Hey, Shanek, what's your take on "The Tragedy of the commons"?

[jj]

What's the solution?

How does private ownership sort it out?

[Cain]

Shanek's probably busy saving the world, so I'll respond on his behalf.

Ahem *clears throat*

Easy. The "tragedy of the commons" is a socialist myth caused wholly and exclusively by government interfence. Restrict government activities by allowing beneficent free-markets to unleash their true creative powers and all these self-imposed problems will wither away (without anyone noticing).

[Insert non-related paean to 19th century America's glory days here]

If even laissez-faire ideologues determine a policy of deregulation, privatization and shrinking of government was less than wildly successful, then we didn't really deregulate (we re-regulated), or privatize enough.

[insert Von Mises quote here]

Link study from the independent-minded, freedom-loving Cato institute here: [] (preferably one that contains a line graph with a precipitous incline).

(The entire post should be peppered with references to Coase.)
_____________________________
How does private ownership sort it out?

The true answer: it doesn't. Not entirely anyway. Public goods and externalities are a major problem for captialism (at least laissez-faire variant).

[Mr Manifesto]

Let's queue another 300-post thread with argumentum ad nauseum from Mr k. Oh, gawd, get me out of here!

[shanek]

Originally posted by jj
What's the solution?

Solution to what? I have no problem with communal property as long as all participants have agreed to the arrangement.

[jj]

Originally posted by shanek


Solution to what? I have no problem with communal property as long as all participants have agreed to the arrangement.

Evasion:

The Tragedy of the Commons is a well-known problem, and it has nothing to do directly with willingness to have communial property, rather with the upkeep, regulation and control of communial property.

So, how about it?

[Cain]

Originally posted by shanek


Solution to what? I have no problem with communal property as long as all participants have agreed to the arrangement.

Bizarre. The typical tragedy of the commons example surrounds the idea of farmers grazing their cows on a commonly owned pasture. Each farmer, as profit-seeking self-interested individual, over-grazes the land by adding extra cows (unsustainable development). Of course it's perfectly possible that everyone could agree to a rule on the number of cows allowed on the land. But that's not the "capitalist solution." The capitalist solution is to privatize the land and allow each person to do as she sees fit.

This is an inadequate solution for global challenges posed by one atmosphere or the world's fisheries.

Besides, even assuming most individuals somehow consent to this communal property, within a framework of capitalist institutions and norms, the free-rider problem still rears it's ugly head. Jones doesn't want to raise one cow. He wants to raise two, and there's nothing you can do about it (compare with a corporation polluting the air or water).

[jj]

Originally posted by Cain


Bizarre. The typical tragedy of the commons example surrounds the idea of farmers grazing their cows on a commonly owned pasture. Each farmer, as profit-seeking self-interested individual, over-grazes the land by adding extra cows (unsustainable development). Of course it's perfectly possible that everyone could agree to a rule on the number of cows allowed on the land. But that's not the "capitalist solution." The capitalist solution is to privatize the land and allow each person to do as she sees fit.

This is an inadequate solution for global challenges posed by one atmosphere or the world's fisheries.

Besides, even assuming most individuals somehow consent to this communal property, within a framework of capitalist institutions and norms, the free-rider problem still rears it's ugly head. Jones doesn't want to raise one cow. He wants to raise two, and there's nothing you can do about it (compare with a corporation polluting the air or water).

Is Shanek in denial about Gresham's law, perchance?

[BillyTK]

<off topic>
Not being the sharpest of knives in the cutlery drawer, I had to google up a definition of Gresham's Law (something about the return on writing interminable crime novels per chance? ;) ) and I found the following, which I thought may be of interest to fellow posters:

Gresham's Law of Activists—Telling good LP (Libertarian Party) activists from bad (http://www.lp.org/services/s99/activist.html)
There are some people in the libertarian movement who are bad activists. Even though they may be "OK" ideologically, they do not forward the cause of freedom. Even if they do make positive contributions, on balance they actually harm the movement.
[...]
Virtually every bad activist puts his or her personal (or factional) interests ahead of the purpose of the organization or cause. The good activist expresses his or her individuality through the choice of joining the organization if it identifies with his or her personal interests. The bad activist will sacrifice the interest of the organization for power, status, enrichment, or some other form of short-term ego gratification.

Putting personal interest before the cause? Expressing individuality through joining the organisation? Surely some mistake? Sounds like communism to me!

I now return you to your scheduled discussion.
</off topic>

[shanek]

Originally posted by jj
The Tragedy of the Commons is a well-known problem, and it has nothing to do directly with willingness to have communial property, rather with the upkeep, regulation and control of communial property.

Do you even know what you're talking about?

Tragedy of the Commons, vs. Tragedy of the anti-Commons, has to do with whether or not people have the right to share resources, creating a situation where those resources are not individually owned, but owned collectively by everyone participating. The tragedy of the commons deals with the risk involved in that if the commons is badly run, then everyone suffers.

