think the question is meaningful. As I've said before, I'd bet that if you could compose a coherent description of idealism and materialism/physicalism/whatever, you would find that they are equivalent. I'll take a look at your paper.
This is obviously not true as eliminative materialism for instance simply dismisses the reality of qualia. Again, talking about epiphenomenalism in the philosophical sense, means talking about ontology.

Best wishes,

Titus

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:That would leave out the irreducible qualia, which supposedly woud not exist (as such) according to reductionism.
We've done qualia to death here, but I'd love to hear your definition. What exactly are qualia, and why are they irreducible? Again, please don't bring up the Knowledge Argument. :D

meant he is reducing the so called qualia of consciousness to workings of the brain and eliminating them as such. See his own message about that within this thread.
Eliminating what? He's only eliminating the unsupported claim that they cannot be workings of the brain.

This is obviously not true as eliminative materialism for instance simply dismisses the reality of qualia.
Well, if it dismisses that there is some sort of personal experience of sensory inputs, then it is silly. If it dismisses that these experiences must be some kind of separate existent, then fine. Anyway, when I say that idealism and materialism/whatever might be equivalent, I mean in way that we can test. Of course the ideas are still be different, but who cares?

Again, talking about epiphenomenalism in the philosophical sense, means talking about ontology.
I think we agree that epiphenomenalism is meaningless. So is ontology in general, although it might be more fun.

~~ Paul

[Titus Rivas]

We've done qualia to death here, but I'd love to hear your definition. What exactly are qualia, and why are they irreducible? Again, please don't bring up the Knowledge Argument.
Well, I'm afraid I find explaining what qualia are to someone who rejects their irreducibility a bit like explaining sight to a congenitally blind person. My energy resources are limited.

Of course the ideas are still be different, but who cares? For one thing, a lot of philosophers like myself do.

I think we both have made our points by now. Unless you'd like to add something of course.

Best wishes,

Titus

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus, I don't reject their irreducibility out of hand. I simply have no idea what sort of thoughts should be in my head to lead me to the idea that they are irreducible. You speak as if it's obvious and only the uninitiated would be foolhardy enough not to see it.

For one thing, a lot of philosophers like myself do
But you can never answer the question.

~~ Paul

[Titus Rivas]

Titus, I don't reject their irreducibility out of hand. I simply have no idea what sort of thoughts should be in my head to lead me to the idea that they are irreducible. You speak as if it's obvious and only the uninitiated would be foolhardy enough not to see it. Well, I just repeat my old tenet then:
the subjective and qualitative (sometimes summarized as qualia) by definition cannot be reduced to the non-subjective and non-qualitative.
Or as I said in my paper (written with Hein van Dongen) Exit Epiphenomenalism (http://www.emergentmind.org/rivas-vandongen.htm), footnote 9:
"We hope it is clear that apart from eliminationism we also discard the various types of identity theory, functionalism and emergence materialism. In practice all of these positions can from an ontological point of view be seen here as forms of materialism, as all of them hold that the mind does not constitute a separate domain of reality, but that it can be seen -and this sense be reduced to- an "interior side", "pattern" or "level" of matter.
However, matter can by definition never be subjective, neither in a special manifestation of it nor as some kind of mysterious level."
The subjective is not just some kind of computational self-reference of a purely physical system. In the brain there are only quantitative processes and structures, and there is no way such processes or structures could ever equal qualitative subjective feelings, thoughts, desires or perceptions. If there were, anything qualitative and subjective would basically just equal a quantity, i.e. a number. Apart from that number there would be nothing to it, as otherwise it couldn't be reduced to the number, to the quantitative process or structure.

To tell you the truth, I'm at a loss whenever I'm confronted with scholars who really take seriously the theory of materialist reductionism (meaning while they really understand what it boils down to). How on earth can anyone who's any bit intelligent believe such a theory? Or is it precisely reserved to people with exceptionally high intelligence to believe anything which strikes anyone else as plain nonsense? If only because it takes a lot of intellectual effort to defend the absurd?

