Is it?

[JetLeg]

Leaving aside the issue, of god's existance, if I have a belief that god is good, but in the bible, he commanded immoral things, is it rational to conclude that these acts are actually moral, (because of my belief that he is good), or that even though they are immoral, they should be done (because we are obliged to our creator)?

[Arkan_Wolfshade]

Leaving aside the issue, of god's existance, if I have a belief that god is good, but in the bible, he commanded immoral things, is it rational to conclude that these acts are actually moral, (because of my belief that he is good), or that even though they are immoral, they should be done (because we are obliged to our creator)?

Please consider reading the following The Science of Good and Evil: Why People Cheat, Gossip, Care, Share, and Follow the Golden Rule (http://www.amazon.com/Science-Good-Evil-People-Gossip/dp/0805077693/ref=sr_1_1/102-9133364-0600140?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190059998&sr=8-1) by Michael Shermer

[Cello Man]

One question (ok, several questions) you should be asking yourself is, "Why does God need to command lowly humans to do his bidding? Can't he do his own dirty work? If he's not omnipotent then why call him God?"

[JetLeg]

Granted that he does, his reasons are irrelevant.

[Seismosaurus]

Your problem is that you are starting with "god is good"... which really should be a conclusion. You start from your conclusion and work back to interpret the evidence to support it. You can do that if you like, but it's not good thinking.

I mean, I could equally say "I believe that Charles Manson is innocent. So therefore all the evidence against him, including his own confession, must be wrong; mistakes by the witnesses, misinterpretation, incorrect lab results, whatever - it's irrelevant why, they just must be wrong if he's innocent."

Can you do that? Sure. But does it make any sense? No.

[uruk]

One flipant response I got from someone with whom I was discussing this very subject was; "it's ok for god to do all those things that we consider bad because he's god. We are his creations and he can do with us what he wants"

The sound of me slapping my head was said to be heard for miles.

I think the question that should be asked is why God , who supposedly delineated what is moral, be allowed to act in opposition of said morals and still be considered moral?
I guess this is something close to what Siesmo is getting at.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Read the Euthyphro.

[ShowerComic]

One flipant response I got from someone with whom I was discussing this very subject was; "it's ok for god to do all those things that we consider bad because he's god. We are his creations and he can do with us what he wants"

Growing up I frequesntly listened to Bill Cosby records, from his time as a stand up comedian. One joke of his has his father saying 'I brought you into this world, I'll take you out - you know!' when he is upset with him
-- It's this reasoning on a grand scale which applies to God.

A line of reasoning going back to Plato - If there are reasons for our Morals we should be able to reason them out ourselves w/o God. If God gives us what is Moral vs. Immoral w/o Reasons then it is on his Whim and morals are arbitrary. -- Someone at the Humanist Convention back in April @ Harvard U. Spelled it out. - in short it boiled down to God was redundant.

[JoeEllison]

Make up whatever you want. Since religion is just a shared fantasy among the believers, you are only altering the fantasy to suit you... just like everyone else does.

[uruk]

Growing up I frequesntly listened to Bill Cosby records, from his time as a stand up comedian. One joke of his has his father saying 'I brought you into this world, I'll take you out - you know!' when he is upset with him
-- It's this reasoning on a grand scale which applies to God.


Unfortunately it does not make god moral, just arbitrary.
Do as I say, not as I do.
I don't see how god can take the moral high ground when he says it is a sin for us to kill each other, but it's ok for him to kill us or to have us kill each other at his command.

[Darth Rotor]

One question (ok, several questions) you should be asking yourself is, "Why does God need to command lowly humans to do his bidding? Can't he do his own dirty work? If he's not omnipotent then why call him God?"
The word _need_ in that question is extraneous, and a diversion from the original question.

Given the OP postulating God existing, you presumed a need that was not a requirement in the question. For such a powerful being, need is irrelevant, compared to the objects of His orders/instructions/commands.

For your question to fit the OP, it would be more accurate to phrase it thusly:

"Why does God command lowly humans to do his bidding?"

One answer to that would be: "Because He can."

Q: "Can't he do his own dirty work?"

A: "Yes, but he can also choose to delegate it out."

Q "If he's not omnipotent then why call him God?"

A: His omnipotence is not curtailed, nor precluded, by the act of delegating certain tasks to his inferiors/subordinates/created subjects/children. You assumed a need, it was not a condition of the argument.

So, why would He undertake this telling of people to do things?

One answer would be: "To build the character of said humans." :cool:

Another: "For His own amusement."

Another: "He bloody well feels like it, what are you going to do, try and kick His butt?"

And so on.

One can always choose not to obey said God, and risk His divine displeasure. The choice, Willow, is yours. ;)

DR

[jimlintott]

Leaving aside the issue, of god's existance, if I have a belief that god is good, but in the bible, he commanded immoral things, is it rational to conclude that these acts are actually moral, (because of my belief that he is good), or that even though they are immoral, they should be done (because we are obliged to our creator)?

It's irrational to skirt over the existence question and jump right into the other stuff.

[KingMerv00]

Leaving aside the issue, of god's existance, if I have a belief that god is good, but in the bible, he commanded immoral things, is it rational to conclude that these acts are actually moral, (because of my belief that he is good), or that even though they are immoral, they should be done (because we are obliged to our creator)?

So might makes right.

[Cello Man]

Thanks for sharing your thoughts, DR. My questions could have had more "teeth", I guess.

On another note, Seismosaurus also raised the issue of the forgone conclusion which I think is probably a more valid argument. I'd be curious to hear your thoughts on it, JetLeg.

[DangerousBeliefs]

Uh, can I just ask a few more questions?

Which god?

How do you know the Bible is correct or even the word of the god in which you're thinking of?

How do you know he? she? is not wrong? Because some ancient re-re-translated text tells you so?

Uh, where's he been these past say... 1000 years?

The thing I think is strangest in the Bible is... God sent Abraham to tell the people... and they didn't believe... so he sends Moses... and Noah... and Lot... David... geesh... who else? Jesus... ect. ect. and people just keep disobeying and ignoring him. Either he is the crappiest god ever or isn't very good at his job.

[Mercutio]

Leaving aside the issue, of god's existance, if I have a belief that god is good, but in the bible, he commanded immoral things, is it rational to conclude that these acts are actually moral, (because of my belief that he is good), or that even though they are immoral, they should be done (because we are obliged to our creator)?By some definitions, yes, these acts are by definition moral because they are god's will.

Of course, such a definition undercuts everything else we ever use "morality" or "goodness" for, so morality and goodness immediately cease being reasonable expectations or guidelins for our behavior. No need to "do good works", because true morality is arbitrarily decided by a god with a track record of capricious behavior.

So you can have one of the two, but not both--either a morality determined by god's will, or a morality we can use to guide our interactions with our fellow humans. I personally prefer the latter.

[JetLeg]

Growing up I frequesntly listened to Bill Cosby records, from his time as a stand up comedian. One joke of his has his father saying 'I brought you into this world, I'll take you out - you know!' when he is upset with him
-- It's this reasoning on a grand scale which applies to God.

A line of reasoning going back to Plato - If there are reasons for our Morals we should be able to reason them out ourselves w/o God. If God gives us what is Moral vs. Immoral w/o Reasons then it is on his Whim and morals are arbitrary. -- Someone at the Humanist Convention back in April @ Harvard U. Spelled it out. - in short it boiled down to God was redundant.

That is a different issue than the OP, but you can indeed say that morality comes from God's will, and it is arbitrary in this sense. Whatever he commands, even if it is genocide is good simply by the virtue of being said by god.

[JetLeg]

Your problem is that you are starting with "god is good"... which really should be a conclusion. You start from your conclusion and work back to interpret the evidence to support it. You can do that if you like, but it's not good thinking.

I mean, I could equally say "I believe that Charles Manson is innocent. So therefore all the evidence against him, including his own confession, must be wrong; mistakes by the witnesses, misinterpretation, incorrect lab results, whatever - it's irrelevant why, they just must be wrong if he's innocent."

Can you do that? Sure. But does it make any sense? No.

But we do it sometimes in our daily life - come to a conclusion, and then judge evidence, knowing that the conclusion we came to is a good one.

For example, we come to the conclusion that gravity exists (or at least that things fall down). So, if someone would tell us that he flies, we would conclude that he is lying because it contradicts our knowledge.

[Foster Zygote]

That is a different issue than the OP, but you can indeed say that morality comes from God's will, and it is arbitrary in this sense. Whatever he commands, even if it is genocide is good simply by the virtue of being said by god.

The "but we were only following orders" defense.

[JetLeg]

These are divine, not human orders

[DangerousBeliefs]

These are divine, not human orders

Today... people who hear voices that tell them to kill are locked up.

Here's an exercise for you... if you started hearing a voice in your head that said it was God and it wanted you to kill all the first born children, would you obey it?

[Cello Man]

Whatever he commands, even if it is genocide is good simply by the virtue of being said by god.

I think that sentiment tops the list of the most terrifying words ever spoken. You're talking about happily going along with orders to kill people, given to you by a being that has not been proven to exist.

Seek professional help. No, I'm not kidding...I wish I was.

[Bri]

Leaving aside the issue, of god's existance, if I have a belief that god is good, but in the bible, he commanded immoral things, is it rational to conclude that these acts are actually moral, (because of my belief that he is good), or that even though they are immoral, they should be done (because we are obliged to our creator)?

Let's assume as a premise that God exists and is good. If God were also all-knowing, he might not be subject to the same morality that we are since he can forsee all consequences of his actions. However, WE are still subject to morality, and therefore God could not ask us to do something immoral without our knowing for absolute certain that he exists. Therefore, unless you are claiming to have absolute and direct proof of God's existence, God could not command you to do anything immoral.

That said, the Bible contains passages where God commands individuals to do things that we would consider immoral. Christians justify this in many ways, including: (1) the person who was commanded had absolute and direct proof of God's existence and therefore knows that the act is moral, or (2) that although the act would be considered immoral in most modern circumstances it was not actually immoral in the specific context of the situation described in the Bible.

Before I become the target of ad-hom attacks, let me state for the record that I'm not defending the above justifications -- I am only pointing out that Christians can and do defend them (I'm not a Christian).

-Bri

[Bri]

I don't see how god can take the moral high ground when he says it is a sin for us to kill each other, but it's ok for him to kill us or to have us kill each other at his command.

Most Biblical scholars would agree that the commandment is to refrain from murder, and not to refrain from killing altogether. There are many instances where killing is justified (punishment for a crime and self-defense are two examples).

By some definitions, yes, these acts are by definition moral because they are god's will.

Of course, such a definition undercuts everything else we ever use "morality" or "goodness" for, so morality and goodness immediately cease being reasonable expectations or guidelins for our behavior. No need to "do good works", because true morality is arbitrarily decided by a god with a track record of capricious behavior.

So you can have one of the two, but not both--either a morality determined by god's will, or a morality we can use to guide our interactions with our fellow humans. I personally prefer the latter.

If God is all-knowing, then he knows all consequences of his actions, and therefore his rules of morality would necessarily be different from ours. Specifically, he would be compelled to do things for the greater good that we might consider to be immoral given that we can predict only the relatively short-term consequences of our actions.

-Bri

[Bri]

But we do it sometimes in our daily life - come to a conclusion, and then judge evidence, knowing that the conclusion we came to is a good one.

For example, we come to the conclusion that gravity exists (or at least that things fall down). So, if someone would tell us that he flies, we would conclude that he is lying because it contradicts our knowledge.

There is actual, physical evidence of gravity. There is no similar evidence of God's existence. (If God is all-powerful, then he must have a reason for not wanting us to know for certain of his existence -- otherwise he could certainly ensure that we would know of his existence). However, the fact that we don't know for certain of his existence precludes us from assuming his existence as a basis of morality.

-Bri

[KingMerv00]

These are divine, not human orders

How is that different?

[JoeEllison]

These are divine, not human orders

That's not a claim you can logically make. All those orders come from people.

[JetLeg]

How is that different?

First, a god is divine, so there must be something good about his orders.

Second, if he is omnibenevolent, then in the end, the results are good somehow.

[Bri]

JetLeg, are you referring to someone who receives an order from God today, or are you referring to passages in the Bible? It can be argued that according to the Bible, various people had direct knowledge of God's existence. That can be used to justify God requesting of them what would seem to be immoral behavior.

But if God exists, then for whatever reason he doesn't tend to make it known for a fact today. The fact is that we don't know for a fact that God exists. Specifically, if God were to talk to only you and nobody else heard it, it is more likely that you're insane than that God is really speaking to you. Therefore, I doubt your argument can be used to justify immoral behavior nowadays since it is based on your premises (that God exists, that God is omnibenevolent, that you know fact that God is speaking to you, etc.) which are actually unknown.

-Bri

[JoeEllison]

First, a god is divine, so there must be something good about his orders.

Second, if he is omnibenevolent, then in the end, the results are good somehow.

Since there's no evidence of a god, everything you are claiming about that god is invented by people. Plus, of course, you're so illogical it makes my head spin.

[JetLeg]

Why should religion provide evidence for its claims? As long as there are no contradictions, religion is "an alternative point of view on reality", a personal viewpoint. Eliminating contradictions is the important part.

[uruk]

These are divine, not human orders
Do as I say. not as I do.

So where does the "in his image" thing come in?

JetLeg
First, a god is divine, so there must be something good about his orders. To the holy all things are holy

Second, if he is omnibenevolent, then in the end, the results are good somehow. The ends justifies the means.

So it comes down to "god can do whatever he want because he's god."

Why are we forced hold ourselves to a higher level of standards of behavior than god holds to himself?

[jond]

Why should religion provide evidence for its claims? As long as there are no contradictions, religion is "an alternative point of view on reality", a personal viewpoint. Eliminating contradictions is the important part.

Because in order to say something is true, you must provide evidence for those claims. And, while it might be a personal point of view to the believer, as soon as he/she/it acts on another person in the name of that point of view, they need to have evidence to support that action.

[Bri]

Why should religion provide evidence for its claims? As long as there are no contradictions, religion is "an alternative point of view on reality", a personal viewpoint. Eliminating contradictions is the important part.

Simply eliminating contradiction is not enough to justify an immoral act. I can easily eliminate contradiction by holding the "alternative point of view" that the entire universe exists only in my mind, which is a personal viewpoint (and entirely possible) without any contradiction.

So am I therefore justified in doing anything I want to you because there is no real consequence to my action (after all, you are only a figment of my imagination)? Or would you prefer that I prove that you're not real before doing something immoral to you?

-Bri

[Mashuna]

First, a god is divine, so there must be something good about his orders.

Second, if he is omnibenevolent, then in the end, the results are good somehow.

So you were only obeying orders, and the end justifies the means?

[Bri]

Why are we forced hold ourselves to a higher level of standards of behavior than god holds to himself?

That's not entirely a valid argument. Morality would involve refraining from performing actions that might foreseeably result in harm to others. If you were all-knowing, that would inevitably compel you to behave according to a different (not higher or lower) standard of behavior than those who are not all-knowing since ALL consequences of your action would be forseeable (in other words, you would understand the full implications of every action). Therefore, you would not only have to act differently, but in some cases in ways that would seem to be immoral to those who are not all-knowing.

Still, your point holds that it would be immoral for us to act in a way that would forseeably harm others, even if we thought that we were being directed by God to do so.

-Bri

[Foster Zygote]

First, a god is divine, so there must be something good about his orders.
Really? You can't imagine a god of evil? Many pantheons include gods who's intent is to do evil.

Second, if he is omnibenevolent, then in the end, the results are good somehow.
What good should we be looking for in Biblical descriptions of the complete slaughter of whole kingdoms? The Bible makes the claim that the populations of several kingdoms were utterly destroyed in the name of God. It clearly makes the claim that no one was left alive. Can you picture a soldier slashing open a young mother with his sword, then doing the same to her four year old daughter and finally taking an infant boy from the dead mother's arms and smashing him against the ground? Are you really so keen to avoid doubt about the "omni-benevolence" of the described god that you would rather justify such actions than question the veracity of these religious claims about the nature of God?

[Ichneumonwasp]

That's not entirely a valid argument. Morality would involve refraining from performing actions that might foreseeably result in harm to others. If you were all-knowing, that would inevitably compel you to behave according to a different (not higher or lower) standard of behavior than those who are not all-knowing since ALL consequences of your action would be forseeable (in other words, you would understand the full implications of every action). Therefore, you would not only have to act differently, but in some cases in ways that would seem to be immoral to those who are not all-knowing.

Still, your point holds that it would be immoral for us to act in a way that would forseeably harm others, even if we thought that we were being directed by God to do so.

-Bri


Do you envision that this oculd explain the problem of natural evil? I still have a hard time understanding how a child dying of overwhelming parasitic infestation could be considered good or relate to some other master plan.

[Bri]

Ichneumonwasp,

Yes, the "greater good" argument (usually in combination with the possibility of free will) can be used to explain the so-called Problem of Evil. There are other explanations as well. The Problem of Evil is fairly well-known, and a good article on the topic can be found here (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/).

-Bri

[JoeEllison]

Why should religion provide evidence for its claims? As long as there are no contradictions, religion is "an alternative point of view on reality", a personal viewpoint. Eliminating contradictions is the important part.
So you're saying it is an imaginary fantasy, adding absolutely nothing to our knowledge. Why are you wasting everyone's time with your make-believe games?

[Ichneumonwasp]

Ichneumonwasp,

Yes, the "greater good" argument (usually in combination with the possibility of free will) can be used to explain the so-called Problem of Evil. There are other explanations as well. The Problem of Evil is fairly well-known, and a good article on the topic can be found here (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/).

-Bri

Know the arguments. Don't buy them. Do you think they adequately address the problem of natural evil?

It seems to me that the most popular approach lately is to invoke the "greater good" argument. I have two problems with it. One is this: God is a utilitarian? If God were going to have a moral structure don't you think deontology would be more "perfect"? I really have a hard time believing that God, if he exists, would be a consequentialist.

The second issue is this: the whole line of argument seems to remove evidence from the equation. Absolutely anything could occur and we would have to argue, "Well, God must have a reason because he is all-good; we just can see all the details." The argument is not logically necessary, but it is unfalsifiable. I don't see any particular reason why anyone should ever accept it.


ETA

Holy **** I just realized that the whole basis of Christianity is Utilitarian. The suffering of one for the good of the many. Hmmmmm, maybe God is a Utilitarian.

[slingblade]

Why should religion provide evidence for its claims?

Example A. Proof that you are not even remotely acquainted with logic, reason, or critical thought.


As long as there are no contradictions, religion is "an alternative point of view on reality", a personal viewpoint. Eliminating contradictions is the important part.

There are contradictions. Myriad contradictions. Which see: The Skeptic's Annotated Bible. (http://skepticsannotatedbible.com/contra/by_name.html)

Please note: that was me, providing evidence for my claim. You know you were going to ask me for it. What you don't know is the irony inherent in that.

[uruk]

That's not entirely a valid argument. Morality would involve refraining from performing actions that might foreseeably result in harm to others. If you were all-knowing, that would inevitably compel you to behave according to a different (not higher or lower) standard of behavior than those who are not all-knowing since ALL consequences of your action would be forseeable (in other words, you would understand the full implications of every action). Therefore, you would not only have to act differently, but in some cases in ways that would seem to be immoral to those who are not all-knowing.

Still, your point holds that it would be immoral for us to act in a way that would forseeably harm others, even if we thought that we were being directed by God to do so.

-Bri

That still runs into the problem of "the ends justifying the means".
The idea that god causing unconcievable death and suffering for some larger plan that we cannot fathom that ends with a "greater good" result does not sit right with me.
We hold to ourselves that the committing bad and immoral acts are not justified even if the result is something good. How "good" can that good be if horrible things were performed to achieve that good?

If the morals that god hands down to us are absolute and immutable then under no condition or context do those immoral acts become moral acts later on.
If god says murder is immoral under what conditions does it become moral?
When god does it for the greater good? Does the greater good justify the immoral act of murder?

[Bri]

Know the arguments. Don't buy them. Do you think they adequately address the problem of natural evil?

I don't know. Depends what you consider "adequately." I think that it is possible that one or more is true, just as it's possible that God exists. That said, there is little evidence that God exists.

It seems to me that the most popular approach lately is to invoke the "greater good" argument. I have two problems with it. One is this: God is a utilitarian? If God were going to have a moral structure don't you think deontology would be more "perfect"? I really have a hard time believing that God, if he exists, would be a consequentialist.

You're using several terms with which I am unfamiliar. Care to "dumb it down" a little bit for me?

The second issue is this: the whole line of argument seems to remove evidence from the equation. Absolutely anything could occur and we would have to argue, "Well, God must have a reason because he is all-good; we just can see all the details." The argument is not logically necessary, but it is unfalsifiable. I don't see any particular reason why anyone should ever accept it.

Well, here I tend to disagree. True, there is little evidence that God exists, but if God exists I don't find it that unlikely that evil would exist also, assuming that there are greater goods. For example, if it is a greater good for us to have the free will to choose good over evil, then it makes logical sense that evil must exist in order for the greater good to exist.

That still runs into the problem of "the ends justifying the means".
The idea that god causing unconcievable death and suffering for some larger plan that we cannot fathom that ends with a "greater good" result does not sit right with me.
We hold to ourselves that the committing bad and immoral acts are not justified even if the result is something good. How "good" can that good be if horrible things were performed to achieve that good?

It's true that if we cannot fathom the ends (as is usually the case since we aren't all-knowing) then the ends cannot justify the means. God, on the other hand, knows exactly what the ends will be, and therefore the same cannot necessarily be said for him.

That said, we do things all the time that would be considered evil if in another context, but we allow them when we feel that they are for the greater good. For example, governments often take over land that is owned by an individual if it is for the greater good. Another example is the death penalty.

In God's case, one argument is that our having free will is a greater good than a world without evil.

If the morals that god hands down to us are absolute and immutable then under no condition or context do those immoral acts become moral acts later on.

Few acts are immutably immoral under all conditions and contexts.

If god says murder is immoral under what conditions does it become moral?

You're using the loaded term "murder" instead of "killing" here. Since "murder" is defined as unjustified (immoral) killing, then under no circumstance is murder moral. However, there are many circumstances where killing is not considered murder, and is justified.

When god does it for the greater good? Does the greater good justify the immoral act of murder?

Yes, it would. Self defense, punishment, and war are all justified reasons for killing, and are considered moral if they serve the greater good.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

...
I don't know. Depends what you consider "adequately." I think that it is possible that one or more is true, just as it's possible that God exists. That said, there is little evidence that God exists.
-Bri
...


God is such an abstract concept. What would you consider evidence that God \ god exists?

[Bri]

JetLeg,

What evidence have you got?

-Bri

[JetLeg]

Because in order to say something is true, you must provide evidence for those claims. And, while it might be a personal point of view to the believer, as soon as he/she/it acts on another person in the name of that point of view, they need to have evidence to support that action.

Ok, I want to understand with what exactly you do not agree -

Each person has a right to his own point of view
Points of view with regard to existance of gods and their qualities are subjective, a matter of faith
So each person can posit any number and qualities of gods that he wants to, and only check to rule out contradictions

[JetLeg]

JetLeg,

What evidence have you got?

-Bri

I don't have any evidence at all. But it makes no sense to ask for evidence for an immaterial god. Therefore one can posit any number and qualities of immaterial G\god\s that he wants to.

[jimlintott]

Ok, I want to understand with what exactly you do not agree -

Each person has a right to his own point of view
Points of view with regard to existance of gods and their qualities are subjective, a matter of faith
So each person can posit any number and qualities of gods that he wants to, and only check to rule out contradictions

Your right to your point of view ends when it has a negative impact on my state of being.

For proof of god(s) I will require evidence that is physical not philosophical in nature. If the only place you can prove the existence of god(s) is in your mind you have to realize that is the only place they exist.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Care to "dumb it down" a little bit for me?

Sure, sorry about that. I assume you know utilitarianism -- the greatest good for the greatest number (sometimes with pleasure thrown in for good, depending on which thinker you're talking about), which is based on outcomes or consequences (hence consequentialist). In other words, the "greater good" arguments all have God looking out for the outcomes rather than caring about what is truly "good". Deontology is concerned with duty and right action, the most famous example being Kant's "categorical imperative" or his later formulation of the "ends principle" (always treat others as though they are an end rather than a means to an end).

It seems strange to say of God that he does not work from an ends principle but that he really only cares about consequences.

But I later realized that is what Christianity is ultimately based upon -- the sacrifice of one for the many.

Well, here I tend to disagree. True, there is little evidence that God exists, but if God exists I don't find it that unlikely that evil would exist also, assuming that there are greater goods. For example, if it is a greater good for us to have the free will to choose good over evil, then it makes logical sense that evil must exist in order for the greater good to exist.

While I think that works well for human evil I am having a hard time fitting that into a structure that explains natural evil. You can try and invoke the Garden of Eden story as people using free will to introduce evil into the world through their action (or frame it as van Inwagen's fanciful restatement of the same thing but within an evolutionary backdrop), but that story just seems silly and it ignores a mound of evidence. Lions had canines long before humans walked this earth and parasites existed long before as well. Human free will is not responsible for earthquakes and tsetse flies.

The only solution that I think treats evil seriously and makes logical sense is if evil is a force in the world and the devil is real. It's a completely wacky idea, but I don't see another good solution for the problem of natural evil.

[Bri]

I don't have any evidence at all. But it makes no sense to ask for evidence for an immaterial god. Therefore one can posit any number and qualities of immaterial G\god\s that he wants to.

I simply said that there is no evidence for God, and you don't seem to dispute that.

Nonetheless, why would it make no sense to ask for evidence of an immaterial God? Can't an immaterial God interact with the world, and thereby provide evidence of his existence?

Sure, one can posit as many immaterial gods as one likes. Yet there is little evidence for any god.

Just because God could exist doesn't mean God does exist. The same can be said about leprechauns.

-Bri

[jond]

Ok, I want to understand with what exactly you do not agree -

Each person has a right to his own point of view
Points of view with regard to existance of gods and their qualities are subjective, a matter of faith
So each person can posit any number and qualities of gods that he wants to, and only check to rule out contradictions

You are welcome to believe anything you want. Just keep it to yourself. Don't preach to me the about the absolute divinity of GOD X, Y or Z if you don't have evidence to back it up. Don't fly planes into buildings just because your imaginary friend says to do so. How hard is that to understand? We only get one shot at this life, don't screw mine up because you think you've got another one coming to you.

As for the contradictions, slingblade covered that a couple posts back.

[Mashuna]

I don't have any evidence at all. But it makes no sense to ask for evidence for an immaterial god. Therefore one can posit any number and qualities of immaterial G\god\s that he wants to.

Of course, as long as you realise that it's just making up stories. Your immaterial, non-evidential God can be whatever you want. It just isn't real.

[Bri]

Sure, sorry about that. I assume you know utilitarianism -- the greatest good for the greatest number (sometimes with pleasure thrown in for good, depending on which thinker you're talking about), which is based on outcomes or consequences (hence consequentialist). In other words, the "greater good" arguments all have God looking out for the outcomes rather than caring about what is truly "good". Deontology is concerned with duty and right action, the most famous example being Kant's "categorical imperative" or his later formulation of the "ends principle" (always treat others as though they are an end rather than a means to an end).

It seems strange to say of God that he does not work from an ends principle but that he really only cares about consequences.

But I later realized that is what Christianity is ultimately based upon -- the sacrifice of one for the many.

The argument that evil may exist because having free will to choose to do good over evil is better than not having evil at all doesn't seem to apply to your description of consequentialism. Specifically, it doesn't seem to have anything to do with the sacrifice of the one for the many.

While I think that works well for human evil I am having a hard time fitting that into a structure that explains natural evil. You can try and invoke the Garden of Eden story as people using free will to introduce evil into the world through their action (or frame it as van Inwagen's fanciful restatement of the same thing but within an evolutionary backdrop), but that story just seems silly and it ignores a mound of evidence. Lions had canines long before humans walked this earth and parasites existed long before as well. Human free will is not responsible for earthquakes and tsetse flies.

I imagine that if there was no such thing as "natural evil" (I assume you're referring to natural disasters and the like) the temptation might be to shut yourself off from other people. Perhaps having the opportunity to help other people in the face of natural disasters is a greater good than having no natural disasters.

The only solution that I think treats evil seriously and makes logical sense is if evil is a force in the world and the devil is real. It's a completely wacky idea, but I don't see another good solution for the problem of natural evil.

I don't know if this is true, but a lot of people do believe in the devil. Of course, there is as little evidence for the devil as there is for God. However, I don't see how it's necessary to believe in the devil in order to believe in God.

-Bri

[Bri]

As for the contradictions, slingblade covered that a couple posts back.

I'm sorry, but the Skeptic's Annotated Bible does not prove contradictions given the vast array of interpretations (both literal and non-literal) that can be applied to the Bible. Google any contradiction from the Skeptics Annotated Bible and you'll find plenty of explanations and justifications.

That is not to say that there is a shred of evidence that the Bible is the inerrant word of God, or even that God exists. It is simply to say that proving contradiction in the Bible is a lot more difficult than some people want to think.

-Bri

[Ichneumonwasp]

The argument that evil may exist because having free will to choose to do good over evil is better than not having evil at all doesn't seem to apply to your description of consequentialism. Specifically, it doesn't seem to have anything to do with the sacrifice of the one for the many.