That's why my solution is to make sure participation is voluntary. That way, people can dissolve the commons if it ends up not working and go back to something that does. This is not unlike what happened to the pilgrims; they started off with a commons, where everyone basicall threw the food they produced into a kitty and everyone took whatever they needed. It didn't work, and they ended up almost starving. But since the relationship was voluntary, not forced upon anyone, then they could easily switch to a more free-market situation where everyone kept what they grew and traded their surplus. That was finally what gave them the "plenty" everyone talks about.

Today, commons aren't really used for that...commons today, at least in the US, tend to be things like condos and other housing developments where the people who buy the houses agree to certain terms, kind of like voluntary zoning. So people can choose to live in the kind of community they want without forcing anyone else, and that seems to work a bit better.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Cain
Besides, even assuming most individuals somehow consent to this communal property, within a framework of capitalist institutions and norms, the free-rider problem still rears it's ugly head. Jones doesn't want to raise one cow. He wants to raise two, and there's nothing you can do about it (compare with a corporation polluting the air or water).

Why couldn't that be a condition of joining the commons?

[chulbert]

Originally posted by shanek
Do you even know what you're talking about?

Too funny.

You oversimplify the problem, shanek. Not all "commons" are easily divsible, ownable land properties. Commons include things like lakes, rivers and air - things that are fundamentally and irrevocably, uhh, common.

[jj]

Originally posted by shanek


Do you even know what you're talking about?

Is there a reason you haven't answered the question, which has now been posed by several people, and framed in a variety of attractively packaged formats?

Is there a reason that you routinely insult your superiors, sir?


Tragedy of the Commons, vs. Tragedy of the anti-Commons, has to do with whether or not people have the right to share resources, creating a situation where those resources are not individually owned, but owned collectively by everyone participating. The tragedy of the commons deals with the risk involved in that if the commons is badly run, then everyone suffers.

In other words, you refuse to take responsibility for the outcome of libertarianism in the tragedy of the commons. Is that it? You simply dismiss any bad outcome as "bad management". Is that it?

When the grass is all gone, it's just 'bad management', there are no social, mechanical, or physical dynamics involved, just bad management?

That's so lame as to not constitute even the beginnings of an answer. Please, in the future, try to at least address the heart of the question instead of attempting to evade the issue by answering a side-issue that isn't germane, and simply dismissing the real issue.

That's why my solution is to make sure participation is voluntary.

How is that a solution to the problem of overuse and abuse? Why are you dodging the issue? How does this deal with enforcement? How does it deal with limited resources? How does it deal with the question of at-hand rewards?

This is not unlike what happened to the pilgrims; they started off with a commons, where everyone basicall threw the food they produced into a kitty and everyone took whatever they needed. It didn't work, and they ended up almost starving. But since the relationship was voluntary, not forced upon anyone, then they could easily switch to a more free-market situation where everyone kept what they grew and traded their surplus. That was finally what gave them the "plenty" everyone talks about.

***howl*** Was that deliberately comic? While there is some point to SOME of what you've said, the way you've represented it looks like it comes from a pulp comic book.

Today, commons aren't really used for that...commons today, at least in the US, tend to be things like condos and other housing developments where the people who buy the houses agree to certain terms, kind of like voluntary zoning. So people can choose to live in the kind of community they want without forcing anyone else, and that seems to work a bit better.
More evasion...

Stop evading. You've now made it clear that you DO know what the tragedy of the commons is, and it's simple, obvious evasion to dismiss it as "bad management".

So, what is the answer? You felt entirely comfortable hounding me by asking what I meant when you took my statements out of context and misrepresented my position, so you have no room to complain here when I'm asking a question, and merely noting that you haven't started to answer the question at all.

You can say "I have no answer" (which I suspect may be true), or you can say "I don't want to answer", but what you can't get away with is to not answer and then imply that you have.

[Dancing David]

There is a modern tragedy of the commons occuring, in the USA and many countries the ability to transmit electo-magnetic readiation at specific wavelegnths for the purpose of information transmission is held in common by th e 'people' and administered by the government..
Currently we have a system where large corporations are totaly dominating the 'airwaves' there is no protection for the individual at any level.
I don't mind the fact that our government sells the rights to transmit to the highest bidder, what I do mind is that there is no power gi9ven to the notion that it is a 'common' at all and that individuals and small corporations should have a 'right of acsess to the common'.

As a very good exazample, we have all the large media giants protesting the issuing of low power FM permits.
Why?
Does a radio station with a transmission distance of a mile really threaten the larger corpopration, they think so.

This is assinine and it demostrates that capitalism does not always lead to freedom.

[Gem]

There is a modern tragedy of the commons occuring, in the USA and many countries the ability to transmit electo-magnetic readiation at specific wavelegnths for the purpose of information transmission is held in common by th e 'people' and administered by the government..
Currently we have a system where large corporations are totaly dominating the 'airwaves' there is no protection for the individual at any level.
I don't mind the fact that our government sells the rights to transmit to the highest bidder, what I do mind is that there is no power gi9ven to the notion that it is a 'common' at all and that individuals and small corporations should have a 'right of acsess to the common'.

