Can computers "imagine"

[Piscivore]

This is probably a dumb question, but do computers or like machines of any caliber have the capability to make correlations between apparently unrelated information in such a way as this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imagination#Imagination_preceding_reality)?

[yairhol]

A computer will do anything it is programmed to do.
You want imagination? program the algorithm which you think best suits the definition of imagination (it will probably be YOUR imagination) or in other words tell the computer what you want it to make of two perceptions (according to the link you provided) in order to come up with a third one.
Computers are dumb but capable of doing as much as its programmer is able to provide.

Regards,
Yair

[TX50]

What has the "sex_robot_book" tag got to do with this!?

[yairhol]

Ha Ha...

[rdaneel]

I think it will happen eventually. I don't believe that there is any "special" quality about the human brain that makes duplicating it's functions impossible. It's ultimately just a machine and any machine can be reverse engineered.

[Taffer]

IMHO, a complex enough computer will perfectly duplicate the actions of a human.

[Schneibster]

Such a computer will not be programmed in its every detail. We will provide the basis and it will grow into intelligence, as children do. The question is, what will we (and such intelligences) DO?

[Piscivore]

What has the "sex_robot_book" tag got to do with this!?
This (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=2627135#post2627135).I think it will happen eventually. I don't believe that there is any "special" quality about the human brain that makes duplicating it's functions impossible. It's ultimately just a machine and any machine can be reverse engineered.
IMHO, a complex enough computer will perfectly duplicate the actions of a human.
But they cannot do such things yet, right?
A computer will do anything it is programmed to do.
You want imagination? program the algorithm which you think best suits the definition of imagination (it will probably be YOUR imagination) or in other words tell the computer what you want it to make of two perceptions (according to the link you provided) in order to come up with a third one.
But how about coming up with their own, independently?
Such a computer will not be programmed in its every detail. We will provide the basis and it will grow into intelligence, as children do. The question is, what will we (and such intelligences) DO?
Eh, the usual human stuff. He laughs, he learns, he loves.

[Taffer]

But they cannot do such things yet, right?

I do not believe so, no.

[PixyMisa]

This is probably a dumb question, but do computers or like machines of any caliber have the capability to make correlations between apparently unrelated information in such a way as this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imagination#Imagination_preceding_reality)?

Sure. That's easy; anything Turing-complete can do that.

But how about coming up with their own, independently?

Independently of what, though? Our thoughts are dependent on our genetic heritage and our environment. A computer has the same restrictions as a human; it's not going to come up with a new program without some sort of input.

[Piscivore]

Independently of what, though?
Independently of specific pre-programming. Let's say the military programs a machine to observe an area and identify vehicles by their general shape, engine sound, and speed. The machine makes several thousand observations of hostile, friendly, and civilian vehicles. One day, it draws on these observations to determine that a particular vehicle, despite fitting several characteristics of a hostile vehicle is instead being operated by friendlies- perhaps because they drive it differently. Could such a thing be possible, or at least plausible, even if this was not a characteristic the designers programmed or even planned for?

[IXP]

Yes. The brain IS a computer and it does so.

IXP

[PixyMisa]

Independently of specific pre-programming. Let's say the military programs a machine to observe an area and identify vehicles by their general shape, engine sound, and speed. The machine makes several thousand observations of hostile, friendly, and civilian vehicles. One day, it draws on these observations to determine that a particular vehicle, despite fitting several characteristics of a hostile vehicle is instead being operated by friendlies- perhaps because they drive it differently. Could such a thing be possible, or at least plausible, even if this was not a characteristic the designers programmed or even planned for?Yes, definitely.

Computers can alter their programming based on data received - or to put it another way, they can learn from observation. Usually this is set up so the computer's operation will remain with in certain bounds, because we expect computers to behave predictably, unlike people.

Computers are capable of all the same types of learning and behaviour as humans, including self-awareness, but are much simpler and less sophisticated, so they don't fare as well on complex problems. Then again, it takes decades of training for a human to competently handle the situation you describe.

[PixyMisa]

In fact, now that I think about it, you just described a Bayesian spam filter.

[yairhol]

Originally Posted by yairhol http://forums.randi.org/helloworld2/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=2666337#post2666337)
A computer will do anything it is programmed to do.
You want imagination? program the algorithm which you think best suits the definition of imagination (it will probably be YOUR imagination) or in other words tell the computer what you want it to make of two perceptions (according to the link you provided) in order to come up with a third one.

But how about coming up with their own, independently?


I Don't think that will ever happen. even asking the computer to generate a random number is not really random but subject to certain rules and algorithms.

Regards,
Yair

[Thabiguy]

Let's say the military programs a machine to observe an area and identify vehicles by their general shape, engine sound, and speed. The machine makes several thousand observations of hostile, friendly, and civilian vehicles. One day, it draws on these observations to determine that a particular vehicle, despite fitting several characteristics of a hostile vehicle is instead being operated by friendlies- perhaps because they drive it differently. Could such a thing be possible, or at least plausible, even if this was not a characteristic the designers programmed or even planned for?

Yes. What you have described is a typical example of a classification problem, solved by means of supervised learning (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervised_learning) - this means that the machine learns to identify vehicles from training data pre-classified as hostile/friendly/civilian, as opposed to the machine making up categories of its own.

In this kind of machine learning, the classifying function is not programmed by the designers, instead it is inferred by the machine from observed data and characteristics. The process is often implemented by methods such as artificial neural networks which infer very complicated classifying functions that are not easily analyzed and explained in terms of simple characteristic-decision relationships. The designers usually do not seek to understand why the machine has decided this way or that way; their usual concern is how often the decision is correct and how to improve that.

