Plantinga refutes naturalism

[Robin]

Came across the following in Alvin Plantinga's review of "The God Delusion"
http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2007/002/1.21.html
First, is God complex? According to much classical theology (Thomas Aquinas, for example) God is simple, and simple in a very strong sense, so that in him there is no distinction of thing and property, actuality and potentiality, essence and existence, and the like. Some of the discussions of divine simplicity get pretty complicated, not to say arcane.
The doctrine of divine simplicity is of course one of the clumsiest kludges in all of theology. Aquinas spotted the fatal flaw in the God hypothesis even back then and he and other theologians ever since have tried to cover it up with complicated and arcane argument.

Interestingly Plantinga does not offer an opinion as to whether the doctrine even makes a shred of sense, or why some entity might be capable of accomplishing massively complex tasks while not being complex itself?
So first, it is far from obvious that God is complex. But second, suppose we concede, at least for purposes of argument, that God is complex. Perhaps we think the more a being knows, the more complex it is; God, being omniscient, would then be highly complex. Perhaps so; still, why does Dawkins think it follows that God would be improbable? Given materialism and the idea that the ultimate objects in our universe are the elementary particles of physics, perhaps a being that knew a great deal would be improbable—how could those particles get arranged in such a way as to constitute a being with all that knowledge? Of course we aren't given materialism.
Standard theist dodge number 462 - claim that someone is assuming materialism. But of course God exists in the immaterial, that spooky, mysterious but highly convenient realm wherein all philosophical and logical problems magically disappear.

If we could get hold of some of this immaterial stuff it would make life much simpler. An immaterial hurricane an immaterial junkyard could produce a material jumbo jet.
The naturalist can be reasonably sure that the neurophysiology underlying belief formation is adaptive, but nothing follows about the truth of the beliefs depending on that neurophysiology. In fact he'd have to hold that it is unlikely, given unguided evolution, that our cognitive faculties are reliable. It's as likely, given unguided evolution, that we live in a sort of dream world as that we actually know something about ourselves and our world.
Plantinga just hasn't thought about this. What survival advantage would our neurophysiological processes have provided if they provided no information or interpretation of our physical environment, but instead sank us deep in a dream?

Nevertheless Plantinga spins a deliciously illogical conclusion from this:
So a broader conclusion is that one can't rationally accept both naturalism and evolution; naturalism, therefore, is in conflict with a premier doctrine of contemporary science. People like Dawkins hold that there is a conflict between science and religion because they think there is a conflict between evolution and theism; the truth of the matter, however, is that the conflict is between science and naturalism, not between science and belief in God.
And triumphantly finishes with:
The naturalism that Dawkins embraces, furthermore, in addition to its intrinsic unloveliness and its dispiriting conclusions about human beings and their place in the universe, is in deep self-referential trouble. There is no reason to believe it; and there is excellent reason to reject it.
I would have thought that the most dispiriting conclusion about human beings and their place in the universe is that we are all destined either to serve an omnipotent God or else suffer eternally.

[quixotecoyote]

Ah phooey. After the first paragraph I thought I'd get to shoot down some Aquinas...

[blobru]

From Plantinga's review linked above:
So why think God must be improbable? According to classical theism, God is a necessary being; it is not so much as possible that there should be no such person as God; he exists in all possible worlds. But if God is a necessary being, if he exists in all possible worlds, then the probability that he exists, of course, is 1, and the probability that he does not exist is 0. Far from its being improbable that he exists, his existence is maximally probable. So if Dawkins proposes that God's existence is improbable, he owes us an argument for the conclusion that there is no necessary being with the attributes of God—an argument that doesn't just start from the premise that materialism is true. Neither he nor anyone else has provided even a decent argument along these lines; Dawkins doesn't even seem to be aware that he needs an argument of that sort.

Alvin back on his ontological hobbyhorse I see. He seems to have no clue that however hard he rides, he'll never get anywhere by this argument.
Elsewhere, for the purposes of his own ontological argument, Plantinga has defined God as omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Such a being is "maximally excellent" because it is incapable of doing anything but good; it's logically consistent (can exist in some possible world), so it must exist in all possible worlds, necessarily, including our own, or it wouldn't be perfect, would it?
Even if we ignore several problems with these premisses and accept the shaky modal logic that connects them, I think Plantinga's ontological argument (and all other variations of Anselm) turns out to be self-refuting.
Allow that an omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect being is maximally excellent and necessary and so God exists. Then imagine a being that is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly immoral -- a maximally execrable being. Why shouldn't it exist too? It's as logically consistent as the excellent God, so it can exist in some possible world. For it to be maximally execrable, it must exist in all possible worlds, be necessary, therefore it exists too.
Now we're stuck with two Gods: one perfectly excellent, the other perfectly execrable. Since they're both omnipotent and omniscient, neither can act without the other knowing, and it is within the power of either to preempt the other's every action (and preempt the preemption, and preempt the preemption of the preemption, ad infinitum). Therefore, nothing ever gets done, least of all the creation of the universe. Because two 'omnipotent' enemies in one universe is a logical contradiction.
He's at least right in saying materialism doesn't refute this argument. It doesn't have to. The ontological argument, as formulated by Plantinga, does that all by itself by arguing two morally opposed Gods into existence; even on its own terms, it is an exercise in creative futility. :pigsfly

[PixyMisa]

The naturalism that Dawkins embraces, furthermore, in addition to its intrinsic unloveliness and its dispiriting conclusions about human beings and their place in the universe, is in deep self-referential trouble. There is no reason to believe it; and there is excellent reason to reject it.Ah, the good old Argumentum ad Because I Say So.

[Beerina]

Such a being is "maximally excellent" because it is incapable of doing anything but good;

I'm still awaiting an intelligible response from a theistic defender regarding the 11 year old girl who was kidnapped, raped, then wrapped in plastic and buried alive. The guy gave her a teddy bear as he wrapped her up so she'd have something to hold onto as she died being buried alive.

Some theist please sit there and tell me that you want to kneel and worship a god who allows this?

This is precidely the idiocy of faith that Dawkins and Harris talk about in their books. It isn't just believing in the absence of evidence. It's believing in the face of grotesque mountains of counter-evidence.

"I have faith God exists and that there's some reason behind all this!"

And that's what leads to suicide bombings and planes into buildings and Christians supporting Israel (which may or not be a good thing for other reasons) because the Bible says the End Times won't come around until Israel is restored.

[ceo_esq]

Allow that an omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect being is maximally excellent and necessary and so God exists. Then imagine a being that is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly immoral -- a maximally execrable being. Why shouldn't it exist too? It's as logically consistent as the excellent God, so it can exist in some possible world. For it to be maximally execrable, it must exist in all possible worlds, be necessary, therefore it exists too.

It's not clear that the maximally evil god is as logically consistent as the maximally good one. Is it possible for an omniscient and omnipotent being also to be perfectly evil? I'm not sure, but it's the subject of some debate. Some philosophers (Swinburne is the first to come to mind) have argued that an omniscient and omnipotent being is necessarily perfectly good.

[blobru]

I'm still awaiting an intelligible response from a theistic defender regarding the 11 year old girl who was kidnapped, raped, then wrapped in plastic and buried alive. ...