Not meant to offend you personally by the way. Reductionism is simply not exactly my cup of tea.

You have the last say on this subject here, okay?

Best wishes,

Titus

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Titus Rivas


You're mixing up two questions I'm afraid. Dualism literally means the current that states there are two irreducible (kinds of) entities, namely physical and non-physical entities. The reason for dualism is that a philosopher accepts the reality of a non-mental physical world (otherwise he or she would have become an ontological idealist) and thereby defines that physical world in such way that consciousness cannot fit in the definition of the physical world.
The other question is quite different, because some dualists may believe that there is a non-physical mind which is the product of a physical brain. In fact Karl Popper believed in this position which is known as emergent (semi-substantialist) dualism. To a certain extent all property dualists also support a variant of emergent (though non-substantialist) dualism.
My own main philosophical reason for believing that the emergentist theory in general is false, is that I hold that a mere material structure cannot be the source of a so called substantial entity which I hold a psyche (or 'self') to be. The brain can be reduced to its components, but the individual subject can only be himself and no one else. However, I believe this classical argument (already formulated by Plotin for example) should be reserved for a different thread. It even has consequences for the issue of life after death for one thing and therefore also for the theoretical bases of psychical research into this field.

Best wishes,

Titus

This is really interesting stuff Titus. You certainly know what you're talking about. I hope you'll be sticking around! :) Incidentally I saw some of your contributions on the philosophy board in the NDE thread :)

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

I was also talking about case studies, yes, but primarily about experimental studies, of which so called meta-analyses have been made with surprising results. See for example this article and this one .

Meta-analysis cannot be used for hypothesis testing. Any claim that meta-analysis of experiments provides evidence for PSI is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how statistical data analysis works.

As for you links, the first does not work, and the second seems to be claiming nothing more than that the meta-analysis seems to indicate that there may be something there. As I said above, that is not the same as saying that there is actually supporting evidence for PSI.

The main reason the results are often not accepted as interesting scientific evidence, is the supposed apriori improbability of PSI which would always carry more weight than any positive experimental outcome.

Can you back up that assertion?

The principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is simple logic. What makes a claim extraordinary? It is the fact that it contradicts other claims for which we already have substantial supporting evidence. Extraordinary evidence is required simply because we already have extraordinary evidence for claims which it contradicts.
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Oh, that's not what I have gathered from the literature. It's not a question of the evidence going against what we already know from other research. If that were the problem, PSI would be probably have been generally accepted a long time ago.

PSI will not be accepted until such time as there is reliable supporting evidence for it.

For instance, I don't see why PSI would 'contradict' evidence for neurological influences on the mind, as both types of evidence would fit perfectly within any interactionist theory),

The existence of PSI most definitely would imply that there are serious problems with the laws of physics as we currently understand them. That makes it an extraordinary claim, and one for which there is no reliable scientific evidence.

but that at a metaphysical level, consciousness is (apriori) not supposed to have any efficacy whatsoever.

Says who? That certainly isn't part of any scientific theory I know of.

I am not interested in speculation about what causal impact of the mind on the brain would imply, under the assumption that the mind is irreducibly non-physical. Such an assumption is inherently anti-science, and would render any scientific explanation of the mind fundamentally impossible. So long as there is no reliable supporting scientific evidence for this view (and there is not), adopting it would be equivalent to simply giving up.
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I'm afraid you're begging the question here. It is only anti-science if you assume that 'real' science depends on physicalism.

Who says I am defending physicalism at all? I don't subscribe to any metaphysical or ontological form of physicalism. I define the term "physical" the way science does. Anything which has an effect on something else, such that the effect can be detected and studied scientifically, is physical.

There is nothing metaphysical about that. Under that definition consciousness is either physical, or supernatural.

I have no interest in either ontological physicalism or interactionist dualism. If you accept the axioms of science, then they are observationally indistinguishable. The same goes for Idealism.

