Nuclear Weapons Flown by mistake...ooops

[DRBUZZ0]

Everyone makes mistakes and the occasional mix up in inventory and tracking is something you have to expect but....

FOR CHRIST SAKE, NOT WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Anyways in a story I already posted here: http://depletedcranium.com/?p=94

A B-52 flying from North Dakota to Lousiana was supposed to be carying a load of cruise missiles which were to be refurbished or recycled. Obviously they were not targeted and armed... pretty routine.

Well, except that the ordinance officer and crew who loaded them left the W-80 nuclear warheads in the missiles when they were not supposed to be part of the deal.

Now, nuclear weapons are transported by the airforce by air from time to time and they are designed to be safe when not armed. The W-80 is a pretty modern warhead and if you drop it from a plane or wack it with a hammer it will not detonate. At worst, it may trigger the chemical primary which could cause contamination of the area: But it is well designed to not detonate unless the safeties are turned off and the arming mechanism is primed.


That's not really the point though. The crew had no idea that the nukes were on board, because they were signed to carry just the missiles. Had something gone wrong in the flight, they would have just taken standard measures, such as landing at the nearest military or civilian airport. If the nukes were known to be on board, they would have been immediately met by a ground crew to guard and handle them.

If the plane had crashed, there would not have been an immediate call for nuclear recovery special teams or to have the area properly quardened off.

But what *really* is the scary thing here is that the USAF always has stated that nuclear weapons are safely handled. They're stored, inventoried, checked, tracked and that there are redundant and tightly controlled systems which assure that any errors will be immediately caught. Guess not this time

[This Guy]

Unless things have changed, there is a two person rule (well, was called "Two Man Rule" when I was in) anytime anything was done with the Nucs. Maintenance, movement, ANYTHING required two people that had sufficient knowledge level to detect if the other one was doing anything they shouldn't.

It's really hard to understand how this happened. I suspect there were a chain of mis-steps along the way, along with some complacency.

Heads will role over this, and I suspect whatever the lapse, it will be remedied.

It is a bit scary to think about though, isn't it?

Fact is (it appears anyway) the warheads where under Air Force control the whole time, so it's not quite as bad as someone walking on the base, and taking a few home or something ;)

[DRBUZZ0]

Unless things have changed, there is a two person rule (well, was called "Two Man Rule" when I was in) anytime anything was done with the Nucs. Maintenance, movement, ANYTHING required two people that had sufficient knowledge level to detect if the other one was doing anything they shouldn't.

It's really hard to understand how this happened. I suspect there were a chain of mis-steps along the way, along with some complacency.

Heads will role over this, and I suspect whatever the lapse, it will be remedied.

It is a bit scary to think about though, isn't it?

Fact is (it appears anyway) the warheads where under Air Force control the whole time, so it's not quite as bad as someone walking on the base, and taking a few home or something ;)


Correct, the nuclear weapons were never out of airforce hands so there wasn't a real danger to anyone, but the point being that it shows a major breakdown in the system. I had heard of the two-man rule, but of course there are other rules and regulations. They cannot be handled by those not certified, they have to be documented whenever transported and can only do so with aproval. They cannot be stored with other weapons. There must be valid inspection certificates... etc etc etc...

The USAF has always maintained that they haver very very tight controls on these things which are redundant and fail-safe.

But here's the question that is bothersome: If this could happen, what if the missiles had been headed to a contractor to be broken down for parts and sold surplus?

or what if they were on their way to being sold to a friendly or semi-friendly nation for refurb and reuse, such as Norway, Greece, Belgium or Pakistan. I'm sure the Pakistanis would be happy to get a little surpurprise and be able to add a nice low-profile Teller-Ulam 150kt high-effeciency warhead to their armory.

What if the missiles had been sent to ARAMARC to lay out in the desert with relatively little security, until the navy or air force decided they might make a nice target to test out an anti-aircraft/anti-missile system on? Or until a museum requested one of the shells? Or ordience squadron decided one of those would look nice "On a Stick" outside their building...