Yes, it doesn't take long for the ontological argument to butt heads with theodicy.
The traditional theistic response is a perfect deity doesn't intervene in such matters because to do so would compromise man's free will: God as Prime Mover who washes Its hands of Its creation for our own good.
That's a perfectly logical defense, but if the theist uses it, she must accept that it renders religion meaningless. There is no point in praying to such a God; and there is no way such a God could have revealed Its desires to mankind; it demotes scriptures from revelation to hallucination.

It's not clear that the maximally evil god is as logically consistent as the maximally good one. Is it possible for an omniscient and omnipotent being also to be perfectly evil? I'm not sure, but it's the subject of some debate. Some philosophers (Swinburne is the first to come to mind) have argued that an omniscient and omnipotent being is necessarily perfectly good.

I don't see any differences prima facie between the two, unless adherents of the ontological argument are arguing that existence per se is a virtue ("something's better than nothing"); so a maximally good god is made better [perfect] by existence, a maximally bad god is made worse [perfect in its context] by non-existence.
I would say that by any human standard of good and bad, the existence of a maximally evil god is far worse than its non-existence.
I don't know Swinburne's precise rebuttal; it may involve reasoning from omnipotence and omniscience to moral perfection. I don't see any connection between omnipotence and morality; omniscience and morality... there's the is/ought dichotomy to overcome -- do facts, even all the facts, ever entail ethics? Perhaps from our own existence we deduce a creator, but whether we ascribe morality or immorality to It depends on our circumstances -- a tenured published professor more likely to see Its benevolence than an embittered college dropout, say.
But I'll have to scan around the net to get the finer details of Swinburne's objection to my Bad God. :D

[blobru]

More from Plantinga's review:
A second example of Dawkinsian-style argument. Recently a number of thinkers have proposed a new version of the argument from design, the so-called "Fine-Tuning Argument." Starting in the late Sixties and early Seventies, astrophysicists and others noted that several of the basic physical constants must fall within very narrow limits if there is to be the development of intelligent life—at any rate in a way anything like the way in which we think it actually happened.
...
One reaction to these apparent enormous coincidences is to see them as substantiating the theistic claim that the universe has been created by a personal God and as offering the material for a properly restrained theistic argument—hence the fine-tuning argument. It's as if there are a large number of dials that have to be tuned to within extremely narrow limits for life to be possible in our universe. It is extremely unlikely that this should happen by chance, but much more likely that this should happen if there is such a person as God.

Now in response to this kind of theistic argument, Dawkins, along with others, proposes that possibly there are very many (perhaps even infinitely many) universes, with very many different distributions of values over the physical constants. Given that there are so many, it is likely that some of them would display values that are life-friendly. ... That still leaves Dawkins with the following problem: even if it's likely that some universes should be fine-tuned, it is still improbable that this universe should be fine-tuned. Name our universe alpha: the odds that alpha should be fine-tuned are exceedingly, astronomically low, even if it's likely that some universe or other is fine-tuned.

What is Dawkins' reply? He appeals to "the anthropic principle," the thought that the only sort of universe in which we could be discussing this question is one which is fine-tuned for life:

the anthropic answer, in its most general form, is that we could only be discussing the question in the kind of universe that was capable of producing us. Our existence therefore determines that the fundamental constants of physics had to be in their respective Goldilocks [life-friendly] zones.

Well, of course our universe would have to be fine-tuned, given that we live in it. But how does that so much as begin to explain why it is that alpha is fine-tuned? One can't explain this by pointing out that we are indeed here—anymore than I can "explain" the fact that God decided to create me (instead of passing me over in favor of someone else) by pointing out that if God had not thus decided, I wouldn't be here to raise that question. It still seems striking that these constants should have just the values they do have; it is still monumentally improbable, given chance, that they should have just those values; and it is still much less improbable that they should have those values, if there is a God who wanted a life-friendly universe.


Not sure here if Prof. Plantinga is being a bit obtuse because he's preaching to the choir (ChristianityToday), or he's a logical lunchpail? He seems to understand the 'some universes will be fine-tuned' part, but can't get the gist of the anthropic principle at all. Whatever -- he's borderline simple if he thinks this refutes Dawkins' argument. Let's condense the above passage to see why:

The Anthropic Reply to Fine-Tuning:
The more universes there are, the more likely some will be fine-tuned. The more fine-tuned universes there are, the more likely some will give rise to life. The more universes that give rise to life, the more likely some will produce rational beings. Any of these rational beings may look at its universe and notice it is fine-tuned.

Plantinga's counter-example to TARtF-T:
I can't explain why God created me by saying if He hadn't I wouldn't be here to ask the question.

:) *** universe fine-tuned == God created me *** :nope:

Notice his blithe shift from something that is observably the case (the universe is fine-tuned) to something that is hypothetically the case (God created me).

Fine-tuning is a necessary prequisite for life. God is not. But Plantinga inserts God into his counter-example as if it were epistemically equivalent to fine-tuning! It isn't.

This is the fallacy of false analogy, if you're keeping score. :warning1

[ceo_esq]

I don't know Swinburne's precise rebuttal; it may involve reasoning from omnipotence and omniscience to moral perfection. I don't see any connection between omnipotence and morality; omniscience and morality... there's the is/ought dichotomy to overcome -- do facts, even all the facts, ever entail ethics? Perhaps from our own existence we deduce a creator, but whether we ascribe morality or immorality to It depends on our circumstances -- a tenured published professor more likely to see Its benevolence than an embittered college dropout, say.
But I'll have to scan around the net to get the finer details of Swinburne's objection to my Bad God. :D


I dug out Richard Swinburne's The Coherence of Theism (Clarendon, 1993) to double-check my recollection. (Never say that your convenience is not my paramount concern! :D)

Here's a pertinent excerpt from what Swinburne says about the necessity of God being morally perfect:

So my argument in summary is as follows. If morality is objective, the naturalistic account of it is correct and morality is based on a set of logically necessary truths. In one discipline concerned with logically necessary truths, viz. philosophy, it is as easy or difficult to reach agreed results as it is in morals. Yet there is a sufficient amount and kind of agreement over methods and results in philosophy for it to be termed an objective discipline, and its results termed true or false. Therefore morals is also properly accounted an objective discipline and moral judgements correctly termed true or false. The extent to which agreement on moral judgements is possible when men are determined to reach conclusions to which they can honestly assent is emphasized by Hare in Freedom and Reason. But he does not draw the conclusion which seems to me to follow - that morality is a discipline which yields results which are true or false. Of course morality has its "fanatics", unconvertible to the majority view in a lifetime; but philosophy has its fair share of those too. Their existence is not seen to cast a serious doubt on the objectivity of philosophy. Why take them more seriously in morals?