But that is a meta-scientific assumption, of the exact same kind we're discussing here. By the way, who's talking about 'giving up' science? Giving up physicalism does not equal giving up science, as science can also be interactionistic. Again, there IS scientific evidence for PSI, which you might find too weak, but which certainly shouldn't be dismissed as fundamentally unscientific.

I am confused. Are you claiming that the scientific community has acknowledged that there is reliable scientific evidence for psi, or are you disagreeing with the general consensus among the scientific community (including most parapsychologists) that there is not yet reliable scientific evidence for psi?

OK. Let's see your analytic derivation of the above claim. Why is it incoherent to claim that consciousness is a set of physical processes in the brain
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Do I really have to repeat that again? Because of the irreducible subjective, qualitative aspects of consciousness which you eliminate and which cannot be described in terms of matter (or physical reality) as a non-subjective, non-qualitative entity (or set of entities).

Which aspects are you referring to? If you are referring to any aspects of consciousness which I could possibly know that I have, then those aspects clearly have an effect on the physical world. That means that either they can be explained scientifically, or science is invalid.

If they can be explained scientifically, then how are they irreducibly subjective? They could not possibly be so, because scientific explanations are by their very nature, objective.

In fact, the entire concept of irreducibly subjective aspects of consciousness is incoherent. If I am aware that I possess an aspect of consciousness, then that aspect of consciousness has an effect on the world. That means it objectively exists, and therefore cannot be irreducibly subjective. And if I am not aware that I have it, then why would I postulate that it exists at all?

However, this point is only interesting for someone who doesn't reject or 'eliminate' these aspects in the first place.

If by interesting you mean self-contradictory, then sure.

Or somebody who sees the scientific worldview as an epistemological framework, rather than a metaphysical one, like me. Does that make me a neopositivist?
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I'm not sure about what you mean by 'the scientific worldview' (as there are several, including for example the epiphenomenalist worldview) nor what you mean "epistemological framework".

By "scientific worldview" I mean any worldview that holds that the scientific method is valid.

Are you talking about epistemological reductionism which reduces scientific theories to physical theories?

I am talking about the epistemological basis of the scientific method itself.

We were talking about a philosophicall theory here, physicalism, as an ontological framework for science.

I don't think that ontological physicalism is a coherent position. I also doubt very much that you will find anybody here who does.

So our discussion runs deeper than what exactly would count as scientific. It is about what types of causality exist, not just about what types of causality could in principle be accepted in scientific theory. In other words, according to your epistemological framework for science as I understand it, there could well be a lot of conscious efficacy out there, but it would simply by definition fall outside the scope of science and no evidence could ever change that -as evidence for conscious efficacy could never be scientific evidence (scientific theories having been defined already as theories which exclude conscious efficacy). Unless one would accept ontological analysis of the kind I have presented as an at least equally important source of rational knowledge (something you wouldn't find viable I understand), that would make one an agnostic about the ultimate reality of conscious efficacy, not an ontological physicalist. If so, adepts of this type of agnosticism should be frank about their position rather than pretending that the question of conscious efficacy can be solved 'scientifically' as defined by themselves.

Where on Earth did you get the idea that science only allows certain metaphysical types of causality? That is nonsensical. Metaphysics is completely irrelevant to science. All that matters to science is that (1) Reality conforms to some set of logical consistent rules, and (2) Those rules can be determined through observation and the application of the scientific method.

As I said before, if consciousness can be explained scientifically, then there is absolutely no point in assuming that it is some irreducibly different substance than everything else. If the metaphysical difference is not detectable through observation, then there is no reason to believe it exists at all.

don't know. I am a scientist, not a philosopher. My position is based on a logical understanding of the scientific method, how it works, and its epistemological basis.
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Let's not forget that epistemology is philosophy, not science.

I know. The scientific method is derived from an epistemological philosophy. That epistemological philosophy is what most modern scientists are referring to when they talk about "physicalism", not the ontological physicalism you have been talking about. That idea was pretty much put to death when Quantum Mechanics and Special Relativity were discovered.