In your scenario, it is entirely possible - and it also frequently happens in the real world - that the machine will decide for classification that is contrary to some "obvious" characteristics, because of some other characteristics, less obvious to human observer. Sometimes, such hidden characteristics will be bogus - for example, the classifier may learn to "lock on" some spurious artifact of sample data - and the decision will be erroneous. Sometimes, the decision may be right and the classifier may actually be seeing real patterns that humans do not see.

The problem is that without independent means of verification, there is no way to tell whether in a particular counter-intuitive decision the machine is being smarter than a human or whether it is off-course. Unless the trained machine has already been proved to outperform human observers in the accuracy of its decisions, it is unlikely that people would rely on its judgement; rather, they would just take the decision as "advisory".

[Cuddles]

Independently of specific pre-programming. Let's say the military programs a machine to observe an area and identify vehicles by their general shape, engine sound, and speed. The machine makes several thousand observations of hostile, friendly, and civilian vehicles. One day, it draws on these observations to determine that a particular vehicle, despite fitting several characteristics of a hostile vehicle is instead being operated by friendlies- perhaps because they drive it differently. Could such a thing be possible, or at least plausible, even if this was not a characteristic the designers programmed or even planned for?

But that is not imagination. That is simply the computer doing what it is designed to do. It measures the characteristics of vehicles and determines what the vehicle is and who is driving it. If it comes to the conclusion that an apparently hostile vehicle is actually friendly then that is determined entirely by past experience, not by any kind of guessing of imagination. Imagination would be if it suddenly decided the vehicle was driven by a herd of pink elephants. Although this would probably be cause for maintanence rather than celebrating the birth of AI.

I'm not quite sure what you mean by "not characteristic the designers programmed". If they did not program it to give a hostile/friendly output then it will not suddenly decide to do so and so your scenario does not make sense. If they did program for this output then it is simply doing what is programmed. You seem to be asking about heuristics and genetic algorithms, but this has nothing to do with imagination.

[Dabljuh]

@OP: You imply that people can imagine. I demand proof for this statement. Also, a proper definition of what imagination means.

[Piscivore]

I Don't think that will ever happen. even asking the computer to generate a random number is not really random but subject to certain rules and algorithms.

Regards,
Yair
I knew that, but that doesn't preclude the possibility that it might do something that is not random but is unexpected, does it?

@OP: You imply that people can imagine. I demand proof for this statement. Also, a proper definition of what imagination means.
I linked to the definition that was pertinent to the discussion I was looking for. This definition is describing behaviour that has been observed. I'm not sure what sort of "proof" you think you want beyond that.

But that is not imagination. That is simply the computer doing what it is designed to do. It measures the characteristics of vehicles and determines what the vehicle is and who is driving it.
What if the "who is driving it" wasn't a characteristic the designers intended to program for?

You seem to be asking about heuristics and genetic algorithms, but this has nothing to do with imagination.
I probably am. Thanks, and to you too Pixy and Thabiguy, for pointing me in the right direction.

[calebprime]

Yes, definitely.

Computers can alter their programming based on data received - or to put it another way, they can learn from observation. Usually this is set up so the computer's operation will remain with in certain bounds, because we expect computers to behave predictably, unlike people.

Computers are capable of all the same types of learning and behaviour as humans, including self-awareness, but are much simpler and less sophisticated, so they don't fare as well on complex problems. Then again, it takes decades of training for a human to competently handle the situation you describe.

my bolding


It almost sounds like you are saying "computers are capable of all the same types of learning and behaviour as humans, including self-awareness."

I've bolded some of the words that raise important issues.

If you changed that to: "computers might some day be capable of many of the same kinds of behaviour as humans, without self-awareness", few would disagree.

The problem with the statement as it stands:

1) present tense
2) all?
3) "same types"--you mean functionally? or by same process?
4) self-awareness?

The strong AI people have been saying that various amazing things will be forthcoming soon. They have been saying this for a long time.

We have computers that can play chess, because chess is a closed, logical problem.

We don't have computers that can dependably cross a street. That's a hard problem, but not for people.

We don't have computers that can make good jokes.

We don't have computers that can feel pain, or pleasure, or love.

I'm perfectly willing to concede that such computers might be possible in hundreds (not thousands) of years, but then they won't really be computers anymore.

Look, I'm aware that these are deep issues. You've got people like Dennett on one side, and people like Searle on the other.

Dennett seems to want to do away with consciousness by sleight-of-hand.

Searle doesn't seem to be able to imagine what computers might be capable of in the future.

So, I'm not coming down on either side, neither do I feel like I can argue with the big boys.

But I couldn't let what you said stand--at least as read literally.

[Dabljuh]

Self-Awareness is the new Soul

A semi-unmeasurable attribute meant to somehow differ man from beast and machine.

[calebprime]

I get your point.

But, right now, I'm hitting my head against the desk.

It hurts.

I know this.

[Piscivore]

We don't have computers that can make good jokes.
Do we have computers that make bad ones? I'm not being facitious, here.

We don't have computers that can feel pain, or pleasure...
These are technically possible now though, right? Negative and positive feedback, and all that?

[calebprime]

or the old joke about behaviorism:

two behaviorists are having sex. when it's over, one says:

"That was good for you. Was it good for me?"

get it?

[calebprime]

Do we have computers that make bad ones? I'm not being facitious, here.


These are technically possible now though, right? Negative and positive feedback, and all that?

technically possible? or just conceivable?

G. Edelman has something like a theory of how the brain produces consciousness that involves feedback loops, it's true.

[PixyMisa]

It almost sounds like you are saying "computers are capable of all the same types of learning and behaviour as humans, including self-awareness."

Yep. That's exactly right.

1) present tenseWell, the past tense would be confusing.

2) all?All.