I conclude that moral judgements such as that an action x is a right action or that it is morally better than y, or that actions of type A are never morally good, are statements which are true or false. To say this is, however, not to deny that actions are often morally on a level. I do not wish to deny that often there are no overriding reasons for doing some one action rather than some other action or rather than refraining from any action at all. Nor do I wish to deny that various life-styles are often morally on a level - your way of living may be very different from mine, and yet there be no overriding reason for pursuing my life-style rather than yours. All that I am claiming is that sometimes it is not like this - some actions, some life-styles are morally better or worse than others. And judgements which affirm that this is so, as also judgements which affirm that it is not morally better to do a certain action than not to do it, are statements which are true or false. We have good reason for saying that judgements about the moral goodness or badness of actions are true or false. That being so, an omniscient person (one "omniscient" in the attenuated sense delineated at the end of Chapter 10) will know of any action, the characteristics of which are fully set out (e.g. that it is done by a person of such-and-such a kind in such-and-such circumstances), whether or not that action is morally good or bad. While we have rather cloudy feelings that abortion and euthanasia are evils, he will know the truth about these matters (whatever it is) with crystal clarity. He will in consequence know at any time of the actions which it is logically possible that he do at that time whether or not they are good or bad. An omniscient person who is also perfectly free will necessarily do good actions and avoid bad ones - since, we saw in Chapter 8, being perfectly free, he will necessarily do those actions which he believes overall good and avoid those which he believes overall bad, and, we have now seen, being omniscient, he will hold true beliefs in this field. A man may fail to do his duty because he does not recognize what his duty is or because he yields to non-rational influences outside his control. But neither of these possibilities is a possibility for a perfectly free and omniscient person. It is logically necessary that a perfectly free and omniscient person be perfectly good.

(footnotes omitted)


I realize that there are two important cross-references in that passage.

First, Swinburne refers to "one 'omniscient' in the attenuated sense delineated at the end of Chapter 10[.]" Swinburne's definition of omniscience is essentially "A person P is omniscient at a time t if and only if he knows every true proposition about t or an earlier time and every true proposition about a time later than t which is true of logical necessity or which he has overriding reason to make true, which it is logically possible that he entertains then."

Second, Swinburne refers here to an argument from a previous chapter in which he concluded that a perfectly free being "will necessarily do those actions which he believes overall good and avoid those which he believes overall bad[.]" The meat of that earlier discussion is as follows:

So an agent has to have some reason if he is to do an action A. Can an agent still do action A even if he judges that he has an overriding reason for refraining from doing A? What are we to make of the suggestion that a man might see doing A as a good thing in one way (e.g. by its giving sensual pleasure to himself), refraining from doing A as a good thing in another way (e.g. by its contributing to the lifelong peace of mind of someone else), see refraining from doing A as over all a better thing than doing A, but nevertheless do A? When it is suggested that a case is of this sort, we may well suspect that it is not, that the agent did not really see refraining from doing A as over all a better thing than doing A. Yet we are sometimes prepared to allow that the situation is as suggested. We do seem to allow the possibility that a man might do an action which he regarded as a good thing only in some respect but on balance a bad thing. But although we allow this possibility, we do feel that some further explanation is called for. If a man really does accept that to refrain from doing A would be on balance better than to do A, and so accepts that he has overriding reason for refraining from doing A, he judges that he has adequate reason for refraining from doing A but totally inadequate reason for doing A. Rational considerations point clearly in one direction, and yet the agent goes in the other direction. Yet to say that someone judges that he has a reason for doing something is to say that if there are no equally good reasons for him doing that thing and if no factors other than reasons influence him, he will do that thing. We could not understand an agent who claimed to acknowledge "overriding reason" for refraining from doing A rather than doing A and also claimed to be uninfluenced by anything other than the reasons which he acknowledged, and yet did A. For if the latter claim is taken at its face value, what on earth can the agent have meant when he said that he acknowledged "overriding reasons" for refraining from doing A? Not what we normally mean, for normally to acknowledge a reason for doing something is to acknowledge an inclination, ceteris paribus, to do that thing. So to say of someone that he acknowledges that he has overriding reason for refraining from doing (or for doing) action A is to say that in so far as no factors other than reasons influence him, he will refrain from A (or do A, as the case may be). If you said that you recognized that over all it would be better for you to go home rather than to go to the cinema, and then you went to the cinema, we should have to suppose either that you were lying or had changed your mind, or that factors other than reasons influenced what you did. An explanation of your behaviour is needed, not only in terms of what you judged about the relative merits of the actions, in terms that is of reasons; but also in terms of other factors such as sensual desires and neurological impulses which led you to do what you did not recognize adequate reason for doing. If a man has strong sensual desires, it makes sense to suppose that he judges that over all it would be better to refrain from doing A than to do A but nevertheless intentionally does A. Such non-rational factors over which the agent does not have control explain "weakness of will", a man acting "against his better judgement". But the suggestion that a man might see refraining from A as over all better than doing A, be subject to no non-rational influences inclining him in the direction of doing A and nevertheless do A, is incoherent.

It follows that a perfectly free agent will never do an action if he judges that over all it would be worse to do the action than to refrain from it; he will never do an action if he acknowledges overriding reasons for refraining from doing it. Similarly, he will always do an action if he acknowledges overriding reasons for doing it rather than for refraining from doing it, if he judges that doing it would be over all better than refraining from doing it. His freedom of choice only operates for choice whether to do an action A when he does not acknowledge overriding reasons for doing A rather than refraining, or for refraining rather than doing A. (Of course, he may not acknowledge the existence of overriding reasons in most or even in any cases.) This is a logical limit on the freedom of a perfectly free agent. If an agent's actions are uninfluenced by non-rational factors, rational considerations can alone influence them.

(footnotes omitted)

[blobru]

WoW. Hope you've got a scanner with good OCR, else that was a lot of typing! Thanks. :)

And after all that ingrate that I am am going to try to boil it all down to a couple of definitions <tsk tsk>...

Swinburne's

omniscience = "knowing good from bad".

omnipotence = "acting rationally".

(in the context of the Ontological Argument)

So, Good God (omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect) is a swell fellow: always does the right thing.
But what about Bad God (omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly immoral)? He knows right from wrong, but in His case, what does it mean to act rationally? Is rational action always selfless? (No?)
It is in Good God's case, right? He's got no reason to be anything but good, so knowing the difference, He always does good. But Bad God's got no reason to be anything but bad -- that's His moral character. Knowing everything might allow Him to distinguish good from bad, but I don't see how it "edifies" Him. (Indeed, He would be a strange sort of God if He changed.) He stays consistent then -- perfectly immoral, selfish -- by choosing to do bad.
Another way: Plantinga has separated omnipotence, omniscience, and morality in his necessary being. This implies morality doesn't depend on omniscience or omnipotence. So in the context of his Ontological Argument, there is no reason to assume an omniscient, omnipotent being can't be perfectly immoral -- one real mean *bleep*! :wide-eyed :p

[Lord Muck oGentry]

From Plantinga:
"Well, of course our universe would have to be fine-tuned, given that we live in it. But how does that so much as begin to explain why it is that alpha is fine-tuned? One can't explain this by pointing out that we are indeed here—anymore than I can "explain" the fact that God decided to create me (instead of passing me over in favor of someone else) by pointing out that if God had not thus decided, I wouldn't be here to raise that question."

