On Materialism

[homunculus]

I suppose I would be a materialist of sorts, but it seems to me that the criteria we impose on scientific theories already exclude those entities and forces to which no consistent, measurable effects can be attributed. This will always be a lazy, ad hoc approach to explanation. If our theory fails to say anything definite about what we should, or should not expect to happen, then we can have no way to test it.

Not only this, but if no concieveable state of affairs would refute our theory, then no actual state of affairs can be adduced as evidence in support of it. So we have no need to deny the existence of gods, spirits, souls, magic etc. (this position of denial is itself logically untenable).

It is enough to lay heavy stress on the importance of our explanations being vulnerable to the possibility of empirical tests, in some publically observeable space. Where experiment cannot help us decide between competing theories (by outruling the wrong ones) we have no rational grounds for relying on any of them.

This is not to say we can dismiss all metaphysical theorizing as "meaningless". On the contrary, it may be the source of important insights. Plus, a change of circumstances (or a different approach) may render a previously untestable theory, testable.

Cheers,

Paul.

P.S. Having said all this, a strong case for a kind of dualism, was put forward by Karl Popper and John Eccles, who argued that unless we accept that mental states are qualitively different from physical ones, science is simply impossible, because a commitment to the search for "truth" depends entirely on the assumption that our theories stand in purely logical relationships to one another (and to the world of our experience). All argument, and all criticism requires this.

Just some "grist for the mill", as they say...

[Q-Source]

Good points.

Basically you are right in your interpretation. In order for Science to test those non material manifestations it is necessary to build a new scientific approach that takes into account the flaws of materialism.
I think that the underlying materialistic assumptions are just limiting the possibility of getting more knowledge on different areas that are still unknown to human beings.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

homunculus,

P.S. Having said all this, a strong case for a kind of dualism, was put forward by Karl Popper and John Eccles, who argued that unless we accept that mental states are qualitively different from physical ones, science is simply impossible, because a commitment to the search for "truth" depends entirely on the assumption that our theories stand in purely logical relationships to one another (and to the world of our experience). All argument, and all criticism requires this.

I don't follow this argument at all. :confused: What is meant by saying that our theories stand in purely logical relationships to one another? And why does this somehow imply that mental states must be qualitatively different from physical ones? For that matter, what definition of physical and mental were they using when they said this? Were they criticizing some form of metaphysical materialism, or were they referring to the epistemological version of materialism that the rest of your post seems to be talking about?


Q-Source,

Basically you are right in your interpretation. In order for Science to test those non material manifestations it is necessary to build a new scientific approach that takes into account the flaws of materialism.

What non-material manifestations? What flaws of materialism are you referring to?

I think that the underlying materialistic assumptions are just limiting the possibility of getting more knowledge on different areas that are still unknown to human beings.

Which materialistic assumptions do you think are limiting us in this way? Are they really assumptions of modern scientific materialism, or are they assumptions that have been attributed to modern materialism by other people? I do not know of any assumptions of modern materialism that could be removed without invalidating the scientific method. That won't give us access to knowledge we currently don't have access to. It will simply remove our access to any knowledge at all.

How can you claim to know something if it cannot be reliably verified? How do you propose to verify something which is non-material?


Dr. Stupid

[Dancing David]

Nice post, point out the philosophical underpining of the materialist viewpoint.

Sorry Q-source, there is no squelching of discussion or endevour, just whacko whining. I feel that if we postulate most 'immaterial experience' to be an artifact of the human condition, it puts it right into the realm of scice. Could you elborate on how materialism has decreased the discussion, I would like to learn, Thanks.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[B]
What non-material manifestations?

Qualia and others


What flaws of materialism are you referring to?

The flaws about the characteristics that matter and its properties *should* have or are expected to have.



Which materialistic assumptions do you think are limiting us in this way?

Specifically the assumptions that state that events only exist if they interact in a materialistic way with something else.


Are they really assumptions of modern scientific materialism, or are they assumptions that have been attributed to modern materialism by other people?

And this is the heart of the problem. They are assumptions of scientific materialism, not of Science.


I do not know of any assumptions of modern materialism that could be removed without invalidating the scientific method.

That's why I said that Science needs a new approach. Do you think that investigation in QM lacks a scientific method if it doesn't follow the assumptions of materialism?


That won't give us access to knowledge we currently don't have access to. It will simply remove our access to any knowledge at all.

You are assuming that there is no way to gain knowledge if we alter our scientific method.


How can you claim to know something if it cannot be reliably verified? How do you propose to verify something which is non-material?


The fact that no-one else can rely on my description of fear, love, taste, etc. -which are immaterial feelings- does not mean that they do not exist. The scientific method helps to provide an approximation of what it might be but it doesn't say what it is.

Q-S

[MRC_Hans]

I shure wish somebody would explain to me what qualia is. Not that it hasnt been tried, but I simply fail to catch on to why they somehow deserve a special category.

On materialism (I generally hate "isms", but...): Even granted that some things might exist which do not interact with the material world, how would we be able to know about them?

Hans

[homunculus]

On materialism (I generally hate "isms", but...): Even granted that some things might exist which do not interact with the material world, how would we be able to know about them?

Exactly!

What qualifies as "material" anyway? Is gravity "material"? It has to do with the curvature of "spacetime" by mass...none of which can be directly observed, only inferred by experiment.

Which is why I added "consistent, measureable effect" as the only criteria useful to science.

Ran out of time...more later...

Paul.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
Even granted that some things might exist which do not interact with the material world, how would we be able to know about them?



:confused:

Then how do you know then that they might exist?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Q-Source,

What non-material manifestations?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Qualia and others

Please explain what you mean by the word "qualia", and why you think that it is both non-material, and something which exists.

What flaws of materialism are you referring to?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The flaws about the characteristics that matter and its properties *should* have or are expected to have.

What characteristics do you think that materialism claims matter should have, that you do not think it actually has, and why?

Which materialistic assumptions do you think are limiting us in this way?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Specifically the assumptions that state that events only exist if they interact in a materialistic way with something else.

I am not sure what you mean by "interact in a materialistic way". Materialism requires that things interact in an observable way. How can this be seen as a limitation? If something is not observable, then regardless of whether your framework allows for its existence or not, you can never know that it exists, or even have any logical reason to think that it does.

Are they really assumptions of modern scientific materialism, or are they assumptions that have been attributed to modern materialism by other people?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And this is the heart of the problem. They are assumptions of scientific materialism, not of Science.

Which assumptions do you think scientific materialism makes, that science does not?

Here's a better idea. Why don't you tell us what you think the assumptions of materialism and science are? That way we can settle right away whether you are talking about the same thing that people who actually consider themselves to be materialists are talking about. We can also then see whether you actually have any idea what the assumptions of science are.

I do not know of any assumptions of modern materialism that could be removed without invalidating the scientific method.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That's why I said that Science needs a new approach. Do you think that investigation in QM lacks a scientific method if it doesn't follow the assumptions of materialism?

So what you are saying is that you don't like science, and want to replace it with something else?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
That won't give us access to knowledge we currently don't have access to. It will simply remove our access to any knowledge at all.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You are assuming that there is no way to gain knowledge if we alter our scientific method.

No, I am saying that right now the scientific method is the only method we have for gaining knowledge. If you want to propose some different method, feel free. But until you do so, and demonstrate that it actually works better in some way than the method we currently have, I don't see how you can complain that the scientific method we have is somehow "flawed".

How can you claim to know something if it cannot be reliably verified? How do you propose to verify something which is non-material?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The fact that no-one else can rely on my description of fear, love, taste, etc. -which are immaterial feelings- does not mean that they do not exist.

Nor does it mean that the existence of those things cannot be scientifically known, or understood. You are simply assuming that they cannot.

The scientific method helps to provide an approximation of what it might be but it doesn't say what it is.

I have no idea what you mean by this. Science describes what is. That description is by necessity always an approximation. If you want to know the absolute truth, I am afraid you are going to have to settle for self-delusion.


homunculus,

What qualifies as "material" anyway? Is gravity "material"? It has to do with the curvature of "spacetime" by mass...none of which can be directly observed, only inferred by experiment.

Which is why I added "consistent, measureable effect" as the only criteria useful to science.

Ran out of time...more later...

That is exactly what it means in modern materialism. The archaic metaphysical notion of some sort of "material substance" of which everything is composed, was discarded as meaningless a long time ago. Unfortunately, the Idealists and Dualists still base their philosophies on such incoherent concepts as "ontological substances", and many of them insist on claiming that modern materialists do as well.


Dr. Stupid

[MRC_Hans]

Originally posted by Q-Source


:confused:

Then how do you know then that they might exist? I don't. That is why I don't believe in them.

Hans

[TheERK]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
I shure wish somebody would explain to me what qualia is. Not that it hasnt been tried, but I simply fail to catch on to why they somehow deserve a special category.

On materialism (I generally hate "isms", but...): Even granted that some things might exist which do not interact with the material world, how would we be able to know about them?

Hans

Qualia, whether they exist are not, are elements of mental experience. I can understand if somebody says it's a flawed theory with no evidence, but I have a hard time believing that you really don't understand what's being discussed here. Instead, since mental experience is such a tricky issue (to some of us), perhaps you're pretending to not know what qualia allegedly are so that you can ask people for a definition--something that you already know nobody can really do well. This (if I'm right) is an unfair tactic; atleast admit that you know what qualists (?) are talking about, and then argue why they are mistaken.

As for your second paragraph, who ever said these things do not interact with the physical world? Oh, I remember: epiphenomenalists. I doubt we have any of those here. To argue that mental events exist, but don't interact with physical events, is ridiculous, but that's an entirely different discussion.

Eric

[MRC_Hans]

Eric:

No, I'm not trolling. As I hinted, I have already had qualia explained, but I fail to understand. What I fail to understand is that qualia are anything but some abstraction level of observations. I fail to see how they are distinct from objective information, except for degree of measurability.

Therefore I fail to understand how they become an argument for any supernatural (or non-materialistic, if you will) realm.

And:As for your second paragraph, who ever said these things do not interact with the physical world?

Q-source did:
Specifically the assumptions that state that events only exist if they interact in a materialistic way with something else.

