Final proof that Stimpson J Cat is wrong

[Interesting Ian]

Stimpy continually claims that he is a materialist/physicalist, but that neither ontology or metaphysics play any role in his particular version of physicalism. There is a simple disproof of this. In order to be a physicalist you necessarily must believe Consciousness supervenes on the physical. But supervenience itself is a metaphysical claim. :) Therefore to be a physicalist necessarily commits you to making at least one metaphysical claim :)

[Yahweh]

Stimpy is not a physicalist, he's a physicist...

The differences are subtle, yet crucial...

[Sundog]

Whew. Glad THAT'S all settled now. :D

[Yahweh]

If there was ever a sarcasm award on JREF, I think the statement above would definately be a nominee...

[The One called Neo]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Stimpy is not a physicalist, he's a physicist...

The differences are subtle, yet crucial...

They're mutually exclusive??

http://www.emotipad.com/emoticons/Drop%20Gob.gif

[Doubt]

For those of us (or at least me) just following along without the philosophy terms burned into their head:

http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=supervenes


su·per·vene ( P ) Pronunciation Key (spr-vn)
intr.v. su·per·vened, su·per·ven·ing, su·per·venes

1. To come or occur as something extraneous, additional, or unexpected. See Synonyms at follow.
2. To follow immediately after; ensue.
3. Philosophy. To be dependent on a set of facts or properties in such a way that change can occur only after change has occurred in those facts or properties.


Not sure how Ian claims that this is metaphysics, but then I don't now what statement he is refering to. Anybody see a post by Stimpy using this term?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Doubt
For those of us (or at least me) just following along without the philosophy terms burned into their head:

http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=supervenes



Not sure how Ian claims that this is metaphysics, but then I don't now what statement he is refering to. Anybody see a post by Stimpy using this term?

Physicalism holds that the physical logically necessitates consciousness. But this is not an a priori necessity, but rather an a posteriori necessity. That is to say that although consciousness is necessitated, we cannot know it is necessitated without reference to the world. One needs to be acquainted with the world. Therefore consciousness is not a case of logical supervenience, but rather metaphysical supervenience. :D

[abiogenesis]

I am very probably naive about all of this, but does Idealism claim that consciousness came first and the world came after? If that is the case, there is no convincing evidence to support that claim. Arguably, there's no conclusive evidence to deny it either and, since the claim cannot be tested, scientifically, it is irrelevant.

- a b i o g e n e s i s -

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Therefore consciousness is not a case of logical supervenience, but rather metaphysical supervenience. :D
Assuming I understand you entirely and correctly, I actually agree with you for the most part with that statement.

[Doubt]

Again, this is not an area that I know much about. However, I have not seen anyone from the materialist side put forward the position the consciousness ever had to happen. It is a product of the physical universe that exists but not vital to the existence of the universe. Where is the necessity here?

Is Stimpy even aware that this thread exists?

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by abiogenesis
I am very probably naive about all of this, but does Idealism claim that consciousness came first and the world came after?
That would suggest dualism, I dont trust the philosophies of dualism.

If that is the case, there is no convincing evidence to support that claim. Arguably, there's no conclusive evidence to deny it either and, since the claim cannot be tested, scientifically, it is irrelevant.
In all philosophical technicalities, yes, it would be an ambigious arguement. But in a materialistic perspective, you could assume matter came first, then consciousness (try not to take that statement to suggest consciousness exists outside of matter).

[abiogenesis]

But in a materialistic perspective, you could assume matter came first, then consciousness (try not to take that statement to suggest consciousness exists outside of matter).

Thank you, Yahweh. That is also my intuitive undesrtanding of reality.

So why, then, is a philosophy like Idealism given so much credence when it requires faith in the supernatural? I guess I just don't get it.

- a b i o g e n e s i s -

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Doubt
Again, this is not an area that I know much about. However, I have not seen anyone from the materialist side put forward the position the consciousness ever had to happen. It is a product of the physical universe that exists but not vital to the existence of the universe. Where is the necessity here?
Make sure you dont oversimplify the idea of consciousness.

"Had to happen", probably not (if there is a way of determining the "had to happen" perspective). Consciouness is a result of lots and lots of evolution. In evolutionary thinking (and philosophical reasoning), consciouness is a more desireable trait than not being self-aware. I'm not sure how the "had to happen" vs. "was going to happen anyway" scenario would play out.

Is Stimpy even aware that this thread exists?
Probably not at the moment.

[Crossbow]

I have $ 100 (USD) that says Stimpy will win this debate!

Any takers?

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by abiogenesis


Thank you, Yahweh. That is also my intuitive undesrtanding of reality.
Super Cool :cool:! No problem at all.

So why, then, is a philosophy like Idealism given so much credence when it requires faith in the supernatural? I guess I just don't get it.
The reason being is one of the most "annoying" facets of philosophy, the fact that philosophy is the science of understanding using logic alone rather than empirical (meaning repeatable observable study; most of modern medicine is rooted in empirical study) and scientific methods.

As far as "faith" goes, philosophy doesnt really like faith that much. Philosophy is built on a foundation of logical reasoning, faith is not.

Finally to answer the "why is philosophy given so much credence when dealing with faith and the supernatural", the reason being is because if there is no logical reasoning against a belief, then there is no logical basis to deny it (yet another one of those annoying parallelisms of philosophy).

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Crossbow
I have $ 100 (USD) that says Stimpy will win this debate!

Any takers?
Right over here!

[abiogenesis]

Yahweh: The reason being is one of the most "annoying" facets of philosophy, the fact that philosophy is the science of understanding using logic alone rather than empirical (meaning repeatable observable study; most of modern medicine is rooted in empirical study) and scientific methods.

Wouldn't the observance of empiricle evidence be logical?

I am increasingly of the opinion that I am no philosopher...

- a b i o g e n e s i s -

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Crossbow
I have $ 100 (USD) that says Stimpy will win this debate!

Any takers?

There is no debate to be had. My statement is a knockout proof :)

[Interesting Ian]

Besides he has never ever won a debate with me before, therefore by inductive reasoning it seems reasonable to assume he won't win a debate with me on any single future occasion.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Originally posted by Crossbow
I have $ 100 (USD) that says Stimpy will win this debate!

Any takers?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Right over here!

Ah! So you don't agree with me after all. I thought it was strange! ;)

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Ah! So you don't agree with me after all. I thought it was strange! ;)
Agree or not, I believe Stimpy can present his philosophy and logic better than you. Why? Because Stimpy, although a physicist, he is an excellent philosopher (possibly moreso than everyone's favorite deity, moi). When in the face of science, all that is illogical cowers in the corner with fear.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by abiogenesis


Wouldn't the observance of empiricle evidence be logical?

I am increasingly of the opinion that I am no philosopher...

- a b i o g e n e s i s -
"In philosophical language, the term empirical means simply what belongs to or is the product of experience or observation."
--Sir W. Hamilton.

Information that relies on observation isnt necessarily "logical deductive reasoning".

If it helps at all (which, based on my empirical knowledge, it most likely wont), I cant remember why empirical evidence and logical reasoning dont get along so well.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Stimpy continually claims that he is a materialist/physicalist, but that neither ontology or metaphysics play any role in his particular version of physicalism. There is a simple disproof of this. In order to be a physicalist you necessarily must believe Consciousness supervenes on the physical. But supervenience itself is a metaphysical claim. :) Therefore to be a physicalist necessarily commits you to making at least one metaphysical claim :)

I think I see a flaw in your proof:

"In order to be a physicalist you necessarily must believe Consciousness supervenes on the physical."

I have to admit, even Philosopher Yahweh can become confused with all these philosophical expressions, but what exactly do you mean by this.

If you explain in laymens terms, what this means, I will either back up or retract my "I see a flaw in your proof" statement.

If I choose to back up my claim, that means I've found a logical contradiction. Remember, if Philosopher Yahweh finds an irrevocable logical contradiction in your proof, you proof is rendered useless.

[Yahweh]

By the way, who keeps 1-starring all your threads. I gave this thread 5 stars a few minutes ago because I honestly believe this thread is worth 5 stars.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh

Agree or not, I believe Stimpy can present his philosophy and logic better than you. Why? Because Stimpy, although a physicist, he is an excellent philosopher (possibly moreso than everyone's favorite deity, moi). When in the face of science, all that is illogical cowers in the corner with fear.

If you think this, then this says very little for your philosophical ability. But this is more than evident from all you inane contributions I have seen so far.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh
[B]

I think I see a flaw in your proof:

"In order to be a physicalist you necessarily must believe Consciousness supervenes on the physical."

I have to admit, even Philosopher Yahweh can become confused with all these philosophical expressions, but what exactly do you mean by this.



It means what it says. There can be no difference in conscious states without a corresponding change in physical states. The physical logically necessitates the mental, although this is not known a priori.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh
By the way, who keeps 1-starring all your threads. I gave this thread 5 stars a few minutes ago because I honestly believe this thread is worth 5 stars.

A good many people don't like me on here. It is no reflection on how interesting the thread is. They just give 1 star to any thread iniated by me as a matter of principle.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If you think this, then this says very little for your philosophical ability. But this is more than evident from all you inane contributions I have seen so far.
Inane, probably. I often have great difficulty putting my thoughts into intelligible statements.

Edit to add:
Oh yeah, I'm also not very good at saying everything I need to say all at once.

Your use of the word "inane", what is the basis of that. Personally, I believe it is based on the "my beliefs are different from your beliefs" priniciple rather than what in philosophy we call "deductive reasoning" or "logic".

Also, I'd appreciate it if you didnt patronize my (or for the matter any other poster's) intelligence. I believe it tarnishes the quality of your character.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


It means what it says. There can be no difference in conscious states without a corresponding change in physical states. The physical logically necessitates the mental, although this is not known a priori.
Ok, then, I retract my statement. Only for 2 reasons:
1. I'm still cloudy on the meaning
2. Even if I fully understand it, I'm assuming it might be out of my league to defend.

[Doubt]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


There is no debate to be had. My statement is a knockout proof :)
Show me where Ian made this argument that you are attacking. You appear to be stating a case for him. This is step one in building a strawman.

[Crossbow]

Originally posted by Yahweh

Right over here!

Yahweh:

I am a bit confused oh 'one with no face'.

So are you accepting the bet or indicating something else?

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Crossbow


Yahweh:

I am a bit confused oh 'one with no face'.

So are you accepting the bet or indicating something else?
I would be accepting the bet. I bet my philosophical US$100 Stimpson J Cat will win this "debate".

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why isn't this a poll? I vote NO.

I remarked a few days ago at my surprise that Ian's head would fit inside his hat. Now I'm surprised that his head fits inside his hair.

~~ Paul

[Crossbow]

Originally posted by Yahweh

I would be accepting the bet. I bet my philosophical US$100 Stimpson J Cat will win this "debate".

OK my man! Good call!

With your philosophical US$100 combined with my real US$100 we should be able to cover any of the bets that will be made by the vast, vast, vast numbers of Interesting Ian supporters.

So tell me, do the dancers at "select" clubs take philosophical dollars for lap dances?

:p

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Crossbow
So tell me, do the dancers at "select" clubs take philosophical dollars for lap dances?

:p
Only at the philosophical dance bars...

[Crossbow]

Originally posted by Yahweh

Only at the philosophical dance bars...

Bummer man!

I am afraid that I am partial to real lap dances as opposed to philosophical lap dances.

[treborf]

Ian (Neo), master of ambiguity. What a hollow victory it must be, when no-one else can appreciate it. You may want to celebrate with a tender act of self-love. It would seem appropriate.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Stimpy continually claims that he is a materialist/physicalist, but that neither ontology or metaphysics play any role in his particular version of physicalism. There is a simple disproof of this. In order to be a physicalist you necessarily must believe Consciousness supervenes on the physical. But supervenience itself is a metaphysical claim. Therefore to be a physicalist necessarily commits you to making at least one metaphysical claim

I am not a physicalist as you define the term. This is just yet another strawman argument.

So much for that. :rolleyes:

Physicalism holds that the physical logically necessitates consciousness.

I am not sure what you mean by this. I think that consciousness is a physical process in the brain. It is not logically necessitated by the physical. It is a subset of that which is physical. It is a physical process. This statement is no more metaphysical than the statement that computation is a physical process occurring in my computer's CPU.

But this is not an a priori necessity, but rather an a posteriori necessity. That is to say that although consciousness is necessitated, we cannot know it is necessitated without reference to the world. One needs to be acquainted with the world. Therefore consciousness is not a case of logical supervenience, but rather metaphysical supervenience.

I cannot make any sense of this.

There is no debate to be had. My statement is a knockout proof :)

How could there be a debate? All you have done is misrepresent my position, and attack it. I'll give you this, you chew through strawmen like a weed-wacker through dandelions.


Dr. Stupid

PS. Like my new sig? :p

[Sindai]

Drat, I got here too late to take that bet. :p

[slimshady2357]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

PS. Like my new sig? :p [/B]

I loved it when I saw it from Yahweh! Nice one Yahweh!

How do you like mine :D
I don't care who you would have said that one to, it's hilarious :D

Adam

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,
PS. Like my new sig? :p
Yes I do! I feel honored and (for whatever reason) suprisingly refreshed! :)

[Martin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
In order to be a physicalist you necessarily must believe Consciousness supervenes on the physicalPhysicalists hold that all that exists is physical. Therefore the statement "Consciousness supervenes on the physical" is semantically equivalent to "a physical thing is dependent on the set of all physical things in such a way that change in that physical thing can occur only after change has occurred in the set of all physical things". Still sound like a metaphysical claim?

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
But this is not an a priori necessity, but rather an a posteriori necessity. That is to say that although consciousness is necessitated, we cannot know it is necessitated without reference to the world. One needs to be acquainted with the world. Therefore consciousness is not a case of logical supervenience, but rather metaphysical supervenience.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I cannot make any sense of this.
I had similar difficulties. Although I usually dont trust my own judgement, I am completely confident in my ability as a philospher.

Ian, I'd just like to point out, good debate doesnt require that you craft you arguement with "intelligent sounding" words, its more important to have an intelligent arguement. You want to thwart the competition, its not good strategy (or fair) to do so by working cryptic Navaho code mojo. So again, would you mind explaining in laymens terms (I cant stress that enough) whatever you mean by the above quote.

[treborf]

Ian succeeds (if you can call it that) only when he can keep complexity up to an unmanageable level. Ask him to state a claim simply, and he won't do it.

[Tricky]

Originally posted by Crossbow


OK my man! Good call!

With your philosophical US$100 combined with my real US$100 we should be able to cover any of the bets that will be made by the vast, vast, vast numbers of Interesting Ian supporters.
I will bet on Interesting Ian, with one caveat. You have to get Ian to admit he has lost. Takers?

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by treborf
Ian succeeds (if you can call it that) only when he can keep complexity up to an unmanageable level. Ask him to state a claim simply, and he won't do it.
I've always try to humor people in my own way like that. I've had personal experience where I've talked to people that turn every simple situation into a needlessly complex essay. At work, in the library is my favorite book. I like to bring it into my class. The book is about 75 pages long, it is a very long book that uses abstract mathematical principles to prove 1 + 1 = 2. I can do that in about 2 sentences and 15 seconds. I take one apple I have one apple, I put another apple next to it I have two apples. Theres your proof. Occams Razor, I took out all that nasty "mathematical" mumbo jumbo.

[Martin]

Originally posted by Yahweh
I take one apple I have one apple, I put another apple next to it I have two apples. Theres your proofThat doesn't prove 1 + 1 = 2, it assumes it.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Tricky

I will bet on Interesting Ian, with one caveat. You have to get Ian to admit he has lost. Takers?
I'd like to bet against it. Instead, I bet one of 2 other situations play out:
1. If Ian realizes he's lost, he'll just stop responding thereby creating the illusion that he hasnt acknowledged any new posts.
2. If Ian realizes he's lost, he will refuse to swallow his pride and never admit, thereby creating the illusion of a stalemate.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Martinm
That doesn't prove 1 + 1 = 2, it assumes it.
Well then, its not really a mathematical law, more of a theorem. Until we can demonstrate in a situation where one apple next to one other apple isnt 2 apples, the proof is based on explicit assumptions.

[Martin]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Well then, its not really a mathematical law, more of a theorem. Until we can demonstrate in a situation where one apple next to one other apple isnt 2 apples, the proof is based on explicit assumptionsCorrect. 1 + 1 = 2 follows directly from Peano's axioms.

[treborf]

Originally posted by Yahweh

At work, in the library is my favorite book. I like to bring it into my class. The book is about 75 pages long, it is a very long book that uses abstract mathematical principles to prove 1 + 1 = 2. I can do that in about 2 sentences and 15 seconds. I take one apple I have one apple, I put another apple next to it I have two apples. Theres your proof. Occams Razor, I took out all that nasty "mathematical" mumbo jumbo.
I love it. In writing, succinctness = impact.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by treborf

I love it. In writing, succinctness = impact.
I've been working on becoming one of the most quotable members on these boards... so many of the things I say are just signatures waiting to happen...

[Sindai]

It's so true!

[NoZed Avenger]

Thank Ed this is the final proof. I'm not sure I could wade through another thread like this one.

NA

[ceptimus]

If any debater calls their opponent a c*nt, f*ckwit, concrete block. etc., has (s)he lost the debate?

[edited for grammar]

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Martinm
Physicalists hold that all that exists is physical. Therefore the statement "Consciousness supervenes on the physical" is semantically equivalent to "a physical thing is dependent on the set of all physical things in such a way that change in that physical thing can occur only after change has occurred in the set of all physical things". Still sound like a metaphysical claim?
Depends.

Would you prefer "Life supervenes on non-life"?

Or wouldn't that be a correct statement for a physicalist/naturalist?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Treborf said:Ian succeeds (if you can call it that) only when he can keep complexity up to an unmanageable level.
Ooh, more sig material!

Ceptimus said:If any debater calls their opponent a c*nt, f*ckwit, concrete block. etc., have they lose the debate?
No, unfortunately. We have to get him to call us Nazis.

Now, concerning supervene. I cannot get my mind around this word. Here is the definition:

"to follow or result as an additional, adventitious, or unlooked-for development"

So shouldn't the statement be "consciousness supervenes from the physical"?

~~ Paul

[jj]

Neat, Ian, you ran and hid in this thread.

You're still trying to enforce your definitions on everyone else, I see.

Where do you get the authority to proceed ex-Cathedra? Please do tell us all.

[jj]

Originally posted by treborf

I love it. In writing, succinctness = impact.

Yes, but can he play the peano? ;)

[jj]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,

I cannot make any sense of this.

It's not you, Stimpy.


How could there be a debate? All you have done is misrepresent my position, and attack it. I'll give you this, you chew through strawmen like a weed-wacker through dandelions.


Dr. Stupid

PS. Like my new sig? :p

I think if we keep this up the world will have a straw-man shortage, Ian will have used them all up.

[Crossbow]

Now let's see that in an instant replay:

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Stimpy continually claims that he is a materialist/physicalist, but that neither ontology or metaphysics play any role in his particular version of physicalism. There is a simple disproof of this. In order to be a physicalist you necessarily must believe Consciousness supervenes on the physical. But supervenience itself is a metaphysical claim. :) Therefore to be a physicalist necessarily commits you to making at least one metaphysical claim :)

You have been soundly slammed Ian; do you wish to retort?

By the way, I noticed that no one, not even you, took up my proposed bet.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Crossbow
By the way, I noticed that no one, not even you, took up my proposed bet.
*Waves hands in the air frantically*

Ok, is this whole thing settled yet or is there a few more rounds left in the match...

[Darat]

Originally posted by Tricky

I will bet on Interesting Ian, with one caveat. You have to get Ian to admit he has lost. Takers?

Hey it's not just death and taxes that are certainties you know... ;)

[Gregor]

Hey, it's no fair people posting items INTENDING them to be sig material. You have to earn your sig. You have to debate someone until rather than admit they're wrong, they pull out the crazy stick.

See mine . . .

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Crossbow
Now let's see that in an instant replay:



You have been soundly slammed Ian; do you wish to retort?

By the way, I noticed that no one, not even you, took up my proposed bet.

If you have discovered any errors in my proof then I'd be delighted to hear them. As a physicalist Stimpy necessarily believes consciousness supervenes on the physical. But this supervience must be of metaphysical necessity rather than logical necessity. Okie dokie?? Now please state my errors.

[Crossbow]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If you have discovered any errors in my proof then I'd be delighted to hear them. As a physicalist Stimpy necessarily believes consciousness supervenes on the physical. But this supervience must be of metaphysical necessity rather than logical necessity. Okie dokie?? Now please state my errors.

Er, Stimpy did issue a reply to your proof. Have you read it?

And if so, do you have any responses?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Crossbow


Er, Stimpy did issue a reply to your proof. Have you read it?

And if so, do you have any responses?

He issued a reply but hasn't said anything. Anyway, I was asking you the question.

[Crossbow]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


He issued a reply but hasn't said anything. Anyway, I was asking you the question.

You were the one who claimed such a vast intellect,
and you were the one who wanted a debate with Stimpy,
and now that you are the one who has to respond to his comments.

Let us focus on one issue at a time for dealing with me will side-track the debate you requested.

[Gregor]

Go Crossbow, go. You're well on your way to a new sig.

[atarian]

:rolleyes:

Ian.

Your "proof" rests on the premise that Stimp is a physicalist, whatever that is.

Stimp's response: I am not a physicalist.

How in the world is that not saying anything?
One of the best ways to refute a proof is to refute it's premises.
What's your evidence that he is a physicalist?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stimpy continually claims that he is a materialist/physicalist, but that neither ontology or metaphysics play any role in his particular version of physicalism. There is a simple disproof of this. In order to be a physicalist you necessarily must believe Consciousness supervenes on the physical. But supervenience itself is a metaphysical claim. Therefore to be a physicalist necessarily commits you to making at least one metaphysical claim
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I am not a physicalist as you define the term. This is just yet another strawman argument.



Your so called "physicalism" fails to distinguish itself from naturalism. Are you going to admit this finally??? If not then explain where I have made the error in the above paragraph? Do you claim that to be a physicalist, consciousness need not supervene on the physical??


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Physicalism holds that the physical logically necessitates consciousness.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I am not sure what you mean by this.


That in all logically possible worlds appropriate conscious states supervene on appropriate physical states.




I think that consciousness is a physical process in the brain.



But presumably one does not hold that conscious states and their correlated physical states are synonymous.


It is not logically necessitated by the physical.

It is a subset of that which is physical. It is a physical process.



The point is that there are conscious states and physical states and these are not synonymous. Even identity theorists say that consciousness supervenes on the physical.



This statement is no more metaphysical than the statement that computation is a physical process occurring in my computer's CPU.


Is the computation a logical necessity?



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
But this is not an a priori necessity, but rather an a posteriori necessity. That is to say that although consciousness is necessitated, we cannot know it is necessitated without reference to the world. One needs to be acquainted with the world. Therefore consciousness is not a case of logical supervenience, but rather metaphysical supervenience.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I cannot make any sense of this.



An a priori logical necessity? You know! Like all unmarried men are bachelors? But doesn't say anything about the world does it?



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is no debate to be had. My statement is a knockout proof
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



How could there be a debate? All you have done is misrepresent my position, and attack it. I'll give you this, you chew through strawmen like a weed-wacker through dandelions.


So how have I misrepresented your position? If you are merely a naturalist, then fine. But as a physicalist you are commited to asserting consciousness supervenes on the physical. Are you denying you believe this?

Please enlighten all of us.

Also tell me why any non-solipsistic position on the nature of reality avoids metaphysical conclusions.

Thanks.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Crossbow


You were the one who claimed such a vast intellect,
and you were the one who wanted a debate with Stimpy,
and now that you are the one who has to respond to his comments.

Let us focus on one issue at a time for dealing with me will side-track the debate you requested.

You have declared I have been soundly slammed. Do you have any evidence whatsoever for this assertion?? Come now. You said it. Back up your assertions.

[Yahweh]

consciousness supervenes on the physical
You continually make that reference. Please, using English words we can all understand, define what that means (by define, I mean dont use the word supervene).

I'm not a dumb philosopher, I have no idea what the hell you are talking about.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Crossbow


You were the one who claimed such a vast intellect,


Please tell me where I have ever claimed that I have a vast intellect where it was not said in jest.

Thanks.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by atarian
:rolleyes:

Ian.

Your "proof" rests on the premise that Stimp is a physicalist, whatever that is.

Stimp's response: I am not a physicalist.

How in the world is that not saying anything?
One of the best ways to refute a proof is to refute it's premises.
What's your evidence that he is a physicalist?

If he concedes he's not a physicalist but merely a naturalist, then I am happy and we can drop this discussion. I want him to admit it though.

[atarian]

Did he ever claim to be a physicalist?

If he didn't, why is it on his shoulders to "concede" anything?

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by atarian
Did he ever claim to be a physicalist?
Stimp's response: I am not a physicalist.
It looks like he did everything but claim he was a physicalist...

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh


It looks like he did everything but claim he was a physicalist...

{Shrugs} Obviously if that is so, then this discussion is at an end. I suspect that statement might have been taken out of context though.

[Interesting Ian]

Just to add that if he is merely a naturalist, I don't think this involves any metaphysical or ontological assumptions. Merely epistemological ones.

I mean even solipsism is compatible with naturalism isn't it?

[Interesting Ian]

Actually he is definitely a physicalist. He has stated in this very thread:


(Consciousness) is a subset of that which is physical. It is a physical process.



That is a tenet of physicalism. Naturalism merely declares that consciousness is susceptible to scientific explanation (ie it can be scientifically explained). Naturalism does not take a ontological or metaphysical stance on anything, where as explicitly stating that consciousness is a physical process does.

And of course this gives even further proof that his position that his physicalism does not involve any metaphysics is a lie, since stating that consciousness is one and the very same thing as a physical process is a very powerful metaphysical stance! :eek:

Give up the argument Stimp. You have comprehensively lost the debate. Admit you're merely a naturalist and not a physicalist and let it go.

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Just to add that if he is merely a naturalist, I don't think this involves any metaphysical or ontological assumptions. Merely epistemological ones.

I mean even solipsism is compatible with naturalism isn't it?
Yes, naturalism is based on epistemological reasoning.

I dont believe solipsism (the theory that the only thing that can truely be known to exist is "self") is entirely compatible with naturalism (all phenomena can be explained by natural phenomena).

I base that assumption on the premise of naturalism, which is primarily consisted of materialistic ideals.

If the only thing known to exist is self, then the idea that everything can be explained by natural phenomena becomes ambigious (as in, cannot be ever really known which conflicts with naturalisms empistemological reasoning).

Isnt philosophy fun, kids! :)

[Martin]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
And of course this gives even further proof that his position that his physicalism does not involve any metaphysics is a lie, since stating that consciousness is one and the very same thing as a physical process is a very powerful metaphysical stance!Is it? IIRC, physical is defined as 'that which is in principle observable, directly or indirectly'. Which would make it an epistemological claim, not a metaphysical one. No?

[Crossbow]

Originally posted by Gregor
Go Crossbow, go. You're well on your way to a new sig.

Thanks man!

:cool:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh

Yes, naturalism is based on epistemological reasoning.

I dont believe solipsism (the theory that the only thing that can truely be known to exist is "self") is entirely compatible with naturalism (all phenomena can be explained by natural phenomena).



Naturalism doesn't involve any metaphysical presuppositions, right? But a denial of solipsism does, right? So it is unclear to me why solipsism is incompatible with naturalism.



I base that assumption on the premise of naturalism, which is primarily consisted of materialistic ideals.



I disagree. But defend yourself here. What materialist ideals precisely?



If the only thing known to exist is self, then the idea that everything can be explained by natural phenomena becomes ambigious (as in, cannot be ever really known which conflicts with naturalisms empistemological reasoning).



I don't think naturalism implies epistemological certainty.



Isnt philosophy fun, kids! :)

Indeed, I love baffling people with long words.

Only kidding! ;)

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Naturalism does not take a ontological or metaphysical stance on anything, where as explicitly stating that consciousness is a physical process does.
I dont reckon so...

Dualism: mind and matter exist but are seperate from each other (or something like that... dont feel like consulting the dictionary right now)

Dualism is a metaphysical belief.

I dont see how Naturalisms non-ontological and non-metaphysical ideals about consciousness being explained by matter and physical phenomena (meaning non-dualistic) is in any way metaphysical.