Other questions aside, Plantinga has come up with a singularly inept comparison. It is just illiterate to suppose that we have any criterion (other than humdrum embodiment, which is a bit of a give-away) by which to distinguish:

1. Fortunate Tom ( who caught God's eye and so got embodied) from

2. Unfortunate Dick ( whom God overlooked for embodiment, His attention being caught by Tom) or

3. Potential Harry ( who is trying very hard to catch God's eye, but hasn't quite managed it yet).

We identify and count persons by identifying and counting bodies. I'd be ashamed to assert so trivial a truth if it weren't for Plantinga's ignorance.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The naturalism that Dawkins embraces, furthermore, in addition to its intrinsic unloveliness and its dispiriting conclusions about human beings and their place in the universe, is in deep self-referential trouble. There is no reason to believe it; and there is excellent reason to reject it.
I'm still waiting for someone to explain to me why belief in a deity eliminates the dispiriting conclusions. He's just absolutely marvelous and when I die I get to go hang with Him and I'll be supremely happy then because ... because ... because why?

The only thing I can figure is that God is going to mesmerize me into being happy, like a little robotic child. God is a drug.

~~ Paul

[JoeEllison]

Alvin Plantinga is kind of a whining little crybaby, isn't he?

[Achán hiNidráne]

Not sure here if Prof. Plantinga is being a bit obtuse because he's preaching to the choir (ChristianityToday), or he's a logical lunchpail? He seems to understand the 'some universes will be fine-tuned' part, but can't get the gist of the anthropic principle at all. Whatever -- he's borderline simple if he thinks this refutes Dawkins' argument.

I'm struggling to understand the gist of his argument. Is he saying that because our solar system has a "Goldilocks Zone," God exists? That doesn't seem to explain why an omnipotent being with such an enthusiasm for life (created in his image, of course) wouldn't make it possible for all planets no matter how close or far from their system's primary to support it? (i.e. If God is perfect, why aren't Mars or Pluto garden worlds?) Or why a perfect being would create superfluous stars and planets if all He needed was one world and one sun to support the race of beings he created for he sole purpose of worshiping him? Seems a waste to have all that useless cosmic flotsam like other stars, planets, whole galaxies, etc. if all God needed was Earth. If anything a "Goldilocks Zone" seems to imply that God is limited to the luminosity of and the distance from a star when deciding what planets have a chance at bearing life. How can an omnipotent being be limited by some thing as paltry as the laws of physics? How can an omnipotent being be limited at all?

Like life, the universe isn't as intelligently designed as Plantinga would have us think. There is inefficiently, redundancy, decay, and chaos that throws a hefty monkey wrench into theism and the power and glory of the Abrahamic Gods.

[Robin]

I dug out Richard Swinburne's The Coherence of Theism (Clarendon, 1993) to double-check my recollection. (Never say that your convenience is not my paramount concern! :D)

Here's a pertinent excerpt from what Swinburne says about the necessity of God being morally perfect

A bit off topic, but Swinburne appears to have begged the question a bit here - what reason is there that a being that can absolutely see the right path to acheiving maximal good and has to power to follow that path, but being perfectly free might decide it just doesn't bloody want to?

Another question is, would a human, even one raised to the same metaphysical realm of God ever be able to distinguish between a good God and evil God?

When a child suffers terribly from some disease it is customary to say - "it looks like evil to us when God does nothing, but there might be some greater good to be acheived, or some greater evil to be avoided that necessitates Him doing nothing".

The unspoken assumption, of course, is that we will get to Heaven and say "Oh, now I see why it was all necessary".

But nobody has ever suggested that we would become maximal beings in heaven. We might go through eternity suffering from the actions of God that seem to us abominably evil and cruel, but just failing to see that in fact God is acheiving some greater good or avoiding some greater evil.

[ceo_esq]

A bit off topic, but Swinburne appears to have begged the question a bit here - what reason is there that a being that can absolutely see the right path to acheiving maximal good and has to power to follow that path, but being perfectly free might decide it just doesn't bloody want to?

I think we'd have to consider the reasons for which the being didn't bloody want to. To borrow something Swinburne said, if a rational agent acknowledged that one course was better overall, but then chose another course, might we not reasonably suppose that the agent was lying or had changed its mind, or that non-rational factors influenced what it did?

[Robin]

I think we'd have to consider the reasons for which the being didn't bloody want to. To borrow something Swinburne said, if a rational agent acknowledged that one course was better overall, but then chose another course, might we not reasonably suppose that the agent was lying or had changed its mind, or that non-rational factors influenced what it did?
No. The rational agent would always choose the better course, but not necessarily the better course.

Swinburne is really just playing with semantic confusion, between different meanings of good/bad, better/worse, right/wrong.

If I say something is a good course of action I might mean it is morally good or I might mean it was appropriate to my purpose.

A criminal might think it a good course of action to kill a witness, but presumably would not consider it a good course of action.

So if the maximal being chose to achieve maximal evil then it would clearly choose the course of action that was better overall for achieving evil.

Hence the old joke:

"Don't you know what you did was wrong?"
"Of course it was wrong, I got caught, didn't I"

[ceo_esq]

No. The rational agent would always choose the better course, but not necessarily the better course.

Swinburne is really just playing with semantic confusion, between different meanings of good/bad, better/worse, right/wrong.

If I say something is a good course of action I might mean it is morally good or I might mean it was appropriate to my purpose.

A criminal might think it a good course of action to kill a witness, but presumably would not consider it a good course of action.


I'm not sure I agree with you about what Swinburne is doing here. To adapt one of his remarks to the specific scenario you raise: What are we to make of the suggestion that a man might see killing a criminal witness against him as a good thing in one way (e.g. by contributing to the preservation of his own liberty), refraining from killing the witness as a good thing in another way (e.g. by contributing to the preservation of someone else's life), but nevertheless kill the witness? To say that the killer thought that it was on balance more morally justifiable to spare the witness, but that he killed the witness because it was more appropriate to his purposes, simply suggests to me that what really happened was one of two things.

(1) The killer judged that his own freedom was a greater good than the life of the witness, such that he actually believed on some level that it was, on balance, more morally justifiable for him to kill the witness. (I think this is what Camus was referring to when he said that every criminal acquits himself before his trial.) Yet an omniscient being could not arrive at this conclusion, because he would know it was false. (Here, I am assuming that it is false, of course.)

(2) The killer truly recognized that sparing the witness was more morally justifiable than killing the witness, but some other force (perhaps fear) acting upon his reason influenced his decision. Yet the decisions of a perfectly free being could not be influenced in this way.

[Robin]

To say that the killer thought that it was on balance more morally justifiable to spare the witness, but that he killed the witness because it was more appropriate to his purposes, simply suggests to me that what really happened was one of two things.

(1) The killer judged that his own freedom was a greater good than the life of the witness, such that he actually believed on some level that it was, on balance, more morally justifiable for him to kill the witness. (I think this is what Camus was referring to when he said that every criminal acquits himself before his trial.) Yet an omniscient being could not arrive at this conclusion, because he would know it was false. (Here, I am assuming that it is false, of course.)

(2) The killer truly recognized that sparing the witness was more morally justifiable than killing the witness, but some other force (perhaps fear) acting upon his reason influenced his decision. Yet the decisions of a perfectly free being could not be influenced in this way.
You are missing the possibility that he recognised the action as evil and clear-headedly, with no forces acting on his reason went and did it anyway.

