A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

I believe it was Galileo who originally made a distinction between what he called the primary and secondary qualities of objects. The primary qualities being those such as length, width, shape, mass, internal structure etc, which could be measured and treated mathematically, and the secondary qualities such as colour, taste and smell which were not considered to be intrinsic attributes of matter but were purely subjective phenomena which matter gave rise to.

So something like length and mass etc, are really out there in the world, but smells, tastes, the phenomenological experience of colour etc merely represent the powers of the primary qualities to produce the secondary qualities of colour, taste, smell etc within us.

In modern science is this distinction still maintained? Or have scientists now recognised their stupidity and agree that no such distinction between "primary qualities" and "secondary qualities" can be made?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

In modern science is this distinction still maintained? Or have scientists now recognised their stupidity and agree that no such distinction between "primary qualities" and "secondary qualities" can be made?

I think that notion was dismissed as fundamentally meaningless a long time ago. I certainly don't know of any modern scientists who subscribe to this kind of dualism.

Way to load the question, by the way. I don't think this view was so much stupidity, as naivety and lack of information.


Dr. Stupid

[Diamond]

This is a qualia question for idiots, isn't it?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,



I think that notion was dismissed as fundamentally meaningless a long time ago. I certainly don't know of any modern scientists who subscribe to this kind of dualism.

Way to load the question, by the way. I don't think this view was so much stupidity, as naivety and lack of information.


Dr. Stupid

Right, so the smell of a fart is actually constitutive of reality itself rather than the fart molecules?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Right, so the smell of a fart is actually constitutive of reality itself rather than the fart molecules?

The smell of a fart does not exist. The process of smelling a fart is a physical process occurring in your brain. The memory of what a fart smells like is stored in the structure of your brain. The experience of remembering what a fart smells like is a process in your brain, and so on.

When we talk about the smell of a fart, we are talking about a process as though it were an object. That is just a quirk of language, based on intuitive preconceptions which date back hundreds, and even thousands of years. It is not an indication of what the true nature of reality is.

I think I see where you are going with this. The mistake in the "primary and secondary qualities" idea is not that there is no difference between things like length, and things like color. It is that the color of an object is not a "quality" of that object at all.

The color of an object is a part of the experience you have when you see, or remember seeing, that object. It is a physical process occurring in your brain.

There are qualities of an object which correspond to the experience of color. Namely the wavelengths of light that it emits and/or reflects. Those are standard qualities of the object, fundamentally no different than length or mass.

The idea that scientists claim that color itself is just a wavelength of light, or a property of a wavelength of light, is a misconception. The color of an object is a process occurring in your brain, usually (but not always) as a result of light of a particular wavelength entering your eyes. It is not a property of the object itself. We tend to intuitively think of it that way, but as is often the case, our intuition is simply wrong.


Dr.Stupid

[wollery]

The smell of a fart is due to a chemical reaction between the molecules of the gases in the fart and the smell sensors of the poor git who smells it. However since everybody has slightly different smell sensors and gets a different amount of molecules and has a brain which interprets the neural responses differently, everyone will smell something slightly different. This doesn' mean that the smell isn't an intrinsic property, just that no two people will agree exactly on how it smells.
Unless it's really bad. :wink:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[b]Ian,



The smell of a fart does not exist.



Now I've heard it all! :eek: :rolleyes: But thanks for providing me with a great sig! :D



The process of smelling a fart is a physical process occurring in your brain. The memory of what a fart smells like is stored in the structure of your brain. The experience of remembering what a fart smells like is a process in your brain, and so on.



They might well be, but what about the actually raw experience of the smell of the fart itself?? If it is only the physical processes occuring in my brain which is constitutive of the reality of a fart, does that mean that one is misguided in blaming the emitter of the fart for the subsequent phenomenal sensation of the smell of the fart? I mean if a fart literally simply is a physical process in my brain . . . :eek:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[b]Ian,

When we talk about the smell of a fart, we are talking about a process as though it were an object.



Very naughty of us I'm sure.



That is just a quirk of language, based on intuitive preconceptions which date back hundreds, and even thousands of years. It is not an indication of what the true nature of reality is.



This is how you talk when the subject of farts come up!?? :eek: Everyone else laughing and giggling, and you talking as if you're practicing writing a Ph.D thesis! :D

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by wollery
The smell of a fart is due to a chemical reaction between the molecules of the gases in the fart and the smell sensors of the poor git who smells it. However since everybody has slightly different smell sensors and gets a different amount of molecules and has a brain which interprets the neural responses differently, everyone will smell something slightly different. This doesn' mean that the smell isn't an intrinsic property, just that no two people will agree exactly on how it smells.
Unless it's really bad. :wink:

But does it not seem strange to deny that the smell of a fart is not actually constitutive of reality itself? And presumably the same would go for the raw experience of colours etc. Does this not lead you to a profound skepticism about the external world? It seems you're saying that what science tells us about reality ie our measurements, is right, but what we actually experience is a lie.

Also it seems you are indeed drawing a distinction between our primary and secondary qualities.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,


I think I see where you are going with this. The mistake in the "primary and secondary qualities" idea is not that there is no difference between things like length, and things like color. It is that the color of an object is not a "quality" of that object at all.



:confused: Oh well, suppose this is at least consistent with you saying the smell of a fart doesn't exist! LOL



The color of an object is a part of the experience you have when you see, or remember seeing, that object. It is a physical process occurring in your brain.



You're saying the phenomenal experience of smelling a fart is one and the very same thing as a physical process in the brain. But does this not sound a trifle daft? (to put it very politely!).



There are qualities of an object which correspond to the experience of color. Namely the wavelengths of light that it emits and/or reflects. Those are standard qualities of the object, fundamentally no different than length or mass.



Yes I agree.



The idea that scientists claim that color itself is just a wavelength of light, or a property of a wavelength of light, is a misconception. The color of an object is a process occurring in your brain, usually (but not always) as a result of light of a particular wavelength entering your eyes. It is not a property of the object itself. We tend to intuitively think of it that way, but as is often the case, our intuition is simply wrong.



Seems to me that if the external world (both primary and secondary qualities) is physical processes in our head then the total;ity of reality is in our heads :( How implausible can you get?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

The smell of a fart does not exist.
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Now I've heard it all! :eek: :rolleyes: But thanks for providing me with a great sig! :D

Yes. Out of context quotes make great sig material, don't they? :rolleyes:

The process of smelling a fart is a physical process occurring in your brain. The memory of what a fart smells like is stored in the structure of your brain. The experience of remembering what a fart smells like is a process in your brain, and so on.
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They might well be, but what about the actually raw experience of the smell of the fart itself??

The "raw experience" of the smell is exactly what I am saying does not exist. It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.

If it is only the physical processes occuring in my brain which is constitutive of the reality of a fart, does that mean that one is misguided in blaming the emitter of the fart for the subsequent phenomenal sensation of the smell of the fart? I mean if a fart literally simply is a physical process in my brain . . . :eek:

Of course not. The farter caused you to have this unpleasant experience by farting.

When we talk about the smell of a fart, we are talking about a process as though it were an object.
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Very naughty of us I'm sure.

No, just naive and ill-conceived.

That is just a quirk of language, based on intuitive preconceptions which date back hundreds, and even thousands of years. It is not an indication of what the true nature of reality is.
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This is how you talk when the subject of farts come up!?? :eek: Everyone else laughing and giggling, and you talking as if you're practicing writing a Ph.D thesis! :D

I'm sorry, I thought you were trying to have a serious discussion, and used farts as an example to add levity. I didn't realize that you were just making a silly fart joke, disguised as a question about science. :rolleyes:

The color of an object is a part of the experience you have when you see, or remember seeing, that object. It is a physical process occurring in your brain.
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You're saying the phenomenal experience of smelling a fart is one and the very same thing as a physical process in the brain.

I don't know what you mean by "phenomenal experience". I am saying that the experience is a physical brain process.

But does this not sound a trifle daft? (to put it very politely!).

No, why would you think so?

The idea that scientists claim that color itself is just a wavelength of light, or a property of a wavelength of light, is a misconception. The color of an object is a process occurring in your brain, usually (but not always) as a result of light of a particular wavelength entering your eyes. It is not a property of the object itself. We tend to intuitively think of it that way, but as is often the case, our intuition is simply wrong.
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Seems to me that if the external world (both primary and secondary qualities) is physical processes in our head then the totality of reality is in our heads :(

What makes you think that things like the length of an object are physical processes in your head? What makes you think that I am suggesting this?

How implausible can you get?

How implausible do you want me to get? :rolleyes:


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[b]Ian,



Yes. Out of context quotes make great sig material, don't they? :rolleyes:




Yes I agree it's unfair, so I've clarified what you actually mean :)

[iankaplan]

Interesting Ian said: Seems to me that if the external world (both primary and secondary qualities) is physical processes in our head then the total;ity of reality is in our heads How implausible can you get?Regular Ian responds:

It seems obvious to me that the molecules which cause me to smell a fart literally came out of someone's behind, and that the smell of the fart is literally a physical process in my brain.