No, no, I think you misunderstand me. The point I was making is that God is a consequentialist in this scheme. We supposedly cannot tell what is really going on because God works on a much larger scale, so we are not able to judge his actions since we can't see the big picture. But his actions are determined by the greatest good for the greatest number, not because of any inherent good in the action itself. Doesn't that srike you as odd?


I imagine that if there was no such thing as "natural evil" (I assume you're referring to natural disasters and the like) the temptation might be to shut yourself off from other people. Perhaps having the opportunity to help other people in the face of natural disasters is a greater good than having no natural disasters.

But I don't think such answers take the issue seriously enough. I know the argument from "soul building", but there seem to be such natural evils in the world that can't be explained from this paradigm. Give people an opportunity to shine -- well why is that really necessary?

Let's take the example of a single forlorn starving child that no one knows about. She sits in an unobserved corner of Darfur riddled with parasites, wracked with pain, and she dies.

The all-powerful and all-ggod God allows this to occur so that theoretically someone could look good saving her even though he knows that no one will or even can because they don't even know about her?



I

[uruk]

It's true that if we cannot fathom the ends (as is usually the case since we aren't all-knowing) then the ends cannot justify the means. God, on the other hand, knows exactly what the ends will be, and therefore the same cannot necessarily be said for him. The point was not what the ends are, the point was acts to get to those ends. It does not matter what the ends are just if comitting immoral acts were justified in achieving those ends.
By our standards no ends justify an immoral act to achieve those ends. A good end does not make the immoral act moral. Just that an immoral act was commited to achieve a good end.

That said, we do things all the time that would be considered evil if in another context, but we allow them when we feel that they are for the greater good. For example, governments often take over land that is owned by an individual if it is for the greater good. Another example is the death penalty. A government can take over someone's land if it is considered for the greater good, but does that make the act moral or justified? I don't think the person who had his land taken away would consider that a "good" act. It may have been a neccessary act when taken in a larger context but it is still an act of theft, just a "legal" theft.

In God's case, one argument is that our having free will is a greater good than a world without evil. But that does make evil good. Evil is still evil.
So having evil around is a consequence of having free will.
Free will is good. And whatever it takes (Having evil around) to get free will is justified. Therefore (having) evil (around) is justified.
But isn't evil mutualy exclusive of good?



Few acts are immutably immoral under all conditions and contexts. In actuality was is moral and immoral depends on society.
But some argue that god's laws are immutable. whatever god says goes no matter what.



You're using the loaded term "murder" instead of "killing" here. Since "murder" is defined as unjustified (immoral) killing, then under no circumstance is murder moral. However, there are many circumstances where killing is not considered murder, and is justified. Which means there is a difference between murder and killing. So if god murders does that mean the murder becomes moral because god is committing the murder?


Yes, it would. Self defense, punishment, and war are all justified reasons for killing, and are considered moral if they serve the greater good.


-Bri
So if god kills in self defence the killing will be moral and justified. Who does god need self defence from?
So if god kills for punishment the killing is moral and justified. So what transgression does god consider worthy of the punishment of death?
So if god kills in a war the killing is justified. who does god war with? and who is getting killed?

[fagin]

Do you envision that this oculd explain the problem of natural evil? I still have a hard time understanding how a child dying of overwhelming parasitic infestation could be considered good or relate to some other master plan.

Nature is neither good nor evil. Organisms fight to survive. Without consciousness of self, there can be no morality.

[Bri]

But his actions are determined by the greatest good for the greatest number, not because of any inherent good in the action itself. Doesn't that srike you as odd?

The situation I described would not be a matter of God determining the greatest good for the greatest number, but rather God determining that our having free will to choose good over evil is more important than not having evil. His actions could very well be towards that (or any other) end that in fact ARE inherently good even if you don't accept the argument that God might be a consequentialist.

But I don't think such answers take the issue seriously enough. I know the argument from "soul building", but there seem to be such natural evils in the world that can't be explained from this paradigm. Give people an opportunity to shine -- well why is that really necessary?

Because perhaps it is a greater good for people to help each other than to shut themselves off from the world. If the only opportunity for evil to befall you would be from other people, you would likely feel compelled to stay away from other people. Also, it is unclear that the conditions necessary for true freedom of choice to help others is presented only by the evil of human beings.

Let's take the example of a single forlorn starving child that no one knows about. She sits in an unobserved corner of Darfur riddled with parasites, wracked with pain, and she dies.

The all-powerful and all-ggod God allows this to occur so that theoretically someone could look good saving her even though he knows that no one will or even can because they don't even know about her?

Her suffering is likely the result of someone choosing to do evil , or at least choosing not to do good. Given that there is enough food and medicine in the world to alleviate the sort of suffering you describe, the fact that she suffers is largely the result of human choice in the form of complacency. So perhaps human beings having the choice to help their fellow human beings is a greater good than human beings having no free will but never suffering.

-Bri

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't know if this is true, but a lot of people do believe in the devil. Of course, there is as little evidence for the devil as there is for God. However, I don't see how it's necessary to believe in the devil in order to believe in God.

-Bri

Sorry, had to leave before I could get to this point.

It isn't necessary to believe in the devil in order to believe in God, but it may be necessary if you want to hang onto a particular conception of God. If God has all the omni attributes that are commonly ascribed and since we have natural evils in the world and since the free will theodicies don't seem to work to explain natural evils (unless you want to accept the Adam and Eve story literally) the best explanation for that type of God with all the evil seems to be the existence of a dark side.

[uruk]

Her suffering is likely the result of someone choosing to do evil , or at least choosing not to do good. Given that there is enough food and medicine in the world to alleviate the sort of suffering you describe, the fact that she suffers is largely the result of human choice in the form of complacency. So perhaps human beings having the choice to help their fellow human beings is a greater good than human beings having no free will but never suffering.

-Bri

How about we change that to an incurable genetic desease. Something that is not caused by man and is incurable by man. like severe Down's syndrome or spina biffida.


So suffering is good because it causes us to help our fellow man. Tell that to the one who's suffering.

[Ichneumonwasp]

The situation I described would not be a matter of God determining the greatest good for the greatest number, but rather God determining that our having free will to choose good over evil is more important than not having evil. His actions could very well be towards that (or any other) end that in fact ARE inherently good even if you don't accept the argument that God might be a consequentialist.

But that is not what the "greater good" solution to the problem concerns. What you are stating here is the typical free will theodicy and that works fine for human evil.

The issue before us, though, is that there are evils that occur in the world that are not the result of human action. If God allows those evils to occur because there may be a "greater good" at play implies that God works in a consequentialist paradigm. He is acting for the "greater good" and allowing those other evils to occur for the greater good.


Because perhaps it is a greater good for people to help each other than to shut themselves off from the world. If the only opportunity for evil to befall you would be from other people, you would likely feel compelled to stay away from other people. Also, it is unclear that the conditions necessary for true freedom of choice to help others is presented only by the evil of human beings.

That can only work in a general sense. That is why I chose the situation that I did. If there are evils that could not have any impact on anyone's decision making then they are true evil. Such evils exist in the world. My screen name is an example. Suffering, great suffering occurs among beings that we do not even see on a regular basis.

Her suffering is likely the result of someone choosing to do evil , or at least choosing not to do good. Given that there is enough food and medicine in the world to alleviate the sort of suffering you describe, the fact that she suffers is largely the result of human choice in the form of complacency. So perhaps human beings having the choice to help their fellow human beings is a greater good than human beings having no free will but never suffering.

-Bri

But, no, not in this example. Of course there is the issue of human complacency, but she is dying completely alone with no witness, no possiblity of intervention from other humans. Yet she still dies. God does not intervene even when no human could possibly.

The argument you propose works in a general sense but the problem I have with it is that it does not work in certain situations. It is those situations that bother me.

Just like with the issue over 'soul building'. We can view evils as soul builders, but there is suffering that cannot possibly build anyone's soul. Like a baby born anencephalic. Or a guy who makes a mistake and has no chance to change his ways because he dies immediately afterwards. What about such situations?

The 'soul builder' argument essentially has God playing the Deist role -- he sets up the conditions for soul building but never intevenes even if no soul building could proceed in a particular instance. How does that fit with an omni-whatever God?

Sorry for the derail, Jetlag, but I really do intend to bring this back to the original point.

[slingblade]

Ok, I want to understand with what exactly you do not agree -

Each person has a right to his own point of view

In that spirit, each person has a right to be wrong.

Points of view with regard to existance of gods and their qualities are subjective, a matter of faith
So each person can posit any number and qualities of gods that he wants to, and only check to rule out contradictions

There's this really good book you should check out, especially the chapter on pink invisible dragons in one's garage....

[GeeMack]

I think that it is possible that one or more is true, just as it's possible that God exists. That said, there is little evidence that God exists.

[...]

True, there is little evidence that God exists [...]


Seems you're claiming that evidence of God exists, Bri. Yes, you qualified your statement by specifying that "little" evidence exists. But you made the claim nonetheless. Then JetLeg asked...

God is such an abstract concept. What would you consider evidence that God \ god exists?


To which you replied...

JetLeg,

What evidence have you got?


JetLeg's question was fair, but you didn't provide an answer. And I'm curious to know, also. If you have a notion that evidence of God exists, please enlighten us as to exactly what that evidence might be.

Of course, there is as little evidence for the devil as there is for God.


Maybe you have evidence, although little of it, that the devil exists, too? Or are you perhaps using the terminology, "little evidence exists," where you actually mean you aren't aware of any evidence at all existing.

[bokonon]

Let's assume as a premise that God exists and is good. If God were also all-knowing, he might not be subject to the same morality that we are since he can forsee all consequences of his actions. However, WE are still subject to morality, and therefore God could not ask us to do something immoral without our knowing for absolute certain that he exists. Therefore, unless you are claiming to have absolute and direct proof of God's existence, God could not command you to do anything immoral.

That said, the Bible contains passages where God commands individuals to do things that we would consider immoral. Christians justify this in many ways, including: (1) the person who was commanded had absolute and direct proof of God's existence and therefore knows that the act is moral, or (2) that although the act would be considered immoral in most modern circumstances it was not actually immoral in the specific context of the situation described in the Bible.
I don't think absolute and direct proof of God's existence is sufficient. Take the story of Abraham and Isaac (Ishmael for our Muslim friends). Even if you accept that Abraham had absolute and direct proof of God's existence, he still doesn't have absolute and direct proof of God's goodness. Indeed, when God orders Abraham to murder his son, that seems to me a compelling argument that God is not good. No "higher purpose" is offered to explain the execution, it's just a capricious because-I-said-so command.

It seems to me that Abraham's blind obedience is an immoral act, and cannot be reconciled with all the platitudes about God's gift to man of free will. The story is evidence that social control was a stronger reason than moral guidance for inventing (and perpetuating) the Abrahamic religions.

[Arkan_Wolfshade]

I don't have any evidence at all. But it makes no sense to ask for evidence for an immaterial god. Therefore one can posit any number and qualities of immaterial G\god\s that he wants to.
I have a dragon in my garage.


Oh, and there is a teapot orbiting the sun.

[Bri]

The point was not what the ends are, the point was acts to get to those ends.

The question is whether or not you can reasonably forsee the consequences of your actions. If you can, then taking into account all of the consequences, it is moral to make a choice based on the best outcome. For God, who could presumably see every consequence of his action, the best choice -- the moral choice -- might appear to be immoral to us who are limited to only seeing relatively immediate consequences.

By our standards no ends justify an immoral act to achieve those ends. A good end does not make the immoral act moral. Just that an immoral act was commited to achieve a good end.

You're stating things backwards. No act in and of itself is moral or immoral. It is only immoral if it is not the best action to perform under a given set of circumstances. Killing someone is immoral in most situations (where it is called "murder"), but not in certain other situations such as self-defense.

But that does make evil good. Evil is still evil.

Like I said, an act in and of itself is not good or evil. It is good or evil depending on the circumstances. Stealing is usually immoral, but probably not immoral if it saves a life.

So having evil around is a consequence of having free will.
Free will is good. And whatever it takes (Having evil around) to get free will is justified. Therefore (having) evil (around) is justified.
But isn't evil mutualy exclusive of good?

No, evil is not mutually exclusive of good. Evil and good can and do coexist. Some would say that evil is necessary for good to exist.

In actuality was is moral and immoral depends on society.
But some argue that god's laws are immutable. whatever god says goes no matter what.

Maybe some believe that God's laws are immutable. Others believe that the laws in the Bible are generalities, based on the most common forseeable circumstances of an action, but may vary depending on the actual forseeable circumstances. For example, I believe that most would agree that many laws can be broken to save a life.

Few believe that the rules that apply to us (which assume that we can't know the full consequences of our actions) also apply to God, since God is all-knowing.

Which means there is a difference between murder and killing. So if god murders does that mean the murder becomes moral because god is committing the murder?

It's a nonsensical question. Since murder is defined as immoral (unjustified) killing, then if God committed murder, it couldn't possibly be moral by definition. Now if you're asking if God kills someone and it seems like murder to us, is it necessarily murder, then the answer is no. Just because it seems like murder to us due to our inability to forsee the full consequences of the action does not mean it's murder. Specifically, the full consequences of the action may serve a greater good that we are not aware of.

So if god kills in self defence the killing will be moral and justified. Who does god need self defence from?

I didn't mean to imply that God kills in self defense? I was providing some examples where killing is justified for us humans. Presumably, there are examples where killing is justified for God as well.

So if god kills for punishment the killing is moral and justified.

Yes, presumably so.

So what transgression does god consider worthy of the punishment of death?

I wouldn't know since I'm not all-knowing, but I imagine that if the consequences lead to a greater good, God might be justified.

So if god kills in a war the killing is justified. who does god war with? and who is getting killed?

Again, I wasn't meaning to imply that God wars with anyone -- it was just an example of a justified killing that would not be considered "murder."

-Bri

[Bri]

Sorry, had to leave before I could get to this point.

It isn't necessary to believe in the devil in order to believe in God, but it may be necessary if you want to hang onto a particular conception of God. If God has all the omni attributes that are commonly ascribed and since we have natural evils in the world and since the free will theodicies don't seem to work to explain natural evils (unless you want to accept the Adam and Eve story literally) the best explanation for that type of God with all the evil seems to be the existence of a dark side.

I disagree with the part of your statement in bold, which I've addressed in a previous post. I don't think you can say for certain that natural evil is not necessary for us to have free choice between good and evil, nor that there are no other possible reasons why natural disasters would be necessary for the greater good.

-Bri

[Bri]

How about we change that to an incurable genetic desease. Something that is not caused by man and is incurable by man. like severe Down's syndrome or spina biffida.

We can and do search for cures for Down's syndrome and spina biffida. We also ease the suffering of those afflicted.


So suffering is good because it causes us to help our fellow man.

That is one possible explanation.

Tell that to the one who's suffering.

Again, we're talking about the greater good, not the individual person. It is possible that suffering is necessary for the greater good.

-Bri

[Bri]

The issue before us, though, is that there are evils that occur in the world that are not the result of human action. If God allows those evils to occur because there may be a "greater good" at play implies that God works in a consequentialist paradigm. He is acting for the "greater good" and allowing those other evils to occur for the greater good.

Some theists may very well define God to be consequentialist. That said, perhaps it is for a greater good that people cannot simply hide from other people to be free from evil. That would not be consequentialist. There may be other un-consequentialist reasons for natural disasters as well.

But, no, not in this example. Of course there is the issue of human complacency, but she is dying completely alone with no witness, no possiblity of intervention from other humans. Yet she still dies. God does not intervene even when no human could possibly.

My point here was not about intervention after-the-fact -- it's about prevention. At some point some human being might have prevented her suffering but chose not to. Do you have evidence of an actual example of someone suffering but nobody could possibly have prevented it?

Just like with the issue over 'soul building'. We can view evils as soul builders, but there is suffering that cannot possibly build anyone's soul. Like a baby born anencephalic. Or a guy who makes a mistake and has no chance to change his ways because he dies immediately afterwards. What about such situations?

Soul building is only one possible "greater good" that might result, but both of your examples include such opportunities. The first one for the care taking of the baby, and perhaps for research to prevent anencephaly. The second perhaps might serve as an example to others to not make the same mistake.

But like you, I don't personally find the notion of soul building to be very compelling (others might though). I think it must go beyond simply providing opportunities to make moral choices as the term "soul building" implies. If there was no suffering other than suffering caused by people then everyone must be provided with everything they need -- there would be no competition for resources, there would be no fear of things beyond our control, there would be no incentive to do wrong. Perhaps it is a greater good for us to be able to resist the temptation to do wrong in order to do what is right. That would imply having an incentive to do wrong (otherwise, it's easy to do what is right).

The 'soul builder' argument essentially has God playing the Deist role -- he sets up the conditions for soul building but never intevenes even if no soul building could proceed in a particular instance. How does that fit with an omni-whatever God?

How do you know God never intervenes? Without knowing every consequence of every event, there is no way for us to know whether it lead to a greater good or not, soul-building or otherwise.

Ichneumonwasp, although I believe I understand where you're coming from, I don't think these possibilities can be eliminated and therefore I don't think the existence of an "omni-whatever" God can be disproved. At least, I'm fairly certain that the arguments you're presenting aren't entirely novel and I don't believe the existence of God has been disproved yet.

-Bri

[Bri]

Seems you're claiming that evidence of God exists, Bri. Yes, you qualified your statement by specifying that "little" evidence exists.

...

JetLeg's question was fair, but you didn't provide an answer. And I'm curious to know, also. If you have a notion that evidence of God exists, please enlighten us as to exactly what that evidence might be.

Perhaps you missed the OP of this thread. JetLeg believes that God exists. Therefore, by qualifying with "little" I was giving him and other theists the benefit of the doubt. I would assume that there may be evidence of the existence of God of which I am unaware (which I might or might not find compelling), which is why I asked JetLeg if he knew of any.

Or are you perhaps using the terminology, "little evidence exists," where you actually mean you aren't aware of any evidence at all existing.

Yes, that's exactly how I'm using it. I don't know of any evidence, but that doesn't mean there isn't any.

-Bri

[Bri]

I don't think absolute and direct proof of God's existence is sufficient. Take the story of Abraham and Isaac (Ishmael for our Muslim friends). Even if you accept that Abraham had absolute and direct proof of God's existence, he still doesn't have absolute and direct proof of God's goodness. Indeed, when God orders Abraham to murder his son, that seems to me a compelling argument that God is not good. No "higher purpose" is offered to explain the execution, it's just a capricious because-I-said-so command.

Yes, you're right. I think we are to assume in the story told by the Bible that Abraham has direct knowledge of God's existence and goodness. That is not to say that the Bible is therefore true or is written by God -- I am only saying that it is not necessarily internally inconsistent in that regard.

It seems to me that Abraham's blind obedience is an immoral act, and cannot be reconciled with all the platitudes about God's gift to man of free will. The story is evidence that social control was a stronger reason than moral guidance for inventing (and perpetuating) the Abrahamic religions.

I disagree. As told in the Bible, Abraham has direct knowledge of God, and he might therefore reasonably assume that the action God is requesting of him is for the greater good.

Of course, I don't think any human being in our world has direct knowledge of God or even if God exists, nor can anyone possibly know for a fact whether an act is for the greater good, and therefore we must act for the more immediate forseeable good.

-Bri

[uruk]

The question is whether or not you can reasonably forsee the consequences of your actions. If you can, then taking into account all of the consequences, it is moral to make a choice based on the best outcome. For God, who could presumably see every consequence of his action, the best choice -- the moral choice -- might appear to be immoral to us who are limited to only seeing relatively immediate consequences.
Then where does the idea that "the ends do not justify the means" come from? It does not matter what the ends are or what the outcome is. A benevolent end does not justify immoral acts to that end. It's not a matter of foreseeing consequences, it's the actions taken.



You're stating things backwards. No act in and of itself is moral or immoral. It is only immoral if it is not the best action to perform under a given set of circumstances. Killing someone is immoral in most situations (where it is called "murder"), but not in certain other situations such as self-defense.
But murder is always immoral by definition under any circumstances. killing in self defence is not murder by definition. It is two different definitions.
So the act of murder is always immoral by definition.

Like I said, an act in and of itself is not good or evil. It is good or evil depending on the circumstances. Stealing is usually immoral, but probably not immoral if it saves a life.
Stealing is still an immoral act by definition wether it saves a life or not. The life was saved via an immoral act. Do you see the point I am making?
The outcome was good for the life saved but the act was bad for the one whom the item was stolen from.

No, evil is not mutually exclusive of good. Evil and good can and do coexist. Some would say that evil is necessary for good to exist.
Can an act be good and evil at the same time in the same circumstance?


Silly question. Since murder is defined as immoral (unjustified) killing, then if God committed murder, it couldn't possibly be moral by definition. Now if you're asking if God kills someone and it seems like murder to us, is it necessarily murder? The question is no. Just because it seems like murder to us due to our inability to forsee the full consequences of the action does not mean it's murder. Specifically, the full consequences of the action may serve a greater good that we are not aware of. Well it different for god. God created us and is ultimately responsible for the circumstances that we are in. Don't you think it odd that god would create the circumstances where it becomes neccessary for him kill somebody? If god is by definititon all knowing and can forsee the bigger picture, you figgure he could get things done without doing things like killing his own creations. odder still is the idea that he creates someone for the sole purpose of killing personaly later on.


Did I imply that God kills for self defense? I was providing some examples where killing is justified for us humans. Presumably, there are examples where killing is justified for God as well. A justified killing is not a murder by definition.


I wouldn't know since I'm not all-knowing, but I imagine that if the consequences lead to a greater good, God might be justified.
Unless you buy the idea that the ends do not justify the means thingy


Again, I wasn't meaning to imply that God wars with anyone -- it was just an example of a justified killing that would not be considered "murder."

-Bri
I agree.

[uruk]

We can and do search for cures for Down's syndrome and spina biffida. We also ease the suffering of those afflicted.
Yea, we have correct god's mistakes.



Again, we're talking about the greater good, not the individual person. It is possible that suffering is necessary for the greater good.

-Bri

See here's the deal. You are going to suffer unimaginable pain and horror and then your going to die a slow excruciating, humiliating death. But hey, everybody else benefits.
It must suck to be that guy.

[Bri]

Then where does the idea that "the ends do not justify the means" come from?

The same place as "too many cooks spoil the broth" or "never judge a book by its cover" I would imagine. As far as I know it's a saying, not a quote from the Bible. It's a good one though, and it's almost always true given that we cannot fully predict the consequences of our actions.


But murder is always immoral by definition under any circumstances. killing in self defence is not murder by definition. It is two different definitions.
So the act of murder is always immoral by definition.

Yes, I agree. The act isn't "murder" -- the act is the taking of a human life. If it's not justified, it's called "murder." But the act of taking a human life is not immoral (i.e. murder) all by itself -- it is only murder under a given set of circumstances in which it isn't justified.

Stealing is still an immoral act by definition wether it saves a life or not. The life was saved via an immoral act. Do you see the point I am making?
The outcome was good for the life saved but the act was bad for the one whom the item was stolen from.

I disagree. To the contrary, not stealing would be immoral if stealing was the only way to save a human life. True, stealing would be "bad" for the person being stolen from, but the overall act would be moral for the person doing the stealing. I do see the point you're making, and it may only be semantics, but you have to agree that the moral choice in this case would be to steal in order to save the life and the immoral choice would be to not steal and allow someone to die.

Can an act be good and evil at the same time in the same circumstance?

According to your definition above, yes. According to mine, good and evil are probably two ends of a continuum. In other words, an act falls somewhere between "absolute good" and "absolute evil" and is considered a "moral" act if it is as far to the good side as forseeably possible given the circumstances.

Well it different for god. God created us and is ultimately responsible for the circumstances that we are in.

Not if he allows us to have free will. If we have free will, we are largely responsible for the circumstances we are in (particularly those aspects of our circumstances that were within our control).

Don't you think it odd that god would create the circumstances where it becomes neccessary for him kill somebody? If god is by definititon all knowing and can forsee the bigger picture, you figgure he could do things without doing things like killing his own creations.

I believe I understand your point. When you talk of God killing someone, you're actually talking about human death and suffering as the result of a natural disaster or a circumstance that is beyond human control (since we don't see any obvious evidence of smiting by God these days), right? Your argument is that surely God could create a world in which there is no death and no suffering that is beyond our control. But that world might very well defeat the purpose of our having free will. If there is no suffering, then there is no incentive to do wrong and it would be easy for everyone to do right. But it's possible that the greater good is achieved by our having the opportunity to exercise our free will to choose to do right in the face of temptation to do wrong.

odder still is the idea that he creates someone for the sole puorpose of killing personaly later on.

Example, please. Where did this idea come from? Presumably, if God kills someone it is for a greater purpose -- not for the sole purpose of killing them for no reason whatsoever.

A justified killing is not a murder by definition.

That was my point.

Unless you buy the idea that the ends do not justify the means thingy

For God, yes the ends may very well justify the means, given that he knows exactly what the ends will be. For human beings who cannot know beforehand exactly what the consequences of our actions will be, the ends don't always justify the means.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

I simply said that there is no evidence for God, and you don't seem to dispute that.

Nonetheless, why would it make no sense to ask for evidence of an immaterial God? Can't an immaterial God interact with the world, and thereby provide evidence of his existence?

Sure, one can posit as many immaterial gods as one likes. Yet there is little evidence for any god.

Just because God could exist doesn't mean God does exist. The same can be said about leprechauns.

-Bri

Which evidence would convince you that a god exists? (I am qurious to the others' answers as well). What exactly is the evidence you are not finding, of what nature?

[JetLeg]

Your right to your point of view ends when it has a negative impact on my state of being.

For proof of god(s) I will require evidence that is physical not philosophical in nature. If the only place you can prove the existence of god(s) is in your mind you have to realize that is the only place they exist.

Let's distinguish between a political right to a point of view and an intellectual right to a point of view. As far as I understand, you say that I have a political right to any point of view, that you don't want the government to imprison anyone for their thoughts. However, an intellectual right to a point of view is means that a certain point of view has any merit at all. If one would think that G.W. Bush is the father of Bill Clinton, he would have a political right to this point of view, but not an intellectual right - it would be just stupid.

Do you think I have an intellectual right to hold whatever opinions with regards to the supernatural that I want to?

[jond]

Let's distinguish between a political right to a point of view and an intellectual right to a point of view. As far as I understand, you say that I have a political right to any point of view, that you don't want the government to imprison anyone for their thoughts. However, an intellectual right to a point of view is means that a certain point of view has any merit at all. If one would think that G.W. Bush is the father of Bill Clinton, he would have a political right to this point of view, but not an intellectual right - it would be just stupid.

Do you think I have an intellectual right to hold whatever opinions with regards to the supernatural that I want to?

You have an "intellectual right" to believe anything you want. You have the right to be stupid. Just keep it to yourself, and don't try to make me believe in your fairy tales.

As for your analogy of GW Bush being Clinton's father: have your heard about David Icke? He writes books about how they're both (as are the British Royal Family) reptilian aliens. Now, he's got no evidence to back it up, but that doesn't stop him from writing this nonsense. The problem is that there are people who believe it. And if they start acting on those beliefs... Reality is a good thing. You should check it out sometime.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Some theists may very well define God to be consequentialist. That said, perhaps it is for a greater good that people cannot simply hide from other people to be free from evil. That would not be consequentialist. There may be other un-consequentialist reasons for natural disasters as well.

But, doesn't that strike you as odd? IF our rule is supposed to be the golden rule, and if that rule originates in God, then why is God a utilitarian? That just seems odd to me.


My point here was not about intervention after-the-fact -- it's about prevention. At some point some human being might have prevented her suffering but chose not to. Do you have evidence of an actual example of someone suffering but nobody could possibly have prevented it?

Yes, I know your point. But there are instances in which no one can intervene in human suffering. We know this because we find their bodies later. Take hikers who go off on their own, fall, break a leg and die a few days later. Autopsy shows that death was not immediate. But no intervention. Of course you can always say -- they made the trip of their own free choice. So choose any large scale pandemic - say the Black Death, where peole died in agony, where entire towns were wiped from the map. No one could intervene because no one was left when the last two people died. Such suffering is not a true exception. It is rather mundane.


Soul building is only one possible "greater good" that might result, but both of your examples include such opportunities. The first one for the care taking of the baby, and perhaps for research to prevent anencephaly. The second perhaps might serve as an example to others to not make the same mistake.

That makes no sense for the 14th century BCE. Do you honestly want to argue that the long history of human suffering serves the purpose of 21st century medical research? That's why God made it happen?

How do you know God never intervenes? Without knowing every consequence of every event, there is no way for us to know whether it lead to a greater good or not, soul-building or otherwise.

Because we find their bodies after the fact and can reconstruct what most likely occurred.

The conclusion of "there is no way for us to kow whether it lead to a greater good or not" is where I was heading and how this turns back to the OP. If we can truly not know how this fits together, then I maintain that we cannot use evidence to disprove God or any conception of God. The argument eliminates the possibility of evidence being used either for or against God. And this raises the issue of relevancy.

Ichneumonwasp, although I believe I understand where you're coming from, I don't think these possibilities can be eliminated and therefore I don't think the existence of an "omni-whatever" God can be disproved. At least, I'm fairly certain that the arguments you're presenting aren't entirely novel and I don't believe the existence of God has been disproved yet.