Similarly an omniscient and perfectly free being could act in the same way.

Again, you are assuming that maximal being would choose moral good over moral evil.

Just because a maximal being would choose the better course of action, in the sense of the more effective course of action, does not mean it would choose the better course of action in the sense of the more morally good course of action.

[ceo_esq]

You are missing the possibility that he recognised the action as evil and clear-headedly, with no forces acting on his reason went and did it anyway.

Similarly an omniscient and perfectly free being could act in the same way.

Again, you are assuming that maximal being would choose moral good over moral evil.

Just because a maximal being would choose the better course of action, in the sense of the more effective course of action, does not mean it would choose the better course of action in the sense of the more morally good course of action.

I still disagree. Maybe it's because a determination to take the more expedient course despite awareness of countervailing reasons seems to me to presuppose, or may fairly be characterized as, a tacit determination on some level that the expedient course is in fact more morally justifiable. A decision to kill the witness under the circumstances (unless out of fear or some other emotion or influence) would entail a decision to ascribe greater good to my own ends and self-interest than to the life of the witness, even if I might not consciously analyze it in quite those terms. Hence, it would essentially be a rational response to a perceived overriding moral reason or excuse to kill. Otherwise it does not seem like a coherent or rational act to me. I'm not ignoring the possibility you point out, I'm just not convinced it's really a possibility for a rational free agent (or perhaps, rather, it's just not consistent with my understanding of what a rational act is). I find it counterintuitive; your experience may differ.

[Robin]

A decision to kill the witness under the circumstances (unless out of fear or some other emotion or influence) would entail a decision to ascribe greater good to my own ends and self-interest than to the life of the witness, even if I might not consciously analyze it in quite those terms.
Or attach a greater importance to self-interest. There is certainly no contradiction in the rational criminal seeing moral good on the one hand and self-interest on the other and rationally acting according to the latter.
Hence, it would essentially be a rational response to a perceived overriding moral reason or excuse to kill. Otherwise it does not seem like a coherent or rational act to me.
It is a perfectly rational act - morality is one thing, self-interest the other. The rational criminal has no way of maximising both so he chooses the one that to him is the most important.
I'm not ignoring the possibility you point out, I'm just not convinced it's really a possibility for a rational free agent (or perhaps, rather, it's just not consistent with my understanding of what a rational act is). I find it counterintuitive; your experience may differ.
Well if you simply refuse to countenance the possibility that someone could rationally choose evil then of course you will come to that conclusion but, as I say, you are simply begging the question. You are equating rationality with morality.

If there are such things then why would a maximal being necessarily be obliged to maximise moral good? It could be just one of many variables in the maximal mind. Who knows what fish a maximal being has to fry?

[Herzblut]

The naturalist can be reasonably sure that the neurophysiology underlying belief formation is adaptive, but nothing follows about the truth of the beliefs depending on that neurophysiology. In fact he'd have to hold that it is unlikely, given unguided evolution, that our cognitive faculties are reliable. It's as likely, given unguided evolution, that we live in a sort of dream world as that we actually know something about ourselves and our world.
Plantinga just hasn't thought about this. What survival advantage would our neurophysiological processes have provided if they provided no information or interpretation of our physical environment, but instead sank us deep in a dream?

Nevertheless Plantinga spins a deliciously illogical conclusion from this:

So a broader conclusion is that one can't rationally accept both naturalism and evolution; naturalism, therefore, is in conflict with a premier doctrine of contemporary science. ...the conflict is between science and naturalism, not between science and belief in God.

This potential conflict between science and naturalism is by no means illogical and cannot be downright refuted. The fact stands that evolution is geared towards adative changes for the sake of survival and reproduction. NOT for the sake of detecting "the truth". Thus, the question is valid in how far we can rely on our own minds.

A very good overview of the topic and the argument that "one can't rationally accept both naturalism and evolution" can be found in this entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Religion and Science
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-science/#NatSci

Herzblut

[Robin]

This potential conflict between science and naturalism is by no means illogical and cannot be downright refuted. The fact stands that evolution is geared towards adative changes for the sake of survival and reproduction. NOT for the sake of detecting "the truth". Thus, the question is valid in how far we can rely on our own minds.
Hmmm... so you can't see any possible way in which accurate information about its surroundings and a method of interpreting this information might actually be something of a comparative survival advantage?

But you have no problem whatsoever with the notion that neural machinery simply constructs "a sort of dream world" would definitely provide a survival advantage for animals? How exactly? What would that survival advantage be? Where would our neural machinery get the information with which to construct this dream world?

As far as our belief mechanism being unreliable, that is of course perfectly true and also old news. Thousands of years of incompatible religious beliefs provide us with the empirical evidence of that.

But there is every reason to conclude that cognitive processes resulting from evolution would be largely accurate with respect to our immediate environment - that the things we sense are thing that are in fact there.

Naturalism does not predict that we should have perfectly reliable cognitive processes and neither does evolution - so why would they be incompatible?
A very good overview of the topic and the argument that "one can't rationally accept both naturalism and evolution" can be found in this entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Religion and Science
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-science/#NatSci

Herzblut
Thanks. That is the funniest thing I have read in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy since they claimed that Mach and Carnap were Neutral Monists. (Which is a little like saying James Randi and Richard Dawkins are Prayerful Marian Roman Catholics. They may be but if so they are stating their case rather badly).

I especially like the part that says that if we were artifacts of some super-intelligence then we would definitely have been given reliable beliefs.

No, strike that, my favourite part is where it says that the "there is nothing like consensus regarding the argument". Putting it mildly.

Note that the article you cite is by Alvin Plantinga and the references he cites for this argument are - well what a co-incidence - Alvin Plantinga!

So far the only people we know of who buy this argument are Alvin Plantinga and you. That is, as Plantinga himself says "nothing like a consensus"

[JoeEllison]

Philosophers seem more and more to me to be incredibly smart people putting together incredibly complex rationalizations for outrageously stupid ideas. That link only confirmed my suspicion.

[Herzblut]

Hmmm... so you can't see any possible way in which accurate information about its surroundings and a method of interpreting this information might actually be something of a comparative survival advantage?

I can't see why "finding out the truth" should be an evolutional advantage in any case. Example:

say, people believed that whatever appeared to be some yellow-brownish stripes behind a bush was a tiger and they immediately ran away from that thing. That looks like a clear advantage over the attitude "Well, it might be a tiger. But we don't know yet. So, let's investigate to find out the truth."

The cost of being wrong is low (some energy waisted by running away) whereas the cost of detecting one is right is enormous: death. In such cases I don't see no benefit whatsoever of finding out "the truth".


But there is every reason to conclude that cognitive processes resulting from evolution would be largely accurate with respect to our immediate environment - that the things we sense are thing that are in fact there.

Not necessarily, as described above.


Naturalism does not predict that we should have perfectly reliable cognitive processes and neither does evolution - so why would they be incompatible?

The argument is presented in the Stanford Ency of Phil.