3) "same types"--you mean functionally? or by same process?Functionally.

4) self-awareness?Absolutely. Self-aware computer systems are the rule rather than the exception.

That self-awareness is rather limited, when compared to human consciousness. But it is very real. Computers can deliver all sorts of information about what they are doing, and why, and what they have done, and what they will do.

The strong AI people have been saying that various amazing things will be forthcoming soon. They have been saying this for a long time.AI is whatever hasn't been done yet.

We don't have computers that can dependably cross a street. That's a hard problem, but not for people.Real-world problem. And it's a problem for cats and dogs and gorillas... and dolphins, for that matter.

We don't have computers that can make good jokes.A limitation they share with most people.

We don't have computers that can feel pain, or pleasure, or love.Ah. And you can prove that, can you?

I'm perfectly willing to concede that such computers might be possible in hundreds (not thousands) of years, but then they won't really be computers anymore.I disagree completely. The human brain is nothing but a squishy, unreliable computer.

Look, I'm aware that these are deep issues. You've got people like Dennett on one side, and people like Searle on the other.Searle is a clown. Unless he has recanted his "Chinese Room" recently?

Dennett seems to want to do away with consciousness by sleight-of-hand.Dennet seems to be pretty much right. I'm not sure I agree with him entirely, but he's onto something. Consciousness is not magic. It's merely the ability to examine one's own thought processes. We discussed this a while back, and while I don't necessarily agree with Dennet's position that a thermostat is conscious, I figure that a computer that supports all reasonable requirements for consciousness - sense, memory, decision and introspection - could be constructed using fewer than one hundred transistors.

Modern microprocessors commonly exceed one hundred million transistors.

Searle doesn't seem to be able to imagine what computers might be capable of in the future.Or in 1950, for that matter.

But I couldn't let what you said stand--at least as read literally.Well, sorry, but I meant exactly what I said.

[PixyMisa]

Do we have computers that make bad ones? I'm not being facitious, here.Oh, sure. Bad jokes are easy. Example (http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn1719)
These are technically possible now though, right? Negative and positive feedback, and all that?Possible and done. Pain and pleasure are, as you say, negative and positive feedback signals. In humans, the psychology of our responses to these signals is complex. In simpler organisms, less so.

You can define pleasure and pain to preclude what computers already do, but that definition would be arbitrary.

[PixyMisa]

Oh yes, calebprime, read this wiki article on reflection (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reflection_%28computer_science%29) to see part of where I'm coming from.

[calebprime]

Ah. And you can prove that, can you?


Well, sorry, but I meant exactly what I said.

You're consistent.

But, inconsistent person that I am, I imagine I feel pain when my child feels pain. On the other hand, my computer is much more useful to me than my child. I would feel nothing but irritation should someone destroy my computer.

I've got to go for today.

It would be a more interesting conversation if some of you who believe computers are currently capable of anything would admit that it hurts when you stub your toe.

It's not too interesting if you just say that Searle is a clown, and that Dennett is basically right.

Show me some examples of computers you believe currently experience pain or pleasure.

Remember, there are people at either end of the conversation who are acting as if they feel pleasure.

Remember, also, that not everything that is undefinable (or very hard to define) is therefore non-existent.

Also, WETWARE! SQUISHY! YUCKERS! the horror! the horror!

squishy and inconsistent and stupid is nice.

my last words, before i was assimilated, for today.

[PixyMisa]

You're consistent.I try.

But, inconsistent person that I am, I imagine I feel pain when my child feels pain.That's not an unreasonable assertion. Given that pain is a negative feedback signal, and that injury to your children puts your genetic propagation at risk, it is reasonable that you would feel the same (or similar) signals in that situation.

On the other hand, my computer is much more useful to me than my child. I would feel nothing but irritation should someone destroy my computer.And how, exactly, is that relevant to the discussion?

It would be a more interesting conversation if some of you who believe computers are currently capable of anything would admit that it hurts when you stub your toe.Of course it hurts when I stub my toe. And a robot can experience pain when it breaks a wheel.

It's not too interesting if you just say that Searle is a clown, and that Dennett is basically right.I explained (briefly) why Dennett is basically right: The requirements for consciousness are sense, memory, decision and introspection. You can simplify this further if you wish, but to remove all reasonable objections, I posited a device that has two inputs with multiple states, two memory cells again with multiple states, and the logical ability to compare inputs and memories to each other in any combination and adjust the memory depending on the results. As I said, a hundred transistors suffices.

The reason Searle is a clown is that he tears systems apart looking for the consciousness box, and when he doesn't find it, posits instead that consciousness is magical. This is nonsense, because consciousness is a property of the system he defined, not a component.

Show me some examples of computers you believe currently experience pain or pleasure.Well, I'm playing Baldur's Gate II right now. My characters scream when they get hit.

How and why is that not pain?

Remember, there are people at either end of the conversation who are acting as if they feel pleasure.Or profound irritation.

Remember, also, that not everything that is undefinable (or very hard to define) is therefore non-existent.What is hard to define?

Also, WETWARE! SQUISHY! YUCKERS! the horror! the horror!Is your brain not squishy? If I club it, do you not ouch?

squishy and inconsistent and stupid is nice.Squishy is purely physical, and irrelevant. If you like inconsistency and stupidity, well, your life must be an unending sea of bliss.

[Z]

But that is not imagination. That is simply the computer doing what it is designed to do. It measures the characteristics of vehicles and determines what the vehicle is and who is driving it. If it comes to the conclusion that an apparently hostile vehicle is actually friendly then that is determined entirely by past experience, not by any kind of guessing of imagination. Imagination would be if it suddenly decided the vehicle was driven by a herd of pink elephants. Although this would probably be cause for maintanence rather than celebrating the birth of AI.