Hans

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

Please explain what you mean by the word "qualia", and why you think that it is both non-material, and something which exists.

You know what I mean by qualia. Feelings, taste, experiences, etc. They exist because I have them, the problem is that the explanation that Science provides does not satisfy me.



What characteristics do you think that materialism claims matter should have, that you do not think it actually has, and why?

Matter has the characteristics that materialism claims, but qualia is not matter and still exists.



Which assumptions do you think scientific materialism makes, that science does not?

QM theory is Science and does not make use of materialistic assumptions like having a identifiable position in space .



Nor does it mean that the existence of those things cannot be scientifically known, or understood. You are simply assuming that they cannot.


Q-S

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Q-Source,

Please explain what you mean by the word "qualia", and why you think that it is both non-material, and something which exists.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You know what I mean by qualia. Feelings, taste, experiences, etc. They exist because I have them,

OK. So why do you think they are non-physical? How could those things even conceivably be non-physical, when they so clearly are not only dependant on physical influences, but also have direct observable physical effects? If something interacts with other physical things, in what sense can you meaningfully say it is non-physical? What criteria would you impose as being necessary and sufficient for something to be physical, and why?

the problem is that the explanation that Science provides does not satisfy me.

Boo hoo. If you don't like it, find a better one. Just don't expect anybody else to care, unless your new and improved consciousness theory is actually verifiable.

What characteristics do you think that materialism claims matter should have, that you do not think it actually has, and why?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Matter has the characteristics that materialism claims, but qualia is not matter and still exists.

First of all, qualia are not matter. They are physical processes. What specific characteristics which you think materialism claims that physical processes must have, are you claiming that qualia do not have?

Which assumptions do you think scientific materialism makes, that science does not?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

QM theory is Science and does not make use of materialistic assumptions like having a identifiable position in space .

Modern scientific materialism makes no such assumption. You are thinking of classical materialism, which nobody who knows anything about the last century of science believes in anymore.

Nor does it mean that the existence of those things cannot be scientifically known, or understood. You are simply assuming that they cannot.

What are you talking about? Anything which can be observed, directly or indirectly, exists. If it can not be observed, then clearly it cannot be scientifically known or understood.

Where on earth did you get the idea that materialists deny the existence of things which can be observed? That's just crazy talk.


Dr. Stupid

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

Boo hoo. If you don't like it, find a better one. Just don't expect anybody else to care, unless your new and improved consciousness theory is actually verifiable.

I don't expect anyone to care, I am not asking YOU to care and I am not proposing any other alternative. I DO care because I haven't found a full description in Science about how a very simple physical process takes place. Not a single one.

If you are satisfied with the incomplete (and sometimes INEXISTENT) description that Science provides then good for you.


That's just crazy talk.

Thank you for your time, Stimpson. Please don't bother anymore.

Q-S

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Q-Source,

If you are satisfied with the incomplete (and sometimes INEXISTENT) description that Science provides then good for you.

Who ever said I was satisfied? What difference does it make whether I am satisfied with the answers science can give me or not? Science is all we've got. It doesn't matter whether we are satisfied with it or not.

I'm not satisfied with the fact that I am only going to live (at most) another 60 years or so, either. That doesn't mean that I can just wish myself a longer life.

That's just crazy talk.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you for your time, Stimpson. Please don't bother anymore.

While I realize that you are just using the above statement to avoid answering my questions, without looking like you are avoiding them, I feel that I should point out that I was not calling you crazy, nor was I saying that what you said was crazy. I was simply saying that to say that something which can be observed doesn't exist, is crazy talk. In other words, materialists would have to be crazy to hold the position which you seem to be attributing to them.

Fortunately, they do not.


Dr. Stupid

[jj]

Originally posted by Q-Source


I don't expect anyone to care, I am not asking YOU to care and I am not proposing any other alternative. I DO care because I haven't found a full description in Science about how a very simple physical process takes place. Not a single one.

If you are satisfied with the incomplete (and sometimes INEXISTENT) description that Science provides then good for you.

Thank you for your time, Stimpson. Please don't bother anymore.

Q-S

Why not answer the question instead of declaring victory by strongarm-not-answering.

By the way, would you mind being honest about the context of the quote you keep using in your signature line? It would be good of you to point out to you that proximate to that comment was the obvious statement something like "QM is simply a description of how matter works".

You really are looking like you've got some serious ethical issues here.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Q-Source,
Modern scientific materialism makes no such assumption. You are thinking of classical materialism, which nobody who knows anything about the last century of science believes in anymore.


Are you saying that "science" has changed its basic assumptions over time?

How possible is it that its basic assumptions will change again?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Suggestologist,

Modern scientific materialism makes no such assumption. You are thinking of classical materialism, which nobody who knows anything about the last century of science believes in anymore.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Are you saying that "science" has changed its basic assumptions over time?

No. I am saying that materialism has changed its basic assumptions over time, based on new knowledge gained by science.

When science determined that our intuitive notions about physical reality were wrong, we rejected those intuitive notions, not science. Since then, materialism has gone from being a metaphysical view of the world, based on our intuitive preconceptions of it, to an epistemological view of the world, based on the axioms and findings of science.


Dr. Stupid

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Q-Source
You know what I mean by qualia. Feelings, taste, experiences, etc. They exist because I have them, the problem is that the explanation that Science provides does not satisfy me. Feeling is an action. Tasting is an action. Experiencing is an action. (I ordinarily say "a behavior", which is technically better, but after so many times through this I felt like a change.) Walking is an action. It, like feeling, tasting, and experiencing, is something I do (or my body does--works the same, take your pick). I have a particular walk (some would say "gait" or "manner of walking", but "walk" will also suffice). You, if you knew me, would recognise me by my walk long before you saw my features, if I walked toward you from some distance away. My walk (noun) has the same type of existence as do my feelings(noun), tastes(n), or experiences(n), which is to say a linguistic existence. These are nouns we use as stand-ins for actions. Sometimes it is a useful abstraction; a physical therapist might refer to my walk when talking to another pt, perhaps even as a particular type of walk. But my walk does not exist in any real form apart from my walking (verb--ok, gerund in this case). The noun usage is an artifice. You see a face; you do not see a sight of a face. (Yes, I know that our language allows us to say we catch sight of something--my point is exactly that it *is* our language rather than our experiencing that opens this can of worms.) You taste sugar; you do not taste the taste of sugar. You experience love; you do not experience the experience of love.

Qualia are a wonderful thing to study. For linguists, perhaps. For me, I'll study seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, feeling...fearing, loving, and all the other actions we do ("things" we do is just another example of our language making nouns out of actions).

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Mercutio
Feeling is an action. Tasting is an action. Experiencing is an action. (I ordinarily say "a behavior", which is technically better, but after so many times through this I felt like a change.) Walking is an action. It, like feeling, tasting, and experiencing, is something I do (or my body does--works the same, take your pick).


And "do" is a stand in for verbs, like "it" is a stand-in for nouns.

Your body does the tasting automatically, after you consciously (or not) cause the taste to obtain (by putting your tongue on something), the initial linkage to qualia also usually happens automatically -- the images and feelings your brain associates with the taste get revivified to some extent and you become aware of them either in direct or peripheral awareness (consciousness or preconsciousness).


I have a particular walk (some would say "gait" or "manner of walking", but "walk" will also suffice). You, if you knew me, would recognise me by my walk long before you saw my features, if I walked toward you from some distance away. My walk (noun) has the same type of existence as do my feelings(noun), tastes(n), or experiences(n), which is to say a linguistic existence.


Hmmm... linguistic existence? You mean that someone creates the concepts within their brain? Which helps categorize (thus reducing complexity) and predict the state of the world in the future?


These are nouns we use as stand-ins for actions. Sometimes it is a useful abstraction; a physical therapist might refer to my walk when talking to another pt, perhaps even as a particular type of walk. But my walk does not exist in any real form apart from my walking (verb--ok, gerund in this case). The noun usage is an artifice. You see a face; you do not see a sight of a face. (Yes, I know that our language allows us to say we catch sight of something--my point is exactly that it *is* our language rather than our experiencing that opens this can of worms.)


I disagree. To say that you "catch sight" puts into metaphorical context the way you experienced the event -- it relates directly to how the experience itself evolved; and/or the usual contextual frames the person applies to their experience.


You taste sugar; you do not taste the taste of sugar. You experience love; you do not experience the experience of love.


If someone said that they "taste the taste of sugar" we would understand the statement to be redundant and the same as "taste the sugar". But to experience the taste of sugar means something different; it implies a revivification of other events and feelings and images associated with the taste.

In your "love" example, you deleted the object of the act of loving. A comprable statement could be: "experience the love of my pet" or "experience loving my pet".


Qualia are a wonderful thing to study. For linguists, perhaps. For me, I'll study seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, feeling...fearing, loving, and all the other actions we do ("things" we do is just another example of our language making nouns out of actions).

But then, we can reduce all nouns to actions/processes -- the easier ones to reduce, we call nominalizations; the harder ones to reduce, we just call nouns.

[scribble]

Originally posted by Mercutio
Feeling is an action. ...

I just wanted to say that you've made a great post, Mercutio, I probably couldn't have said it so well myself, though I was tempted to try while reading through this thread. Glad you beat me to it.

-Chris

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

Hmmm... linguistic existence? You mean that someone creates the concepts within their brain? Which helps categorize (thus reducing complexity) and predict the state of the world in the future? I'm having a tough time with "creates the concepts within their brain". Some people mean this literally, others not so literally. I mean that our language treats these actions, these behaviors that we do, as nouns, but does not differentiate between types of nouns. A noun that is an abstract category of behaviors looks just as concrete as, well, concrete, when a sentence makes the claim that we "see" it. I see a concrete block; I see qualia; I see dead people (oops, got carried away there). I have a computer; I have a walk.

So if I understand your comment (and I certainly may not), no I do not mean that we create the concepts within our brains. These concepts have their only claim to actual existence in the fact that they are nouns. They are nouns only having snuck in the back door. Of course, we are completely comfortable with treating them as nouns. In fact, the only time treating them as nouns gets us into trouble is when we then decide we need to look for them, examine them, describe them, and see what they can do. Only then do we find out that there appears to be something special about "qualia" since they cannot be described, only experienced. Well, my "walk" can only be experienced, too. When I sit down, where did my walk go?