No, strike that, my favourite part is where it says that the "there is nothing like consensus regarding the argument". Putting it mildly.

Right. Neither consensus for Plantinga - nor for you! That is the point I am making.

Herzblut

[Robin]

say, people believed that whatever appeared to be some yellow-brownish stripes behind a bush was a tiger and they immediately ran away from that thing.

That looks like a clear advantage over the attitude "Well, it might be a tiger. But we don't know yet. So, let's investigate to find out the truth."
Plantinga implied that false beliefs, unreliable cognitive faculties would have a survival advantage over true beliefs and reliable cognitive faculties.

I contend that the opposite is more likely to be true - I cannot see how a false belief or an unreliable cognitive faculty would ever be an advantage.

Now the belief "a yellow-brownish striped thing might be dangerous" is an example of a true belief and a reliable cognitive process. Wouldn't you say? So your example contradicts Plantinga.

On the other hand the belief that "it is safe to go in closer and check if a potentially dangerous thing really is dangerous" is an example of a false belief and an unreliable cognitive process. So your second example also contradicts Plantinga.

An even more reliable cognitive process might lead them to remember that other yellow-brownish striped thingies ran rather faster than people and so running away was only likely to draw the thing's attention and that staying very still and hoping it didn't notice you was probably more likely the go.

It looks like true beliefs and reliable cognitive processes are winning hands down here.

Reliable cognitive faculties and accurate information about the environment would help creatures avoid predators, find food, find mates etc. Living in a "sort of dream" would do none of those things.

Are you really, seriously arguing that unreliable cognitive faculties will in general give a greater survival advantage over reliable cognitive faculties?
The argument is presented in the Stanford Ency of Phil.
I already referred to this remember? It was by Plantinga and cited Plantinga.

If you read it, it doesn't actually present any coherent argument as such.

It is just not a serious position.

[Herzblut]

Plantinga implied that false beliefs, unreliable cognitive faculties would have a survival advantage over true beliefs and reliable cognitive faculties.

I perceived it differently. Namely that a human behavioral adaption does not tell alot - if anything - about the correctness of the underlying thoughts. An adaption might be beneficial for survival although the reasoning behind it is completely wrong.


I contend that the opposite is more likely to be true - I cannot see how a false belief or an unreliable cognitive faculty would ever be an advantage.

How do you define "false belief"? Whatever belief is "true" when it's useful. If it's useless or even harmful it's "false", per definition. This is not identical to your scientific perception of true and false.


Now the belief "a yellow-brownish striped thing might be dangerous" is an example of a true belief and a reliable cognitive process. Wouldn't you say?

A belief "X might be dangerous" is useless, see above. It does not force an adaption of behaviour. The belief "X is dangerous" causes such adaption, run!


It looks like true beliefs and reliable cognitive processes are winning hands down here.

True in the sense of useful, yes. Human perception is not capable to rebuild an accurate image of the surrounding nature within the brain. The image is heavily constrained and biased towards useful attributes, some of them being even faked to us by ourselves - and the rest is completely ignored. Objective "truth" is irrelevant all together.

You seem to assume that most human decisions are based on rationality. I disagree.


Are you really, seriously arguing that unreliable cognitive faculties will in general give a greater survival advantage over reliable cognitive faculties?

I would argue that reliability is the main advantage of human cognition. The archaic instinct is much more reliable. I believe, cognition is more relevant for organizing social behaviour: dominate a language, recognize faces etc.


I already referred to this remember? It was by Plantinga and cited Plantinga.

Which says what about its validity?


If you read it, it doesn't actually present any coherent argument as such.

I found it pretty nice, when I read it. Let me recheck.

Herzblut

[Robin]

I perceived it differently. Namely that a human behavioral adaption does not tell alot - if anything - about the correctness of the underlying thoughts. An adaption might be beneficial for survival although the reasoning behind it is completely wrong.
Well let's see it in Plantinga's own words:
In fact he'd have to hold that it is unlikely, given unguided evolution, that our cognitive faculties are reliable. It's as likely, given unguided evolution, that we live in a sort of dream world as that we actually know something about ourselves and our world.
Which is a lot closer to what I said.

You would have to admit at least that if we were a group that didn't "actually know something about ourselves and our world" then we would know nothing of tigers and their eating habits, and could not even see the stripes. That would give us a very poor survival advantage. That would contradict Plantinga's above words.
How do you define "false belief"? Whatever belief is "true" when it's useful. If it's useless or even harmful it's "false", per definition. This is not identical to your scientific perception of true and false.
No a true belief is true when it is true. It might not be useful but generally speaking it is. For example a group who thought tigers were harmless might not survive long.
A belief "X might be dangerous" is useless, see above. It does not force an adaption of behaviour. The belief "X is dangerous" causes such adaption, run!
Why is "is" more useful than "might be"? A belief causing an adaptation is what is useless. A belief that triggers you to draw on knowledge and act accordingly might be much more useful. For example "tigers run fast and have sharp ears but not such good eyesight" might lead to the conclusion "freeze where I am". The knowledge "my family is that direction and I want to lead the tiger away" would lead to another evolutionarily useful behaviour. Perhaps the prior knowledge "there are tigers in this area" led them to be carrying appropriate weapons in the first place.

In every case more accurate knowledge and the ability to act quickly on that knowledge would be better than a simple "tiger - run!" response which only gives the possibility of one, not necessarily appropriate, behaviour.
True in the sense of useful, yes. Human perception is not capable to rebuild an accurate image of the surrounding nature within the brain. The image is heavily constrained and biased towards useful attributes, some of them being even faked to us by ourselves...
Really? For example?
You seem to assume that most human decisions are based on rationality. I disagree.
I don't know why you should say this since I have never said or implied anything even remotely like this and have explicitly said exactly the opposite in this thread. Try to stick to what I actually say.
I would argue that reliability is the main advantage of human cognition. The archaic instinct is much more reliable. I believe, cognition is more relevant for organizing social behaviour: dominate a language, recognize faces etc.
That is not an answer, I asked "Are you really, seriously arguing that unreliable cognitive faculties will in general give a greater survival advantage over reliable cognitive faculties?". So are you saying yes?
Which says what about its validity?
You bolded the name of the encyclopedia and felt it necessary to mention it again even though I had already referred to it. So it appeared that you were trying to use the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to add some sort of spurious respectability to the argument. I was just pointing out that you were doing nothing but re-quoting Plantinga.
I found it pretty nice, when I read it. Let me recheck.
Herzblut
Nice it may be, coherent it is not. Even if the premise were not self-evidently absurd, the rest of the argument is at least suspect. The "has a defeater for" construction hides some dodgy reasoning.

[Herzblut]

Well let's see it in Plantinga's own words:
In fact he'd have to hold that it is unlikely, given unguided evolution, that our cognitive faculties are reliable. It's as likely, given unguided evolution, that we live in a sort of dream world as that we actually know something about ourselves and our world.
You would have to admit at least that if we were a group that didn't "actually know something about ourselves and our world" then we would know nothing of tigers and their eating habits, and could not even see the stripes. That would give us a very poor survival advantage. That would contradict Plantinga's above words.