I suppose someone could quibble with the definition of the word "smell", claiming that the molecules that might cause one to turn away in disgust are themselves called "smell". In that case, I would have to amend my statement to the following:

It seems obvious to me that the smell of a fart literally came out of someone's behind, and that the smelling of the fart is literally a physical process in my brain.

Stimpy, are either of those statements agreeable to you? How about you, Ian?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

iankaplan,

It seems obvious to me that the molecules which cause me to smell a fart literally came out of someone's behind, and that the smell of the fart is literally a physical process in my brain.

I suppose someone could quibble with the definition of the word "smell", claiming that the molecules that might cause one to turn away in disgust are themselves called "smell". In that case, I would have to amend my statement to the following:

It seems obvious to me that the smell of a fart literally came out of someone's behind, and that the smelling of the fart is literally a physical process in my brain.

Stimpy, are either of those statements agreeable to you? How about you, Ian?

They're fine with me.

Dr. Stupid

[jj]

The real question is:

Why is anyone bothering to discuss this semantically unclear, slippery-slope set of terms with Ian in the first place.

Yes, I know that there exist "definitions". That doesn't mean that they relate to either the scientific process or to a potential version of "reality" in any meaningful fashion.

And, Ian, you claim to know what kind of "god" I don't believe in. You have to date refused to demonstrate any extraordinary evidence for your extraordinary assertion that you can read my mind and learn such a thing.

Please provide this evidence forthwith.

[wollery]

Okay, two points to clear up here.

1. How can the smell of a fart not be real? It is the result of the comparison of a stored smell memory (electrical neuron activity) to a smell stimulus (more neuron activity) stimulated by a chemical reaction of a gas molecule with the smell sensors. All of these are real physical processes.

2. You can measure the colour of an object. You simply compare the amount of electromagnetic radiation recieved from it in different narrowband filters. This allows you to describe the colour as a ratio of fluxes at different wavelengths. In the extreme you take a very high resolution spectrum, which shows the wavelengths the colour is produced by in minute detail! Easy.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

wollery,

Okay, two points to clear up here.

1. How can the smell of a fart not be real? It is the result of the comparison of a stored smell memory (electrical neuron activity) to a smell stimulus (more neuron activity) stimulated by a chemical reaction of a gas molecule with the smell sensors. All of these are real physical processes.

That's just the point. Smelling something is a process, not an object. The memory of having smelled something exists. The process of smelling something exists, but to say that the smell itself exists, somehow independently of these things, is simply nonsensical. When we use the word "smell" as a noun, we are referring to a specific instantiation of the process of smelling something, not to some sort of object.

It is essentially a question of semantics. By referring to smells as though they were things, the false impression is created that there is something more to the experience of smelling than just the physical process. As is clear from Ian's prior post, it creates the impression that smell is a property of things, and that we experience that property. It is this kind of misconceptualization that leads to dualism. Once you acknowledge that smell, color, etc... are not properties of things, but rather processes of our brains interacting with those things, the apparent dualism vanishes into thin air.

2. You can measure the colour of an object. You simply compare the amount of electromagnetic radiation recieved from it in different narrowband filters. This allows you to describe the colour as a ratio of fluxes at different wavelengths. In the extreme you take a very high resolution spectrum, which shows the wavelengths the colour is produced by in minute detail! Easy.

Once again, this is a question of semantics. Clearly there are properties of objects which determine what color we see when we look at them, namely those properties you described. You can certainly refer to those properties as "color". But there is also the color we actually see. That is not a property of the object. It is a process occurring in our brain.

This too leads to dualistic misconceptualizations. A dualist will claim that an apple has two different types of color properties. It has the physical properties of color, namely the spectrum of wavelengths it reflects, and it has the subjective properties of color, namely the way it looks to you.

But the second type of color is not a property of the apple at all. It is a physical process occurring in your brain. Objects do not have physical and subjective properties. They just have physical properties. What we often think of as their subjective properties are actually just the processes by which we process the sensory input of those objects.


I hope that clears up what I am trying to say. I realize that this type of wording is somewhat confusing, but I am trying to point out the flaw in the entire idea of there being irreducibly subjective properties of objects. Ian has often expressed that he thinks it is incomprehensibly stupid that a materialist would claim that subjective properties are really physical properties, but the fact of the matter is that materialists do not think that there is any such thing as subjective properties, and that what he is calling subjective properties are actually not properties at all.


Dr. Stupid

[Mercutio]

If I might add just one thing to stimpy and wollery's discussion, wollery's point 1, though an improvement on discussion, is needlessly complex, due to the influence of the "cognitive revolution". The "comparing to memory" part is not necessary, even when you define it as a biological process. The unpleasantness of the smell is the result of natural selection (probably smells just great to a dung beetle), not because we store some conceptual platonic fart (thank you II, for choosing an example for which even serious discussion seems silly). I realize that is probably not what wollery intended, but it is part of the semantic baggage that stimpy so correctly blames for the problem.

Oh, and more agreement with iankaplan's analysis. Sensation&perception psychologists make the same distinction using the terms "distal stimulus" and "proximal stimulus".

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by iankaplan
Interesting Ian said: Regular Ian responds:

It seems obvious to me that the molecules which cause me to smell a fart literally came out of someone's behind, and that the smell of the fart is literally a physical process in my brain.

I suppose someone could quibble with the definition of the word "smell", claiming that the molecules that might cause one to turn away in disgust are themselves called "smell". In that case, I would have to amend my statement to the following:

It seems obvious to me that the smell of a fart literally came out of someone's behind, and that the smelling of the fart is literally a physical process in my brain.

Stimpy, are either of those statements agreeable to you? How about you, Ian?

Complete unadulterated gobbledegook :rolleyes:

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

II
Seems to me that if the external world (both primary and secondary qualities) is physical processes in our head then the totality of reality is in our heads
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Stimpy
What makes you think that things like the length of an object are physical processes in your head? What makes you think that I am suggesting this?



Quite simple. You have denied there is a distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities. Therefore if the smell of a fart is literally in ones head, so then necessarily must a length of an object necessarily be in ones head. Otherwise there is a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Which you initially denied! :rolleyes:

Make your bloody mind up! :mad:

[Interesting Ian]

Stimpy
The "raw experience" of the smell is exactly what I am saying does not exist.


I'm afraid it represents stupidity beyond all measure to deny this :rolleyes:



It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.



Certainly not meaningless! Jesus wept!!

And we only have your word that a physical process in the brain is numerically identical to the smell of a fart. Sorry matey, but I don't believe you.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by wollery
[B]Okay, two points to clear up here.

1. How can the smell of a fart not be real? It is the result of the comparison of a stored smell memory (electrical neuron activity) to a smell stimulus (more neuron activity) stimulated by a chemical reaction of a gas molecule with the smell sensors. All of these are real physical processes.



It is is it? How do you know? How can you derive the smell from physical processes precisely??



2. You can measure the colour of an object.



I somewhat doubt that. Colour like smell, like any other qualia, is not susceptible to measurement.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[b]wollery,



That's just the point. Smelling something is a process, not an object. The memory of having smelled something exists. The process of smelling something exists, but to say that the smell itself exists, somehow independently of these things, is simply nonsensical.



{shrugs}

It's you that subscribes to the existence of a physical reality.

[iankaplan]

Interesting Ian described my assertions asComplete unadulterated gobbledegook.LOL

Have any of you ever heard of the phenomenon whereby someone is so intelligent, and so confident in their intelligence, that they lose the ability to think critically about their own beliefs? I don't know what made me think of that....

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian

What makes you think that things like the length of an object are physical processes in your head? What makes you think that I am suggesting this?
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Quite simple. You have denied there is a distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities.

No, I did not. Go read my response again. What I did was reject the naive notion of primary and secondary qualities, and then go on to explain that this is because I do not think that what we think of as "secondary qualities" are actually "qualities" at all.

Therefore if the smell of a fart is literally in ones head, so then necessarily must a length of an object necessarily be in ones head. Otherwise there is a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Which you initially denied!

Make your bloody mind up!

Try criticizing what I actually said for once. :rolleyes:

The "raw experience" of the smell is exactly what I am saying does not exist.
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I'm afraid it represents stupidity beyond all measure to deny this :rolleyes:

Why? Keep in mind that I am not denying the existence of the experience, nor am I denying the existence of any aspect of the experience that I am aware of. What I am denying is the dualistic notion that there is some irreducibly subjective aspect of the experience.

This is no different than saying that I do not think that "raw computation" exists.

It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.
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Certainly not meaningless! Jesus wept!!

Doubtful.

And we only have your word that a physical process in the brain is numerically identical to the smell of a fart. Sorry matey, but I don't believe you.

That's fine. You don't have to believe me. I don't believe many of the things you believe either. I am telling you what my position is. Take it or leave it.

But just because you don't believe it doesn't mean it is wrong, or stupid, or nonsensical.

That's just the point. Smelling something is a process, not an object. The memory of having smelled something exists. The process of smelling something exists, but to say that the smell itself exists, somehow independently of these things, is simply nonsensical.
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{shrugs}

It's you that subscribes to the existence of a physical reality.