I disagree. To say that you "catch sight" puts into metaphorical context the way you experienced the event -- it relates directly to how the experience itself evolved; and/or the usual contextual frames the person applies to their experience. The "way" we experience the event is, of course, terribly important; it is the context of our action. Our actions can only be best understood when we do examine them in context; any dissection of "running", say, is incomplete until we see the context of running for a bus, running from an attacker, or running for exercise. The context of seeing is likewise important, and sheds light on the qualia issue as well. The context of seeing must include what it is we are looking at (or imagining, which can be seen as seeing without the thing present), our history with that thing, and our current reasons for looking at that thing.

In that sense, "catching sight" of someone can add to the contextual description, I agree. But I meant to emphasise "sight" in that phrase--we see the person, we do not see the sight of that person. So perhaps you are quibbling over a point I did not intend.

If someone said that they "taste the taste of sugar" we would understand the statement to be redundant and the same as "taste the sugar". But to experience the taste of sugar means something different; it implies a revivification of other events and feelings and images associated with the taste. More of the above--the full context of tasting sugar will of course depend on context--whether you are stirring it into coffee or licking it off a supermodel's abs....(just give me a moment here...) but my intent was to simplify the example to just the taste part. Of course, the same argument applies to all the rest of the context. If part of this experience is remembering the last time you licked sugar off Laetitia Casta, you are remembering doing that, you are not remembering the memory of doing that.

In your "love" example, you deleted the object of the act of loving. A comprable statement could be: "experience the love of my pet" or "experience loving my pet". By now, it should be plain that the two sentences here are completely different contexts. Either way, we are not "experiencing the experience", but merely (if "merely" can ever apply to love) loving or being loved.


Oh, and thanks, scribble!

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by jj


Why not answer the question instead of declaring victory by strongarm-not-answering.

I don't like to have impolite discussions with people I like and respect. And I like Stimpy and this exchange was deteriorating into name calling.


By the way, would you mind being honest about the context of the quote you keep using in your signature line? It would be good of you to point out to you that proximate to that comment was the obvious statement something like "QM is simply a description of how matter works".


It seems to be out of context, but you were insisting many posts with the same.

Anyway, I am going to do you a favour and delete it. I am bored with it. :D

Q-S

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

That is exactly what it means in modern materialism. The archaic metaphysical notion of some sort of "material substance" of which everything is composed, was discarded as meaningless a long time ago. Unfortunately, the Idealists and Dualists still base their philosophies on such incoherent concepts as "ontological substances", and many of them insist on claiming that modern materialists do as well.



Which idealists and dualists are doing this? Could you provide a list of them?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by MRC_Hans
[B]Eric:

No, I'm not trolling. As I hinted, I have already had qualia explained, but I fail to understand. What I fail to understand is that qualia are anything but some abstraction level of observations.


What on earth could an "abstraction level of observations" conceivably mean?



I fail to see how they are distinct from objective information, except for degree of measurability.


Because of what the words "objective" and "information" actually mean. They are not objective because only the subject experiences them, and they are not information because they are not physical.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Which assumptions do you think scientific materialism makes, that science does not?



What on earth could "scientific materialism" mean? That science is compatible with materialism? Or that science implies materialism??

Anyway I would venture to suggest that the assumptions it might make that science doesn't is that there is a material reality, that consciousness is derived from this material reality, and that the physical world is closed.

[scribble]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


What on earth could an "abstraction level of observations" conceivably mean?


I think you should read the whole thread before you go looking for a fight. Mercutio explained this idea well, I think, and especially gave a good example of it (search for 'walk').


Because of what the words "objective" and "information" actually mean. They are not objective because only the subject experiences them, and they are not information because they are not physical.

Is this a deliberate attempt to sidetrack the thread, or do you just not care? If you're trying to make a real point, back it up - if you're just throwing out meaningless assertations, then maybe putting it below your tagline bar would make it clear it's unimportant to read.

-Chris

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by scribble


I think you should read the whole thread before you go looking for a fight. Mercutio explained this idea well, I think, and especially gave a good example of it (search for 'walk').



I have read the entire thread scumbag. No previous reference were made to this phrase.



Because of what the words "objective" and "information" actually mean. They are not objective because only the subject experiences them, and they are not information because they are not physical.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Is this a deliberate attempt to sidetrack the thread, or do you just not care? If you're trying to make a real point, back it up - if you're just throwing out meaningless assertations, then maybe putting it below your tagline bar would make it clear it's unimportant to read.



What the f*ck is your problem?? What the f*ck do I have to back up?? I am simply stating what is the case. If can't understand what I'm saying then please don't bother responding to my posts.



Is this a deliberate attempt to sidetrack the thread, or do you just not care? If you're trying to make a real point, back it up - if you're just throwing out meaningless assertations, then maybe putting it below your tagline bar would make it clear it's unimportant to read.

-Chris [/B]

I answered his question. How on earth someone can remotely imagine that this somehow is derailing the thread is quite beyond me. You've got a screw loose mate.

[scribble]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


I have read the entire thread scumbag. No previous reference were made to this phrase.

Much anger I sense in you, young Jedi. Go to the Dark Side you will, hrmmm?


I answered his question. How on earth someone can remotely imagine that this somehow is derailing the thread is quite beyond me. You've got a screw loose mate.

I thought 'mate' was a term of affection to you brits.

I was refering to the fact that you made some assertions there without any sort of reasoning, evidence, or proof given behind them.

-Chris

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

That is exactly what it means in modern materialism. The archaic metaphysical notion of some sort of "material substance" of which everything is composed, was discarded as meaningless a long time ago. Unfortunately, the Idealists and Dualists still base their philosophies on such incoherent concepts as "ontological substances", and many of them insist on claiming that modern materialists do as well.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Which idealists and dualists are doing this? Could you provide a list of them?

You, Q-Source, our old friend UCE...

What on earth could "scientific materialism" mean? That science is compatible with materialism? Or that science implies materialism??

This is a very dishonest post. We both know perfectly well that I have explained to you what I mean by "scientific materialism" many times before. You told me that it is essentially what you call naturalism, remember?

Anyway I would venture to suggest that the assumptions it might make that science doesn't is that there is a material reality, that consciousness is derived from this material reality, and that the physical world is closed.

1) It does not make the assumption that there is a "material reality". That would be meaningless without first defining what the word "material" means. It assumes that reality is objective, and that its components can be either directly observed, or indirectly observed through interactions, and that a set of logical consistent rules exist which can be inferred by observing its components. It then defines the word "material" to refer to the components of that reality. That is exactly what science does, and must do, in order to be coherent.

2) It does not assume that consciousness is derived from this material reality. It need make no specific assumptions about consciousness at all. We observe that consciousness exists, and is therefore part of reality. Our assumption that it can be explained scientifically, in terms of matter and physical processes, is not specific to consciousness. It is an assumption we make about anything which can be observed to exist. And once again, that is an assumption that science must make in order to be coherent.

3) It does assume that the physical world is causally closed. Science must also make that assumption in order to be coherent.

I know you disagree with all three of the above statements. I could not care less. Your own dismissal of the idea that science is something worth taking the time to understand, renders any opinions you may have about it completely worthless.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by scribble

I thought 'mate' was a term of affection to you brits.



Not always.



I was refering to the fact that you made some assertions there without any sort of reasoning, evidence, or proof given behind them.

-Chris

Because it is so mindnumbingly simple. A qualia, such as for example the actual raw experience of redness, is something which only the subject experiences. You might also experience redness when you look at the same object. But in each case we each have our own qualitative experience of redness. Moreover it is likely that the shade of redness I experience will not be absolutely identical to yours, despite viewing the same object. Indeed you could be seeing blue whenever I see red, but we would never know it because you have always systematically labelled your experience of blue as being red. Conversely I might see blue whenever you see red. Since we are systematic in labelling our experienced colors, we could never know that what I experience as being red you see as blue, and vice versa. This perhaps more than anything else demonstrates the subjectivity of qualia.

Now to be objective it has to be publically accessible. So although you can never check that I am seeing exactly the same color (qualia) as you, you can in principle check the neural correlates of someone experiencing a color. Likewise for the object we are both visually experiencing as being red, anyone can in principle check that the object concerned is reflecting a certain wavelength of light which our minds will interpret as being what we will respectively label as redness (even though our experiences might well be different).

A similar consideration applies to information. The term has a particular meaning. It applies only to the physical world. By physical world I mean that which in principle anyone could observe, either directly or indirectly, using the appropriate instruments. So information is applicable to the wavelength of light reflected and the neural correlates of seeing a color, but not the raw experience (qualia) of the color itself.

[scribble]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Because it is so mindnumbingly simple. A qualia, such as for example the actual raw experience of redness, is something which only the subject experiences. You might also experience redness when you look at the same object. But in each case we each have our own qualitative experience of redness. Moreover it is likely that the shade of redness I experience will not be absolutely identical to yours, despite viewing the same object.


Why do you consider that likely? I've never had a disagreement with anyone I've met over what is red and what is blue - though in defense of your argument, I do not have any color blind friends.

This perhaps more than anything else demonstrates the subjectivity of qualia.

My experiences are subjective by your definition, I agree. Yet somehow, I can accurately relate my experiences to another person and they can demonstrate that that understanding came through just fine. If I have done this, is my experience not indirectly observed by the person I am describing it to, and therefore 'publically accessable'? How is it, if all of our internal experiences are so totally different and unrelateable, we are able to relate them so well? I think you will need to provide some hefty proof of this claim - it's way out there as far as I'm concerned.

Now to be objective it has to be publically accessible. So although you can never check that I am seeing exactly the same color (qualia) as you, you can in principle check the neural correlates of someone experiencing a color. Likewise for the object we are both visually experiencing as being red, anyone can in principle check that the object concerned is reflecting a certain wavelength of light which our minds will interpret as being what we will respectively label as redness (even though our experiences might well be different).


Sounds good to me.