-Bri

I don't pretend for a second that this is a new argument. I wanted only to hear your opinion on where the argument leads. It seems to me that we reach the same conclusion -- correct me if I am wrong -- that we end up stuck with some form of fideism. But that essentially means that the argument is successful because it begins with a premise about God - that he is omni-everything. And it seems to end with -- well we can't tell. So, it seems to me that the original premise -- God is all good, all powerful, etc. cannot be used as a starting point. We are left with "well we don't know for sure".

[Bri]

Which evidence would convince you that a god exists? (I am qurious to the others' answers as well). What exactly is the evidence you are not finding, of what nature?

I think I see where you're coming from now, JetLag. I may have misunderstood the OP before.

If God is all-powerful, he could certainly convince me of his existence (otherwise he wouldn't be all-powerful). Short of that, if he were to appear before the world and performed miracles under controlled conditions that everyone could plainly see with their own eyes, I imagine that I would (eventually) be convinced.

I'm not sure what that has to do with the OP though.

It is fairly clear in the stories written in the Bible that Abraham had special knowledge of God, and therefore was acting for God. As written, it was reasonable for Abraham to assume that the outcome would be for the greater good, and it was therefore moral for him to do as God asked. The responsibility of the consequences would be God's, knowing that Abraham would obey.

If you're asking whether a Christian would believe that everything God asked Abraham to do would be moral for them to do on their own, it's possible that some Christian might believe that. Logically it wouldn't make sense unless they had special knowledge of God as Abraham does in the Bible, and God specifically asked them to do it. I don't know of any Christians who believe that today it is possible for someone to have the same knowledge of God that Abraham is described in the Bible as having.

-Bri

[Bri]

Yea, we have correct god's mistakes.

It is far from clear that if God exists, diseases were necessarily a mistake.

See here's the deal. You are going to suffer unimaginable pain and horror and then your going to die a slow excruciating, humiliating death. But hey, everybody else benefits.
It must suck to be that guy.

Yup, it would certainly suck for that guy.

-Bri

[Bri]

But, doesn't that strike you as odd? IF our rule is supposed to be the golden rule, and if that rule originates in God, then why is God a utilitarian? That just seems odd to me.

Why does that strike you as odd?

Yes, I know your point. But there are instances in which no one can intervene in human suffering. We know this because we find their bodies later. Take hikers who go off on their own, fall, break a leg and die a few days later. Autopsy shows that death was not immediate. But no intervention. Of course you can always say -- they made the trip of their own free choice. So choose any large scale pandemic - say the Black Death, where peole died in agony, where entire towns were wiped from the map. No one could intervene because no one was left when the last two people died. Such suffering is not a true exception. It is rather mundane.

Mundane, and perhaps necessary in order for us to have free will to choose right despite temptation to do wrong.

That makes no sense for the 14th century BCE. Do you honestly want to argue that the long history of human suffering serves the purpose of 21st century medical research? That's why God made it happen?

I didn't say that was the reason -- I said it was a possible reason. Without being all-knowing I wouldn't know every possible good that might come out of a seemingly bad situation. That doesn't mean that the worst scenario you can come up with wasn't for the greater good though. I'm not sure how you can demonstrate otherwise.

Also, I feel compelled to say again that I'm not a Christian so I don't necessarily believe these arguments. But the Problem of Evil doesn't seem to disprove the existence of an "omni-whatever" God.

Because we find their bodies after the fact and can reconstruct what most likely occurred.

We always find their body after the fact? You said that God "sets up the conditions for soul building but never intevenes [sic] even if no soul building could proceed in a particular instance." How would you know if there was any opportunity for soul building, and how do you know God NEVER intervenes if there isn't?


The conclusion of "there is no way for us to kow whether it lead to a greater good or not" is where I was heading and how this turns back to the OP. If we can truly not know how this fits together, then I maintain that we cannot use evidence to disprove God or any conception of God. The argument eliminates the possibility of evidence being used either for or against God. And this raises the issue of relevancy.

You'll have to explain this further. I don't understand how our not being all-knowing would preclude evidence of God. Specifically, if God is all-powerful, he can certainly provide us evidence of his existence (if nothing else he could configure our brains in such a way that we would all know that he exists). I'm also not sure how your assertion that no evidence is possible for the existence or nonexistence of God relates to the OP, but it is possible that I'm not understanding the OP.

I don't pretend for a second that this is a new argument. I wanted only to hear your opinion on where the argument leads. It seems to me that we reach the same conclusion -- correct me if I am wrong -- that we end up stuck with some form of fideism. But that essentially means that the argument is successful because it begins with a premise about God - that he is omni-everything. And it seems to end with -- well we can't tell. So, it seems to me that the original premise -- God is all good, all powerful, etc. cannot be used as a starting point. We are left with "well we don't know for sure".

I may be in agreement with you. I don't think that we can know for certain whether or not God exists unless God exists and makes himself known. Ironically, if God doesn't exist, I'm afraid we may never know it! In that regard, until such time as God chooses to make himself known to us, belief in God will always be a belief based on faith rather than actual fact. Yes, we are left with "we don't know for sure," and I think that most Christians would agree with that since most Christians readily admit that their beliefs are based on faith.

-Bri

[Ichneumonwasp]

Why does that strike you as odd?

Well, if God is the author of the good and he is all-good, it would seem to follow that he would be driven not from consequences but from the nature of goodness itself. I thought that was one of the definitions of God (as all-good). It seems odd to me that Christians find themselves painted into a corner in which God is a utilitarian and that they don't examine that issue more fully. Is that God really all-good? He doesn't seem so to me.



I didn't say that was the reason -- I said it was a possible reason. Without being all-knowing I wouldn't know every possible good that might come out of a seemingly bad situation. That doesn't mean that the worst scenario you can come up with wasn't for the greater good though. I'm not sure how you can demonstrate otherwise.

Also, I feel compelled to say again that I'm not a Christian so I don't necessarily believe these arguments. But the Problem of Evil doesn't seem to disprove the existence of an "omni-whatever" God.

No, don't get me wrong. I'm not saying that I could demonstrate otherwise. I was trying to point out the fact that if we really take evil seriously and if the way that we define evil is the same way that God defines evil, then the "greater good" argument seems to have some consequences that a Christian doesn't necessarily want to see.

I know you are not a Christian, don't worry. I am not trying to put you on the spot. I just wanted to pick your brain because I respect your opinion and your way of arguing. I wanted you to help me think through the issue.



We always find their body after the fact? You said that God "sets up the conditions for soul building but never intevenes [sic] even if no soul building could proceed in a particular instance." How would you know if there was any opportunity for soul building, and how do you know God NEVER intervenes if there isn't?

But that doesn't matter. We only need show one instance where there was no chance for soul building to occur from our perspectiveto force the issue into the "we can't really know what God is up to" arena. Once we are in that arena it means that we can't use the evidence before our eyes -- the evil that we see to answer any questions about God. But it should follow, then, that we can't use the evidence before our eyes to argue for the existence of God either. It should mean that our original proposition "God is all good" is in doubt. It cannot be disproved, but it also cannot be proved, so it rests as a bare proposition. Barring some unforeseen revelation I think the argument seems to lessen any proposals that we can make about God. If we cannot test those propositions in the real world because God is simply beyond our grip, then we cannot be sure of such propositions.

The proposistion that God is all-good and all-powerful seems pretty shaky because we have been forced into the corner of admitting that we don't really know what God is up to. If we can't use the evidence before our eyes to support that proposition, it seems to me that we are just whistling in the dark about it.



You'll have to explain this further. I don't understand how our not being all-knowing would preclude evidence of God. Specifically, if God is all-powerful, he can certainly provide us evidence of his existence (if nothing else he could configure our brains in such a way that we would all know that he exists). I'm also not sure how your assertion that no evidence is possible for the existence or nonexistence of God relates to the OP, but it is possible that I'm not understanding the OP.

It doesn't preclude all potential evidence of God. That is not what I meant at all. But if we cannot use the evidence that we see to judge whether God is good or evil, then the proposition that God is all good is just a proposition. It seems that we can't say anything about it. So, it seems that proposition loses relevance.

The way it relates back to the opening post is that we cannot tell the difference between "God does the good because it is good" and "what God does is good because the good is what God does". We have lost all ability to judge between those propositions. There is no logical way to distinguish the two (that I know) and we are preculded from using the evidence of our eyes.

Now, if God were to reveal himself to us and explain it all, then that would be an entirely different ballgame. I think John Hick said something about this with his idea of eschatological evidence/revelation. Basically all will be revealed at the end times. But for us to believe in that requires that we bet on one particular outcome without any clear evidence for that outcome.


I may be in agreement with you. I don't think that we can know for certain whether or not God exists unless God exists and makes himself known. Ironically, if God doesn't exist, I'm afraid we may never know it! In that regard, until such time as God chooses to make himself known to us, belief in God will always be a belief based on faith rather than actual fact. Yes, we are left with "we don't know for sure," and I think that most Christians would agree with that since most Christians readily admit that their beliefs are based on faith.

-Bri

Yeah, I think that is where it all ends. It seems kind of funny that 2000 years of speculation ends up with "we don't know" or "God is so Other that you can't possibly comprehend Him". It makes me wonder what relevance such a God could possibly have for our lives.

[JetLeg]

I think I see where you're coming from now, JetLag. I may have misunderstood the OP before.

If God is all-powerful, he could certainly convince me of his existence (otherwise he wouldn't be all-powerful). Short of that, if he were to appear before the world and performed miracles under controlled conditions that everyone could plainly see with their own eyes, I imagine that I would (eventually) be convinced.

I'm not sure what that has to do with the OP though.

It is fairly clear in the stories written in the Bible that Abraham had special knowledge of God, and therefore was acting for God. As written, it was reasonable for Abraham to assume that the outcome would be for the greater good, and it was therefore moral for him to do as God asked. The responsibility of the consequences would be God's, knowing that Abraham would obey.

If you're asking whether a Christian would believe that everything God asked Abraham to do would be moral for them to do on their own, it's possible that some Christian might believe that. Logically it wouldn't make sense unless they had special knowledge of God as Abraham does in the Bible, and God specifically asked them to do it. I don't know of any Christians who believe that today it is possible for someone to have the same knowledge of God that Abraham is described in the Bible as having.

-Bri

With regards to the OP, it was answered pretty well by seismosaurus.

As to the evidence - can you give me example of what would convince you? When skeptics demand evidence for an immaterial god, what do they mean, what type of evidence?

If no evidence is possible in principle, I still think one can think that there is 1 immaterial god, or 5, and this point of view is exactly the same as saying that there are 0 immmaterial gods.

[Bri]

Well, if God is the author of the good and he is all-good, it would seem to follow that he would be driven not from consequences but from the nature of goodness itself. I thought that was one of the definitions of God (as all-good). It seems odd to me that Christians find themselves painted into a corner in which God is a utilitarian and that they don't examine that issue more fully. Is that God really all-good? He doesn't seem so to me.

I don't think God being utilitarian is necessarily antithetical to Christian belief, nor does it mean that God wants us to be utilitarian. I always assumed that to a Christian "all-good" meant that God would be compelled to maximize good rather than eliminate all evil, particularly if minimizing evil would essentially turn us into purposeless robots. But maximizing good is something that human beings would be fairly poor at given that we cannot know the consequences of our actions in that regard.

It seems compatible with Christian belief that the ultimate "good" requires evil. If the ultimate good is for us to choose to do good despite the temptation to do evil, then the existence of evil is necessary to achieve the ultimate good. I suppose you could argue that God must be utilitarian if the ultimate good requires individuals to suffer, to toil, to overcome obstacles in order to achieve it. But it is not utilitarian in that we all have to suffer, to toil, and to overcome obstacles (some more than others, of course) to achieve the greater good for everyone. But the alternative might be worse than the suffering -- it might mean that we lack purpose altogether. So is it utilitarian if everyone suffers but everyone benefits?

No, don't get me wrong. I'm not saying that I could demonstrate otherwise. I was trying to point out the fact that if we really take evil seriously and if the way that we define evil is the same way that God defines evil, then the "greater good" argument seems to have some consequences that a Christian doesn't necessarily want to see.

I'm not sure why the above (even if you consider it utilitarian, which I'm not certain I agree with) is in any way antithetical to Christian belief. Even if God is utilitarian (perhaps necessarily so due to his "omni-whatever" nature) that does not necessarily mean that we are supposed to be (given that we are not "omni-whatever" in nature).

I know you are not a Christian, don't worry. I am not trying to put you on the spot. I just wanted to pick your brain because I respect your opinion and your way of arguing. I wanted you to help me think through the issue.

Oh, not a problem, and I didn't feel put on the spot. I have been in similar discussions in other threads that have turned into ad hom attacks because people misunderstood my position, so I just wanted to be clear. I'm not saying that Christians are right about God -- I'm just saying that they could possibly be.

But that doesn't matter. We only need show one instance where there was no chance for soul building to occur from our perspectiveto force the issue into the "we can't really know what God is up to" arena.

Well, I think we're squarely in that arena. I don't think any Christian claims to know precisely what God is up to, particularly given the fact that we aren't all-knowing ourselves. We can only speculate as to what God might be up to given certain assumptions about God (that he exists, that he is all-powerful, that he is good, etc).

Once we are in that arena it means that we can't use the evidence before our eyes -- the evil that we see to answer any questions about God. But it should follow, then, that we can't use the evidence before our eyes to argue for the existence of God either.

I agree (and have said before) that there is little or no evidence that God exists. That is not to say that God himself (assuming he exists) could not provide such evidence, but certainly if he has reason for us to not know for certain of his existence then we won't know for certain of his existence.

It should mean that our original proposition "God is all good" is in doubt. It cannot be disproved, but it also cannot be proved, so it rests as a bare proposition.

I doubt there are a lot of Christians who would disagree with that. Christianity is, after all, based on faith. Yes, Christians accept the premise that God exists and is good based on faith, and most don't claim that they base the belief on fact.

Barring some unforeseen revelation I think the argument seems to lessen any proposals that we can make about God. If we cannot test those propositions in the real world because God is simply beyond our grip, then we cannot be sure of such propositions.

I agree. We can't be sure about such propositions. Particularly so if God is all-powerful and doesn't want us to know for certain of his existence.

The proposistion that God is all-good and all-powerful seems pretty shaky because we have been forced into the corner of admitting that we don't really know what God is up to. If we can't use the evidence before our eyes to support that proposition, it seems to me that we are just whistling in the dark about it.

Yes, that's one way to look at it.

It doesn't preclude all potential evidence of God. That is not what I meant at all. But if we cannot use the evidence that we see to judge whether God is good or evil, then the proposition that God is all good is just a proposition. It seems that we can't say anything about it. So, it seems that proposition loses relevance.

I don't know, really. We all hold beliefs that are not based on compelling evidence -- we usually call them opinions. If you hold that one cannot have an opinion without solid evidence, then one cannot assert that black licorice tastes better than red. I think it all boils down to the fact that the belief that God exists is simply an opinion rather than fact. But I also think that's what Christians mean when they say that their beliefs are based on faith.

Yeah, I think that is where it all ends. It seems kind of funny that 2000 years of speculation ends up with "we don't know" or "God is so Other that you can't possibly comprehend Him".

If the ultimate good is for us to be able to freely choose to do good despite the temptation to do evil, then it would make sense that God doesn't want us to know for certain that he exists. If we knew that he exists, it would be like holding a gun to our heads and the choice to do good would essentially be made for us.

It makes me wonder what relevance such a God could possibly have for our lives.

Oddly, even if God doesn't exist, he (or maybe more precisely the concept of him) certainly has relevance in our lives, even for those of us who aren't Christian. Even without any solid evidence whatsoever, he has managed to be relevant.

-Bri

[Bri]

As to the evidence - can you give me example of what would convince you? When skeptics demand evidence for an immaterial god, what do they mean, what type of evidence?

I believe I answered you in the post which you quoted:

If God is all-powerful, he could certainly convince me of his existence (otherwise he wouldn't be all-powerful). Short of that, if he were to appear before the world and performed miracles under controlled conditions that everyone could plainly see with their own eyes, I imagine that I would (eventually) be convinced.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

I believe I answered you in the post which you quoted:

If God is all-powerful, he could certainly convince me of his existence (otherwise he wouldn't be all-powerful). Short of that, if he were to appear before the world and performed miracles under controlled conditions that everyone could plainly see with their own eyes, I imagine that I would (eventually) be convinced.

-Bri

I meant a specific example. If god is immaterial, he cannot literally appear to the world. Are you thinking of a giant eye appearing in the sky, or something like that?

[slingblade]

http://www.godlessgeeks.com/LINKS/Dragon.htm

Now, what's the difference between an invisible, incorporeal, floating dragon who spits heatless fire and no dragon at all? If there's no way to disprove my contention, no conceivable experiment that would count against it, what does it mean to say that my dragon exists? Your inability to invalidate my hypothesis is not at all the same thing as proving it true. Claims that cannot be tested, assertions immune to disproof, are veridically worthless, whatever value they may have in inspiring us or in exciting our sense of wonder. What I'm asking you to do comes down to believing, in the absence of evidence, on my say-so. The only thing you've really learned from my insistence that there's a dragon in my garage is that something funny is going on inside my head.

The entire excerpt is well worth reading and cogitating.

[uruk]

The same place as "too many cooks spoil the broth" or "never judge a book by its cover" I would imagine. As far as I know it's a saying, not a quote from the Bible. It's a good one though, and it's almost always true given that we cannot fully predict the consequences of our actions. Yep it just a platitude. but if you lock yourself into a line of thinking you have to follow it through othwerwise you are acting hypocritcaly.
Which of course humans do quite a bit.


Yes, I agree. The act isn't "murder" -- the act is the taking of a human life. If it's not justified, it's called "murder." But the act of taking a human life is not immoral (i.e. murder) all by itself -- it is only murder under a given set of circumstances in which it isn't justified. It is a question of semantics



I disagree. To the contrary, not stealing would be immoral if stealing was the only way to save a human life. True, stealing would be "bad" for the person being stolen from, but the overall act would be moral for the person doing the stealing. I do see the point you're making, and it may only be semantics, but you have to agree that the moral choice in this case would be to steal in order to save the life and the immoral choice would be to not steal and allow someone to die. Then again it would depend on whose life is being saved. If you go by the overall big picture.



According to your definition above, yes. According to mine, good and evil are probably two ends of a continuum. In other words, an act falls somewhere between "absolute good" and "absolute evil" and is considered a "moral" act if it is as far to the good side as forseeably possible given the circumstances.
Well that's the problem with a bigger picture picture. Most of do not have the bigger picture. And we are most certainly excluded from see ing Gods bigger picture. We can only opperate by what we can see at any givin moment.


Not if he allows us to have free will. If we have free will, we are largely responsible for the circumstances we are in (particularly those aspects of our circumstances that were within our control). Theres a problem with free will and an omnicient god. One tends to cancell out the other. If we are to have true free will god cannot know what our decision will be untill we make them. (although I'm sure he could make damnd good guesses) If god knows what our decisions will be in advanced than our will is not truely free from his perspective. Which would mean that all actions and consequences are known to him.



I believe I understand your point. When you talk of God killing someone, you're actually talking about human death and suffering as the result of a natural disaster or a circumstance that is beyond human control (since we don't see any obvious evidence of smiting by God these days), right? Your argument is that surely God could create a world in which there is no death and no suffering that is beyond our control. But that world might very well defeat the purpose of our having free will. If there is no suffering, then there is no incentive to do wrong and it would be easy for everyone to do right. But it's possible that the greater good is achieved by our having the opportunity to exercise our free will to choose to do right in the face of temptation to do wrong. Well two things here; suffering from natural disasters has nothing to do with free will. Other than chosing to live in an area that you know is prone to disasters.. but if you have no inkling then...well you know.
Second, if god is omnicient then there is no free will (from his perspective)



Example, please. Where did this idea come from? Presumably, if God kills someone it is for a greater purpose -- not for the sole purpose of killing them for no reason whatsoever. If god kills someone for the reason of allowing another person to make a choice. If god is omnicient then god already knows what choice the other person is going to make in advance. So why kill the guy at all?




For God, yes the ends may very well justify the means, given that he knows exactly what the ends will be. For human beings who cannot know beforehand exactly what the consequences of our actions will be, the ends don't always justify the means.
But the saying implies that it does not matter what the outcome is the ends do not justify the means. Period. Call me an absolutists (i'm not really, but i'm just playing devils advocate here)

-Bri[/QUOTE]

[Beerina]

For God, yes the ends may very well justify the means, given that he knows exactly what the ends will be.

Perhaps. But I find it hard to believe there is some greater end that can only be achieved via the world we have about us now. There are no more pleasant paths? It requires millions of starving people? Billions of torture victims? A 9 year old girl being raped, then wrapped in plastic and given a teddy bear to hold while she is buried alive?

I think not.

[Gurdur]

...There are no more pleasant paths? It requires millions of starving people? ....

Sounds just like libertarianism, doesn't it? Another reason to dislike God; the resemblance to Ayn Rand. Of course, she did think she was God.

[JetLeg]

You have an "intellectual right" to believe anything you want. You have the right to be stupid. Just keep it to yourself, and don't try to make me believe in your fairy tales.

As for your analogy of GW Bush being Clinton's father: have your heard about David Icke? He writes books about how they're both (as are the British Royal Family) reptilian aliens. Now, he's got no evidence to back it up, but that doesn't stop him from writing this nonsense. The problem is that there are people who believe it. And if they start acting on those beliefs... Reality is a good thing. You should check it out sometime.

I am trying to understand.

I think that each person's point of view is unique. So, if you disagree with a person's point of view, you have to show that it is false. If there is no way to show it is false, then yours is not better than his.

Agree so far?

[jimlintott]

Let's distinguish between a political right to a point of view and an intellectual right to a point of view. As far as I understand, you say that I have a political right to any point of view, that you don't want the government to imprison anyone for their thoughts. However, an intellectual right to a point of view is means that a certain point of view has any merit at all. If one would think that G.W. Bush is the father of Bill Clinton, he would have a political right to this point of view, but not an intellectual right - it would be just stupid.

Do you think I have an intellectual right to hold whatever opinions with regards to the supernatural that I want to?

Holding a 'point of view' that is contrary to well established facts is less a 'point of view' and more an act of willful ignorance. Which is a nice way of saying an act of stupidity.

A point of view on the supernatural is a point of view on nature. In nature facts are established not by points of view but by evidence. There may be differing points of view on what the evidence is suggesting but in the end the fact will be immutable. It certainly won't change to suit your point of view. Can you fly by taking a different point of view on gravity?

If you really believe in the supernatural, why call it supernatural? If it's real it's natural. If you want to prove something as real then you need evidence, not a point of view.

[Bri]

I meant a specific example. If god is immaterial, he cannot literally appear to the world. Are you thinking of a giant eye appearing in the sky, or something like that?

Honestly, it wouldn't much matter how God appeared physically. He could appear as Jesus or a talking goat, or just a booming voice in the sky or in my head. If he could perform miracles under controlled conditions that would eliminate the possibility of a hoax, it would be pretty strong evidence in my opinion.

Alternately, as I've said, he could just make me believe in him (being omnipotent and all) without presenting any evidence.

-Bri

[Reinhard]

Just a couple of thoughts I've been having:

If God sees that suffering is the only path to true goodness, then God must suffer as we do (because he is omnibenevolent, the personification of good... hopefully you get my point here). But the only way for God to truly suffer as we do would be to lack knowledge... because if he knew and could see all the outcomes of his suffering (i.e. omniscience) then he would not be experiencing true human suffering. But if he cannot experience true human suffering, then how can he be omniscient? Paradox attack!

To put it another way, God voluntarily submits to suffering because he knows it to be the path to goodness (and, as he is omnipotent, nothing can force suffering on him without his permission). But this is not real suffering at all... unless God has no free will, in which case he is not omnipotent because he cannot do as he pleases. Therefore, it is impossible for God to understand the true nature of the suffering he inflicts on others - which is apparently impossible, because he is omniscient - and therefore God could logically perform evil acts... which is impossible, because he is omnibenevolent. Aargh!

Alternatively, God does not suffer. But as he is supposedly omnibenevolent, then that means that suffering is not the path to true goodness, and that it is perfectly possible to create a world in which there is absolute goodness but no suffering (as long as God remains omnipotent). So, why did God include suffering? It can't be for the greater good, because he is the greater good, and suffering did not feature in his personality. We're back to square one... again.

Ahahaha... my brain...

[uruk]

Perhaps. But I find it hard to believe there is some greater end that can only be achieved via the world we have about us now. There are no more pleasant paths? It requires millions of starving people? Billions of torture victims? A 9 year old girl being raped, then wrapped in plastic and given a teddy bear to hold while she is buried alive?

I think not.
And the other problem has to do with the victims. All thier suffering may be for achievement of a bigger picture but it certainly sucks loads for them.
And that also bring into question god's attitude toward the individual. All these other guys are more important to god than this individual. And if god has a great plan then your sole purpose for existance was to be killed or suffer in some horrible fashion for the benefit (which you do not get to partake) of others.

Sucks to be that person. On the other hand, if there is an afterlife.......

[JetLeg]

Holding a 'point of view' that is contrary to well established facts is less a 'point of view' and more an act of willful ignorance. Which is a nice way of saying an act of stupidity.

A point of view on the supernatural is a point of view on nature. In nature facts are established not by points of view but by evidence. There may be differing points of view on what the evidence is suggesting but in the end the fact will be immutable. It certainly won't change to suit your point of view. Can you fly by taking a different point of view on gravity?

If you really believe in the supernatural, why call it supernatural? If it's real it's natural. If you want to prove something as real then you need evidence, not a point of view.


That is why I don't believe in miracles for example, because you need evidence for that. But, if we are talking immaterial, for which you cannot have evidence, then you have points of view. And if you can't contradict one, just as valid as yours.

[uruk]

Honestly, it wouldn't much matter how God appeared physically. He could appear as Jesus or a talking goat, or just a booming voice in the sky or in my head. If he could perform miracles under controlled conditions that would eliminate the possibility of a hoax, it would be pretty strong evidence in my opinion.

Alternately, as I've said, he could just make me believe in him (being omnipotent and all) without presenting any evidence.

-Bri

Yep. Whenever I'm asked what would it take for me to beleive that there is a god. My answer is "God would know what it would take."

[Bri]

Then again it would depend on whose life is being saved. If you go by the overall big picture.

How so? First of all, we as human beings cannot see the overall big picture as an all-knowing God could. Therefore, we would not be able to make judgments about whose life is worth saving and whose isn't. So in our case, stealing would be the more moral choice if it means also saving a life.

Anyway, my point stands -- it's the forseeable consequence of the action that makes it moral or immoral and not the action itself.

Well that's the problem with a bigger picture picture. Most of do not have the bigger picture. And we are most certainly excluded from see ing Gods bigger picture. We can only opperate by what we can see at any givin moment.

I totally agree. Our morality must be based on what we can see from our limited perspective. God's morality, on the other hand, would be based on what God can see (which is everything), and therefore the moral action for God might differ from the moral action for us in the same circumstance. In other words, the moral choice for God might seem immoral to us.

Theres a problem with free will and an omnicient god. One tends to cancell out the other. If we are to have true free will god cannot know what our decision will be untill we make them. (although I'm sure he could make damnd good guesses) If god knows what our decisions will be in advanced than our will is not truely free from his perspective. Which would mean that all actions and consequences are known to him.

That's a discussion for another thread (and in fact there was a really interesting thread about this topic about a year ago). The short answer is that there are several possible solutions to this problem, and it is possible for God to be all-knowing and for us to still have free will.

Well two things here; suffering from natural disasters has nothing to do with free will. Other than chosing to live in an area that you know is prone to disasters.. but if you have no inkling then...well you know.

Well, it is possible that God not only wants us to have free will, but actually wants us to be able to make choices that matter. Sure, he could set up a world in which nothing bad happens to anyone, but we all have to make a choice about whether we want to eat ambrosia or nectar for breakfast. If the greatest good were served only by our having free will, then that scenario would be the optimal one. However, it is possible that the greatest good is actually served by us making free choices to do right despite the temptation to do evil. In that case, evil is necessary. You could argue that only man-made evil would be necessary and that natural disasters would not be necessary, but one could also argue that without any suffering or toil caused by nature, there would be no reason or incentive for people to be evil to one another.

If god kills someone for the reason of allowing another person to make a choice. If god is omnicient then god already knows what choice the other person is going to make in advance. So why kill the guy at all?

There are other possible reasons for allowing natural disasters and other forms of suffering that are presumably beyond human control than to simply give another person the opportunity to make a specific choice (see above).

But the saying implies that it does not matter what the outcome is the ends do not justify the means. Period. Call me an absolutists (i'm not really, but i'm just playing devils advocate here)

Is the saying a Christian saying? Does it necessarily pertain to God? If not, it's pretty much irrelevent to this discussion.

-Bri

[Bri]

Perhaps. But I find it hard to believe there is some greater end that can only be achieved via the world we have about us now. There are no more pleasant paths?

I don't know. Do you?

I think not.

Thinking and knowing are two different things.