I tend to hope that that sort of thing could not happen, but it definitely is disconcerting.

[Tumblehome]

The USAF has always maintained that they haver very very tight controls on these things which are redundant and fail-safe.


Is that "fail-safe" as in the unsinkable Titanic? That's a myth to make us feel more comfortable with nukes around. As long as humans are involved, there's no such thing as fail-safe.

[dudalb]

I suspect a few careers have just gone up in smoke over this.
I hope they enjoy being the officer in charge of recruiting in Nome,Alaska and Mashed Potato Falls,North Dakota.

[Aoidoi]

Is that "fail-safe" as in the unsinkable Titanic? That's a myth to make us feel more comfortable with nukes around. As long as humans are involved, there's no such thing as fail-safe.I believe fail-safe is just refering to the mode of failure. That is, if something goes wrong the bomb's failure mode isn't a nuclear detonation. Or if something goes wrong in the inventory process the failure mode should be "don't put it on the plane." Whenever in doubt, go with the safe option. Not that anything is 100%, but the idea is that unless the whole process is successfully followed, there shouldn't be any mushroom clouds.

The disturbing conspiracy theory I heard over at /. was the idea that this wasn't accidental, and that they were deliberately moving nukes to the base where middle east operations are occurring from. Which appears obviously crazy, yet somehow still creeps me right the hell out.

[DRBUZZ0]

I believe fail-safe is just refering to the mode of failure. That is, if something goes wrong the bomb's failure mode isn't a nuclear detonation. Or if something goes wrong in the inventory process the failure mode should be "don't put it on the plane." Whenever in doubt, go with the safe option. Not that anything is 100%, but the idea is that unless the whole process is successfully followed, there shouldn't be any mushroom clouds.

The disturbing conspiracy theory I heard over at /. was the idea that this wasn't accidental, and that they were deliberately moving nukes to the base where middle east operations are occurring from. Which appears obviously crazy, yet somehow still creeps me right the hell out.



Nuclear weapons in general won't detonate unless there is a properly times implosion of the trigger. Modern designs improve on this inherent tendency by using precise trigger mechanisms, having components which must be physically moved within the weapon before it can be detonated and having the weapon designed to only operate properly if the material is primed by such things as neutron tubes or by injecting tritium into the core.

So you're quite correct that it will not actually end up exploding if the weapon is dropped/hit/burned or whatever. it actually takes a series of steps to ready the weapon for detonation.

There have been some accidents where weapons have broken apart, burned or exploded, but never a nuclear explosion. Worst case senerio is they end up hauling away several tons of plutonium-contaminated soil.

So it's not the safety of having these flown around. "Seceret" flying of nuclear weapons "pretending it's an accident" is not necessary. The air force does move nukes on occasion. Either they are moved to a facility for dismantling and disposing. They are moved for refurbishment. They are moved when a squadron moves or a base closes or if they are just being deployed elsewhere.

They are sometimes moved on bombers, but, of course, this is done without arming them of connecting the firing mechanism. They would be flown by certified and trained crews and kept close tabs on. On other occasions they may be transported in specialized canisters in cargo aircraft.


If they wanted to transport them, that wouldn't be that big a deal. And if they wanted to send them to Iran or something, well they could get them over on an ICBM in 30 minutes, or possibly less if they had a SSBM submarine in the area. They could fly them over in not a lot of time either...

So it's not that. It's simply the fact that it's unsettling that these things are floating around or getting shipped where they aren't supposed to be.

Look, it's one thing to say "Oh you didn't want pickles on that burger. I must have made a mistake." vrs. "Oh those nuclear weapons were supposed to be left in the munitions bunker.... oopsies!"

[Checkmite]

Nukes are so cool.

[Tumblehome]

I believe fail-safe is just refering to the mode of failure. That is, if something goes wrong the bomb's failure mode isn't a nuclear detonation. Or if something goes wrong in the inventory process the failure mode should be "don't put it on the plane." Whenever in doubt, go with the safe option. Not that anything is 100%, but the idea is that unless the whole process is successfully followed, there shouldn't be any mushroom clouds.