A similar consideration applies to information. The term has a particular meaning. It applies only to the physical world. By physical world I mean that which in principle anyone could observe, either directly or indirectly, using the appropriate instruments. So information is applicable to the wavelength of light reflected and the neural correlates of seeing a color, but not the raw experience (qualia) of the color itself. [/B]

So you're saying a qualia is not information, or contains no information, or what exactly? If it has absolutely 0 processing value, then why do we experience things at all? If we didn't have qualia (the raw experience, you say) of things, then how would we know anything at all of the world around us?

-Chris

[Mercutio]

OOooooh, scribble, you are not going to like this--for the last two posts, I agree more with Ian than with you! Of course, I need to translate his, but once you figure in the perspective change, he is more conservative in his explanation than are you. You have the right general idea, but several details are awry. Ian's general idea is off, but the details are, on first reading, are spot on.

Ok, on second reading, I disagree with both of you! But it will have to wait, cuz it will take some serious time.

or maybe...

Ian is right about us not being certain we see the same colors. There is a LOT we can do with color-matching, extrapolations from people who are colorblind in only one eye, and so on, to suggest tremendous agreement among individuals, but we absolutely (thus far) cannot guarantee that your red is his red (I was going to say I know mine is different, because I have different concentrations of photopigments from the average person, but truth to tell, we cannot say that my red differs from yours. We can demonstrate identical proportions of photopigments in the retina, but all that does is put more burden on the challenge--it does not prove we see the same red). Of course, the colors will be (to the extent that we can agree on publicly verified "red" or "blue") functionally identical, so their structural identity is, for scientific purposes, irrelevant. As Scribble says, you don't argue over what color "red" is; this does nothing to refute Ian's point. Pragmatically, however, Ian's point is irrelevant. Interesting, but not subject to scientific investigation.

Ian's differentiation of objective and subjective may well be correct, but it is not the current differentiation between public and private (or overt and covert), and there are important differences. Rather than speaking of "seeing red" as a private behavior, an action accomplished by an organism, Ian speaks of it as the subjective observation of a qualia. That is, in fact, the way we generally (colloquially) speak of it. It is the language that gets us into trouble. (which I wrote of at length earlier, and have no wish to repeat here.)

Scribble's claim that the indirect description of a private event can render it publicly observable is another no-no. What is publicly observable in that case is verbal behavior. Since you cannot tell whether I am descibing accurately or lying, we had best not consider it an indirect observation of private experience. Certainly we can (and must) rely on verbal reports to study our private behaviors (and we have much success with this), but that is not the same as rendering the private public.

As for your discussion on information--both of you--at this point I'm going to have to give the victory to the pinot grigio, and call it quits.

[csense]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

If something interacts with other physical things, in what sense can you meaningfully say it is non-physical?


What of time

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Mercutio
I'm having a tough time with "creates the concepts within their brain". Some people mean this literally, others not so literally. I mean that our language treats these actions, these behaviors that we do, as nouns, but does not differentiate between types of nouns. A noun that is an abstract category of behaviors looks just as concrete as, well, concrete, when a sentence makes the claim that we "see" it. I see a concrete block; I see qualia; I see dead people (oops, got carried away there). I have a computer; I have a walk.


Well, linguistic existence as the existence of concepts (shemata, prototypes, templates, narratives, etc.) used as tokens in a person's thought processes. Which serves to reify processes. And which reduces the chaos of reality into discrete units -- which makes thinking about reality less: complex, time consuming, and mental energy devouring.

But even concrete is just a process -- if we choose to reduce it to such things. Concrete must cure to strengthen; this is an ongoing process which partially determines what humans attribute to the category we call "concrete". Atoms must swirl around in a semi-permanent fashion for the matter (the particular piece of matter humans can categorize as an instance of concrete) to be sensed in the way that it is sensed.


So if I understand your comment (and I certainly may not), no I do not mean that we create the concepts within our brains. These concepts have their only claim to actual existence in the fact that they are nouns. They are nouns only having snuck in the back door. Of course, we are completely comfortable with treating them as nouns. In fact, the only time treating them as nouns gets us into trouble is when we then decide we need to look for them, examine them, describe them, and see what they can do.


Are you saying that we could not "look" for a particular category (type) of walking? Are you saying that we could not examine and describe a "walk" in choreographic terms? Are you saying that we cannot see what a, for example, sexy walk can do? Or that a particular walk can get us to cross a room faster than another?


Only then do we find out that there appears to be something special about "qualia" since they cannot be described, only experienced. Well, my "walk" can only be experienced, too. When I sit down, where did my walk go?


Well, when a piece of concrete is demolished and turned to sand, where does the concrete go?


The "way" we experience the event is, of course, terribly important; it is the context of our action. Our actions can only be best understood when we do examine them in context; any dissection of "running", say, is incomplete until we see the context of running for a bus, running from an attacker, or running for exercise. The context of seeing is likewise important, and sheds light on the qualia issue as well. The context of seeing must include what it is we are looking at (or imagining, which can be seen as seeing without the thing present), our history with that thing, and our current reasons for looking at that thing.

In that sense, "catching sight" of someone can add to the contextual description, I agree. But I meant to emphasise "sight" in that phrase--we see the person, we do not see the sight of that person. So perhaps you are quibbling over a point I did not intend.


I really don't understand what you mean here. Catching sight does not generally mean "seeing the sight of the person". And of course, "sight" is somewhat ambiguous in the quoted phrase in the sentence before this one.


[b] More of the above--the full context of tasting sugar will of course depend on context--whether you are stirring it into coffee or licking it off a supermodel's abs....(just give me a moment here...) but my intent was to simplify the example to just the taste part. Of course, the same argument applies to all the rest of the context. If part of this experience is remembering the last time you licked sugar off Laetitia Casta, you are remembering doing that, you are not remembering the memory of doing that.


Well, you may as well say "the remembering of the remembering of doing that" since memories do not exist without the action/process of remembering.


By now, it should be plain that the two sentences here are completely different contexts. Either way, we are not "experiencing the experience", but merely (if "merely" can ever apply to love) loving or being loved.


Sure, but do you disagree that most native speakers of the English language would interpret the phrase "experiencing the experience" as redundant -- and equivalent to "experiencing". So both - the redundant and simple form of the idea - really mean the same thing to most of them. And, we can re-experience the experience later, as a part of the process of remembering the experience.

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

You, Q-Source, our old friend UCE...



Stimpson, why don't you go to Philosophy Forums (http://forums.philosophyforums.com/) and have a chat about your "scientific materialism" with the people over there?. The thing that Ian, Geoff and I have pointed it out to you is that you insist on attributing to Science some methaphysical (or epistemological :rolleyes: ) beliefs that are exclusively held by materialists.

Q-S

[Stimpson J. Cat]

csense,

If something interacts with other physical things, in what sense can you meaningfully say it is non-physical?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What of time

What about it?



Q-Source,

You, Q-Source, our old friend UCE...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Stimpson, why don't you go to Philosophy Forums and have a chat about your "scientific materialism" with the people over there?. The thing that Ian, Geoff and I have pointed it out to you is that you insist on attributing to Science some methaphysical (or epistemological ) beliefs that are exclusively held by materialists.

I still don't know what it is that you think I am attributing to science that should not be attributed to it.

In any event, I do not know of any belief that is "exclusive" to materialists. It seams to me that no matter how you define materialism, you could take one or more specific beliefs, and incorporate them into some other framework which is different from materialism. That is, unless you just define materialism to be "any framework which holds that x is true".

You still have not explained to me what you think the assumptions of materialism and science are, and how they differ. That makes it very difficult for me to address your claim that they make different assumptions.


Dr. Stupid

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Well, linguistic existence as the existence of concepts (shemata, prototypes, templates, narratives, etc.) used as tokens in a person's thought processes. Which serves to reify processes. And which reduces the chaos of reality into discrete units -- which makes thinking about reality less: complex, time consuming, and mental energy devouring.

But even concrete is just a process -- if we choose to reduce it to such things. Concrete must cure to strengthen; this is an ongoing process which partially determines what humans attribute to the category we call "concrete". Atoms must swirl around in a semi-permanent fashion for the matter (the particular piece of matter humans can categorize as an instance of concrete) to be sensed in the way that it is sensed. So now, rather than trying to claim a concrete existence of qualia, you try to define concrete as a process. Forgive me if I think this has the feel of a philosophical grasping at straws. Perhaps I don't quite see it--certainly, actions are extended in time, and objects exist for extended periods of time, but to equate actions and objects in the manner you do strains credulity. Are you saying that we could not "look" for a particular category (type) of walking? Are you saying that we could not examine and describe a "walk" in choreographic terms? Are you saying that we cannot see what a, for example, sexy walk can do? Or that a particular walk can get us to cross a room faster than another? I have said it was a useful category. I have also said it does not exist without the members of the category. I challenge you to pick out a sexy walk in a group of seated individuals. I challenge you to say which walk gets you across the room quicker, given that you don't engage in the actual action of that walk. The usefulness of a category does not mean that it has any existence whatsoever independent of its parts. Oh, come on. Are you saying you can point to the component parts of an action like walking in a seated person? Please demonstrate. [quote]
I really don't understand what you mean here. Catching sight does not generally mean "seeing the sight of the person". And of course, "sight" is somewhat ambiguous in the quoted phrase in the sentence before this one.
Again I was merely trying to explain the specific usage of sight in one example. Any usage of any word may be unique, and so ambiguous if you try to apply another definition to it. That is why words are best defined by their usage, rather than by relationship to some ideal.


Well, you may as well say "the remembering of the remembering of doing that" since memories do not exist without the action/process of remembering.
and their existence is the action/process. Just as with any other qualia. This was my point.

Sure, but do you disagree that most native speakers of the English language would interpret the phrase "experiencing the experience" as redundant -- and equivalent to "experiencing". So both - the redundant and simple form of the idea - really mean the same thing to most of them. And, we can re-experience the experience later, as a part of the process of remembering the experience. And each separate usage is a separate instance, which is why we have categories...and the redundancy is my point. seeing a sight is redundant. Remembering a memory is redundant. Experiencing a qualia is redundant.

[scribble]

Originally posted by Mercutio
[B]OOooooh, scribble, you are not going to like this--for the last two posts, I agree more with Ian than with you!