I'm actually not dicussing just this one sentence of Platinga, as you seem to be inclined to. I think it doesn't lead far because it's pretty ambiguous. But OK:

First of all P says it's unlikely that our cognitive faculties are reliable and it's equally unlikely that we live in a sort of dream world. Thus, he calls this dream world scenario unlikely.

Secondly, your counter-argument that tigers are in fact dangerous and not acknowledging their danger would be no survial advantage, is very weak. Because, taking Ps dream world assumption granted for the sake of the argument, you would not be able to know for a fact that tigers are dangerous. This might as well be part of the dream.

This is just my ad-hoc interpretation and I don't regard it useful to keep riding on that particular phrase.


No a true belief is true when it is true.

A circular definition like this is completely meaningless. Please provide a better one.


Why is "is" more useful than "might be"? A belief causing an adaptation is what is useless.

What? Evolution is all about adaption. A belief causing a favorable adaption is useful.


A belief that triggers you to draw on knowledge and act accordingly might be much more useful.

You assert what you have to prove.


In every case more accurate knowledge and the ability to act quickly on that knowledge would be better than a simple "tiger - run!" response which only gives the possibility of one, not necessarily appropriate, behaviour.

This is wrong, I think. In the event of a potential tiger attack, humans don't tend to seek their knowledgebase in order to decide rationally how to behave. This would be extremely harmful to survival. Humans act immediately and instinctively.

This kind of reasoning you show here leads me to the conclusion that you think humans would indeed base their decisions on knowledge and rationality. This is mostly wrong, it is fatally wrong in case of crisis situations.


Really? For example?

The visual system is restricted to a certain frequency frame of electromagnetic waves. Radio waves are e.g. invisible for humans. The visual image we create from our current surrounding is basically made up upfront by the brain. The small radius of our current attention is then tried to be matched up with what we actually perceive from the eyes. This mechanism is extremely efficient and supportive for our survival. On the other hand, it has typical faintnesses and can easily be tricked into failure:

http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/index.html

Thus, we don't see what's "really" there. If you think so, you believe an illusion.


I don't know why you should say this since I have never said or implied anything even remotely like this and have explicitly said exactly the opposite in this thread. Try to stick to what I actually say.

See above.

That is not an answer, I asked "Are you really, seriously arguing that unreliable cognitive faculties will in general give a greater survival advantage over reliable cognitive faculties?". So are you saying yes?

No, this is your straw man.

I come to the Stanford article later.

Herzblut

[Robin]

First of all P says it's unlikely that our cognitive faculties are reliable and it's equally unlikely that we live in a sort of dream world. Thus, he calls this dream world scenario unlikely.
No, read his words, he says that given evolution and naturalism we should expect it likely that we should live in that time of dream world. In other words he is saying there is something (unspecified) about naturalism and evolution which, if true would lead to unreliable cognitive faculties.

He repeats this assertion in the Stanford article, and it is absolutely crucial to his premise. So it is not a side issue.

I am simply saying that one of the main features of evolution is that any features that are selected provides comparative advantage given the organism's environment.

Hence my question:


That is not an answer, I asked "Are you really, seriously arguing that unreliable cognitive faculties will in general give a greater survival advantage over reliable cognitive faculties?". So are you saying yes?
No, this is your straw man.
Herzblut
No, it is my question. It is the key to the premise. I am sorry if it sounded like a straw man, I thought this is what you were arguing. Let me rephrase it:

"In general will unreliable cognitive faculties give an animal the same or greater survival advantages compared to reliable cognitive faculties?"

[Herzblut]

No, read his words, he says that given evolution and naturalism we should expect it likely that we should live in that time of dream world.

No. He said "as likely", Robin.


He repeats this assertion in the Stanford article, and it is absolutely crucial to his premise. So it is not a side issue.

I'll come to it.


"In general will unreliable cognitive faculties give an animal the same or greater survival advantages compared to reliable cognitive faculties?"

You're constructing a false dilemma. Reliability is beneficial as far as survival advantages are improved. This does not imply a cognitive reliability as deployed in science, for instance.

Herzblut

[Robin]

No. He said "as likely", Robin.
Splitting hairs. As likely implies a probability of around .5 - that is likely.
I'll come to it.
We are there already, this is part of his premise.
You're constructing a false dilemma.
If there is a false dilemma then it is not of my construction. Plantinga chose the criteria of reliability of cognitive faculties and what the theory of evolution predicts about them. He is the one that is conflating cognitive faculties, belief mechanisms and rationality, assuming that a conclusion about one will automatically apply to the other.

Whereas I would say that rationality would start by recognising the limitations of belief mechanisms.
Reliability is beneficial as far as survival advantages are improved.
On this we agree.
This does not imply a cognitive reliability as deployed in science, for instance.
Agreed. So what we have is that evolution/naturalism predicts that it is probable that a person has reliable cognitive faculties and will have a preponderance of true beliefs over false beliefs, where these beliefs relate to the immediate observable environment.

[PixyMisa]

Philosophers seem more and more to me to be incredibly smart people putting together incredibly complex rationalizations for outrageously stupid ideas. That link only confirmed my suspicion.
There's a quote I like about that:
The tools of a mathematician are pencil, paper and waste paper basket. The waste paper basket distinguishes him from a philosopher.

[Herzblut]

Agreed. So what we have is that evolution/naturalism predicts that it is probable that a person has reliable cognitive faculties and will have a preponderance of true beliefs over false beliefs, where these beliefs relate to the immediate observable environment.
Reliable cognitive faculties, true beliefs related to the immediate observable environment?

No, Robin. Not at all. Oh, btw, look at this amazing card trick:

Colour changing card trick!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=voAntzB7EwE

Yeah, how reliable our observations are, aren't they? :D

And, Robin, the squares A and B are the same shade of grey!
http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html

Even if you know it better, you will always be tricked into believing the opposite, into a false belief!

And, Robin, what is it that you see here? What do your reliable cognitive faculties and your true beliefs tell you about it? Can you make up your mind?
http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/sze_missCornerCube/index.html

And what about religions? You honestly say that the adaptive behavioral change religious belief systems imply are related to the truth of those religious beliefs?

And this goes on and on. You should rethink your general notion towards human nature.

Herzblut

[Herzblut]

Robin,

now where are the reliable cognitive faculties, and true beliefs we hold related to the immediate observable environment?

Herz

[Robin]

Reliable cognitive faculties, true beliefs related to the immediate observable environment?

No, Robin. Not at all. Oh, btw, look at this amazing card trick:
*Deep sigh*.. note my wording Herzblut ... preponderance of true beliefs over false beliefs

What on earth made you think I didn't know about optical illusions and perception errors?

That is why my wording was careful. It would help in future if you would read properly and think about it for a little while before responding, it really would.

You are not suggesting that the majority of objects of perception in our immediate environment are illusions and perceptual errors are you?

By the way, Plantinga insists in his argument that a theist God would give us reliable cognitive faculties - so what do your perceptual errors say about that argument? We obviously don't have completely reliable cognitive faculties so by Plantinga's own argument there must be no God!!!