-Bri

[Bri]

And the other problem has to do with the victims. All thier suffering may be for achievement of a bigger picture but it certainly sucks loads for them.

The alternative might suck worse. It might really suck to be a robot without any purpose in life. So, if suffering is necessary for purposeful free will, then it might make sense that people suffer.

And that also bring into question god's attitude toward the individual. All these other guys are more important to god than this individual. And if god has a great plan then your sole purpose for existance was to be killed or suffer in some horrible fashion for the benefit (which you do not get to partake) of others.

If the suffering results in a greater good for all humankind, then the sufferers also benefit.

Sucks to be that person. On the other hand, if there is an afterlife.......

And then there's the question of the afterlife...

-Bri

[jond]

I am trying to understand.

I think that each person's point of view is unique. So, if you disagree with a person's point of view, you have to show that it is false. If there is no way to show it is false, then yours is not better than his.

Agree so far?

Well, you're going down the path of the invisible dragon in my garage. You can't prove I don't have one, can you? Once again, you're welcome to your beliefs. But if you want me to believe them as well, you have to give me something more than "because I believe it." When you make a claim, you have to back it up. If you can't, then my point of view is better because I don't make claims that can't be backed up.

As for the "god is immaterial" claim: are you claiming that "god" created the earth, and all it's inhabitants? If so, then he is at least capable of being material, therefore capable of being materialistically known. If not, then what's the point of wasting time arguing about it's existence?

[JetLeg]

Actually, if god created earth, it does not mean that he is material, only that he created matter.

With immaterials there is no way to prefer one opinion to another, right? So there is no way to say whether immaterials exist or not. So all opinions on it are equal.

[jimlintott]

You are claiming that something exists but its form is immaterial.

Outrageous claims require outrageous evidence.

Your point of view is meaningless.

[jond]

Actually, if god created earth, it does not mean that he is material, only that he created matter.

No, if he created matter, he is at least capable of being materialistically known. He might want to hide in his basement, but he is capable of coming out to play.

[/QUOTE] With immaterials there is no way to prefer one opinion to another, right? So there is no way to say whether immaterials exist or not. So all opinions on it are equal.[/QUOTE]

I guess. But what's the point? It's all speculative fancy with no possible impact on our lives.

[JetLeg]

No, if he created matter, he is at least capable of being materialistically known. He might want to hide in his basement, but he is capable of coming out to play.

With immaterials there is no way to prefer one opinion to another, right? So there is no way to say whether immaterials exist or not. So all opinions on it are equal.[/QUOTE]

I guess. But what's the point? It's all speculative fancy with no possible impact on our lives.[/QUOTE]

What do you mean by "materialistically known" ?

It can have emotional impact.

[JetLeg]

Outrageous claims require outrageous evidence.


I agree that it is true with regards to claims of matter.

But again, with immaterial entities, there is no way to prove or disprove, so claiming there are 1 or 5 is as good as saying there are 0.

[slingblade]

I agree that it is true with regards to claims of matter.

But again, with immaterial entities, there is no way to prove or disprove, so claiming there are 1 or 5 is as good as saying there are 0.

Yes, we know. So there is no more reason to believe in your version of god than there is to believe in the immaterial dragon in my garage.


You haven't bothered to read it yet, have you?

[JetLeg]

I read it.

But, " an immaterial dragon " is a contradiction. An "immmaterial essence of being", "an immaterial essence", an "immaterial being" is not a contradiction.

[slingblade]

Who said it was? When you can prove an immaterial being exists, I might listen. Until then, I'm going to go feed my immaterial dragon some immaterial snacks.

[Bri]

What do you mean by "materialistically known" ?

It can have emotional impact.

I believe that what jond is pointing out is that if God created the material world, then it is possible for God to choose to physically interact with or affect the material world in a way that we could detect. If God cannot possibly interact with or affect the material world, then not only would he not be omnipotent, but he would be inconsequential (it would make absolutely no difference whether or not he exists). If God could interact with or affect the material world, then he could potentially provide us with evidence of his existence.

Which makes this statement not necessarily true:

With immaterials there is no way to prefer one opinion to another, right? So there is no way to say whether immaterials exist or not. So all opinions on it are equal.

A consequential immaterial being (one that can interact with the material world) could indeed make itself known to us, and we could therefore have evidence of its existence. An opinion based on evidence would outweigh an opinion without evidence.

However, as far as I know there is no evidence for any such being, and therefore all are equally valid or invalid.

-Bri

[jond]

I believe that what jond is pointing out is that if God created the material world, then it is possible for God to choose to physically interact with or affect the material world in a way that we could detect. If God cannot possibly interact with or affect the material world, then not only would he not be omnipotent, but he would be inconsequential (it would make absolutely no difference whether or not he exists). If God could interact with or affect the material world, then he could potentially provide us with evidence of his existence.

Which makes this statement not necessarily true:



A consequential immaterial being (one that can interact with the material world) could indeed make itself known to us, and we could therefore have evidence of its existence. An opinion based on evidence would outweigh an opinion without evidence.

However, as far as I know there is no evidence for any such being, and therefore all are equally valid or invalid.

-Bri

Right, what Bri said...

[uruk]

How so? First of all, we as human beings cannot see the overall big picture as an all-knowing God could. Therefore, we would not be able to make judgments about whose life is worth saving and whose isn't. So in our case, stealing would be the more moral choice if it means also saving a life.

Anyway, my point stands -- it's the forseeable consequence of the action that makes it moral or immoral and not the action itself. What if the theft was to save the life of a person that would be evil later on? What if it was a death that god intended but because of free will a person chose to do the act of theft which saved the evil person life? Would it still be a moral act from god's perspective? Would god allow an idividual's free will to counter his will or plan? If so, how does that affect God's greater plan? God has a plan but does our free will alter or change that plan? Is god powerless against our free will?



I totally agree. Our morality must be based on what we can see from our limited perspective. God's morality, on the other hand, would be based on what God can see (which is everything), and therefore the moral action for God might differ from the moral action for us in the same circumstance. In other words, the moral choice for God might seem immoral to us. So then from our perspective: god does immoral things. It does not matter what the outcome is because we may never know what it will be.


That's a discussion for another thread (and in fact there was a really interesting thread about this topic about a year ago). The short answer is that there are several possible solutions to this problem, and it is possible for God to be all-knowing and for us to still have free will. Can you give me a brief sound bite answer? To be honest I don't see how god knowing what our choices will be in advance equates to us having free will from his perspective. Everything we do, all choices we make will like clockwork, deterministic. All the choices have been made for us from the beginning by god's design. All is known to him from beginning to end.


Well, it is possible that God not only wants us to have free will, but actually wants us to be able to make choices that matter. Sure, he could set up a world in which nothing bad happens to anyone, but we all have to make a choice about whether we want to eat ambrosia or nectar for breakfast. If the greatest good were served only by our having free will, then that scenario would be the optimal one. However, it is possible that the greatest good is actually served by us making free choices to do right despite the temptation to do evil. In that case, evil is necessary. You could argue that only man-made evil would be necessary and that natural disasters would not be necessary, but one could also argue that without any suffering or toil caused by nature, there would be no reason or incentive for people to be evil to one another. I don't think you can separate suffering from evil. We consider things that are evil things that cause suffering. Althogh not everything that causes suffering is considered evil.

You also come up to the problem of good and evil. You said yourself that what is good and what is evil depends on the circumstances.

But again, suffering caused by natural disasters have nothing to do with good and evil. It's just a consequence. Possibly a meaningless consequence which would mean meaningless suffering.
If god has no power to affect our free will (other wise how free would that will be) then those who chose to live (wether knowingly or unknowingly) within an area where there is a natural disaster may die for no reason or part of god's plan. Would that not be meaningless death and suffering?



There are other possible reasons for allowing natural disasters and other forms of suffering that are presumably beyond human control than to simply give another person the opportunity to make a specific choice (see above). Again that would suck for the victim. His/her life becomes forfiet for the benefit of another. How does god wiegh one life against another? Is one more important than the other? Does god consider one life disposable against another's?



Is the saying a Christian saying? Does it necessarily pertain to God? If not, it's pretty much irrelevent to this discussion.

-Bri
To be honest, I don't know but I've heard it quite a bit. I'm sure the entomology could be googled. And if it does not pertain to god but yet we hold ourselves to that ideal. That would be an example of how we would hold ourselves to a higher moral ideal than god would hold for himself.
In the case of the theft to save a life. By definition theft is an immoral act. That platitude would hold that the ends, even though benevolent, would not justify the act. In reality the justification would be decided by a court of peers.
God could just say well that doesn't apply to me because i see a bigger more benevolent picture. But then again the platitude says..............

[uruk]

The alternative might suck worse. It might really suck to be a robot without any purpose in life. So, if suffering is necessary for purposeful free will, then it might make sense that people suffer. True but the suffer has no choice. Where is his free will? That is if it is he that must suffer for the benefit of others. Would god allow the suffer's free will to affect the bigger benefit he had planned for the others?
If the robot had no conciousness it would not suffer. If it had, it could make it's own purpose.



If the suffering results in a greater good for all humankind, then the sufferers also benefit. How so? The suffer has to suffer so that the others can benefit from the greater good.



And then there's the question of the afterlife...

-Bri
Yep. But that would depend on what kind of an afterlife it is.

[mr. ottle]

The alternative might suck worse. It might really suck to be a robot without any purpose in life. So, if suffering is necessary for purposeful free will, then it might make sense that people suffer.


But aren't the denizens of Heaven (or at least God himself) conceived to possess free will without having to suffer or being forced to choose to do evil or any of the other free will defenses to the problem of evil?

if God can make, say, the Archangel Gabriel possess free will without having to go through AIDS or Alzheimer's or whatever else, it seems disingenuous to say it MUST be true that we have to deal with that.

[JetLeg]

Who said it was? When you can prove an immaterial being exists, I might listen. Until then, I'm going to go feed my immaterial dragon some immaterial snacks.

May be I could agree that if a person says that he believes in an immaterial dragon eating immaterial snacks, you cannot disprove him.

Some personal views which can be disproven are wrong. But if there is no way to disprove a certain view, then it is just an alternative point of view on reality, which is just as valid as having none.

I am promoting relativism when it comes to immaterial entities.

Values are similar to immaterial entities somehow - you can't definitely show that ones are better, and with immaterial entities their number can be from 0 to 777

[Bri]

What if the theft was to save the life of a person that would be evil later on? What if it was a death that god intended but because of free will a person chose to do the act of theft which saved the evil person life? Would it still be a moral act from god's perspective? Would god allow an idividual's free will to counter his will or plan? If so, how does that affect God's greater plan? God has a plan but does our free will alter or change that plan? Is god powerless against our free will?

An all-powerful God could certainly ensure that a person who is meant to die will die. An all-powerful God could also remove free will or limit the choices available in a given circumstance if he so chose.

So then from our perspective: god does immoral things. It does not matter what the outcome is because we may never what it will be.

From our perspective, God does things that if a person without omniscience were to do them would be immoral.

I don't know what you mean by the sentence that I've put in bold. Please explain.

Can you give me a brief sound bite answer? To be honest I don't see how god knowing what our choices will be in advance equates to us having free will from his perspective.

Not really, but here are some quick synopses of some of the possibilities:


One answer had to do with the idea of "middle knowledge." This means that God doesn't know directly, but can predict what you will choose to do of your own free will.

Another answer was that omniscience simply means the ability to know anything that is knowable, just as omnipotence means the ability to do anything that is doable. Since it is simply a logical absurdity to know something that is unknowable (such as the result of a free choice) God doesn't actually know what the result will be, but is still omnipotent. This is logically equivalent to the question of whether an omnipotent being can make a boulder larger than it can lift. The answer is that the concept of lifting the unliftable is simply a logical absurdity, and therefore is not something that an omnipotent being would be required to do.

Another is that although God CAN know your future action, he can choose to restrict his knowledge in order to allow for free will. In other words, God's knowledge and your free choice are mutually exclusive, but under God's control.

Another answer had to do with God operating outside of and being unlimited by time. If the timeline of the universe is established in a single instance (actually timelessly) then it is possible that the choices we make are free, but that God can then examine the timeline, essentially peeking into the future, and determine what you will do of your own free will. This would essentially mean that God knows what you will do by simply observing it (just as we can know what occurred in the past by observation).


This topic really is a total derail of the thread though, so I'm not going to comment any further (and some of these do require further comment to fully understand them).

I don't think you can separate suffering from evil. We consider things that are evil things that cause suffering. Althogh not everything that causes suffering is considered evil.

You also come up to the problem of good and evil. You said yourself that what is good and what is evil depends on the circumstances.

But again, suffering caused by natural disasters have nothing to do with good and evil. It's just a consequence. Possibly a meaningless consequence which would mean meaningless suffering.
If god has no power to affect our free will (other wise how free would that will be) then those who chose to live (wether knowingly or unknowingly) within an area where there is a natural disaster may die for no reason or part of god's plan. Would that not be meaningless death and suffering?

It's possible that natural disasters truly are random and God doesn't specifically control them. So why would a benevolent God put something like that into motion? Possibly because without them, we would have no incentive to do evil, and therefore no freedom to choose to do good despite the temptation to do evil. So, it is possible that random suffering leads to a greater good.

Again that would suck for the victim. His/her life becomes forfiet for the benefit of another. How does god wiegh one life against another? Is one more important than the other? Does god consider one life disposable against another's?

Again, I agree it would suck for the victim. And whether or not God exists, there is no doubt that suffering sucks for the sufferer.

That said, it is possible that the suffering is entirely random. It is also possible that it's not random and that God makes a choice as to specifically which lives will be ended to produce the most good.

If the "most good" is related to the human species having free will, you cannot say that one life is forfeited for another, but rather that some lives are forfeited for free will (which benefits us all). It can also be argued that were no lives forfeited and free will therefore were not to exist, that it would be a fate worse than death for us all. In that vein, those whose lives are "forfeited" also benefit from others before them forfeiting their lives, and that death and suffering are a small price to pay for free will.

To be honest, I don't know but I've heard it quite a bit. I'm sure the entomology could be googled. And if it does not pertain to god but yet we hold ourselves to that ideal. That would be an example of how we would hold ourselves to a higher moral ideal than god would hold for himself.

It can be argued that "the ends don't justify the means" is not an ideal, but a necessity due to our limitations (limitations that God doesn't have). It would not be an example of our holding ourselves to a higher moral standard -- it would only be an example of our holding ourselves to a different moral standard due to the fact that we cannot know the full consequences of our actions.

In the case of the theft to save a life. By definition theft is an immoral act.

I disagree. Theft is generally immoral, but in some circumstances not stealing would be more immoral.

That platitude would hold that the ends, even though benevolent, would not justify the act. In reality the justification would be decided by a court of peers.

In a court of law, it's called "extenuating circumstances" and people are often held to a less severe punishment or completely absolved of any wrong-doing based on extenuating circumstances.

God could just say well that doesn't apply to me because i see a bigger more benevolent picture. But then again the platitude says..............

If God is omnibenevolent, he would be compelled to follow the more benevolent picture regardless of the saying.

-Bri

[Bri]

But aren't the denizens of Heaven (or at least God himself) conceived to possess free will without having to suffer or being forced to choose to do evil or any of the other free will defenses to the problem of evil?

if God can make, say, the Archangel Gabriel possess free will without having to go through AIDS or Alzheimer's or whatever else, it seems disingenuous to say it MUST be true that we have to deal with that.

I have already conceded that free will is possible without suffering. It is possible to have a world where the only choice in life is whether to have ambrosia or nectar for breakfast. But if the greatest good is for humankind to be able to freely choose to do right while resisting the temptation to do wrong, this scenario wouldn't qualify.

My (limited) understanding of Christian theology is that angels don't have free will, nor is there any temptation to do wrong. A rather empty existence, really -- they exist only to do God's bidding. God has free will, but God is ... well, God. Presumably, God, being benevolent yet all powerful can do wrong but chooses only to do good.

-Bri

[slingblade]

May be I could agree that if a person says that he believes in an immaterial dragon eating immaterial snacks, you cannot disprove him.

This is confusing. I don't understand your syntax. Please restate the point clearly.

Some personal views which can be disproven are wrong.

Personal views = opinions. Of course opinions can be wrong.

But if there is no way to disprove a certain view, then it is just an alternative point of view on reality, which is just as valid as having none.

Yes. It's null. It's meaningless. You might as well discuss the belief that there is a teapot orbiting the moon.

I am promoting relativism when it comes to immaterial entities.

You have to show that an immaterial entity exists.

Values are similar to immaterial entities somehow - you can't definitely show that ones are better, and with immaterial entities their number can be from 0 to 777

This is nonsense. It has no meaning.

I prefer fact to belief. If you have any facts, I'll listen. But if all you want to discuss is imaginary, unreal things, what's the point?

[JetLeg]

This is confusing. I don't understand your syntax. Please restate the point clearly.



Personal views = opinions. Of course opinions can be wrong.



Yes. It's null. It's meaningless. You might as well discuss the belief that there is a teapot orbiting the moon.



You have to show that an immaterial entity exists.



This is nonsense. It has no meaning.

I prefer fact to belief. If you have any facts, I'll listen. But if all you want to discuss is imaginary, unreal things, what's the point?

A teapot orbiting a moon COULD in priciple be proven to exist. So believing in such a teapot doesn't make too much sense.

But immaterial entities CANNOT be in fact proven to exist. So believing in them does make sense. Such a belief should be respected. If there is no way to prove something, then thinking that it is true cannot be disproved, and therefore is reasonable.

[Bri]

True but the suffer has no choice. Where is his free will?

Having free will does not mean being able to do absolutely anything you want. For example, just because you cannot choose to fly doesn't mean that you don't possess free will. So even if you have free will, your choices may be constrained. Ironically, in the scenario I put forth, if nobody suffered, nobody would have free will at all.

If the robot had no conciousness it would not suffer. If it had, it could make it's own purpose.

Please rephrase this. I don't understand.

How so? The suffer has to suffer so that the others can benefit from the greater good.

The sufferer also has free will, which it can be argued is better than not suffering but having no free will.

Yep. But that would depend on what kind of an afterlife it is.

I believe that according to Christianity, those who suffer most in this life benefit the most in the afterlife.

-Bri

[Bri]

A teapot orbiting a moon COULD in priciple be proven to exist. So believing in such a teapot doesn't make too much sense.

A teapot orbitting the moon could in principle be proven to exist in the same way that an immaterial being could be proven to exist -- evidence is possible for their existence, but not for their non-existence.

But immaterial entities CANNOT be in fact proven to exist.

Quite incorrect, as I pointed out before. An immaterial entity that is consequential (i.e. could interact with the material world) could prove itself to exist. An immaterial entity that is inconsequential (can in no way affect our material world) is not worth believing in because whether or not it exists has no bearing on us whatsoever.

So believing in them does make sense. Such a belief should be respected. If there is no way to prove something, then thinking that it is true cannot be disproved, and therefore is reasonable.

I understand what you're trying to say, but you're saying it wrong. What (I think) you want to say is that something which cannot be disproved might possibly be true. You are certainly welcome to believe in such things, as long as you realize that your belief is based on faith rather than fact. In other words, your belief that an immaterial being exists is only your opinion until such time as it chooses to provide evidence of itself.

-Bri

[Bri]

<ignore -- double post>

[Bri]

When you make a claim, you have to back it up. If you can't, then my point of view is better because I don't make claims that can't be backed up.

Everyone makes claims that can't be backed up with evidence -- these are called opinions. For example, "black licorice tastes better than red" is an opinion and cannot be backed up with evidence.

If a claim can be backed up with compelling evidence, it would be closer to fact rather than opinion.

There's nothing wrong with having opinions, as long as you don't claim them to be fact.

-Bri

[jimlintott]

A teapot orbiting a moon COULD in priciple be proven to exist. So believing in such a teapot doesn't make too much sense.

But immaterial entities CANNOT be in fact proven to exist. So believing in them does make sense. Such a belief should be respected. If there is no way to prove something, then thinking that it is true cannot be disproved, and therefore is reasonable.

I always thought that logic was basically common sense.

Wrong again. Did a human write this?

As for the sentence in bold: Therefore they don't.

[jimlintott]

Everyone makes claims that can't be backed up with evidence -- these are called opinions. For example, "black licorice tastes better than red" is an opinion and cannot be backed up with evidence.
-Bri

Of course the black tastes better, it is actual licorice flavour after all. The red stuff is usually strawberry. Strawberry will never taste as good as licorice. Therefore black wins.

:D

[mr. ottle]

I have already conceded that free will is possible without suffering. It is possible to have a world where the only choice in life is whether to have ambrosia or nectar for breakfast. But if the greatest good is for humankind to be able to freely choose to do right while resisting the temptation to do wrong, this scenario wouldn't qualify.

Oh, I agree. My point was that if the "greatest good" (however that gets defined) requires us to choose evil things once in awhile, then God must have designed that into us on purpose, since he has a template where that's not the case -- Himself, at least. I don't think there are any Christians who don't believe God has free will -- but if he does, he somehow never manages to choose evil.

(In the Christian view, anyway. From my own POV, if you presuppose Jebus, then he's chosen evil a multitude of times.)


My (limited) understanding of Christian theology is that angels don't have free will, nor is there any temptation to do wrong. A rather empty existence, really -- they exist only to do God's bidding. God has free will, but God is ... well, God. Presumably, God, being benevolent yet all powerful can do wrong but chooses only to do good.

Now that I think on't, I don't recall if I've ever had a Christian tell me if they think angels have free will or not. If angels do not, then that tells us some interesting things about the revolt of the angels and why Satan did what he allegedly did. That thought won't make many Christians happy.

If God designed humans so that they cannot choose to never do evil, then making us apologize for these God-guaranteed sins seems odd at best. (Psychotic at worst.) Maybe a perfect and un-petty God could have shared a little more wisdom so we wouldn't ignorantly choose evil, or maybe put us in a better world, so we weren't forced to sometimes choose evil (say, to steal food after a flood to feed your children).

Anyway, I'm not trying to derail the thread. Please continue :)

[uruk]

An all-powerful God could certainly ensure that a person who is meant to die will die. An all-powerful God could also remove free will or limit the choices available in a given circumstance if he so chose. God's says I give you free will except where it interferes with what I want to do. God is certainly within his right to do so but it that kind of defeats the purpose of giving us free will. Our will is not free when it becomes inconvieniant for him.



From our perspective, God does things that if a person without omniscience were to do them would be immoral.

I don't know what you mean by the sentence that I've put in bold. Please explain.
Sorry, I worded the statement awkwardly. I'm stating from our perspective god does immoral things. From our perspective, it does not matter what gods motives are because they are unkown to us. We only know what we can know. And I don't think being omniscient disqualifies you from being immoral.

Since you will not respond to these issues further (understandably) I will only state my brief replies with the following.
Not really, but here are some quick synopses of some of the possibilities:


One answer had to do with the idea of "middle knowledge." This means that God doesn't know directly, but can predict what you will choose to do of your own free will.
Seems like a cop out to me. If he can't know something directly that means he does not know something which means that he is not omnicient.

Another answer was that omniscience simply means the ability to know anything that is knowable, just as omnipotence means the ability to do anything that is doable. Since it is simply a logical absurdity to know something that is unknowable (such as the result of a free choice) God doesn't actually know what the result will be, but is still omnipotent. This is logically equivalent to the question of whether an omnipotent being can make a boulder larger than it can lift. The answer is that the concept of lifting the unliftable is simply a logical absurdity, and therefore is not something that an omnipotent being would be required to do.

That is only if you define foreknowledge of our choice a logical absurdity. I don't understand how that can be a logical absurdity. The absurdity is only there if you say god is omnicient and can't know what our choice is (in order to preserve the notion of free will under the concept of an all knowing god.) It's a false dilema.

Another is that although God CAN know your future action, he can choose to restrict his knowledge in order to allow for free will. In other words, God's knowledge and your free choice are mutually exclusive, but under God's control. Another cop out. There is still apart of god that knows since if he's omnicient. He just chooses not to act upon that knowledge.


Another answer had to do with God operating outside of and being unlimited by time. If the timeline of the universe is established in a single instance (actually timelessly) then it is possible that the choices we make are free, but that God can then examine the timeline, essentially peeking into the future, and determine what you will do of your own free will. This would essentially mean that God knows what you will do by simply observing it (just as we can know what occurred in the past by observation).
Then god can still know all your choices in advance. Since he can take that knowledge with him back to a point in time before you made the decision. If you mess with time you have to accept all the paradoxes it implies.

Theres still the issue of god's big plan. Especially if he does not allow free will to affect that plan. Any choice we makes which that goes against that plan is negated in favor of the plan. So the free will we exercised in making that choice becomes meaningless and the end result is the same as if we made the choice god wanted us to make inorder so that his plan remains intact.



It's possible that natural disasters truly are random and God doesn't specifically control them. So why would a benevolent God put something like that into motion? Possibly because without them, we would have no incentive to do evil, and therefore no freedom to choose to do good despite the temptation to do evil. So, it is possible that random suffering leads to a greater good. I'm not seeing your point. How does a natural disaster provide us with an incentive to chose or do evil?


Again, I agree it would suck for the victim. And whether or not God exists, there is no doubt that suffering sucks for the sufferer.

That said, it is possible that the suffering is entirely random. It is also possible that it's not random and that God makes a choice as to specifically which lives will be ended to produce the most good.

If the "most good" is related to the human species having free will, you cannot say that one life is forfeited for another, but rather that some lives are forfeited for free will (which benefits us all). It can also be argued that were no lives forfeited and free will therefore were not to exist, that it would be a fate worse than death for us all. In that vein, those whose lives are "forfeited" also benefit from others before them forfeiting their lives, and that death and suffering are a small price to pay for free will.
It only matters to us if we believe that we have free will.
I don't see how we can have actual free will (in god's perspective) if god is all knowing and has a plan that he does not allow our actions to affect.
If this is the case then free will has no value to god as something that is worth allowing people to suffer for. It's only to perpetuate our own belief in our false sense of free will.
Only his plan is what matters to him. And if he wants his plan to come to fruition and not allow us affect that plan (lest it reaches an outcome he does not want) then god cannot allow us to have true free will. Whatever choice we make is nullified so that the plan progresses as he wishes.

Nature does not value the individual as important compared to the whole. If god feels that way also then the greater good is more important than the well being of the individual. That kind of puts a damper on the whole personal god idea.


It can be argued that "the ends don't justify the means" is not an ideal, but a necessity due to our limitations (limitations that God doesn't have). It would not be an example of our holding ourselves to a higher moral standard -- it would only be an example of our holding ourselves to a different moral standard due to the fact that we cannot know the full consequences of our actions. The spirit of the statement implies that the outcome or ends is a good outcome.
The statement says that it makes no difference if the end is a good and just end, doing bad things to get to that end does not justify the bad things you did to get to that good and benevolent end.
It doesn't matter how good and beneficial the results of the action are.
It does not matter wether we know what the full consequences of our actions are or not.






I disagree. Theft is generally immoral, but in some circumstances not stealing would be more immoral. well that can be seen as a rationalization.
But the act itself is still considered immoral. Just in certain situations the immoral act can be overlooked.


In a court of law, it's called "extenuating circumstances" and people are often held to a less severe punishment or completely absolved of any wrong-doing based on extenuating circumstances. Yep. that's called "overlooking the immoral act inlight of the circumstances"
Yea. it may be an argument of sematics but there you have it.



If God is omnibenevolent, he would be compelled to follow the more benevolent picture regardless of the saying.

-Bri
yea, but the statement implies that the outcome or bigger picture doesn't matter. The moral value of the acts affects the moral value of the outcome.

But if you run into logical problems with omnicience, you'll have the same logical problems with omnibenevolence. In fact with omni-anything.

[Bri]

Of course the black tastes better, it is actual licorice flavour after all. The red stuff is usually strawberry. Strawberry will never taste as good as licorice. Therefore black wins.

:D

Since I happen to agree, I will say that it is a FACT that black is better than red!

-Bri

[Bri]

Oh, I agree. My point was that if the "greatest good" (however that gets defined) requires us to choose evil things once in awhile, then God must have designed that into us on purpose, since he has a template where that's not the case -- Himself, at least. I don't think there are any Christians who don't believe God has free will -- but if he does, he somehow never manages to choose evil.

Yes, I assume that God did design us to have the potential to do evil as well as good. And we certainly don't disappoint, do we?

As for God, never choosing evil in no way reduces his ability to do evil if he wanted. He might also potentially be free to choose between various good options, but some would presume that he always chooses the best good option available.


Now that I think on't, I don't recall if I've ever had a Christian tell me if they think angels have free will or not. If angels do not, then that tells us some interesting things about the revolt of the angels and why Satan did what he allegedly did. That thought won't make many Christians happy.

According to Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallen_angel) Christians believe that fallen angels were banished from heaven because they were given free will and subsequently took actions against God:

It is generally accepted by most Christians that the fallen angels were cast out of Heaven because of actions taken against God.[citation needed] These actions were enabled because the angels were granted free will.

If God designed humans so that they cannot choose to never do evil, then making us apologize for these God-guaranteed sins seems odd at best. (Psychotic at worst.)

I think that's pushing it. If we have the freedom to choose evil, it doesn't mean that we can't choose not to do evil. The fact that we have the freedom to choose implies that we are responsible for those choices.