You're right. I don't like it. You can't be my friend anymore. Go away.

:p



Scribble's claim that the indirect description of a private event can render it publicly observable is another no-no. What is publicly observable in that case is verbal behavior. Since you cannot tell whether I am descibing accurately or lying, we had best not consider it an indirect observation of private experience. Certainly we can (and must) rely on verbal reports to study our private behaviors (and we have much success with this), but that is not the same as rendering the private public.


Point well taken.



As for your discussion on information--both of you--at this point I'm going to have to give the victory to the pinot grigio, and call it quits.

Ian, you care to address my questions on the information portion of your post?

-Chris

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Mercutio
So now, rather than trying to claim a concrete existence of qualia, you try to define concrete as a process. Forgive me if I think this has the feel of a philosophical grasping at straws. Perhaps I don't quite see it--certainly, actions are extended in time, and objects exist for extended periods of time, but to equate actions and objects in the manner you do strains credulity.


What I'm suggesting is that all "concrete" objects can be reduced to processes; just as non-concrete objects can; so you need to be more specific than just "can be reduced to process or action".


[b] I have said it was a useful category. I have also said it does not exist without the members of the category. I challenge you to pick out a sexy walk in a group of seated individuals. I challenge you to say which walk gets you across the room quicker, given that you don't engage in the actual action of that walk. The usefulness of a category does not mean that it has any existence whatsoever independent of its parts.[b] [quoteWell, when a piece of concrete is demolished and turned to sand, where does the concrete go? Oh, come on. Are you saying you can point to the component parts of an action like walking in a seated person? Please demonstrate.

Yes. The way you walk, turns into the way you sit. Just like the concrete turns into the gravel. The component parts (in walking and sitting) seem to be the legs, arms, and general body posture.

[B]
Again I was merely trying to explain the specific usage of sight in one example. Any usage of any word may be unique, and so ambiguous if you try to apply another definition to it. That is why words are best defined by their usage, rather than by relationship to some ideal.

[b] and their existence is the action/process. Just as with any other qualia. This was my point.


But see above; the same is true of any "concrete" object. "Existence" of a concrete object can always be reduced to action/process. To define the difference, you need to be more specific.


[b] And each separate usage is a separate instance, which is why we have categories...and the redundancy is my point. seeing a sight is redundant. Remembering a memory is redundant. Experiencing a qualia is redundant.

Well, I need to disagree with myself slightly. Experiencing an experience may mean that the person has dissociated the experience; or in other words: in their minds eye -- sees themselves -- and sees how that other self experiences it. And, that agrees with your argument that usage is unique.

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

Yes. The way you walk, turns into the way you sit. Just like the concrete turns into the gravel. The component parts (in walking and sitting) seem to be the legs, arms, and general body posture.
The way you walk turns into the way you sit? I doubt you even buy this yourself! The whole point of "a walk" is that it is the action. Someone with the exact same bodily dimensions as me (legs, arms, and general body posture) will almost assuredly have a different walk from me (my walk may well be unique, due to my personal history). A walk is not, cannot be "stored" in my sitting (I would argue the same distinction for any private behavior as well--it makes sense to talk about remembering, but "memories" as objects do not exist. Even cognitive psychologists have ceased looking at it that way, turning to a re-constructive action of remembering.) I may very well enjoy looking at the way somebody is sitting, but in no way does that identify a sexy walk! Nor does flying turn into perching, writing into typing, singing into snoring, or any action into another action. That's why we call it "another" action.

On the plus side, you have demonstrated exactly the same type of misuse of object and action that takes place at the private level with our conceptions about thinking, feeling, and remembering. At least this way, the example we are using is something that others can see.

[csense]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

If something interacts with other physical things, in what sense can you meaningfully say it is non-physical?

What of time

What about it?


Well, do you think the statement, time is non-physical, is meaningfull.
I would make an educated guess and say that the majority of the population thinks so.


If when motion increases, time decreases, then clearly time and space interact with each other, and yet, are two seperate things, and if motion, or physical processes, can affect time, then it also can not be an abstract or a priori principle, therfore, it must be something that exists within what we call objective reality, or outside the observer, even though both may be correlated.

Do you think that this is possibly an example of the non-physical interacting with the physical, and if not, why.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

csense,

Well, do you think the statement, time is non-physical, is meaningfull.

No, I do not.

I would make an educated guess and say that the majority of the population thinks so.

I would guess that you are probably right. Those people are wrong.

If when motion increases, time decreases, then clearly time and space interact with each other, and yet, are two separate things, and if motion, or physical processes, can affect time, then it also can not be an abstract or a priori principle, therefore, it must be something that exists within what we call objective reality, or outside the observer, even though both may be correlated.

Do you think that this is possibly an example of the non-physical interacting with the physical, and if not, why.

No, I do not. Time is an abstract concept, not something which exists and interacts with other things.

Consider your above example of time dilation and length contraction. What does it actually mean to say that when an object is moving, time slows down, and length contracts?

What it means is that the duration between two events is shorter in that reference frame, and the displacement between two events is shorter in that reference frame.

Duration and displacement are not things, physical or otherwise. They are properties of things. The duration between two events is a property of those events. The displacement between two events is a property of those events. Space and time are mathematical concepts we use to quantify these properties.

Space and time do not interact with anything. Neither do velocity, and acceleration (which are simply derivatives of the above). They are abstract concepts we use to quantify the properties of things, events, and processes.


Dr. Stupid

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
....
Space and time do not interact with anything. Neither do velocity, and acceleration (which are simply derivatives of the above).
Interesting comment.


They are abstract concepts we use to quantify the properties of things, events, and processes.
Dr. Stupid
What isn't?

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Mercutio
The way you walk turns into the way you sit? I doubt you even buy this yourself! The whole point of "a walk" is that it is the action.


The physical parameters of a person's body, directly impact both the possible ways they can walk, and the possible ways they can sit.

Just like the properties of the rocks in the concrete, determine the possible ways that the concrete will look, or how the gravel will look, or how the magma will look (if the rocks are melted).


Someone with the exact same bodily dimensions as me (legs, arms, and general body posture) will almost assuredly have a different walk from me (my walk may well be unique, due to my personal history).


Right. You can never say that two things are exactly identical. But we can determine degrees of similarity.


A walk is not, cannot be "stored" in my sitting


There is obvious information in the way you sit, which tells us the way you will walk. Without getting into psychological aspects, the size and proportions of your body parts is an obvious source of information.


(I would argue the same distinction for any private behavior as well--it makes sense to talk about remembering, but "memories" as objects do not exist. Even cognitive psychologists have ceased looking at it that way, turning to a re-constructive action of remembering.) I may very well enjoy looking at the way somebody is sitting, but in no way does that identify a sexy walk!


How is asking yourself "Is that a sexy walk?" any different than asking yourself "Is that a stone block?" ?

And how is asking yourself "How will that gravel look when incorporated into concrete?" any different than asking yourself "What does the way she sits tell me about the way she will walk?"


Nor does flying turn into perching, writing into typing, singing into snoring, or any action into another action. That's why we call it "another" action.


But those are conceptual distinctions that tell me how you categorize and punctuate events; it does not mean that someone else may not punctuate things differently.


On the plus side, you have demonstrated exactly the same type of misuse of object and action that takes place at the private level with our conceptions about thinking, feeling, and remembering. At least this way, the example we are using is something that others can see.

I agree that thinking, feeling, remembering, and so on are nominalizations. However, everything can be reduced to actions and processes.

Reductionism (oops, a nominalization) to the process level does not partition concepts the way you think it does. I could offer the needed partition, but I'm interested to see if you understand that all "concrete" objects can be reduced to processes and actions.

[hammegk]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
....I'm interested to see if you understand that all "concrete" objects can be reduced to processes and actions.

LOL. Welcome to the fray. :)

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
[The physical parameters of a person's body, directly impact both the possible ways they can walk, and the possible ways they can sit.

Just like the properties of the rocks in the concrete, determine the possible ways that the concrete will look, or how the gravel will look, or how the magma will look (if the rocks are melted).
...
Right. You can never say that two things are exactly identical. But we can determine degrees of similarity.
...
There is obvious information in the way you sit, which tells us the way you will walk. Without getting into psychological aspects, the size and proportions of your body parts is an obvious source of information.
...
How is asking yourself "Is that a sexy walk?" any different than asking yourself "Is that a stone block?" ?

And how is asking yourself "How will that gravel look when incorporated into concrete?" any different than asking yourself "What does the way she sits tell me about the way she will walk?"
...
But those are conceptual distinctions that tell me how you categorize and punctuate events; it does not mean that someone else may not punctuate things differently.

I agree that thinking, feeling, remembering, and so on are nominalizations. However, everything can be reduced to actions and processes.

Reductionism (oops, a nominalization) to the process level does not partition concepts the way you think it does. I could offer the needed partition, but I'm interested to see if you understand that all "concrete" objects can be reduced to processes and actions. Are you suggesting that all is action? That nothing acts? I'm terribly sorry, but I'm having a really tough time believing that you are really making this argument. I think I want to know that you are serious before I make an attempt at answering you. Please tell me why a concrete block is an action in the same way that walking is. Tell me about the walking separate from the (well, I'd call it a person, but perhaps a person is an action--oh, dash it, I'll be reckless and call it a person) person who is walking, and tell me about the concrete block separate from the...the...see, here I don't get what object is concrete blocking right now.

If this is just a philosophical exercise, and you actually see a difference between walking and concrete blocks, please let me know--I won't hold it against your argument, and will continue to pursue same. I just honestly don't (can't?) believe that for a moment you see an equivalence here.

As for the earlier bits, you are describing the parameters of the walker, not the walk. They are, of course, related in that the former does (must? I don't know) put constraints on the range of the latter. But any more than that and you are on thin ice, which also puts constraints on your walking. Knowing the gravity of the planet you happen to be on also "is an obvious source of information" which "tells us the way you will walk"(to use your phrases), but I hope you do not equate the gravity with the walking.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Mercutio
Are you suggesting that all is action? That nothing acts? I'm terribly sorry, but I'm having a really tough time believing that you are really making this argument. I think I want to know that you are serious before I make an attempt at answering you. Please tell me why a concrete block is an action in the same way that walking is. Tell me about the walking separate from the (well, I'd call it a person, but perhaps a person is an action--oh, dash it, I'll be reckless and call it a person) person who is walking, and tell me about the concrete block separate from the...the...see, here I don't get what object is concrete blocking right now.