This raises the obvious question of what you think the word "physical" means. If you are presupposing the claim that their are two distinct ontological "substances", physical and mental, then you are presupposing dualism. Under the scientific worldview, the word "physical" refers to anything which interacts with anything else in an observable way.
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Within an idealistic ontology, you would be right, as everything observed would be 'in the mind', and there would be no external physical reality.

One need not assume any ontology. The definition of physical I gave does not require ontological assumptions.

However, most scientists still mean by 'physical' something which exists in itself, independent of our observation of it. Thus there is nothing arbitrary about distinguishing subjective consciousness from a non-subjective outside world.

Why assume that our subjective experiences are not part of the objective world? You seem to be claiming that scientists have the view that there is the objective world, and our minds which are not a part of it, observing it. This view was discredited long ago. Our minds are a part of the objective world. It does not exist independently of our subjective observations of it. Our subjective observations are a part of it.

As I said above, our subjective experiences objectively exist. The concept of something being irreducibly subjective is not coherent.

the subjective and qualitative (sometimes summarized as qualia) by definition cannot be reduced to the non-subjective and non-qualitative. The subjective is not just some kind of computational self-reference of a purely physical system.

So far you have offered no actual logical argument or evidence to back up this claim. You have merely asserted it as being obvious.

To tell you the truth, I'm at a loss whenever I'm confronted with scholars who really take seriously the theory of materialist reductionism (meaning while they really understand what it boils down to). How on earth can anyone who's any bit intelligent believe such a theory? Or is it precisely reserved to people with exceptionally high intelligence to believe anything which strikes anyone else as plain nonsense? If only because it takes a lot of intellectual effort to defend the absurd?

No, it is because people who are familiar with science, in particular, modern science like Quantum Mechanics and Relativity, realize how unreliable our intuitive preconceptions about things are. They have learned to rely on the actual evidence, and to not allow their intuitive preconceptions to bias their judgement. Unfortunately, many philosophers never seem to learn this lesson.


Dr. Stupid

[Titus Rivas]

Dear Dr. Stupid,

Let's just leave it at that.

The reason why the first link may not have worked may be that I'm based at the Netherlands.

In my view, our standpoints are too different (at least on this subject) to make an interesting exchange possible.

Best wishes,

Titus

P.S.: I do have another thing in common with you, namely that I like Stimpson a lot (and Ren of course). But that's another subject :D

[Titus Rivas]

This is really interesting stuff Titus. You certainly know what you're talking about. I hope you'll be sticking around! Incidentally I saw some of your contributions on the philosophy board in the NDE thread

Thanks a lot, Ian. I've been browsing through some of your own messages and they seem interesting alright. Ever heard of this other interesting Ian (http://www.childpastlives.org/stevenson.htm) by the way?

Best wishes,

Titus

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:In my view, our standpoints are too different (at least on this subject) to make an interesting exchange possible.
But, er, but, wait, ... this can't possibly be. In philosophy, you don't get to throw up your hands, do you?

From the article about Dr. Stevenson:His strict methods systematically rule out all possible "normal" explanations for the child’s memories.
Wow! Imagine the Nobel prize this guy could win if he simply published a paper with the list of all possible normal explanations for this. It boggles the mind.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Titus Rivas


In my view, our standpoints are too different (at least on this subject) to make an interesting exchange possible.



Or indeed any meaningful exchange possible. I should have realised this a long time ago in my exchanges with Stimpson. :( How can you communicate with someone who denies that which is so obvious? ie our subjective experiences.

Ah! Just seen your reply to me. Yes I have heard of him. Which reminds me that I may as well order this (http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0786414588/qid=1060287513/sr=1-17/ref=sr_1_2_17/026-6202115-3606848) from the library.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian asked:How can you communicate with someone who denies that which is so obvious? ie our subjective experiences.
By explaining why it's so obvious in compelling terms that don't involve words like obvious, instinct, irreducible, by definition, and f*ckwit.