Anyway, I'm not trying to derail the thread. Please continue :)

I don't think it was any more of a derail than any other discussion as of late! I appreciate your comments.

-Bri

[Bri]

God's says I give you free will except where it interferes with what I want to do. God is certainly within his right to do so but it that kind of defeats the purpose of giving us free will. Our will is not free when it becomes inconvieniant for him.

Possibly so. Removing free will in certain circumstances wouldn't necessarily defeat the purpose of having free will in general.

Sorry, I worded the statement awkwardly. I'm stating from our perspective god does immoral things. From our perspective, it does not matter what gods motives are because they are unkown to us. We only know what we can know. And I don't think being omniscient disqualifies you from being immoral.

Being omniscient doesn't disqualify you from being immoral, but being omni-benevolent does. Just because something might appear to be immoral from our perspective doesn't make it necessarily immoral given that our perspective is limited. That's why at least some (if not most) Christians assert that you cannot apply human rules and characteristics to God.

Since you will not respond to these issues further (understandably) I will only state my brief replies with the following.

I was oversimplifying the arguments, of course. But to go into the detail required to do them justice would definitely be a derail.

Theres still the issue of god's big plan. Especially if he does not allow free will to affect that plan. Any choice we makes which that goes against that plan is negated in favor of the plan. So the free will we exercised in making that choice becomes meaningless and the end result is the same as if we made the choice god wanted us to make inorder so that his plan remains intact.

Except that the plan might actually require allowing us to choose between good and evil, in which case our choices don't negate the plan, they ARE the plan.

I'm not seeing your point. How does a natural disaster provide us with an incentive to chose or do evil?

Imagine a world with no natural disasters and no suffering caused by things beyond the control of people. No drought, plenty of food and water, no shortage of resources, etc. What exactly would we have to fight about? Most of the evil we do is to gain an advantage over those we fear are trying to gain an advantage over us. If everyone has everything they need, there might be no temptation for anyone to do evil.

I don't see how we can have actual free will (in god's perspective) if god is all knowing and has a plan that he does not allow our actions to affect.

I don't think anyone ever suggested this. I suggested that the plan may very well involve us having actual free will.

well that can be seen as a rationalization.
But the act itself is still considered immoral. Just in certain situations the immoral act can be overlooked.

Why would an immoral act be overlooked? That overlooking of a supposedly immoral act is in fact a rationalization. If what you say is true, then the person would have to be punished for stealing the same way regardless of the circumstances.

A moral dilemma occurs when you have to make a choice between two seemingly immoral acts and decide which is the lesser or two evils, in this case stealing or letting someone die. In this case it is fairly clear-cut, and I don't see how making the obviously moral choice to save a life would be worthy of punishment.

yea, but the statement implies that the outcome or bigger picture doesn't matter. The moral value of the acts affects the moral value of the outcome.

I know what the statement means, but why are you talking about the statement as if it's an absolute truth when it has little to do with the discussion? Specifically, it isn't even clear that it's a belief that Christians hold, so it is irrelevant to the discussion.

But if you run into logical problems with omnicience, you'll have the same logical problems with omnibenevolence. In fact with omni-anything.

Omni-benevolence isn't generally taken to mean never allowing anything bad to happen to anyone (clearly if it did, Christians wouldn't believe their God to be omni-benevolent and your point would be moot).

-Bri

[mr. ottle]

Yes, I assume that God did design us to have the potential to do evil as well as good. And we certainly don't disappoint, do we?

As for God, never choosing evil in no way reduces his ability to do evil if he wanted. He might also potentially be free to choose between various good options, but some would presume that he always chooses the best good option available.

Of course, many Christians would say that everything God does is good, so it would be impossible for him to do wrong by definition. No matter what it was, if he did it, it was the best thing to do. Quite a P.R. campaign he has going.

According to Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallen_angel) Christians believe that fallen angels were banished from heaven because they were given free will and subsequently took actions against God:

It is generally accepted by most Christians that the fallen angels were cast out of Heaven because of actions taken against God.[citation needed] These actions were enabled because the angels were granted free will.
Interesting. God gives some of his angels free will, and they immediately turn on him. Omniscience ain't what it used to be, I guess. Makes you wonder why he did it again with us.

(Hypothetically. I don't actually believe in free will, really.)


I think that's pushing it. If we have the freedom to choose evil, it doesn't mean that we can't choose not to do evil. The fact that we have the freedom to choose implies that we are responsible for those choices.

In theory. But in practice, we pretty much have to start apologizing for everything the minute we take our first breath. And we have to apologize for every little urge, fantasy, and dark thought that we had, and that our forebears had. Pretty unusual, especially after Jesus allegedly made up for all that for us.

[uruk]

Having free will does not mean being able to do absolutely anything you want. For example, just because you cannot choose to fly doesn't mean that you don't possess free will. So even if you have free will, your choices may be constrained. Ironically, in the scenario I put forth, if nobody suffered, nobody would have free will at all. Well if god's plan requires that the person suffer or makes a choice that will lead to him suffering for the greater cause. Where is his free will? Where is his freedom?



Please rephrase this. I don't understand. Well, I was not quite sure what you meant about the robot statement. Robots by definition do not feel anything.



The sufferer also has free will, which it can be argued is better than not suffering but having no free will. Well chosing not suffer is defintly not in his cards. And to be honest I don't believe that we really have free will. Only the illusion of free will.
And it is doubly so if there is a god.



I believe that according to Christianity, those who suffer most in this life benefit the most in the afterlife.

-Bri That's great if you believe in an afterlife.

[uruk]

Possibly so. Removing free will in certain circumstances wouldn't necessarily defeat the purpose of having free will in general. Maybe, but it kind of lessens the spirit of it. And it means the greater good of god giving us free will is not quite so great if it is only doled out in portions. It like saying that god loves unconditionaly but with conditions.



Being omniscient doesn't disqualify you from being immoral, but being omni-benevolent does. Just because something might appear to be immoral from our perspective doesn't make it necessarily immoral given that our perspective is limited. That's why at least some (if not most) Christians assert that you cannot apply human rules and characteristics to God. Well it sounds to me that being omnibenvolent is a little like "to the holy all things are holy". Because god is omnibenevolent anything that god does good no matter what. God commits genocied but it's good because god did it. I think this would run into several logical absurdities.
I'm an agnostic and I also believe that you cannot apply human characteristics to god if he exists. But then that would also mean that free will would have a different meaning to god than it does to us.



I was oversimplifying the arguments, of course. But to go into the detail required to do them justice would definitely be a derail. I agree.



Except that the plan might actually require allowing us to choose between good and evil, in which case our choices don't negate the plan, they ARE the plan. But then how does giving us free will where we might choose evil mean that the god"s plan end in a greater good? WHat if by some strange fluke we all choose evil. I know that highly improbable but not impossible. Especially if satan did a particularly good job of fooling us?



Imagine a world with no natural disasters and no suffering caused by things beyond the control of people. No drought, plenty of food and water, no shortage of resources, etc. What exactly would we have to fight about? Most of the evil we do is to gain an advantage over those we fear are trying to gain an advantage over us. If everyone has everything they need, there might be no temptation for anyone to do evil. Actually that might be a great place to live. Isn't that what some people believe heaven is?



I don't think anyone ever suggested this. I suggested that the plan may very well involve us having actual free will.
And if it we all choose badly in gods eyes?


Why would an immoral act be overlooked? That overlooking of a supposedly immoral act is in fact a rationalization. If what you say is true, then the person would have to be punished for stealing the same way regardless of the circumstances.
Well isn't that what you are doing when you say theft is justified if the end result was a good thing? Your overlooking the immoral aspect of the theft. Overlooking the loss of the one who was stolen from.
Some court may convict the offender but give him a symbolic punishment because of the extenuating circumstances. Most would say that yea, the theft is immoral but choose not to do anything about it because of the circumstances

A moral dilemma occurs when you have to make a choice between two seemingly immoral acts and decide which is the lesser or two evils, in this case stealing or letting someone die. In this case it is fairly clear-cut, and I don't see how making the obviously moral choice to save a life would be worthy of punishment. Well you just said that stealing was an evil. I agree it is a lesser evil than letting someon die. But stealing is still considered evil none the less. And like I said most would choose to ignore the "evil" of the theft in light of the life saved.



I know what the statement means, but why are you talking about the statement as if it's an absolute truth when it has little to do with the discussion? Specifically, it isn't even clear that it's a belief that Christians hold, so it is irrelevant to the discussion. Well it was relevent to the original post about gods actions being moral or not in a certain situation which is what I thought we were talking about.

What the statement also implies is how would it sit with you if your benefit came at the cost of other's well being? If I had my choice I would not want my well being to come at the cost of another's well being. although I know that it happens all the time.
Do you see how that would apply to god killing and causing suffering for a greater good? Is it worth it to you that god cause all that death and destruction so that things are better for you?
You begin to wonder if there was a way where god din't have to do it.
Could you live with it.

In the theft/life scenario; I would rather have not had to steal inorder to save the life. I would have liked to have done it another way than by stealing. I would do it again but
I would also feel bad about having to steal. Now think about if it was god that set up the situation where I was forced to to have to steal to save the life.

I don't know if the "ends justifies the means" statement is related to christianity. but then Christians do not have an exclusive claim to god.
And it does have a good point.



Omni-benevolence isn't generally taken to mean never allowing anything bad to happen to anyone (clearly if it did, Christians wouldn't believe their God to be omni-benevolent and your point would be moot).
-Bri

Omni benevolence means that everything you do is good reguardless of what it is. That leads to a logical absurdity.
like a round square or a good evil act.

And isn't non-action in preventing somethning bad from happening also a bad thing?

[uruk]

To kind of expand on the other meaning of the "ends do not justify the means" statement, consider the United States.
I think most Americans will agree that the existance of the U.S. is a good thing. But now think about what had to happen for the U.S. to come into being.

The Native Americans were decimated and almost completely displaced so that the U.S. could start. (In fact they continue to suffer.) Slaves were used to build alot of the infrastructure. And half of Mexico's territories were taken so that the U.S. could become a bi-coastal nation. I am certain that most will agree that these are terrible things. Does the existance of the U.S. justify those actions? Does it make those actions good?

Do these actions take away or lessen the greatness of the U.S.? Personaly I think it does.
The U.S. though great as I think it is has tarnish because of those acts. It does not have higher moral basis than it could have had.

[slingblade]

A teapot orbiting a moon COULD in priciple be proven to exist. So believing in such a teapot doesn't make too much sense.

But immaterial entities CANNOT be in fact proven to exist. So believing in them does make sense. Such a belief should be respected. If there is no way to prove something, then thinking that it is true cannot be disproved, and therefore is reasonable.


One word: falsifiabilty.

Even thought it's Wiki, this seems a pretty good article on the subject.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability

[JetLeg]

A teapot orbitting the moon could in principle be proven to exist in the same way that an immaterial being could be proven to exist -- evidence is possible for their existence, but not for their non-existence.



Quite incorrect, as I pointed out before. An immaterial entity that is consequential (i.e. could interact with the material world) could prove itself to exist. An immaterial entity that is inconsequential (can in no way affect our material world) is not worth believing in because whether or not it exists has no bearing on us whatsoever.



I understand what you're trying to say, but you're saying it wrong. What (I think) you want to say is that something which cannot be disproved might possibly be true. You are certainly welcome to believe in such things, as long as you realize that your belief is based on faith rather than fact. In other words, your belief that an immaterial being exists is only your opinion until such time as it chooses to provide evidence of itself.

-Bri



One word: falsifiabilty.

Even thought it's Wiki, this seems a pretty good article on the subject.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability

I am talking of non-consequential immaterials. Yes, they are unfalsifiable, and they fall outside of the realm of science. So what?

The point is this - if there are a few people, a few points of view, how do you know that you are the right one? You need to be sure that all the others are wrong, you need to falsify their claims somehow. If there is no way to do that, then they are just as right as you are, and we have relativism.

[jond]

I am talking of non-consequential immaterials. Yes, they are unfalsifiable, and they fall outside of the realm of science. So what?

The point is this - if there are a few people, a few points of view, how do you know that you are the right one? You need to be sure that all the others are wrong, you need to falsify their claims somehow. If there is no way to do that, then they are just as right as you are, and we have relativism.

If they are non-consequential immaterials, they have no impact on us. Until such time as they are proven, they exist only in your imagination. If they do have an impact on us, then they are consequential, and must in some way have a measurable material effect. Including emotional effect. We may not have the technology to measure it today, but that doesn't mean it isn't measurable.

Again: you're welcome to believe what you want to believe. What you do with those beliefs is where people get into trouble. If you believe a non-consequential immaterial god wants you to do something that will in any way effect my life, then we've got a problem. If you keep it to yourself, then the problem goes away. Pretty simple, really.

How do you know that you are the right one? You don't. What works for me is the process of evaluating the evidence. No evidence? The point of view fails. Non-consequential immaterials don't actually exist until proven otherwise. If I'm wrong and they do exist, so what? They're non-consequential, therefore it is meaningless to think about them.

[JetLeg]

If they are non-consequential immaterials, they have no impact on us. Until such time as they are proven, they exist only in your imagination. If they do have an impact on us, then they are consequential, and must in some way have a measurable material effect. Including emotional effect. We may not have the technology to measure it today, but that doesn't mean it isn't measurable.

Again: you're welcome to believe what you want to believe. What you do with those beliefs is where people get into trouble. If you believe a non-consequential immaterial god wants you to do something that will in any way effect my life, then we've got a problem. If you keep it to yourself, then the problem goes away. Pretty simple, really.

How do you know that you are the right one? You don't. What works for me is the process of evaluating the evidence. No evidence? The point of view fails. Non-consequential immaterials don't actually exist until proven otherwise. If I'm wrong and they do exist, so what? They're non-consequential, therefore it is meaningless to think about them.

I don't know that I am the right one with unfalsifiable nc-immaterials, but neither do you. So, the point of view of a person that thinks they are is just as valid as thinks they are none, ergo relativism.

Agree so far?

Now, lets imagine I would believe in an uf(unfalsifiable)-nc-immaterial that would want me to do something with the life of other people. If you agreed with the above statement, since it is an uf-immaterial, the point of view that he exists is just as valid as he doesn't ergo relativism, ergo I do have the right to act on my belief.

[JetLeg]

I always thought that logic was basically common sense.

JetLeg's quote : But immaterial entities CANNOT be in fact proven to exist

Wrong again. Did a human write this?

As for the sentence in bold: Therefore they don't.


Whatever cannot in principle be proven to exist, does not?
Are you sure?


-1- We humans have limited capacities of knowedge. How can we know, perhaps something exists, and we just will never be able to prove it? For example, ants might never be able to prove the eixistance of atoms. So can an ant come to a conclusions that atoms never exist.

-2- uf(unfalsifiable)-nc(nonconsequentail)-Immatareial entities cannot be proven. So WHY EXACTLY does it follow they do not exist???

[Bri]

Of course, many Christians would say that everything God does is good, so it would be impossible for him to do wrong by definition. No matter what it was, if he did it, it was the best thing to do. Quite a P.R. campaign he has going.

It wouldn't be phrased that way, but yes it's essentially unfalsifiable. We can neither predict nor track after the fact the full results of any action with any certainty, therefore we can neither prove nor disprove the notion that everything God does is for the greater good.


[/INDENT]Interesting. God gives some of his angels free will, and they immediately turn on him. Omniscience ain't what it used to be, I guess. Makes you wonder why he did it again with us.

Obviously free will is better than no free will, even considering the consequences.

(Hypothetically. I don't actually believe in free will, really.)

There is some evidence against free will and little if any for free will, but of course that doesn't mean free will doesn't exist.

In theory. But in practice, we pretty much have to start apologizing for everything the minute we take our first breath. And we have to apologize for every little urge, fantasy, and dark thought that we had, and that our forebears had. Pretty unusual, especially after Jesus allegedly made up for all that for us.

Yes, I understand what you're saying, but again we're not forced to do evil and then punished for it. We choose to do evil. Some Christians would also argue that apologizing and penance are a way to avoid punishment in recognition of the fact that we will succumb to temptation on occasion.

-Bri

[Bri]

Well if god's plan requires that the person suffer or makes a choice that will lead to him suffering for the greater cause. Where is his free will? Where is his freedom?

Like I said, possessing free will does not mean that you're in control of everything. Even a person who suffers has free will and can make choices. They can't choose to fly, and in some cases can't choose not to suffer, but they can make other choices.

Well, I was not quite sure what you meant about the robot statement. Robots by definition do not feel anything.

What I meant was that if we have no free will, we are essentially following a program (like a robot) or acting out a play that was written long before we were born rather than actually making choices.

Well chosing not suffer is defintly not in his cards. And to be honest I don't believe that we really have free will. Only the illusion of free will.
And it is doubly so if there is a god.

The evidence seems to point to us not having free will at this point. Although I acknowledge that, I also hope that we do have free will.

That's great if you believe in an afterlife.

We're talking about the Christian view of God, and Christians do believe in an afterlife as far as I know.

-Bri

[Bri]

I am talking of non-consequential immaterials. Yes, they are unfalsifiable, and they fall outside of the realm of science. So what?

So what indeed! Why even waste your time talking about entities that you can never come into contact with and that cannot affect your life in any way whatsoever?

-Bri

[JetLeg]

So what indeed! Why even waste your time talking about entities that you can never come into contact with and that cannot affect your life in any way whatsoever?

-Bri

You can believe in them, and take emotional consolation from them.

And, in order to know that your point is right, and others are wrong, you need to be able to disprove all others. You cannot disprove that point of view, so you cannot know you are right and I am wrong.

[JetLeg]

In order to know that your point is right, and others are wrong, you need to be able to disprove all others. If the point view of others are unfalsifiable, you are not able to disprove them, so you cannot know that you are right and they are wrong


Do you agree with this, by the way?

[mr. ottle]

Obviously free will is better than no free will, even considering the consequences.

I don't think it's obvious at all. How would it feel to have no free will? Would you even know the difference? Yet the price of free will, according to many Christians, is the threat of eternal torment.

If God is so uptight that he is abloe to punish us forever, how is the illusion of free will and the guarantee of paradise superior to the real free will?

Yes, I understand what you're saying, but again we're not forced to do evil and then punished for it. We choose to do evil. Some Christians would also argue that apologizing and penance are a way to avoid punishment in recognition of the fact that we will succumb to temptation on occasion.

I don't think we're really disagreeing here. On paper, you're correct. It's the Christian theology that's contradictory.

[mr. ottle]

And, in order to know that your point is right, and others are wrong, you need to be able to disprove all others. You cannot disprove that point of view, so you cannot know you are right and I am wrong.

But what does it matter? If there are no consequences for guessing wrong, why worry about distinguishing between non-consequential immaterial beings (or discerning them from entities that don't exist)?

Disproving all other non-consequential immaterial beings is not just impossible, but utterly pointless. Which non-existent entity exists more than the others? Why would anyone bother trying to be right about which of the (literally) infinite number of possible non-existent beings is worth believing in?

Hmmm... I feel like I'm repeating what Bri has said about 8 times now...

[JetLeg]

But what does it matter? If there are no consequences for guessing wrong, why worry about distinguishing between non-consequential immaterial beings (or discerning them from entities that don't exist)?

Disproving all other non-consequential immaterial beings is not just impossible, but utterly pointless.

Hmmm... I feel like I'm repeating what Bri has said about 8 times now...

Well, if I believe that a uf-nc-immaterial told me that all the world has to wear green, and I have to enforce it on the world, what then?

Again, you can't know you are right, because you cannot disprove me.

[mr. ottle]

Well, if I believe that a uf-nc-immaterial told me that all the world has to wear green, and I have to enforce it on the world, what then?

Then you are not dealing with a uf-nc-immaterial because it has interacted with you in the real world.

(Or, of course, you are wrong about where you got your commandment.)

Again, you can't know you are right, because you cannot disprove me.

I don't need to disprove you, because it doesn't matter if you are right. The universe would not be any different in any way at all whether you are right or wrong.

But the burden of proof is on you. Shame you defined your claim in such a way that you cannot prove anything.

[JetLeg]

Then you are not dealing with a uf-nc-immaterial because it has interacted with you in the real world.

(Or, of course, you are wrong about where you got your commandment.)

I don't need to disprove you, because it doesn't matter if you are right. The universe would not be any different in any way at all whether you are right or wrong.

But the burden of proof is on you. Shame you defined your claim in such a way that you cannot prove anything.

I'll rephrase it - I believe there is a uf-nc-immaterial that wants all humanity to wear green socks. It did not interact with me, it is a nc-immaterial but I believe that this uf-nc-immaterial wants all humanity to wear green socks.

So, I want to impose it on humanity. Doesn't that make sense?

And no, the universe would be different if I were right. It would have a uf-nc-immaterial. That's a difference. The fact that we can't prove something to exist doesn't mean that there is no actual difference as to whether it exists or not.

It does not have an effect upon other things, if that is what you mean. But a universe with uf-nc-immaterials is a different one than a universe without them. The only difference is that in one uf-nc-immaterials exist, and in the other they don't. And there is no way to prove in which one we live. That's right. But still, there is a difference.

[mr. ottle]

I'll rephrase it - I believe there is a uf-nc-immaterial that wants all humanity to wear green socks. It did not interact with me, it is a nc-immaterial but I believe that this uf-nc-immaterial wants all humanity to wear green socks.

So, I want to impose it on humanity. Doesn't that make sense?

Sure. You, by some undetermined method, have decided it's in humanity's best interest to wear green socks. Fine.

When asked to explain, you say you got the orders from a being that cannot affect the real world at all, that we cannot detect, and that you cannot show it even has the basic qualities of existence. You aren't likely to be pursuasive :)

And no, the universe would be different if I were right. It would have a uf-nc-immaterial. That's a difference. The fact that we can't prove something to exist doesn't mean that there is no actual difference as to whether it exists or not.

But in what way would it be different? Just saying it has an extrra immaterial object in it doesn't really make anything different. Is there a single atom anywhere displaced because of this thing? Is there even one consequence of the wishes or actions of the inconsequential?

If you can define existence to include things that do not exist in the physical world (and I don't really think you can), what possible effect could this being's existence have? It won't create anything, destroy anything, reflect light, or even exert a gravitational pull -- exactly like a non-existent thing does.

[jond]

I'll rephrase it - I believe there is a uf-nc-immaterial that wants all humanity to wear green socks. It did not interact with me, it is a nc-immaterial but I believe that this uf-nc-immaterial wants all humanity to wear green socks.

So, I want to impose it on humanity. Doesn't that make sense?

And no, the universe would be different if I were right. It would have a uf-nc-immaterial. That's a difference. The fact that we can't prove something to exist doesn't mean that there is no actual difference as to whether it exists or not.

It does not have an effect upon other things, if that is what you mean. But a universe with uf-nc-immaterials is a different one than a universe without them. The only difference is that in one uf-nc-immaterials exist, and in the other they don't. And there is no way to prove in which one we live. That's right. But still, there is a difference.

JetLeg, this is what you don't get: A nc-immaterial entity by definition CANNOT interact with you to tell you to wear green socks. By definition, if it IS telling you to wear green socks, then it IS CONSEQUENTIAL. And if it is consequential, then the bruden of proof lies on you to demonstrate that this entity is real and wants us to wear green socks. If you simply believe that there's an entity that wants all humanity to wear green socks, and you try to put them on people, this is what we call psychotic behavior. If you really believe that such an entity exists, and is telling you to do things, then you really need to seek professional help.

[JetLeg]

Sure. You, by some undetermined method, have decided it's in humanity's best interest to wear green socks. Fine.

When asked to explain, you say you got the orders from a being that cannot affect the real world at all, that we cannot detect, and that you cannot show it even has the basic qualities of existence. You aren't likely to be pursuasive :)



But in what way would it be different? Just saying it has an extrra immaterial object in it doesn't really make anything different. Is there a single atom anywhere displaced because of this thing? Is there even one consequence of the wishes or actions of the inconsequential?

If you can define existence to include things that do not exist in the physical world (and I don't really think you can), what possible effect could this being's existence have? It won't create anything, destroy anything, reflect light, or even exert a gravitational pull -- exactly like a non-existent thing does.

I am not trying to pursue, just trying to show that you cannot know you are right, because you cannot prove me wrong. If you cannot prove me wrong, there is no way you can know which one of us is right, it would be just arrogant.

And yes, it won't create anything, destroy anything, reflect light, or even exert a gravitational pull -- exactly like a non-existent thing does. But it would exist. In its own, special, nc-immaterial way.
--

Though may be I might feel its existance? May be it would be able to have an effect on my feelings?

[Bri]

Maybe, but it kind of lessens the spirit of it.

There are always constraints on free will. The freedom is to choose between the options that are available to you at the time, not to choose anything whatsoever.

Well it sounds to me that being omnibenvolent is a little like "to the holy all things are holy".

Of course that's not how it works. If God were to do something immoral, then he would no longer be omni-benevolent. Christians simply believe that it's against God's nature to do so, and that he never does (which would mean that he's omni-benevolent). And we can't prove or disprove it -- it's unfalsifiable.

But then how does giving us free will where we might choose evil mean that the god"s plan end in a greater good?

If having free will to choose between good and evil IS the greater good, then God providing us the free will to choose between good and evil WOULD result in the greater good, don't you think?

WHat if by some strange fluke we all choose evil. I know that highly improbable but not impossible. Especially if satan did a particularly good job of fooling us?

The theory is that the freedom to choose evil (regardless of whether we actually choose evil) is such a great good that it would be better for us to have the choice and to always choose evil than for us to never have the choice at all.

Actually that might be a great place to live. Isn't that what some people believe heaven is?

I don't know, but if so it is clear that people living there don't have the type of free will described above.

And if it we all choose badly in gods eyes?

See above. It would still result in a greater good than if we didn't have the freedom to choose.

Well isn't that what you are doing when you say theft is justified if the end result was a good thing?

No, in this theory, the forseeable consequences of the action are taken into account when determining whether or not the action is moral or immoral.

Note that I agree that the ends don't always justify the means. In this theory, the means are themselves consequences, just as the ends are consequences. All consequences of an action must be weighed before determining whether or not the action is justified. Instead of "the ends don't justify the means" this theory is more like "the ends don't always justify the means."

Some court may convict the offender but give him a symbolic punishment because of the extenuating circumstances. Most would say that yea, the theft is immoral but choose not to do anything about it because of the circumstances

If something is immoral, you should refrain from doing it. So, let's say that a man who you know intends to kill his daughter asks you where his daughter is. He knows that you know where his daughter is. You also know that it is immoral to lie. According to "the ends never justify the means" you would have to tell the truth. But would telling the truth be the moral choice given that you can forsee the consequences?

Well you just said that stealing was an evil. I agree it is a lesser evil than letting someon die. But stealing is still considered evil none the less. And like I said most would choose to ignore the "evil" of the theft in light of the life saved.

Yes, stealing is evil but letting someone die is more evil. Therefore, if you have to make a choice between the two, stealing would be the moral action and letting them die would be the immoral action. In this case, the ends do justify the means. Sure, it sucks for the person being stolen from, but so be it! It would suck worse for the person dying if you didn't steal.

Well it was relevent to the original post about gods actions being moral or not in a certain situation which is what I thought we were talking about.

Well, true, to a point. We don't know what rules of ethics a god might be using, so if we're talking about the Christian God we would look to Christianity to tell us whether or not their God could be behaving in a moral way or not. In that regard, "the ends don't justify the means" is only relevant if Christians believe it applies both to human beings and to God. It is unclear whether they believe it applies to human beings, but I'm fairly certain that it cannot apply to Christian belief about God since the Christian God knows ALL consequences of his actions and therefore MUST look at the full consequences of an action in order to act morally.

What the statement also implies is how would it sit with you if your benefit came at the cost of other's well being? If I had my choice I would not want my well being to come at the cost of another's well being. although I know that it happens all the time.

"Benefit" is not always good, quite true. And yes the means do have to be taken into account since they are also consequences of actions (I never meant to imply that they didn't).

Do you see how that would apply to god killing and causing suffering for a greater good?

Yes, I can see how it might apply, but I would also argue that it cannot apply to the Christian God, nor do Christians expect it to apply to their God.

Is it worth it to you that god cause all that death and destruction so that things are better for you?

So that things are better for everyone (including those suffering). I can see how it might be a greater good to suffer and have free will than to never suffer at all, yes.

You begin to wonder if there was a way where god din't have to do it...In the theft/life scenario; I would rather have not had to steal inorder to save the life. I would have liked to have done it another way than by stealing.

That's another question entirely. Certainly if the same good can be achieved through other means, it would be better. The argument here is that the same good cannot be achieved through other means.

Omni benevolence means that everything you do is good reguardless of what it is.

No, it doesn't. Not to any Christian anyway, and we're talking about the Christian God here. If you would like to posit another god that cannot do anything that we might consider "wrong" then I'll agree that your god cannot exist and is a logical absurdity. But like it or not, the Christian God could possibly exist.

And isn't non-action in preventing somethning bad from happening also a bad thing?

Yes, hence the example I gave you of stealing to save a life (action) or not stealing and allowing the person to die (non-action).

-Bri

[Bri]

Now, lets imagine I would believe in an uf(unfalsifiable)-nc-immaterial that would want me to do something with the life of other people. If you agreed with the above statement, since it is an uf-immaterial, the point of view that he exists is just as valid as he doesn't ergo relativism, ergo I do have the right to act on my belief.