If what I say is true (which it is by logical reasoning), your philosophy is flawed.

And of course this gives even further proof that his position that his physicalism does not involve any metaphysics is a lie, since stating that consciousness is one and the very same thing as a physical process is a very powerful metaphysical stance! :eek:
I dont know what you base that on...

[b]Give up the argument Stimp. You have comprehensively lost the debate. Admit you're merely a naturalist and not a physicalist and let it go.
Not with philosopher Yahweh to meddle with your slightly ill-founded philosophical beliefs...

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Martinm
Is it? IIRC, physical is defined as 'that which is in principle observable, directly or indirectly'.



A strange definition. I am aware however that Stimpy defines it thus.


Which would make it an epistemological claim, not a metaphysical one. No? [/B]

Yes I think so. But this is kind of a cheat because then by appropriately defining the word "physical" in this way, you can then define yourself as a "physicalist".

But then such a "physicalism" in reality is failing to distinguish itself from naturalism. Agreed?

I really do think it is possible to reach an agreement here if Stimpy would just let his pride go and admit that his "physicalism" equates to naturalism.

Physicalism ,as normally understood, holds that the physical is primary with phenomenological consciousness being logically derived (so therefore also a physical thing).

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh
I dont see how Naturalisms non-ontological and non-metaphysical ideals about consciousness being explained by matter and physical phenomena (meaning non-dualistic) is in any way metaphysical.

If what I say is true (which it is by logical reasoning), your philosophy is flawed.



Only if I have in fact asserted that naturalism is in anyway metaphysical. Since I have explicitly stated otherwise, it does not follow my reasoning is flawed.

[Yahweh]

Before I answer, I have say let you know that I am dedicating for more of my time than I really should be... while I'm on this computer debating philosophy on JREF, the computer behind me has a computer game running (Dark Orbit) and I havent killed anything in a while...

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I base that assumption on the premise of naturalism, which is primarily consisted of materialistic ideals.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I disagree. But defend yourself here. What materialist ideals precisely?
Well, I'm going to have to define both terms using my friend dictionary.com (why would I need a website, because at the moment I'm mentally exhausted, too much philosophy, too many aliens to kill on the other computer... at least this is a good jumpstart before I officially have to go back to work):

Naturalism
The system of thought holding that all phenomena can be explained in terms of natural causes and laws.

Materialism
The theory that physical matter is the only reality and that everything, including thought, feeling, mind, and will, can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena.

Therefore in the 2 definitions, you can see how Naturalism is very closely related to materialism.

Materialism goes slightly further by saying physical matter is the only reality. Of course, Naturalism is not based on metaphysical ideals (you can tell by the way is says all phenomena are explained in terms of natural causes and laws). So, by logical reasoning, you can make the explicit assumption that Naturalism is held upright by primarily materialistic ideals.

I need a nap... sleep is for the weak... I'm not weak... no naps... for a while...

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh


Not with philosopher Yahweh to meddle with your slightly ill-founded philosophical beliefs... [/B]

But my beliefs have not been addressed in this thread! :confused:

[Yahweh]

Have you noticed how extremely stubborn I am...

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Only if I have in fact asserted that naturalism is in anyway metaphysical. Since I have explicitly stated otherwise, it does not follow my reasoning is flawed.

You stated this:
I mean even solipsism is compatible with naturalism isn't it?"
Solipsism:
The theory or view that the self is the only reality.

I believe solipsism is a metaphysical claim (its related to immaterialistic and dualistic principles).

Solipsism (metaphysical) and naturalism (non-metaphysical) are non-compatible. By equating that both beliefs are infact compatible with one another, that would pose a logical flaw (I'm not entirely sure its enough to call a logical contradiction...).

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh


I believe solipsism is a metaphysical claim (its related to immaterialistic and dualistic principles).




This is where we disagree since I don't agree it is. Oh well, progress is being made! :D

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


This is where we disagree since I don't agree it is. Oh well, progress is being made! :D
Thank you Ian so much for being more "sensible" (for lack of better words because I'm exhauste to think right now) than some of the other debates I've seen in recent times :), but I am simply giving into Cleopatra's advice... I'm going to bed...

I'll continue this when I wake up. I dont know when that will be...

[treborf]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


But my beliefs have not been addressed in this thread! :confused:
Because you refuse to state them.

Strip out the useless jargon and you basically have one side (Stimpson, arguing for the mainstream) saying that consciousness is a function of the brain. Ian (arguing against the mainstream) has not given any alternative explanation for consciousness. In my view, Stimpson is the winner until Ian proposes a more convincing alternative.

[Crossbow]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Please tell me where I have ever claimed that I have a vast intellect where it was not said in jest.

Thanks.

OK then, here you go with some fine examples of how you berate others and elevate yourself:

The below were posted by Interesting Ian in the "When I grow up, I wanna be Stimpson J. Cat. (Appreciation thread)"

The guy's a complete moron who doesn't understand the most simple of reasoning. Seems that his latest gambit is to call himself a naturalist rather than a materialist. As if naturalism is devoid of ontological presuppositions! :rolleyes:
>
If you think that you clearly either don't read the debates, or you don't understand them.
>
But he sure as hell could brush up on his philosophy. What I'm in awe off is that even after all this time where his errors have been pointed out by various people, he still fails to understand that materialism (however so it could be reasonably defined) is unintelligible.
>
Yeah I don't belong to the Stimpy arselicking club, therefore I shouldn't post on this thread. OK, don't worry, I won't bother anymore.
>
I just wonder how many of you morons have actually read and understood the debates Stimpy has been having with various other people. His contributions are not impressive!
>
Does it indeed. Anyway, I was drunk last night which excuses me.
>
Apart from the fact that I don't like materialists? Nothing whatsoever so far as I am aware. Materialists are responsible for a great deal of misery in the world.
>
Where does he use either logic or rationality properly? He has never done so with me. I have soundly shown that his ideas on the nature of reality are simply incoherent. But he just keeps making the same mistakes and doesn't appear to understand my arguments. Anyone who thinks he is intelligent, either hasn't actually read the debates he's been in, or has not understood those debates.

The fact that so many people on this board have such a high regard for his intellect just demonstrates how stupid people are on here.

I should stress that liking him as a person and admiring him for his intellect are 2 quite different things.

I certainly don't dislike him, although I get extremely unhappy with his intellectual dishonesty in failing to acknowledge when he's been soundly thrashed in an argument. I would never do this.
>
Is there anyone out there, who is claiming that Stimpy is thrashing me with his arguments, actually read our debates at all? I simply can't believe they can have done because it doesn't seem possible to come to the conclusion that Stimpy gets the better of me in the majority of our debates. He just simply constantly shifts his position all the time, basically conceding the argument to me, but perhaps seeming to the casual onlooker, who is not actually reading the debates, that Stimpy is getting the better off me.

Could I please request that unless people can be bothered to actually read the debates, and make some attempt to understand them, not to come to come to any judgements.

It doesn't seem you brights are too bright :rolleyes:
>
Jesus wept! Does your stupidity know of any limits?? I would be absolutely delighted if ever anyone on this board could actually engage me in any arguments. But it ain't going to happen.

Good, rudeness is seemingly the only thing that people understand around here, so might as well make good use of it.
>
Oh f*ck off you compete and total w*nk. I really can't be ars*d to talk to concrete blocks such as your good self and Stimpy anymore.

Go get yourself a f*cking clue d*ckhead.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh

Thank you Ian so much for being more "sensible" (for lack of better words because I'm exhauste to think right now) than some of the other debates I've seen in recent times :), but I am simply giving into Cleopatra's advice... I'm going to bed...

I'll continue this when I wake up. I dont know when that will be...

Going to bed before 4pm? Ha! I won't be going to bed for another 12 hours! :) Plenty of drinking time.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Crossbow


OK then, here you go with some fine examples of how you berate others and elevate yourself:



The guy's a complete moron who doesn't understand the most simple of reasoning. Seems that his latest gambit is to call himself a naturalist rather than a materialist. As if naturalism is devoid of ontological presuppositions!



Er . .sorry, I was drunk when I said that. Not thinking straight. I was wrong. It's more of a methodological rule. Anyway, Stimpy has quite clearly stated he is a materialist/physicalist as well as a naturalist (for any onlookers that might not know, physicalism and materialism are synonymous. Not withstanding Yahweh's denials)!

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by treborf

Because you refuse to state them.



Well . .er . . I haven't stated them no. This is why my beliefs haven't been discussed! :confused:



Strip out the useless jargon and you basically have one side (Stimpson, arguing for the mainstream) saying that consciousness is a function of the brain. Ian (arguing against the mainstream) has not given any alternative explanation for consciousness. In my view, Stimpson is the winner until Ian proposes a more convincing alternative. [/B]

My beliefs are pretty close to the 17th century philosopher Bishop Berkeley. There's a good exposition of this philosophy at this (http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~ursa/philos/berkeley.htm) web site.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I am not a physicalist as you define the term. This is just yet another strawman argument.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Your so called "physicalism" fails to distinguish itself from naturalism. Are you going to admit this finally???

naturalism does not imply that the scientific method will work. Naturalism only implies that a natural explanation exist, not that it is possible to determine the explanation through our observations. Naturalism is my first axiom, and the observability axiom is the second. That is the distinction from naturalism.

Do you claim that to be a physicalist, consciousness need not supervene on the physical??

I still don't understand what you mean by supervene.

I am not sure what you mean by this.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That in all logically possible worlds appropriate conscious states supervene on appropriate physical states.

I don't know what supervene means. Explain.

I think that consciousness is a physical process in the brain.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

But presumably one does not hold that conscious states and their correlated physical states are synonymous.

That's what I just said. Conscious states are physical states. There are no "correlated" physical states. The physical states are the conscious states. I do not think it is possible for me to be any more clear about this.

It is not logically necessitated by the physical.

It is a subset of that which is physical. It is a physical process.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The point is that there are conscious states and physical states and these are not synonymous. Even identity theorists say that consciousness supervenes on the physical.

Well, that is not what I say. I say that conscious states are a type of physical state.

This statement is no more metaphysical than the statement that computation is a physical process occurring in my computer's CPU.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Is the computation a logical necessity?

The computation is not a logically necessary product of the process. The computation is the process. I don't know whether this qualifies as supervenience or not, but it is clearly not metaphysical.

But this is not an a priori necessity, but rather an a posteriori necessity. That is to say that although consciousness is necessitated, we cannot know it is necessitated without reference to the world. One needs to be acquainted with the world. Therefore consciousness is not a case of logical supervenience, but rather metaphysical supervenience.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I cannot make any sense of this.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

An a priori logical necessity? You know! Like all unmarried men are bachelors? But doesn't say anything about the world does it?

Then I would say that it is an a-priori necessity. In principle, the existence of the phenomena we think of as consciousness (thought, awareness, etc...) can be logically derived from the physical brain activity, because these phenomena are brain processes.

The claim that it is a post-priori necessity would be to claim that it is something distinct from the brain process, which is somehow logically correlated with it. That is not what I am claiming.

How could there be a debate? All you have done is misrepresent my position, and attack it. I'll give you this, you chew through strawmen like a weed-wacker through dandelions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

So how have I misrepresented your position? If you are merely a naturalist, then fine. But as a physicalist you are commited to asserting consciousness supervenes on the physical. Are you denying you believe this?

Yes, I guess I am.

Also tell me why any non-solipsistic position on the nature of reality avoids metaphysical conclusions.

The rejection of solipsism is a logically necessary component of the naturalism axiom. Since my framework constitutes a falsifiable hypothesis, my rejection of solipsism is no more metaphysical than my acceptance of any scientific theory for which there is substantial supporting evidence.

I mean even solipsism is compatible with naturalism isn't it?

No, it isn't. Not if by solipsism you mean the assumption that reality is all a figment of your own imagination. If this is the case, then naturalism doesn't work, because our experiences are often self-contradictory. The only way to reconcile this with naturalism is to assume that our experiences are a fallible representation of something else, which functions according to natural laws. In other words, an external world of some sort.

And this is not metaphysical because I do not make any assumptions about this external world which are not empirically verifiable through science.

Actually he is definitely a physicalist. He has stated in this very thread:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Consciousness) is a subset of that which is physical. It is a physical process.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That is a tenet of physicalism. Naturalism merely declares that consciousness is susceptible to scientific explanation (ie it can be scientifically explained). Naturalism does not take a ontological or metaphysical stance on anything, where as explicitly stating that consciousness is a physical process does.

This is a blatant misrepresentation of my position on several counts.

1) Just because physicalism (as you define it) also makes the claim that consciousness is physical, does not mean that my position is equivalent to it. Especially since your idea of physicalism defines the word "physical" to refer to an ontological substance, and mine does not.

2) Naturalism claims that consciousness has a natural explanation, but does not claim that this explanation can be determined through observations, as I do.

3) Using my definition of physical, stating that consciousness is physical means exactly the same thing as saying that it can be explained scientifically.

And of course this gives even further proof that his position that his physicalism does not involve any metaphysics is a lie, since stating that consciousness is one and the very same thing as a physical process is a very powerful metaphysical stance!

Only if you define "physical" metaphysically, which I have not done!

Give up the argument Stimp. You have comprehensively lost the debate. Admit you're merely a naturalist and not a physicalist and let it go.

I have a better idea. Why don't you, for once, try to actually address my position, rather than attacking a poor defenseless strawman?

Naturalism doesn't involve any metaphysical presuppositions, right? But a denial of solipsism does, right? So it is unclear to me why solipsism is incompatible with naturalism.

Solipsism makes both metaphysical and epistemological presumptions, as do many other metaphysical worldviews (like yours, for example).

Is it? IIRC, physical is defined as 'that which is in principle observable, directly or indirectly'.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A strange definition. I am aware however that Stimpy defines it thus.

Then you admit that your claim that when I said consciousness is physical, I was making a metaphysical claim, was a deliberate misrepresentation?

But then such a "physicalism" in reality is failing to distinguish itself from naturalism. Agreed?

I really do think it is possible to reach an agreement here if Stimpy would just let his pride go and admit that his "physicalism" equates to naturalism.

I find it rather odd that you have twisted this entire thing around to a question of whether or not my position is naturalism. As I recall, the original point of debate, from which all of this discussion stemmed, was the question of whether consciousness could be described scientifically. When I said that it could, and explained why (without making any references to materialism or physicalism), you immediately claimed that I was presupposing the correctness of ontological materialism.

Do you now acknowledge that it is possible to claim that consciousness can be described scientifically without being an ontological materialist, and that such a position is not self-contradictory?

I have already clearly stated that I am not a materialist or physicalist as you define the term. I am also quite happy to acknowledge that I am a naturalist, and that my position is nothing more than naturalism plus the assumption that the natural laws can be determined through observation. In fact, if you clearly state that this is what you mean by naturalism, I will even go so far as to state that my position is simply naturalism.

Are you prepared to acknowledge that the claim that consciousness can be described scientifically does not require a presumption of metaphysical materialism? Are you willing to acknowledge that the claim that consciousness is a brain process does not have to be a metaphysical assumption, and that it can instead be a scientific theory?


Dr. Stupid

[jj]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


There is no debate to be had. My statement is a knockout proof :)

No, your arrogant lack of self-awareness is what's knockout-proof, Ian.

Even Nukie Brown couldn't knock you out.

[jj]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If you think this, then this says very little for your philosophical ability. But this is more than evident from all you inane contributions I have seen so far.

Rephrased "everyone who disagrees with my brilliant logic and though, logic and thought that approximately nobody else in the known universe accepts or agrees with, is dumb".

Ian, you really ought to look at the "checklist for kookery" again.

[Crossbow]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


Er . .sorry, I was drunk when I said that. Not thinking straight. I was wrong. It's more of a methodological rule. Anyway, Stimpy has quite clearly stated he is a materialist/physicalist as well as a naturalist (for any onlookers that might not know, physicalism and materialism are synonymous. Not withstanding Yahweh's denials)!

Well thanks for the apology and I will remind you of it at your next tirade.

[Interesting Ian]

I wish you didn't make such long posts. I'll just address these 2 points for now.


I have already clearly stated that I am not a materialist or physicalist as you define the term. I am also quite happy to acknowledge that I am a naturalist, and that my position is nothing more than naturalism plus the assumption that the natural laws can be determined through observation. In fact, if you clearly state that this is what you mean by naturalism, I will even go so far as to state that my position is simply naturalism.


Apart from a disagreement about the word "naturalism" (as I think it does include the assumption that natural laws can be ascertained through observation) then this is entirely satisfactory to me.



Are you prepared to acknowledge that the claim that consciousness can be described scientifically does not require a presumption of metaphysical materialism?



This is simply the naturalist position. Of course I don't believe in naturalism, but that's irrelevant in the context of this discussion.



Are you willing to acknowledge that the claim that consciousness is a brain process does not have to be a metaphysical assumption, and that it can instead be a scientific theory?



No I am not willing here. I think you should drop this and simply maintain consciousness is scientifically explicable. You see you're implicitly conveying the idea that the brain process is primary. That is when you say consciousness is a brain process you imply that consciousness is reducible to a brain process, rather than a brian process is reducible to consciousness.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Are you willing to acknowledge that the claim that consciousness is a brain process does not have to be a metaphysical assumption, and that it can instead be a scientific theory?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No I am not willing here. I think you should drop this and simply maintain consciousness is scientifically explicable.

Why, if I am permitted to claim that consciousness can be explained scientifically, am I not permitted to present a specific scientific theory for it? It would seem to me that the only way you could reasonably claim that this theory is not an acceptable one, would be for you to scientifically falsify it.

You see you're implicitly conveying the idea that the brain process is primary. That is when you say consciousness is a brain process you imply that consciousness is reducible to a brain process, rather than a brian process is reducible to consciousness.

Why is that not permissible? For the brain process to be reducible to consciousness, everything would have to be reducible to consciousness. The far more parsimonious theory is that consciousness is just a particular class of brain processes. The only way this could be construed as a metaphysical claim is if you have already assumed metaphysical characteristics for consciousness. But if this is the case, then you cannot even argue that consciousness can be scientifically explained.

Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

So the argument goes on. :( :mad: But I haven't got any more time to further respond to you today Stimp.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Anyone that (thinks he) knows the difference between materialism, physicalism, and naturalism has read way too much philosophy.

Unfortunately, I'm almost there.

~~ Paul

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Anyone that (thinks he) knows the difference between materialism, physicalism, and naturalism has read way too much philosophy.

Unfortunately, I'm almost there.

~~ Paul
Or perhaps they needed to learn about all that (and more) to get the post baccalaureate or higher degree so they could be qualified to teach the stuff to teenagers...

[Ossai]

Interesting Ian
stating that consciousness is one and the very same thing as a physical process is a very powerful metaphysical stance! No metaphysics necessary. I’ve repeatedly ask for clarification on your dualist stance and you have continually avoided it. Exactly where is the supernatural necessary for consciousness?

Ossai

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Yahweh

Well, I'm going to have to define both terms using my friend dictionary.com

Naturalism
The system of thought holding that all phenomena can be explained in terms of natural causes and laws.

Materialism
The theory that physical matter is the only reality and that everything, including thought, feeling, mind, and will, can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena.

Therefore in the 2 definitions, you can see how Naturalism is very closely related to materialism.



Nope I don't see this at all! One might as well say the following is closely related to naturalism:

"The theory that minds are the only reality and that everything, including what we refer to as physical reality and various mind states, can be explained wholly in terms of mind and its attributes such as thought, feeling and Will".



Materialism goes slightly further by saying physical matter is the only reality. Of course, Naturalism is not based on metaphysical ideals (you can tell by the way is says all phenomena are explained in terms of natural causes and laws). So, by logical reasoning, you can make the explicit assumption that Naturalism is held upright by primarily materialistic ideals.



So why not primarily idealist ideals as well?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Anyone that (thinks he) knows the difference between materialism, physicalism, and naturalism has read way too much philosophy.
IMO, naturalism denies any possibility of dualism, but is silent as to which is the correct remaining choice -- idealism or non-idealism.


Unfortunately, I'm almost there.

~~ Paul

Nudge, nudge.... Did that get you closer, or farther away? :D

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:IMO, naturalism denies any possibility of dualism, but is silent as to which is the correct remaining choice -- idealism or non-idealism.
Define them carefully and I'll bet they are equivalent.

~~ Paul

[DialecticMaterialist]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If you have discovered any errors in my proof then I'd be delighted to hear them. As a physicalist Stimpy necessarily believes consciousness supervenes on the physical. But this supervience must be of metaphysical necessity rather than logical necessity. Okie dokie?? Now please state my errors.

Begging the question in that you assume consciousness is metaphysical from the onset.


It could simply be a matter of physical necessity.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist


Begging the question in that you assume consciousness is metaphysical from the onset.


It could simply be a matter of physical necessity.

The statement that consciousness might be metaphysical makes no sense. I assume you mean might be non-physical?

Anyway, in this thread I have not addressed the hypothesis that consciousness might be non-physical. I have assumed it is physical throughout.

Edited to add: No not physical, I mean I assumed it can be explained by naturalistic causes! LOL And I berate Stimpy from conflating physicalism with naturalism :rolleyes:

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Define them carefully and I'll bet they are equivalent.
~~ Paul

In the sense that either fully supports the scientific method, and neither can be falsified by same, I'd agree. What differs will be one's mindset regarding "truth" "faith" & "absolute certainty".

In another sense, you can state the mind-body problem "doesn't exist"; Stimpy gave that answer once. So far as I see, this just opens the door to added complexity -- what exists that is mind and body?

The choice one makes (notice that word, choice) offers fewer logical conundrums when "mind" is considered as primary.
Free-will, HPC, & the life/non-life barrier in particular most logically inply "mind", imo (as of course my fact that *I* think ... :D ).

[Pyrrho]

If Stimpy is wrong, I don't wanna be right...

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:The choice one makes (notice that word, choice) offers fewer logical conundrums when "mind" is considered as primary.
I don't think it offers fewer logical conundrums, because free will, HPC, and life/nonlife have no logical problems associated with them. That is, unless you insist on some. However, I know one thing that considering mind primary does do: completely ignore the interesting questions.

See sig.

~~ Paul

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
See sig.
Nice sig!

[Interesting Ian]

Ugggh God! Been ill since Friday night :( Been having diarrhoea about once every 30 mins yesterday, but much less frequent today. So starting to feel slightly better. :)

Anyway, a good simile illustrating what supervience actually means can be found here (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/)



The idea of supervenience might be introduced via an example due to David Lewis of a dot-matrix picture:

A dot-matrix picture has global properties -- it is symmetrical, it is cluttered, and whatnot -- and yet all there is to the picture is dots and non-dots at each point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing but patterns in the dots. They supervene: no two pictures could differ in their global properties without differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there isn't a dot (1986, p. 14).
Lewis's example gives us one way to introduce the basic of idea of physicalism. The basic idea is that the physical features of the world are like the dots in the picture, and the psychological or biological or social features of the world are like the global properties of the picture.



So likewise conscious states, although reducible to physical processes in the brain, are nevertheless identical to such processes. But note this does not mean consciousness and physical states of the brain are synonymous! The dots and the patterns they comprise are not synonymous with the global properties ie the actual picture, although they are identical. Likewise for consciousness. No-one would suggest otherwise; oh . . .apart from Stimpy LOL

So just as the dots in the dot-matrix picure enjoy a prime reality with the picture supervening on these dots, so the physical processes of the world have the prime reality with consciousness supervening on certain special physical states; namely those found in the brain. But saying that physical processes are primary with consciousness being derived from this primary reality is a metaphysical position. This contradicts Stimpys original position that he is a physicalist who rejects metaphysics in his interpretation of reality.

Edited to add:

Stimpy,

Ooops, just remembered you said you don't subscribe to supervenience. Is that still true now I've given an explanation of what it means?

[Interesting Ian]

Just a quick point about solipsism and Yahweh's and Stimpy's denial that it is a metaphysical position.

Now to hold a metaphysical or ontological position is to hold that some aspect of reality exists beyond any epistemological criteria. But this is precisely what any non-solipsistic position does, and which solipsism doesn't!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:Now to hold a metaphysical or ontological position is to hold that some aspect of reality exists beyond any epistemological criteria. But this is precisely what any non-solipsistic position does, and which solipsism doesn't!
I'm not sure why a non-solipsistic position makes any ontological assumptions. The interesting point is that, in spite of individual errors in observation, we seem to be able to come up with coherent science. This suggests one of two things.

First, rejecting solipsism, it might be that we are observing events that are common to all of us. This is the idea that there is an external reality, though this need not be an ontological assumption, merely an assumption that what we observe obeys logical rules. And that assumption is continually tested as we do science.

Now, even though Stimpson says that the above scenario assumes the rejection of solipsism, it seems to me that it does not strictly require it. Instead, solipsism could simulate the same scenario. My mind could project a world that obeys logical rules, but at the same time mess up my perceptions in odd ways to fool me into thinking that I'm fallible. In other words, it could project incorrect perceptions for me, while at the same time projecting other people who have the correct perception of those same events.

Now, which scenario requires fewer strange assumptions?

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I'm not sure why a non-solipsistic position makes any ontological assumptions. The interesting point is that, .....we seem to be able to come up with coherent science. This suggests one of two things.

...the idea that there is an external reality, though this need not be an ontological assumption, merely an assumption that what we observe obeys logical rules. And that assumption is continually tested as we do science.

Now, even though Stimpson says that the above scenario assumes the rejection of solipsism, it seems to me that it does not strictly require it. Instead, solipsism could simulate the same scenario. My mind could project a world that obeys logical rules, but at the same time mess up my perceptions in odd ways to fool me into thinking that I'm fallible. In other words, it could project incorrect perceptions for me, while at the same time projecting other people who have the correct perception of those same events.

Now, which scenario requires fewer strange assumptions?

~~ Paul
Unfortunately, rejecting solipsism to me is "faith" -- that it is not so -- and that all of us "think".

Rejecting dualism -- imo the only logical choice, leaves the 2 (ontological) choices:

I think, implying:...........................I am, implying:
Free Will, Goals.............................MPB algorithm; Random inputs
Life; energy per se.........................Non-life; matter per se
Qualia & HPC...................................Turing machine
“Possible” answers to “Why”............No meaning

One can make one's own choice, but what I am aware of makes the choice most logically "I Think".

Note that science to date works fine under either assumption.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Just a quick point about solipsism and Yahweh's and Stimpy's denial that it is a metaphysical position.

I didn't say that solipsism isn't a metaphysical position. It is entirely possible for a metaphysical position to be inconsistent with a purely epistemological position.

A good example of this would be your own metaphysical position, as compared to naturalism. You have already said that you do not consider naturalism to be a metaphysical position. It is purely epistemological. But you are not a naturalist. A naturalist must necessarily reject your metaphysical position, because it is not naturalistic. But that doesn't make naturalism metaphysical.

Put simply, most metaphysical positions also imply epistemological ones. Solipsism has some very specific epistemological implications which are simply not compatible with naturalism.

Now to hold a metaphysical or ontological position is to hold that some aspect of reality exists beyond any epistemological criteria. But this is precisely what any non-solipsistic position does, and which solipsism doesn't!

As you said, any claims of aspects of reality beyond epistemological criteria are metaphysical. But naturalism does not make any. And the rejection of solipsism does not necessarily include any. In the case of naturalism, the reason for this is that the assumption that solipsism is false is a logically necessary assumption for the scientific method to be valid. Combine this with the fact that the scientific framework of naturalism is falsifiable, and we find that the rejection of solipsism is not a metaphysical claim at all, but rather a claim for which there is substantial empirical supporting evidence (not proof).

This type of thing is not specific to naturalism, either. Any epistemological framework is going to have axioms which are not compatible with all possible metaphysical frameworks. Once again, that does not mean that all epistemological frameworks are metaphysical. On the contrary, it means that some metaphysical frameworks are also epistemological.


Paul,

First, rejecting solipsism, it might be that we are observing events that are common to all of us. This is the idea that there is an external reality, though this need not be an ontological assumption, merely an assumption that what we observe obeys logical rules. And that assumption is continually tested as we do science.

Now, even though Stimpson says that the above scenario assumes the rejection of solipsism, it seems to me that it does not strictly require it. Instead, solipsism could simulate the same scenario. My mind could project a world that obeys logical rules, but at the same time mess up my perceptions in odd ways to fool me into thinking that I'm fallible. In other words, it could project incorrect perceptions for me, while at the same time projecting other people who have the correct perception of those same events.