No wonder philosophy runs around in circles for millennia. Everything is obvious!

~~ Paul

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Or indeed any meaningful exchange possible. I should have realised this a long time ago in my exchanges with Stimpson. How can you communicate with someone who denies that which is so obvious? ie our subjective experiences.

I do not deny the existence of our subjective experiences. I just deny that they are irreducibly subjective. In fact, the very fact that I claim that subjective experiences objectively exist means that I could not possibly be denying their existence.

Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,



I do not deny the existence of our subjective experiences. I just deny that they are irreducibly subjective. In fact, the very fact that I claim that subjective experiences objectively exist means that I could not possibly be denying their existence.

Dr. Stupid

What does it mean to say they objectively exist if only ever one person can be acqauinted with such experiences? They are subjective by the very meaning of the term.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

What does it mean to say they objectively exist if only ever one person can be acqauinted with such experiences?

That they have an effect on the world, and that in principle, if science is valid, it should be possible to provide an explanation for them based on observation of those effects.

In other words, the exact same thing it means to say that anything is objective.

The fact that one person cannot experience another person's experiences, does not mean that they are not objective. Every brain is slightly different. It is not physically possible for your brain to perform the same processes that mine does. Does that mean that those processes are not objective?

They are subjective by the very meaning of the term.

Of course. But that doesn't mean that they do not objectively exist. To claim that something is irreducibly subjective is to claim that it cannot possibly have any observable effect on anything. In other words, epiphenomenalism. That is an incoherent and nonsensical position.

Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

II
What does it mean to say they objectively exist if only ever one person can be acqauinted with such experiences?
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Stimp
That they have an effect on the world, and that in principle, if science is valid, it should be possible to provide an explanation for them based on observation of those effects.


That's not what objective means. And I should point out that a conscious experience amounts to more than an effect on the world (even granted it does have an effect).



The fact that one person cannot experience another person's experiences, does not mean that they are not objective.



It's no good Stimp, going to have to use that in my sig!



Every brain is slightly different. It is not physically possible for your brain to perform the same processes that mine does. Does that mean that those processes are not objective?



These processes can be detected from a third person perspective. My raw experience of love cannot be.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
They are subjective by the very meaning of the term.
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Of course. But that doesn't mean that they do not objectively exist.


Objectively exist? I don't understand what you mean. Specify the differences between objective existence compared to non-objective existence. Come to that compare it to subjective existence as well.



To claim that something is irreducibly subjective is to claim that it cannot possibly have any observable effect on anything.



I'm baffled by this logic.

[Dancing David]

Objective experience: a photon enters the eye and reacts with a receptor

Subjective experience: I see red.

I can't have an experience without the objective world.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian, you're the one who has to define subjective existence. Really, I don't know what that means. What makes something subjective as opposed to objective? It appears that you use consciousness as an example, because no one can experience your consciousness except you. But that is true for almost everything else. No one can experience what it's like to be the weather, either, or a river.

There are virtually an infinite number of things we cannot experience. Yet you select one particular thing, your consciousness, and promote that to special status. In one sense, your consciousness is less special than the weather or a river, because at least I can experience my consciousness to get an idea of what yours is like. Neither of us can experience a river.

~~ Paul

[Dymanic]

Earlier in the thread (when the virtues of reductionist methods were being weighed) I mentioned that I liked the way this was put:

Originally posted by Titus

Within a rational context, one should only reduce something real to the extent that it doesn't lose its defining characteristics.
In other words, while reductionism will always be an indispensable tool, when applied to some things (such as consciousness) a point of diminishing returns is reached. This occurs before the final point of ultimate reducibility is reached. In my view, this failure of reductionist methods (which have served so well in other areas) is why an understanding of consciousness continues to elude us, and promises to continue to do so. We overrun the level at which our hope of understanding lies, proceed to the point of irreducibility, and, stubbornly clinging to our favorite tool, flail about there looking for answers. We are like the man who, having lost his keys in the darkness, looks for them under a street lamp "because the light is better there".