It would be impossible for a non-consequential immaterial to make it known that it would want you to do anything. Nor could you ever know anything about it, including what it might want you to do. Nor could it likely even know about you.

Therefore, your point of view (that it wants you to do something) is NOT valid, and IS falsifiable.

It can be therefore be assumed that you're a lunatic and should be locked up.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

It would be impossible for a non-consequential immaterial to make it known that it would want you to do anything. Nor could you ever know anything about it, including what it might want you to do. Nor could it likely even know about you.

Therefore, your point of view (that it wants you to do something) is NOT valid, and IS falsifiable.

It can be therefore be assumed that you're a lunatic and should be locked up.

-Bri

Writing from the asylum,

I am not claiming that an nc-immaterial revealed something to me by scripture, that would be wrong.

But it can want me to do something, why not? It is an nc-immaterial that has wishes and wants me to do something. It can know something about the world, but it cannot influence it. And I am not even saying that it revealed it to me.

I am not believing that it wants all the world to wear green socks because of revealation. I am saying that I have an intellectual right to believe this. You cannot know if you are right, or I am right, since you cannot prove me wrong.

[Bri]

You can believe in them, and take emotional consolation from them.

And, in order to know that your point is right, and others are wrong, you need to be able to disprove all others. You cannot disprove that point of view, so you cannot know you are right and I am wrong.

I have no desire to prove your imaginary being wrong. And it MUST be imaginary because you have absolutely no knowledge of it, including whether it exists or not -- you only imagine that it exists.

Therefore, EVEN IF SOME BEING EXISTS that happens to be EXACTLY as you imagine it, it is only coincidence -- the only being you actually know about is entirely imaginary.

My point is that it makes no difference to me whatsoever if something exactly like what you imagine exists or not. If it does exist, it cannot communicate with you AT ALL. That's what makes it inconsequential.

-Bri

[mr. ottle]

I am not trying to pursue, just trying to show that you cannot know you are right, because you cannot prove me wrong. If you cannot prove me wrong, there is no way you can know which one of us is right, it would be just arrogant.

But I'm not the one making any claims. I'm not the one who has said anything to be right or wrong about.

And "not being able to be proved wrong" is not the same thing as "right." By your own admission, there is no difference between your god and a non-existent being.

And yes, it won't create anything, destroy anything, reflect light, or even exert a gravitational pull -- exactly like a non-existent thing does. But it would exist. In its own, special, nc-immaterial way.

Maybe if you defined what you meant by "existence," we could clear some of this up.

Though may be I might feel its existance? May be it would be able to have an effect on my feelings?

Nope. An emotion is a measureable, chemical reaction in the brain. If this entity was working there, it would no long be immaterial or non-consequential.

[Bri]

I don't think it's obvious at all.

I meant that obviously according to Christian belief, free will is better than no free will, even considering the suffering that is necessary for free will.

If God is so uptight that he is abloe to punish us forever, how is the illusion of free will and the guarantee of paradise superior to the real free will?

I think it is assumed that not all sins will result in eternal damnation, and that any sins that do result in eternal damnation are avoidable given that we have free will.

I don't think we're really disagreeing here. On paper, you're correct. It's the Christian theology that's contradictory.

No, we don't disagree on most points, except that I would disagree that Christian theology is contradictory. I don't agree with Christian theology, but it's not contradictory.

-Bri

[mr. ottle]

But it can want me to do something, why not? It is an nc-immaterial that has wishes and wants me to do something. It can know something about the world, but it cannot influence it.

There's really no way to test this, but it seems to me that an immaterial being cannot observe the physical world any more than physical beings can observe an immaterial world.

Of course, the distinction is meaningless -- since you're making up an entity in your own mind, it would know everything you do.

[Bri]

Well, if I believe that a uf-nc-immaterial told me that all the world has to wear green, and I have to enforce it on the world, what then?

Again, you can't know you are right, because you cannot disprove me.

WRONG!

By definition, an inconsequential being CANNOT tell you anything. Therefore, your belief that you were told something by an inconsequential being IS falsifiable and is absolutely FALSE.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

My belief is not that an nc-being told me something.

My belief is that an nc-being wants something from me, not that he told me what it is.

[mr. ottle]

I think it is assumed that not all sins will result in eternal damnation, and that any sins that do result in eternal damnation are avoidable given that we have free will.

Hmmmm. I'm not entirely ignorant of Christian theology. It sounds like you're talking about some very specific branch of Christianity. The ones I have the most experience with (mainly the fire&brimstone protestant types) all believe that any sin that you have not apologize for will get you a one-way ticket downstairs.

But this might be drifting too far from this topic. (Not that that's a bad thing -- the main thread in this topic has drifted pretty far from reality...)

[Bri]

How did you come about this belief, given that you have no way of knowing whether the being even exists or not?

-Bri

[Bri]

Hmmmm. I'm not entirely ignorant of Christian theology. It sounds like you're talking about some very specific branch of Christianity. The ones I have the most experience with (mainly the fire&brimstone protestant types) all believe that any sin that you have not apologize for will get you a one-way ticket downstairs.

I'm not aware of any religion that believes that you will spend an eternity in hell for not apologizing for any sin, but I could certainly be mistaken about that. My point was that not committing the sin to begin with, or apologizing afterwards, are both choices you can make to avoid eternal damnation.

But this might be drifting too far from this topic. (Not that that's a bad thing -- the main thread in this topic has drifted pretty far from reality...)

Heh, I have to agree with you there!

-Bri

[JetLeg]

Originally Posted by JetLeg
I am not trying to pursue, just trying to show that you cannot know you are right, because you cannot prove me wrong. If you cannot prove me wrong, there is no way you can know which one of us is right, it would be just arrogant.


And "not being able to be proved wrong" is not the same thing as "right." By your own admission, there is no difference between your god and a non-existent being.


But you can't prove that you are right as well, agree? The only way to know you are right, when you argue with someone is if you can prove him wrong. You cannot, ergo you cannot know that you are right. Ergo relativism with regards to uf-immaterial beings.

[jond]

My belief is not that an nc-being told me something.

My belief is that an nc-being wants something from me, not that he told me what it is.

How, then did you reach this conclusion? If you believe the nc-being wants something from you, it must have in some way communicated that to you. If it can communicate to you, it is no longer an nc-being. Sorry.

[JetLeg]

How did you come about this belief, given that you have no way of knowing whether the being even exists or not?

-Bri

I don't know. Just do.

[Bri]

I am saying that I have an intellectual right to believe this. You cannot know if you are right, or I am right, since you cannot prove me wrong.

I agree that you have a right to believe it. You do NOT have a right to act on your belief, given that there is no way your belief could be based on anything other than your own imagination.

It's true, I cannot know if there is an inconsequential being that wants us to wear green socks, but I CAN know that you also can't know if there is an inconsequential being that wants us to wear green socks. Therefore, your belief must originate entirely within your imagination, and even if true would just be coincidence.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

How, then did you reach this conclusion? If you believe the nc-being wants something from you, it must have in some way communicated that to you. If it can communicate to you, it is no longer an nc-being. Sorry.

Just as I don't need evidence that nc-being exists, I don't need evidence that nc-being wants something from me. I didn't say it actually communicated to me.

[uruk]

Like I said, possessing free will does not mean that you're in control of everything. Even a person who suffers has free will and can make choices. They can't choose to fly, and in some cases can't choose not to suffer, but they can make other choices. I understand. But I was refering to what happens to our free will when it comes against any plan that god has.


What I meant was that if we have no free will, we are essentially following a program (like a robot) or acting out a play that was written long before we were born rather than actually making choices.I'm sorry I didn't realize what you had meant when you used the term "robot". My mistake.
Of course if we were lead to believe that we had free will in that situation, we wouldn't know the difference.

But if god has an ultimate plan that he wished to be achieved reguardless of what our choices would be. That would mean god taking back our free will for his purposes. What kind of gift would that be?

Take for instance Christ's passion. God sent Jesus down to earth to be sacrificed so the act could absolve us of our sins. In order for that plan to happen. All the things that lead up to Jesus's capture and torture and crucifixion had to take place otherwise the sacrifice could not take place.
Everybody had to play thier part regaurdless of thier free will. Judas could have chosen not to betray jesus, But if he did not Jesus would not have been captured.
Pontious Pilot could have chosen to let Jesus go, But if he did had not the order of crucifixtion would not have been issued.

You could argue that other events could have taken place with other people, but the end result would have been the same. So that means god had to take away free will so that his plan could happen. What kind of a gift is that if you take it away whenever you felt like it?

Have you ever heard of the epithet "indian giver"? (yea I know it's racists, But please look up what it means)



The evidence seems to point to us not having free will at this point. Although I acknowledge that, I also hope that we do have free will. I hope so also. But as long as we believe we have it what's the difference. A difference that makes no difference is no difference.



We're talking about the Christian view of God, and Christians do believe in an afterlife as far as I know.

-BriIt's a nice luxury to have if you have the faith. But as an agnostic I don't have that luxury.
I "feel" there is something after this life. I just don't know what it is. But that could just be something that is a consequence of having a conciousness. The feeling that it once it started it won't have an ending. But then I have no memory of conciousness before I was concieved or born. Would it be the same after I die? Non-existance? There would be no "me" to worry about.

[JetLeg]

I agree that you have a right to believe it. You do NOT have a right to act on your belief, given that there is no way your belief could be based on anything other than your own imagination.

It's true, I cannot know if there is an inconsequential being that wants us to wear green socks, but I CAN know that you also can't know if there is an inconsequential being that wants us to wear green socks. Therefore, your belief must originate entirely within your imagination, and even if true would just be coincidence.

-Bri

First, I think that the idea that people shouldn't act on their beliefs a bit impossible from a psychological point of view. If you believe something, how can you not act on it? Imagine a person who believes that if the all the world does not wear green socks, everyone will go to hell after they die. How can he not act on it? If we add for example, that if everyone do wear green socks, they will go to heaven. If he cares about people, he will act on his beliefes. (Note - I don't actually believe that).

Second, how can you know that I CANNOT know. You can't prove me wrong, so how can you know that? It's arrogant of you.

[mr. ottle]

But you can't prove that you are right as well, agree? The only way to know you are right, when you argue with someone is if you can prove him wrong. You cannot, ergo you cannot know that you are right. Ergo relativism with regards to uf-immaterial beings.

The only thing I've said is that your immaterial being is indistinguishable from a non-existent being, which you have already conceded. Given how all these words are defined, I can be confident I am correct.

You are wrong, because what you are claiming is self-contradictory. I don't have to be making a claim at all when you do that.

[mr. ottle]

Second, how can you know that I CANNOT know. You can't prove me wrong, so how can you know that? It's arrogant of you.

As an aside, can we retire this particular "argument"? It's untrue, insulting, and juvenile.

If you have some reason to think that your god is anything other than a figment of your imagination, let's have it. Until you do, then why should we think it's anything but a figment?

[slingblade]

I am not trying to pursue, just trying to show that you cannot know you are right, because you cannot prove me wrong. If you cannot prove me wrong, there is no way you can know which one of us is right, it would be just arrogant.

I see, now.

I don't need to be right. I really don't. I don't care if I'm right.

Believing in God is a waste of time to me, and has resulted in my inviting abuse upon myself, to the point where I literally have no life to live any more.
It hurts me to continue to believe in a god. So I've stopped.

It doesn't even matter if gods are real or not. They make no difference to my life.

The people who believe in gods have, however, made only negative differences to my life. They've abused me to the point that I can no longer function in the world. I have no life. I will never have a life again.

I'm spending a few months watching my mother slowly die. After she's gone, I have no idea what I will do with myself.

Your god that makes no difference and can neither be proven or unproven is no more of consequence to me than the talking tomato you can neither prove or disprove. It isn't even an exercise in mental masturbation. If it were, I could at least expect a mental orgasm at some point, but that's not going to happen, either.

A difference which makes no difference is no difference.

You don't get that. Fine. Have fun. At least you still can.

[jond]

Just as I don't need evidence that nc-being exists, I don't need evidence that nc-being wants something from me. I didn't say it actually communicated to me.

If you believe it wants something from you, you MUST have had it communicate to you somehow. You might not be aware of the mechanism by which it communicated, but in order for you to have the information (in this case, that we should all wear green socks) it must have been communicated to you. And therefore, it's not a nc-being. If not, it's only in your head, and you should seek help rather than trying to put green socks on people.

[JetLeg]

As an aside, can we retire this particular "argument"? It's untrue, insulting, and juvenile.

If you have some reason to think that your god is anything other than a figment of your imagination, let's have it. Until you do, then why should we think it's anything but a figment?

I'm sorry about the 'arrogant'.

But I am serious about the argument.

Again -

You cannot be sure that you are right, unless you have a way to prove me wrong.
Agreed?
Then, you cannot be sure that you are right and I am wrong with regards to nc-immaterials.

[Bri]

First, I think that the idea that people shouldn't act on their beliefs a bit impossible from a psychological point of view. If you believe something, how can you not act on it? Imagine a person who believes that if the all the world does not wear green socks, everyone will go to hell after they die. How can he not act on it? If we add for example, that if everyone do wear green socks, they will go to heaven. If he cares about people, he will act on his beliefes. (Note - I don't actually believe that).

You admit that any belief you would have about an inconsequential being cannot possibly originate from anywhere other than their own mind, right?

In other words, this belief MUST come from your imagination or else the being is not inconsequential.

It would not be rational for you to act on a belief that you know originates entirely in your own mind.

Second, how can you know that I CANNOT know. You can't prove me wrong, so how can you know that? It's arrogant of you.

It's not arrogant, it's simple logic. You cannot possibly know what an inconsequential being wants by definition. You might believe that an inconsequential being wants you to do something, but it is utterly impossible for you to know that an inconsequential being wants you to do something.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

If you believe it wants something from you, you MUST have had it communicate to you somehow.


If you believe it wants something from you, you MUST have had it communicate to you somehow.

No. Again, I did not say I have evidence it wants something from me. Just that I can believe that it wants something from me.

[jond]

If you believe it wants something from you, you MUST have had it communicate to you somehow.

No. Again, I did not say I have evidence it wants something from me. Just that I can believe that it wants something from me.

Then you have no reason to believe it, and no right to inflict those beliefs on others.

[mr. ottle]

You cannot be sure that you are right, unless you have a way to prove me wrong.
Agreed?

Nope. Not agreed. You are wrong by definition. I am sure I am right when I am saying that you are wrong.

Unless you start giving us some reasons, then "JetLag is wrong" is the only conclusion.

[JetLeg]

Nope. Not agreed. You are wrong by definition. I am sure I am right when I am saying that you are wrong.

Unless you start giving us some reasons, then "JetLag is wrong" is the only conclusion.

If you are an atheist, then almost all the world thinks something else. To know you are right you must prove them wrong somehow. Otherwise you can't, it's relativism, it is a personal point of view, there is no way to decide right or wrong here...

Why don't we agree on this one?

[Bri]

JetLeg,

You are confusing knowledge and belief. Look them up. You may believe that this inconsequential being exists and wants us to wear green socks, but you do not know that this being exists, nor that if it does it wants us to wear green socks.

Besides that, even if you did actually know for a fact that there was a being who wanted you to wear green socks, why would you think that would give you the right to force everyone to wear green socks? You know I exist and let's pretend that I actually tell you that I want everyone to wear green socks. Why would my wishes give you the right to put green socks on anyone but yourself?

-Bri

[jond]

If you are an atheist, then almost all the world thinks something else. To know you are right you must prove them wrong somehow. Otherwise you can't, it's relativism, it is a personal point of view, there is no way to decide right or wrong here...

Why don't we agree on this one?

Jet, we agree you have the right to believe whatever you want. What we don't agree is that you have the right do something with that belief that has any impact on me unless you have evidence to back it up. Simple, right?

[Bri]

If you are an atheist, then almost all the world thinks something else. To know you are right you must prove them wrong somehow. Otherwise you can't, it's relativism, it is a personal point of view, there is no way to decide right or wrong here...

Why don't we agree on this one?

You are incorrect about the meaning of the term "atheist," which just means "not theist." An atheist simply holds no belief in a god. Indeed some atheists believe that there are no gods, but others simply don't hold a belief one way or the other.

Few atheists feel compelled to prove theists wrong. They don't have to. The burden of proof is on the person making the claim, which in this case is the theist.

-Bri

[mr. ottle]

If you are an atheist, then almost all the world thinks something else. To know you are right you must prove them wrong somehow. Otherwise you can't, it's relativism, it is a personal point of view, there is no way to decide right or wrong here...

Why don't we agree on this one?

Most of the world believes in a god that can interact in the real world. The argument with them is whether an observable effect is a direct manipulation from God or a result of natural laws (among other things).

And as an atheist, all I'm saying is I lack a belief in God. I don't have to disprove the infinite number of possible gods to lack that belief. I am absolutely right that I don't have a belief in any gods. I can't prove it to you that I lack those beliefs, so it must be your job to prove that I'm not a Muslim.

What we're disagreeing on is that there is some difference between the imaginary and the non-existent. Your belief in your non-material deity is no different from a belief in leprechauns.

Also, we are disagreeing that the inability to disprove the non-material somehow weakens a skeptical viewpoint.

[jimlintott]

JetLeg

It seems obvious to me that you do not understand the concept of falsifiability.

Read this article. (http://marvinfrench.com/p1/odds&ends/filchers.pdf)

Another, basically the same. (http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/moseley/ltonline/readings/filchers.html)

[uruk]

There are always constraints on free will. The freedom is to choose between the options that are available to you at the time, not to choose anything whatsoever. Understood. I was refering to a situation where the choice you made was negated by god. God altering or setting up a situation that forces you to make a choice that he wants for the greater good of his plan takes away your free will.


Of course that's not how it works. If God were to do something immoral, then he would no longer be omni-benevolent. Christians simply believe that it's against God's nature to do so, and that he never does (which would mean that he's omni-benevolent). And we can't prove or disprove it -- it's unfalsifiable. But you are employing a rationalization or rather a redifintion of an immoral act by wieghing it against an outcome so that god can comit an immoral act and call it good so that god can remain omni-benevolent.

Good and bad, moral and immoral are by definition diametricaly opposed.

In practice we do bad things or allow bad things to happen so that something good can take place from the result of the act. It does not mean the bad thing is no longer bad. We just chose to do it or allow it to happen.



If having free will to choose between good and evil IS the greater good, then God providing us the free will to choose between good and evil WOULD result in the greater good, don't you think? Only if having free will alone is the specific greater good that is sought.
But from the Christian perspective God's greater good is to have more people choose him.
Isn't that the reason he gave us free will, so that we could choose him freely and honestly?
Choosing evil would go against that greater good since god decrees that doing evil (and not repenting) will prevent you from being in his good graces.

Wouldn't this kind of defeat this purpose if giving us free will was his only greater good? It's only a means to an end.



The theory is that the freedom to choose evil (regardless of whether we actually choose evil) is such a great good that it would be better for us to have the choice and to always choose evil than for us to never have the choice at all. But the greater good of having free will does not redefine evil. The evil is still evil. Just a necessary evil.

Also the end result of always choosing evil goes against the Christian theory. Having free will alone does not seem to an end in itself, but rather a means to an end.



I don't know, but if so it is clear that people living there don't have the type of free will described above. Maybe. But in pratice people seem happy to give up something so that they can have something else. Such as giving up some personal freedoms so that they can have security.



See above. It would still result in a greater good than if we didn't have the freedom to choose. I don't see how if according to the Christian belief God's plan is to have us repent and follow his teachings and join him in heaven. If we all chose evil then it kind of puts a kink in that plan.



No, in this theory, the forseeable consequences of the action are taken into account when determining whether or not the action is moral or immoral. Well in the strictest sense, I disagree. An immoral act is by defintion an immoral act reguardless of the outcome. The end result does not mean the immoral act becomes moral. It means that committing the immoral act became necessary so that the end result could be achieved.

I can certainly see where you could say that the "bad" thing became the "right" thing to do in a given situation. But you would be ignoring and glossing over all the other consequences the "bad" thing has associated with it. I mean, there is a reason a "bad" thing is called a bad thing. And the good result is lessen by the bad thing that had to be done to get it.


Note that I agree that the ends don't always justify the means. In this theory, the means are themselves consequences, just as the ends are consequences. All consequences of an action must be weighed before determining whether or not the action is justified. Instead of "the ends don't justify the means" this theory is more like "the ends don't always justify the means." Well now you are changing the spirit of the saying to suit you.
In practice I would agree with you. The world is not black and white. And you could debate what is actually good and bad. But you do see what the saying is getting at. Any evil or immoral act that arrives at a good end also has an effect on how good that good end is.
I'm sure you've heard of a "Pyrric [sp?] Victory".


If something is immoral, you should refrain from doing it. So, let's say that a man who you know intends to kill his daughter asks you where his daughter is. He knows that you know where his daughter is. You also know that it is immoral to lie. According to "the ends never justify the means" you would have to tell the truth. But would telling the truth be the moral choice given that you can forsee the consequences? Well the better way out of this in order so that you would not have to lie would be to trying to convince the man not to kill his daughter or to restrain him or call authorities. Or if Ihe had gun pointed at me threating to shoot me If I did not tell him, I could choose to take the higher path and refuse to tell him and sacrifice myself in order save the daughter's life. I hear God pays heavy dividens for sacrificing yourself for the well being of others. And I did not have to lie.



Yes, stealing is evil but letting someone die is more evil. Therefore, if you have to make a choice between the two, stealing would be the moral action and letting them die would be the immoral action. In this case, the ends do justify the means. Sure, it sucks for the person being stolen from, but so be it! It would suck worse for the person dying if you didn't steal. Your arguing magnitude. One in relation to the other. This still does not redfine the immoral act into a moral one outside of that circumstance.

All it would mean that it is necessary to do the evil or immoral thing so that the person will not die. What if stealing the thing caused the person your stealing from to die? Like stealing medicine or oxygen they needed to live so the other could live. I just slid the moral magnitude back the other way.

There is a reason why an immoral act is called an immoral act. And it remains so dispite what the end result of committing that act is. It was just necessary so that the outcome could be achieved.



Well, true, to a point. We don't know what rules of ethics a god might be using, so if we're talking about the Christian God we would look to Christianity to tell us whether or not their God could be behaving in a moral way or not. In that regard, "the ends don't justify the means" is only relevant if Christians believe it applies both to human beings and to God. It is unclear whether they believe it applies to human beings, but I'm fairly certain that it cannot apply to Christian belief about God since the Christian God knows ALL consequences of his actions and therefore MUST look at the full consequences of an action in order to act morally. Well then certainly God is using a different set of ethics than the one he is imposing upon us. The old testament clearly states that "Thou shalt not kill". It does not say "I shall not kill".

But the saying "The ends do not justify the means" does imply that the all the consequences of actions are known. It says "the ends" not "some ends".
It also implies the moral value of the actions taken are not affected by the ends. That means an immoral act taken to achieve a good end does change the immoral act into a moral one.
Of course there is nothing to say that god has to be bound by this. But then it also means that god does use a different set of ethics for himself.



"Benefit" is not always good, quite true. And yes the means do have to be taken into account since they are also consequences of actions (I never meant to imply that they didn't).
Then it sort of means that the bad thing committed still has the bad aspect to it. It was not changed into a good thing.


Yes, I can see how it might apply, but I would also argue that it cannot apply to the Christian God, nor do Christians expect it to apply to their God. Well then that is being a bit arbitrary to ignore something that has some truth value to it because it does not allow you to attribute a characteristic to your god.



So that things are better for everyone (including those suffering). I can see how it might be a greater good to suffer and have free will than to never suffer at all, yes.I don't see how the ones suffering so that we all have free will is any better for the suffering than the ones who get free will and do not suffer. Thier sufferning is a necessary bad thing so that every one can benefit from free will. It does not make it any less bad.



That's another question entirely. Certainly if the same good can be achieved through other means, it would be better. The argument here is that the same good cannot be achieved through other means. But this still does not redefine the theft as a good thing. Just that it was necessary for it be done.



No, it doesn't. Not to any Christian anyway, and we're talking about the Christian God here. If you would like to posit another god that cannot do anything that we might consider "wrong" then I'll agree that your god cannot exist and is a logical absurdity. But like it or not, the Christian God could possibly exist. You are right. I got the meaning a bit skewed. Omni benevolence can mean that you choose not to do wrong. But then that implies that you are capable of doing wrong. Which would mean that at any point you do something wrong or bad you loose that characteristic.



Yes, hence the example I gave you of stealing to save a life (action) or not stealing and allowing the person to die (non-action).
-Bri
But this still does not redefine a bad or immoral action into a good or moral action.

[Bri]

Understood. I was refering to a situation where the choice you made was negated by god.

Agreed, in that instance he is taking away your free will. But that is not to say that he is taking away your free will entirely.

But you are employing a rationalization or rather a redifintion of an immoral act by wieghing it against an outcome so that god can comit an immoral act and call it good so that god can remain omni-benevolent.

I disagree. We are asking whether a particular act is the right or wrong choice in a given situation. In the case of stealing to save a life, it is the right choice to steal and the wrong choice to let the person die. You may feel compelled to insist that stealing is always immoral, but in my book "moral" means "right" and "immoral" means "wrong." In no way can you say that it would be the "right" or "moral" choice to allow someone to die in this situation.

Good and bad, moral and immoral are by definition diametricaly opposed.

Moral and immoral may be two ends of a spectrum, implying that some actions are better or worse (more moral or less moral) than others. If you have a limited number of choices, we can say that the "right" action is the most moral choice, and the "wrong" action is the least moral.

Certainly smiting someone has some negative consequence, but Christians don't expect that their God only performs acts that have no negative consequences whatsoever; rather, they expect that their God chooses the most moral act in a given circumstance -- that is, the choice that is necessary for the greater good.

In practice we do bad things or allow bad things to happen so that something good can take place from the result of the act. It does not mean the bad thing is no longer bad. We just chose to do it or allow it to happen.

The sentence I have placed in bold means precisely that in practice the ends DO sometimes justify the means! Thank you!

Sure, something bad will happen in either case, but in this case the right (or more moral) act is the one that would lead to the best overall result (the person lives even though some property is stolen) and the wrong (or less moral) act is the one that would lead to the worst overall result (the person dies but no property is stolen).

Only if having free will alone is the specific greater good that is sought.

And it very well could be. That's my point.


But from the Christian perspective God's greater good is to have more people choose him.
Isn't that the reason he gave us free will, so that we could choose him freely and honestly?
Choosing evil would go against that greater good since god decrees that doing evil (and not repenting) will prevent you from being in his good graces.

Wouldn't this kind of defeat this purpose if giving us free will was his only greater good? It's only a means to an end.

If God wants us to freely choose him, then yes free will would be the only means to that end. Therefore, even if we all chose evil, it might still be a greater good than having no possibility to meet the goal at all.

If the goal is for us to freely choose God, I'm not certain how we could have any possibility of meeting that goal unless we also had the ability to fail to meet the goal (to not choose God). So I would argue that having the possibility of meeting the goal is better than having no possibility whatsoever of meeting the ultimate goal.

But the greater good of having free will does not redefine evil. The evil is still evil. Just a necessary evil.

But a lesser evil than having no free will (and no possibility whatsoever to meet the goal).

Also the end result of always choosing evil goes against the Christian theory. Having free will alone does not seem to an end in itself, but rather a means to an end.

Let's try to illustrate by showing how much "goodness" may be introduced into or removed from the world from various events taking place:


having free will: +500
not having free will: -500
doing a good deed: +1
doing a bad deed: -1
reaching the goal (choosing God): +1000
not reaching the goal (not choosing God): -1000


Free will is good, so it is worth 500 "goodness" points, but no free will is bad, so we have to subtract 500 goodness points. Each good deed we do adds a point of "goodness" to the world, each bad deed takes one away (let's say that there are 100 deeds that we can do total). Reaching the ultimate goal of choosing God means 1000 points of "goodness" added to the world, whereas if we don't choose God it takes away 1000 points of "goodness" from the world.

If God gave us no free will, we would have -1500 points: we would have no free will (-500 points), we could do no good deeds (0 points) or bad deeds (0 points) since those require free will, and we couldn't freely choose God (-1000 points).

Let's say we are given free will, but we fail miserably and do 100 bad deeds: We get +500 for having free will, but -100 for doing the bad deeds and -1000 for not reaching the goal, so our score is -600.

As you can see, having free will is better (in this case a lesser evil) even if we fail miserably. Of course, if we succeed it's better still.

I don't see how if according to the Christian belief God's plan is to have us repent and follow his teachings and join him in heaven. If we all chose evil then it kind of puts a kink in that plan.

According to you, God's plan is for us to follow his teachings of our own free will. Unfortunately, that goal has exactly zero chance of being reached unless there is the possibility of us choosing evil instead. However, even if we chose evil, it is still better (or in this case a lesser evil) than if we didn't have free will at all (see above).

I can certainly see where you could say that the "bad" thing became the "right" thing to do in a given situation.

Bingo!

But you would be ignoring and glossing over all the other consequences the "bad" thing has associated with it. I mean, there is a reason a "bad" thing is called a bad thing. And the good result is lessen by the bad thing that had to be done to get it.