Okay, that makes sense.

The disturbing conspiracy theory I heard over at /. was the idea that this wasn't accidental, and that they were deliberately moving nukes to the base where middle east operations are occurring from. Which appears obviously crazy, yet somehow still creeps me right the hell out.


I wouldn't put too much stock in the CT. As always, bureaucratic error is the overwhelming favourite explanation. It seems the only reason the story got out is because it was a mistake. If the nukes really were supposed to be on board, I don't think we'd know about it.

[Random]

I suspect a few careers have just gone up in smoke over this.
I hope they enjoy being the officer in charge of recruiting in Nome,Alaska and Mashed Potato Falls,North Dakota.

Recruitment is not the dumping ground of the military. Military recruiters are pressured to make their numbers by telling them if they do not make their numbers, their careers will suffer. That doesn’t work if they have no career prospects.

Recruiters are then told not to engage in any unethical practices and are given a quota they can only make by engaging in unethical practices.

[drkitten]

Recruitment is not the dumping ground of the military. Military recruiters are pressured to make their numbers by telling them if they do not make their numbers, their careers will suffer. That doesn’t work if they have no career prospects.


So what is the dumping ground of the military, then? Where do recruiters go when they mess up -- other than back into civilian life?

[Starthinker]

So what is the dumping ground of the military, then? Where do recruiters go when they mess up -- other than back into civilian life?

You know when you're watching some show about UFO's and the witness claims to have "called the Air Force" to see if any secret planes were flying over? Well, who do you think mans those phones?

[dementedcactus]

Let's just hope they don't 'accidentally' drop one on Iran. Cause that would suck.

Really it was a mistake. A mistake with a nuke mind you, but just a mistake. There are other examples of military mistakes - wink wink Iraq, Veitnam, Canada, France, Florida :)

[Blue Mountain]

(leading part snipped)

But here's the question that is bothersome: If this could happen, what if the missiles had been headed to a contractor to be broken down for parts and sold surplus?

or what if they were on their way to being sold to a friendly or semi-friendly nation for refurb and reuse, such as Norway, Greece, Belgium or Pakistan. I'm sure the Pakistanis would be happy to get a little surpurprise and be able to add a nice low-profile Teller-Ulam 150kt high-effeciency warhead to their armory.
Just curious here ... as transported, is there enough equipment to detonate the device? Or is there a trigger mechanism of some sort that is always taken on a separate transport? (Hmmm ... that seems unlikely to me ... "Have received shipment of 15 nuclear devices to aid in our conflict with Planet X, but the plane carrying the triggers was shot down. Please advise soonest.")

[Overman]

http://www.overman.info/OverGifs/BumpBomb.gif

[DRBUZZ0]

Just curious here ... as transported, is there enough equipment to detonate the device? Or is there a trigger mechanism of some sort that is always taken on a separate transport? (Hmmm ... that seems unlikely to me ... "Have received shipment of 15 nuclear devices to aid in our conflict with Planet X, but the plane carrying the triggers was shot down. Please advise soonest.")

Some of the older ones did have a removable primary "pit" but I believe that the W-80 and most of the newer warheads are pretty much single-units which are not designed to be opened or serviced by ground crews, except for refurbishment by assembly personnel, which IIRC is usually done at the Sandia national laboratories.

So all the components would probably be there. The only exception might be things such as batteries or possibly tritium capsules, which need to be swapped out fairly regularly due to limited shelf life.

However, many of the weapons do have a "mechanical" system that prevents them from detonating. For example the fission trigger may be in seperate pieces which have to be slid together by an internal mechanism before they are in alignment with the explosives. If this is not done, the warhead cannot detonate.

There are also security mechanisms and strong-weak link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_link_weak_link) components.

There are security components designed to make the weapons hard to detonate without proper security codes. In some weapons this is not electronic but actually a precision mechanical mechanism which, if not properly unlocked, will perminantly jam

http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm
http://cryptome.org/nuke-fuze.htm