Now, which scenario requires fewer strange assumptions?

You hit it right on the nose, Paul. The rejection of solipsism is necessary to derive that the scientific method should work. One could attempt to claim that solipsism is true, but that for some unidentifiable reason, your perceptions behave exactly as though solipsism were false. But since this hypothesis is unfalsifiable, it must be rejected by the naturalistic framework.

In fact, this is a general thing in naturalism. The assumption that something is true may be unfalsifiable, and the assumption that it is false may be falsifiable. If this is the case, then the assumption that it is false is an epistemological assumption, and the claim that it is false, based on supporting empirical evidence, is an epistemological claim. On the other hand, the claim that the assumption is true is a metaphysical one.

A good example of this is the existence of a God of Weather. The hypothesis that an undetectable sentient being is actually in control of the weather, and exerts his influence is subtle ways that are completely indetectable to humans, is an unfalsifiable metaphysical claim. The hypothesis that the weather is a complex dynamical process, completely reducible to the laws of physics as we know them, is a falsifiable theory, and one for which there is substantial supporting evidence. This theory directly implies that there is no Weather God involved, but this is by no means a metaphysical claim.

The situation with solipsism is completely analogous. Solipsism is not falsifiable, but there are many falsifiable hypotheses which are incompatible with solipsism. The claim of solipsism is therefore a metaphysical one (and also an epistemological one), but the rejection of solipsism in favor of the falsifiable hypothesis is a purely epistemological claim.


Dr. Stupid

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Anyway, a good simile illustrating what supervience actually means can be found here

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The idea of supervenience might be introduced via an example due to David Lewis of a dot-matrix picture:

A dot-matrix picture has global properties -- it is symmetrical, it is cluttered, and whatnot -- and yet all there is to the picture is dots and non-dots at each point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing but patterns in the dots. They supervene: no two pictures could differ in their global properties without differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there isn't a dot (1986, p. 14).
Lewis's example gives us one way to introduce the basic of idea of physicalism. The basic idea is that the physical features of the world are like the dots in the picture, and the psychological or biological or social features of the world are like the global properties of the picture.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


That sounds like reducibility to me. You said this was a simile, where does the metaphysical part come in? This example certainly doesn't involve anything metaphysical.

So likewise conscious states, although reducible to physical processes in the brain, are nevertheless identical to such processes. But note this does not mean consciousness and physical states of the brain are synonymous!

What do you mean by synonymous? Certainly I am only claiming that the physical process is identical to the mental process. They are the same thing. If you mean something other than that by "synonymous", then I don't know what you mean.

The dots and the patterns they comprise are not synonymous with the global properties ie the actual picture, although they are identical. Likewise for consciousness. No-one would suggest otherwise; oh . . .apart from Stimpy LOL

I have no idea what this means. The global properties of the picture are properties of the patterns of dots. Like you said, they are identical. I have no idea what you mean by synonymous here, or how supervenience differs from reducibility.

Ooops, just remembered you said you don't subscribe to supervenience. Is that still true now I've given an explanation of what it means?

I don't know. What you described sounds like plain old reducibility. Clearly I think that consciousness is reducible to brain processes. I see nothing whatsoever that is metaphysical about this, and I have no idea what you are talking about when you say that A and B are identical, but not synonymous. I was tought in grade school that synonymous means that two words mean the same thing.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
I didn't say that solipsism isn't a metaphysical position.



I am denying that solipsism is a metaphysical position!



A good example of this would be your own metaphysical position, as compared to naturalism.



You can't compare it to naturalism any more than a materialist/physicalist could compare their position to naturalism! Naturalism is not a metaphysical position! It has absolutely nothing to do wityh either idealism or physicalism!


You have already said that you do not consider naturalism to be a metaphysical position. It is purely epistemological. But you are not a naturalist. A naturalist must necessarily reject your metaphysical position, because it is not naturalistic. But that doesn't make naturalism metaphysical.



I reject naturalism, but certainly idealism is not incompatible with naturalism. My version of it is, yes

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

Put simply, most metaphysical positions also imply epistemological ones. Solipsism has some very specific epistemological implications which are simply not compatible with naturalism.




Sorry, I'm unable to think of any at all. Care to name any?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Paul,



You hit it right on the nose, Paul. The rejection of solipsism is necessary to derive that the scientific method should work.



Nonsense! Give some reasons to back this up.

[Interesting Ian]

Stimpy
One could attempt to claim that solipsism is true, but that for some unidentifiable reason, your perceptions behave exactly as though solipsism were false.


One could attempt to claim that a non-solipsistic position is true, but that for some unidentifiable reason, your perceptions behave exactly as though a non-solipsism position were false.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Solipsism is not falsifiable,


{Shrugs}

Neither is a non-solipsistic position. So what?



but there are many falsifiable hypotheses which are incompatible with solipsism.



Name one.

[The Central Scrutinizer]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Stimpy continually claims that he is a materialist/physicalist, but that neither ontology or metaphysics play any role in his particular version of physicalism. There is a simple disproof of this. In order to be a physicalist you necessarily must believe Consciousness supervenes on the physical. But supervenience itself is a metaphysical claim. :) Therefore to be a physicalist necessarily commits you to making at least one metaphysical claim :)


Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz :s2:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[b]Ian,



That sounds like reducibility to me. You said this was a simile, where does the metaphysical part come in? This example certainly doesn't involve anything metaphysical.



I explained that but you've decided to ignore it.



What do you mean by synonymous? Certainly I am only claiming that the physical process is identical to the mental process. They are the same thing. If you mean something other than that by "synonymous", then I don't know what you mean.



Notwithstanding their identity, there are differing meanings attached to talking about the experience of pain and the actual physical process in the brain.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:Nonsense! Give some reasons to back this up.
in response to Stimpy's:The rejection of solipsism is necessary to derive that the scientific method should work.
Because the idea that solipsism could just be fooling us into believing that science works is an unfalsifiable idea. It might be right, but it seems prudent to reject it.

~~ Paul

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I didn't say that solipsism isn't a metaphysical position.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am denying that solipsism is a metaphysical position!

Well, that raises a very important point. I actually know of two different conceptions of solipsism. One of them is metaphysical, and the other is purely epistemological.

The metaphysical view of solipsism is that all that exists is your own consciousness. Everything you experience is a construct of your own mind, and the impression that your are interacting with an external world is an illusion.

The epistemological view is that nothing other than your own experiences can ever be known. It is not possible to learn anything about the external world from your observations, nor is it even possible to know if an external world exists.

Now, clearly naturalism must reject the epistemological view of solipsism. And of course there is nothing metaphysical about doing so. But what about the metaphysical view?

That metaphysical view of solipsism has epistemological implications too. In fact, it implies the epistemological view of solipsism. So when we reject the epistemological view of solipsism, we also reject the metaphysical view of it, along with any other metaphysical views that imply epistemological views which are incompatible with naturalism.

A good example of this would be your own metaphysical position, as compared to naturalism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You can't compare it to naturalism any more than a materialist/physicalist could compare their position to naturalism! Naturalism is not a metaphysical position! It has absolutely nothing to do wityh either idealism or physicalism!

That was exactly the point I was making. Naturalism is an epistemological philosophy, and your view of Idealism is a metaphysical one. But nevertheless naturalism must reject your view of Idealism. Doing so does not make naturalism metaphysical, and neither does rejecting solipsism.

You have already said that you do not consider naturalism to be a metaphysical position. It is purely epistemological. But you are not a naturalist. A naturalist must necessarily reject your metaphysical position, because it is not naturalistic. But that doesn't make naturalism metaphysical.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I reject naturalism, but certainly idealism is not incompatible with naturalism. My version of it is, yes.

I know. I was talking about your version of it.

Put simply, most metaphysical positions also imply epistemological ones. Solipsism has some very specific epistemological implications which are simply not compatible with naturalism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sorry, I'm unable to think of any at all. Care to name any?

Science assumes that reality functions according to a set of consistent natural laws. Metaphysical solipsism claims that reality is nothing more than your experiences. Our experiences do not appear to function according to consistent natural laws. The simplest hypothesis that we can construct to account for this is that our experiences are fallible, that is, that they give us an imperfect representation of reality. Such a claim is meaningless if we assume that reality is just our experiences. In that case, we must make the completely absurd assumption that reality is not objective, but that for some inexplicable reason, it just happens to behave in every single observable way as though it were.

One could attempt to claim that solipsism is true, but that for some unidentifiable reason, your perceptions behave exactly as though solipsism were false.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

One could attempt to claim that a non-solipsistic position is true, but that for some unidentifiable reason, your perceptions behave exactly as though a non-solipsism position were false.

No, one could not, because that would be meaningless. What is the expected behavior for a solipsistic position? There isn't any. Solipsism is an epistemological dead-end. The only way to make any claims about what you expect to observe after assuming solipsism is true, is to tack on the assumption that reality behaves as though it were actually objective, even though it is not. The assumption that solipsism is true adds absolutely nothing to the position. All it does is imply that for some completely unknowable reason, reality behaves as though it were something that it is not. It is far more parsimonious to simply say that since reality behaves exactly as though it were objective, that we think it probably is.

but there are many falsifiable hypotheses which are incompatible with solipsism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Name one.

Like the hypothesis that I am not special, and that other people are essentially no different than me. That is a falsifiable hypothesis. You can always invent unfalsifiable hypotheses which claim that the hypothesis is false, but in such a way that we could never tell. Such unfalsifiable hypotheses (like solipsism) are of no value.

That sounds like reducibility to me. You said this was a simile, where does the metaphysical part come in? This example certainly doesn't involve anything metaphysical.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I explained that but you've decided to ignore it.

I assume you are referring to this?

So just as the dots in the dot-matrix picure enjoy a prime reality with the picture supervening on these dots, so the physical processes of the world have the prime reality with consciousness supervening on certain special physical states; namely those found in the brain. But saying that physical processes are primary with consciousness being derived from this primary reality is a metaphysical position. This contradicts Stimpys original position that he is a physicalist who rejects metaphysics in his interpretation of reality.

I did address it, I just didn't quote it. If there is nothing metaphysical about saying that the dots "enjoy a primary reality with the picture supervening on the dots", then there is nothing metaphysical about saying that the physical processes "enjoy a primary reality with consciousness supervening on the process".

This is just semantics. You are using the word "primary" here to mean that it is the more general thing, with the supervening phenomena being a particular pattern or process. That is a completely different usage of the word "primary" than in metaphysics.

What do you mean by synonymous? Certainly I am only claiming that the physical process is identical to the mental process. They are the same thing. If you mean something other than that by "synonymous", then I don't know what you mean.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notwithstanding their identity, there are differing meanings attached to talking about the experience of pain and the actual physical process in the brain.

How do you figure? Sure, when somebody talks about the experience of pain, they may not know that it is a physical process in the brain. They may even believe that it is not. But if it is, then they are talking about that process nevertheless.

A person may not know that burning is a particular type of chemical reaction, but that doesn't mean that when he talks about something burning he isn't talking about a particular type of chemical reaction.

Once again, this is purely semantics, and has no bearing on the actual content or meaning of my position. Burning is not metaphysical. Patterns of dots forming images is not metaphysical, and consciousness being reducible to physical brain processes is not metaphysical.


Dr. Stupid

[Loki]

Stimpy,

I still don't understand what you mean by supervene.

In case this still applies....

From here (http://www.mulhauser.net/research/tutorials/supervenience/supervenience.htm)

'Supervenience' must be broken down into (at least) logical supervenience and metaphysical supervenience. The former is a relationship of a priori necessity, requiring that we take a concept's intension as that which fixes reference for whatever world is actual.
...
By contrast, a posteriori necessity grounds 'metaphysical supervenience', which features principally in talk about consciousness:

and from here (http://spot.colorado.edu/~rhanna/43005300_fall2_handout5.htm)
Now back to strong supervenience, or just plain old "supervenience" for short. If we assume that the A-properties are physical properties and that the B-properties are mental properties, then this yields a materialist or physicalist supervenience.
...
When this extra constraint is added, materialist supervenience is then called "superdupervenience," because it captures the idea that the lower-level properties necessarily determine the higher-level properties in a wholly lawlike fashion.
...
Now finally we can define logical supervenience. The notion of logical supervenience means that the two occurrences of ‘necessarily’ in the formulation of strong supervenience are to be read as ‘logically (i.e., analytically, weakly metaphysically) necessarily’, as opposed, e.g., to ‘non-logically (i.e., non-analytically, synthetically, strongly metaphysically) necessarily’ or ‘physically (i.e., nomologically, naturally) necessary’, which are more restricted modalities.
Now, I'm sure that clears everything up?

[Upchurch]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
So the argument goes on. :( :mad: But I haven't got any more time to further respond to you today Stimp. Just to recap (I've been out of the country), Ian had a "final proof" that is inconclusive and requires more discussion?

JK may be gone, but the more things change, the more they stay the same.

[Dancing David]

Sorry Ian, you haven't convinced me,
Especialy your argument about the dots and the picture, there is no picture without the brain to give it meaning.

No go!

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Sorry Ian, you haven't convinced me,
Especialy your argument about the dots and the picture, there is no picture without the brain to give it meaning.

No go!

I haven't convinced you of what? Remember I am not arguing for any position on the mind body problem in this thread. I was simply discussing the distinction between physicalism and naturalism and maintaining that the former is saying something about the nature of reality (what reality really is, or ontology) and the latter isn't (concerns itself with epistemological issues only).

I have no real disagreement with Stimpy in this thread apart from semantic quibbling about whether physicalism involves metaphysics. THis has simply transpired to boil down to a question about what the word metaphysics actually means. In other words it seems that Stimpy has a differing definition of metaphysics than I have. Now I could appeal to authority and quote loads of sources showing that my definition of metaphysics is correct. But it really isn't important.

Stimpy agrees with supervenience meaning that he holds that there is an underlying reality to . . er . .reality which consciousness supervenes upon. Nuff said. What is there to argue about further?

[treborf]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

What is there to argue about further?
Geez, I go away for the weekend and this thread has turned into a love-fest.

To answer your question, for a start, some of the claims you've made to support your position are debatable. For example, you've said that based on current evidence, 'real' science would never say that consciousness appears to be a function of the brain. Do you want to retract that claim?

[treborf]

But, hey, I give you credit, Ian, for recognizing that this is simply a debate about semantics.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,



Well, that raises a very important point. I actually know of two different conceptions of solipsism. One of them is metaphysical, and the other is purely epistemological.

The metaphysical view of solipsism is that all that exists is your own consciousness. Everything you experience is a construct of your own mind, and the impression that your are interacting with an external world is an illusion.

The epistemological view is that nothing other than your own experiences can ever be known. It is not possible to learn anything about the external world from your observations, nor is it even possible to know if an external world exists.
Stimpy, are those your definitions, or do you feel these are as close to agreed definitions that philosophers will ever reach?

Stimpy addressing Ian:

But nevertheless naturalism must reject your view of Idealism.
You would agree then that naturalism is viable under some form of Idealism?

Stimpy, would you mind commenting on what you see in Ian's position that denies it?


Like the hypothesis that I am not special, and that other people are essentially no different than me. That is a falsifiable hypothesis.
I don't see any falsifiability in that hypo; would you mind being a bit more specific on how to falsify it?

To me, it's no better than Paul's reason to deny solipsism -- "it would be prudent".

Gentlemen's agreement that it is not so is still my position. I'd like to hear a logical argument that we could agree on.

[Lord Kenneth]

Metaphysics - The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value. (taken from dictionary.com

I believe that would include solipsism, materialism, naturalism, physicalism, etc...

Does it even matter? It's just a grouping of certain things. If one of them is wrong it doesn't affect other metaphysical ideas. It's like a building with different departments in it dealing with different things. Or something.


Quibbling with semantics usually doesn't get us very far.

[Crossbow]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


I haven't convinced you of what? Remember I am not arguing for any position on the mind body problem in this thread. I was simply discussing the distinction between physicalism and naturalism and maintaining that the former is saying something about the nature of reality (what reality really is, or ontology) and the latter isn't (concerns itself with epistemological issues only).

I have no real disagreement with Stimpy in this thread apart from semantic quibbling about whether physicalism involves metaphysics. THis has simply transpired to boil down to a question about what the word metaphysics actually means. In other words it seems that Stimpy has a differing definition of metaphysics than I have. Now I could appeal to authority and quote loads of sources showing that my definition of metaphysics is correct. But it really isn't important.

Stimpy agrees with supervenience meaning that he holds that there is an underlying reality to . . er . .reality which consciousness supervenes upon. Nuff said. What is there to argue about further?

Well then, if that is the case (that you have no real disagreement with Stimpy), then I take it that you do not have the "Final Proof that Stimpson J. Cat is wrong", yes?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Hammegk,

Well, that raises a very important point. I actually know of two different conceptions of solipsism. One of them is metaphysical, and the other is purely epistemological.

The metaphysical view of solipsism is that all that exists is your own consciousness. Everything you experience is a construct of your own mind, and the impression that your are interacting with an external world is an illusion.

The epistemological view is that nothing other than your own experiences can ever be known. It is not possible to learn anything about the external world from your observations, nor is it even possible to know if an external world exists.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Stimpy, are those your definitions, or do you feel these are as close to agreed definitions that philosophers will ever reach?

As I said, they are the only two definitions of solipsism that I know of. If you know of some others, then by all means feel free to share.

But nevertheless naturalism must reject your view of Idealism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You would agree then that naturalism is viable under some form of Idealism?

Stimpy, would you mind commenting on what you see in Ian's position that denies it?

Ian has specifically stated that he does not think that consciousness can be explained scientifically, even though it has an observable effect on the world. That violates naturalism. He has also claimed to believe in Libertarian free-will, which violates naturalism.

Like the hypothesis that I am not special, and that other people are essentially no different than me. That is a falsifiable hypothesis.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I don't see any falsifiability in that hypo; would you mind being a bit more specific on how to falsify it?

Simple, just demonstrate some fundamental difference between me and everybody else.

To me, it's no better than Paul's reason to deny solipsism -- "it would be prudent".

The supporting evidence for the above hypothesis is exactly why it is prudent to do so.

Gentlemen's agreement that it is not so is still my position. I'd like to hear a logical argument that we could agree on.

It's pretty simple. If you accept the epistemological position of naturalism, then the rejection of solipsism is the most parsimonious explanation for the fact that the world seems to behave exactly as though reality were objective.

Of course, if you reject naturalism, then unless you have some other epistemological position to replace it, you can't draw any conclusions from your observations. If you settle on some other epistemological framework, then your conclusions will, of course, depend on that framework.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Crossbow


Well then, if that is the case (that you have no real disagreement with Stimpy), then I take it that you do not have the "Final Proof that Stimpson J. Cat is wrong", yes?

{shrugs}

Not with his erroneous definition of metaphysics no.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Well then, if that is the case (that you have no real disagreement with Stimpy), then I take it that you do not have the "Final Proof that Stimpson J. Cat is wrong", yes?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

{shrugs}

Not with his erroneous definition of metaphysics no.

That's odd. I don't recall ever giving a definition of metaphysics. If want to define "metaphysics" in such a way as to include things which are empirically verifiable, that's fine with me.

The fact still remains that my position makes no claims which are not, at least in principle, empirically verifiable, and makes no reference whatsoever to things which are not, even in principle, empirically verifiable.

Dr. Stupid

[treborf]

In a nutshell: Stimpy requires evidence; Ian does not.

Of course, Ian rarely makes claims that anyone can understand, let alone examine.

[ceptimus]

Do these guys really type all those long words: epistemological, naturalism, solipsism, ontological, consciousness, supervenience, metaphysical, and so on, every time they use them? I would have to set up some keyboard shotcuts.

[treborf]

Originally posted by ceptimus
Do these guys really type all those long words: epistemological, naturalism, solipsism, ontological, consciousness, supervenience, metaphysical, and so on, every time they use them? I would have to set up some keyboard shotcuts.
Hee hee. Me too. I'd be worried about typos. Someone (I'll let you guess) might jump on it and declare victory!

[Lord Kenneth]

Solipsism (only thing you can truly know is self) is somewhat right as you can never know for complete certainity that what you see and observe is reality. This is infact echoed in science because you cannot know things for sure when observing an outside system (there is a name for it, remind me what it is...). However, that does not mean one must seriously consider it...

Also, if conciousness and interpretation of the senses ARE done in the brain, and the brain does not interpret reality incorrectly, then technically we can know things because we are not really observing an outside system but the same one.

I might be wrong. Correct me if I am.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Lord Kenneth,

Solipsism (only thing you can truly know is self) is somewhat right as you can never know for complete certainity that what you see and observe is reality. This is infact echoed in science because you cannot know things for sure when observing an outside system (there is a name for it, remind me what it is...). However, that does not mean one must seriously consider it...

Also, if conciousness and interpretation of the senses ARE done in the brain, and the brain does not interpret reality incorrectly, then technically we can know things because we are not really observing an outside system but the same one.

I might be wrong. Correct me if I am.

It is a question of semantics. If you define "knowledge" to mean "absolute proof", then you can never know anything other than abstract analytical tautologies. That is not a very useful definition of knowledge.

Dr. Stupid

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ceptimus said:Do these guys really type all those long words: epistemological, naturalism, solipsism, ontological, consciousness, supervenience, metaphysical, and so on, every time they use them? I would have to set up some keyboard shotcuts.
Ha! Might I suggest *suf for all those words. That is, some sequence of letters followed by a suffix chosen from ism, ical, ness, ence.

For example, with apologies to Stimpson:Ian has specifically stated that he does not think that *suf can be explained *suf, even though it has an observable effect on the world. That violates *suf. He has also claimed to believe in *suf, which violates *suf.

~~ Paul

[DialecticMaterialist]

The statement that consciousness might be metaphysical makes no sense. I assume you mean might be non-physical?

So what's the problem? He's assuming a parsimonious position if he's a physicalist. I hardly see how that is proof he is wrong.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by DialecticMaterialist


So what's the problem? He's assuming a parsimonious position if he's a physicalist. I hardly see how that is proof he is wrong.

He's assuming a parsimonious position? How is it more parsimonious than idealism?

BTW this has nothing whatsoever to do with the topic of this thread

And also BTW I do not believe that it could remotely be thought that Ockhams razor can be used in such a context.

And if it could then denying an entire physical Universe would certainly seem more parsimonious than hypothesising its existence such as all physicalists do!

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,

Science assumes that reality functions according to a set of consistent natural laws. Metaphysical solipsism claims that reality is nothing more than your experiences. Our experiences do not appear to function according to consistent natural laws. The simplest hypothesis that we can construct to account for this is that our experiences are fallible, that is, that they give us an imperfect representation of reality. Such a claim is meaningless if we assume that reality is just our experiences. In that case, we must make the completely absurd assumption that reality is not objective, but that for some inexplicable reason, it just happens to behave in every single observable way as though it were.


The assumption of an objective reality is born out of observations that are quantitative, reasonably stable, reasonably consistent and roughly adhere to contructed mathematical relationships we call logic. We equate these aspects of experience with an external objective reality and assume that it functions according to our contructed logical rules. Thus some aspects of experience do appear to roughly follow consistent logical relationships. However, the assumption that these stable and consistent observations relate to an external reality beyond the experiential realm is an unfalsifiable position and therefore should be rejected. Furthermore, science works just as well without this assumption. Science does not need to have anything to say about the nature of reality for the method to function.



All Solipsism implies is that for some completely unknowable reason, reality behaves as though it were something that it is not.

Not quite. There are aspects of our experience that are not consistent and stable and significantly stray from the contructed framework of logic. There are also aspects of our experience that are not quantifiable and are therefore not subject to mathematical relationships simply by default. Solipsism implies is that for some as yet unknown reason, reality (experience) behaves as if it were operating according to an external, logically based objective reality.


It is far more parsimonious to simply say that since reality behaves exactly as though it were objective, that we think it probably is.

In order to say this, you first have to assume that reality is external to experience. That is a fallacy based on an unfalsifiable premise.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

And if it could then denying an entire physical Universe would certainly seem more parsimonious than hypothesising its existence such as all physicalists do!

I am not a physicalist, remember?

Anyway, the hypothesis I make is that an external objective reality exists. This is a very parsimonious position, and here is why.

First of all, I think we can all agree that at the very least science (and thus naturalism) must assume that reality appears to be objective, in every observable way.

That implies an external reality. There is no way around it. Even if you imagine that you perceptions are purely constructs of your own mind, the above assumption means that those experiences must be following rules which you are not aware of. You must assume that there is some component to your own mind that you are not directly aware of.

Clearly the assumptions of naturalism imply that there is more to reality than just our perceptions, and furthermore that it must behave in all observable ways as though it were objective.

At this point, assuming that reality is objective does not involve postulating the existence of some external reality. It is nothing more acknowledging that reality being objective is the most parsimonious explanation for the fact that it behaves in every observable way as though it were.


davidsmith,

The assumption of an objective reality is born out of observations that are quantitative, reasonably stable, reasonably consistent and roughly adhere to constructed mathematical relationships we call logic. We equate these aspects of experience with an external objective reality and assume that it functions according to our contructed logical rules. Thus some aspects of experience do appear to roughly follow consistent logical relationships. However, the assumption that these stable and consistent observations relate to an external reality beyond the experiential realm is an unfalsifiable position and therefore should be rejected. Furthermore, science works just as well without this assumption. Science does not need to have anything to say about the nature of reality for the method to function.

See my above response to Ian. If reality behaves according to logical rules, and is objective, then there must be more to reality that just our experiences. Even if it is nothing more than some aspect of your own mind that you don't have direct conscious access to, it is still something beyond your experiences.

It is no less parsimonious to assume that this external reality is some objective reality of which you are just a part, then it is too assume that it is just some aspect of your own mind. In fact, it is far more parsimonious to do so, since that it exactly what the evidence seems to indicate is the case.


Dr. Stupid

[hammegk]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

....
In order to say this, you first have to assume that reality is external to experience. That is a fallacy based on an unfalsifiable premise.

Seems obvious to me, and you. So far as I can tell Stimpy doesn't agree.

That continues to confuse me in that he eliminates dualism, but has no ontological belief, yet is not a monist of either kind. Either idealism(I'd say "life"=mind) or physicalism-materialism(I'd say non-life=body).

Consideration of the life/non-life boundry (or lack thereof) and various aspects of homo sap "consciousness" lead me to the side of idealism.

Originally posted by Stimpy

It is no less parsimonious to assume that this external reality is some objective reality of which you are just a part, then it is too assume that it is just some aspect of your own mind. In fact, it is far more parsimonious to do so, since that it exactly what the evidence seems to indicate is the case.
To me still supports either "mind" or "body". What am I missing?

[Dancing David]

Hmmm,

I find this interesting, where does experience come from, it is not self standing.

If I see the color of a bird is red , it is because a photon came from some where and then refelected off the bird, entered my eye and interacted with the receptor in my eye.

There is no experienec outside of external reality, without an external reality there would not be experience.

The way to break the tautology is that there is experience, scienfce allows us to predict the behavior of that experience, the prediction is consistent with thier being an objective reality.

All the rest is just masturbation with words.

[DialecticMaterialist]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


He's assuming a parsimonious position? How is it more parsimonious than idealism?

BTW this has nothing whatsoever to do with the topic of this thread

And also BTW I do not believe that it could remotely be thought that Ockhams razor can be used in such a context.

And if it could then denying an entire physical Universe would certainly seem more parsimonious than hypothesising its existence such as all physicalists do!



Well then you obviously don't understand the principle of parsimony very well.


The principle of parsimony is used to keep people from making things up, because if a person can add as many assumptions or excuses as he or she wants, he or she can literally invent and prove any sort of story.

Basically then its used to avoid endless controversy and prevent people from imagining things.


Now obviously in a universe of subjective idealism this does not apply, because a person cannot make things up: his or her thought is what exists.




So Occam's Razor's very validity demands one accept an objectivist position, not a subjectivist one. This means Ian that the Principle of Parsimony's very justification for its existence demands one assume some sort of objectivist position.

Hence subjective idealism is not compatible with Occam's Razor and can hardly then be justified as parsimonious.



Lastly you Ian may not think Occam's Razor applies to this situation but simply thinking that does not make it true. You have to give a reason for this.