In the case of stealing to save a life: there are two evils, one of them is the lesser of the two evils and is the right choice (more moral or less immoral depending on how you want to look at it).

I'm sure you've heard of a "Pyrric [sp?] Victory".

Pyrrhic. Yes, that simply means that the means are too costly to justify the ends. It is true that the ends don't always justify the means (but sometimes they do!) In my view, you have to weight ALL of the consequences (both the means and the ends) in order to decide which choice is the right (more moral) one.

Well the better way out of this in order so that you would not have to lie would be to trying to convince the man not to kill his daughter or to restrain him or call authorities.

Of course if there was a better third option that would lead to better overall consequences then you would take that, but that's not part of this hypothetical.

In this hypothetical, no other options are possible (please don't make me complicate the story by adding reasons why no other options are possible, just accept it). You have to answer him either by telling the truth (forseeably leading to the girl's death) or by lying to him (saving her life).

Your arguing magnitude. One in relation to the other. This still does not redfine the immoral act into a moral one outside of that circumstance.

Semantics. The question is whether or not the act of lying in and of itself is wrong so that in order to do the "right" thing you would have to tell the man the truth. If the ends don't justify the means in this case, then you would have to tell the truth and allow the girl to die.

Well then certainly God is using a different set of ethics than the one he is imposing upon us. The old testament clearly states that "Thou shalt not kill". It does not say "I shall not kill".

First of all, a more accurate translation is "thou shalt not murder." The Bible goes on to specify under what circumstances you are allowed to kill.

Second of all, nobody said that God had to operate under the same rules as people. Clearly he can't operate under the same rules and make moral decisions, given that he can forsee all of the consequences of his actions and we cannot.

I don't see how the ones suffering so that we all have free will is any better for the suffering than the ones who get free will and do not suffer.

I never said that those who suffer have it better than those who don't suffer. I said that everyone -- including the sufferer -- benefits from suffering.

Thier sufferning is a necessary bad thing so that every one can benefit from free will. It does not make it any less bad.

Semantics. It is right (more moral) if suffering is for the greater good.

But this still does not redefine the theft as a good thing. Just that it was necessary for it be done.

Semantics. It is right (more moral) if the theft is for the greater good.

You are right. I got the meaning a bit skewed. Omni benevolence can mean that you choose not to do wrong. But then that implies that you are capable of doing wrong. Which would mean that at any point you do something wrong or bad you loose that characteristic.

Correct. My point is that the Christian God may be omni-benevolent as long as what he does is for the greater good, according to how Christians define omni-benevolence. Now, you may want to define the word differently in order to preclude the Christian God from being omni-benevolent, but in order to have an honest discussion about whether the Christian God can logically exist, we need to use the definition that Christians use to describe their God.

But this still does not redefine a bad or immoral action into a good or moral action.

Again, semantics.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

Jet, we agree you have the right to believe whatever you want. What we don't agree is that you have the right do something with that belief that has any impact on me unless you have evidence to back it up. Simple, right?

But that is not to the point. My point was that you cannot know that you are right since you cannot disprove me, so you are not "more right" than I am. How can you know your position is the right one without disproving the positions of others?

[JetLeg]

You are incorrect about the meaning of the term "atheist," which just means "not theist." An atheist simply holds no belief in a god. Indeed some atheists believe that there are no gods, but others simply don't hold a belief one way or the other.

Few atheists feel compelled to prove theists wrong. They don't have to. The burden of proof is on the person making the claim, which in this case is the theist.

-Bri

But I am not sure about the burden of proof. You need to disprove the positions of all others to know that you are right somehow, aren't you?

[jimlintott]

But that is not to the point. My point was that you cannot know that you are right since you cannot disprove me, so you are not "more right" than I am. How can you know your position is the right one without disproving the positions of others?

E-V-I-D-E-N-C-E

It is possible for evidence to show that nobody had the right position.

[JetLeg]

And how do you prove the need for evidence? What do you prove that with?

[uruk]

Agreed, in that instance he is taking away your free will. But that is not to say that he is taking away your free will entirely. Then free will is not truly free. Only when god wants it to be free.



I disagree. We are asking whether a particular act is the right or wrong choice in a given situation. In the case of stealing to save a life, it is the right choice to steal and the wrong choice to let the person die. You may feel compelled to insist that stealing is always immoral, but in my book "moral" means "right" and "immoral" means "wrong." In no way can you say that it would be the "right" or "moral" choice to allow someone to die in this situation.
I am talking about the moral value of the act itself. A "bad act" may be the "right" choice in to achieve a specific end. But the moral value of the end does not change the moral value of the "bad" act. It is still a bad act that leads to a good end.


Moral and immoral may be two ends of a spectrum, implying that some actions are better or worse (more moral or less moral) than others. If you have a limited number of choices, we can say that the "right" action is the most moral choice, and the "wrong" action is the least moral. The fact that you are limited to just making bad acts inorder to achieve a good end still does not change the fact that those acts are still immoral or bad

Certainly smiting someone has some negative consequence, but Christians don't expect that their God only performs acts that have no negative consequences whatsoever; rather, they expect that their God chooses the most moral act in a given circumstance -- that is, the choice that is necessary for the greater good.
So then you're saying God can commit immoral and bad acts just so long as the outcome is good because the better the outcome the less immoral the act is. But wait! the act is still immoral, Just considered "less" immoral.
What does that say about omni-benevolence?


[quote]The sentence I have placed in bold means precisely that in practice the ends DO sometimes justify the means! Thank you! Nope. I just said that we just allow it. We just accept that a bad thing had to be done and ignore the other consequences of the act .

Sure, something bad will happen in either case, but in this case the right (or more moral) act is the one that would lead to the best overall result (the person lives even though some property is stolen) and the wrong (or less moral) act is the one that would lead to the worst overall result (the person dies but no property is stolen). but my point is that actions that are still bad and immoral. Bad things that have to be done so that good things can result. That would nean that god would have to do bad things so that good things happen. Which would mean that God is not omni-benevolent.



And it very well could be. That's my point. I believe the bible says a different greater good is god's goal rather than just free will alone. You even say that its possible that god temporarily suspends free will so that his plan can proceed. If giving us free will is good what is taking free will away?



If God wants us to freely choose him, then yes free will would be the only means to that end. Therefore, even if we all chose evil, it might still be a greater good than having no possibility to meet the goal at all.


If the goal is for us to freely choose God, I'm not certain how we could have any possibility of meeting that goal unless we also had the ability to fail to meet the goal (to not choose God). So I would argue that having the possibility of meeting the goal is better than having no possibility whatsoever of meeting the ultimate goal.
But at this point the choice itself is not inherently good or evil, and evil still has to be around so that the choice can be made.
So that means that god allows evil to exist for his plan to work. But is'nt allowing evil or bad things to happen also a bad thing? Yes but it is a necessary evil so that god's greater plan can exists. But those evil things are still evil.


But a lesser evil than having no free will (and no possibility whatsoever to meet the goal). But it is still evil.



Let's try to illustrate by showing how much "goodness" may be introduced or removed into the world from various events taking place:


having free will: +500
not having free will: -500
doing a good deed: +1
doing a bad deed: -1
reaching the goal (everyone chooses to believe in God): +1000
not reaching the goal (not everybody chooses to believe in God): -1000


Free will is good, so it is worth 500 "goodness" points, but no free will is bad, so we have to subtract 500 goodness points. Each good deed we do adds a point of "goodness" to the world, each bad deed takes one away (let's say that there are 100 deeds that we can do total). Reaching the ultimate goal of choosing to believe in God means 1000 points of "goodness" added to the world, whereas if we don't believe in God it takes away 1000 points of "goodness" from the world.

If God gave us no free will, we would have -1500 points: we would have no free will (-500 points), we could do no good deeds (0 points) or bad deeds (0 points) since those require free will, and we couldn't freely choose to believe in God (-1000 points).

Let's say we are given free will, but we fail miserably and do 100 bad deeds: We get +500 for having free will, but -100 for doing the bad deeds and -1000 for not reaching the goal, so our score is -600.

As you can see, having free will is better (in this case a lesser evil) even if we fail miserably. Of course, if we succeed it's better still. Assigning arbitray numbers to show an offset of some sort still does not change that fact the bad and evil things are still have a level of evil assigned to it.
God still as to do or allow bad and evil things to happen so that his plan will work.



According to you, God's plan is for us to follow his teachings of our own free will. Unfortunately, that goal has exactly zero chance of being reached unless there is the possibility of us choosing evil instead. However, even if we chose evil, it is still better (or in this case a lesser evil) than if we didn't have free will at all (see above). I believe that is Christianities view. isn't it? And this still does not change the fact that God still has to do or allow evil or bad things. wether it it less evil or not makes no difference, the act is still an evil act.



Bingo! But the bad thing is still a bad thing. What does that say about omni-benevolence?



In the case of stealing to save a life: there are two evils, one of them is the lesser of the two evils and is the right choice (more moral or less immoral depending on how you want to look at it). Again lesser or more does not matter. It is still evil.



Pyrrhic. Yes, that simply means that the means are too costly to justify the ends. It is true that the ends don't always justify the means (but sometimes they do!) In my view, you have to weight ALL of the consequences (both the means and the ends) in order to decide which choice is the right (more moral) one. In my view there is no justification. Just what consequences you are willing to deal with. The good thing does not cancell out the bad thing. It's a matter of what you are willing to overlook.

Of course if there was a better third option that would lead to better overall consequences then you would take that, but that's not part of this hypothetical.

In this hypothetical, no other options are possible (please don't make me complicate the story by adding reasons why no other options are possible, just accept it). You have to answer him either by lying (forseeably leading to the girl's death) or by telling him the truth (saving her life). Well now that I am unrealistcaly constrained into a forced choice (sounds familiar?) I would say that I would choose to lie to save the girl. (remember my other choices were taken away from me) Because I have no other choice to take. I am forced to make an immoral choice because that is the only choice available to me that will lead to the desired outcome.
(Is god also constrained in what he has to do to achieve his goal? Are his decisions also similarly constrained? What does that say about omni-potence?)

It's kind of like the choice god give us. God says we are free to choose to follow him or not.
If I choose to follow him I am rewarded by going to heaven. If I don't choose him I am consigned to hell. Sure I can freely choose either one but what kind of a choice is that?

Free will, yea but how free is that will when the choices we have have that kind of a consequence?

Semantics. The question is whether or not the act of lying in and of itself is wrong so that in order to do the "right" thing you would have to tell the man the truth. If the ends don't justify the means in this case, then you would have to tell the truth.
It's a question of what you are willing to do to achieve a desired outcome. It's also semantics to say "that a bad thing is the right thing to do", you're playing with words.
It is more accurate to say "that this act was necessary to achieve this goal." The act was a "bad" act but it was necessary to achieve a "good" goal.


First of all, a more accurate translation is "thou shalt not murder." The Bible goes on to specify under what circumstances you are allowed to kill. Sorry, I guess I refered to the layman's version. You know, Cecil B Demile.

Second of all, nobody said that God had to operate under the same rules as people. Clearly he can't operate under the same rules and make moral decisions, given that he can forsee all of the consequences of his actions and we cannot. Well then god does operate under a different set of moral codes than we do. But Than what does "in his image" mean?



I never said that those who suffer have it better than those who don't suffer. I said that everyone -- including the sufferer -- benefits from suffering. By having free will? The suffering guy may be willing to give up his free will if the suffering would stop.

May be you could answer this for me. Do we still have free will in heaven?
Is suffering still a price we have to pay for free will in heaven?



Semantics. It is right (more moral) if suffering is for the greater good.

So suffering is good? To who? The ones who suffer or the ones who benefits from the suffering? Is the greater good still so great if suffering is required for it's existance. Would not the greater good be even greater if there were no suffering to achieve it? As your numbers put it, one subtracts from the other. Greater good without the suffering would be greater than the greater good with the suffering.

Semantics. It is right (more moral) if the theft is for the greater good.
It's still a bad thing for the one who was stolen from. But we choose to overlook his loss for the greater good. Still greater good without the theft is greater than the greater good with the theft.
The subtraction caused by the theft taints the greater good.


Correct. My point is that the Christian God may be omni-benevolent as long as what he does is for the greater good, according to how Christians define omni-benevolence. Now, you may want to define the word differently in order to preclude the Christian God from being omni-benevolent, but in order to have an honest discussion about whether the Christian God can logically exist, we need to use the definition that Christians use to describe their God. But that's redefining the meaning of the word to suite a desired characteristic. It's omni-benevolence, but not really. Its a christian interpretation of omni-benevolence.
That kind of defeats the purpose of having a dictionary. The word has an accepted definition and you have to see if your description of god fits that definition, other wise it's something else.



Again, semantics.

-BriBut no less true.

[jimlintott]

And how do you prove the need for evidence? What do you prove that with?

I believe you just asked for evidence.

Why?

[mr. ottle]

And how do you prove the need for evidence? What do you prove that with?

Um. This question is meaningless, I'm afraid.

Don't think of it as "evidence." Think of it as "reasons to accept one version of reality over the infinite number of others."

Think of the things you don't believe -- there must be something. And think of why you don't believe them but do believe something else.

That's how I feel about all the assertions you've made. You are not giving me no reasons to accept anything you're saying over the much simpler explanations (look up Occam's Razor sometime) I currently hold.

[Bri]

But I am not sure about the burden of proof. You need to disprove the positions of all others to know that you are right somehow, aren't you?

Right about what?

I have no belief either for or against the existence of leprechauns. No, I don't have to prove or disprove leprechauns in order to not have a belief about them.

However, if you want to convince me that leprechauns are real, the burden of proof is on you to provide evidence.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

E-V-I-D-E-N-C-E

It is possible for evidence to show that nobody had the right position.

So you say that if a person has no evidence, you do not need to disprove his position?

[Bri]

uruk,

I feel like in some cases I'm answering the same questions over and over again, so this keeps getting longer and longer. Feel free to prune out redundant questions because the answer won't change!

Then free will is not truly free. Only when god wants it to be free.

Yup. You can't fly, so it's not truly free.

I am talking about the moral value of the act itself.

There is only one act you can perform. That act is one of the following:


stealing (and thereby saving a life)
not stealing (and thereby letting someone die)


One of those choices is more moral than the other. That choice is the right act to perform given those two possible choices.


A "bad act" may be the "right" choice in to achieve a specific end.

In other words, the end DOES justify the means in this case, in contradiction with "the ends don't justify the means" as you've said previously.

The act itself is one of the two choices above. If you choose stealing, then it IS the right and most moral choice, so how can it be a "bad act?" The act that involves not stealing is the wrong and most immoral choice, so how could it be the "good act?"

But the moral value of the end does not change the moral value of the "bad" act. It is still a bad act that leads to a good end.

I disagree that acts without context have moral values. In this case, it is obvious that the act of stealing is the most moral act possible in that circumstance. More to the point, if you lived your life according to "the ends don't justify the means," you would morally have to let the person die. Therefore, it is much more apt to say "the ends don't always justify the means."

The fact that you are limited to just making bad acts inorder to achieve a good end still does not change the fact that those acts are still immoral or bad

If you choose a "bad act" to achieve a good end, then you are admitting that the end DOES justify the means.

We are talking about which course of action would be the most moral course of action to take. You cannot say "both courses of action are immoral" because that doesn't help you to decide which action is the correct one. You have to make a judgment concerning which is less immoral or more moral. In order to do that you have to consider the consequences of both choices. If you assert that the ends don't justify the means, you would have to do nothing, which means letting the person die, which is decidedly the less moral (more immoral) of the two choices.

So then you're saying God can commit immoral and bad acts just so long as the outcome is good because the better the outcome the less immoral the act is. But wait! the act is still immoral, Just considered "less" immoral.
What does that say about omni-benevolence?

To say that act A is "less immoral" than act B is equivalent to saying that act A is "more moral" than act B. To say that act A is "more immoral" than act B is equivalent to saying that act A is "less moral" than act B. God is omni-benevolent as long as his choices achieve the greatest good possible.

There are no absolute "immoral" or "moral" acts, but rather a continuum based on the context of circumstance. This is clear from the mental gymnastics you have to go through to state that "A 'bad act' may be the 'right' choice in to achieve a specific end," and then pretend that it's not in direct contradiction with your premise that "the ends don't justify the means."

Nope. I just said that we just allow it. We just accept that a bad thing had to be done and ignore the other consequences of the act .

Pray tell, what do you think "the ends don't justify the means" means?

Why do we allow it? Because it would be utterly absurd to let the person die so that you don't steal, that's why. The ends, in fact, DO justify the means under those circumstances.

but my point is that actions that are still bad and immoral. Bad things that have to be done so that good things can result.

Again, you are just restating that the ends DO justify the means.


That would nean that god would have to do bad things so that good things happen. Which would mean that God is not omni-benevolent.

By your definition of omni-benevolence, perhaps. But your definition is not one that many other people, including Christians, hold.

In order for you to hold that definition, you have to keep contradicting yourself, so it's no surprise that the definition would lead to a contradiction! But you might consider using a definition that Christians actually use if you intend to disprove the Christian God. Otherwise, you've only managed to disprove some other god that you've made up.

Assigning arbitray numbers to show an offset of some sort still does not change that fact the bad and evil things are still have a level of evil assigned to it.

The illustration shows that it is possible that in order to maximize the goodness in the world, we MUST have free will even if having free will results in us always doing evil. Not having free will results in less goodness than having free will, regardless of how many good or evil deeds we do because of it.

Well now that I am unrealistcaly constrained into a forced choice (sounds familiar?) I would say that I would choose to lie to save the girl. (remember my other choices were taken away from me) Because I have no other choice to take. I am forced to make an immoral choice because that is the only choice available to me that will lead to the desired outcome.

So once again, the end DOES justify the means.

(Is god also constrained in what he has to do to achieve his goal? Are his decisions also similarly constrained? What does that say about omni-potence?)

Possibly. It says that it is possible that the most good can only be achieved if there is also the possibility of evil.

It's a question of what you are willing to do to achieve a desired outcome.

The ends justify the means!

It's also semantics to say "that a bad thing is the right thing to do", you're playing with words.

Except that I never said that. I said that whether an act is "bad" or not depends on its context. In the context where stealing something saves someone's life, it's not bad at all -- it's good.

It is more accurate to say "that this act was necessary to achieve this goal." The act was a "bad" act but it was necessary to achieve a "good" goal.

Both mean the same thing as "the ends justify the means."

Well then god does operate under a different set of moral codes than we do. But Than what does "in his image" mean?

God operates under a different set of moral codes only insofar as God must act to achieve the greatest good possible, whereas we act to achieve the greatest good that we can given our limitations.

By having free will? The suffering guy may be willing to give up his free will if the suffering would stop.

You may be willing to spend your entire life locked in a steel box in order to avoid the possibility of being hit by a truck, but that doesn't mean it would lead to the greatest good.

May be you could answer this for me. Do we still have free will in heaven?
Is suffering still a price we have to pay for free will in heaven?

I don't know. You'd have to ask a Christian. My guess is that from the descriptions I've heard of heaven, the choices are limited there, but there is no suffering either.

So suffering is good?

Yes, assuming the freedom to choose good in the face of temptation to choose evil is a greater good.

To who? The ones who suffer or the ones who benefits from the suffering?

We all benefit if we all have the freedom to choose between good and evil.

Is the greater good still so great if suffering is required for it's existance. Would not the greater good be even greater if there were no suffering to achieve it?

That is assuming that the greatest good can be achieved without suffering, and the presumption here is that it can't by its very nature. Can you prove that it can?

As your numbers put it, one subtracts from the other. Greater good without the suffering would be greater than the greater good with the suffering.

Do the math, and show me a scenario using the numbers in my illustration how a greater good can be achieved without free will than with it. Looking at the BEST scenario without free will and the WORST scenario with free will, it is clear that the greater good is always achieved with free will than without it.

It's still a bad thing for the one who was stolen from. But we choose to overlook his loss for the greater good.

The ends justify the means.

Still greater good without the theft is greater than the greater good with the theft.

Better than that would be saving the person without the theft and also finding a million dollars. But that's not a possibility in the scenario I presented.

The subtraction caused by the theft taints the greater good.

And yet it's still the greatest good possible in the scenario I described, and therefore theft is the most moral choice.

But that's redefining the meaning of the word to suite a desired characteristic.

No, it's the common meaning of the word. You are redefining it in order to prove the impossibility of an "omni-benevolent god". But you're not disproving the Christian God at all.

I can disprove the possibility of an omni-benevolent god also by re-defining "omni-benevolent" to mean "mortal," in which case I can claim that "mortal god" is a contradiction and therefore the existence of an omni-benevolent god is impossible!

Of course, if I want to disprove the Christian God (rather than my own "mortal god") then I have to use terms in the way Christians use it.


It's omni-benevolence, but not really. Its a christian interpretation of omni-benevolence.

If you say so. I won't quibble except to say that it's the common definition of the word and the one you're using is not. Regardless, you have to use theirs if you want to disprove a God that contains the characteristics they believe their God to possess.

-Bri

[uruk]

So you say that if a person has no evidence, you do not need to disprove his position?

The lack of evidence severly weakens that persons position. If his position does not conform to logic, his position is weakened even more. So you get to a point where his position becomes improbable. It practicaly disproves itself.

[uruk]

Hey bri I'm going to conceed to the point because we are starting to go in circles and I 'm getting tired.

You can craft any hypothetical situation into forcing a point. You will admit that the hypotheical scenario you gave me was not a realitic one because of the imposed restrictions. And I still could have chosen not to say anything at all and it still would have saved the girl. Although that would technicaly be a lie of omission.

Things like stealing, killing, raping, murdering, destroying all have an intrinsic moral value assigned to it by the text book definition of those terms.
And I still believe that that intrinsic moral value does not go away just because of the moral value of the outcome. Why? because the moral value of the outcome is also dependent on circumstance. There is always some point of view where the moral value of the outcome does not alter the moral value of the act dependent upon the circumstance.

For instance the victim of the theft and the importance of the item that was stolen from him. What if the item stolen was necessary for his survival?

As far as the Christian definition of an omni-benevolent god, is a redefinition it self. And from a brief look on the internet the christian version of omnibenevolence you gave me doesn't coincide with alot of other definitions of omnibenevolence.

But it was alot of fun and I learned alot.
Thanks

[jond]

But that is not to the point. My point was that you cannot know that you are right since you cannot disprove me, so you are not "more right" than I am. How can you know your position is the right one without disproving the positions of others?

As I posted before, and you seem to have missed: You have no reason to believe it, and no right to inflict those beliefs on others.

(I've bolded the key phrase for you.)

I don't need to disprove you, you need to prove your claim. You're making a claim that your n/c being exists. It's up to you to prove that claim, not me to disprove it. It's not a question of being more right, it's a question of simple reasoning. If you have no reason (and you earlier stated that you don't) to belive that it exists and wants you to do something, then you cannot expect anyone to believe you. If you don't grasp that concept, then you're going to have a really hard time here in the real world.

[Bri]

You can craft any hypothetical situation into forcing a point. You will admit that the hypotheical scenario you gave me was not a realitic one because of the imposed restrictions. And I still could have chosen not to say anything at all and it still would have saved the girl. Although that would technicaly be a lie of omission.

Like I said, I can continue to add more and more details until it becomes a more realistic scenario where you only have two choices. For example, if you don't lie to him, he will find her anyway and kill her. So the choices are "lie" or "don't lie" -- the result is still the same, the more moral choice is to lie. I was just trying to avoid added complexity and show a simple example where "the ends don't justify the means" isn't valid.

Things like stealing, killing, raping, murdering, destroying all have an intrinsic moral value assigned to it by the text book definition of those terms.

I've shown that you are wrong. Killing, for example does not have intrinsic moral value. If it did, then the punishment for killing someone would always be the same. Justified killing isn't morally wrong at all. Unjustified killing (which we call "murder") may have different moral values depending on extenuating circumstances. So, no, the act of killing doesn't have a set moral value, but rather its moral value depends on the circumstances.

And I still believe that that intrinsic moral value does not go away just because of the moral value of the outcome. Why? because the moral value of the outcome is also dependent on circumstance. There is always some point of view where the moral value of the outcome does not alter the moral value of the act dependent upon the circumstance.

I don't understand what you mean by this. My argument is that the moral value of an act is based on it's forseeable outcome, not necessary the actual outcome. In some cases, unforseeable results can occur (either better or worse than the predicted outcome) which you wouldn't be responsible for since you're not omniscient.

God, however, IS omniscient and therefore would be responsible for the actual outcome, not just the forseeable outcome. This is why his moral responsibility seems to differ slightly from ours.

For instance the victim of the theft and the importance of the item that was stolen from him. What if the item stolen was necessary for his survival?

Again, you make my point for me. If stealing always has the same moral value, it wouldn't matter what was stolen. In this case, if the thing you are stealing is necessary for his survival, you would have to take that into account as a consequence of the action. That might of course make all the difference as to which choice was more moral.

As far as the Christian definition of an omni-benevolent god, is a redefinition it self. And from a brief look on the internet the christian version of omnibenevolence you gave me doesn't coincide with alot of other definitions of omnibenevolence.

Perhaps you could post some references. I believe that the idea that what God does is for the greater good is a Christian idea. You must think Christian theologians particularly dense if they think their God never performs acts such as killing, given that God smites people fairly regularly in the Bible.

But it was alot of fun and I learned alot.

Me too! Thanks for the discussion!

-Bri

[JetLeg]

As I posted before, and you seem to have missed: You have no reason to believe it, and no right to inflict those beliefs on others.

(I've bolded the key phrase for you.)

I don't need to disprove you, you need to prove your claim. You're making a claim that your n/c being exists. It's up to you to prove that claim, not me to disprove it. It's not a question of being more right, it's a question of simple reasoning. If you have no reason (and you earlier stated that you don't) to belive that it exists and wants you to do something, then you cannot expect anyone to believe you. If you don't grasp that concept, then you're going to have a really hard time here in the real world.

How do you prove that you need reasons for something?

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't understand what you mean by this. My argument is that the moral value of an act is based on it's forseeable outcome, not necessary the actual outcome. In some cases, unforseeable results can occur (either better or worse than the predicted outcome) which you wouldn't be responsible for since you're not omniscient.

-Bri

It's the same discussion we had earlier. Kant's ethics would not admit consequences into distinctions of right and wrong. An action was "moral" if (in his first formulation) you could will that act to be a universal action or (in his second formulation) if you treat all people as an end and not merely as a means to an end. The consequences, forseen or otherwise, do not enter into the discussion. It is the intention of the action that is important.

The problems we always end with in ethics discussions is that we do seem to use two different paradigms to discuss moral action -- utilitarianism and deontology. A complete "duty based" system creates significant problems. If it is always a sin to lie, then is it really a sin to lie to that Nazi thug at the door asking about Jews I have hidden in the basement?

But the same is true of consequentialism. We see problems with it as a pure model for deciding all moral action -- if I intended to do good but bad occurs, am I really a bad person, or did a bad thing just happen? If the greatest good is the desired outcome, then scapegoating is justifiable? It really is OK for one person to suffer for the greater good of society?

Most Christians do not view God as a consequentialist. They seem to think of God as good by definition and what they seem to mean by that is that God works from a deontological perspective. They do, however, seem to make God a consequentialist when it helps with certain arguments, as in this thread.

Or here's another one. Say I'm a trucker. I don't check my break fluid one day. In scenario one a kid jumps out in front of me and I run him over because I just can't break quickly enough, but I could have if I had checked the break fluid levels. So you call me negligent. It just seems wrong to call a trucker who doesn't check his brake fluid levels and nothing happens negligent.

Sometimes we look at consequences and sometimes we don't.

[jond]

How do you prove that you need reasons for something?

Do you really believe that, or are you just playing games?

[JetLeg]

The problems we always end with in ethics discussions is that we do seem to use two different paradigms to discuss moral action -- utilitarianism and deontology.


There is also virtue ethics, which deals with what type of person you should be, what qualities you should possess.

[Ichneumonwasp]

There is also virtue ethics, which deals with what type of person you should be, what qualities you should possess.

Yes, quite right. But most people do not frame God's character in terms of virtue ethics because God is supposed to be an absolute and virtues are means, not absolutes.

[Bri]

Ichneumonwasp,

I understand your point, and I'm not exactly arguing for utilitarianism so much as pointing out that deontology presents severe ethical problems in some instances. So I'm not saying that the ends always justify the means, but rather that the ends have to be taken into account.

I don't know what classification it falls under, but what I suggested was certainly not pure utilitarianism (perhaps it's a subset of it) since I'm not considering the actual end results, but only the forseeable (perhaps "reasonably predictable" is a better term) results. You wouldn't be responsible for a result that couldn't be predicted. And it goes both ways -- if you do something that would predictably lead to disaster but happens to not in one case, then it might still be a problem (reckless endangerment).

Now it is possible that pure utilitarianism actually does work for God, given that he's omniscient and can accurately predict all of the results of his actions. Were the trucker in your example omniscient, he would definitely be negligent because he would know for certain the results of his actions.

At any rate, my point was that I think uruk is being a little impractical by suggesting that a Christian must always follow a strict deontology model, particularly in relation to their God. Obviously that model in its pure form will lead to absurd results.

It seems quite clear that Christians do not believe their God to utilize a pure deontology model of morality when they describe him as "omni-benevolent" (if indeed they use that term to describe their God).