And? Correct me if I am wrong, but you did ask for people's opinion on this subject, didn't you? You asked a question, and I gave you an answer. Nobody is twisting your arm insisting that you accept my answer as correct.

Are you interested in understanding what other people's worldviews are, and why they hold them? Or are you just interested in insulting anybody who doesn't agree with you?

I was actually somewhat hopeful when you started this thread that you were trying to understand how non-idealists and non-dualists approach issues like the one you presented. Apparently I was being overly-optimistic. :(


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
quote:
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What makes you think that things like the length of an object are physical processes in your head? What makes you think that I am suggesting this?
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Quite simple. You have denied there is a distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities.
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No, I did not. Go read my response again. What I did was reject the naive notion of primary and secondary qualities, and then go on to explain that this is because I do not think that what we think of as "secondary qualities" are actually "qualities" at all.



Look, will you for at least once in your life try to understand?? I don't care whether you deny the existence of secondary qualities. My original question was whether those apparent qualities labelled secondary qualities (the actual experience of a colour or smells and so on, whether they exist or not!) have a differing ontological status than that which we label the primary qualities. You do apparently maintain this distinction. But in your answer you certainly gave the impression that you didn't! :mad:



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The "raw experience" of the smell is exactly what I am saying does not exist.
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I'm afraid it represents stupidity beyond all measure to deny this
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Why? Keep in mind that I am not denying the existence of the experience, nor am I denying the existence of any aspect of the experience that I am aware of. What I am denying is the dualistic notion that there is some irreducibly subjective aspect of the experience.



But there is. If I smell something you can never know what it is like to have my experience, even if you smell the same smell.



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It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.
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Certainly not meaningless! Jesus wept!!
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Doubtful.



Look, why can't the actual experience of smells actually be out there in the world, so that they are constitutive of reality? What is wrong with supposing that the physical process in the brain simply allows you access to the smell. Why on earth is this meaningless??




Are you interested in understanding what other people's worldviews are, and why they hold them?



Yes, I am perplexed as to why anyone would be a materialist. It simply doesn't make sense to me. Clearly I am not becoming enlightened by debating with you.

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I believe it was Galileo who originally made a distinction between what he called the primary and secondary qualities of objects. The primary qualities being those such as length, width, shape, mass, internal structure etc, which could be measured and treated mathematically, and the secondary qualities such as colour, taste and smell which were not considered to be intrinsic attributes of matter but were purely subjective phenomena which matter gave rise to.

So something like length and mass etc, are really out there in the world, but smells, tastes, the phenomenological experience of colour etc merely represent the powers of the primary qualities to produce the secondary qualities of colour, taste, smell etc within us.

In modern science is this distinction still maintained? Or have scientists now recognised their stupidity and agree that no such distinction between "primary qualities" and "secondary qualities" can be made?

Interesting issue Interesting Ian !

I think this original distinction made by Galileo has been the primary cause of the mistaken distinction between an objective reality and subjective experience. It has been the distinction that is the basis of modern science and materialism; that mathematics is the only route to understanding reality.

Ironically, I have read that this original assertion was made in the view that the primary mathematical attributes of reality had a divine origin. Try telling that to Stimpy !

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat


I think I see where you are going with this. The mistake in the "primary and secondary qualities" idea is not that there is no difference between things like length, and things like color. It is that the color of an object is not a "quality" of that object at all.

The color of an object is a part of the experience you have when you see, or remember seeing, that object. It is a physical process occurring in your brain.


This is equally true of any experience that has the "primary" qualities. If the brain is responsible for contructing your experience per se, then the length of an object is also a physical process occuring in your brain.

However, we attribute our subjective experience of length to an objective reality, but not the colour.

The same distinction that Galileo made all that time ago still holds, even if you confine experience to brain processes. In other words, why make a distinction as to which brain processes reflect objectivity and which do not ?

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat



What makes you think that things like the length of an object are physical processes in your head? What makes you think that I am suggesting this?




No, you must explain why you think they are NOT physical processes in your head for this reason:

If you say that our conscious experience is nothing more than brain processes then our experience of the length of an object must be included in that definition. But for some reason you choose to segregate certain brain processes from others and say that one set denotes an objective reality whereas the other does not.

The basis on which you select which experiences (all brain processes remember) denote an objective reality are the ones that are amenable to logical relationships and are consistent, for example, length.

However, the validity of your framework of reality is based on how well observations agree with it - namely that reality is logical, consistent and therefore objective. But you have just selected which observations you will compare with your framework based on whether they are logical and consistent. You can then (erroneously) conclude that the logical observations are also objective ! The brain processes that correspond to experiences that are not mathematical you ignore and say they are simply brain processes.

Do you not see how your argument breaks down ?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

No, I did not. Go read my response again. What I did was reject the naive notion of primary and secondary qualities, and then go on to explain that this is because I do not think that what we think of as "secondary qualities" are actually "qualities" at all.
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Look, will you for at least once in your life try to understand?? I don't care whether you deny the existence of secondary qualities. My original question was whether those apparent qualities labelled secondary qualities (the actual experience of a colour or smells and so on, whether they exist or not!) have a differing ontological status than that which we label the primary qualities.

You asked:

In modern science is this distinction still maintained? Or have scientists now recognised their stupidity and agree that no such distinction between "primary qualities" and "secondary qualities" can be made?

And I answered:

I think that notion was dismissed as fundamentally meaningless a long time ago. I certainly don't know of any modern scientists who subscribe to this kind of dualism.

I think that makes it quite clear that what I am rejecting is the dualistic notion of things having physical (primary) and subjective (secondary) qualities. I neither claimed that modern scientists maintain a distinction between them, nor that they do not. What I claimed is that the very idea of primary and secondary qualities was dismissed as being incoherent.

If this is not the question you meant to ask, then you can hardly blame me for not reading your mind, and instead answering the question you actually asked.

That said, clearly I think that qualities of objects are not the same thing as our experiences of percieving them. As for claiming that they have differing ontological status, that sounds to me like dualism again. I will make no claim about their ontological status.

You do apparently maintain this distinction. But in your answer you certainly gave the impression that you didn't!

Perhaps the problem was that you did not carefully read my answer, and instead just jumped to conclusions based on what you thought my answer would be? Or maybe you just have poor reading comprehension. Either way, that is your problem, not mine.

Why? Keep in mind that I am not denying the existence of the experience, nor am I denying the existence of any aspect of the experience that I am aware of. What I am denying is the dualistic notion that there is some irreducibly subjective aspect of the experience.
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But there is. If I smell something you can never know what it is like to have my experience, even if you smell the same smell.

So what? That experience is just a physical process happening in your brain. All your above statement implies is that it is not possible for my brain to perform the same physical process as yours. How does that make the process irreducibly subjective?

It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.
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Certainly not meaningless! Jesus wept!!
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Doubtful.
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Look, why can't the actual experience of smells actually be out there in the world, so that they are constitutive of reality? What is wrong with supposing that the physical process in the brain simply allows you access to the smell. Why on earth is this meaningless??

If the experience is the process, then it is meaningless by definition.

Remember, you asked for my position. Since my position is that experiences are a process in the brain, clearly I think that it is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absense of the process.

If you disagree with my position, fine. Just provide some evidence to back up your alternative position.

Are you interested in understanding what other people's worldviews are, and why they hold them?
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Yes, I am perplexed as to why anyone would be a materialist. It simply doesn't make sense to me. Clearly I am not becoming enlightened by debating with you.

That is because you are (a) apperently completely unable to consider the nature of reality without imposing your intuitive preconceptions onto it, and (b) you are completely unable to even accept the hypothetical possibility that my position might actually make sense.

Instead of actually trying to understand what I am saying, all you do is pick through my posts looking for comments that you don't think make sense, so that you can tell me they don't make sense. But they are never going to make sense to you if you are not willing to make an honest effort to understand them. And you are never going to be able to do that unless you can get over your absolute certainty that my position doesn't make any sense.


davidsmith,

Ironically, I have read that this original assertion was made in the view that the primary mathematical attributes of reality had a divine origin. Try telling that to Stimpy !

I am quite aware of that. I fail to see why you think this should bother me, given that I think the entire assertion is ill-conceived.

I think I see where you are going with this. The mistake in the "primary and secondary qualities" idea is not that there is no difference between things like length, and things like color. It is that the color of an object is not a "quality" of that object at all.

The color of an object is a part of the experience you have when you see, or remember seeing, that object. It is a physical process occurring in your brain.
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This is equally true of any experience that has the "primary" qualities. If the brain is responsible for contructing your experience per se, then the length of an object is also a physical process occuring in your brain.

Nonsense. I do not ever experience the length of an object. I infer its length from my experiences.

However, we attribute our subjective experience of length to an objective reality, but not the colour.

That is because color is something we experience, and length is not. Length is a property of an object. The color we see is not a property of the object. It is a process in our brain which is affected by properties of the object, as well as by other things.

I would think this would all be trivially obvious to anybody who knows anything about how perception works, and who has ever given it any serious thought.

The same distinction that Galileo made all that time ago still holds, even if you confine experience to brain processes. In other words, why make a distinction as to which brain processes reflect objectivity and which do not ?