Concrete must go through a process of curing in order to strengthen. Let's pretend that such a process can stop at some time and that you're not asking me to defend this aspect as a process.

Matter is not at rest, internally. The concrete block stays a concrete block because of molecular/atomic bonding (though that isn't the only reason it stays together). Such bonding constitutes an ongoing process that never finds a resting point -- the matter is always in motion -- electrons whirring around keeping the matter from disintegrating into smaller pieces, and once in a while a bond here and a bond there fails, and oxidation happens to that part of the block, and a bird craps on another part that causes chemical reactions, and a worm crawls underneath it, and it gets rained on, etc. All of which cause small amounts of disintegration from the "block". Matter is always undergoing processes, and processes are inherent to any concept of "concrete" objects.

A person consists of many, many processes; respiration, circulation, digestion, cognition, etc. I would think that while a concrete block might seem hard to imagine as a process, that a person could easily be seen as a set of processes.


If this is just a philosophical exercise, and you actually see a difference between walking and concrete blocks, please let me know--I won't hold it against your argument, and will continue to pursue same. I just honestly don't (can't?) believe that for a moment you see an equivalence here.


There is an equivalence in the way that you have attempted to construct the partition. You won't like the way I construct mine, because it has nothing to do with process vs. object, per se. You just really won't like it. But here it is: The test for nominalization is: Of a noun or noun phrase -- Ask yourself the question: "Can you put it in a wheelbarrow?" If you can't, then it's a nominalized verb (e.g. "a walk" is a nominalization of walking or walking-in-a-particular-fashion ). If you can put it (or a representative piece of it) in a wheelbarrow, then it's an actual physical object, just like the wheelbarrow. Just don't confuse the wheelbarrow with an imaginary wheelbarrow that can hold non-physical objects ... :) (So, you sort of have to presuppose that the material world exists in order to conduct the test properly.)

[B]
As for the earlier bits, you are describing the parameters of the walker, not the walk. They are, of course, related in that the former does (must? I don't know) put constraints on the range of the latter.


Well, a walk is a sequence of visual inputs over time; much like a concrete block is a sequence of visual inputs over a space.

But any more than that and you are on thin ice, which also puts constraints on your walking. Knowing the gravity of the planet you happen to be on also "is an obvious source of information" which "tells us the way you will walk"(to use your phrases), but I hope you do not equate the gravity with the walking.

Gravity and friction coefficients definately impact the way someone walks, just as do the parameters of their body, and their mood, and the way they learned to walk in the first place. These are analogous with the properties of the gravel before it gets concretized.

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

Concrete must go through a process of curing in order to strengthen. Let's pretend that such a process can stop at some time and that you're not asking me to defend this aspect as a process.

Matter is not at rest, internally. The concrete block stays a concrete block because of molecular/atomic bonding (though that isn't the only reason it stays together). Such bonding constitutes an ongoing process that never finds a resting point -- the matter is always in motion -- electrons whirring around keeping the matter from disintegrating into smaller pieces, and once in a while a bond here and a bond there fails, and oxidation happens to that part of the block, and a bird craps on another part that causes chemical reactions, and a worm crawls underneath it, and it gets rained on, etc. All of which cause small amounts of disintegration from the "block". Matter is always undergoing processes, and processes are inherent to any concept of "concrete" objects. Look at your last sentence here. Note the difference between it and "objects are actions", which was the gist of your argument before.

A person consists of many, many processes; respiration, circulation, digestion, cognition, etc. I would think that while a concrete block might seem hard to imagine as a process, that a person could easily be seen as a set of processes.
A set of processes undergone by...more processes? Are you proposing an infinite regression of actions with never anything actually acting? BTW, a person does not "consist of...processes". Those processes are not the person, the are the actions of the person. As the actions of the concrete block are curing, waiting a loooong time, and eventually crumbling.
There is an equivalence in the way that you have attempted to construct the partition. You won't like the way I construct mine, because it has nothing to do with process vs. object, per se. You just really won't like it. But here it is: The test for nominalization is: Of a noun or noun phrase -- Ask yourself the question: "Can you put it in a wheelbarrow?" If you can't, then it's a nominalized verb (e.g. "a walk" is a nominalization of walking or walking-in-a-particular-fashion [but then, "milk" was a taken from the verb: milking..]). If you can put it (or a representative piece of it) in a wheelbarrow, then it's an actual physical object, just like the wheelbarrow. Just don't confuse the wheelbarrow with an imaginary wheelbarrow that can hold non-physical objects ... :) (So, you sort of have to presuppose that the material world exists in order to conduct the test properly.)
Either I'm not understanding you, or you have flipped your argument 180 degrees. If a concrete block is really an action, which you have claimed previously, does that mean we cannot put it in the wheelbarrow? If a thought or a memory are as real as a concrete block, can we have a wheelbarrow full of thoughts? I think your wheelbarrow is on my side. I must have misunderstood you before--I thought you were trying to either show that qualia were some form of object, or failing that, show that what we normally think of as objects are in fact processes. Your wheelbarrow disagrees with you...
Well, a walk is a sequence of visual inputs over time; much like a concrete block is a sequence of visual inputs over a space.
A concrete block is a sequence of visual inputs? You can put visual inputs in a wheelbarrow? You are claiming a walk exists only in the eye of the beholder? I thought you said it was composed of leg lengths and angles and the like...
Gravity and friction coefficients definitely impact the way someone walks, just as do the parameters of their body, and their mood, and the way they learned to walk in the first place. These are analogous with the properties of the gravel before it gets concretized. You are going to have to develop this analogy. I think you will find that it breaks down. Besides which, you were not claiming an analogy between object and action, but an identity.

[Dancing David]

very nice discussion here,

to summarise my impression, although I am not sure where this is headed with the qualia thing.

objects: things that interact with other things. ie material objects that can interact with the wheelbarrow

confusion over the word action:
a. the physics sense where any change in parameters is aclled action
b. human motivation sense where action implies deliberate will

Suggestologis: seems to be haeded in the direction that all objects are involved in acton at some level of perception

Therefore objects partake of both object and actiopn.


I would just like to state at this point though that when it comes to qualia I agree with Dr. Stupid, abstraction exist as mental contructs not as 'real' things, and therefore while we can create mental contructs like 'time' (which can only be defined by reference to physical processes) that all mental constructs loose meaning when set apart from there physical definition, they loose thier meaning.

Further examples:
beauty: this is a cultural norm, it is defined culturaly by a set of symetry and proportions that are culturaly determined. To remove the human percieving the object as beautiful and say that an object has a trancendant quality called beauty is lacking in meaning.

qualia: as been discussed repeatedly, there are no qualia without the organic entity to percieve them, in the scientific sense there are defined wavelegths of light. But it is the perciever that makes them qualia. Without the perception there are no qualia.

my two cents.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
That is exactly what it means in modern materialism. The archaic metaphysical notion of some sort of "material substance" of which everything is composed, was discarded as meaningless a long time ago. Unfortunately, the Idealists and Dualists still base their philosophies on such incoherent concepts as "ontological substances", and many of them insist on claiming that modern materialists do as well.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Which idealists and dualists are doing this? Could you provide a list of them?
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You, Q-Source, our old friend UCE...



Please point out where I have ever stated this. And last time I heard, Q-Source was a materialist. She might have changed her mind since, I don't know. But simply because she has the integrity to recognise the major problems of materialism doesn't necessitate she's not a materialist.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
What on earth could "scientific materialism" mean? That science is compatible with materialism? Or that science implies materialism??
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This is a very dishonest post. We both know perfectly well that I have explained to you what I mean by "scientific materialism" many times before. You told me that it is essentially what you call naturalism, remember?



Ah naturalism! So why are you calling it scientific materialism? What on earth has naturalism got to do with materialism?? The only metaphysical positions that naturalism has are the denial of libertarian free will, and that the totality of reality can be described by physical laws. Quite unlike materialism.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anyway I would venture to suggest that the assumptions it might make that science doesn't is that there is a material reality, that consciousness is derived from this material reality, and that the physical world is closed.
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1) It does not make the assumption that there is a "material reality".



That's true enough if you're referring to naturalism. I was confused by you calling it scientific materialism.




That would be meaningless without first defining what the word "material" means. It assumes that reality is objective,



Does it? Where did you get this from?



and that its components can be either directly observed, or indirectly observed through interactions, and that a set of logical consistent rules exist which can be inferred by observing its components. It then defines the word "material" to refer to the components of that reality.



You are mistaken.This is not what the word material means. It is a mind independent reality from which minds are logically derived. It is also typically thought as as ontologically self-subsistent. In brief the material is the prime reality with consciousness being either concomitant or derived from this prime reality.



2) It does not assume that consciousness is derived from this material reality.



Naturalism doesn't, materialism does.




It need make no specific assumptions about consciousness at all. We observe that consciousness exists, and is therefore part of reality. Our assumption that it can be explained scientifically, in terms of matter and physical processes, is not specific to consciousness. It is an assumption we make about anything which can be observed to exist. And once again, that is an assumption that science must make in order to be coherent.



This is naturalism, not materialism.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

That is exactly what it means in modern materialism. The archaic metaphysical notion of some sort of "material substance" of which everything is composed, was discarded as meaningless a long time ago. Unfortunately, the Idealists and Dualists still base their philosophies on such incoherent concepts as "ontological substances", and many of them insist on claiming that modern materialists do as well.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Which idealists and dualists are doing this? Could you provide a list of them?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You, Q-Source, our old friend UCE...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Please point out where I have ever stated this.

You have, on many occasions, expressed the belief that reality is composed of a single type of ontological existent, and that this existent is consciousness. Do you deny this?

And last time I heard, Q-Source was a materialist. She might have changed her mind since, I don't know. But simply because she has the integrity to recognise the major problems of materialism doesn't necessitate she's not a materialist.