Remember the Principle is used to avoid endless controversy and avoid people making stuff up. This is just as important in philosophy as it is in science.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:To me still supports either "mind" or "body". What am I missing?
What is the point, in an ideal world where all is consciousness, of having some mechanism to make everyone's view of "external reality" consistent? What necessary purpose does it serve?

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

What is the point, in an ideal world where all is consciousness, of having some mechanism to make everyone's view of "external reality" consistent? What necessary purpose does it serve?
~~ Paul

Those darn Laws of Physics -- some math that predicts what our perceptions will perceive -- are handy to keep the perceived universe chugging along as it seems (to intend ;) )to.

WHY?

That's the part of the Question idealism can at least offer "possible" rationales. What do you non-idealists think is the "necessary purpose served"?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk asked:That's the part of the Question idealism can at least offer "possible" rationales. What do you non-idealists think is the "necessary purpose served"?
Well, touché, I suppose. I just find it easier to swallow an external reality using a bunch of laws to maintain its coherence. Why should a purely Beingness-based reality care to force all its little mini-beingnesses into a consistent framework?

Geez, that sounds absurd. Never mind.

~~ Paul

[Loki]

hammegk,

What do you non-idealists think is the "necessary purpose served"?
The physical universe serves no "necessary purpose" under materialism - it "just is". If consciousness arises from this state, and seeks "purpose" then there is no conflict. But under idealism, what purpose does the universe serve? How can you decide amongst the endless stream of potential alternatives?

[Diamond]

I think we should keep the argument down to logical nuggets.

So when "Interesting" makes a statement "Materialism says..." then we can immediately fill in the rest of the statement:

"Materialism says...." /a statement follows which contradicts the modern philosphical understanding of materialism/ is constructed as a straw man argument / cannot be logically refuted because no logic entered the argument to begin with.

"Materialists believe..." /a statement which would not or could not be made logically by materialists / a straw man argument / cannot be used as a justification for any other philosophical alternative / a troll statement designed to bait threads or posters who should know better

"Consciousness is..." /an entity specifically described to be inaccessible to scientific disproof / a modern version of animistic belief in disembodied spirits / a meaningless argument designed to defy rational argument

"I have disproved materialism" or "Materialism is demonstrably false because..." / because I am an egotistical drunken wanker with lots of keyboard time / everyone can go round a circular argument an infinite number of times / I desperately need attention for my lack of achievement in this concept I deny: Real Life

[Peskanov]

Loki,

----
quote:
The physical universe serves no "necessary purpose" under materialism - it "just is". If consciousness arises from this state, and seeks "purpose" then there is no conflict. But under idealism, what purpose does the universe serve? How can you decide amongst the endless stream of potential alternatives?
----

I strongly disagree; materialism does not make any statement about that; it's perfectly possible under a materialist framework that the universe we know is designed by some entity to serve a purpose... But it's not very probable.
Let's not confuse current knowledge with speculation and extrapolation...

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Loki
hammegk,


The physical universe serves no "necessary purpose" under materialism - it "just is". If consciousness arises from this state, and seeks "purpose" then there is no conflict. But under idealism, what purpose does the universe serve? How can you decide amongst the endless stream of potential alternatives?

Loki,

Why does idealism have to provide a purpose for the existence of consciousness ?

If materialism provides an "it just is" answer to why the objective universe exists then its just as acceptable for idealism to do the same for the experiential universe, surely.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

David, I agree that idealism can say "it just is." What I don't understand is why idealism would bother with the appearance of external consistency. I suppose "why not" is a perfectly good answer. But then, why bother with metaphysics at all?

~~ Paul

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,


Anyway, the hypothesis I make is that an external objective reality exists. This is a very parsimonious position, and here is why.

First of all, I think we can all agree that at the very least science (and thus naturalism) must assume that reality appears to be objective, in every observable way.


No I certainly do not agree ! Science deals with experiences that are quantitative, roughly logical, roughly consistent and roughly stable. From this you are assuming that reality is purely logical, stable and consistent. So in order for science to have anything to say about objective knowledge it must first assume the existence of objective reality from our observations, which is unfalsifiable. Can you not see the logical fallacy ?




Clearly the assumptions of naturalism imply that there is more to reality than just our perceptions, and furthermore that it must behave in all observable ways as though it were objective.

At this point, assuming that reality is objective does not involve postulating the existence of some external reality. It is nothing more acknowledging that reality being objective is the most parsimonious explanation for the fact that it behaves in every observable way as though it were.

What do you mean by objective then ? Assuming that reality is objective certainly means that you are assuming the existence of some external reality because that is what "objective" means !



See my above response to Ian. If reality behaves according to logical rules, and is objective, then there must be more to reality that just our experiences.

Ok thats fine. As long as you know that you have first made an unfalsifiable assumption that reality is indeed objective (i.e., separate from experience). And if you do this then of course an experiential reality does not work ! This is a logical fallacy based on an unfalsifiable premise. Also science can work just as well without this assumption. It just won't be giving us knowledge about an objective reality. It would be giving us knowledge about certain aspects of our experiences.


Even if (reality) is nothing more than some aspect of your own mind that you don't have direct conscious access to, it is still something beyond your experiences.

No it isn't !? If reality is experiential then its not beyond your experiences.


It is no less parsimonious to assume that this external reality is some objective reality of which you are just a part, then it is too assume that it is just some aspect of your own mind. In fact, it is far more parsimonious to do so, since that it exactly what the evidence seems to indicate is the case.

Again logical fallacy. The evidence you speak of is laden with the unfalsifiable assumption that reality is objective. Of course it will then follow that this evidence will indicate an objective reality !

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
David, I agree that idealism can say "it just is." What I don't understand is why idealism would bother with the appearance of external consistency. I suppose "why not" is a perfectly good answer. But then, why bother with metaphysics at all?

~~ Paul

Dealing with consistent logical experiences is the function of science, but I suppose the question that must be asked here is whether science can actually say anything about the true nature of reality, under an assumption of an objective reality or not.

[treborf]

Davidsmith73 or hammegk, do you agree with the mainstream scientific view that consciousness is a function of the brain? I think you don't, but can you please confirm this?

Thanks in advance.

treborf

[hammegk]

Originally posted by treborf
....hammegk, do you agree with the mainstream scientific view that consciousness is a function of the brain? I think you don't, but can you please confirm this?


No I don't. I was a dualist most of my life (i.e. hadn't really thought about it) but I now lean towards idealism thanks to posters here.


Originally posted by Paul
....
What I don't understand is why idealism would bother with the appearance of external consistency.
One alternative imo is solipsism; even with Stimpy's help I still find that denying it is axiomatic rather than logical.

By denying solipsism external consistency is also axiomatic -- just as it is for materialists. Science works equally well under either axiom.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Davidsmith,

First of all, I think we can all agree that at the very least science (and thus naturalism) must assume that reality appears to be objective, in every observable way.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No I certainly do not agree ! Science deals with experiences that are quantitative, roughly logical, roughly consistent and roughly stable. From this you are assuming that reality is purely logical, stable and consistent. So in order for science to have anything to say about objective knowledge it must first assume the existence of objective reality from our observations, which is unfalsifiable. Can you not see the logical fallacy ?

What is all of this "roughly" nonsense?

When I talk about the assumptions of science, I am not talking about the assumptions you must make to account for the fact that, so far, science has seemed to work pretty well. I am talking about the assumptions you must make in order to claim that the scientific method will work.

Objectivity is one of the axioms of science. You can apply the scientific method without making this assumption, but if you do so, then you are just treating it as a heuristic, not as an actual logical framework for understanding the world.

Clearly the assumptions of naturalism imply that there is more to reality than just our perceptions, and furthermore that it must behave in all observable ways as though it were objective.

At this point, assuming that reality is objective does not involve postulating the existence of some external reality. It is nothing more acknowledging that reality being objective is the most parsimonious explanation for the fact that it behaves in every observable way as though it were.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What do you mean by objective then ? Assuming that reality is objective certainly means that you are assuming the existence of some external reality because that is what "objective" means !

Like I said, the very fact that reality functions according to logical rules, rules which we are not directly aware of, implies that there is more to reality than just our experiences. Even if you take the metaphysical view that reality is constructed by your mind, you are assuming the existence of some part of your mind which is external to your experiences.

See my above response to Ian. If reality behaves according to logical rules, and is objective, then there must be more to reality that just our experiences.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ok thats fine. As long as you know that you have first made an unfalsifiable assumption that reality is indeed objective (i.e., separate from experience). And if you do this then of course an experiential reality does not work ! This is a logical fallacy based on an unfalsifiable premise.

No, it is not. The axioms of science, of which the claim that reality functions according to consistent logical rules is one, constitute a falsifiable hypothesis. Namely the hypothesis that science will work.

Also science can work just as well without this assumption. It just won't be giving us knowledge about an objective reality. It would be giving us knowledge about certain aspects of our experiences.

That is nonsensical. In order for the scientific method to give us any knowledge at all, there must be knowledge for it to give us. There must be facts about reality that it can reveal to us. In short, there must be more to reality than just our experiences.

Even if (reality) is nothing more than some aspect of your own mind that you don't have direct conscious access to, it is still something beyond your experiences.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No it isn't !? If reality is experiential then its not beyond your experiences.

What part of the above did you not understand? If there is some aspect of your mind which you do not have direct conscious access to, then it is something beyond your experiences.

Even Idealism must posit the existence of something beyond your actual experiences, even if it only assumes that this something is just another part of your mind. To claim that reality is nothing more than your experiences, denies the idea that there is actually something having those experiences, and that there is something causing you to have those experiences (even if that cause is also a part of you).

Dr. Stupid

[treborf]

Originally posted by hammegk
Originally posted by treborf
....hammegk, do you agree with the mainstream scientific view that consciousness is a function of the brain? I think you don't, but can you please confirm this?


No I don't. I was a dualist most of my life (i.e. hadn't really thought about it) but I now lean towards idealism thanks to posters here.

Thanks for the answer. Since idealism doesn't see consciousness as a function of the brain, how does it explain consciousness? In other words, given a few sentences, in plain language, how would idealism complete the following: "Consciousness is __________________". What evidence is there for this explanation?

Thanks again.

treborf

[Loki]

davidsmith73/Peskanov,

(peskanov wrote) : I strongly disagree; materialism does not make any statement about that; it's perfectly possible under a materialist framework that the universe we know is designed by some entity to serve a purpose... But it's not very probable.

Oh well - the dangers of imprecise phrasing in philosphical discussions! What I meant was that under materialism, "it just is" is perfectly acceptable. I didn't mean to imply that "it just is" is required.

(davidsmith73 wrote) : Why does idealism have to provide a purpose for the existence of consciousness ?

If materialism provides an "it just is" answer to why the objective universe exists then its just as acceptable for idealism to do the same for the experiential universe, surely.
Well, first off I was referring to Idealism's "purpose for the existence of the universe", not "purpose for the existence of consciousness". Why don't I think "it just is" is acceptable under Idealismto explain the universe? Because Idealism posits that consciousness is the 'core'. Well, actually it's more accurate to say that Idealism posits that something that is in some way similar or related to what we perceive as consciousness here in the "real world" is the 'core'. As an aside, I find it sort of significant that *everything* that I consider to be my consciousness is in someway a reference to something in the "real world" - if the "real world" was taken away, or I try to imagine having never been exposed to the "real world", then I have a hard time thinking of what "consciousness" might be. The only consciousness that I'm personally aware of seems to be governed by time, and by cause and effect, and to be shaped entirely in response to the "real world".

But I'm wandering off track ... why aren't I comfortable with "it just is" under Idealism? Well, because it seems to me that (in the world I can see) consciousness that creates always has a purpose for that creation. The creation is to solve a problem, or to explore an idea. If the Uberconsciousness(es) of Idealism created this universe, and time, and the laws pf physics, it seems to me highly likely there was a purpose - it is/was to "solve a problem" or "explore an idea". "Just Is" seems somehow contradictory to the nature of consciousness, and therefore Idealism implies "because...". Of course, idealism cannot even begin to explain this "because...", even though it appears to be a necessary component of the theory. Well, that's how it seems to me!

[hammegk]

Originally posted by treborf

"Consciousness is __________________".
Reading through what we've said so far, I need to explain that "consciousness" imo is for all intents & purposes "life". Animal Consciousness is a function of whatever perceived system (like a human brain) is available to perceive with.

Consciousness=life is the intent to exist as a perceiving entity -- in my case *me*, the "perceived/perceiving bag'o bones" that consciousness (*I*) has available to it.

To me, the more interesting question is, at what point do "energy" interactions become "live"? Is not the level of "what-is" currently postulated in one guise as Higgs Field a viable possibility? If not, why not?



What evidence is there for this explanation?

My one, indisputable, fact: that *I* think. ;)

And at a more basic level, Life "lives".

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

My one, indisputable, fact: that *I* think.
Hammegk, you refuse to consider the fact that your thoughts are merely projections by the invisible pink hamster orbiting Neptune. So *you* think, but that thinking is not *I*. The *I* is the hamster.

~~ Paul

[c4ts]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Hammegk, you refuse to consider the fact that your thoughts are merely projections by the invisible pink hamster orbiting Neptune. So *you* think, but that thinking is not *I*. The *I* is the hamster.

~~ Paul

Gah! Would you stop using "invisible pink" to describe your ludicrous examples?? I'm just pointing out that the hamster can't be pink in the same sense it is invisible. Color requires some sort of spectral reflectivity, something that invisible things can't have in order to remain invisible (unless it reflects a color we can't see, but pink isn't one of those colors)! I thought I explained this waaaaay back in another thread where somebody mentioned invisible pink unicorns.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The hamster is pink, but it is normally invisible. When it chooses to become visible, then it is pink. The invisibility is used to make it nonfalsifiable. It if were always pink, it would be slightly more falsifiable, which would render it useless as an example of a nonfalsifiable pink hamster.

Also, as has come to light since the discovery of the hamster, even when it is invisible, it is visible to certain select people. To them, it appears pink, as you would expect from the fact that it is an invisible pink hamster.

~~ Paul

[c4ts]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
The hamster is pink, but it is normally invisible. When it chooses to become visible, then it is pink. The invisibility is used to make it nonfalsifiable. It if were always pink, it would be slightly more falsifiable, which would render it useless as an example of a nonfalsifiable pink hamster.

Also, as has come to light since the discovery of the hamster, even when it is invisible, it is visible to certain select people. To them, it appears pink, as you would expect from the fact that it is an invisible pink hamster.

~~ Paul

Then call it the "selectively invisible pink hamster."

[treborf]

Originally posted by hammegk

Reading through what we've said so far, I need to explain that "consciousness" imo is for all intents & purposes "life". Animal Consciousness is a function of whatever perceived system (like a human brain) is available to perceive with.

Consciousness=life is the intent to exist as a perceiving entity -- in my case *me*, the "perceived/perceiving bag'o bones" that consciousness (*I*) has available to it.

To me, the more interesting question is, at what point do "energy" interactions become "live"? Is not the level of "what-is" currently postulated in one guise as Higgs Field a viable possibility? If not, why not?

[Evidence:]

My one, indisputable, fact: that *I* think. ;)

And at a more basic level, Life "lives".
Well, thanks for taking a crack at explaining it. From the words you choose, it sounds like you're saying that consciousness is separate from the body ("the 'perceived/perceiving bag'o bones' that consciousness has available to it"). Please correct me if I'm wrong. Can this hypothesis be tested through experimentation?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Davidsmith,

What is all of this "roughly" nonsense?

When I talk about the assumptions of science, I am not talking about the assumptions you must make to account for the fact that, so far, science has seemed to work pretty well. I am talking about the assumptions you must make in order to claim that the scientific method will work.


What is the difference between the assumptions you must make to account for the fact that, so far, science has seemed to work pretty well and the assumptions you must make in order to claim that the scientific method will work ? You have identified the latter (below) but not the former. The way I see it, both assumptions are one and the same.


Objectivity is one of the axioms of science. You can apply the scientific method without making this assumption, but if you do so, then you are just treating it as a heuristic, not as an actual logical framework for understanding the world.


Objectivity is indeed one of the axioms of science. However, we are trying to reach a conclusion as to whether this assumption of objectivity is valid. You can't use this assumption as a premise to then logically show how it is valid.

I agree you can apply the scientific method without the assumption of objectivity. And indeed if you do this you would not be able to use science as a framework for understanding the "world" but this "world" is the objective one.



Like I said, the very fact that reality functions according to logical rules, rules which we are not directly aware of, implies that there is more to reality than just our experiences.


That is not a fact. It is an assumption that is unfalsifiable. In reply to the "whats this roughly nonsense" comment, I am refering to the fact that no experience conforms to a consistent, stable and logical construction in an exact way. And claiming that its a fact that we are not directly aware of logical rules is again applying the assumption that these rules have an objective existence. Again, logical fallacy. In fact its plain to see that we are aware of these rules we contructed them in the first place.


Even if you take the metaphysical view that reality is constructed by your mind, you are assuming the existence of some part of your mind which is external to your experiences.

I have not taken the view that reality is constructed by your mind. Reality is Consciousness. The illusion of objective physical reality is constructed by your mind.



The axioms of science, of which the claim that reality functions according to consistent logical rules is one, constitute a falsifiable hypothesis. Namely the hypothesis that science will work.


How does this address what I said ? What do you mean by science "working". Do you mean these axioms will enable us to gain objective knowledge ? If so, then you have to first make the assumption of objectivity ! This is the assumption that we are trying to justify in the debate. You can't justify it by first making the assumption of objectivity and then show how science (which is based on this assumption) can give us knowledge about objective reality !



That is nonsensical. In order for the scientific method to give us any knowledge at all, there must be knowledge for it to give us.

Under idealism this must be knowledge about the relationships between aspects of our experience. Science works on forming relationships between observations. The debate here is whether we are justified in giving these relationships a separate ontological existence (objectivity) to the realm from which we extracted these relationships (Consciousness).


There must be facts about reality that it can reveal to us. In short, there must be more to reality than just our experiences.

Or there must be relationships within the realm of Consciousness that we are able to extract. We extract these relationships from experiences and they manifest within the realm of Consciousness. Consciousness has not been supervened.

note: I speak of Consciousness and Experience. I actually give the same meaning to each as a unified collective term, not any individual, isolated qualia such as redness. It is the quality of pure Consciousness that can be regarded as the nature of reality. it is the quality that is common to any individual experience we can identify.


What part of the above did you not understand? If there is some aspect of your mind which you do not have direct conscious access to, then it is something beyond your experiences.


Your statement doesn't make sense. Having an "aspect of your mind" you do not have "conscious access" to is a contradiction. Perhaps you could expand on your definition of "mind" and "conscious access" in this context. Remember that I am using Experience (I have given it a capital to avoid confusion) to mean a common quality to every individual experience we have. I'll also call that Consciousness. There would have to be something beyond Consciousness itself. An aspect of your mind is not beyond Consciousness even if it is a contructed logical framework.


Even Idealism must posit the existence of something beyond your actual experiences, even if it only assumes that this something is just another part of your mind.

There is a subtle distinction to what I'm saying. I'm saying there is nothing beyond Experience. Thats different to saying there is nothing beyond my experiences. My experiences change. Your "mind" changes and is not equivalent to Consciousness.

[Diamond]

Originally posted by treborf

Thanks for the answer. Since idealism doesn't see consciousness as a function of the brain, how does it explain consciousness? In other words, given a few sentences, in plain language, how would idealism complete the following: "Consciousness is __________________". What evidence is there for this explanation?

Thanks again.

treborf [/B]

I believe I have already answered this at the top of page 5 ;)

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by treborf
Davidsmith73 or hammegk, do you agree with the mainstream scientific view that consciousness is a function of the brain? I think you don't, but can you please confirm this?

Thanks in advance.

treborf

I don't think Consciousness is a function of the brain. I do have a distinction to make between Consciousness itself and someones mind which is a set of identifiable experiences at a point in time. The way I can best describe Consciousness itself (at the moment) is to think about the quality that is common to every individual conscious exprience or feeling you have. For example, fear, redness, love, the smell of s**t. They all have one common quality which is that they manifest as a conscious experience. That base quality, Consciousness, I regard as the fundamental nature of reality. (At least for now ;) )

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Loki


Well, first off I was referring to Idealism's "purpose for the existence of the universe", not "purpose for the existence of consciousness".

Do you mean the physical universe or at least what idealism refers to as the illusion of a physical univserse ?


Why don't I think "it just is" is acceptable under Idealism to explain the universe? Because Idealism posits that consciousness is the 'core'. Well, actually it's more accurate to say that Idealism posits that something that is in some way similar or related to what we perceive as consciousness here in the "real world" is the 'core'. As an aside, I find it sort of significant that *everything* that I consider to be my consciousness is in someway a reference to something in the "real world" - if the "real world" was taken away, or I try to imagine having never been exposed to the "real world", then I have a hard time thinking of what "consciousness" might be.


Mystics and Hindu types claim to have experienced this through deep meditation. They cannot describe it, which is a shame but I think expected since qualia are only amenable to ostensive definitions (eg redness). So of there is nothing remotely similar to the feeling of "pure" Consciousness then you would have no hope of describing it to someone else. Perhaps you should try becoming a Hindu ;)


But I'm wandering off track ... why aren't I comfortable with "it just is" under Idealism? Well, because it seems to me that (in the world I can see) consciousness that creates always has a purpose for that creation. The creation is to solve a problem, or to explore an idea.

I don't understand. Could you elaborate ?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by hammegk

Reading through what we've said so far, I need to explain that "consciousness" imo is for all intents & purposes "life". Animal Consciousness is a function of whatever perceived system (like a human brain) is available to perceive with.

Consciousness=life is the intent to exist as a perceiving entity -- in my case *me*, the "perceived/perceiving bag'o bones" that consciousness (*I*) has available to it.

To me, the more interesting question is, at what point do "energy" interactions become "live"? Is not the level of "what-is" currently postulated in one guise as Higgs Field a viable possibility? If not, why not?



Hammegk,

I don't really understand what you're getting at when you say the question must be "what is the difference between life and non-life".

What is the relevance between the nature of consciousness and the criteria that we apply to our definitions of a living or dead entity ?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

C4ts suggests:Then call it the "selectively invisible pink hamster."
Actually, selectively invisible pink hamster orbiting Neptune, or SIPHON for short. Excellent, thank you, sir!

~~ Paul

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

What is the difference between the assumptions you must make to account for the fact that, so far, science has seemed to work pretty well and the assumptions you must make in order to claim that the scientific method will work ? You have identified the latter (below) but not the former. The way I see it, both assumptions are one and the same.

Any number of assumptions could account for the fact that, up till now, science has seemed to work. Such assumptions may or may not imply that science will continue to work, and will work for all observable phenomena.

The scientific framework I have presented is the minimal set of assumptions necessary to logically derive the scientific method. The assumption that reality is objective is one necessary assumption in that framework. So is the assumption that reality functions according to consistent logical rules, and the assumption that those rules can, in principle, be derived from our observations.

Objectivity is one of the axioms of science. You can apply the scientific method without making this assumption, but if you do so, then you are just treating it as a heuristic, not as an actual logical framework for understanding the world.
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Objectivity is indeed one of the axioms of science. However, we are trying to reach a conclusion as to whether this assumption of objectivity is valid. You can't use this assumption as a premise to then logically show how it is valid.

The very idea of trying to demonstrate that an axiom is valid, is nonsensical. If you could do that it would not be an axiom.

I agree you can apply the scientific method without the assumption of objectivity. And indeed if you do this you would not be able to use science as a framework for understanding the "world" but this "world" is the objective one.

That's the whole point. The purpose of science is to understand the world around us. If you simply assume that there is no World, and only your experiences, then there is nothing there to be understood.

Like I said, the very fact that reality functions according to logical rules, rules which we are not directly aware of, implies that there is more to reality than just our experiences.
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That is not a fact. It is an assumption that is unfalsifiable. In reply to the "whats this roughly nonsense" comment, I am refering to the fact that no experience conforms to a consistent, stable and logical construction in an exact way. And claiming that its a fact that we are not directly aware of logical rules is again applying the assumption that these rules have an objective existence. Again, logical fallacy. In fact its plain to see that we are aware of these rules we contructed them in the first place.

How can we apply the scientific method if we don't assume that there are rules for science to find? Once again, this assumption is an axiom. Nobody is claiming that it can be proven!

Even if you take the metaphysical view that reality is constructed by your mind, you are assuming the existence of some part of your mind which is external to your experiences.
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I have not taken the view that reality is constructed by your mind. Reality is Consciousness. The illusion of objective physical reality is constructed by your mind.

That is just semantics. Either way, the fact remains that you are assuming the existence of more than just your experiences, regardless of whether that additional stuff is assumed to be part of your mind, or something else entirely.

The axioms of science, of which the claim that reality functions according to consistent logical rules is one, constitute a falsifiable hypothesis. Namely the hypothesis that science will work.
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How does this address what I said ? What do you mean by science "working". Do you mean these axioms will enable us to gain objective knowledge ? If so, then you have to first make the assumption of objectivity ! This is the assumption that we are trying to justify in the debate. You can't justify it by first making the assumption of objectivity and then show how science (which is based on this assumption) can give us knowledge about objective reality !

I mean quite simply that science makes predictions about what we expect to observe. Those predictions are testable. Science can be clearly and unambiguously demonstrated to work. If it did not, then that would falsify the axioms of science. None of them individually can be falsified, but the framework can.

That is how it works with any scientific theory. The individual claims of the theory, taken out of context, cannot be falsified, because you could always invent ad-hoc explanations for why the predictions of the theory failed. But the theory as a whole is falsifiable.

That is nonsensical. In order for the scientific method to give us any knowledge at all, there must be knowledge for it to give us.
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Under idealism this must be knowledge about the relationships between aspects of our experience. Science works on forming relationships between observations. The debate here is whether we are justified in giving these relationships a separate ontological existence (objectivity) to the realm from which we extracted these relationships (Consciousness).

Once again, without a sound logical framework from which the scientific method can be logically derived, there is no logical way for us to model the relationships between our observations. It is simply not logically possible to do this without making some assumptions about the nature of those relationships.

There must be facts about reality that it can reveal to us. In short, there must be more to reality than just our experiences.
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Or there must be relationships within the realm of Consciousness that we are able to extract. We extract these relationships from experiences and they manifest within the realm of Consciousness. Consciousness has not been supervened.

Irrelevant semantics. It doesn't make any difference whether you claim it is part of consciousness or not. It is still something more than just our experiences.

note: I speak of Consciousness and Experience. I actually give the same meaning to each as a unified collective term, not any individual, isolated qualia such as redness. It is the quality of pure Consciousness that can be regarded as the nature of reality. it is the quality that is common to any individual experience we can identify.

In other words, you are assuming that there is more to it than just the experiences. You are also making assumptions about its nature.

You can't get around the assumption of objectivity. Any statement of the form "This is how things are" has a built in assumption of objectivity.

Even idealism assumes the existence of an objective reality. It just makes the additional assumptions about the nature of that reality.

What part of the above did you not understand? If there is some aspect of your mind which you do not have direct conscious access to, then it is something beyond your experiences.
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Your statement doesn't make sense. Having an "aspect of your mind" you do not have "conscious access" to is a contradiction. Perhaps you could expand on your definition of "mind" and "conscious access" in this context. Remember that I am using Experience (I have given it a capital to avoid confusion) to mean a common quality to every individual experience we have. I'll also call that Consciousness. There would have to be something beyond Consciousness itself. An aspect of your mind is not beyond Consciousness even if it is a contructed logical framework.

If there is nothing more to your mind than what you have direct conscious access to, and everything that exists is part of your mind, then it is not possible for there to be anything that you do not know. Surely you are not claiming to be omniscient?

Like I said before, there must be more to reality that just your experiences for there to be any knowledge about reality for science to provide you with.

Even Idealism must posit the existence of something beyond your actual experiences, even if it only assumes that this something is just another part of your mind.
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There is a subtle distinction to what I'm saying. I'm saying there is nothing beyond Experience. Thats different to saying there is nothing beyond my experiences. My experiences change. Your "mind" changes and is not equivalent to Consciousness.

If there is a difference between "Experience", and your experiences, then you are assuming the existence of something beyond just your experiences. You are assuming objectivity.


Dr. Stupid

[hammegk]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

Hammegk,

I don't really understand what you're getting at when you say the question must be "what is the difference between life and non-life".