But the human brain works the same way. There is nothing in all imagination that wasn't assimilated from past experiences.

If the machine suddenly decided the vehicle was driven by pink elephants, that means it had some experience of elephants, the color pink, etc.

The machine might be in an environment where trees and rocks exist; so it could, in theory, imagine that green rocks were driving some vehicle. The machine's designers would undoubtably see this as some form of processing error, but it could also very well be simple imagination.

I think a lot of us forget that everything we think or imagine is based entirely off of our past experiences; that our brains came as blank as can be, and were programmed over the course of our lifetimes with a vast array of experiences, cross-linked via trial and error.

So if we were to create some vastly complex thinking machine, and gave it a lifetime of experiences and the means to cross-index those experiences in any way it desired, then, yes, it would imagine quite a bit.

[MortFurd]

Independently of specific pre-programming. Let's say the military programs a machine to observe an area and identify vehicles by their general shape, engine sound, and speed. The machine makes several thousand observations of hostile, friendly, and civilian vehicles. One day, it draws on these observations to determine that a particular vehicle, despite fitting several characteristics of a hostile vehicle is instead being operated by friendlies- perhaps because they drive it differently. Could such a thing be possible, or at least plausible, even if this was not a characteristic the designers programmed or even planned for?

There was a project I read about once along those lines. I can't find a link to it, so I don't know for sure whether the project was real or just a story made. At any rate:

A computer was programmed to detect pictures that showed tanks. The idea being to develop a general recognition algorithm, then train using pictures with tanks and pictures without tanks. A human operator would then correct the program's picks, and the program would reanalyse and improve its detection. After a long period of training, it got to the point where it would recognize all of the test pictures correctly.

At this point, they were to demonstrate it and were given a picture that was not one of the samples. The program failed. It couldn't tell if there was a tank in the picture or not.

Now, you might think the program had simply "memorized" the sample set and couldn't tell anything about a new photo. You'd be wrong. It could detect some tanks in other new pictures that were given to it, but not reliably.

It turns out that the sample pictures were all taken such that the tank pictures all showed a stretch of blue sky, and that the pictures without tanks didn't. The difference being (so I remember reading) that the tank pictures were shot in the winter and the non-tank pictures were all shot in the summer.

The program "learned" to distinguish pictures of winter versus pictures of summer rather than pictures with tanks versus pictures without.

A surprising (and unexpected) result, but not imagination.

[MortFurd]

But the human brain works the same way. There is nothing in all imagination that wasn't assimilated from past experiences.

If the machine suddenly decided the vehicle was driven by pink elephants, that means it had some experience of elephants, the color pink, etc.

The machine might be in an environment where trees and rocks exist; so it could, in theory, imagine that green rocks were driving some vehicle. The machine's designers would undoubtably see this as some form of processing error, but it could also very well be simple imagination.

I think a lot of us forget that everything we think or imagine is based entirely off of our past experiences; that our brains came as blank as can be, and were programmed over the course of our lifetimes with a vast array of experiences, cross-linked via trial and error.

So if we were to create some vastly complex thinking machine, and gave it a lifetime of experiences and the means to cross-index those experiences in any way it desired, then, yes, it would imagine quite a bit.

And there's the rub:
A machine "desires" nothing. It hasn't got a desire-a-mabobby. You could feed a bazillion facts into a database, and give it the capability to cross index items. It would never go and do the indexing, though, without being "told" to. If you tell it to do so, you're going to have to provide rules and goal because it won't come up with any on its own.

You could provide such a program with a way to determine its own goals. A "learning" algorithm, so to speak. But, you must still set it an objective of some kind and give it some kind of limits. If you don't you get a tremendous mess. Just do a join of all tables in a database, with out a WHERE clause. That gets you imagination, in spades. The database will combine all of the elements in all of the tables in all ways possible. Won't do you much good, because there's no way of sorting something useful out of the crap. Wouldn't do the machine much good, either. It'd crunch and grind and spit out phracking long lists of gibberish, but it wouldn't be any closer to imagination.


We've got imagination. We have built in goals (food, safety, sleep) and we set ourselves other goals in attaining those primary goals. We have limitations that restrict our data combining - physical limits that prevent carrying out some actions, mental limits on how much information we can process at once.

Unless you provide your program with some sort of goals and limits, it won't "imagine," it'll either do nothing or else spew endless garbage.

[c4ts]

My laptop has an imagination. Sometimes when I try to get it to work for me it's off in la la land daydreaming via a bunch of useless processes I can't get rid of, eating 99% of the available CPU...

[Piscivore]

And there's the rub:
A machine "desires" nothing. It hasn't got a desire-a-mabobby.
My antivirus-a-mabobby is being rather insistant that I renew my subscription. Soon.

You could feed a bazillion facts into a database, and give it the capability to cross index items. It would never go and do the indexing, though, without being "told" to. If you tell it to do so, you're going to have to provide rules and goal because it won't come up with any on its own.
Isn't it possible to create rules and goals unintentionally, especially in complex systems? As I recall quite a lot of "I, Robot" was about just such problems.

We've got imagination. We have built in goals (food, safety, sleep) and we set ourselves other goals in attaining those primary goals. We have limitations that restrict our data combining - physical limits that prevent carrying out some actions, mental limits on how much information we can process at once.
Aren't "mental limits" just another form of a physical limitation?

Replace "food" with "power" and "sleep" with "compiling time"- don't then all the same parameters apply to a machine, especially a complex one?

You could provide such a program with a way to determine its own goals. A "learning" algorithm, so to speak. But, you must still set it an objective of some kind and give it some kind of limits.
Well, it seems to me that the limits you mentioned already apply, so it has inherently "some kind of limit". It is funny that you mentioned physical requirements, because so far the prime motivators for my robotic protagonist's actions have been precisely security, then power.