BTW, thank you for your insight and for clarifying what was becoming a murky discussion!

-Bri

[JetLeg]

Do you really believe that, or are you just playing games?

I don't know if I really believe it, I am a bit confused.

[Ichneumonwasp]

I understand your point, and I'm not exactly arguing for utilitarianism so much as pointing out that deontology presents severe ethical problems in some instances. So I'm not saying that the ends always justify the means, but rather that the ends have to be taken into account.

Oh, yes, quite right.

Though, there is a way for deontology to solve those ethical problems quite nicely, at least for humans. For instance -- say I am walking down the street and I see a guy raping a woman down a dark alley. Now, if I am supposed to treat everyone as a end in and of themselves and not as a means to an end, I find myslef in a paradoxical situation. I cannot treat both the rapist and rapee (is that a word?) both as ends. If I treat the woman as an end I do what she wants and stop the rape. But if I treat the rapist as an end, I have to allow the rape to continue. So, how to solve such a dilemma? If we view the natural state of affairs as everyone treating everyone else as an end, then I can solve the problem. One of these two has broken the normal state of affairs, the normal moral sphere -- namely, the rapist. So, to return the situation back to the moral sphere, since he is not treating the woman as an end but as a means to an end, I stop the rapist from doing what he is doing.

Same with the Nazis and the Jews I am hiding. I blithely lie to the bastards because that is what they are.

Deontology seems to be able to solve its paradoxes very nicely. But here's the kicker from what I can see...........how does anything gain a moral value in the first place? It seems to me that we assign moral value to actions in the first place because of the consequences those actions generally entail. We're all consequentialists.

Personally, I don't think we can escape either one of these perspectives. I think this shows just how messy the whole ethics thing is to begin with and why we argue about it so much. I think it also shows that the whole thing is probably more rationalization than rational.

And when it comes to speaking of God in these terms, it just gives me a headache.


BTW, thank you for your insight and for clarifying what was becoming a murky discussion!

-Bri

And the same to you.

[uruk]

Deontology seems to be able to solve its paradoxes very nicely. But here's the kicker from what I can see...........how does anything gain a moral value in the first place? It seems to me that we assign moral value to actions in the first place because of the consequences those actions generally entail. We're all consequentialists.

Personally, I don't think we can escape either one of these perspectives. I think this shows just how messy the whole ethics thing is to begin with and why we argue about it so much. I think it also shows that the whole thing is probably more rationalization than rational.

And when it comes to speaking of God in these terms, it just gives me a headache.




And the same to you.Thanks for puting succinctly what my damaged little brain could not articulate.

[Bri]

Oh, yes, quite right.

Though, there is a way for deontology to solve those ethical problems quite nicely, at least for humans.

How does deontology resolve the hypothetical of someone having to steal something (say, a defibrillator from a medical supply store) to save the life of another person? Neither the person who will die without help nor the store owner have violated the normal state of affairs.

I admit that I don't really understand deontology, but I'll read up on it and also re-read what you wrote. Meanwhile, Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontology#Criticism_of_deontology) gives an example that it says cannot be adequately explained using deontological ethics:

The most pressing difficulty for deontologist philosophers is justifying constraints. Robert Nozick famously points out what has become known as the paradox of deontology. If we are truly concerned about rights (such as the right not to be harmed in certain ways expressed by Kamm's Principle of Permissible Harm) then it seems logical we should seek to minimize violations of these rights. However, deontological constraints themselves prohibit such action. For example, consider a case where someone has maliciously sent a trolley hurtling towards five innocent and immobile people at the end of a track. The only way to stop the trolley and save the five is to throw one innocent bystander in front of the trolley. If the five are killed, this would constitute five violations of the PPH. If the one is thrown in the way, this constitutes one violation of the PPH. However, the Principle of Permissible Harm clearly rules out throwing one in front of the trolley. Hence the paradox. In order to respect the rights of the five, deontologists tell us we must respect the rights of the one.

I'm not sure that what I was suggesting really falls entirely under either category but seems to be more closely related to utilitarianism. Perhaps it's not really a complete ethical system but is instead just a handwave that concedes that both are useful. Perhaps there are cases where it will yield the wrong result also. The idea is that the ethical action is not always the one that resulted in the most good (i.e. the ends justify the means), but rather the one that could have been reasonable predicted to produce the most good before the action took place.

ETA: According to the Wikipedia article here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontology#Contemporary_deontologists), the Principle of Permissible Harm states:

The Principle states that one may harm in order to save more if and only if the harm is an effect or an aspect of the greater good itself.

That sounds an awful lot like the "greater good" argument used by Christians (that evil is indeed an aspect of the greater good of free will). Perhaps it resolves your question about Christians being concerned that their God is a utilitarianist.

-Bri

[jond]

I don't know if I really believe it, I am a bit confused.

OK, try to step back and maybe rethink where you're trying to take all this. Try to put a little bit of reality into your thinking, and understand that just because there's some chance greater than zero of your entitiy being real, doesn't mean that it's a 50/50 proposition. If there's no evidence of something, the null hypothesis is that it doesn't exist. Not that there's zero chance, just that the likelihood is really REALLLY small.

Many years ago, I had an intro psychology class and the professor had a cute phrase that went something like this: A neurotic builds a dream house in the sky. A psychotic moves in. Seriously, Jetleg: I hope you haven't moved in. You seem like a good person looking for some answers, and the folks here have lots of good ones that are worth listening (?) to.

[Bri]

OK, try to step back and maybe rethink where you're trying to take all this. Try to put a little bit of reality into your thinking, and understand that just because there's some chance greater than zero of your entitiy being real, doesn't mean that it's a 50/50 proposition. If there's no evidence of something, the null hypothesis is that it doesn't exist. Not that there's zero chance, just that the likelihood is really REALLLY small.

Even if we were to concede that an inconsequential being exists and is by coincidence exactly like JetLeg's imaginary being, including the fact that it wants JetLeg to interfere with the rights of others exactly like JetLeg's imaginary being does. How does that give JetLeg the right to interfere with the rights of others? What authority does JetLeg feel that either his imaginary being or the coincidentally identical actual being can possibly have given that neither can in any way affect our world?

-Bri

[Ichneumonwasp]

How does deontology resolve the hypothetical of someone having to steal something (say, a defibrillator from a medical supply store) to save the life of another person? Neither the person who will die without help nor the store owner have violated the normal state of affairs.

It doesn't exactly resolve it. If people die from natural causes then they die. You could create a hypothetical in which stealing would be necessary to stop a crime, but stealing would still be wrong in that situation. It might be that you are willing to accept the sin because of the greater good, but it is still a sin according to Kant.

I'm not sure that what I was suggesting really falls entirely under either category but seems to be more closely related to utilitarianism. Perhaps it's not really a complete ethical system but is instead just a handwave that concedes that both are useful. Perhaps there are cases where it will yield the wrong result also. The idea is that the ethical action is not always the one that resulted in the most good (i.e. the ends justify the means), but rather the one that could have been reasonable predicted to produce the most good before the action took place.

ETA: According to the Wikipedia article here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontology#Contemporary_deontologists), the Principle of Permissible Harm states:

That sounds an awful lot like the "greater good" argument used by Christians (that evil is indeed an aspect of the greater good of free will). Perhaps it resolves your question about Christians being concerned that their God is a utilitarianist.

-Bri

That sums it up pretty well. It may just be me, but what I seem to see is that Christians, like all people, use utilitarianism when it suits and deontology when it suits.

It just seems strange to me to speak of God in those terms. God is supposed to be an absolute. Absolutely good by definition, which seems to fit with deontology.

But it may just be my peculiar way of looking at it.

ETA

And, yes, the trolley example is one that is easily solved by utilitarianism and not easily dealt with by deontology. The counter is to have a trolley with five people on it hurtling toward sudden death and a guy standing next to you. You are, for some weird reason, constrained so that you cannot throw yourself on the track, but you can push the guy onto the track and this will save the life of the five other people. Do you kill the one to save the five? That seems easy from a utilitarian persepctive -- it's the same calculation in terms of lives. But it is much more difficult to throw an innocent to his death than to flip a switch and decide between one and five people dying.

[jond]

Even if we were to concede that an inconsequential being exists and is by coincidence exactly like JetLeg's imaginary being, including the fact that it wants JetLeg to interfere with the rights of others exactly like JetLeg's imaginary being does. How does that give JetLeg the right to interfere with the rights of others? What authority does JetLeg feel that either his imaginary being or the coincidentally identical actual being can possibly have given that neither can in any way affect our world?

-Bri

As I have pointed out several times, it doesn't give him any right to interfere with anyone's rights. But I hope Jetleg is starting to see this. His admission that he is confused indicates some hope. Maybe he will learn to use reason and rational thought.

[Ichneumonwasp]

Bri,

You know what, this really was a useful discussion for me. I was hoping that you might help me think through these issues, and I think you have helped immensely.

I think I understand now why I find the idea of God as a utilitarian so strange. It seems as though ethics really does deal with two spheres that often overlap -- justice and harm.

Utilitarianism is excellent for dealing with issues concerning harm but isn't so good at some weird justice issues. Deontology is excellent for dealing with justice but not so good with some weird harm issues.

We, or at least I, tend to think of God in terms of justice. His acts are supposed to be always just. So I tend to see him from a deontological perspective. The things that we see as merely harmful -- like a trolley heading toward certain doom -- in God's hands are supposed to also be just if he is all-just and the author of the universe. I guess that's why I have trouble with natural evil. I guess it's just one of those things we run into when trying to analyze too closely -- values simply conflict, like equality and freedom. We can want pure freedom, but that creates great inequality. We can want equality, but that limits freedom.

Maybe we are only creating new insoluble paradoxes, like the definition of omnipotence, that show our limitations when discussing God.

Any way, thanks for the excellent discussion.

[jimlintott]

So you say that if a person has no evidence, you do not need to disprove his position?

I'd be wondering how they came to their position without evidence.

How about you disprove the need for evidence?

That seems to be your logic.

You didn't read those FiLCHeRS articles I linked to did you?

[Bri]

Ichneumonwasp,

Thank you, actually. I wasn't even aware of the terms "utilitarianism" and "deontology" until you pointed them out, although I didn't assume in the least that what I was talking about was anything new. Like you said, both systems seem to have their shortcomings, and perhaps justice and harm are two somewhat opposing spheres of ethics.

I had thought that what I was talking about was closer to utilitarianism, but with the addition of the "Principle of Permissible Harm" it may have been just as close to deontology.

So can you think of an example where a system of copnsidering the "reasonably predictable" consequences of an action doesn't work?

Also, my apologies to JetLeg for possibly derailing his thread.

-Bri

[Ichneumonwasp]

So can you think of an example where a system of copnsidering the "reasonably predictable" consequences of an action doesn't work?


-Bri

For the real world? Probably not at all, or at least not very easily unless it has people believing some really weird things.

Most of the hypotheticals concern science fiction type worlds -- like a world where someone is sacrificed and everyone else derives benefit from it. I think there is a story called "Those Who Were Left Behind" or something like that using it as a premise. Anther one would be what if Jeffrey Dahmer were to be executed but the guy about to pull the switch knows that Dahmer will actually be sent to the Blessed Isles. That would maximize pleasure -- we see justice, he gets to bask in goodness fro eternity -- but it wouldn't be just.

I guess the closest would be if some group of people really thinks that sacrificing a child for the benefit of the community really seems to work. We know that is all bunk, but if they really believe it, then they would seem to be able to justify their behavior by maximizing the benefit to the many. Scapegoating does seem to relieve tension. I don't know how you do that sort of utilitarian calculation, though. It is certainly not just.

[Bri]

It doesn't exactly resolve it. If people die from natural causes then they die. You could create a hypothetical in which stealing would be necessary to stop a crime, but stealing would still be wrong in that situation. It might be that you are willing to accept the sin because of the greater good, but it is still a sin according to Kant.

Does Kant not believe in a sin of complacency? In other words, isn't it a sin to sit by and watch someone die? To my mind, it seems a worse sin than to "borrow" a defibrillator without permission.

Also, how does Kant get around the notion of extraneous circumstances? How does he get around the fact that the punishment for a crime varies depending on the circumstances surrounding it (and in some cases a crime like killing someone by throwing him in front of a trolley to save five other people might not even be a crime at all)?

To not consider levels of "badness" or "goodness" with consideration to circumstances seems wrong to my mind. In some circumstances, a normally "bad" action can be completely excused, maybe can even become a "good" action.

That sums it up pretty well. It may just be me, but what I seem to see is that Christians, like all people, use utilitarianism when it suits and deontology when it suits.

That is likely the case. Ethics is a lot more difficult than most people assume, given that it seems like second nature most of the time. I guess it's the few times that you face a moral dilemma that you see how complex it can be.

It just seems strange to me to speak of God in those terms. God is supposed to be an absolute. Absolutely good by definition, which seems to fit with deontology.

An absolute perhaps, but one that is impossible for us to understand. Also, it seems possible that the "greater good" Christians speak of is compatible with the Principle of Permissible Harm of deontology.

It honestly never occurred to me that the Christian religion might be deontological in nature until you mentioned it. It seems like Christianity is more utilitarian, but maybe that's just my perception. As you pointed out, God seems to be utilitarian if he acts for the greater good. But perhaps the Bible sets up seemingly absolute rules (thou shalt not kill) because it understands that utilitarianism can only be successfully practiced if you're omniscient (that is the only way to ensure the best outcome), as a way to remind us that we can only act according to the most likely outcome given that we're not omniscient. The Bible does seem to recognize exceptions to its rules depending on the circumstances, for example it lists lots of circumstances where you can kill someone, such as the death penalty, war, and self-defense.

-Bri

[Bri]

I guess the closest would be if some group of people really thinks that sacrificing a child for the benefit of the community really seems to work. We know that is all bunk, but if they really believe it, then they would seem to be able to justify their behavior by maximizing the benefit to the many. Scapegoating does seem to relieve tension. I don't know how you do that sort of utilitarian calculation, though. It is certainly not just.

Good examples! That reminds me of the movie "Minority Report" where the impath children are essentially imprisoned, hooked up to computers, and used to prevent crimes.

I guess the question is if it really did benefit society to lock up an innocent person or kill an innocent person would it be justified. I guess that would depend on what cost you would place on imprisoning an innocent person (or in your example sacrificing an innocent person) vs. how much benefit would be gained. When you say that it wouldn't be just, I think that's because we put such a high price on imprisoning or killing innocent people for no reason that it can't possibly outweigh any benefit the society might derive.

-Bri

[Ichneumonwasp]

Does Kant not believe in a sin of complacency? In other words, isn't it a sin to sit by and watch someone die? To my mind, it seems a worse sin than to "borrow" a defibrillator without permission.

I think Kant would probably say that borrowing the defibrillator was wrong but not to act would be more wrong. But that doesn't excuse the theft. He would probably pat you on the back as he called the authorities to cart you off to jail.

Also, how does Kant get around the notion of extraneous circumstances? How does he get around the fact that the punishment for a crime varies depending on the circumstances surrounding it (and in some cases a crime like killing someone by throwing him in front of a trolley to save five other people might not even be a crime at all)?

To not consider levels of "badness" or "goodness" with consideration to circumstances seems wrong to my mind. In some circumstances, a normally "bad" action can be completely excused, maybe can even become a "good" action.

To him there are no extraneous circumstances. Think of him as the ultimate Javert from Les Mis. There is duty. You perform your duty and you are good. There are no exceptions. The imperative was categorical. No possibility of an exception.

That's why it's fun to think up exceptions that his ideas can't deal with, like the trolley or Nazis knocking at your door. With his first formulation of this -- the categorical imperative -- he would have had to tell the Nazis where the Jews were hiding because you cannot will that a lie be the norm for everyone.

He wanted an ethics completely free of consequences. You already see how ridiculous things get in certain situations. Here is just how weird it can get. Pretend that we are on a volcanic island and there are three prisoners in jail for murder. They are scheduled for execution tomorrow. But the island starts to sink. If we do nothing the prisoners will drown. We will put ourselves at great risk to go back and get them out of the cells so that we can execute them. But, if we don't do that, justice will not be served. To serve justice properly we would have to put our lives on the line to execute those guys even though the end result is going to be the same -- they are going to die.

Pretty weird.

[JetLeg]

OK, try to step back and maybe rethink where you're trying to take all this. Try to put a little bit of reality into your thinking, and understand that just because there's some chance greater than zero of your entitiy being real, doesn't mean that it's a 50/50 proposition. If there's no evidence of something, the null hypothesis is that it doesn't exist. Not that there's zero chance, just that the likelihood is really REALLLY small.

Many years ago, I had an intro psychology class and the professor had a cute phrase that went something like this: A neurotic builds a dream house in the sky. A psychotic moves in. Seriously, Jetleg: I hope you haven't moved in. You seem like a good person looking for some answers, and the folks here have lots of good ones that are worth listening (?) to.

But, nevertheless - can you prove the need to give reasons for your opinions somehow?

[Bri]

JetLeg,

You don't need to give reasons for your opinions if you don't want to. And you can even hold opinions without having any reasons if you want to. However, you can't really expect anyone else to agree with your opinions unless you can give valid reasons.

In a similar vein, if you want to believe in invisible beings that you've made up in your head, feel free. Just don't expect anyone else to believe in them without evidence. And no, you don't have the right to impose your views or beliefs on others, so no green socks for me, thank you very much.

As for a belief without evidence being just as "valid" as beliefs for which there is evidence, that would depend on what you mean by "valid." Certainly any belief is possible unless proven impossible. But there is more reason for someone to believe something if you provide evidence than if you don't -- in other words, a belief for which you have evidence is more likely to be true than a belief for which there is no evidence.

-Bri

[uruk]

I
He wanted an ethics completely free of consequences. You already see how ridiculous things get in certain situations. Here is just how weird it can get. Pretend that we are on a volcanic island and there are three prisoners in jail for murder. They are scheduled for execution tomorrow. But the island starts to sink. If we do nothing the prisoners will drown. We will put ourselves at great risk to go back and get them out of the cells so that we can execute them. But, if we don't do that, justice will not be served. To serve justice properly we would have to put our lives on the line to execute those guys even though the end result is going to be the same -- they are going to die.

Pretty weird.

Is'nt this related to the reason the executioner swabs the condemend prisoner's arm with alchohol before he inserts the needle?

[volatile]

Sounds just like libertarianism, doesn't it? Another reason to dislike God; the resemblance to Ayn Rand. Of course, she did think she was God.

I'd never heard of Ayn Rand until recently, but suddenly I noticed her name kept cropping up. Having read a brief summary of Objectivism, it sounded interesting enough to take a look at. Frankly, I'm sorry I bothered - the whole "philosophy" is based on a materialist strawman and a base self-interest. Whilst I am sympathetic, to a certain degree, with her take on the mind-body problem, the way she presents it (and the way Peikoff presents it on her behalf) is so blunt and unsophisticated. I don't understand why she's such a cult figure in some circles...

[Ichneumonwasp]

Is'nt this related to the reason the executioner swabs the condemend prisoner's arm with alchohol before he inserts the needle?

I don't know. That just sounds like irrational behavior to me. Even if you introduced bacteria with the injection the person would not die of sepsis immediately. Besides it would still be us killing the prisoner. Interesting observation, though.

[jond]

But, nevertheless - can you prove the need to give reasons for your opinions somehow?

JetLeg: Bri summed it up perfectly. You don't need to give reasons for your opinion if you don't want to. But you can't expect anyone to take your opinion seriously if you don't. And you certainly can't think it's OK to act on those opinions (towards another person) without having a reason to do so. Can you? Really?

[Bri]

BTW, JetLeg, if it will help in answering jond, I should tell you that I believe that a second inconsequential being exists. Since you can't disprove my belief, it is just as valid as yours.

My inconsequential being wants everyone to decide for themselves about their socks. Additionally, my inconsequential being wants me to tell you to shove your green socks "where the sun don't shine" (his words, not mine) should you attempt to force me to wear them.

Oh, and my inconsequential being can kick your inconsequential being's ass.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

BTW, JetLeg, if it will help in answering jond, I should tell you that I believe that a second inconsequential being exists. Since you can't disprove my belief, it is just as valid as yours.

My inconsequential being wants everyone to decide for themselves about their socks. Additionally, my inconsequential being wants me to tell you to shove your green socks "where the sun don't shine" (his words, not mine) should you attempt to force me to wear them.

Oh, and my inconsequential being can kick your inconsequential being's ass.

-Bri


* scratching head *

[mr. ottle]

* scratching head *

Why the confusion? Either show that Bri is wrong or admit that your inconsequential being wold come out second in a God Fight Throwdown.

[Bri]

JetLeg,

My point was that you cannot know that you are right since you cannot disprove me, so you are not "more right" than I am. How can you know your position is the right one without disproving the positions of others?

-Bri

[JetLeg]

Your problem is that you are starting with "god is good"... which really should be a conclusion. You start from your conclusion and work back to interpret the evidence to support it. You can do that if you like, but it's not good thinking.

I mean, I could equally say "I believe that Charles Manson is innocent. So therefore all the evidence against him, including his own confession, must be wrong; mistakes by the witnesses, misinterpretation, incorrect lab results, whatever - it's irrelevant why, they just must be wrong if he's innocent."

Can you do that? Sure. But does it make any sense? No.

With Charles Manson we are supposed to collect evidence that would proove or disproove his innocence. Therefore, we are not justified to work backwards.

But, with god, we are taking the idea that he is good on faith. We are not searching for evidence for this one. And , if we already come to the conclusion that god is good via faith, we interpret every evidence that we come accross in this light.

[JetLeg]

Why the confusion? Either show that Bri is wrong or admit that your inconsequential being wold come out second in a God Fight Throwdown.

Well, I can't really say much.

I can just say that it feels that I am more right. After all, we are a specie that seeks answers to life, no? So, the idea of a good god is inherently meaningful, it brings meaning to life, and it feels right, unlike some other ideas.

[JetLeg]

JetLeg,

My point was that you cannot know that you are right since you cannot disprove me, so you are not "more right" than I am. How can you know your position is the right one without disproving the positions of others?

-Bri

Ok, what about this - let us leave the green socks aside.

Lets take the idea of a good god. Why don't you just Try to believe it, and see what impact it has on your life?

The reasons :

-1- The impact it might have on you

-2- The best way to understand the experience of others is to try to go through it yourself.

[JetLeg]

BTW, JetLeg, if it will help in answering jond, I should tell you that I believe that a second inconsequential being exists. Since you can't disprove my belief, it is just as valid as yours.

My inconsequential being wants everyone to decide for themselves about their socks. Additionally, my inconsequential being wants me to tell you to shove your green socks "where the sun don't shine" (his words, not mine) should you attempt to force me to wear them.

Oh, and my inconsequential being can kick your inconsequential being's ass.

-Bri

Well, it is a clarifying example. Thanks for it. Can you give me some other examples of your point?

[Bri]

JetLeg,

Ok, what about this - let us leave the green socks aside.

Lets take the idea of a good god. Why don't you just Try to believe it, and see what impact it has on your life?

The reasons :

-1- The impact it might have on you

-2- The best way to understand the experience of others is to try to go through it yourself.

Lets take the idea of NO god. Why don't you just try to believe it, and see what impact it has on your life? Same reasons as above.

As with the green socks, you have a right to believe whatever you like, as do I. But you've admitted that your beliefs are no more valid than mine since you cannot disprove mine.

So, can I convince you that I'm right and you're wrong without evidence? If I'm unable to convince you, do I have the right to force my belief on you?

In short, if I suggest that you "try out" my beliefs, no harm done. You can choose to take my suggestion, or you can choose to ignore it. But I do NOT have the right to force my beliefs on you.

Likewise, you do not have the right to force your beliefs on anyone else.

-Bri

[Bri]

Well, it is a clarifying example. Thanks for it. Can you give me some other examples of your point?

My point is very simple, JetLeg. Nobody knows the answer. Whether you believe in the Christian God, or some other God, or no gods at all -- we just don't know for certain.

Some viewpoints are more valid than others, specifically those for which there is evidence. If you want to convince others of your beliefs, you have a better chance of doing so if you provide hard evidence. Unfortunately, there is little evidence of God, but neither is there much evidence that no gods exist. In short, we just don't know for sure.

So, by all means, share your beliefs with those who are interested. But keep in mind that your beliefs are only opinion, not fact, and listen with an open mind when others share their beliefs with you. Try to see things from their perspective. With most things, the "default" belief without any evidence is no belief one way or the other ("I just don't know"), so the atheist/agnostic viewpoint has a lot of merit.

And by NO means do you have the right to ever force your beliefs on others, nor do others have the right to force their beliefs on you.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

JetLeg,
Lets take the idea of NO god. Why don't you just try to believe it, and see what impact it has on your life? Same reasons as above.


Well, I don't really feel like it, frankly. But why don't you try?

[Bri]

So why would you think I'd feel like trying out your belief?

I think you've missed my point. Please re-read my last post. It wasn't difficult to understand.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

So why would you think I'd feel like trying out your belief?

I think you've missed my point. Please re-read my last post. It wasn't difficult to understand.

-Bri


What point of your post did I miss?


Well, I think that most of the people on this planet believe in one god. At least one can say that monotheism is amongst the most popular views held. Is that a reason to try it?

Additionaly, believing in a loving god is fun and can be comforting.

[jond]

What point of your post did I miss?


Well, I think that most of the people on this planet believe in one god. At least one can say that monotheism is amongst the most popular views held. Is that a reason to try it?

Additionaly, believing in a loving god is fun and can be comforting.

Fun and comforting for you, maybe. Maybe not for someone else. But, for the last time: you're welcome to believe whatever fantasy you want. JUST KEEP IT TO YOURSELF.

[Bri]

What point of your post did I miss?

The point is that you really ought to try to see things from other perspectives before attempting to convince others to see things from yours.


Well, I think that most of the people on this planet believe in one god.

That is a nice example of a logical fallacy called Argumentum ad populum (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argumentum_ad_populum) (Appeal to the masses). You cannot conclude a proposition to be true simply because many people believe it.

You are also arguing that most people believe in one god without specifying which god. In this case, fewer people believe in the Christian God than don't believe in the Christian God.

According to Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religions), as of 2005 there are about 2.1 billion Christians compared to 1.1 billion who are secular/irreligious/agnostic/atheist/antitheistic/antireligious. The Straight Dope (http://www.straightdope.com/mailbag/mreligio.html) has the number of atheists much closer to that of Christians (2.0 billion Christians compared to 1.8 billion atheists).

Using either source, if you include religions that believe in other gods, the number of people who don't believe in the Christian God far outweighs those that do.

At least one can say that monotheism is amongst the most popular views held. Is that a reason to try it?

No, that's not a reason to try it any more than the fact that most people in the world aren't Christian would be a reason for you to try a different religion.

Additionaly, believing in a loving god is fun and can be comforting.

There is evidence from the Bible that the Christian God isn't all that loving. Some find more comfort in believing that there is no god than in believing in the Christian God.

Others don't find "comfort" to be a compelling reason to believe something for which there is no evidence.

-Bri

[JetLeg]

Fun and comforting for you, maybe. Maybe not for someone else. But, for the last time: you're welcome to believe whatever fantasy you want. JUST KEEP IT TO YOURSELF.

Why do you stress the keep-it-to-yourself point? I agree that these beliefs should not be forced upon others.

[Bri]

There's nothing wrong with talking about it. But your attitude of "you should listen to me, but I don't feel like listening to you" is a big turn-off. I can understand why jond wants you to keep it to yourself.

-Bri

[Seismosaurus]

With Charles Manson we are supposed to collect evidence that would proove or disproove his innocence. Therefore, we are not justified to work backwards.

But, with god, we are taking the idea that he is good on faith. We are not searching for evidence for this one. And , if we already come to the conclusion that god is good via faith, we interpret every evidence that we come accross in this light.

Yes indeed. But once you do that, you are no longer making a logical argument. You are simply expressing an emotional standpoint that you have. At most you are exploring the ramifications of your emotional standpoint.

Now that's all well and good if you want to do that. But if you are admitting emotional standpoints as a way to decide on evidence, then other people can just as easily do the same - meaning I can equally declare that I have faith in Manson's innocence and work back from there.

I rarely argue with people who make a claim based purely on their faith, precisely because faith is simply not compatible with rational argument. But consider that under your system of argument you cannot be proved wrong, even if you are wrong. Your entire method of argument simply does not admit any possibility of error.

And it ultimately boils down to "I believe in god because I want to." If you choose to believe in god on that basis, then more power to you. But I can't see how you can expect anybody else to take it seriously.

[jond]

Why do you stress the keep-it-to-yourself point? I agree that these beliefs should not be forced upon others.

Then what's the point of asserting (as you did earlier in the thread) that you have a right to try to make people to wear green socks because your beliefs tell you that you should?

[Bri]

I don't want to put words in JetLeg's mouth, but it sounds as though he was trying to logically justify forcing one's beliefs on others if you believe that God wants you to do so. He was first forced to consider an inconsequential being whereas the Christian God is generally regarded to be consequential. Then it was pointed out that even in the case of an inconsequential being, the premise that one could force one's beliefs on others is false.

Hopefully he has realized the error of his logic. Now it sounds like he just wants others to consider his point of view without considering other points of view himself. Not exactly the most persuasive approach.

-Bri