What is the relevance between the nature of consciousness and the criteria that we apply to our definitions of a living or dead entity ?
And I don't understand your inability to see what, to me, is an unbreakable chain from first living "what-is" to human consciousness. Life vs non-life is the biggest hurdle imo.


Paul & C4ts: When do you plan to quit your day jobs & try stand-up comedy? :D

The question to be answered is "mind" vs "matter". In your examples, "something" is thinking. No I will never know if I'm just "its" dream. Axiomatically, and heeding TLOP as we currently model it, I chose *I* as most parsimonious, and by further axiom agree *you* also think.

[Stimpy]: I agree with everything you stated in the post above answering davidsmith, but your comments offer no help in the decision of mind vs matter. For science the answer is (currently)irrelevant.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:The question to be answered is "mind" vs "matter". In your examples, "something" is thinking. No I will never know if I'm just "its" dream. Axiomatically, and heeding TLOP as we currently model it, I chose *I* as most parsimonious, and by further axiom agree *you* also think.
That's fine, but you need a mechanism to cause us both to think we experience more or less the same "external reality." As Stimpy keeps saying, you needs an objectifier.

~~ Paul

[treborf]

Originally posted by davidsmith73


I don't think Consciousness is a function of the brain. I do have a distinction to make between Consciousness itself and someones mind which is a set of identifiable experiences at a point in time. The way I can best describe Consciousness itself (at the moment) is to think about the quality that is common to every individual conscious exprience or feeling you have. For example, fear, redness, love, the smell of s**t. They all have one common quality which is that they manifest as a conscious experience. That base quality, Consciousness, I regard as the fundamental nature of reality. (At least for now ;) )
Thanks for your explanation. I'll ask you the same follow-up question as I asked hammegk: how would someone go about testing this explanation of consciousness through experimentation?

Thanks,
treborf

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Hammegk,

I agree with everything you stated in the post above answering davidsmith, but your comments offer no help in the decision of mind vs matter. For science the answer is (currently)irrelevant.

That is why I reject the distinction as meaningless.

We have to make certain assumptions about the nature of reality in order to construct a framework for understanding it (science). I see no point in making any further assumptions. If a question cannot, even in principle, be answered by science, then I am quite content to simply say "I don't know", and move onto something that actually matters.

Quite simply, I don't care whether reality is ontologically "material", or ontologically "mental", or even if its true nature is pluralistic. It simply doesn't make any difference. I have no way of knowing, and even if I did know, that knowledge would not provide any practical benefit.

What's more, when you think about it, any speculation we make about things which we have no information about, is almost certainly doomed to be wrong. Simply guessing something unknowable, and believing it is true, is nothing more than monumental over-optimism, and wishful thinking.

Dr. Stupid

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

That's fine, but you need a mechanism to cause us both to think we experience more or less the same "external reality." As Stimpy keeps saying, you needs an objectifier.

~~ Paul

Umm, the only "thing" *I* can effect/affect is the neural system in *me*. The Laws of "What-Is" seem to handle the objectivity problem.

However the effect/affect does can carry forward to the perceived world, via *my* thought (&faith) carried forward to words & acts. I.E. "Faith" can move mountains -- some organization & machines would make it easier (for *me* ;) ).

[davidsmith73]

Stimpy, before we go any further with this debate, I would like to know your definition of "objective" please.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

Stimpy, before we go any further with this debate, I would like to know your definition of "objective" please.

Anything which exists independently of your awareness of it. Note that this does not rule out the possibility that you may be a part of objective reality. In fact, the fact that you interact with the rest of objective reality implies that you are a part of it.

Dr. Stupid

[Loki]

davidsmith73,

Mystics and Hindu types claim to have experienced this through deep meditation. They cannot describe it, ... So of there is nothing remotely similar to the feeling of "pure" Consciousness then you would have no hope of describing it to someone else. Perhaps you should try becoming a Hindu
Yes, well, a mystic telling me he has experienced something that he cannot describe doesn't exactly overwhelm me with confidence that his experience was "the true nature of consciousness". I'll pass on the offer of Hinduism for now.

don't understand. Could you elaborate ?
I'm not sure! How else to express it?....Hmmm...*all* my experiece with consciousness has shown me that there is "intent" whenever a consciousness "creates". SO there was an "intent" behind the creation of the "illusion of a physical universe" under Idealism. So "just is" doesn't cut it as an explanation - which leaves : Why did the Uberconsciousness(es) create the illusion of a physciual universe? I don't expect you or anyone else to be able top answer that question, which says to me that Idealism raises a question that it can't answer. Not so under materialism - "just is" is perfectly acceptable.

[slimshady2357]

Yes, the "just is" would be the answer to "Why does the Ubermind exist?" ;)

But Loki, if I was to ask you "Why are the laws of the universe the way they are?" Wouldn't you find "they just are like that" acceptable?

So why can't an Idealist say to the question "Why does the Ubermind act as it does?" with "the laws of the mind of the Ubermind 'just are'"?

In my opinion there are no satisfactory answers from either side to these types of questions. I have doubts there evn can be.

Adam

[hammegk]

Slim, you & I agree on that, anyway. Hope that doesn't worry you too much. :D

Back to a basic question for homo sap (and least some other lifeforms) at the higher/highest levels of intellect:

Is "thought" a function of brain activity, or

Is brain activity a function of "thought"?

Which answer leads to the fewest logical inconsistencies -- there are a fair number of somewhat similar questions imo -- in your mind?

[Loki]

slimshady2357,

So why can't an Idealist say to the question "Why does the Ubermind act as it does?" with "the laws of the mind of the Ubermind 'just are'"?
Sure, the "Ubermind" can just be I guess - but under idealism the ubermind creates the (illusion of a) real physical universe. Again, this creation is an act of teh Ubermind - therefore, it reflects the intent of the Ubermind. So I find "just is" to be somewhat contradictory - we have a Ubermind sufficiently powerful to generate "billions and billions" os starts, etc into existence, but we are to assume it did this for no reason? It's possible - I';m just saying that I find it "contrary" to the nature of an Ubermind to suppose that it wold act without a reason.

In my opinion there are no satisfactory answers from either side to these types of questions. I have doubts there evn can be
Yes, I agree there are no answers here. And I agree it may remain that way. I was simply offering what seems to me to be a "reasonable default position" about why there is a physcial universe (or an illusion of such) - under materialism, "just is" seems fine. Under Idealism "just is" seems to go against the flow of the concept of a conscious creator. I think Idealism stringly implies "because...", but then has no way to answer it. Materialism doesn't require a "because..."

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
davidsmith,


The scientific framework I have presented is the minimal set of assumptions necessary to logically derive the scientific method. The assumption that reality is objective is one necessary assumption in that framework. So is the assumption that reality functions according to consistent logical rules, and the assumption that those rules can, in principle, be derived from our observations.


The assumption that reality is objective is indeed needed to logically derive the scientific method as a method for obtaining objective knowledge. Without this assumption, we can perfectly well continue the two step process of theory and observation. However, the knowledge gained would not be about an objective reality, rather it would simply be a description of particular experiential relationships we find existing within the realm of Consciousness.



That's the whole point. The purpose of science is to understand the world around us. If you simply assume that there is no World, and only your experiences, then there is nothing there to be understood.


The purpose of science holding the assumption of an objective reality is to understand the "world around us", because the "world around us" contains that very assumption. If there is no objective reality then science becomes a method for describing particular experiential relationships we find existing within the realm of Consciousness.



How can we apply the scientific method if we don't assume that there are rules for science to find?


observation and theory. One is a description of the other. You do not have to assume that the theory is describing a separate ontological realm to the realm from which you compare your theoretical description.


That is just semantics.

I must object to your habit of using this phrase. Semantics is very important to this debate because a large part of it is the discussion of particular meanings of words. A debate would get very far if we were debating two different things.



Either way, the fact remains that you are assuming the existence of more than just your experiences, regardless of whether that additional stuff is assumed to be part of your mind, or something else entirely.


I disagree here. And this is where semantics is important. The word "mind" can mean quite different things depending on who you are talking to. The way you have used it above, I would assume you are talking about it in the same sense as your individual consciousness. Individual consciousness clearly lies in the realm of Experience. In that sense, if we assume the existence of something outside of the realm of Experience then that additional stuff cannot by definition be part of your mind. So what you have said above is a contradiction.


I mean quite simply that science makes predictions about what we expect to observe. Those predictions are testable. Science can be clearly and unambiguously demonstrated to work. If it did not, then that would falsify the axioms of science. None of them individually can be falsified, but the framework can.


So by "work" you mean that a theory (which makes descriptive predictions within a logical framework) matches observations. In other words, certain observations fall into the category of forming roughly logical and consistent relationships to other observations. The assumption of objectivity does not have to come into it.



Once again, without a sound logical framework from which the scientific method can be logically derived, there is no logical way for us to model the relationships between our observations. It is simply not logically possible to do this without making some assumptions about the nature of those relationships.


Show me how it is not possible for us to model the relationships between our observations without the assumption of objectivity. Describing relationships between your observations does not need the assumption of objectivity.



Me: Or there must be relationships within the realm of Consciousness that we are able to extract. We extract these relationships from experiences and they manifest within the realm of Consciousness. Consciousness has not been supervened.

Stimpy: Irrelevant semantics. It doesn't make any difference whether you claim it is part of consciousness or not. It is still something more than just our experiences.


:eek: Of course it makes a difference if you claim it is part of consciousness or not. Consciousness is the realm that objectivity is claimed to be ontologically separate from ! If your experience of the thing is the thing then there is nothing outside that realm of existence.


Me: I speak of Consciousness and Experience. I actually give the same meaning to each as a unified collective term, not any individual, isolated qualia such as redness. It is the quality of pure Consciousness that can be regarded as the nature of reality. it is the quality that is common to any individual experience we can identify.

Stimpy: In other words, you are assuming that there is more to it than just the experiences. You are also making assumptions about its nature.

You can't get around the assumption of objectivity. Any statement of the form "This is how things are" has a built in assumption of objectivity.

Even idealism assumes the existence of an objective reality. It just makes the additional assumptions about the nature of that reality.


Clearly not true. Refer to your definition of objectivity:

Anything which exists independently of your awareness of it.

I haven't made any assumption of there being more to reality than Consciousness. Any individual experience is manifest within this realm. Objectivity assumes the existence of a separate realm to the one within which experiences such as redness are contained.


Me: Remember that I am using Experience (I have given it a capital to avoid confusion) to mean a common quality to every individual experience we have. I'll also call that Consciousness. There would have to be something beyond Consciousness itself. An aspect of your mind is not beyond Consciousness even if it is a contructed logical framework.


Stimpy: If there is nothing more to your mind than what you have direct conscious access to, and everything that exists is part of your mind, then it is not possible for there to be anything that you do not know. Surely you are not claiming to be omniscient?

Like I said before, there must be more to reality that just your experiences for there to be any knowledge about reality for science to provide you with.


Everything that exists is not part of your mind. Its the other way round. Your mind is part of Consciousness. Your mind is defined as what you experience within a certain time frame. For example, right now I am not experiencing pain. Pain is not part of my mind right, but the contents of my mind at any moment is not equivalent to reality.


If there is a difference between "Experience", and your experiences, then you are assuming the existence of something beyond just your experiences. You are assuming objectivity.


No. Objectivity = anything which exists independently of your awareness of it. It is a realm beyond the realm of Experience. Your experiences (collectively termed your mind) are within this single realm. The single realm of Experience does not exist independently from your individual experiences.

Consider what I am saying from the perspective of materialism. In the same sense as above there could be said to be a difference between an electron and the fundamental objective reality. However you would not say that the electron exists independently from this fundamental reality. The electron is part of it.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

The assumption that reality is objective is indeed needed to logically derive the scientific method as a method for obtaining objective knowledge. Without this assumption, we can perfectly well continue the two step process of theory and observation. However, the knowledge gained would not be about an objective reality, rather it would simply be a description of particular experiential relationships we find existing within the realm of Consciousness.

What is this "realm of consciousness" of which you speak? If it includes more than just your actual experiences, then it is something which objectively exists, and knowledge about it is objective knowledge.

How can we apply the scientific method if we don't assume that there are rules for science to find?
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observation and theory. One is a description of the other. You do not have to assume that the theory is describing a separate ontological realm to the realm from which you compare your theoretical description.

I am not making any claims about ontological separateness of experiences and reality. on the contrary, I freely acknowledge that our experiences are a part of objective reality.

Either way, the fact remains that you are assuming the existence of more than just your experiences, regardless of whether that additional stuff is assumed to be part of your mind, or something else entirely.
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I disagree here. And this is where semantics is important. The word "mind" can mean quite different things depending on who you are talking to. The way you have used it above, I would assume you are talking about it in the same sense as your individual consciousness. Individual consciousness clearly lies in the realm of Experience. In that sense, if we assume the existence of something outside of the realm of Experience then that additional stuff cannot by definition be part of your mind. So what you have said above is a contradiction.

Nonsense. There is more to your own consciousness than just your experiences. Simply defining "realm of experience" to include that extra stuff, does not change the fact that it objectively exists.

Once again, without a sound logical framework from which the scientific method can be logically derived, there is no logical way for us to model the relationships between our observations. It is simply not logically possible to do this without making some assumptions about the nature of those relationships.
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Show me how it is not possible for us to model the relationships between our observations without the assumption of objectivity. Describing relationships between your observations does not need the assumption of objectivity.

I have already explained this. There has to be more to reality that just our experiences. Even if you just look at science as modeling our experiences, you have to first assume that there are reasons why we experience the things we do. There has to be more to it than just the experience, or there is nothing there for science to tell us.

Me: Or there must be relationships within the realm of Consciousness that we are able to extract. We extract these relationships from experiences and they manifest within the realm of Consciousness. Consciousness hhaas not been supervened.

Stimpy: Irrelevant semantics. It doesn't make any difference whether you claim it is part of consciousness or not. It is still something more than just our experiences.
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Of course it makes a difference if you claim it is part of consciousness or not. Consciousness is the realm that objectivity is claimed to be ontologically separate from ! If your experience of the thing is the thing then there is nothing outside that realm of existence.

I never said anything about ontological separateness. That is dualism. I am not a dualist, and science in no way has anything to do with dualism.

Our experiences are not ontologically separate from objective reality. They are a part of objective reality.

Even idealism assumes the existence of an objective reality. It just makes the additional assumptions about the nature of that reality.
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Clearly not true. Refer to your definition of objectivity:

Anything which exists independently of your awareness of it.

I haven't made any assumption of there being more to reality than Consciousness. Any individual experience is manifest within this realm.

I said your awareness of it, not consciousness. Idealism implicitly assumes that there is more to your consciousness than just what you are aware of.

Objectivity assumes the existence of a separate realm to the one within which experiences such as redness are contained.

No, that is dualism. Objectivity only assumes that there is more to reality than just what you are aware of.

Everything that exists is not part of your mind. Its the other way round. Your mind is part of Consciousness. Your mind is defined as what you experience within a certain time frame. For example, right now I am not experiencing pain. Pain is not part of my mind right, but the contents of my mind at any moment is not equivalent to reality.

That is a claim of objective reality. You are claiming that consciousness objectively exists.

In fact, all you are doing is renaming reality to be "consciousness", and then misapply some vague definition of subjectivity to claim that reality is not objective.

One does not have to be a dualist to believe in objective reality. One must simply accept that there is more to reality than just your experiences. Monistic philosophies like Idealism and Materialism both do this. Neither of those philosophies claim that there is an objective realm separate from a subjective realm. They both hold that everything is part of one realm, and that this one realm contains more than just your experiences.

Of course, one need not make any assumptions about ontological realms. All you need to do is reject Solipsism, which means accepting that there is more to reality than just your experiences.

Dr. Stupid

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

One does not have to be a dualist to believe in objective reality.

Odd, we agree on that. :D


One must simply accept that there is more to reality than just your experiences. Monistic philosophies like Idealism and Materialism both do this. Neither of those philosophies claim that there is an objective realm separate from a subjective realm. They both hold that everything is part of one realm, and that this one realm contains more than just your experiences.
Amazingly, we agree again!


Of course, one need not make any assumptions about ontological realms.
True, but philosophy & logic invite one to examine both monist positions for inconsistencies.


All you need to do is reject Solipsism, which means accepting that there is more to reality than just your experiences.
Dr. Stupid
Damn. Agreement again.

How would prove, or disprove that you, or I, are "different" from all else. I'm still stuck on that prudent "gentlemens' agreement"; we are all alike, "thinking".

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Hammegk,

Of course, one need not make any assumptions about ontological realms.
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True, but philosophy & logic invite one to examine both monist positions for inconsistencies.

Examine them all you want, but logic will never be able to tell you which, if either of them, is correct.

All you need to do is reject Solipsism, which means accepting that there is more to reality than just your experiences.
Dr. Stupid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Damn. Agreement again.

How would prove, or disprove that you, or I, are "different" from all else. I'm still stuck on that prudent "gentlemens' agreement"; we are all alike, "thinking".

There's the problem. You are looking for proof. When it comes to proof, you are always going to be disappointed. At some point you have to simply acknowledge that proof is not obtainable, and settle for evidence instead.

Once you accept that axioms of science (objectivity, logical rules, and empiricism), the theory that you are just another person is a falsifiable theory. You don't need to have faith, or accept any "gentlemen's agreement". There is plenty of supporting evidence.

Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
davidsmith,

What is this "realm of consciousness" of which you speak? If it includes more than just your actual experiences, then it is something which objectively exists, and knowledge about it is objective knowledge.


The realm of Consciousness doesn't exist independently of your experience of it. Every single experience we have is a manifestation of this reality.



I am not making any claims about ontological separateness of experiences and reality. on the contrary, I freely acknowledge that our experiences are a part of objective reality.


In that case your definition of objectivity is contradictory. You say objectivity = anything existing (ontology) independently (separate) from your experience of it. This is clearly a claim about the ontological separateness of objective reality from experience.
Perhaps you want to change your definition ;)



Nonsense. There is more to your own consciousness than just your experiences. Simply defining "realm of experience" to include that extra stuff, does not change the fact that it objectively exists.


Objectivity = anything that exists independently from your experience of it.

The single realm of Consciousness does not objectively exist. It is experiential by definition. Every experience we have is a manifestation of Consciousness and this is the only existence there is.



I never said anything about ontological separateness. That is dualism. I am not a dualist, and science in no way has anything to do with dualism.

Our experiences are not ontologically separate from objective reality. They are a part of objective reality.


Like I said, this makes your definition of objectivity meaningless. Your definition of objectivity cannot get away from dualism and the hard problem results.



I said your awareness of it, not consciousness. Idealism implicitly assumes that there is more to your consciousness than just what you are aware of.

This "just what you are aware of" is a bit unclear to me. If I am just aware of red and yellow right now is green going to be classed as "more than I am aware of" ?



Objectivity only assumes that there is more to reality than just what you are aware of.


No, you said that objectivity assumes that something existsindependently of your experience of it.

That is dualism. Try again at a definition ?


That is a claim of objective reality. You are claiming that consciousness objectively exists.

No. Consciousness is contained within every single experience we have. If there is no Consciousness then there are no experiences. There is no reason to assume that Consciousness exists separately from any experience because such a concept is meaningless. If you want to picture a Venn diagram, any individual experience is a small circle within the larger circle of Consciousness. So Consciousness is not separate from any experience, rather any experience is a manifestation of Consciousness.



One does not have to be a dualist to believe in objective reality. One must simply accept that there is more to reality than just your experiences.


Objectivity assumes that something existsindependently of your experience of it.

Dualism


Monistic philosophies like Idealism and Materialism both do this. Neither of those philosophies claim that there is an objective realm separate from a subjective realm. They both hold that everything is part of one realm, and that this one realm contains more than just your experiences.


What do you mean by "more than just your experiences" ?

If this is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it ?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

What is this "realm of consciousness" of which you speak? If it includes more than just your actual experiences, then it is something which objectively exists, and knowledge about it is objective knowledge.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The realm of Consciousness doesn't exist independently of your experience of it. Every single experience we have is a manifestation of this reality.

That is no different than me saying "Objective reality does not exist independently of your experience of it. Every single experience we have is a manifestation of objective reality".

You are mistakenly interpreting objective reality to mean some sort of ontological independence from experiences. That is dualism. All that reality being objective means is that there is more to reality than just your experiences.

I am not making any claims about ontological separateness of experiences and reality. on the contrary, I freely acknowledge that our experiences are a part of objective reality.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In that case your definition of objectivity is contradictory. You say objectivity = anything existing (ontology) independently (separate) from your experience of it. This is clearly a claim about the ontological separateness of objective reality from experience.
Perhaps you want to change your definition ;)

I have no need to change it. Not only did you misinterpret it, but it is quite clear that you misinterpreted it, since I clarified within the definition that I was not referring to any kind of ontological separateness, but instead only to the fact that there is more to reality than just your awareness of it.

Here is what I actually said again:

Anything which exists independently of your awareness of it. Note that this does not rule out the possibility that you may be a part of objective reality. In fact, the fact that you interact with the rest of objective reality implies that you are a part of it.

I specifically clarified that I wasn't referring to any kind of ontological "separateness". I also clarified after that post that by "independently" I simply mean that there is more to it than just the awareness, and that it is only independent in the sense that the stuff you are aware of is there even when you are not aware of it.

Quite frankly, I can only imagine two ways that you could have so grossly misinterpreted what I have been saying:

1) You aren't really trying to understand my position. You think you already know what it is, and are just arguing against that.

2) You are deliberately misrepresenting my position in order to make it easier to attack.

I do not know, or care, which it is.

Nonsense. There is more to your own consciousness than just your experiences. Simply defining "realm of experience" to include that extra stuff, does not change the fact that it objectively exists.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Objectivity = anything that exists independently from your experience of it.

The single realm of Consciousness does not objectively exist. It is experiential by definition.

By whose definition? Are you really claiming there is nothing more than just your experiences? Are you really a solipsist? If so, why are you arguing with yourself?

Every experience we have is a manifestation of Consciousness and this is the only existence there is.

That is just monism. Monism is a claim about objective reality. Objectivity is not equivalent to dualism. I am not a dualist.

I never said anything about ontological separateness. That is dualism. I am not a dualist, and science in no way has anything to do with dualism.

Our experiences are not ontologically separate from objective reality. They are a part of objective reality.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Like I said, this makes your definition of objectivity meaningless. Your definition of objectivity cannot get away from dualism and the hard problem results.

There is no dualism in my definition. Not unless you artificially put it there. Claiming there is more to reality than just your experiences does not imply dualism. Both Idealism and Materialism make this assumption, as does the scientific framework.

I said your awareness of it, not consciousness. Idealism implicitly assumes that there is more to your consciousness than just what you are aware of.
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This "just what you are aware of" is a bit unclear to me. If I am just aware of red and yellow right now is green going to be classed as "more than I am aware of" ?

Don't be stupid. I am not interested in such mindless sophisms.

What you are aware of is the stuff you are experiencing. When you claim that there are patterns to your experiences, patterns which you are not currently aware of, you are assuming that there is more to reality than just what you are aware of.

Objectivity only assumes that there is more to reality than just what you are aware of.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No, you said that objectivity assumes that something existsindependently of your experience of it.

That is dualism. Try again at a definition ?

I just gave you the definition. Objectivity means that there is more to reality than just what you are aware of. That is what I meant by "exists independently of your experience of it", as was clear from my definition, where I explicitly clarified that I was not talking about dualism.

This is silly. You aren't even arguing with me. You are arguing with some nonexistent dualist.

That is a claim of objective reality. You are claiming that consciousness objectively exists.
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No. Consciousness is contained within every single experience we have. If there is no Consciousness then there are no experiences. There is no reason to assume that Consciousness exists separately from any experience because such a concept is meaningless. If you want to picture a Venn diagram, any individual experience is a small circle within the larger circle of Consciousness. So Consciousness is not separate from any experience, rather any experience is a manifestation of Consciousness.

The fact that the consciousness circle contains more than just experiences is what makes it objective. Nobody is defending dualism here.

Monistic philosophies like Idealism and Materialism both do this. Neither of those philosophies claim that there is an objective realm separate from a subjective realm. They both hold that everything is part of one realm, and that this one realm contains more than just your experiences.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What do you mean by "more than just your experiences" ?

I already explained that.

If this is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it ?

An epistemological one.

I suppose you could claim it is an ontological claim too, using the right definition of ontological. But the fact remains that it is a claim about something knowable, unlike claims about unknowable ontological substances.



Dr. Stupid

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

Examine them all you want, but logic will never be able to tell you which, if either of them, is correct.

True, but I find fewer inconsistencies assuming idealism.


Once you accept that axioms of science (objectivity, logical rules, and empiricism), the theory that you are just another person is a falsifiable theory.
Depending on what you have in "mind;)" as a proof, materialism is falsifiable.


You don't need to have faith, or accept any "gentlemen's agreement". There is plenty of supporting evidence.
Dr. Stupid
Yup, and that evidence still supports either monist position. What would you propose be examined to disprove solipsism? Sorry I'm so slow seeing what you are intending as a test.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
davidsmith,

That is no different than me saying "Objective reality does not exist independently of your experience of it. Every single experience we have is a manifestation of objective reality".

My view is different in one important way. If I am conscious of a hammer in terms of visual, auditory and tactile experience, this hammer does not exist independently from these experiences regardless of whether you choose to call this non-ontological independent existence "objective".


You are mistakenly interpreting objective reality to mean some sort of ontological independence from experiences. That is dualism. All that reality being objective means is that there is more to reality than just your experiences.

So your definition of objectivity would view the hammer as existing independently from the visual, auditory and tactile experiences of the hammer, correct ? The hammer would exist in the absence of those experiences.

Ok , I can see how this would not involve a separate ontological existence.

However, my view does not involve this definition of objectivity and this is why. I shall take objectivity to mean the existence of a thing in the absence of the experience of that thing. I view reality to be experiential. No thing can exist in the absence of an experience of that thing.



I have no need to change it. Not only did you misinterpret it, but it is quite clear that you misinterpreted it, since I clarified within the definition that I was not referring to any kind of ontological separateness, but instead only to the fact that there is more to reality than just your awareness of it.

My mistake, sorry. So how do you figure that my view entails objectivity ? I have clearly stated that reality is experiential. This means that there can be no more to it than your experience of it.


Me: The single realm of Consciousness does not objectively exist. It is experiential by definition.

Stimpy: By whose definition? Are you really claiming there is nothing more than just your experiences? Are you really a solipsist? If so, why are you arguing with yourself?


By my definition. I don't put a label on my view. You can call it solipsism if you want. I don't really know what that would mean. I am claiming that no aspect of reality, including the single realm of Consciousness, exists without an experience of it. Any individual experience is a manifestation of Consciousness.


Me: Every experience we have is a manifestation of Consciousness and this is the only existence there is.

Stimpy: That is just monism. Monism is a claim about objective reality.


According to our definition of objectivity, my monism cannot be. Consciousness does not exist without an awareness of it. By definition, an awareness of anything must be a manifestation of Consciousness.


What you are aware of is the stuff you are experiencing. When you claim that there are patterns to your experiences, patterns which you are not currently aware of, you are assuming that there is more to reality than just what you are aware of.


I would say that such patterns do not exist if they are not experienced.


The fact that the consciousness circle contains more than just experiences is what makes it objective.

I gave the Venn diagram as an analogy for ontological equivalence. Since I now realise you are not talking about separate ontology I think the analogy is not appropriate for the current definition of objectivity.

If you take any individual experience, it is a manifestation of Consciousness. Consciousness exists experientially so there can be no existence when there are no experiences.



I suppose you could claim it is an ontological claim too, using the right definition of ontological. But the fact remains that it is a claim about something knowable, unlike claims about unknowable ontological substances.



It appears as if this suff of "more than just your experiences" cannot be truly known to exist.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Hammegk,

Examine them all you want, but logic will never be able to tell you which, if either of them, is correct.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

True, but I find fewer inconsistencies assuming idealism.

I don't know of any actual inconsistencies with either. At least, not with the most general forms of idealism and ontological materialism. Both metaphysics suffer from the same problems: No verifiability, and no way to distinguish the unverifiable things they claim exist from the unverifiable things they claim do not exist.

You don't need to have faith, or accept any "gentlemen's agreement". There is plenty of supporting evidence.
Dr. Stupid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yup, and that evidence still supports either monist position. What would you propose be examined to disprove solipsism? Sorry I'm so slow seeing what you are intending as a test.