Your premise is flawed. We don't experience properties of objects. We infer the properties of objects from our experiences. There is a very important difference.

No, you must explain why you think they are NOT physical processes in your head for this reason:

If you say that our conscious experience is nothing more than brain processes then our experience of the length of an object must be included in that definition. But for some reason you choose to segregate certain brain processes from others and say that one set denotes an objective reality whereas the other does not.

I have never, ever, experienced the length of an object. Next stupid question?


Dr. Stupid

[Soapy Sam]

Whence the simple answer to the Zen question:-

"If a tree falls in the forest and there is noone to hear it, does it make a noise?"

No. Noise is an artifact of nervous systems.

Next question.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian
This is no different than saying that I do not think that "raw computation" exists.


Right, raw computation is a "User Illusion".

I'll point out that the technical term for a process or verb that has been turned into a steady-state or noun is a "Nominalization". A smell is a nominalization for the process of smelling.

And I'll just quickly point out that science (oops, another nominalization, and wrong type of referent as well -- since "science" can't function as an actor, only people who call themselves scientists can) nominalizes processes all the time, fixes them as entities with properties, and proceeds to promote such objectified views.


Since my position is that experiences are a process in the brain, clearly I think that it is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absense of the process.


Your position is that we infer measurements from personal experiences; thus we see the measuring stick, we calibrate it between the points we INTEND to measure (intentional stance) and utilize our effectors (usually our hands) to do so, we see the contrast of color, we interpret one color as the figure of the numbers, and the other color as the ground (figure-ground - which requires the subconscious analysis of contextual-cues), we match the figures to the semantic (meaning) of numbers stored in our associative memory, and thus we can infer a measurement of an object -- also a meaning-making (semantic) undertaking.

Seeing the measuring stick AS a measuring stick is a "user illusion", and seeing the object as one in need of measurement is a meaning-making, and deciding to carry out the measurement is our intentional stance. Calibrating the measurement is a product of learning. And so on..

Now, you are suggesting that objectivity can be arrived at by inference from a sequence of subjective experience. Please explain: Is the process of inference itself a subjective sequence of experience?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
I think that makes it quite clear that what I am rejecting is the dualistic notion of things having physical (primary) and subjective (secondary) qualities. I neither claimed that modern scientists maintain a distinction between them, nor that they do not. What I claimed is that the very idea of primary and secondary qualities was dismissed as being incoherent.



You can maintain there is no distinction, but you cannot maintain they are incoherent. Hell, you yourself are asserting that the secondary qualities are literally one and the same as physical processes in the brain, and yet, for some mysterious reason, the primary qaulities aren't :eek: Sorry matey, you're going to have to explain that one!


That said, clearly I think that qualities of objects are not the same thing as our experiences of percieving them.


So you think there are qualities which our perceptions resemble?



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why? Keep in mind that I am not denying the existence of the experience, nor am I denying the existence of any aspect of the experience that I am aware of. What I am denying is the dualistic notion that there is some irreducibly subjective aspect of the experience.
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But there is. If I smell something you can never know what it is like to have my experience, even if you smell the same smell.
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So what?



Well that is precisely what subjective means!




That experience is just a physical process happening in your brain.



No it isn't, a smell of a fart is not one and the same thing as a physical process in the brain. A smell of a fart is a smell of a fart!!



All your above statement implies is that it is not possible for my brain to perform the same physical process as yours. How does that make the process irreducibly subjective?



Because you do not experience the same qualitative feel of some secondary quality that I do. Nor is there any objective way (from 3rd person perspective) to ever experience my experiences.




Stimp
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It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.
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II
Certainly not meaningless! Jesus wept!!
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Stimp
Doubtful.
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II
Look, why can't the actual experience of smells actually be out there in the world, so that they are constitutive of reality? What is wrong with supposing that the physical process in the brain simply allows you access to the smell. Why on earth is this meaningless??
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Stimp
If the experience is the process, then it is meaningless by definition.



Yet again you demonstrate your poor grasp of the English language. It seems that in addition to a whole host of other words you persistently misuse, you also don't know the meaning of meaningless.

It would not be meaningless, it would simply be incorrect. That which is incorrect is not necessarily meaningless!



Remember, you asked for my position. Since my position is that experiences are a process in the brain, clearly I think that it is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absense of the process.



You are now shifting the meaning of the word "meaningless". A position contrary to yours is not necessarily meaningless. It is not meaningless to hypothesise that you might be wrong!



If you disagree with my position, fine. Just provide some evidence to back up your alternative position.



But I don't need any! We immediately experience qualia. There fore it exists and it is meaningless to say that it doesn't exist or is synonymous with some physical activity. And I use the word meaningless in its proper sense!



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Are you interested in understanding what other people's worldviews are, and why they hold them?
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Yes, I am perplexed as to why anyone would be a materialist. It simply doesn't make sense to me. Clearly I am not becoming enlightened by debating with you.
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That is because you are (a) apperently completely unable to consider the nature of reality without imposing your intuitive preconceptions onto it, and (b) you are completely unable to even accept the hypothetical possibility that my position might actually make sense.




This like saying I am refusing to even accept the hypothetical possibility that your position that 2 + 2 = 5 might actually make sense. The point is it doesn't.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Suggestologiest,

And I'll just quickly point out that science (oops, another nominalization, and wrong type of referent as well -- since "science" can't function as an actor, only people who call themselves scientists can) nominalizes processes all the time, fixes them as entities with properties, and proceeds to promote such objectified views.

Like what? :rolleyes:

And even if they do, how is this relevant? What does this have to do with my argument that raw experiences do not exist?

Since my position is that experiences are a process in the brain, clearly I think that it is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absense of the process.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Your position is that we infer measurements from personal experiences; thus we see the measuring stick, we calibrate it between the points we INTEND to measure (intentional stance) and utilize our effectors (usually our hands) to do so, we see the contrast of color, we interpret one color as the figure of the numbers, and the other color as the ground (figure-ground - which requires the subconscious analysis of contextual-cues), we match the figures to the semantic (meaning) of numbers stored in our associative memory, and thus we can infer a measurement of an object -- also a meaning-making (semantic) undertaking.

Seeing the measuring stick AS a measuring stick is a "user illusion", and seeing the object as one in need of measurement is a meaning-making, and deciding to carry out the measurement is our intentional stance. Calibrating the measurement is a product of learning. And so on..

That has got to be the most convoluted, obfuscated, and unnecessarily overcomplicated way of saying that science is based on unprovable assumptions, that I have ever seen. I hope you are proud of yourself. Suffice it to say, I am not impressed. Anybody who understands anything about formal logic knows this.

Now, you are suggesting that objectivity can be arrived at by inference from a sequence of subjective experience. Please explain: Is the process of inference itself a subjective sequence of experience?

I am not suggesting it at all. It is an axiom of science. And no, the process of inference is not a sequence of experiences. You experience the process, but that just means that you experience your own thoughts.

I hope you are not trying to deliberately confuse the experience of your own thought processes and the experiences you have from sensory input. Once again, the fact that they are different, and that it is possible for us to tell the difference, are assumptions of science.

Why is it that discussions like this always evolve into attacks on the validity of science itself? If you reject the assumptions of science, then clearly you are not going to agree with a position that is based on the acceptance of those assumptions.

Mine is such a position. If you reject the very validity of science, then just say so. Don't screw around with a bunch of philosobabble. Just say flat out that you think I am wrong because you think science is bunk. That way none of us have to waste our time trying to have an intelligent discussion with you.


Ian,

I think that makes it quite clear that what I am rejecting is the dualistic notion of things having physical (primary) and subjective (secondary) qualities. I neither claimed that modern scientists maintain a distinction between them, nor that they do not. What I claimed is that the very idea of primary and secondary qualities was dismissed as being incoherent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You can maintain there is no distinction, but you cannot maintain they are incoherent.

The idea is incoherent because it is based on a fundamental misconception about the nature of sensory perception.

Hell, you yourself are asserting that the secondary qualities are literally one and the same as physical processes in the brain, and yet, for some mysterious reason, the primary qaulities aren't Sorry matey, you're going to have to explain that one!

I already explained it to you. :rolleyes: What part of my explanation did you not understand?

That said, clearly I think that qualities of objects are not the same thing as our experiences of percieving them.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

So you think there are qualities which our perceptions resemble?

No. How can a physical process resemble the qualities of physical objects? What would that even mean? :confused:

Why? Keep in mind that I am not denying the existence of the experience, nor am I denying the existence of any aspect of the experience that I am aware of. What I am denying is the dualistic notion that there is some irreducibly subjective aspect of the experience.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

But there is. If I smell something you can never know what it is like to have my experience, even if you smell the same smell.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

So what?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well that is precisely what subjective means!

I am not saying it isn't subjective. I am saying that the above does not, in any way, imply that it is irreducibly subjective. Do you understand the difference?

That experience is just a physical process happening in your brain.
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No it isn't, a smell of a fart is not one and the same thing as a physical process in the brain. A smell of a fart is a smell of a fart!!

Proof by assertion, followed by an irrelevant tautology. :rolleyes: Don't you have anything better than that?