As a very good exazample, we have all the large media giants protesting the issuing of low power FM permits.
Why?
Does a radio station with a transmission distance of a mile really threaten the larger corpopration, they think so.

This is assinine and it demostrates that capitalism does not always lead to freedom.

Media ownership is a market that SHOULD be regulated, in order to promote diversity in reporting and prevent bias. (regulation relating on to how much each big company can buy local stations)

Gem

[shanek]

Originally posted by chulbert
You oversimplify the problem, shanek. Not all "commons" are easily divsible, ownable land properties. Commons include things like lakes, rivers and air - things that are fundamentally and irrevocably, uhh, common.

There are still methods of dividing them up. They aren't "fundamentally common." There's no reason why different people can own different sections of a lake.

That's how it works up here with Lake Norman. Duke Energy owns most of the lake, but individual landowners own so-many feet from their property inwards to the lake. Whatever swims into your area, you own. Whatever swims away, you don't own anymore.

It's that way with land, too, to an extend. If a deer wanders onto your property, it's yours, and you can kill it and eat it. But if it's on someone else's property, you have to have their permission.

[shanek]

Originally posted by Dancing David
Currently we have a system where large corporations are totaly dominating the 'airwaves' there is no protection for the individual at any level.

That's a big point, especially since the airwaves are supposed to be for the "common" use. But this is where the real Tragedy of the Commons comes from: Where you have one and only one authority governing it, and you don't have a choice.

The power grid might be another example, as recent events have shown.

[jj]

Originally posted by shanek


That's a big point, especially since the airwaves are supposed to be for the "common" use. But this is where the real Tragedy of the Commons comes from: Where you have one and only one authority governing it, and you don't have a choice.

The power grid might be another example, as recent events have shown.

Precisely, the power grid is exactly an example of when a tragedy of the commons occurs due to a dropping of the regulations around a common system, and the lack of a financial reward for those owning part of the system resulting from the lack of regulation coupled with the fact that the ECONOMIC point of best return is to allow the system to be unstable and unreliable.

Ok, we're getting somewhere. You've admitted that pure libertarian ideals are unworkable.

So when IS regulation justified? How do you prevent the tragedy of the commons?

[shanek]

Originally posted by jj
Precisely, the power grid is exactly an example of when a tragedy of the commons occurs due to a dropping of the regulations around a common system,

Oh, give it a farking rest! It was proved over and over again in that other thread, despite all of your blathering, that there were very few areas of the total blackout area that anyone was even pretending to be deregulated, and that the source of the problem was in a fully regulated area.

[jj]

Originally posted by shanek


Oh, give it a farking rest! It was proved over and over again in that other thread, despite all of your blathering, that there were very few areas of the total blackout area that anyone was even pretending to be deregulated, and that the source of the problem was in a fully regulated area.

No, that wasn't proven. What's more, perhaps you need to brush up on the situation in Northern Ohio, and how the providers have been reacting to the political and regulatory climates.

I ask you, now, to give it a long, long rest, and to reply TO THE QUESTION OF THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS.

Not to who owns or might or should own the commons, but the libertarian solution to the actual problem, and, if you don't mind, some evidence of where it's been applied and shown to work.

Evidence, man, evidence.

[Ziggurat]

Shanek will probably continue to try to weasel his way out by claiming that complete privatization always works, and problems only arise when privatization and deregulation aren't complete.

So I'm going to get a little more specific: the world's large fish populations are being destroyed. This is a tragedy of the commons. The oceans are international, they cannot be divided up among countries let alone private citizens or corporations, and that's something you cannot get around even if you think it would be preferable. Given this reality, what is the libertarian solution to stop fish populations from being essentially destroyed by overfishing? Do libertarians HAVE a solution to this problem?

[Victor Danilchenko]

shane,

The Tragedy of the Commons has nothing to do with 'community ownership' per se. It's a game-theoretic problem, which in economic terms translates into 'free rider' problem -- when the profits are internalized but costs are externalized, each participant has economic incentive to overproduce, yet overall the system experiences diminished production capacity due to externalized costs (the reverse situation, where costs are internalized but profits externalized, is the 'public goods' problem which leads to underproduction).

Mathematically, it's an equivalent of the infamous 'prisoner's Dilemma', where it's in each prisoner's selfish interest ot betray, yet they all end up suffering more by mutual betrayal than by mutual cooperation. There is in principle no efficient solution sto this problem if the agents are selfish -- the solution is either to make agents selfless directly, or to introduce stateful iteration with a small exploration sigma, in which case 'tit for tat' becomes an optimal strategy, rather than betrayal.

In practical terms, the tragedy of the commons perfectly applies to air, since it's impossible to regulate air ownership: air does not care about property boundaries.

And your answers are typically evasive.

[jj]

Thank you, Victor, I was waiting to see if Shanek could define it for himself, or if he'd waffle and dance.

Now, we don't know why he's waffling, but we do know he won't meet the question head-on.