If you don't you get a tremendous mess. Just do a join of all tables in a database, with out a WHERE clause. That gets you imagination, in spades. The database will combine all of the elements in all of the tables in all ways possible. Won't do you much good, because there's no way of sorting something useful out of the crap. Wouldn't do the machine much good, either. It'd crunch and grind and spit out phracking long lists of gibberish, but it wouldn't be any closer to imagination.
This seems contradictory- "combining all tables gets you imagination, but it isn't usefull data, so it isn't imagination"?

And since when was coherence a prerequisite of imagination?

[Z]

And there's the rub:
A machine "desires" nothing. It hasn't got a desire-a-mabobby. You could feed a bazillion facts into a database, and give it the capability to cross index items. It would never go and do the indexing, though, without being "told" to. If you tell it to do so, you're going to have to provide rules and goal because it won't come up with any on its own.

You could provide such a program with a way to determine its own goals. A "learning" algorithm, so to speak. But, you must still set it an objective of some kind and give it some kind of limits. If you don't you get a tremendous mess. Just do a join of all tables in a database, with out a WHERE clause. That gets you imagination, in spades. The database will combine all of the elements in all of the tables in all ways possible. Won't do you much good, because there's no way of sorting something useful out of the crap. Wouldn't do the machine much good, either. It'd crunch and grind and spit out phracking long lists of gibberish, but it wouldn't be any closer to imagination.


We've got imagination. We have built in goals (food, safety, sleep) and we set ourselves other goals in attaining those primary goals. We have limitations that restrict our data combining - physical limits that prevent carrying out some actions, mental limits on how much information we can process at once.

Unless you provide your program with some sort of goals and limits, it won't "imagine," it'll either do nothing or else spew endless garbage.

And you're saying you can't provide a machine the exact same requirements as a human?

In fact, all I can see that you've said here is that, in order to make a machine with a human-like behavior, it needs all associated human-like behaviors as well.

OF COURSE IT DOES!

Conversely, if you take a new-formed human brain and hook it into some system that keeps it continually fed, protected, and isolated from anything except general inputs (no hunger or threats or anything), it'll do the same thing as your computer above: generate gobbledygook.

If we put a thinking machine together that requires periodic recharging (such as, say, a robot vacuum), then it will set a goal to recharge when it gets low; and subordinate to that, set a goal to come up with an optimal navigation plan to reach its docking station. The ones we have now are simple and linear in nature, of course, but if we give one a complex enough neural-like system of computation and the ability to process inputs and randomly index things through trial and error, there's no reason why the machine can't, through trial and error, come up with multiple various plans to reach its docking station when hungry - plans dealing with obstacles or a relocated station, etc.

None of what you mentioned is magical or totally unique to humankind; all of them (except, possibly, sleep) could be and probably will be built into the machines of the future.

As for our imagination, I see absolutely no functional difference in a human's imagination and your table generator above. Humans can imagine all sorts of useless gobbledygook - and often do.

But you are right - humans have needs that must be fulfilled, and can sort out the imagined data combinations to come up with useful solutions to fulfill those needs. However, that doesn't make them unique.

Some machines already have needs, and do what we do, albeit in a very limited fashion.

So I'm not exactly sure what your post is on about...

[toddjh]

For what it's worth, genetic algorithms already come up with unexpected solutions to problems. I can't seem to find it on the net, but I read an article a few years ago about a simple genetic algorithm application to compute the fastest route from point A in the solar system to point B. The algorithm finally spit out a hugely complex solution involving multiple slingshots around inner planets and a course correction which involved flying between a planet and one of its moons.

The point of the article wasn't just that genetic algorithms work, it was that they work in ways that even the programmers don't anticipate. It's not as simple as, say, using numerical methods to find the best option out of a set of trivial solutions; it actually gives the impression of innovation and lateral thinking.

So it looks to me like the "hard" part of imagination isn't making the actual leaps between apparently unrelated concepts, but rather understanding enough about the concepts and how they do relate. The real difficulty seems to lie in explaining to your genetic algorithm how to determine relative success, and (most of all) what it means to combine two different approaches to the same problem. It turns out that this is actually prohibitively difficult a lot of the time.

[Soapy Sam]

Define "imagine".

[Piscivore]

Define "imagine".

For my purposes the portion of the Wiki page to which I linked suffices:
When two existing perceptions are combined within the mind the resultant third perception referred to as its synthesis and on occasion a fourth called the antithesis, which at that point only exists as part of the imagination, can often become the inspiration for a new invention or technique.

Obviously, I'm less than thrilled with the "within the mind" bit, but it's Wiki.

[CynicalSkeptic]

Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?

[Cuddles]

But the human brain works the same way. There is nothing in all imagination that wasn't assimilated from past experiences.

If the machine suddenly decided the vehicle was driven by pink elephants, that means it had some experience of elephants, the color pink, etc.

The machine might be in an environment where trees and rocks exist; so it could, in theory, imagine that green rocks were driving some vehicle. The machine's designers would undoubtably see this as some form of processing error, but it could also very well be simple imagination.

I think a lot of us forget that everything we think or imagine is based entirely off of our past experiences; that our brains came as blank as can be, and were programmed over the course of our lifetimes with a vast array of experiences, cross-linked via trial and error.

So if we were to create some vastly complex thinking machine, and gave it a lifetime of experiences and the means to cross-index those experiences in any way it desired, then, yes, it would imagine quite a bit.

I'd say that is exactly the difference between us and this hypothetical computer. Experience and, more importantly, the ability to experience more. This computer looks at vehicles. That is it. It can't imagine a pink elephant because it does not know what an elephant is or what pink is. It will never be able to imagine a pink elephant because it can never find out what pink is or what an elephant is.