Q-Source flat-out stated that she believes materialism is false, and that she thinks consciousness is non-physical. The first means that she is either not a materialist, insane, or a liar. The second indicates that she is a dualist.

This is a very dishonest post. We both know perfectly well that I have explained to you what I mean by "scientific materialism" many times before. You told me that it is essentially what you call naturalism, remember?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ah naturalism! So why are you calling it scientific materialism? What on earth has naturalism got to do with materialism?? The only metaphysical positions that naturalism has are the denial of libertarian free will, and that the totality of reality can be described by physical laws. Quite unlike materialism.

Same old Bullsh*t. I am not even going to respond to this crap. What's the point? You obviously weren't listening any of the other times I explained this to you. :rolleyes:


Dr. Stupid

[metacristi]

While I agree that the actual computational-emergentist hypothesis regarding the nature of consciousness [which reject even the 'interactionist dualism' of Eccles'] is the most supported by the empirical data gathered so far I don't think science need the 'epistemical' assumption that it is actually 'true' [albeit still fallible].As I've argued before,for the moment at least,it is only a mere conjecture.We need much more evidence to go beyond the simple conjecture status:an android whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being or at least a successful 'holistic' theory of mind.

Moreover I don't think that science should presuppose [as an 'epistemological' assumption based on the actual objective data] the materialistic approach of consciousness in general [where as materialistic count also Chalmers' panpsychism,Eccles' interactionist dualism or Penrose-Hameroff's 'quantum consciousness'] as being 'true'.For the same reasons as above.

After all the assumption made by science that consciousness can be understood does not entail us to assume the computational-emergentist hypothesis or materialism in general as being enough to explain consciousness.Not even as an 'epistemological assumption':the 'for the moment we don't know' is a better alternative...Indeed there is still possible that we will never understand consciousness in its entirety not because of some evident experimental limitations but simply because a form of idealism is true [which we will never know from 'inside'].

All we can derive from the actual findings in the neurology field is a rational basis for a personal belief that consciousness is entirely material [or in a stronger form an emergent,computational,phenomenon of matter].Of course this does not mean that all would be rational people should also believe the same...

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Mercutio
Look at your last sentence here. Note the difference between it and "objects are actions", which was the gist of your argument before.
[/b] A set of processes undergone by...more processes? Are you proposing an infinite regression of actions with never anything actually acting?
[/B]

Well there are materialists who think that at the bottom of everything, there is some piece of matter. Then there are energeticists who think that at the bottom of everything there is energy. The distinction between matter and energy may be an irrelevant dichotomy, but there is no reason to believe that there is any-THING at the bottom of everything -- there is no evidence that tells us if the energeticists are right or the materialists are right -- it may be that both and neither are right.


BTW, a person does not "consist of...processes". Those processes are not the person, the are the actions of the person. As the actions of the concrete block are curing, waiting a loooong time, and eventually crumbling.
Either I'm not understanding you, or you have flipped your argument 180 degrees. If a concrete block is really an action, which you have claimed previously, does that mean we cannot put it in the wheelbarrow?
[/B]

Very good question. You know that you put something in the wheelbarrow -- but what is it, really? The answer is that it is only a "concrete block" as part of your "user illusion" of the matter. A good illustration of "User Illusion" is seeing a bathtub as a bathtub, rather than just a piece of matter in a shape -- because you see a use for the matter and it's shape and set-up.


If a thought or a memory are as real as a concrete block, can we have a wheelbarrow full of thoughts? I think your wheelbarrow is on my side. I must have misunderstood you before--I thought you were trying to either show that qualia were some form of object, or failing that, show that what we normally think of as objects are in fact processes. Your wheelbarrow disagrees with you...


My wheelbarrow disagrees with what you thought I meant, because you could not see that all concrete objects can be reduced down to process level definitions.


A concrete block is a sequence of visual inputs? You can put visual inputs in a wheelbarrow?
[/B]

Ah, but putting visual inputs into a wheelbarrow correlates them with the visual inputs OF the wheelbarrow. That is what putting something into a wheelbarrow is -- especially since we usually only use an imaginary wheelbarrow, placing things into it in view of our mind's eye(s).


You are claiming a walk exists only in the eye of the beholder? I thought you said it was composed of leg lengths and angles and the like...


You can look at things from different perspectives, can't we?


You are going to have to develop this analogy. I think you will find that it breaks down. Besides which, you were not claiming an analogy between object and action, but an identity.

Yes, tacit definitions, identities.

[Mercutio]

I'm not entirely certain I understood any of that. I actually had to go back and read through your posts again to see whether you had shifted views or what, and I am sorry to say I have no clue. Is it that qualia are real, that nothing is real, that matter is actually action, that actions have actions, and it's turtles all the way down?...I give up.

Originally posted by Suggestologist

My wheelbarrow disagrees with what you thought I meant, because you could not see that all concrete objects can be reduced down to process level definitions.
Thus, you are saying that thinking and concrete blocks and bathtubs are in fact all the same. When you throw in the "looking at things from different perspectives", it is not unreasonable to actually mistake the process that is a bathtub from that which is a concrete block, or "red". Ordinarily, I would say "I know you don't mean this, but where have I gone wrong?", but I honestly think that this sort of mistake [i]is[/] implied by your line of reasoning...or perhaps I just thought that is what I read, and actually I was bathtub at the time.

But anyway...so qualia are every bit as real as bathtub-processes, and not merely metaphorically so, but literally so. Fine. So why stop with qualia? Surely the experience of red needs to be experienced. And the experience of experiencing the experience needs also to be experienced. We need qualia2, and qualia3, and qualiaprimeturtle, don't we? Or is there a logical reason for stopping with the first turtle?

Oh, and did you actually answer the one about the walk being in the eye of the beholder? I only saw another question, and I cannot for the life of me tell what is serious and what is not, here.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Mercutio
I'm not entirely certain I understood any of that. I actually had to go back and read through your posts again to see whether you had shifted views or what, and I am sorry to say I have no clue. Is it that qualia are real, that nothing is real, that matter is actually action, that actions have actions, and it's turtles all the way down?...I give up.

Thus, you are saying that thinking and concrete blocks and bathtubs are in fact all the same.


In some respects, they are, in others they aren't. Don't engage in all-or-none thinking.

You can put a "walker" (defined as a person who walks) into a wheelbarrow; but you cannot put the walk into the wheelbarrow separate from the walker. The idea that the person is a walker depends on a "user illusion"; with respect to a base of the person as (just) a person. And, of course, personhood is a lower-level "user illusion" than walkerhood.

The relationship is attribute to attibutee. To call a person a walker is an example of metonymy -- compressing the attibute and attributee into one entity. To call a set of "matter" a person is also an example of metonymy (and I don't mean that in a materialist vs. non-materialist sense) -- a "user illusion".

But anyway...so qualia are every bit as real as bathtub-processes, and not merely metaphorically so, but literally so. Fine.


Qualia result from cognitive processes. Consciousness "feels like" something becuase most people use a kinesthetic strategy to determine reality -- a reality test based on a feeling (usually in the "gut").


So why stop with qualia? Surely the experience of red needs to be experienced. And the experience of experiencing the experience needs also to be experienced. We need qualia2, and qualia3, and qualiaprimeturtle, don't we? Or is there a logical reason for stopping with the first turtle?


Sounds like the same problem as quantum measurement requiring an observer to collapse the quantum state. As far as I can tell, they haven't figured out why things should collapse (for an observer of the first observer) with the first observer, either.

I don't see anything wrong with second-order experience, though. What exactly a person means by "experiencing an experience" may differ from person to person; but it may mean just dissociating from the experience and experiencing things from a dissociated (intramental) point of view. Second-order (and higher) dissociation is also possible.


Oh, and did you actually answer the one about the walk being in the eye of the beholder? I only saw another question, and I cannot for the life of me tell what is serious and what is not, here.

Yes. The walk is in the eye of the "user illusioner". Someone else may call it a crawl.

[Mercutio]

I think that actually cleared up quite a bit. I will remain comfortable with thinking at the level of an actual "person". That this person can be seen as a walker, runner, thinker or anything-elser is essentially dissection, albeit functional rather than structural dissection. That the person can be seen as an arbitrary collection of matter in a space-time continuum is an abstraction in the other direction. The apparant autonomy of behavior (in that the only strings attached are metaphorical--certainly we obey TLOP and behave in accordance with other laws--say, of learning) of this particular collection of matter over the course of what we'll label a "lifetime" is, to my thinking, a more natural line of demarcation. I'll be willing to consider other lines of demarcation as soon as any practical reason to arises. From my perspective, then, arbitrary as it may be from your philosphical view, concrete blocks, bathtubs, and people can be put into wheelbarrows, "walkers" cannot because as soon as they are put in they become "sitters", walks and qualia cannot be put in. In terms of actions, they are accomplished by things (even though they may be technically accomplished by actions composed of actions composed of actions, ad infinitum), such that concrete blocks and bathtubs tend to just sit around, people walk and talk and see and feel and hear. They don't hear qualia, they simply hear. They don't see qualia, they simply see. Given my arbitrary level of abstraction, does this make sense?

[Q-Source]

I am a materialists who recognises the limitations of Science to explain what consciousness is. I do not know what consciousness is but I know it exists. Does that make me a dualist? No, it doesn't because I am not giving a definition of consciousness.

I accept what Science offers but I do not accept what Scientific materialism offers.

Q-S

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Q-Source,

I am a materialists who recognises the limitations of Science to explain what consciousness is. I do not know what consciousness is but I know it exists. Does that make me a dualist? No, it doesn't because I am not giving a definition of consciousness.

You know x exist, but can't define what x refers to? What does that mean?

How can you make any claims about consciousness without first defining what you mean by the term? Your above statement is utterly devoid of any meaning.

I accept what Science offers but I do not accept what Scientific materialism offers.

Can you be specific? What does science offer? What does scientific materialism offer that science does not?

[edited to add]

In your first sentence above, you claim that you accept materialism, but recognize the limitations of science. In your las sentence you claim that you accept science, but not materialism. Could you explain how this is not contradictory?


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Q-Source,



You know x exist, but can't define what x refers to? What does that mean?