The evidence does not support either monist position, because as you just pointed out, it is consistent with both. It only supports the falsifiable theory I presented, namely that I am just another person.


davidsmith,

That is no different than me saying "Objective reality does not exist independently of your experience of it. Every single experience we have is a manifestation of objective reality".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

My view is different in one important way. If I am conscious of a hammer in terms of visual, auditory and tactile experience, this hammer does not exist independently from these experiences regardless of whether you choose to call this non-ontological independent existence "objective".

Exactly. I am claiming that the hammer exists, and you are claiming that it does not, but that instead some inherently unknowable part of consciousness does, which is creating the illusion of the hammer.

We are both assuming the existence of something more than just the experiences. The only difference is that I am assuming that it is possible for me to extract information about this external world from my observations, and you are assuming that it is not.

I have no need to change it. Not only did you misinterpret it, but it is quite clear that you misinterpreted it, since I clarified within the definition that I was not referring to any kind of ontological separateness, but instead only to the fact that there is more to reality than just your awareness of it.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

My mistake, sorry. So how do you figure that my view entails objectivity ? I have clearly stated that reality is experiential. This means that there can be no more to it than your experience of it.

You are playing word games here. You have implicitly assumed the existence of more than just your experiences. All you are doing is arbitrarily calling this stuff part of the experiential realm. Calling it that doesn't make it something you experience.

Once again, if you are truly claiming that all that exists is your experiences, then by definition there cannot be any facts about reality that you do not know.

Stimpy: By whose definition? Are you really claiming there is nothing more than just your experiences? Are you really a solipsist? If so, why are you arguing with yourself?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

By my definition. I don't put a label on my view. You can call it solipsism if you want. I don't really know what that would mean. I am claiming that no aspect of reality, including the single realm of Consciousness, exists without an experience of it. Any individual experience is a manifestation of Consciousness.

Once again, calling it the "realm of consciousness" doesn't make it any less objective. If you are truly claiming that this realm does not include anything that you do not experience, then yes, that is solipsism.

As soon as you include other people's experiences, you are once again assuming objectivity, because you are assuming that those other people are actually other people, and not just more experiences you are having.

Stimpy: That is just monism. Monism is a claim about objective reality.
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According to our definition of objectivity, my monism cannot be. Consciousness does not exist without an awareness of it. By definition, an awareness of anything must be a manifestation of Consciousness.

Do you realize that there is a difference between saying that all experiences are a subset of consciousness, and that consciousness consists only of experiences?

What you are aware of is the stuff you are experiencing. When you claim that there are patterns to your experiences, patterns which you are not currently aware of, you are assuming that there is more to reality than just what you are aware of.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I would say that such patterns do not exist if they are not experienced.

Unless they are experienced, or unless you are experiencing them? Remember that if you assume other people have experiences too, you have already assumed an objective reality.

If you take any individual experience, it is a manifestation of Consciousness. Consciousness exists experientially so there can be no existence when there are no experiences.

Yes, I understand that this is your position. But if you are claiming that there is more to reality than just your experiences, then you have assumed reality is objective.

I suppose you could claim it is an ontological claim too, using the right definition of ontological. But the fact remains that it is a claim about something knowable, unlike claims about unknowable ontological substances.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

It appears as if this suff of "more than just your experiences" cannot be truly known to exist.

Of course it can. You just have to discard the ridiculous notion of absolute knowledge. I know that the World around me exists. To claim that is unknowable is nothing more than to define "knowledge" in a completely useless way.

As I said before, science provides us with knowledge about objective reality. Without the assumption of objectivity, there is nothing for science to tell us.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

I don't know of any actual inconsistencies with either. At least, not with the most general forms of idealism and ontological materialism. Both metaphysics suffer from the same problems: No verifiability, and no way to distinguish the unverifiable things they claim exist from the unverifiable things they claim do not exist.



Just to reiterate, your materialism is just as ontological as idealism. After all you hold the position that:

a) There is a reality which exists in abstraction from any conscious experience of it.

b) This reality has primary reality where as consciousness only enjoys a derived reality. This is because all consciousnesses can be reduced to this primary reality.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

DavidSmith73
My view is different in one important way. If I am conscious of a hammer in terms of visual, auditory and tactile experience, this hammer does not exist independently from these experiences regardless of whether you choose to call this non-ontological independent existence "objective".
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Exactly. I am claiming that the hammer exists, and you are claiming that it does not, but that instead some inherently unknowable part of consciousness does, which is creating the illusion of the hammer.



I suspect that David is claiming no such thing. If one can see and feel a hammer, feel its weight, swing it so that it impacts on other objects producing effects in the world, then to suggest the hammer is an illusion is I suggest vacuous.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Just to reiterate, your materialism is just as ontological as idealism. After all you hold the position that:

a) There is a reality which exists in abstraction from any conscious experience of it.

That is just the rejection of solipsism. It is an epistemological position, and is one which any non-solipsistic philosophy must make. Call it ontological if you want. I am not interested in such semantic nonsense.

b) This reality has primary reality where as consciousness only enjoys a derived reality. This is because all consciousnesses can be reduced to this primary reality.

First of all, my philosophy makes no such assumption. I make the claim that human conscious is just a part of reality, but that is no different than claiming that anything else that exists is part of reality.

To claim that everything is reducible to consciousness would be a metaphysical claim. To claim that consciousness is a part of reality is simply to acknowledge that it exists.

As for primacy, I only claim that consciousness does not appear to be necessary for reality to exist, based on the evidence that reality existed long before any people did. Once again, this is an epistemological claim, based on observation. It is not a metaphysical assumption.

You can continue to misrepresent my position if you want, but you are just being dishonest.

Exactly. I am claiming that the hammer exists, and you are claiming that it does not, but that instead some inherently unknowable part of consciousness does, which is creating the illusion of the hammer.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I suspect that David is claiming no such thing. If one can see and feel a hammer, feel its weight, swing it so that it impacts on other objects producing effects in the world, then to suggest the hammer is an illusion is I suggest vacuous.

I would tend to agree, but that is exactly what it would mean to say that there is nothing more to the hammer than your experiences.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Just to reiterate, your materialism is just as ontological as idealism. After all you hold the position that:

a) There is a reality which exists in abstraction from any conscious experience of it.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



That is just the rejection of solipsism.



No, I believe there is a version of solipsism that simply denies that other people have a inner mental life. Solipsism does not necessarily deny the existence of a material world (a world existing independently of my experiences which gives rise to my perceptual experiences).

Idealism rejects the notion of a material world (ie a non perceptually experienced reality), but normally accepts that other people have inner mental lives.

So idealism and solipsism really have nothing to do with each other.

BTW, one is necessarily committed to metaphysical and ontological positions if one is not a radical solipsist (ie both rejecting an external reality and a fortiori a material world, and rejecting that other people have inner mental lives).



It is an epistemological position,



No this is not correct. If there is a world in abstraction from our perceptions of it, we could never know it. It is an ontological commitment you are making here.


and is one which any non-solipsistic philosophy must make. Call it ontological if you want. I am not interested in such semantic nonsense.


I will indeed call it ontological because that's what it is. If you're interested in communicating in English you also are obliged to call it ontological.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
b) This reality has primary reality where as consciousness only enjoys a derived reality. This is because all consciousnesses can be reduced to this primary reality.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



First of all, my philosophy makes no such assumption. I make the claim that human conscious is just a part of reality, but that is no different than claiming that anything else that exists is part of reality.


You have agreed that consciousness supervenes on the physical. Are you now backing away from that position? Besides, if the physical does not have primary reality then the inherent reasonable position that we cease to exist when we die can no longer be maintained.




To claim that everything is reducible to consciousness would be a metaphysical claim.


It is indeed.




To claim that consciousness is a part of reality is simply to acknowledge that it exists.



Not a particularly bold claim then.



As for primacy, I only claim that consciousness does not appear to be necessary for reality to exist,



Has anyone ever experienced reality in the absence of conscious awareness? We know reality through experiencing it. We cannot know an unexperienced reality exists because one cannot experience an unexperienced reality, by definition. So if we only know a experienced reality exists, and experiences require consciousness, this means that, contrary to what you claim, we can only know about a reality which requires the conscious perception of it.




based on the evidence that reality existed long before any people did.



But how do you know that the past was determined rather than existing in a superposition of possible states?
http://www.discover.com/june_02/featuniverse.html


Once again, this is an epistemological claim, based on observation. It is not a metaphysical assumption.


No, saying the past existed in a concrete sense is metaphysical :) How could we possibly know it? Anyway, doesn't QM suggest otherwise?


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exactly. I am claiming that the hammer exists, and you are claiming that it does not, but that instead some inherently unknowable part of consciousness does, which is creating the illusion of the hammer.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I suspect that David is claiming no such thing. If one can see and feel a hammer, feel its weight, swing it so that it impacts on other objects producing effects in the world, then to suggest the hammer is an illusion is I suggest vacuous.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I would tend to agree, but that is exactly what it would mean to say that there is nothing more to the hammer than your experiences.



Not my experiences in particular. Any experiences whatsoever including the infinite mind's.

[Dancing David]

Mr Smith, I have good reason to believe (not know) that a photon that enters my eye may have existed for millions of years, prior to my perception of it.
Is this not proof of the 'objective' reality on the theoretical level.
( If you accept the theory that photons are wavicle that propagte through space at a quantifiable spped.)

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

That is just the rejection of solipsism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No, I believe there is a version of solipsism that simply denies that other people have a inner mental life. Solipsism does not necessarily deny the existence of a material world (a world existing independently of my experiences which gives rise to my perceptual experiences).

I have never heard of that being referred to as solipsism. It doesn't matter, though. My point still stands. Whether you are an ontological materialist, an idealist, or a naturalist, you have to assume that there is more to reality than just your experiences. Call that whatever you want to.

Idealism rejects the notion of a material world (ie a non perceptually experienced reality), but normally accepts that other people have inner mental lives.

Which is an assumption of objective reality. You are, at the very least, assuming that there is more to other people than just your own experiences of them.

So idealism and solipsism really have nothing to do with each other.

I know.

BTW, one is necessarily committed to metaphysical and ontological positions if one is not a radical solipsist (ie both rejecting an external reality and a fortiori a material world, and rejecting that other people have inner mental lives).

Call it whatever you want, Ian. I am not going to argue semantics with you anymore. If you want to claim that the assumption that there is more to reality than just your experiences, is an ontological or metaphysical one, go right ahead.

The fact remains that it is a necessary epistemological position for the construction of the scientific method. It is an assumption about the nature of our observations, not about something completely unknowable.

It is an epistemological position,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No this is not correct. If there is a world in abstraction from our perceptions of it, we could never know it. It is an ontological commitment you are making here.

That is where you are wrong. The above claim, that we could never know such a world, is an epistemological position. The claim that we can know about such a world is also an epistemological position. This is exactly the point of the scientific method.

If science just assumed the existence of something other than our experiences, without providing some method for acquiring knowledge about it, then that would be metaphysical nonsense. But that isn't what science does. Science assumes an objective reality, and then provides a logical framework for learning about that objective reality by observing it.

That is the key point. The scientific method connects this objective reality to our experiences, by assuming that reality functions according to logical rules, and that those rules can be inferred from our observations.

The simple fact is that we do have a considerable amount of knowledge about objective reality. Sure, that knowledge is all contingent on the assumption that reality is objective, but it is knowledge nonetheless.

First of all, my philosophy makes no such assumption. I make the claim that human conscious is just a part of reality, but that is no different than claiming that anything else that exists is part of reality.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You have agreed that consciousness supervenes on the physical. Are you now backing away from that position?

I don't recall ever agreeing to that. What I do recall is being completely baffled by what you mean by supervenience, since on one hand you described it as being equivalent to descriptive reductionism, and on the other hand you asserted that it was metaphysical.

I'm not going to play these word games with you Ian. You want me to use terms like "supervenience" and "ontology" so that you can insist that they mean something that contradicts my position.

Besides, if the physical does not have primary reality then the inherent reasonable position that we cease to exist when we die can no longer be maintained.

If we do not make any metaphysical assumptions about ontological primacy, and instead rely on science to reveal the logical relationships between consciousness and other stuff, then the hypothesis that our minds cease to exist when we die is clearly well-supported by the empirical evidence.

Human consciousness is pretty clearly a physical process in the brain. You can speculate all you want about non-human consciousness, meta-minds, Gods, and unknown aspects of human consciousness. I am not interested in such nonsense.

To claim that consciousness is a part of reality is simply to acknowledge that it exists.
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Not a particularly bold claim then.

So what's the problem then? Why make any metaphysical assumptions about role of consciousness in reality? Why not simply leave it up to science to determine what its role is?

As for primacy, I only claim that consciousness does not appear to be necessary for reality to exist,
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Has anyone ever experienced reality in the absence of conscious awareness?

That question is meaningless.

We know reality through experiencing it. We cannot know an unexperienced reality exists because one cannot experience an unexperienced reality, by definition. So if we only know a experienced reality exists, and experiences require consciousness, this means that, contrary to what you claim, we can only know about a reality which requires the conscious perception of it.

That does not follow at all. The fact that our only source of knowledge about reality is through our experiences, in no way implies that the existence of reality ontologically depends on our experiences.

based on the evidence that reality existed long before any people did.
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But how do you know that the past was determined rather than existing in a superposition of possible states?
http://www.discover.com/june_02/featuniverse.html

That link is philosophical nonsense, not science. It is also irrelevant to the issue. You cannot refute the fact that the Universe has existed longer than people have, without completely throwing out the very idea of scientific evidence.

Once again, this is an epistemological claim, based on observation. It is not a metaphysical assumption.
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No, saying the past existed in a concrete sense is metaphysical :)

I have no idea what you mean by a "concrete sense". At the very least, we must assume that it is possible to learn about the past by making observations now.

How could we possibly know it?

The same way we know anything. By constructing falsifiable theories, and testing them.

Anyway, doesn't QM suggest otherwise?

No, it doesn't. Certain metaphysical interpretations of QM do. That is irrelevant, since they are just blind speculation.

I would tend to agree, but that is exactly what it would mean to say that there is nothing more to the hammer than your experiences.
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Not my experiences in particular. Any experiences whatsoever including the infinite mind's.

Like I said, you are assuming the existence of an objective reality, by claiming that the infinite mind, which is not just a subset of your experiences, actually exists.


Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat



Exactly. I am claiming that the hammer exists, and you are claiming that it does not, but that instead some inherently unknowable part of consciousness does, which is creating the illusion of the hammer.

Well, the hammer does not really exist in an important sense according to both our views. In your view the hammer is a manifestation of a fundamental objective reality but it is a reality that exists regardless of any experience of its manifestations.

The hammer does not exist according to my view also. The experience of a hammer is a manifestation of Consciousness.

The difference is that the fundamental reality that manifests my hammer is contained within all the individual experiences that make the illusion of this thing I have called a hammer. There cannot be an instance whereby Consciousness exists without experiences. If you like, individual experiences consist of Consciousness.

I haven't made the claim that Consciousness is unknowable.


We are both assuming the existence of something more than just the experiences.

No. There is no more to Consciousness than is contained within any individual experience.


Me: So how do you figure that my view entails objectivity ? I have clearly stated that reality is experiential. This means that there can be no more to it than your experience of it

Stimpy: You are playing word games here. You have implicitly assumed the existence of more than just your experiences. All you are doing is arbitrarily calling this stuff part of the experiential realm. Calling it that doesn't make it something you experience.

Whats with all this "word games" and "thats just semantics" excuse all the time ? Can I not express meaning through words or something ? If I'm changing my meanings to suit the argument then by all means (no pun intended) point out where.

Where have I assumed the existence of more than just your experiences ?



Once again, if you are truly claiming that all that exists is your experiences, then by definition there cannot be any facts about reality that you do not know.


I don't follow this :confused:



Once again, calling it the "realm of consciousness" doesn't make it any less objective. If you are truly claiming that this realm does not include anything that you do not experience, then yes, that is solipsism.


What makes this realm not objective is that it is nothing more than Experience itself and Experience itself is expressed through every individual experience we can identify. What part of this do you not understand ?



Do you realize that there is a difference between saying that all experiences are a subset of consciousness, and that consciousness consists only of experiences?


Why don't you tell me the difference. Then I'll figure out if its relevant to what I'm saying.



Unless they are experienced, or unless you are experiencing them? Remember that if you assume other people have experiences too, you have already assumed an objective reality.


The issue of other people having experiences is very interesting and I don't think as clear cut to this debate as you make out. I haven't figured out my position on that yet. Next post maybe.


Me: It appears as if this suff of "more than just your experiences" cannot be truly known to exist.

Stimpy: Of course it can. You just have to discard the ridiculous notion of absolute knowledge.


Why is it ridiculous ? I have absolute knowledge of the nature of redness. That is what I mean when something can be truly known to exist.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Mr Smith, I have good reason to believe (not know) that a photon that enters my eye may have existed for millions of years, prior to my perception of it.
Is this not proof of the 'objective' reality on the theoretical level.
( If you accept the theory that photons are wavicle that propagte through space at a quantifiable spped.)


You only know about the history of the electron through experience. Descriptive theories are constructed from our experiences therefore the concept of the electron traveling through space/time before your perception of it is a constructed fiction.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,


That link is philosophical nonsense, not science. It is also irrelevant to the issue. You cannot refute the fact that the Universe has existed longer than people have, without completely throwing out the very idea of scientific evidence.




Didn't like some of the questions being asked eh ? :D

Thanks for the link Ian. At least some intelligent people are not too scared to think about Consciousness in a different way.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

Exactly. I am claiming that the hammer exists, and you are claiming that it does not, but that instead some inherently unknowable part of consciousness does, which is creating the illusion of the hammer.
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Well, the hammer does not really exist in an important sense according to both our views. In your view the hammer is a manifestation of a fundamental objective reality but it is a reality that exists regardless of any experience of its manifestations.

Huh? I am in no way suggesting that the hammer does not exist. I am claiming that the hammer does exist, and is a part of objective reality.

The hammer does not exist according to my view also. The experience of a hammer is a manifestation of Consciousness.

What does that mean? Is it a part of consciousness, or not?

The difference is that the fundamental reality that manifests my hammer is contained within all the individual experiences that make the illusion of this thing I have called a hammer. There cannot be an instance whereby Consciousness exists without experiences. If you like, individual experiences consist of Consciousness.

Yes, I get all that. What I want to know is whether you are claiming there is nothing more to consciousness, and thus reality, then just your experiences?

We are going around in circles here. Could you just clearly state, once and for all, whether you believe there is more to reality than just your experiences?

I haven't made the claim that Consciousness is unknowable.

If there is nothing more to consciousness than just your experiences, then there is nothing to know about it that you do not already.

We are both assuming the existence of something more than just the experiences.
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No. There is no more to Consciousness than is contained within any individual experience.

So all of consciousness is contained within a single experience? You are not making any sense here.

Me: So how do you figure that my view entails objectivity ? I have clearly stated that reality is experiential. This means that there can be no more to it than your experience of it

Stimpy: You are playing word games here. You have implicitly assumed the existence of more than just your experiences. All you are doing is arbitrarily calling this stuff part of the experiential realm. Calling it that doesn't make it something you experience.
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Whats with all this "word games" and "thats just semantics" excuse all the time ? Can I not express meaning through words or something ? If I'm changing my meanings to suit the argument then by all means (no pun intended) point out where.

When you use the term "consciousness" to refer to the totality of existence, and then claim that because you have arbitrarily decided to call reality "consciousness" that this somehow makes that reality non-objective.

Where have I assumed the existence of more than just your experiences ?

Not my experiences, your experiences. The simple fact that you believe I also have experiences implies that you have assumed that there is more to reality than just your experiences.

Once again, if you are truly claiming that all that exists is your experiences, then by definition there cannot be any facts about reality that you do not know.
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I don't follow this

Any fact about reality that you do not already know, must necessarily be something which you have not experienced. If all that exists is your experiences, then you have experienced the totality of existence. What is left for you to know?

Once again, calling it the "realm of consciousness" doesn't make it any less objective. If you are truly claiming that this realm does not include anything that you do not experience, then yes, that is solipsism.
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What makes this realm not objective is that it is nothing more than Experience itself and Experience itself is expressed through every individual experience we can identify. What part of this do you not understand ?

What do you mean by "Experience"? Clearly you are talking about something more than just your own experiences?

You keep using the word "we". What is this we you speak of? Are you assuming that I have experiences too? If so, then you are assuming that my experiences exist, but my experiences are not your experiences. That means that there is more to reality than just your experiences.

Even if you assume that all that exists is experiences, as soon as you assume that there are experiences which are not your experiences, you are assuming an objective reality.

Do you realize that there is a difference between saying that all experiences are a subset of consciousness, and that consciousness consists only of experiences?
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Why don't you tell me the difference. Then I'll figure out if its relevant to what I'm saying.

Wow. That was a rhetorical question. It never occurred to me that you actually might not understand the difference. :eek:

The difference is that in the first case, there can be more to consciousness than just experiences, and in the second case, there cannot.

Unless they are experienced, or unless you are experiencing them? Remember that if you assume other people have experiences too, you have already assumed an objective reality.
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The issue of other people having experiences is very interesting and I don't think as clear cut to this debate as you make out. I haven't figured out my position on that yet. Next post maybe.

Are you serious? :eek:

Me: It appears as if this suff of "more than just your experiences" cannot be truly known to exist.

Stimpy: Of course it can. You just have to discard the ridiculous notion of absolute knowledge.
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Why is it ridiculous ? I have absolute knowledge of the nature of redness. That is what I mean when something can be truly known to exist.

Double wow. You really are a solipsist, aren't you? Amazing.

I think we are done here. If you don't even believe I exist as anything more than a figment of your imagination, then there is not much point in me trying to reason with you.


Dr. Stupid

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

That link is philosophical nonsense, not science. It is also irrelevant to the issue. You cannot refute the fact that the Universe has existed longer than people have, without completely throwing out the very idea of scientific evidence.



One trouble with the cat in the box is "what consciousness needs to observe the experiment for an outcome to exist; homo sap? the cat? the uranium atom? the decay particle? ???. Idealism does not necessarily purport that "people" are the only possible event observers.

And are you saying that Wheeler's thinking on photon path(s) is not proper science?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Davidsmith,

You only know about the history of the electron through experience. Descriptive theories are constructed from our experiences therefore the concept of the electron traveling through space/time before your perception of it is a constructed fiction.

Your obvious attempt to invalidate science by equating scientific theories with substantial supporting evidence to "constructed fictions" is duly noted. :rolleyes:

That link is philosophical nonsense, not science. It is also irrelevant to the issue. You cannot refute the fact that the Universe has existed longer than people have, without completely throwing out the very idea of scientific evidence.
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Didn't like some of the questions being asked eh ?

What are you talking about? What questions? :confused:

Thanks for the link Ian. At least some intelligent people are not too scared to think about Consciousness in a different way.

So this is what you are reduced to? You can't address my arguments, so instead you insinuate that I am close-minded, and afraid to acknowledge the possibility that your silly religious beliefs might be true?

Why should I be afraid? Certainly it would be a lot less frightening to imagine that I am some sort of immortal consciousness, then to accept that I am an organic machine which could be snuffed out of existence at any moment by forces completely beyond my control.

You need courage to accept reality for what it is. Choosing to believe in metaphysical fantasies which grant you immortality and resolves all those nagging doubts about purpose and meaning, requires only intellectual dishonesty.


hammegk,

One trouble with the cat in the box is "what consciousness needs to observe the experiment for an outcome to exist; homo sap? the cat? the uranium atom? the decay particle? ???. Idealism does not necessarily purport that "people" are the only possible event observers.

Of course it doesn't. Idealism specifically goes out of its way to make sure it doesn't make any testable claims. It merely claims that everything is the way it is because some "meta-mind" decided to make it that way. It is the old "goddidit" explanation, with a funny new hat.

And are you saying that Wheeler's thinking on photon path(s) is not proper science?

I don't know what you are specifically referring to. Wheeler did a lot of good physics. He has also done a lot of philosophical speculation. Can you tell the difference? That link Ian gave was about philosophy, not science.

Incidentally, this is a really annoying double standard on the part of people like Ian. If I started posting philosophical meanderings of great scientists who agree with my own worldview, and who think Idealism is nonsense, Ian would (rightfully) dismiss them as arguments from authority. But when he finds one physicist whose views seem, at least superficially, to be in some sort of alignment with his own, he uses it to claim that "QM is suggestive of Idealism". :rolleyes:


Dr. Stupid

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat


Of course it doesn't. Idealism specifically goes out of its way to make sure it doesn't make any testable claims. It merely claims that everything is the way it is because some "meta-mind" decided to make it that way. It is the old "goddidit" explanation, with a funny new hat.
Who is this god you speak of?

Testable claims? Well, let's see -- any of a plethora of ESP like occurences could disprove materialism -- no substantiated results to date.

Finding the "indivisible A-tom" would substantiate that an objective material world exists -- but would it actually prove that what-is is not infinitely divisible? No substantiated results to date.

Non-idealism claims meta-material makes it that way, and you still have "mind effects brain" vs "brain effects mind", and life vs non-life.



I don't know what you are specifically referring to.
The dual-path problem exhibited by observations of light paths around quasars.


....he uses it to claim that "QM is suggestive of Idealism". :rolleyes:
Dr. Stupid
What bothers you is that interpretation is as good as the one you prefer to cling to; Non-life makes life, brain is mind.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

hammegk,

Of course it doesn't. Idealism specifically goes out of its way to make sure it doesn't make any testable claims. It merely claims that everything is the way it is because some "meta-mind" decided to make it that way. It is the old "goddidit" explanation, with a funny new hat.
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Who is this god you speak of?

I thought that was pretty clear. The "meta-mind" in idealism is just God with a funny hat. Either way you are attributing the way reality is to the whim of some conscious being.

Testable claims? Well, let's see -- any of a plethora of ESP like occurences could disprove materialism -- no substantiated results to date.

I don't really agree with this. Ontological materialism would not be disproven by this. It is as unfalsifiable as Idealism is. Modern materialism would only be disproven by this if you could demonstrate that these ESP occurrences had no scientific explanation.

Finding the "indivisible A-tom" would substantiate that an objective material world exists -- but would it actually prove that what-is is not infinitely divisible? No substantiated results to date.

You are looking for positive proof. It doesn't work that way. What you need is supporting evidence, and that comes from testing falsifiable theories.

The existence of "indivisible A-toms", as you put it, is not falsifiable. It is also not a component of any modern scientific theory, or scientific worldview, that I know of. It is a naive and outdated concept which was discarded nearly a century ago.

Non-idealism claims meta-material makes it that way, and you still have "mind effects brain" vs "brain effects mind", and life vs non-life.

What do you mean by "non-idealism"? Ontological materialism? Solipsism? Dualism? Pluralism? They all make different claims.

My philosophy makes no assumptions about why things are the way they are. Any aspect of that question which can be answered through science, is left to science to answer. Any aspect of that question which cannot be answered by science, is unknowable and unanswerable.

....he uses it to claim that "QM is suggestive of Idealism".
Dr. Stupid
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What bothers you is that interpretation is as good as the one you prefer to cling to; Non-life makes life, brain is mind.

My claim that the human mind is a process of the brain is not a philosophical interpretation. It is a direct falsifiable hypothesis for which there is substantial supporting scientific evidence.

There is nothing metaphysical about that. I am not making any claims about non-human consciousnesses which may, or may not, have created reality. Nor am I making any claims about aspects of human consciousness that I don't already know about, such as the ability for human consciousness to create the physical world, and the false impression that it is just a brain process.

I am claiming only that those aspects of consciousness which I know exist (thought, memory, awareness, etc...) are brain processes. That is a scientific claim, not a metaphysical one. And it is well supported by scientific evidence.


And I have no idea what you mean by "life vs non-life". There is no clear distinction between life and non-life. The line is arbitrary, and no matter where you put it, you will probably be able to find something that lies close enough to the boundary to render the distinction ambiguous.


Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
davidsmith,


Huh? I am in no way suggesting that the hammer does not exist. I am claiming that the hammer does exist, and is a part of objective reality.


I was trying to get at the concept of reducing the hammer to different elements. If you take away the head from the handle then the hammer does not exist. And so on and so forth ad infinitum with the remaining parts.


Me: The hammer does not exist according to my view also. The experience of a hammer is a manifestation of Consciousness.