I can imagine things because I have a huge amount of things I have experienced and can connect bits of them in pretty much any way I like. The computer has an extremely limited set of things it has experienced and can only connect them in certain ways. For example, if this computer sees a vehicle it can measure the speed, direction, how much it swerves and so on. It can measure some pretty complex parameters. But it still does not know what a wheel is, and no matter how much it analyses what it does know, it can never know what a wheel is. The closest it can come to imagination is to say it can see a vehicle that is moving in a different way from any other it has seen, but whose movement is made up of components of other vehicles it has seen.

This is essentially the same process as human imagination, but is on a scale many orders of magnitude lower. It is like comparing a hydrogen atom with a star, yes, they are both made of the same stuff, but it doesn't really make sense to discuss them using the same terms. It's the difference between chemistry and biology. Biology is just chemistry, but on a much more complex level that a lot of the time it just makes no sense to talk about one in terms of the other. Human imagination is biology while the computer's imagination is very much chemistry, and likely to remain so for good while.

[Z]

I'd say that is exactly the difference between us and this hypothetical computer. Experience and, more importantly, the ability to experience more. This computer looks at vehicles. That is it. It can't imagine a pink elephant because it does not know what an elephant is or what pink is. It will never be able to imagine a pink elephant because it can never find out what pink is or what an elephant is.

I can imagine things because I have a huge amount of things I have experienced and can connect bits of them in pretty much any way I like. The computer has an extremely limited set of things it has experienced and can only connect them in certain ways. For example, if this computer sees a vehicle it can measure the speed, direction, how much it swerves and so on. It can measure some pretty complex parameters. But it still does not know what a wheel is, and no matter how much it analyses what it does know, it can never know what a wheel is. The closest it can come to imagination is to say it can see a vehicle that is moving in a different way from any other it has seen, but whose movement is made up of components of other vehicles it has seen.

This is essentially the same process as human imagination, but is on a scale many orders of magnitude lower. It is like comparing a hydrogen atom with a star, yes, they are both made of the same stuff, but it doesn't really make sense to discuss them using the same terms. It's the difference between chemistry and biology. Biology is just chemistry, but on a much more complex level that a lot of the time it just makes no sense to talk about one in terms of the other. Human imagination is biology while the computer's imagination is very much chemistry, and likely to remain so for good while.

In other words, a sufficiently complex computer could certainly imagine.

Thank you.

[PixyMisa]

I'd say that is exactly the difference between us and this hypothetical computer. Experience and, more importantly, the ability to experience more. This computer looks at vehicles. That is it. It can't imagine a pink elephant because it does not know what an elephant is or what pink is. It will never be able to imagine a pink elephant because it can never find out what pink is or what an elephant is.
But that's not a limitation of computers, it's merely a limitation of specific classes of computer programs. We write programs that way because we want the behaviour of the program to be bounded.

It's quite easy to program computers in other ways, and often useful

This is essentially the same process as human imagination, but is on a scale many orders of magnitude lower. It is like comparing a hydrogen atom with a star, yes, they are both made of the same stuff, but it doesn't really make sense to discuss them using the same terms.
I know what you're getting at, but that's a terrible analogy.

It's the difference between chemistry and biology. Biology is just chemistry, but on a much more complex level that a lot of the time it just makes no sense to talk about one in terms of the other. Human imagination is biology while the computer's imagination is very much chemistry, and likely to remain so for good while.
That's a much better one.

Computers can imagine, and it's the same thing as human imagination, but much more limited. So much more limited that we usually talk about it using different terminology.

But just as biology is chemistry (is physics), human imagination is information processing.

[Cuddles]

In other words, a sufficiently complex computer could certainly imagine.

Thank you.

But that's not a limitation of computers, it's merely a limitation of specific classes of computer programs. We write programs that way because we want the behaviour of the program to be bounded.

Exactly. In answer to the OP "Can computer imagine?" the answer is no. The answer to the question "Will computers be able to imagine in the future?" is probably yes, but it is a different question.

That's a much better one.

Computers can imagine, and it's the same thing as human imagination, but much more limited. So much more limited that we usually talk about it using different terminology.

I wouldn't go quite that far. All imagination is information processing, but not all information processing is imagination. I don't think it is just that we usually use different terms, with current technology it just doesn't make sense to say computers have imagination. As Z says, a sufficiently complex computer probably could imagine, but the trouble is we can't make sufficiently complex computers yet.

[Z]

Can't, or just haven't?

The thing you're pointing to here is the vastness of knowledge the average human brain has. We don't make computers that recognize military vehicles, have an understanding of elephants and pinkness, and the ability to cross-reference same... because we don't need them to do that. I'm sure that if we wanted to we could create a computer that would 'imagine'...

Of course, there's also the ephemerity of the word 'imagine' itself. For example, you claim that imagination is information processing, but information processing isn't necessarily imagination... what if it is? What if all the weird random thoughts of our imagination is nothing more than the cross-indexing of things in our minds, brought to our conscious attention by whatever mechanism?

In other words, how we define 'imagination' becomes vital to recognizing whether we've created computers capable of it or not.

So... how DO you define 'imagination'?

[calebprime]

cp: It almost sounds like you are saying "computers are capable of all the same types of learning and behaviour as humans, including self-awareness."

PM: Yep. That's exactly right.

...
PM: Well, sorry, but I meant exactly what I said.

...

First, my apologies for mangling the quote feature. Also, I'm not attempting to quote you out of context for the purpose of debating points, only for focus.

Anyone who reads my posts will be aware that debate is not my intent, and logic (beyond the correct use of ordinary language) is not my strong point.