All your above statement implies is that it is not possible for my brain to perform the same physical process as yours. How does that make the process irreducibly subjective?
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Because you do not experience the same qualitative feel of some secondary quality that I do. Nor is there any objective way (from 3rd person perspective) to ever experience my experiences.

What secondary quality??? That is my whole point. You are starting from the point of view that objects have secondary qualities that we somehow experience. I am saying that objects do not have such secondary qualities at all. Your experience of seeing an apple is a process in your brain. My experience of seeing the same apple is a process in my brain. Same apple, different processes. Neither of us is experiencing any "secondary quality" of the apple. We are both responding to stimulus from light being reflected off of the apple.

I don't need to experience you thoughts to know that they objectively exist, any more than I need for my brain to perform the same computational process as my CPU, to know that the computation process is actually happening in my CPU.

If the experience is the process, then it is meaningless by definition.
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Yet again you demonstrate your poor grasp of the English language. It seems that in addition to a whole host of other words you persistently misuse, you also don't know the meaning of meaningless.

It would not be meaningless, it would simply be incorrect. That which is incorrect is not necessarily meaningless!

My grasp of the English language is just fine. It would be incorrect to assert that some aspect of the experience exists independently of the process. Once it is established that no such aspect exists, it is meaningless to talk about "raw-experiences" as though they were actually something that exists.

If you disagree with my position, fine. Just provide some evidence to back up your alternative position.
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But I don't need any! We immediately experience qualia. There fore it exists and it is meaningless to say that it doesn't exist or is synonymous with some physical activity. And I use the word meaningless in its proper sense!

Incorrect. We have experiences. Your definition of "qualia", as far as I can tell, includes the presumption of some sort of irreducibly subjective "secondary qualities". That means that your assertion that what we experience are qualia, is not an assertion that you have demonstrated is true, or which I agree with.

Like I said, I reject the notion that what we experience is some sort of secondary quality of objects. What an apple looks like, is not a quality of the apple at all. It is a process occurring in the brain. That process is dependent on qualities of the apple (as well as other things). Those qualities are ordinary physical qualities like shape, texture, and color (meaning wavelengths of light reflected). There are no irreducibly subjective "secondary qualities".

That is because you are (a) apperently completely unable to consider the nature of reality without imposing your intuitive preconceptions onto it, and (b) you are completely unable to even accept the hypothetical possibility that my position might actually make sense.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This like saying I am refusing to even accept the hypothetical possibility that your position that 2 + 2 = 5 might actually make sense. The point is it doesn't.

I can provide a formal logical proof that, within the context of the axioms of arithmetic, 2+2=5 is a false statement. Can you provide a formal logical proof that within the context of the axioms of science, my position is false?


Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat



I am quite aware of that. I fail to see why you think this should bother me, given that I think the entire assertion is ill-conceived.


It was just a light hearted joke. Things can get a bit too heated here.


Nonsense. I do not ever experience the length of an object. I infer its length from my experiences.

Exactly. You infer "length" to objectively exist even though the inference is based on experiences which you say are nothing but brain processes. Colour is also a brain process but you do not infer it to exist objectively in the same sense as length.

I want you to justify this inference. You can't justify it simply by restating your inference ! That would be circular reasoning.




That is because color is something we experience, and length is not. Length is a property of an object. The color we see is not a property of the object. It is a process in our brain which is affected by properties of the object, as well as by other things.


You have laden your argument with the assumptions we are trying to validify.

Think about it again.

If you say that all experiences are brain processes then the experiences that constitute the length of an object are also brain processes, just like the observations that constitute a hallucination are brain processes.

You infer some experiences to denote objective properties of objects while others brain processes you do not.

So, you have to justify why you ascribe an objective reality to some experiences and not others.

Remember that we start with our experiences


I would think this would all be trivially obvious to anybody who knows anything about how perception works, and who has ever given it any serious thought.

And someone who knows anything about how perception works would know that an inference of objective length is based on experiences which you regard as nothing but brain process. Colours are also brain processes but you do not ascribe them to denote objective properties of reality. Why ?



Your premise is flawed. We don't experience properties of objects. We infer the properties of objects from our experiences. There is a very important difference.


Again, laden with the assumptions we are trying to validify.

see above.


I have never, ever, experienced the length of an object. Next stupid question?


If you assume that all experiences are brain processes, you have to admit that the experiences you use to infer your objective "length" are themselves brain processes.

So, the question is, how can you justify ascribing certain brain processes to denote an objective reality (the ones that make up length) while others ones you do not (the ones that make up colour).

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Suggestologiest,

Like what? :rolleyes:

And even if they do, how is this relevant? What does this have to do with my argument that raw experiences do not exist?


Well, I thought that I'd just mention a couple points in passing before I got to the meat of the argument. Since you were describing the concept some people call "nominalization", seemingly without knowing that is its name. An in-context example of the process was then added.

Providing such examples is in line with my position on the primacy of personal experience. I would much rather provide an experience for you, than coldly describe it in a disembodied way.


That has got to be the most convoluted, obfuscated, and unnecessarily overcomplicated way of saying that science is based on unprovable assumptions, that I have ever seen. I hope you are proud of yourself. Suffice it to say, I am not impressed. Anybody who understands anything about formal logic knows this.


I find it strange that you read it that way. I was simply describing the process you were discussing. And describing it as a sequence of subjective experience. Again, providing live examples seems not to agree with your disposition.


I am not suggesting it at all. It is an axiom of science. And no, the process of inference is not a sequence of experiences. You experience the process, but that just means that you experience your own thoughts.


Are you saying that one's own thoughts are not subjective experiences? Ok, I experience my own thoughts. Where do the thoughts come from (that priviledges them as objective constructs) when an inference is made?


I hope you are not trying to deliberately confuse the experience of your own thought processes and the experiences you have from sensory input. Once again, the fact that they are different, and that it is possible for us to tell the difference, are assumptions of science.


Sensation and thought processes are connected. Think of a juicy lemon and your mouth waters. I was not aware that "science" (I assume you mean some specific scientists) had made the assumption that thought and sensory input were not both types of personal experience. I'm really not sure what you mean when you say that "we can tell the difference". Your own thought processes necessarily frame and select what sensory information you will become aware of and what meanings you will apply to them.

Simple example, If you think you are in a war, a large bang will be interpreted as likely coming from a bomb. In other contexts, you would draw different conclusions about a big bang.


Why is it that discussions like this always evolve into attacks on the validity of science itself? If you reject the assumptions of science, then clearly you are not going to agree with a position that is based on the acceptance of those assumptions.


I'm not attacking "science". What I have disagreed with in this thread and one or two others, is your interpretation of science, and the specific assumptions about it that you entertain. Most centrally, I disagree with your belief in the primacy of experimental study over personal experience. I believe in the primacy of personal experience; and once personal experience is established, scientific studies can be entertained.


Mine is such a position. If you reject the very validity of science, then just say so. Don't screw around with a bunch of philosobabble. Just say flat out that you think I am wrong because you think science is bunk. That way none of us have to waste our time trying to have an intelligent discussion with you.


That's not what I think. I think you are wrong because you've read something into the "scientific process" that isn't there.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

Most centrally, I disagree with your belief in the primacy of experimental study over personal experience. I believe in the primacy of personal experience; and once personal experience is established, scientific studies can be entertained.
We have devised instruments for the purpose of making precise measurements of phenomena, such as properties of light.

What is it about our experience of seeing the color red (say) that makes you consider it more valid than a measurement of the same phenomenon by the instruments we have devised? Is not the human eye simply a device created for the same purpose, and the quale, red, its output for light with a wavelength around 700 nm? Is this quale somehow less artificial than the output of a scientific instrument? Would the fact that the phenomenon has the specific property of wavelength ever emerge from simple observation?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

Nonsense. I do not ever experience the length of an object. I infer its length from my experiences.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Exactly. You infer "length" to objectively exist even though the inference is based on experiences which you say are nothing but brain processes. Colour is also a brain process but you do not infer it to exist objectively in the same sense as length.

I want you to justify this inference. You can't justify it simply by restating your inference ! That would be circular reasoning.

I justify it based on a scientific analysis of my experiences.

That is because color is something we experience, and length is not. Length is a property of an object. The color we see is not a property of the object. It is a process in our brain which is affected by properties of the object, as well as by other things.
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You have laden your argument with the assumptions we are trying to validify.

What exactly is it that you think we are trying to "validify". I have been attempting to explain my position, not to provide evidence or arguments to support it. I can hardly hope to convince you, or anybody else, that my position is reasonable, if you don't even understand what my position is.

Think about it again.

If you say that all experiences are brain processes then the experiences that constitute the length of an object are also brain processes, just like the observations that constitute a hallucination are brain processes.

No experience "constitutes" the length of an object. The length of an object is inferred from our experiences.

You infer some experiences to denote objective properties of objects while others brain processes you do not.

No, I extract information about objective properties of objects from my experiences. There is no "experience of length", or "experience of mass", etc...

So, you have to justify why you ascribe an objective reality to some experiences and not others.

I ascribe an objective reality to all experiences. All experiences objectively exist. The question is whether a specific experience is telling me something about an object or not.