We need to devise new tools, and epiphenomenalism, though a failure, appears to be the result of efforts to do that.

As far as "Dr. Ian"'s site...I felt that some very dubious (and rather familiar) reasons for accepting his 'results' were being presented. I'm afraid I'd have to say it was Reader's Digest all the way.

[Loki]

(ApparentlySoberIan wrote) : What does it mean to say they objectively exist if only ever one person can be acqauinted with such experiences? They are subjective by the very meaning of the term.
Oh dear ... Ian appears to be channeling UCE! I fear a definitive definition approaching!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Dymanic said:In other words, while reductionism will always be an indispensable tool, when applied to some things (such as consciousness) a point of diminishing returns is reached. This occurs before the final point of ultimate reducibility is reached.
Why do you say so?

It seems to me that people think reductionism can't explain consciousness because consciousness is an experiential thing. But no one is saying that reductionism will allow someone else to experience your consciousness. We are only saying that will explain how consciousness arises.

You will always be able to say "Science cannot describe what my consciousness feels like," but that doesn't mean that science won't be able to explain how consciousness arises in you. This is how consciousness is both objective and subjective.

It's important not to make a leap from the inherent uniqueness of individual consciousness to an assumption of incomprehensibility. Imagine I never allowed anyone else to observe my left foot. Does that elevate my left foot to the status of being something other than the rest of my body?

~~ Paul

[Dymanic]

I guess what I'm saying is simply that trying to explain the property of 'consciousness' at the level of potassium ions (or, worse, quantum effects) is sort of like trying to explain the property of 'wetness' by examining water molecules (and hydrogen atoms, and oxygen atoms, and their various sub-components, etc). In other words, while the necessary elements may indeed be present at that level, correlating them in a way that produces a useful model for understanding may turn out to be virtually hopeless at too low a level. I think consciousness is produced by a pattern of relationships, and like any pattern, the key to seeing it is finding the proper frame of reference.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I agree completely. We'll need many layers between atoms and consciousness to understand it, just as we need many layers between atoms and software applications to understand them. But I think we can build up these layers in a sort of counter-reductionist (increasonist?) way until we've built up to the origins of consciousness.

~~ Paul

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Paul

But I think we can build up these layers in a sort of counter-reductionist (increasonist?) way until we've built up to the origins of consciousness.
That is our great hope. I wish I could be more optomistic about our prospects, but I think it may depend a lot on something like luck.

Suppose we have some large and complicated piece of machinery of alien design, and when operating, it produces some behavior we wish to understand -- the result of some unknown property. We carefully disassemble the machine, placing the parts in order on a long bench as we remove them, and proceed to subject each of them to a painstaking process of microscopic examination and chemical analysis. We might learn a lot from this without coming any closer to understanding the particular behavior that most interests us, especially if the particular property that is most important in producing that behavior happens to be the machine's center of gravity. Once we know that this is the case, the results of our detailed examination suddenly become exponentially more useful; we can calculate with great precision the effects of a slight change here or there; but lacking that critical frame of reference is a major obstacle, and zeroing in on that key is something that might not easily emerge directly from our efforts.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But we don't just take the machine apart and poke around at the components. We do experiments with the machine. We move it around. We press buttons. We try it in the dark. We also poke at large subassemblies. It's like the way we learn about genetics. We don't just stare at chromosomes all day. We try all sorts of crazy experiments with flies and mice and men.

That said, I don't expect neurophysiology to turn into child's play any time soon.

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
I agree completely. We'll need many layers between atoms and consciousness to understand it, just as we need many layers between atoms and software applications to understand them. But I think we can build up these layers in a sort of counter-reductionist (increasonist?) way until we've built up to the origins of consciousness.

~~ Paul
Two questions:
When the software assures you it is alive, is it?

Keeping the problem of consciousness simple -- alive vs not-alive -- how does one know that life was forced to emerge given the correct physical structure, or that life -- at it's whim -- chooses to "enliven" said structure?