A good reply to my incredulity at your position would be:

-Here is a computer program that is capable of understanding language.
(so that it can not be fooled by trivial tricks.)

-Here is a computer, hooked up to a robot, that can cross a street. (Not just one street that it trained on for several years, but any street.)

-I strongly believe my computer feels pain and pleasure. The scream it makes when I play a computer game is more than a recording. There is something it is like to be a computer. (Nagel)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Nagel

-I'm interested in more than winning a debate: I really think that computers are as sentient as people.

-This sentience has ethical consequences:

Here you explain what they are: perhaps we should scrap people, perhaps we should treat computers and people the same, perhaps we should be equally kind to both people and computers. Perhaps there should be no penalty for murder. (Yes, I know these are all potential straw men...)

Given that the common-sense position is that people feel and computers don't (currently)--I think the burden of proof is on you.

Simply come up with some examples of highly successful computer systems that can do what humans can do currently--in the areas of poorly-defined problems--and I will have learned something about the current state of the art.

Otherwise, it's just the usual JREF pissing contest.

And, yes, I admit the last post I made here was a complete shambles.

But, again, my challenge is simple:

Without saying, "define blah blah", give me examples of the state of the art.

Remember, it was your oft-stated position that "computers are capable of all the same types of learning and behaviour as humans, including self-awareness."

[Piscivore]

Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?

I really had to resist having mine do so. :D

[PixyMisa]

I wouldn't go quite that far. All imagination is information processing, but not all information processing is imagination.
Sure.

I don't think it is just that we usually use different terms, with current technology it just doesn't make sense to say computers have imagination. As Z says, a sufficiently complex computer probably could imagine, but the trouble is we can't make sufficiently complex computers yet.
It depends on the definition of "imagine". Piscivore linked to one in the original post, and by that definition, it is clear that current computers are indeed possessed of imagination.

[PixyMisa]

Remember, it was your oft-stated position that "computers are capable of all the same types of learning and behaviour as humans, including self-awareness."
I've bolded the operative word.

If I'd said "Computers are capable of the same learning and behaviour as humans.", that would be folly.

But if we categorise human mental faculties, we find in every case that there is only a difference in degree, and not in kind, between computers and humans. Whether we are interested in perception, or language, or the ability to safely cross the street, or to form new inferences, or consciousness itself, computers can do it. Albeit most often, poorly.

The point is not that computers are human, the point is that there is in a very important sense a continuum of humanity from the IBM 701 to you and I.

And somewhere along that continuum the ethical questions you pose become pressing.

[calebprime]

bingo.

now I get it.:)

[PixyMisa]

I don't find Nagel particularly interesting, though. As you may have guessed, I am a strict reductionist.

[PixyMisa]

bingo.

now I get it.:)
Cool. Sorry about the confusion, we started from different places and had to circle a couple of times before we met.

[Cuddles]

So... how DO you define 'imagination'?

I think the problem here is that trying to define "imagination" is rather like trying to define "life". There is no doubt that I am alive (hopefully) and there is no doubt that a rock is not alive. However, no matter what definition of life you use you always find that there are things that are clearly alive that don't fit that definition and things that aren't alive that do fit it. There is a continuum of "aliveiness" and no matter how you choose your definition there is a big grey area that doesn't quite fit.

Imagination is the same, no matter how you define it you have a continuum which has a big area that is not easy to define. It seems that you choose your definition such that something with even very limited processing and memory has imagination, while I define it such that it takes much more to be classed as actual imagination. I think computers are at about the stage of viruses. No-one can quite decide whether they are alive or not, and they jump from alive to dead depending on exactly which definition you pick.

I can see the problems with both our views. As I see it, your definition allows computers to have imagination, but dilutes the meaning so much that it is not really a useful word any more. If what computers do is imagination then what do we call whatever I do that is orders of magnitude more complex. The main problem with my definition is that it is a post-definition. Essentially, I define imagination to be what I have and not what computers have. It is useful as a descriptive word to distinguish clearly different processes (even if htat difference is only in the degree of complexity), but has virtually no analytical value.

To go back to the "life" analogy, your definition allows thing like cars and fire to be classed as alive and so the word "life" is no longer useful as a general description because it includes too many different typse of things, but can be useful for analysing new discoveries to determine if they are alive or not. My definition excludes all those extras, but is basically defined as "These thing are alive therefore that is what life means". It is useful to describe things that we already know about, but is completely unable to account for any new forms of life.

At the moment I think my view of imagination works because there is such a big difference between us and computers that a comparison deon't make much sense. However, as computers and programming get more sophisticated I think your definition will become more valid. For the moment I'll stick with mine though.

PS The definitions of life were for example only, that isn't the actual definition of life I use, so let's not get into a debate about that here.

[Z]

I think the problem here is that trying to define "imagination" is rather like trying to define "life". There is no doubt that I am alive (hopefully) and there is no doubt that a rock is not alive. However, no matter what definition of life you use you always find that there are things that are clearly alive that don't fit that definition and things that aren't alive that do fit it. There is a continuum of "aliveiness" and no matter how you choose your definition there is a big grey area that doesn't quite fit.

Your analysis of the problem is spot-on, I'd say -but let me put it in my own words for a moment.

There are two ways to approach definitions for any word - the first is to define it by describing its properties; the second, to define it by demonstrating examples of it.

We necessarily have to use the second approach for many terms, such as teaching color or tone, though there does exist a first-approach definition for such terms. However, the first approach just doesn't give anyone a working definition of color or tone, so we learn about these by the second approach.

With concepts such as 'life', 'consciousness' and 'imagination', we took the second approach over the course of history, and are only just now learning that the first approach might be more useful to us. Sure, when we were living in the dark ages, it was OK to approach definitions of 'life' as 'that which we possess and rocks do not.' The problem is, we started with even more limited second-approach definitions - 'that which the adult males of my tribe have and no one else has'.