I would think this would all be trivially obvious to anybody who knows anything about how perception works, and who has ever given it any serious thought.
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And someone who knows anything about how perception works would know that an inference of objective length is based on experiences which you regard as nothing but brain process. Colours are also brain processes but you do not ascribe them to denote objective properties of reality. Why ?

Once again, you are all mixed up. Color is one of many brain processes that extract information about objects from. Objective qualities are not brain processes. They are not experiences.

Why are you mixing the two up? You have experiences. You make some basic assumptions about how those experiences relate to objective reality. Based on those assumptions, you infer characteristics of objective reality from your experiences.

At no point is a quality of an object an experience. At no point is an experience a quality of an object.

I have never, ever, experienced the length of an object. Next stupid question?
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If you assume that all experiences are brain processes, you have to admit that the experiences you use to infer your objective "length" are themselves brain processes.

Of course. But the experience I use to infer length is not the quality of length. It is not a quality of the object at all.

So, the question is, how can you justify ascribing certain brain processes to denote an objective reality (the ones that make up length) while others ones you do not (the ones that make up colour).

I don't. There are no brain processes which constitute the length of an object. That is an incredibly silly misrepresentation of my position.


Suggestologist,

And even if they do, how is this relevant? What does this have to do with my argument that raw experiences do not exist?
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Well, I thought that I'd just mention a couple points in passing before I got to the meat of the argument. Since you were describing the concept some people call "nominalization", seemingly without knowing that is its name. An in-context example of the process was then added.

Unlike some people here, I see no reason to obfuscate my arguments with jargon that most people don't know. If I had used the term "nominalization", I would have has to explain what it means anyway, so why bother?

Providing such examples is in line with my position on the primacy of personal experience. I would much rather provide an experience for you, than coldly describe it in a disembodied way.

What does your position have to do with my position? I was asked what my position is. I have been trying to explain it. If you want to answer Ian's original question, and state your own position of the subject, then go ahead, but this has nothing to do with my own position, or my attempts to try to explain my position to Ian.

I am not suggesting it at all. It is an axiom of science. And no, the process of inference is not a sequence of experiences. You experience the process, but that just means that you experience your own thoughts.
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Are you saying that one's own thoughts are not subjective experiences?

Sort of. I am saying that there is more to the process of thinking than just your experience of it.

Ok, I experience my own thoughts. Where do the thoughts come from (that priviledges them as objective constructs) when an inference is made?

Your thoughts are brain processes. The "come from" your brain.

I hope you are not trying to deliberately confuse the experience of your own thought processes and the experiences you have from sensory input. Once again, the fact that they are different, and that it is possible for us to tell the difference, are assumptions of science.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sensation and thought processes are connected. Think of a juicy lemon and your mouth waters.

Of course they are connected. I was not implying otherwise. They are just not equivalent.

I was not aware that "science" (I assume you mean some specific scientists) had made the assumption that thought and sensory input were not both types of personal experience.

I did not say that. What I said is that your thoughts are not just experiences, and that your experience of your thoughts is not the same type of experience as your experience of sensory input.

As for science, science assumes that there is a difference between the experiences that occur as a result of sensory input, and the experiences of your own thoughts. This is implicit in the assumption that your sensory experiences contain information about objective reality.

I'm really not sure what you mean when you say that "we can tell the difference".

I mean that it is possible to distinguish between sensory input and hallucination.

Your own thought processes necessarily frame and select what sensory information you will become aware of and what meanings you will apply to them.

Irrelevant.

Simple example, If you think you are in a war, a large bang will be interpreted as likely coming from a bomb. In other contexts, you would draw different conclusions about a big bang.

In either case, you can use the principles of science to figure out what the correct conclusion is, and also distinguish the above from the possibility you did not mention, which is that the bang was a figment of your imagination, and not a sensory experience at all.

Why is it that discussions like this always evolve into attacks on the validity of science itself? If you reject the assumptions of science, then clearly you are not going to agree with a position that is based on the acceptance of those assumptions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I'm not attacking "science". What I have disagreed with in this thread and one or two others, is your interpretation of science, and the specific assumptions about it that you entertain. Most centrally, I disagree with your belief in the primacy of experimental study over personal experience. I believe in the primacy of personal experience; and once personal experience is established, scientific studies can be entertained.

Well, I guess we can agree on one thing, and that is that we completely disagree on what science is. I don't know where you got your ideas about what science is, and how it works, but it bears almost no resemblance at all to the scientific process that is actually used by real scientists. I should know. I'm one of them.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Stimp
Nonsense. I do not ever experience the length of an object. I infer its length from my experiences.
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DavidSmith
Exactly. You infer "length" to objectively exist even though the inference is based on experiences which you say are nothing but brain processes. Colour is also a brain process but you do not infer it to exist objectively in the same sense as length.

I want you to justify this inference. You can't justify it simply by restating your inference ! That would be circular reasoning.
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Stimp
I justify it based on a scientific analysis of my experiences.



Oh dear. Looks like David is making you look like a fool :)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

DavidSmith
Think about it again.

If you say that all experiences are brain processes then the experiences that constitute the length of an object are also brain processes, just like the observations that constitute a hallucination are brain processes.
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Stimp
No experience "constitutes" the length of an object. The length of an object is inferred from our experiences.



Everything is inferred in this sense. Colour is inferred as well. Just think of that checker square illusion:
http://suso.suso.org/thoughtmedia/illusion.jpg

There is no meaningful distinction between length and colour. In both cases we can measure them, and in both cases the mind implicitly infers and thereby experiences certain qualia of a certain colour or length. How do you draw a distinction between the two?? How can you say that one is a brain process and the other is not??

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Dymanic

We have devised instruments for the purpose of making precise measurements of phenomena, such as properties of light.

What is it about our experience of seeing the color red (say) that makes you consider it more valid than a measurement of the same phenomenon by the instruments we have devised? Is not the human eye simply a device created for the same purpose, and the quale, red, its output for light with a wavelength around 700 nm? Is this quale somehow less artificial than the output of a scientific instrument? Would the fact that the phenomenon has the specific property of wavelength ever emerge from simple observation?

There's more to color perception than wavelength. There is also saturation and purity; and more. A computer can measure all of the properties for you. What is different when a human perceives color is that: color triggers memory and emotion. Blues and pale whites do "feel" colder to a person, and reds and oranges "feel" warmer. The qualia is not the perception, but the resulting emotional (affective) and body-sensation (kinsethetic) experiences -- personal experiences.

I'm not suggesting that personal experience is more valid or more correct. Just that you cannot evaluate the validity without the experience. How did we determine which color the computer would tell us is "red" and which other color the computer would tell us is "green" and so on? A human had to calibrate the machine (or calibrate the machine that calibrates this one), and to do so, that person had to have the knowledge of what colors are called as well as how they look. The human who calibrated the computer had to have the personal experience of color, otherwise there is no way the person could validate the calibration.

The same is true of any field of science. If you have no personal experience, you cannot create well-formed, valid hypotheses to even begin to test.

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

The human who calibrated the computer had to have the personal experience of color, otherwise there is no way the person could validate the calibration.
And the wavelengths outside the visible spectrum? How do you suppose they calibrated those?

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Dymanic

We have devised instruments for the purpose of making precise measurements of phenomena, such as properties of light.

What is it about our experience of seeing the color red (say) that makes you consider it more valid than a measurement of the same phenomenon by the instruments we have devised? Is not the human eye simply a device created for the same purpose, and the quale, red, its output for light with a wavelength around 700 nm? Is this quale somehow less artificial than the output of a scientific instrument? Would the fact that the phenomenon has the specific property of wavelength ever emerge from simple observation? In fact, simple observation may tell us that something appears orange. That orange, though, may arise as a qualia due to any number of different objective stimuli. Certainly, a particular unique wavelength may be interpreted as orange. So may a blend of two wavelengths, or three, or four or more. "Orange" is experienced; the wavelengths are inferred from our experience with spectrometers and other devices. The experience of seeing orange and the experience of conducting a Fourier analysis of the wavelength or wavelengths that brought about that "seeing orange" are two vastly different experiences. The first is only observable by one person; the second is observable by any number of people. The fact that one method is more public than the other defines the subjective/objective distinction, but it is not the only difference. The first is directly experienced, the second is inferred (as Stimpy explained).

Now, we could throw our hands in the air, claim equivalence of both types of experience, and say that subjective experience is every bit as likely to be "real" as is the collectively agreed-upon "objective" measurements. If I am not mistaken, that is what some are suggesting here. We could also take advantage of the agreement with other observers and place our confidence in the inferred "objective" reality. Can we guarantee the superiority of either choice? Logically, I really don't think so (which is why I understand II's arguments). Practically, however, yes we can. Choosing to believe that reality is objective, logical, consistent (or whatever the three conditions you folk were bandying about) has led to the success of science as a methodology. Practically speaking, if the subjective is the true reality, it has so far behaved as if the objective reality is real, and so there is no practical reason to switch to the subjective assumption.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[Suggestologist,
Unlike some people here, I see no reason to obfuscate my arguments with jargon that most people don't know. If I had used the term "nominalization", I would have has to explain what it means anyway, so why bother?
[/B]

Ah, but scientists love to obfuscate. And as I said, I like to give people the experience, not the description. :) Perhaps my writing style will be clearer below. Or I could be giving you false hope, who knows.