Stimpy: What does that mean? Is it a part of consciousness, or not?

The experiences that make up a "hammer" are manifestations of Consciousness. However, the "hammer" does not exist in the same sense as above. Take away the head from the handle and you experience new manifestations of Consciousness, ad infinitum.



Yes, I get all that. What I want to know is whether you are claiming there is nothing more to consciousness, and thus reality, then just your experiences?

We are going around in circles here. Could you just clearly state, once and for all, whether you believe there is more to reality than just your experiences?



This depends on our meaning of "me" and "you". I've tried to address this further down.



So all of consciousness is contained within a single experience? You are not making any sense here.


Think about what this means in terms of familar concepts. In your view, all of objective reality must be expressed through any aspect of it. The behaviour of an electron or a planet must be an expression of the singular fundamental objective realm of reality. If it were not then the electron would be excluded from this realm.

The same goes for any expression of Consciousness.


Me: If I'm changing my meanings to suit the argument then by all means point out where.

Stimpy: When you use the term "consciousness" to refer to the totality of existence, and then claim that because you have arbitrarily decided to call reality "consciousness" that this somehow makes that reality non-objective.


objectivity = a thing existing in the absence of an experience of that thing.

Consciousness (and therefore any experience) cannot exist in the absence of an experience of it by (my) definition because any experience is an expression of Consciousness.

Thus Consciousness is not objective with respect to the above definition.



Any fact about reality that you do not already know, must necessarily be something which you have not experienced. If all that exists is your experiences, then you have experienced the totality of existence. What is left for you to know?

I don't know :D


What do you mean by "Experience"? Clearly you are talking about something more than just your own experiences?

No. Think of the electron again. In your view the electron is an expression of "Objective reality". There is nothing more to the electron than this. The same goes for any other aspect of "Objective reality" such as a planet.

If we substitue an electron for an equivalent aspect of my proposed reality, say redness, then redness must be an expression of "Experience" and there can be no more to redness than this.

The differnece is that an electron would exist in the absence of an experience of it. Redness would not, and therefore is not objective.



You keep using the word "we". What is this we you speak of? Are you assuming that I have experiences too? If so, then you are assuming that my experiences exist, but my experiences are not your experiences. That means that there is more to reality than just your experiences.

Even if you assume that all that exists is experiences, as soon as you assume that there are experiences which are not your experiences, you are assuming an objective reality.


I don't agree. For something to be objective it must exist in the absence of an experience of it. The temporal and spatial location of these experiences do not exist in an objective sense just like any of my experiences do not really exist in time or space. Consciousness does not have spatial or temporal properties. Remember that "I" or "you" has two very different meanings; the physical body and the feeling of the self. In my view, both are an experience and are thus subject to the same metaphysic as any other experience.


Do you realize that there is a difference between saying that all experiences are a subset of consciousness, and that consciousness consists only of experiences?

The difference is that in the first case, there can be more to consciousness than just experiences, and in the second case, there cannot.


You would not say that there can be more to objective reality than is expressed through an aspect of it such as an electron. On the other hand you would say that objective reality consists only of its expressed aspects.


Me: I have absolute knowledge of the nature of redness. That is what I mean when something can be truly known to exist.

Stimpy: Double wow. You really are a solipsist, aren't you? Amazing.



What has my definition of true knowledge have to do with solipsism ?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Davidsmith,


What are you talking about? What questions? :confused:


Why does the universe exist?

Does this mean humans are necessary to the existence of the universe?

Did the universe really exist before you started looking at it ?

Mmm, there's quite a few you seem to have missed.



So this is what you are reduced to? You can't address my arguments, so instead you insinuate that I am close-minded, and afraid to acknowledge the possibility that your silly religious beliefs might be true?


Touched a nerve. Intriguing. ;)

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
hammegk,



I am claiming only that those aspects of consciousness which I know exist (thought, memory, awareness, etc...) are brain processes. That is a scientific claim, not a metaphysical one. And it is well supported by scientific evidence.



No, its a claim based on metaphysics. Specifically, that the experiences you base your evidence on are reference to an objective reality and not merely more experiences. After our long debate you surely can't have forgotton this !

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

We are going around in circles here. Could you just clearly state, once and for all, whether you believe there is more to reality than just your experiences?
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This depends on our meaning of "me" and "you". I've tried to address this further down.

Are you serious? :confused:

So all of consciousness is contained within a single experience? You are not making any sense here.
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Think about what this means in terms of familar concepts. In your view, all of objective reality must be expressed through any aspect of it. The behaviour of an electron or a planet must be an expression of the singular fundamental objective realm of reality. If it were not then the electron would be excluded from this realm.

The same goes for any expression of Consciousness.

I have no idea what you are trying to say here.

Stimpy: When you use the term "consciousness" to refer to the totality of existence, and then claim that because you have arbitrarily decided to call reality "consciousness" that this somehow makes that reality non-objective.
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objectivity = a thing existing in the absence of an experience of that thing.

Consciousness (and therefore any experience) cannot exist in the absence of an experience of it by (my) definition because any experience is an expression of Consciousness.

Thus Consciousness is not objective with respect to the above definition.

That doesn't make any sense. Reality is objective if there is more to it than just your experiences. If I have experiences, and those experiences are not your experiences, then my experiences objectively exist. Likewise, since you have experiences which are not my own experiences, I would have to say that your experiences objectively exist.

In other words, once you accept that other consciousnesses do exist, and are not just figments of your own imagination, those consciousnesses objectively exist. And since you must acknowledge that from their point of view, your own consciousness objectively exists, you must accept that your own consciousness, and indeed your own experiences, are part of objective reality.

Any fact about reality that you do not already know, must necessarily be something which you have not experienced. If all that exists is your experiences, then you have experienced the totality of existence. What is left for you to know?
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I don't know :D

So much for your ridiculous assertion that science can function without the assumption of objectivity. :rolleyes:

Even if you assume that all that exists is experiences, as soon as you assume that there are experiences which are not your experiences, you are assuming an objective reality.
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I don't agree. For something to be objective it must exist in the absence of an experience of it.

You keep using that word "experience", as though it were some singular thing. What are you talking about? If you are talking about more than just your own experiences, then your definition of "experience" already assumes objectivity!

The temporal and spatial location of these experiences do not exist in an objective sense just like any of my experiences do not really exist in time or space. Consciousness does not have spatial or temporal properties. Remember that "I" or "you" has two very different meanings; the physical body and the feeling of the self. In my view, both are an experience and are thus subject to the same metaphysic as any other experience.

What is this nonsense? Do you have any evidence for this insane assertion? Of course experiences are spatiotemporal!

The difference is that in the first case, there can be more to consciousness than just experiences, and in the second case, there cannot.
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You would not say that there can be more to objective reality than is expressed through an aspect of it such as an electron. On the other hand you would say that objective reality consists only of its expressed aspects.

What is your point?

Me: I have absolute knowledge of the nature of redness. That is what I mean when something can be truly known to exist.

Stimpy: Double wow. You really are a solipsist, aren't you? Amazing.
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What has my definition of true knowledge have to do with solipsism ?

The fact that you consider knowledge to be unobtainable. Once again, this makes a mockery of your prior assertion that science does not require objectivity. In your desperate attempt to come up with some sort of validation for your subjective reality hypothesis, you have rendered the concept of knowledge completely meaningless.

I don't even know what it is you are trying to claim anymore.

Let's back up here, in order to avoid any confusion.

Given the following definition of objective (clarified, so as to avoid any ambiguity, or misleading language):

Reality is objective if there is more to it than just your experiences.

Would you agree that reality is objective?

Would you agree that objective reality is a necessary assumption of science?

If not, why not?


Dr. Stupid

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

What are you talking about? What questions?
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Why does the universe exist?

I don't know. Neither do you. Nobody does.

Does this mean humans are necessary to the existence of the universe?

The evidence clearly indicates that we are not. The evidence could be wrong, but there is currently no reason to think it is, and plenty of very good reasons to think it is not.

Did the universe really exist before you started looking at it ?

According to my Mom, it did.

Mmm, there's quite a few you seem to have missed.

What are you talking about?

So this is what you are reduced to? You can't address my arguments, so instead you insinuate that I am close-minded, and afraid to acknowledge the possibility that your silly religious beliefs might be true?
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Touched a nerve. Intriguing. ;)

Don't kid yourself. :rolleyes: It takes a lot more than an ignorant arm-chair philosopher projecting his own fears and inadequacies onto me, to get me worked up.

I am claiming only that those aspects of consciousness which I know exist (thought, memory, awareness, etc...) are brain processes. That is a scientific claim, not a metaphysical one. And it is well supported by scientific evidence.
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No, its a claim based on metaphysics. Specifically, that the experiences you base your evidence on are reference to an objective reality and not merely more experiences.

What "more experiences"? More experiences than just my experiences? If so, then clearly they objectively exist.

After our long debate you surely can't have forgotton this !

Forgotten what? That you are incapable of understanding that your very assumption that an experiential reality, of which your own experiences are merely a subset, is an assumption of an objective reality?


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
The fact remains that it is a necessary epistemological position for the construction of the scientific method. It is an assumption about the nature of our observations, not about something completely unknowable.



I simply point out that neither materialism or naturalism have to be true in order for the progress of science to take place.



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It is an epistemological position,
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No this is not correct. If there is a world in abstraction from our perceptions of it, we could never know it. It is an ontological commitment you are making here.
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That is where you are wrong. The above claim, that we could never know such a world, is an epistemological position. The claim that we can know about such a world is also an epistemological position. This is exactly the point of the scientific method.


The point is that the assertion of a reality existing in abstraction of any conscious awareness is a ontological position. Why do I ned to keep repeating myself?? Please take note of what I say and try to understand.


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Besides, if the physical does not have primary reality then the inherent reasonable position that we cease to exist when we die can no longer be maintained.
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If we do not make any metaphysical assumptions about ontological primacy, and instead rely on science to reveal the logical relationships between consciousness and other stuff, then the hypothesis that our minds cease to exist when we die is clearly well-supported by the empirical evidence.



Only by making the metaphysical presumption that consciousness itself is a physical thing. Science per se does not suggest that consciousness ceases to exist. Given that the world is physically closed, how could it since consciousness cannot be detected or inferred? If consciousness can play no role in our scientific theories it certainly can't declare it ceases to exist when the brain stops functioning!



Human consciousness is pretty clearly a physical process in the brain.



Nothing you or anyone else has ever said, remotely suggests this.



So what's the problem then? Why make any metaphysical assumptions about role of consciousness in reality? Why not simply leave it up to science to determine what its role is?



Because consciousness is outside the purview of science. Science in principle can never explain consciousness. To maintain otherwise is to misunderstand the nature and scope of science.



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As for primacy, I only claim that consciousness does not appear to be necessary for reality to exist,
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Has anyone ever experienced reality in the absence of conscious awareness?
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That question is meaningless.



Not at all. Either reality can be experienced in the absence of conscious awareness or it can't.



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We know reality through experiencing it. We cannot know an unexperienced reality exists because one cannot experience an unexperienced reality, by definition. So if we only know a experienced reality exists, and experiences require consciousness, this means that, contrary to what you claim, we can only know about a reality which requires the conscious perception of it.
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That does not follow at all. The fact that our only source of knowledge about reality is through our experiences, in no way implies that the existence of reality ontologically depends on our experiences.



I of course never claimed this. Read what I said more carefully. A reality in abstraction from consciousness is unknowable. I didn't say it necessarily therefore doesn't exist. But in supposing it exists you are at the very minimum making a massive ontological leap of faith.



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based on the evidence that reality existed long before any people did.
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But how do you know that the past was determined rather than existing in a superposition of possible states?
http://www.discover.com/june_02/featuniverse.html
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That link is philosophical nonsense, not science.



Science cannot be so easily seperated from philosophy. QM suggests that reality, in abstraction from our measurements, is merely a realm of mathematical possibilities, and it is only a measurement which makes one of these possibilities concrete.


It is also irrelevant to the issue. You cannot refute the fact that the Universe has existed longer than people have, without completely throwing out the very idea of scientific evidence.


What scientific evidence do we have that reality, before it enters the consciousness of any sentient being, is a unique concrete determined one? Come on Stimp, let's see all your evidence LOL

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Incidentally, this is a really annoying double standard on the part of people like Ian. If I started posting philosophical meanderings of great scientists who agree with my own worldview, and who think Idealism is nonsense, Ian would (rightfully) dismiss them as arguments from authority. But when he finds one physicist whose views seem, at least superficially, to be in some sort of alignment with his own, he uses it to claim that "QM is suggestive of Idealism".


You have stated that there is plenty of scientific evidence to suggest that even before any consciousness arose, the past existed in a unique determined concrete sense. I'm wondering what this evidence might conceivably be? So first of all answer this question please.

I would in fact suggest the scientific evidence suggests quite the converse. If QM applies to the macroscopic realm as well as the microscopic (and why on earth should anyone suppose otherwise?), I'm curious as to how a 'un-collapsed' wave-function representing the Universe as a whole can be reconciled with a unique concrete determined past??

Now I find a materialist atheist physicist agrees with me. It seemed appropriate that to pre-empt your inevitable charge that I don't know what I'm talking about, to point out that many eminent physicists agree with me.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

The fact remains that it is a necessary epistemological position for the construction of the scientific method. It is an assumption about the nature of our observations, not about something completely unknowable.
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I simply point out that neither materialism or naturalism have to be true in order for the progress of science to take place.

True, but the fact that the progress of science does take place, constitutes supporting evidence for naturalism.

That is where you are wrong. The above claim, that we could never know such a world, is an epistemological position. The claim that we can know about such a world is also an epistemological position. This is exactly the point of the scientific method.
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The point is that the assertion of a reality existing in abstraction of any conscious awareness is a ontological position. Why do I ned to keep repeating myself?? Please take note of what I say and try to understand.

If that is how you define "ontological", then fine, it is ontological. Who cares? The point is that it is an epistemological position, about something which is knowable, rather than blind speculation about something unknowable.

If we do not make any metaphysical assumptions about ontological primacy, and instead rely on science to reveal the logical relationships between consciousness and other stuff, then the hypothesis that our minds cease to exist when we die is clearly well-supported by the empirical evidence.
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Only by making the metaphysical presumption that consciousness itself is a physical thing.

What do you mean by physical? If you mean that it has some effect on other observable things, then that is a direct observation. If you mean that it can be described scientifically, then that is an assumption of naturalism, and as I already pointed out, an epistemological assumption, not a metaphysical one.

If you are talking about it being some sort of "physical substance" as per ontological materialism, then this assumption is not required at all for our scientific evidence that consciousness is a brain process.

Science per se does not suggest that consciousness ceases to exist. Given that the world is physically closed, how could it since consciousness cannot be detected or inferred? If consciousness can play no role in our scientific theories it certainly can't declare it ceases to exist when the brain stops functioning!

Here we go again. :rolleyes: Please provide some evidence for your assertion that consciousness, which clearly plays an observable role in the physical world, cannot be detected or inferred, and cannot play any role in scientific theories. That is epiphenomenalism, which neither of us is defending.

Fact: Consciousness has an effect on the observable world.

Fact: Naturalism holds that all observable effects can be explained scientifically.

This means that either consciousness can be explained scientifically, or naturalism is false. If you are claiming that consciousness cannot be explained scientifically, then provide your evidence that this is true.

Human consciousness is pretty clearly a physical process in the brain.
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Nothing you or anyone else has ever said, remotely suggests this.

:rolleyes: Burying your head in the sand and chanting "I won't believe it" isn't going to make it go away.

So what's the problem then? Why make any metaphysical assumptions about role of consciousness in reality? Why not simply leave it up to science to determine what its role is?
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Because consciousness is outside the purview of science. Science in principle can never explain consciousness. To maintain otherwise is to misunderstand the nature and scope of science.

To claim it cannot is to claim that science is invalid, and that its premises are false.

I am afraid I am going to need to see some kind of evidence for that before I believe it.

That does not follow at all. The fact that our only source of knowledge about reality is through our experiences, in no way implies that the existence of reality ontologically depends on our experiences.
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I of course never claimed this. Read what I said more carefully. A reality in abstraction from consciousness is unknowable.

Wrong. It is only unknowable if you do not assume that there is a logical connection between objective reality and our experiences. That there is, and more specifically that this relationship allows us to extract information about objective reality from our experiences, is the basis of science!

I didn't say it necessarily therefore doesn't exist. But in supposing it exists you are at the very minimum making a massive ontological leap of faith.

No faith is involved. As I already explained, several times, the premises of the scientific method, of which objectivity is one, constitute a falsifiable hypothesis. The success of the scientific method is supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the premises of the scientific method are valid.

Evidence, not faith.

That link is philosophical nonsense, not science.
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Science cannot be so easily seperated from philosophy.

Science is derived from philosophy, but not all philosophy is science. The philosophical speculation on that linked page is not science. It is metaphysical nonsense.

QM suggests that reality, in abstraction from our measurements, is merely a realm of mathematical possibilities, and it is only a measurement which makes one of these possibilities concrete.

QM suggests nothing of the sort. You don't know what you are talking about. You are just repeating what somebody else told you. We both know that you have no actual understanding of QM.

It is also irrelevant to the issue. You cannot refute the fact that the Universe has existed longer than people have, without completely throwing out the very idea of scientific evidence.
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What scientific evidence do we have that reality, before it enters the consciousness of any sentient being, is a unique concrete determined one? Come on Stimp, let's see all your evidence LOL

We have supporting evidence for the falsifiable hypothesis that the universe has existed for billions of years. The appeal to QM to try to claim that the past is indeterminant is nothing more than a fancy rehashing of the old "how do you know the universe wasn't created 5 minutes ago?" nonsense.

A tree that falls down in the woods when nobody is around really does make a sound, Ian. You don't need to take that on faith. You just need to abandon the silly notion that the entire universe is here for your benefit. :rolleyes:

You have stated that there is plenty of scientific evidence to suggest that even before any consciousness arose, the past existed in a unique determined concrete sense. I'm wondering what this evidence might conceivably be? So first of all answer this question please.

I didn't say that. What I said is that there is evidence that the Universe existed long before human consciousness did. The above is unfalsifiable metaphysical nonsense.

I would in fact suggest the scientific evidence suggests quite the converse. If QM applies to the macroscopic realm as well as the microscopic (and why on earth should anyone suppose otherwise?), I'm curious as to how a 'un-collapsed' wave-function representing the Universe as a whole can be reconciled with a unique concrete determined past??

Where is your evidence that human consciousness is required to collapse the wave-function? For that matter, where is your evidence that the wave-function is anything more than a useful mathematical tool for describing our observations? You are referring to a metaphysical interpretation of QM as though it were the actual scientific theory. It is not.

Now I find a materialist atheist physicist agrees with me. It seemed appropriate that to pre-empt your inevitable charge that I don't know what I'm talking about, to point out that many eminent physicists agree with me.

Wheeler is not a materialist, either in the sense that you define the term, or in the sense that I do. I have no idea whether he is an atheist or not. Furthermore, I doubt very much that Wheeler "agrees with you". You may find nuggets of what he says that you think you understand, and that seem to be in agreement with your own views, but I suspect that if you explained your views to him (particularly your view that consciousness cannot be scientifically explained), that he would he would tell you that your position is incoherent and irrational.

And even if he did agree with you, one is not many.


Dr. Stupid

[Loki]

Stimpy,

You have amazing stamina!

[a_unique_person]

Originally posted by Sundog
Whew. Glad THAT'S all settled now. :D


So this is all your fault.

[Dancing David]

Originally posted by davidsmith73



You only know about the history of the electron through experience. Descriptive theories are constructed from our experiences therefore the concept of the electron traveling through space/time before your perception of it is a constructed fiction.

Perhaps you need glasses dude, your consiousness has trouble distinguishing photon from electron.

I perceive light because photons interact with the receptors in my eye, this is a very string theory that is borm out by the repition and experience of repition in the scientific sense.

Can you tell how elese that you see colors Mr. Smith? Any theory you propose will require the existance of the 'objective' medium through which information is converyed to the sense organs.

You are not going to make the claim that your percioeve without sense organs, are you?

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Dancing David

You are not going to make the claim that your percioeve without sense organs, are you?
Yes(kinda). The first thing *I* perceive is that I inhabit a body *me* equiped with a bunch of sensory equipment. I'd call the sense organ "consciousness".

Originally posted by Stimpy

I am claiming only that those aspects of consciousness which I know exist (thought, memory, awareness, etc...) are brain processes. That is a scientific claim, not a metaphysical one. And it is well supported by scientific evidence.
Yup. Everything *me* supplies.


And I have no idea what you mean by "life vs non-life". There is no clear distinction between life and non-life. The line is arbitrary, and no matter where you put it, you will probably be able to find something that lies close enough to the boundary to render the distinction ambiguous.
One way to look at it, it's the distinction between *I* & *me*.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Hammegk,

I am claiming only that those aspects of consciousness which I know exist (thought, memory, awareness, etc...) are brain processes. That is a scientific claim, not a metaphysical one. And it is well supported by scientific evidence.
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Yup. Everything *me* supplies.

What more are you claiming that there is to consciousness?

And I have no idea what you mean by "life vs non-life". There is no clear distinction between life and non-life. The line is arbitrary, and no matter where you put it, you will probably be able to find something that lies close enough to the boundary to render the distinction ambiguous.
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One way to look at it, it's the distinction between *I* & *me*.

What are you talking about? :confused:

What does consciousness have to do with the distinction between life and non-life? Most forms of life do not have any consciousness at all! Even among the animal kingdom, only a small percentage of animal species have advanced enough nervous systems for anything like consciousness to exist.

And if you are going to claim that things like plants and bacteria are conscious, even though they exhibit no indication of it whatsoever, then why not claim that rocks and cars are conscious too?


Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

davidsmith,


Me: Think about what this means in terms of familar concepts. In your view, all of objective reality must be expressed through any aspect of it. The behaviour of an electron or a planet must be an expression of the singular fundamental objective realm of reality. If it were not then the electron would be excluded from this realm.

The same goes for any expression of Consciousness.

Stimpy: I have no idea what you are trying to say here. [/QUOTE]



Well maybe that is why we are going round in circles. If you can't even understand how parts of your proposed objective reality must be expressions of the whole then we are stuck.

I'll try once more. In materialist mode, lets take the behaviour we call an electron. The electron objectively exists. In other words it exists regardless of whether it is experienced. Objective reality is the underlying reality than pervades all things/processes we label as objective, eg, electrons, rocks, living things etc. It has to if you are following a truly monistic concept of reality. If this underlying objective reality did not completely pervade all things we observe as objective then part or all of those things would be outside this objective realm. In other words you would have a dualistic reality.

The same goes for the realm of Consciousness. Consciousness must pervade all individual experiences. In this sense there is nothing more to reality than what is contained within any experience.


Me: objectivity = a thing existing in the absence of an experience of that thing. Consciousness (and therefore any experience) cannot exist in the absence of an experience of it by (my) definition because any experience is an expression of Consciousness. Thus Consciousness is not objective with respect to the above definition.


Stimpy: That doesn't make any sense. Reality is objective if there is more to it than just your experiences.



I don't agree with this definition. There is a difference between that definition and the one I was using which defines objectivity to be the existence of a thing in the absence of an experience of that thing.



If I have experiences, and those experiences are not your experiences, then my experiences objectively exist.

Likewise, since you have experiences which are not my own experiences, I would have to say that your experiences objectively exist.

In other words, once you accept that other consciousnesses do exist, and are not just figments of your own imagination, those consciousnesses objectively exist. And since you must acknowledge that from their point of view, your own consciousness objectively exists, you must accept that your own consciousness, and indeed your own experiences, are part of objective reality.



Other "consciousnesses" are merely other experiences. Since these experiences would not exist in the absence of an experiences of them they cannot be regarded as objective.

"I" (in the illusionary physical body sense) am constantly changing my physical and temporal location. This does not mean that the experiences that correlate with one particular physical location in spacetime are objectively separate from those that correlate with another spacetime location. In this sense there is nothing to distinguish my experiences from the proposed existence of other experience occuring in different spacetime locations (which could be me or you) regardless of whether they are correlated with my physical body or yours.

So if you are saying that objectivity is "something more than just my experiences" then that is a meaningless distinction when applied to what I am actually saying.



So much for your ridiculous assertion that science can function without the assumption of objectivity. :rolleyes:


That was just a little joke. I still say that science can function without the assumption of objectivity. The definition of what kind of knowledge science gives us would have to change.



You keep using that word "experience", as though it were some singular thing. What are you talking about?


The singular thing of Experience is the single realm of reality. Surely you are familiar with the concept of monism ! I thought you were a seasoned materialistic monist ?

If you are talking about more than just your own experiences, then your definition of "experience" already assumes objectivity!


Well, it seems we are talking about a different meaning to the word objective. Your definition, as I have explained above, is meaningless with regards to my view. There is an important difference between saying objectivity is something more than just your own experiences and saying that objectivity is the existence of something in the absence of an experience of it.



What is this nonsense? Do you have any evidence for this insane assertion? Of course experiences are spatiotemporal!


So where are they ?


Me:You would not say that there can be more to objective reality than is expressed through an aspect of it such as an electron. On the other hand you would say that objective reality consists only of its expressed aspects

Stimpy: What is your point?


Your assertion about the difference between saying that all experiences are a subset of consciousness, and that consciousness consists only of experiences is not valid when addressing a monistic philosophy.


The fact that you consider knowledge to be unobtainable.
Once again, this makes a mockery of your prior assertion that science does not require objectivity. In your desperate attempt to come up with some sort of validation for your subjective reality hypothesis, you have rendered the concept of knowledge completely meaningless.



No. I have never said knowledge is unobtainable. The models that describe the relationships between our experiences are still obtainable through science. Its just that this would not relate to objective knowledge. It would be knowledge about the relationships between certain experiences. So the concept of scientific knowledge is not rendered meaningless, it has just changed its meaning.


I don't even know what it is you are trying to claim anymore.



Thats because you haven't thought long enough about what I am saying.


Let's back up here, in order to avoid any confusion.

Given the following definition of objective (clarified, so as to avoid any ambiguity, or misleading language):

Reality is objective if there is more to it than just your experiences.



Don't agree with this definition.

How about this:

Reality is objective if it exists in the absense of experience

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

Well maybe that is why we are going round in circles. If you can't even understand how parts of your proposed objective reality must be expressions of the whole then we are stuck.

I'll try once more. In materialist mode, lets take the behaviour we call an electron. The electron objectively exists. In other words it exists regardless of whether it is experienced. Objective reality is the underlying reality than pervades all things/processes we label as objective, eg, electrons, rocks, living things etc. It has to if you are following a truly monistic concept of reality. If this underlying objective reality did not completely pervade all things we observe as objective then part or all of those things would be outside this objective realm. In other words you would have a dualistic reality.

I understand that just fine.

What I don't understand is this:

The same goes for the realm of Consciousness. Consciousness must pervade all individual experiences. In this sense there is nothing more to reality than what is contained within any experience.

That does not follow. You are making the leap from the statement that all experiences are part of consciousness, to the statement that consciousness consists only of experiences.

Stimpy: That doesn't make any sense. Reality is objective if there is more to it than just your experiences.
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I don't agree with this definition. There is a difference between that definition and the one I was using which defines objectivity to be the existence of a thing in the absence of an experience of that thing.

So what? The only difference is that your definition allows for there to be experiences other than your own. I am simply saying that under my definition of objective, those other experiences objectively exist.

What difference does an arbitrary definition make? The point is that the scientific method depends on the assumption of objectivity as I have defined it. That is the only assumption of objectivity I make. Like I said, I do not assume what the nature of objective reality is. I leave that up to science to determine.

Other "consciousnesses" are merely other experiences. Since these experiences would not exist in the absence of an experiences of them they cannot be regarded as objective.

This is exactly why your definition of objective is completely pointless. You are saying that, by definition, experiences are not objective. This is not a statement about the nature of experiences, or their relationship to everything else. Your definition amounts to nothing more than "anything that isn't an experience is objective".

You are still assuming that there is more to reality than just your experiences. Call that whatever you want.

"I" (in the illusionary physical body sense) am constantly changing my physical and temporal location. This does not mean that the experiences that correlate with one particular physical location in spacetime are objectively separate from those that correlate with another spacetime location. In this sense there is nothing to distinguish my experiences from the proposed existence of other experience occuring in different spacetime locations (which could be me or you) regardless of whether they are correlated with my physical body or yours.