Of course, we came to accept, over time, that more than just a few males in a single tribe had life... and this has eventually led us to coming up with functional definitions of life. And there really aren't nearly as many grey areas with life as you seem to think there are. Yes, viruses and protoviruses exist in a grey area between life and non-life - thus, it's useful to employ a new term, such as 'protolife' - but for the most part, definitions for life clearly exclude fire and automobiles. Those definitions, however, are starting to include very advanced computer programs and theoretically possible mechanical creations, because these creations are beginning to exhibit some of the qualities that we use to define 'life'.

You seem to be in the camp that insists there must always be a clear delineation between what man is, and what machine is. So no matter how 'lifelike' a machine will ever become, you'll still be insisting that there is some ephemeral difference between your life, and a machine's life (so it seems to me).

The same thing goes with consciousness. I have always, ALWAYS considered consciousness to be 'information processing', and have always considered computers to be limited forms of consciousness. Even if we include self-awareness to consciousness, we'd be forced to accept modern computers as conscious.

Yet there seems to be a school of thought that thinks that consciousness is limited solely to organic life forms - and not even all organic life forms. And as computers become more complex and aware, this school tightens its definition of 'conscious' so that humans are included, but machines are not - and, as a result, neither are elephants, spiders, dogs, monkeys, or disabled people.

But in both cases, life and consciousness, this second school has to, as you say, 'post define' the term in order to avoid associating mankind with beings it desperately wants to be superior to.

But second school definitions just aren't going to cut it any more, as man becomes more god-like and begins creating life.

So it becomes vitally necessary to define our terms BEFORE we apply them, and to stick to those terms, no matter what the apparent implications are.

Imagination is the same way. If we look at post-defining the word, we're pretty clueless as to whether machines imagine or not; and if we define it as something we can do, but machines cannot, then we're stuck trying to determine WHY machines can't imagine - what it is that we possess that machines don't, and eventually, we work our way back to defining imagination in the first place - and having to face up to that definition when the machine DOES get whatever it is we think is unique to humans.

Likewise, by post-defining the term, we might be erroneously excluding innumerable species who also possess imagination - not that we have any way of knowing whether they do or not. Do dogs have imagination? Do flies? What about fish? Or gorillas?

My biggest problem with people like you (as regards these sorts of terms) is that you seem to be holding on to the opinion that there has to be something unique about humans. And as far as I can see, there isn't. Humans don't violate the rules of physics or chemistry or any other natural law. Humans are just complex chemical machines, and like any other machine, they can be reverse-engineered too. So there is absolutely nothing a human has, is, or can do now that can't be made into a machine in the future. Absolutely nothing.

And since that is true, it is also true that many of the qualities that we possess are going to start emerging in our creations as we grow in skill and ability. Why should it bother you so to say that computers have a proto-imagination? Why should it trouble you if we say that a new car that can reproduce itself and has a very advanced computer is 'alive'? Will it bother you later when we find out that programs can have feelings, and have those feelings hurt? Or will it bother you more when we truly come to understand the human machine, and start taking steps to fix the problems rather than avoid or coddle them - like chemical therapy for aggressive or antisocial behavior, or direct genetic manipulation to eliminate undesired traits and add desired ones?

Imagination is the same, no matter how you define it you have a continuum which has a big area that is not easy to define. It seems that you choose your definition such that something with even very limited processing and memory has imagination, while I define it such that it takes much more to be classed as actual imagination.

But without defining the 'much more', you're just moving goal posts. That's all I ask - if you're going to define imagination in such a way that current computers cannot do it, you need to explain WHY the computer can't do it.

In other words, define 'imagination', and then we can talk.

IMHO, imagination is the act of cross-indexing seemingly unrelated data and looking for useful correllations. Machines CAN do this, so machines CAN imagine.

You seem to think there's more to it, but fail to state what that 'more' is.

I think computers are at about the stage of viruses. No-one can quite decide whether they are alive or not, and they jump from alive to dead depending on exactly which definition you pick.

They (generally) cannot reproduce. Thus, they're not alive. (I'm not saying that mules aren't alive, but the natural state of the basic creature can reproduce, so the class of creature is alive. Computers aren't designed to reproduce, and so aren't alive)

I can see the problems with both our views. As I see it, your definition allows computers to have imagination, but dilutes the meaning so much that it is not really a useful word any more.

How so? What is your definition of 'useful'?

If what computers do is imagination then what do we call whatever I do that is orders of magnitude more complex.

Imagination.

And it may not be orders of magnitude more complex at all. Only the hardware running it is.

Back in the day, I had a Vic-20 computer, and I wrote programs on it. Those programs were tiny - sometimes only a byte or two long.

Windows Vista is orders of magnitude more complex. What do I call it?

Oh, right - a program.

Same thing.

[Piscivore]

I think the problem here is that trying to define "imagination" is rather like trying to define "life". There is no doubt that I am alive (hopefully) and there is no doubt that a rock is not alive. However, no matter what definition of life you use you always find that there are things that are clearly alive that don't fit that definition and things that aren't alive that do fit it. There is a continuum of "aliveiness" and no matter how you choose your definition there is a big grey area that doesn't quite fit.


That's all well and good (not sure I agree, though), only I was quite clear (I thought) about what it was I was asking about. I only used the word "imagine" in the subject because it was short, I did not use it whatsoever in the post, and I linked to a very specific, limited definition of the concept, which I then repeated for those that didn't see the link. Trying to use a broader, less specific, fuzzy or mystical interpretation is- I'm sorry- moving my goalposts as Z mentions.