What does your position have to do with my position? I was asked what my position is. I have been trying to explain it. If you want to answer Ian's original question, and state your own position of the subject, then go ahead, but this has nothing to do with my own position, or my attempts to try to explain my position to Ian.

Sort of. I am saying that there is more to the process of thinking than just your experience of it.


Ok. I am trying to understand what other than personal experience is going on when you are thinking. At least your thoughts on this.


Your thoughts are brain processes. The "come from" your brain.


What goes on in the brain is not available to anyone else; only to the person who experiences what goes on. So these are personal experiences, which seem (to me) to have to be subjective.


Of course they are connected. I was not implying otherwise. They are just not equivalent.

I did not say that. What I said is that your thoughts are not just experiences, and that your experience of your thoughts is not the same type of experience as your experience of sensory input.


And that is because there is a signal that travels through your body to the brain in one case, and the brain sends signals to itself in the other?


As for science, science assumes that there is a difference between the experiences that occur as a result of sensory input, and the experiences of your own thoughts. This is implicit in the assumption that your sensory experiences contain information about objective reality.


OK, what warrants the assumption that sensory experience contains information about objective reality?


In either case, you can use the principles of science to figure out what the correct conclusion is, and also distinguish the above from the possibility you did not mention, which is that the bang was a figment of your imagination, and not a sensory experience at all.


You can use principles of science. But if you mean we need scientific studies with double-blind controls and statistical analyses, etc., then no, you usually can't.

There are more ambiguous signals than those. And I could get into a discussion of double-binds (not double-blind -- double-bind), but I don't think you would be up to it at this time.

So, something only slightly ambiguous then: What meaning should someone assign to another person smiling at them? Can this always be determined scientifically?


Well, I guess we can agree on one thing, and that is that we completely disagree on what science is. I don't know where you got your ideas about what science is, and how it works, but it bears almost no resemblance at all to the scientific process that is actually used by real scientists. I should know. I'm one of them.

Dr. Stupid

All "real" scientists do it your way? All "real" Americans support the death penalty. -- It's a type of logical fallacy thingy.

When I asked you to tell me what it is in particular, that you think I don't know about science, you told me to go read a book on the subject -- you didn't specify which one, and I've already read plenty of them. It sounded like the old "Go read the bible" answer the credophiles resort to at times.

Anyway, if you have a specific book in mind that you think represents your position on science best, let me know. Alternatively, you could just tell me what you think science actually is; and how "real" scientists do it.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Dymanic

And the wavelengths outside the visible spectrum? How do you suppose they calibrated those?

Well, for the visible spectrum, you can't just say that we'll call frequency X, red. Because the english speaking society already "knows" what they mean when they say red. The frequency of what people already called red, then had to be discovered.

The invisible spectra didn't have the problem of social knowledge to constrain them. So, scientists could basically segment the spectrum in any way they wanted to, and call the segments whatever they wanted to. They simply extrapolated out from what they already knew, but what they already knew came from experience.

I can test such things (that invisible spectra exist) by using my remote control or garage door opener. Or by listening to the radio. Or by watching TV. So it's all verifiable by personal experience.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:There is no meaningful distinction between length and colour. In both cases we can measure them, and in both cases the mind implicitly infers and thereby experiences certain qualia of a certain colour or length. How do you draw a distinction between the two?? How can you say that one is a brain process and the other is not??
Is there a meaningful distinction between length and love?

~~ Paul

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Ian said:
Is there a meaningful distinction between length and love?

~~ Paul


Is this a trick question? :) I think it might depend on asking the question: The length of what?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Ian said:
Is there a meaningful distinction between length and love?

~~ Paul


Yes of course. Length, colour, the smell of a fart etc, all as experienced are all constitutive of the external world. Something like love is a state of mind. So completely different.

BTW, length, colours, smells etc as measured (and therefore objective) is what science deals with. But the real "stuff" of the world is our actual experiences, our qualia.

In this sense science doesn't deal with reality as such since reality is subjective. Science deals with what we might call the merely objective.

All clear? :)

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

I can test such things (that invisible spectra exist) by using my remote control or garage door opener. Or by listening to the radio. Or by watching TV. So it's all verifiable by personal experience.
That's not experience. It's inference based on experimentation. You do not experience radio waves, X-rays, etc. Thousands of years of personal experience with communicable diseases did not lead to understanding of microorganisms.

Mercutio apparently noticed that you didn't answer any of my questions about why you place personal experience above scientific measurement. Would you say that his comments fairly characterize your position, or would you rather have a go at actually answering them yourself?

[BillyJoe]

Originally posted by Mercutio
Now, we could throw our hands in the air, claim equivalence of both types of experience, and say that subjective experience is every bit as likely to be "real" as is the collectively agreed-upon "objective" measurements. If I am not mistaken, that is what some are suggesting here. We could also take advantage of the agreement with other observers and place our confidence in the inferred "objective" reality. Can we guarantee the superiority of either choice? Logically, I really don't think so (which is why I understand II's arguments). Practically, however, yes we can. Choosing to believe that reality is objective, logical, consistent (or whatever the three conditions you folk were bandying about) has led to the success of science as a methodology. Practically speaking, if the subjective is the true reality, it has so far behaved as if the objective reality is real, and so there is no practical reason to switch to the subjective assumption. :)

Should trust our subjective experiences or accept that what we subjectively experience may be an hallucination, delusion, illusion or misperception and therefore check our subjective experiences against the experiences of others to arrive at an objective reality.....

regards,
BillyJoe.
[Jus' passin' thru']

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

No experience "constitutes" the length of an object. The length of an object is inferred from our experiences.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Everything is inferred in this sense. Colour is inferred as well. Just think of that checker square illusion:
http://suso.suso.org/thoughtmedia/illusion.jpg

There is no meaningful distinction between length and colour. In both cases we can measure them, and in both cases the mind implicitly infers and thereby experiences certain qualia of a certain colour or length. How do you draw a distinction between the two?? How can you say that one is a brain process and the other is not??

You are deliberately confusing the color of an object, defined to be the wavelength of light it emits or reflects, and the experience of color.

The wavelength of light that an apple reflects is a quality of the apple. It is not a brain process. The experience of seeing red when you look at an apple is a physical process in your brain, not a quality of the apple.

The fact that we often refer to both of these things as "color" is just an ambiguity of the English language.

I really don't see why you are having trouble with this simple concept.


Suggestologist,

Unlike some people here, I see no reason to obfuscate my arguments with jargon that most people don't know. If I had used the term "nominalization", I would have has to explain what it means anyway, so why bother?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ah, but scientists love to obfuscate.

Evidence? All the scientists I know try to explain their research as clearly as possible, making their explanations more no complicated than is absolutely necessary to be accurate. Can you give some examples of scientists who "love to obfuscate"?

Once again, you are just making unjustified attacks on scientists.

Sort of. I am saying that there is more to the process of thinking than just your experience of it.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ok. I am trying to understand what other than personal experience is going on when you are thinking. At least your thoughts on this.

Information processing. Computation. Retrieval and storage of memory. All sorts of things going on subconsciously, which you are not aware of, and can therefore not reasonably be said to have "experienced".

Your thoughts are brain processes. The "come from" your brain.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What goes on in the brain is not available to anyone else; only to the person who experiences what goes on.

Not true. They are not experiencable by anybody else. That does not mean that they are undetectable, or non-objective, or in any other way fundamentally different from any other physical process.

So these are personal experiences, which seem (to me) to have to be subjective.

Sure, they are subjective. That does not mean that they do not objectively exist, or that they are not physical processes, or that they cannot be studied and understood scientifically.

And once again, this has no relevence to the topic being discussed, which is whether or not your sensory experiences are qualities of the objects you are percieving.

Of course they are connected. I was not implying otherwise. They are just not equivalent.

I did not say that. What I said is that your thoughts are not just experiences, and that your experience of your thoughts is not the same type of experience as your experience of sensory input.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And that is because there is a signal that travels through your body to the brain in one case, and the brain sends signals to itself in the other?

It is because in one case the source of the signal is sensory input, which contains information about the objects being sensed, and in the other the source is your own brain, which does not contain any information about any objects outside of your brain, that didn't originally get their through sensory input.

As for science, science assumes that there is a difference between the experiences that occur as a result of sensory input, and the experiences of your own thoughts. This is implicit in the assumption that your sensory experiences contain information about objective reality.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OK, what warrants the assumption that sensory experience contains information about objective reality?

Pragmatism. If we don't make that assumption, then we have nop source of information about objective reality.

In either case, you can use the principles of science to figure out what the correct conclusion is, and also distinguish the above from the possibility you did not mention, which is that the bang was a figment of your imagination, and not a sensory experience at all.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You can use principles of science. But if you mean we need scientific studies with double-blind controls and statistical analyses, etc., then no, you usually can't.

I said using the principles of science. Double blind studies are a very effective way of controlling for subjective bias, but not the only way. in any event, the double blind protocal is not even relevent to the above scenario.