There is one very important distinction. Your experiences are only the ones which you are having, regardless of the mechanism.

So if you are saying that objectivity is "something more than just my experiences" then that is a meaningless distinction when applied to what I am actually saying.

It is not meaningless unless you are going to claim that my experiences and your experiences are indistinguishable. That is nonsensical.

So much for your ridiculous assertion that science can function without the assumption of objectivity.
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That was just a little joke. I still say that science can function without the assumption of objectivity. The definition of what kind of knowledge science gives us would have to change.

Without objectivity as I have defined it, there would be no knowledge for science to give. Your definition of objectivity is irrelevant to science.

You keep using that word "experience", as though it were some singular thing. What are you talking about?
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The singular thing of Experience is the single realm of reality. Surely you are familiar with the concept of monism ! I thought you were a seasoned materialistic monist ?

I am quite familiar with materialistic monism, but I am not one. As for your claim that reality consists of only experiences, what possible logical reason could you have for holding such a position?

If you are talking about more than just your own experiences, then your definition of "experience" already assumes objectivity!
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Well, it seems we are talking about a different meaning to the word objective. Your definition, as I have explained above, is meaningless with regards to my view. There is an important difference between saying objectivity is something more than just your own experiences and saying that objectivity is the existence of something in the absence of an experience of it.

Well, my definition is the one that is relevant to science, and it was the question of whether science requires the assumption of objectivity to be valid that sparked all of this.

If you are claiming that science can still function in a reality which is objective (as I have defined the term), but in which all that exists is experiences, then I would agree. So what? You are still making more assumptions than I am. You are assuming an experiential monism. I am only assuming that there is more to reality than my experiences.

What is this nonsense? Do you have any evidence for this insane assertion? Of course experiences are spatiotemporal!
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So where are they ?

They are physical processes occurring in your brain.

Me:You would not say that there can be more to objective reality than is expressed through an aspect of it such as an electron. On the other hand you would say that objective reality consists only of its expressed aspects

Stimpy: What is your point?
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Your assertion about the difference between saying that all experiences are a subset of consciousness, and that consciousness consists only of experiences is not valid when addressing a monistic philosophy.

Of course it is. It would only become invalid if you are claiming that experiences are the monistic substance of which everything is composed. If you are a mental monist, then that still allows for the possibility that there is more to mind than just experiences, because experiences are not the ontological substance, consciousness is. That is the form of Idealism I am familiar with.

Let's back up here, in order to avoid any confusion.

Given the following definition of objective (clarified, so as to avoid any ambiguity, or misleading language):

Reality is objective if there is more to it than just your experiences.
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Don't agree with this definition.

How about this:

Reality is objective if it exists in the absense of experience

How about we quit quibbling about definitions, and get to the point?

1) Do you agree that there must be more to reality than just your experiences, for science to make sense?

2) Do you agree that your form of mental monism makes the assumption that there is more to reality than just your experiences?

3) Do you agree that there are components of your mental monism which must be assumed, which do not have to be assumed in order for science to be valid?

If your answer to the above three questions are all yes, then we are essentially in agreement about everything other than the claim that mental monism is actually true, or a rational position to hold.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

DavidSmith73
objectivity = a thing existing in the absence of an experience of that thing. Consciousness (and therefore any experience) cannot exist in the absence of an experience of it by (my) definition because any experience is an expression of Consciousness. Thus Consciousness is not objective with respect to the above definition.


Hey David! That's brilliant! :) I'll have to put it in my sig (if you don't mind?).

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

Stimpy: That doesn't make any sense. Reality is objective if there is more to it than just your experiences.
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DavidSmith73
I don't agree with this definition. There is a difference between that definition and the one I was using which defines objectivity to be the existence of a thing in the absence of an experience of that thing.


Absolutely, it is clear that Stimpy doesn't understand what the word objective means.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Absolutely, it is clear that Stimpy doesn't understand what the word objective means.

Why is it that every discussion with you ends up with us disagreeing on a definition, and you insisting that I am using the wrong meaning (as though that were somehow relevant to the actual content of the discussion :rolleyes: )?

Could it be because you cannot actually address the content of my position? You know what I mean by objective now. Who cares whether you use the word to mean the same thing or not?

What matters is that my original point, which is that the scientific method requires us to assume that there is more to reality than just our own experiences.

Just look at the nonsensical gymnastics you guys have gone through in your attempt to refute this. You start by saying that my assumption of an external reality (which I clearly explained as meaning that there is more to reality than your own experiences) is not necessary for science. You then made no objection when I referred to this as an assumption of objective reality. Then, when I explained why an external reality is, in fact, necessary for science, you start whining that this isn't what "objective" means!

Who cares what the damn word means! It is just a word. It means whatever you define it to mean. What is important is the content of my position. Can you actually address that content, or are you just going to keep playing meaningless word games, and avoiding the issue?


Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,



Why is it that every discussion with you ends up with us disagreeing on a definition, and you insisting that I am using the wrong meaning (as though that were somehow relevant to the actual content of the discussion :rolleyes: )?

Could it be because you cannot actually address the content of my position? You know what I mean by objective now. Who cares whether you use the word to mean the same thing or not?

What matters is that my original point, which is that the scientific method requires us to assume that there is more to reality than just our own experiences.

Just look at the nonsensical gymnastics you guys have gone through in your attempt to refute this. You start by saying that my assumption of an external reality (which I clearly explained as meaning that there is more to reality than your own experiences) is not necessary for science. You then made no objection when I referred to this as an assumption of objective reality. Then, when I explained why an external reality is, in fact, necessary for science, you start whining that this isn't what "objective" means!

Who cares what the damn word means! It is just a word. It means whatever you define it to mean. What is important is the content of my position. Can you actually address that content, or are you just going to keep playing meaningless word games, and avoiding the issue?


Dr. Stupid

Stimpy for gods sake, the content of your position is entirely dependent of the meaning of your words !

flibble grobble queack.

What content is there in that ? Sweet FA. Thats because I haven't specified the meaning of those words. When we "play word games" we are doing it for a very important reason. The meaning that you are using for words is not relavent to the argument.

[c4ts]

This is why I loathe semantics.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[b]Ian,



Why is it that every discussion with you ends up with us disagreeing on a definition, and you insisting that I am using the wrong meaning (as though that were somehow relevant to the actual content of the discussion :rolleyes: )?

Could it be because you cannot actually address the content of my position? You know what I mean by objective now. Who cares whether you use the word to mean the same thing or not?



You continually use words outside their proper meaning. By so doing you cheat because then you say things like science deals with the objective, which obviously I have no problems with under the proper definition of objective. But you use the word "objective" to include that which is only purely subjective ie conscious experiences. So your statements to the causual onlooker look eminently sensible. But if one digs into what you actually mean by these words your position is incoherrent nonsense. This is not to mention that from one post to the next you persistently contradict yourself! :rolleyes:

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

Stimpy for gods sake, the content of your position is entirely dependent of the meaning of your words !

That is why I went to great lengths to explain what I meant as clearly as possible. Is there still any aspect of my position which you don't understand? If so, what?

What content is there in that ? Sweet FA. Thats because I haven't specified the meaning of those words. When we "play word games" we are doing it for a very important reason. The meaning that you are using for words is not relavent to the argument.

Give me a break. In my above post I even went so far as to completely rephrase my position, and my questions about yours, so as to eliminate any ambiguous language or words whose meanings we don't agree on. You have simply ignored that, and continue to whine about semantics.


Ian,

You continually use words outside their proper meaning.

Says you. What is the proper meaning, anyway? The words in question have many usages in common English. That is why when discussing philosophy or science, it is necessary to precisely define your terms. I have done that.

And I have never before met anybody who did not consider the assumption that other people actually exist to be an assumption of objective reality. Even the other Idealists I have conversed with agree that Idealism assumes an objective reality, and that the ontological nature of that reality is mind.

I think you guys are just desperately searching for anything to sidetrack the discussion from the actual issue.

By so doing you cheat because then you say things like science deals with the objective, which obviously I have no problems with under the proper definition of objective. But you use the word "objective" to include that which is only purely subjective ie conscious experiences. So your statements to the causual onlooker look eminently sensible. But if one digs into what you actually mean by these words your position is incoherrent nonsense. This is not to mention that from one post to the next you persistently contradict yourself!

The above might actually be a valid criticism, if not for two facts:

1) I have been very clear about exactly what I mean. There is no way you can accuse me of being deliberately misleading with my words, because from the very beginning of this discussion I have been very careful to clarify any words which may be even slightly ambiguous.

2) Your assertion that my usage of the word objective is incorrect, is simply nonsense. This is how most of the philosophers I have conversed with, materialists, idealists, dualists, theists, and so on, define the term.

But of course, none of this makes any difference. You both know what my position is. Can you answer my questions, and address my points, or not?

I'll repeat them for you:

1) Do you agree that there must be more to reality than just your experiences, for science to make sense?

2) Do you agree that your form of mental monism makes the assumption that there is more to reality than just your experiences?

3) Do you agree that there are components of your mental monism which must be assumed, which do not have to be assumed in order for science to be valid?

If your answer to the above three questions are all yes, then we are essentially in agreement about everything other than the claim that mental monism is actually true, or a rational position to hold.

If all you are interested in doing is quibbling about word usage, then just say so now, so that I can quit wasting my time.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

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You continually use words outside their proper meaning.
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Says you. What is the proper meaning, anyway? The words in question have many usages in common English.


David has already given an excellent defintion of what the word "objective" means. You clearly are failing to understand what the word means.



That is why when discussing philosophy or science, it is necessary to precisely define your terms. I have done that.



Defining objective to also include that which is subjective, scarcely makes your ideas more clear. You're a moron who is quite clearly incapable of understanding anything.



And I have never before met anybody who did not consider the assumption that other people actually exist to be an assumption of objective reality.



Then they are equally clueless as you. Objective means that which can be established from the third person perspective. I cannot objectively know that other people's bodies are inhabited by conscious minds. Conscious expereinces are irreducibly private. I can only ever infer what someone else is feeling. I cannot objectively know that.


Even the other Idealists I have conversed with agree that Idealism assumes an objective reality, and that the ontological nature of that reality is mind.



Not your definition of "objective" they don't. Or if they do then they are not idealists. The merely objective is not characteristic of reality. Only the subjective is real. The so-called "objective" abstracts from reality.


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By so doing you cheat because then you say things like science deals with the objective, which obviously I have no problems with under the proper definition of objective. But you use the word "objective" to include that which is only purely subjective ie conscious experiences. So your statements to the causual onlooker look eminently sensible. But if one digs into what you actually mean by these words your position is incoherrent nonsense. This is not to mention that from one post to the next you persistently contradict yourself!
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The above might actually be a valid criticism, if not for two facts:

1) I have been very clear about exactly what I mean. There is no way you can accuse me of being deliberately misleading with my words, because from the very beginning of this discussion I have been very careful to clarify any words which may be even slightly ambiguous.

2) Your assertion that my usage of the word objective is incorrect, is simply nonsense. This is how most of the philosophers I have conversed with, materialists, idealists, dualists, theists, and so on, define the term.



And you matey are a bare faced despicable liar. Name anyone who defines objective as that which is wholly subjective. Apart from your good self that is. :rolleyes:



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1) Do you agree that there must be more to reality than just your experiences, for science to make sense?



Yes of course you cretin!



2) Do you agree that your form of mental monism makes the assumption that there is more to reality than just your experiences?



Er . . .yeah :rolleyes:



3) Do you agree that there are components of your mental monism which must be assumed, which do not have to be assumed in order for science to be valid?



Obviously.



If your answer to the above three questions are all yes, then we are essentially in agreement about everything other than the claim that mental monism is actually true, or a rational position to hold.
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In this you are profoundly wrong. I utterly reject your daft as a*seholes materialism.

[Tricky]

Ian, you are a decent fellow, but I advise you stop this charade. Stimpy has addressed every issue you have raised and demolished your points. And he has done so without resorting to character assasination and vulgarity. You are looking ever more like a bad loser.

And I advise you stop drinking. Your alcoholic posts are all too obvious.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

David has already given an excellent defintion of what the word "objective" means. You clearly are failing to understand what the word means.

I understand his definition just fine. I just don't consider it to be a useful concept. His definition of objective has no relevance to my position, and the question of whose definition is the "right" one has no relevance to the validity of my position.

That is why when discussing philosophy or science, it is necessary to precisely define your terms. I have done that.
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Defining objective to also include that which is subjective, scarcely makes your ideas more clear. You're a moron who is quite clearly incapable of understanding anything.

I prefer the term "motard" myself. :rolleyes:

And I have never before met anybody who did not consider the assumption that other people actually exist to be an assumption of objective reality.
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Then they are equally clueless as you. Objective means that which can be established from the third person perspective. I cannot objectively know that other people's bodies are inhabited by conscious minds.

Of course you can. This is just stupid. I have explained this to you before. I experience my own consciousness directly. I formulate the falsifiable hypothesis that I am just another person, fundamentally no different from any other. That theory is supported by extensive evidence. Besides, if we accept your belief that consciousness has an effect on the observable world, then it must be objectively knowable, through those effects. That is indirect observation, and fundamentally no different than our objective knowledge of anything else.

Conscious expereinces are irreducibly private. I can only ever infer what someone else is feeling. I cannot objectively know that.

All objective facts that you claim to know are inferred. The question is whether that inference is logically justified, based on the available evidence. In the case of consciousness, it is.

Even the other Idealists I have conversed with agree that Idealism assumes an objective reality, and that the ontological nature of that reality is mind.
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Not your definition of "objective" they don't. Or if they do then they are not idealists. The merely objective is not characteristic of reality. Only the subjective is real. The so-called "objective" abstracts from reality.

You appear to be using the terms "objective" and "physical" to mean the same thing. They do not.

The above might actually be a valid criticism, if not for two facts:

1) I have been very clear about exactly what I mean. There is no way you can accuse me of being deliberately misleading with my words, because from the very beginning of this discussion I have been very careful to clarify any words which may be even slightly ambiguous.

2) Your assertion that my usage of the word objective is incorrect, is simply nonsense. This is how most of the philosophers I have conversed with, materialists, idealists, dualists, theists, and so on, define the term.
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And you matey are a bare faced despicable liar. Name anyone who defines objective as that which is wholly subjective. Apart from your good self that is. :rolleyes:

That isn't how I defined it. Apparently one of us is a liar, but it isn't me.

1) Do you agree that there must be more to reality than just your experiences, for science to make sense?
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Yes of course you cretin!

quote:
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2) Do you agree that your form of mental monism makes the assumption that there is more to reality than just your experiences?
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Er . . .yeah

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) Do you agree that there are components of your mental monism which must be assumed, which do not have to be assumed in order for science to be valid?
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Obviously.

quote:
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If your answer to the above three questions are all yes, then we are essentially in agreement about everything other than the claim that mental monism is actually true, or a rational position to hold.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In this you are profoundly wrong. I utterly reject your daft as a*seholes materialism.

What materialism? My point is that I only make three assumptions:

1) That there is more to reality than my own experiences.

2) That reality functions according to consistent logical rules.

3) That it is possible for me to extract information about those rules from my observations.

Those are the minimal assumptions necessary for science to be valid. Based on those assumptions, I rely on science for any other information about reality.

So what, exactly, is wrong with this position?


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Tricky
Ian, you are a decent fellow, but I advise you stop this charade. Stimpy has addressed every issue you have raised and demolished your points. And he has done so without resorting to character assasination and vulgarity. You are looking ever more like a bad loser.

And I advise you stop drinking. Your alcoholic posts are all too obvious.

Demolished my points :rolleyes: Are you unable to understand anything of the exchange whatsoever?? TRy reading what has been said. There is not just me that has exposed the incoherency in Stimpy's thoughts. I have nothing more to say to Stimpy.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

What materialism? My point is that I only make three assumptions:

1) That there is more to reality than my own experiences.

2) That reality functions according to consistent logical rules.

3) That it is possible for me to extract information about those rules from my observations.

Those are the minimal assumptions necessary for science to be valid. Based on those assumptions, I rely on science for any other information about reality.

So what, exactly, is wrong with this position?


Dr. Stupid

We've been through all this. The above 3 points only commit you to naturalism. They are insufficient for you to be classified as a physicalist. But you have made other comments which place you squarely in the physicalist camp. Must I scroll up to quote them?

BTW no-one disagrees with 1. But I would dispute there is more to the external world than the collective sum of all sensory experiences.

Incidentally I would rephrase 2 so that it says:

2) The external world functions according to consistent logical rules.

So in other words I disagree that these are the minimal assumpotions necessary for science. Science does not require naturalism to be true.

Naturalism makes a unnecessary metaphysical assumption that all our behaviour can be exhaustively explained in terms of physical cause and effect. Which means I was a bit hasty in declaring before that naturalism doesn't have any metaphysical elements. Oh well LOL

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

We've been through all this. The above 3 points only commit you to naturalism. They are insufficient for you to be classified as a physicalist. But you have made other comments which place you squarely in the physicalist camp. Must I scroll up to quote them?

I guess so, because I do not think I have made any such comments. :rolleyes:

BTW no-one disagrees with 1. But I would dispute there is more to the external world than the collective sum of all sensory experiences.

That is beside the point. Your metaphysical speculations are of no relevance to the validity of my position.

Incidentally I would rephrase 2 so that it says:

2) The external world functions according to consistent logical rules.

This presupposes that you are not part of the external world. Why make such an assumption? Furthermore, once you acknowledge that your experiences have an effect on the external world, this becomes nonsensical.

It is not possible for the external world to function according to consistent logical rules, if something which has an effect on it does not.

So in other words I disagree that these are the minimal assumpotions necessary for science. Science does not require naturalism to be true.

You are wrong, for the above reason.

Naturalism makes a unnecessary metaphysical assumption that all our behaviour can be exhaustively explained in terms of physical cause and effect. Which means I was a bit hasty in declaring before that naturalism doesn't have any metaphysical elements. Oh well LOL

Naturalism requires that all observable effects can be explained scientifically, and this necessarily includes human behavior. That is a necessary assumption of science. Call it metaphysical if you want, but it is a purely epistemological assumption.

At this point I have no idea what you even mean by "metaphysical". You seem to include any claim about the nature of reality, regardless of its verifiability.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We've been through all this. The above 3 points only commit you to naturalism. They are insufficient for you to be classified as a physicalist. But you have made other comments which place you squarely in the physicalist camp. Must I scroll up to quote them?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I guess so, because I do not think I have made any such comments.



Well let's make a list of all the comments in this thread shall we?

[list=1]
I think that consciousness is a physical process in the brain.
It (ie consciousness) is a physical process.
Conscious states are physical states.
The physical states are the conscious states. I do not think it is possible for me to be any more clear about this.
Well, that is not what I say. I say that conscious states are a type of physical state.
In principle, the existence of the phenomena we think of as consciousness (thought, awareness, etc...) can be logically derived from the physical brain activity, because these phenomena are brain processes.
The far more parsimonious theory is that consciousness is just a particular class of brain processes.
Clearly I think that consciousness is reducible to brain processes.
[/list=1]

I'm sure there's many more, but that will do. I would say this definitely makes you a physicalist wouldn't you agree. Certainly these statements go far beyond the naturalism expounded in your 3 points.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

II
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BTW no-one disagrees with 1. But I would dispute there is more to the external world than the collective sum of all sensory experiences.
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That is beside the point. Your metaphysical speculations are of no relevance to the validity of my position.



No, disputing my position is metaphysical. Why should anyone suppose there is anything more to the world outside all possible experiences?? Ontological claptrap.




II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incidentally I would rephrase 2 so that it says:

2) The external world functions according to consistent logical rules.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



This presupposes that you are not part of the external world. Why make such an assumption?



Because I do not sensorily experience myself. The external world is that constituted by the information from my 5 senses. My actaul conscious states are not external to me.



Furthermore, once you acknowledge that your experiences have an effect on the external world, this becomes nonsensical.



You've made the assertion. Now you prove it. I would say denying it is nonsensical. How can my own conscious experiences be of the external world? How can they be external to me? You do not understand what the word external means. Like so many other words! :rolleyes:



It is not possible for the external world to function according to consistent logical rules, if something which has an effect on it does not.


Well fair enough. A falling ball does not obey consistent logical rules if I catch it on its descent and then move it around in an arbitrary fashion. But reality operates according to logical rules provided we don't interfere and intervene in the course of events.


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So in other words I disagree that these are the minimal assumpotions necessary for science. Science does not require naturalism to be true.
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You are wrong, for the above reason.



I have refuted your reasons.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naturalism makes a unnecessary metaphysical assumption that all our behaviour can be exhaustively explained in terms of physical cause and effect. Which means I was a bit hasty in declaring before that naturalism doesn't have any metaphysical elements. Oh well LOL
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Naturalism requires that all observable effects can be explained scientifically, and this necessarily includes human behavior.



You can explain it scientifically, maybe via psychology and sociology, but this doesn't mean to say that our behaviour can be reduced to an unbroken chain of physical cause and effect.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat


Me: The same goes for the realm of Consciousness. Consciousness must pervade all individual experiences. In this sense there is nothing more to reality than what is contained within any experience.

Stimpy: That does not follow. You are making the leap from the statement that all experiences are part of consciousness, to the statement that consciousness consists only of experiences.



That leap is justified. If you understood my other comments then you will understand that within materialism you can say the same thing; all physical processes are part of objective reality and there is nothing more to objective reality than what is contained within any physical process.

As I keep saying, the difference between our views is that my view of reality is not objective. It does not exist in the absence of experience.



Me: I don't agree with this definition. There is a difference between that definition and the one I was using which defines objectivity to be the existence of a thing in the absence of an experience of that thing.

Stimpy: So what? The only difference is that your definition allows for there to be experiences other than your own. I am simply saying that under my definition of objective, those other experiences objectively exist.


Your definition is pretty meaningless then. The fact is that your definition makes special reference to experience whether it be my experience, your experience or someone else’s. If you are saying that experiences are part of objective reality then why do make special reference to it in your definition and say that objectivity is something more than an individuals experiences. Its simply incoherent nonsense.



What difference does an arbitrary definition make? The point is that the scientific method depends on the assumption of objectivity as I have defined it. That is the only assumption of objectivity I make. Like I said, I do not assume what the nature of objective reality is. I leave that up to science to determine.



The scientific method does not depend on objectivity as you have defined it. If you think about it properly, your definition is incoherent within both our views. Furthermore you have assumed something about the nature of objective reality and I quote:

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Stimpy: “I specifically clarified that I wasn't referring to any kind of ontological "separateness". I also clarified after that post that by "independently" I simply mean that there is more to it than just the awareness, and that it is only independent in the sense that the stuff you are aware of is there even when you are not aware of it.”
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You have assumed that objective reality does exist in the absence of an experience of it. During this debate you have mixed together two different meanings of objective. At the present time you have adopted the “more than just your experiences” definition, which I have explained is meaningless with reagards to the basis of each of our views. Above, you were using a much better definition which is simply that objective reality is a reality that exists in the absence of an experience of it. Science does not need the latter definition to function.



Me: Other "consciousnesses" are merely other experiences. Since these experiences would not exist in the absence of an experiences of them they cannot be regarded as objective.

Stimpy: This is exactly why your definition of objective is completely pointless. You are saying that, by definition, experiences are not objective. This is not a statement about the nature of experiences, or their relationship to everything else. Your definition amounts to nothing more than "anything that isn't an experience is objective".


Hang on, you said above that you were making no assumptions about the nature of reality ! Oh, so its OK for only you to do that is it ? Like Ian said, your posts are riddled with contradictions.

Anyway, I do make a statement about the nature of reality by way of an ostensive definition. It is experiential. The meaning of experiential can be understood merely by introspective examination. If you can’t do that then I’ll assume you are a zombie !


You are still assuming that there is more to reality than just your experiences. Call that whatever you want.

I’ll call that a pretty meaningless statement if you don’t mind.


There is one very important distinction. Your experiences are only the ones which you are having, regardless of the mechanism.


So what ? This doesn’t have anything to do with how Consciousness cannot be regarded as objective. I was merely explaining how my experiences and someone elses are all expressions of Consciousness and all that apparently distinguishes them is their correlation with a description of their location in spacetime (which to confuse matters further is also an experience!). At the current time we do not have a model that describes how my experiences are usually correlated with the spatial and temporal location of “me” in the physical sense. In fact the phenomena of ESP might be the starting point to address this issue because it suggests otherwise.


Me: So if you are saying that objectivity is "something more than just my experiences" then that is a meaningless distinction when applied to what I am actually saying.

Stimpy: It is not meaningless unless you are going to claim that my experiences and your experiences are indistinguishable. That is nonsensical.


Its not nonsensical at all. All experiences are an expression of Consciousness. Therefore in terms of underlying reality there is nothing to distinguish mine from yours.




Without objectivity as I have defined it, there would be no knowledge for science to give. Your definition of objectivity is irrelevant to science.


There would be knowledge about the relationships between experiences. These relationships are also experiences. They do not objectively exist.



I am quite familiar with materialistic monism, but I am not one. As for your claim that reality consists of only experiences, what possible logical reason could you have for holding such a position?


Experiences are the only things we truly know to exist. :rolleyes:



Well, my definition is the one that is relevant to science, and it was the question of whether science requires the assumption of objectivity to be valid that sparked all of this.


No its not relavent to science. I could just as well have lived an isolated existence without the knowledge or assumption that there are other people with other experiences and still perform science. Your definition of objective is quite silly.

So here’s my question to you.

Do you assume that reality exists in the absence of an experience of it ?


Stimpy: What is this nonsense? Do you have any evidence for this insane assertion? Of course experiences are spatiotemporal!

Me: So where are they ?

Stimpy: They are physical processes occurring in your brain.


This is based on the assumption that the physical processes are the same thing as the experience. You also have the circular problem of the fact that the observation of physical process in the brain are also experiences themselves. If we examine an experience in isolation we find no spatial or temporal aspect to them for the simple reason that they are not measurable.




Me: Your assertion about the difference between saying that all experiences are a subset of consciousness, and that consciousness consists only of experiences is not valid when addressing a monistic philosophy.

Stimpy: Of course it is. It would only become invalid if you are claiming that experiences are the monistic substance of which everything is composed. If you are a mental monist, then that still allows for the possibility that there is more to mind than just experiences, because experiences are not the ontological substance, consciousness is. That is the form of Idealism I am familiar with.


That may be the form of Idealism you are familiar with but it is not what I am saying at all. Experiences are the ontological “substance” of reality because, as I have said many times now, Consciousness is expressed through every single experience. Thus you can easily say that experiences are an expression of Consciousness and all there is to reality is experiences. Its just like saying physical processes are an expression of objective reality and all there is to objective reality is physical processes.

I’m going to explain what makes our views different one last time. Your reality is objective because you say it exists in the absence of an experience of it. Mine does not and therefore is not objective.





1) Do you agree that there must be more to reality than just your experiences, for science to make sense?

No. Because I could just as well have lived on a deserted island and do science all by myself without any knowledge of other people and their experiences.


2) Do you agree that your form of mental monism makes the assumption that there is more to reality than just your experiences?

No. Because any experience I have is an expression of Consciousness. Any experience someone else has also is an expression of Consiousness. Hence there is no more to reality than that which is contained with my experience or someone elses.


3) Do you agree that there are components of your mental monism which must be assumed, which do not have to be assumed in order for science to be valid?


No. I think I am right in saying that all I assume is that reality is experiential. Without experience we would not have science. However if you are talking about the validity of science, we must address what science can actually tell us about reality. If you do not assume objectivity then science cannot give you objective knowledge because such knowledge does not exist. If you assume an experiential reality, science would not be giving us any knowledge about the nature of reality, only knowledge about the relationships we find between certain experiences and these relationships are also experiences themselves (i.e they do not objectively exist).

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian



Well fair enough. A falling ball does not obey consistent logical rules if I catch it on its descent and then move it around in an arbitrary fashion. But reality operates according to logical rules provided we don't interfere and intervene in the course of events.



Exactly. This is why science is not describing an objective reality. In effect, science is being selective with which experiences it classes as relating to an objective reality and are therefore real. The ones that don't seem to strictly adhere to logical rules are not included. Then of course you can claim that reality seems to be based on logical rules because you have just excluded the experiences that don't fit !