There is no doubt that it is easier to force "life" to depart leaving an inert lump.

[Loki]

hammegk,

When the software assures you it is alive, is it?
No, but it may be conscious - but since you insist on defining any difference aaway then I guess you won't find my answer very acceptable?

Keeping the problem of consciousness simple -- alive vs not-alive -- how does one know that life was forced to emerge given the correct physical structure, or that life -- at it's whim -- chooses to "enliven" said structure?
Doesn't it follow from the assumptions?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Loki

No, but it may be conscious - but since you insist on defining any difference aaway then I guess you won't find my answer very acceptable?
No, I don't. Are you willing to assign "consciousness" to non-life?

If you will define the life / non-life boundry, that would help me see your viewpoint.


Doesn't it follow from the assumptions?
No. ;)

[Loki]

hammegk,

No, I don't. Are you willing to assign "consciousness" to non-life?
Yes, at this stage! It seems entirely possible to me that a robot might be conscious, but not "living" in a traditional sense. If and when this does become possible (yes yes - how will we know) I suspect that the meaning of the terms "living" and "conscious" will be redefined somewhat.

If you will define the life / non-life boundry, that would help me see your viewpoint.
If you would define "life" I might be able to help. But since you define "life" as "that which is conscious" and you define "conscious" as "being alive" I'm afraid I don't really have ready answer for you.

(hammegk wrote) : Keeping the problem of consciousness simple -- alive vs not-alive -- how does one know that life was forced to emerge given the correct physical structure, or that life -- at it's whim -- chooses to "enliven" said structure?

(I wrote) : Doesn't it follow from the assumptions?

(hammegk wrote) : No.
Then I think I fail to understand your question. I thought you were asking "If materialism was true, how does one know that life (ie, consciousness) was forced to emerge given the correct physical structure?". Again, my answer would be - it flows from the assumptions. Am I missing the point here?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Loki

Yes, at this stage! It seems entirely possible to me that a robot might be conscious, but not "living" in a traditional sense. If and when this does become possible (yes yes - how will we know) I suspect that the meaning of the terms "living" and "conscious" will be redefined somewhat.
Unfortunately, no-one will ever know if a robot *is* conscious.


If you would define "life" I might be able to help. But since you define "life" as "that which is conscious" and you define "conscious" as "being alive" I'm afraid I don't really have ready answer for you.
Do you have a better definition? And let's not worry overmuch about Terran parochialism of outlook.


Then I think I fail to understand your question. I thought you were asking "If materialism was true, how does one know that life (ie, consciousness) was forced to emerge given the correct physical structure?". Again, my answer would be - it flows from the assumptions. Am I missing the point here?
Umm, you don't get to assume materialism is true.

[Loki]

hammegk,

Unfortunately, no-one will ever know if a robot *is* conscious.
I'm not sure I agree - it probably relies on, yet again, the definiton of conscious. If we reach a point at whihc we beleive that consciousness has been explained in terms of physical processes, and we replicate those physical processes in silicon, I'm prepared to call it "consciousness". A few "ifs" in there, but nothing says to me that this is impossible.

Do you have a better definition? And let's not worry overmuch about Terran parochialism of outlook.

Chemical process...reproduction...reactive to environment...something...something... How am I doing??

Umm, you don't get to assume materialism is true.
Then what's the point of your question? Are you asking what's possible under any set of assumptions???

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Loki

I'm not sure I agree - it probably relies on, yet again, the definiton of conscious. If we reach a point at whihc we beleive that consciousness has been explained in terms of physical processes, and we replicate those physical processes in silicon, I'm prepared to call it "consciousness". A few "ifs" in there, but nothing says to me that this is impossible.
Agreed, but again, we will never know the Truth of the matter.


Chemical process...reproduction...reactive to environment...something...something... How am I doing??
"Reactive to environment", yup. The other criteria may be terran eccentricity.


Then what's the point of your question? Are you asking what's possible under any set of assumptions???
Nope, it's binary. Mind, or matter.