So, something only slightly ambiguous then: What meaning should someone assign to another person smiling at them? Can this always be determined scientifically?

I principle, yes. In practice, no. What does any of this have to do with the topic being discussed?

Well, I guess we can agree on one thing, and that is that we completely disagree on what science is. I don't know where you got your ideas about what science is, and how it works, but it bears almost no resemblance at all to the scientific process that is actually used by real scientists. I should know. I'm one of them.

Dr. Stupid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All "real" scientists do it your way? All "real" Americans support the death penalty. -- It's a type of logical fallacy thingy.

The logical fallacy being used here is "false analogy".

Do you even know any real scientists? Have you ever discussed these issues with one? have you ever read any articles from real scientific journals? Ever read the guidelines for publication in those journals?

Do you actually have any idea what you are talking about at all? Or are you just repeating the post-modernistic nonsense that you heard from somebody else, or read about in some philosophy book or papers?


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
No experience "constitutes" the length of an object. The length of an object is inferred from our experiences.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Everything is inferred in this sense. Colour is inferred as well. Just think of that checker square illusion:
http://suso.suso.org/thoughtmedia/illusion.jpg

There is no meaningful distinction between length and colour. In both cases we can measure them, and in both cases the mind implicitly infers and thereby experiences certain qualia of a certain colour or length. How do you draw a distinction between the two?? How can you say that one is a brain process and the other is not??
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



You are deliberately confusing the color of an object, defined to be the wavelength of light it emits or reflects, and the experience of color.



Ummmm . . .no I'm not. Perhaps I wasn't clear enough in my explanation. First let's consider actual experiences. The colour we actaully expereince depends on context, right? Just consider that checker square illusion. The colour of a square we actually see depends upon the colour of the surrounding squares, and in the context of the fact that it is an image of a 3 dimensional object etc. So the colour as experienced is inferred. And you have already agreed that the length of an object as experienced is also inferred. So no difference there.

Secondly there are their measurable properties. Well both the length of an object can be measured and so can a particular wavelength of electromagnetic radiation. So again there is no difference. Thus we cannot draw any distinction between color and length. Has that made it any more clear?



The wavelength of light that an apple reflects is a quality of the apple. It is not a brain process.


This of course isn't relevant to the crucial point as perhaps you'll now understand on reading the above. I would just like to say though that although I agree with you that the wavelength of light reflected by the apple is not a brain process (duh!), I have to disagree that it is a quality of the apple. It is not the wavelength of light that is a quality of the apple, but rather the colour we actaully experience (which incidentally is again not a brain process).




The experience of seeing red when you look at an apple is a physical process in your brain, not a quality of the apple.



As I have said I disagree with this.



The fact that we often refer to both of these things as "color" is just an ambiguity of the English language.



Well, I'm more disposed to feel it is scientists and the materialists who have abused the English language and started to use words in an incorrect sense.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:Yes of course. Length, colour, the smell of a fart etc, all as experienced are all constitutive of the external world. Something like love is a state of mind. So completely different.

BTW, length, colours, smells etc as measured (and therefore objective) is what science deals with. But the real "stuff" of the world is our actual experiences, our qualia.

In this sense science doesn't deal with reality as such since reality is subjective. Science deals with what we might call the merely objective.

All clear?
Not at all. I don't understand the distinction. If everything is conjured up by my mind, then it is conjuring up length, color, and love. In fact, you have reamed us up and down about making distinctions between the objective world and subjective experience. Now you're making a distinction between the "merely objective" and other stuff.

Even if we make that distinction, how do you know that my cat doesn't have a love-projection attribute that I am experiencing with my senses, just like she has a length attribute?

~~ Paul

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
....First let's consider actual experiences. The colour we actaully expereince depends on context, right? Just consider that checker square illusion. The colour of a square we actually see depends upon the colour of the surrounding squares, and in the context of the fact that it is an image of a 3 dimensional object etc. So the colour as experienced is inferred. And you have already agreed that the length of an object as experienced is also inferred. So no difference there.

Secondly there are their measurable properties. Well both the length of an object can be measured and so can a particular wavelength of electromagnetic radiation. So again there is no difference. Thus we cannot draw any distinction between color and length. Has that made it any more clear? [...]
Actually, a bit less clear, but worth exploring. There's something here...let's take the colour of that square, to start. We can easily simplify it--take a piece of orange paper as a center, and two other pieces of paper as surrounds--that is, we'll take a yellow piece and a red piece, cut a hole in each, and place them in turn over the orange piece. In the case of the yellow surround, the orange will look more red; in the case of the red surround, the orange will look more yellow. But I cannot agree that its change in appearance is inferred, as you claim above. It is directly experienced (yes, we can go into opponent process channels and perceptual fields, relying on the mechanics of the bipolar and ganglion cells in the retina to explain the effect, but if I am not mistaken, all that is irrelevant to your argument). We can recall the process by which we constructed the illusion, remembering that, in fact, it is the same piece of orange paper beneath two different surrounds, to infer that the color is actually the same, and that the apparant difference is illusory. The fact that our agreed-upon "objective" inference about the illusion does not make the "subjective" experience of the changing nature of the orange paper any less real--it truly does appear to be two different colors. But the appearance is not inferred--it is experienced.

Anyway, that's my reaction when I read your above statement. Am I mistaken?

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Mercutio

The experience of seeing orange and the experience of conducting a Fourier analysis of the wavelength or wavelengths that brought about that "seeing orange" are two vastly different experiences. The first is only observable by one person; the second is observable by any number of people. The fact that one method is more public than the other defines the subjective/objective distinction, but it is not the only difference. The first is directly experienced, the second is inferred (as Stimpy explained).

But first-hand experience (especially visual experience) is absolutely filthy with inference, as the optical illusion demonstrates. Input recieved through our visual apparatus is pre-processed in ways that made the results more useful for our protohuman ancestors, facing different types of problems than those addressed by modern science.

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Dymanic

But first-hand experience (especially visual experience) is absolutely filthy with inference, as the optical illusion demonstrates. Input recieved through our visual apparatus is pre-processed in ways that made the results more useful for our protohuman ancestors, facing different types of problems than those addressed by modern science. If you are speaking of the gestalt perceptual phenomena (closure, grouping, continuity, etc.) then you have a case for a form of inference (although it does stretch the word a bit). The example, however, was of color perception. Unless I am overlooking something, "inference" is not a word I would apply to the experience of a particular color. As I said above, we may certainly infer a process (or several competing hypotheses about processes) to explain our experience--but the processes are what is inferred, not the experience itself. When we see a unique wavelength as "orange" or when we see a mixture of two other wavelengths as "orange", our perception is identical--we see orange. We do not "infer" orange from either stimulus set, unless you wish to postulate that any mechanical processing at all is a form of inference. If that is your argument, I have no response to it at present.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

You are deliberately confusing the color of an object, defined to be the wavelength of light it emits or reflects, and the experience of color.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ummmm . . .no I'm not. Perhaps I wasn't clear enough in my explanation. First let's consider actual experiences. The colour we actaully expereince depends on context, right? Just consider that checker square illusion. The colour of a square we actually see depends upon the colour of the surrounding squares, and in the context of the fact that it is an image of a 3 dimensional object etc. So the colour as experienced is inferred. And you have already agreed that the length of an object as experienced is also inferred. So no difference there.

Good grief, man! That is a completely different type of inference. In fact, the first example is not inference at all. It is a matter of your experience being determined by the sensory input according a set of rules which your visual cortex has learned over the course of your life.

That is completely different than logical inference, which is a sequnce of logical deductions about the world, made from your experiences, based on assumptions you have made about the relationship between your experiences and the world.

In the first case, your visual cortex is interpreting your sensory input according to a set of heuristics which it has learned, and which cause you to experience the two rectangles as being different colors. The second case is a matter of you logically inferring facts about the world from your experiences. Are you seriously going to tell me you do not think there is any difference between those things?

Secondly there are their measurable properties. Well both the length of an object can be measured and so can a particular wavelength of electromagnetic radiation. So again there is no difference. Thus we cannot draw any distinction between color and length. Has that made it any more clear?

The wavelength of light reflected by an object is a measurable property, just like length. But as the optical illusion you mentioned clearly illustrates, the experience of color you see is not a property of the object you are looking at. It is a process in your brain which depends not only on the wavelength of light hitting your eyes, but also on a number of other factors, including the way your brain has learned to inerpret such sensory input.

The wavelength of light that an apple reflects is a quality of the apple. It is not a brain process.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This of course isn't relevant to the crucial point as perhaps you'll now understand on reading the above. I would just like to say though that although I agree with you that the wavelength of light reflected by the apple is not a brain process (duh!), I have to disagree that it is a quality of the apple. It is not the wavelength of light that is a quality of the apple, but rather the colour we actaully experience (which incidentally is again not a brain process).

That makes absolutely zero sense. Suffice it to say that this view is completely inconsistent with the scientific view of objective reality, and how perception works. You can preach this view all you want, but the simple fact that you believe it does not make it true, and does not render my own view false.

You asked me for my view on the issue. I gave it to you.