[Herzblut]

*Deep sigh*.. note my wording Herzblut ... preponderance of true beliefs over false beliefs

You underestimate my point, I believe. Examples like the colours card trick put to doubt the overall reliance of human perception. You're claimed preponderance of true beliefs is pure speculation and requires evidence. Religion is another strong argument against your notion. So far, I've only seen claims without factual support from you. That's not very convincing.


By the way, Plantinga insists in his argument that a theist God would give us reliable cognitive faculties - so what do your perceptual errors say about that argument? We obviously don't have completely reliable cognitive faculties so by Plantinga's own argument there must be no God!!!

Very good point!

Herzblut

[ceo_esq]

Or attach a greater importance to self-interest. There is certainly no contradiction in the rational criminal seeing moral good on the one hand and self-interest on the other and rationally acting according to the latter.

It is a perfectly rational act - morality is one thing, self-interest the other. The rational criminal has no way of maximising both so he chooses the one that to him is the most important.

Well if you simply refuse to countenance the possibility that someone could rationally choose evil then of course you will come to that conclusion but, as I say, you are simply begging the question. You are equating rationality with morality.

Choosing selfishly under rational circumstances (not controlled by fear, etc.) entails, on my view, two things: (1) a determination or assumption, conscious or otherwise, that the good of the self is most important - that is, it's a greater good than other goods that might be implicated by the alternative, and (2) a decision to serve what is perceived as the greater good. But 1 seems to me to involve a moral proposition, or more exactly, as I suggested, a conclusion or assumption about the truth of a moral proposition, and 2 relies on that conclusion or assumption. Assuming arguendo that coherent moral propositions are either true or false, the conclusion in 1 will only be drawn by an omniscient being if it is in fact objectively correct.

When you speak of "attaching a greater importance to self-interest", and choosing the path that favors the more important thing, that sounds to me like a dressed-up decision to act in accordance with a moral impulse. If the criminal rationally chose the opposite way, we might say he attached a greater importance to the victim's life than his own self interest. Won't the choice that protects or serves the end the chooser deems more important be perceived by a rational chooser as the choice with greater moral warrant? Isn't that simply adherence to a basic principle of moral decision-making?

[Herzblut]

I just like to give a short summary of the Stanford text to present the full argument.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-science/#NatSci

..some have suggested a science/religion (or science/quasi-religion) conflict of a wholly different sort: one between naturalism and science. (Otte 2002; Plantinga 1993, 2002a, forthcoming; Rea 2002; Taylor 1963); there are also hints of this effect in Nietzsche (2003) and in Darwin himself (1887).

This refers to more sources than just the Plantinga bloke. Last not least The Darwin himself.

Note many thinkers going back at least to Nietzsche (Nietzsche 2003) and possibly William Whewell (Curtis 1986) have pointed to a potentially worrisome implication of evolutionary theory. .. It is fitness-enhancing behavior and traits that get rewarded by natural selection; what get penalized are maladaptive traits and behaviors. In crafting our cognitive faculties, natural selection will favor cognitive faculties and processes that result in adaptive behavior; it cares not a whit about true belief (as such) or about cognitive faculties that reliably give rise to true belief.

Darwin himself apparently worried about this question: "With me," says Darwin, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind? (Darwin 1887)

... so the suggestion goes, it is unlikely that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given the conjunction of naturalism with the proposition that we and our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of natural selection winnowing random genetic variation.

If so, one who believes that conjunction will have a defeater for the proposition that our faculties are reliable—but if that's true, she will also have a defeater for any belief produced by her cognitive faculties—including, of course, the conjunction of naturalism with evolution. That conjunction is thus seen to be self-refuting. If so, however, this conjunction cannot rationally be accepted, in which case there is conflict between naturalism and evolution, and hence between naturalism and science.

Herzblut

[Robin]

Incorrect information, post deleted

[Robin]

Well I think an out of context quote of an offhand remark in a letter Darwin wrote a year before he died could not really be considered as support for the premise.

But I think your two last quotes from Plantinga accurately sum up what he is saying.

We could also include his schematic from the same source:
Let R be the proposition that our cognitive faculties are reliable, N the proposition that naturalism is true and E the proposition that we and our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the processes to which contemporary evolutionary theory points us

We can state the argument schematically as follows:

1. P(R | N&E) is low.
2. Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that (1) is true has a defeater for R.
3. Anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for any other belief she holds, including N&E itself.
Therefore

4. Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that (1) is true has a defeater for N&E; hence N&E can't be rationally accepted.

[blobru]

Plantinga’s logic: Theism vs. Evolution & Naturalism

Theism (God exists) --> God's beliefs are true --> God creates man in His image --> man's beliefs are true

Evolution & Naturalism (no God) --> Evolution values survival, not truth --> Evolution creates man --> man's beliefs may be true or false

But what guarantees the truth of God's beliefs, other than His say-so?
Plantinga says God is omniscient; what’s a fair formula for "omniscience" then? How about: data + rationality = truth.
Evolution has endowed man not with omniscience certainly but with rationality at least. And evolution has endowed man with senses to acquire data.

It's true the raw data acquired by the senses may be true or false as Plantinga contends. But raw data examined rationally becomes something more. The senses may be fooled by magic, but the rational mind is capable of doubt, suspecting a trick. Plantinga omits our capacity to doubt and test the raw impressions of our senses from his dim appraisal of man's knowledge. Man's knowledge is ‘as likely true as false’ only applies to unfiltered sensory impressions, not to rationally scrutinized and measured belief. Without rationality, there is no “truth”.

In fact, and this is the kicker (or ‘defeater’ as Plantinga calls it), assuming theism is true, there is no need to ever test our beliefs, for as Plantinga says, God creates us with cognitive faculties like his own, which guarantee our beliefs are true. This has got to be the single stupidest attack on the consistency of science (and default defence of theism) I have ever read. It is theism that makes science inconsistent by asserting we perfect images of God don’t even need it in the first place! Evolution, forcing us to admit the fallibility of our senses, and naturalism, banning God, entails science!! They couldn’t be more consistent!!! And science is all about testing belief -- TRUTH (in the sense of divine omniscience) never enters into it!!!! Gawd!!!!!

Ok, calming down somewhat -- look, I do admire Prof. Plantinga for his immense scholarship in the history of this debate; but his God bias is seriously leading him down the garden [of eden] path to nutsville… :cs:

[Robin]

Let R be the proposition that our cognitive faculties are reliable, N the proposition that naturalism is true and E the proposition that we and our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the processes to which contemporary evolutionary theory points us

We can state the argument schematically as follows:

1. P(R | N&E) is low.
2. Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that (1) is true has a defeater for R.
3. Anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for any other belief she holds, including N&E itself.
Therefore

4. Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that (1) is true has a defeater for N&E; hence N&E can't be rationally accepted.
Note that belief plays no part in the scientific method, so the set of people who "believe" N&E will comprise completely of the set of people that don't understand N&E.

The set of people be "believe" N&E and understand N&E will be a null set.

So 3. refers either to a null set or it does not refer to N&E (but some modified version of them) and cannot be part of the argument.

Similarly Plantinga's phrase "one who believes that conjunction will have a defeater for the proposition that our faculties are reliable" also refers either to a null set of someone who does not understand the proposition so the argument in the paragraph is fallacious.