How can you make any claims about consciousness without first defining what you mean by the term? Your above statement is utterly devoid of any meaning.



Can you be specific? What does science offer? What does scientific materialism offer that science does not?

[edited to add]

In your first sentence above, you claim that you accept materialism, but recognize the limitations of science. In your las sentence you claim that you accept science, but not materialism. Could you explain how this is not contradictory?


Dr. Stupid

Told you she was a materialist. It's not often you're right and you're wrong again.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Told you she was a materialist. It's not often you're right and you're wrong again.

Of course she is. Why else would she be claiming that materialism is false, and promoting Berkely's Idealism in another thread? :rolleyes:

Wanna see a neat trick, Ian?

I am a fundamentalist Christian.

See that? Now you can claim that some Fundamentalist Christians are also atheists. Isn't that cool?


Dr. Stupid

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Mercutio
I think that actually cleared up quite a bit. I will remain comfortable with thinking at the level of an actual "person". That this person can be seen as a walker, runner, thinker or anything-elser is essentially dissection, albeit functional rather than structural dissection. That the person can be seen as an arbitrary collection of matter in a space-time continuum is an abstraction in the other direction. The apparant autonomy of behavior (in that the only strings attached are metaphorical--certainly we obey TLOP and behave in accordance with other laws--say, of learning) of this particular collection of matter over the course of what we'll label a "lifetime" is, to my thinking, a more natural line of demarcation. I'll be willing to consider other lines of demarcation as soon as any practical reason to arises. From my perspective, then, arbitrary as it may be from your philosphical view, concrete blocks, bathtubs, and people can be put into wheelbarrows, "walkers" cannot because as soon as they are put in they become "sitters", walks and qualia cannot be put in.


But a walker need not be walking at the time you place her into the wheelbarrow, she need only have the potential ability to walk. Just as a bathtub need not be filled with water and have a person bathing in it in order to be called a bathtub, at any particular moment. And "person" stands for all of the abilities (and processes) that the prototypical person can potentially "do".


In terms of actions, they are accomplished by things (even though they may be technically accomplished by actions composed of actions composed of actions, ad infinitum), such that concrete blocks and bathtubs tend to just sit around, people walk and talk and see and feel and hear. They don't hear qualia, they simply hear. They don't see qualia, they simply see. Given my arbitrary level of abstraction, does this make sense?

Yes. But my impression of qualia is that people are including cognitive processes that are triggered by the raw sensory data; and confusing that with the low-level reality (what linguists might call the deep-structure) of the source of the sensory data.

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Suggestologist


But a walker need not be walking at the time you place her into the wheelbarrow, she need only have the potential ability to walk. Just as a bathtub need not be filled with water and have a person bathing in it in order to be called a bathtub, at any particular moment. And "person" stands for all of the abilities (and processes) that the prototypical person can potentially "do".
I'll disagree here, but only mildly. A "potential walker" is not a "walker"--the proper noun there is "person". A "walker" is partially defined by walking. Yes, a person does all those things (I'll quibble with "stands for"), if we are talking about walking, singing, thinking, etc., or is all those things if we are talking about walker, talker, thinker, but they do or are all these things only in a molar sense. There's nothing wrong with that, but if we are going to talk in the molar sense, we already have the approprate word--person. The others are needlessly narrow.


Yes. But my impression of qualia is that people are including cognitive processes that are triggered by the raw sensory data; and confusing that with the low-level reality (what linguists might call the deep-structure) of the source of the sensory data. And that is one of the key problems of the term "qualia"--our introspective understanding may have little to do with the actual processing that goes on. What one person calls raw qualia, another calls semi-processed qualia...When seeing is viewed as a behavior, we can simply look at all the processes involved as contributing, without teasing apart which are which arbitrary category. (It may be possible to tease those things apart, and it may be worthwhile, but it would take better evidence to convince me that introspection is the way to do this. Since qualia are defined in introspective terms, it is quite possible that you will (can?) never separate out what is unprocessed from what is processed. (after all, some processing takes place at the level of the retina itself, long before it gets to "cognitive processing".

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Mercutio
I'll disagree here, but only mildly. A "potential walker" is not a "walker"--the proper noun there is "person". A "walker" is partially defined by walking. Yes, a person does all those things (I'll quibble with "stands for"), if we are talking about walking, singing, thinking, etc., or is all those things if we are talking about walker, talker, thinker, but they do or are all these things only in a molar sense. There's nothing wrong with that, but if we are going to talk in the molar sense, we already have the approprate word--person. The others are needlessly narrow.


I'll quibble back that not all persons are (immediately) potential walkers -- so the categorization isn't needlessly narrow. And I'm not a singer; most people wouldn't want to hear my attempts at singing. :)

[Mercutio]

Originally posted by Suggestologist
I'll quibble back that not all persons are (immediately) potential walkers -- so the categorization isn't needlessly narrow. And I'm not a singer; most people wouldn't want to hear my attempts at singing. :) And, of course, the only way that we can possible know if they are walkers or singers is for them to engage (or try, I suppose:), for singers like us) in those behaviors. I still say that's a functional dissection of a natural "whole" unit, the person.

Of course, in particular contexts, walkers and singers and the like may be the level of analysis needed. There, however, the context has already dissected out the function required by the person--in fact, on first thought such contexts already will presume which whole organism is the one being functionally dissected. ("how many singers do we have here?", being asked to a group of people getting ready to put on a show, will typically not count birds among the total number of singers.)

[Dub]

Originally posted by Q-Source


I don't expect anyone to care, I am not asking YOU to care and I am not proposing any other alternative. I DO care because I haven't found a full description in Science about how a very simple physical process takes place. Not a single one.
Q-S

Perhaps thats because they arent 'very simple' processes. Your assumption that they are may be why you look down on the scientific method for not being able to currently describe them fully.

[jan]

Originally posted by metacristi
While I agree that the actual computational-emergentist hypothesis regarding the nature of consciousness [which reject even the 'interactionist dualism' of Eccles'] is the most supported by the empirical data gathered so far I don't think science need the 'epistemical' assumption that it is actually 'true' [albeit still fallible].As I've argued before,for the moment at least,it is only a mere conjecture.We need much more evidence to go beyond the simple conjecture status:an android whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being or at least a successful 'holistic' theory of mind.

Moreover I don't think that science should presuppose [as an 'epistemological' assumption based on the actual objective data] the materialistic approach of consciousness in general [where as materialistic count also Chalmers' panpsychism,Eccles' interactionist dualism or Penrose-Hameroff's 'quantum consciousness'] as being 'true'.For the same reasons as above.

After all the assumption made by science that consciousness can be understood does not entail us to assume the computational-emergentist hypothesis or materialism in general as being enough to explain consciousness.Not even as an 'epistemological assumption':the 'for the moment we don't know' is a better alternative...Indeed there is still possible that we will never understand consciousness in its entirety not because of some evident experimental limitations but simply because a form of idealism is true [which we will never know from 'inside'].

All we can derive from the actual findings in the neurology field is a rational basis for a personal belief that consciousness is entirely material [or in a stronger form an emergent,computational,phenomenon of matter].Of course this does not mean that all would be rational people should also believe the same...

But with any scientific theory, you can imagine that it might be incomplete and that there might be something else you until now failed noticing. Maybe adaptive selection is not the only driving force of evolution, and there is something else nobody has discovered yet? So wouldn't it be better to claim over and over again that Darwinism is nothing but a plausible hypothesis? So wouldn't it be better science would avoid the epistemologic position that Darwinism is true?

Maybe there is a big cavity in the middle of the earth (regardless how unlikely this may sound), so science shouldn't be that quick in claiming that the earth is solid? Maybe it should avoid the epistemical, if not even metaphysical assumption that the statement "the earth is solid" is true?

Of course you can imagine that there is something about consciousness that can't be explained in terms of physics. Sounds possible. But there are a lot of things you can imagine. Why should anybody bother, as long as there is not the slightest evidence? As soon as there is the slightest evidence that a specific theory is incomplete and that there is a new aspect yet unexplored, this new aspect will be explored. Why, often enough they are explored cheerfully even without the evidence (think of all the UFO nuts).

Maybe there is something about consciousness that can't be explained in terms of physics. But if, then what is it? Any idea? Some mentions Qualia as an example. I don't think that this is valid, but at least it is a hint where we should search, not a general suspicion.

If I meet an android that perfectly mimics human behaviour, it may be possible that it does not have a mind like mine. But as long as I don't have any evidence (and "mimics human behaviour perfectly" means that there is no evidence per definition), why should I start a quest for that mysterious possible difference that may or may not exist?

There are just too many possible theories to disprove them all. Therefore, you start with a testable theory you hope to be true, not by disproving all the false theories (until just one remains). And if your theory stands the tests, that's the best you can and will ever get. Since you mentioned Popper, I guess you knew that.

You may imagine that materialism is incomplete (that is, there is something about consciousness that doesn't depend on anything physical), but by it's specific nature, it will never be discovered by mankind. But that objection can always be raised. Maybe all of our theories are false in a way we will never notice. Suggest a better approach than science.

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Mercutio
And, of course, the only way that we can possible know if they are walkers or singers is for them to engage (or try, I suppose:), for singers like us) in those behaviors. I still say that's a functional dissection of a natural "whole" unit, the person.


Is your bathtub a hot-tub? Is a person a projectile? Is your bathtub a bird-bath? Is a person an impure mass of carbon and H2O?

To say that "walker" is a dissection of the whole of a "person" -- is like saying that a "person" is a dissection of the whole of "matter-that-exists". (You probably have to be a materialist to say this, and it's probably why people who don't like this idea aren't.)

Describing some person as a walker means that we think they can do everything that walking entails (this may depend on how we have defined walking). Not every person can.


Of course, in particular contexts, walkers and singers and the like may be the level of analysis needed. There, however, the context has already dissected out the function required by the person--in fact, on first thought such contexts already will presume which whole organism is the one being functionally dissected. ("how many singers do we have here?", being asked to a group of people getting ready to put on a show, will typically not count birds among the total number of singers.)

I don't agree that the context always makes the distinctions we intend to make clearer.

[Pyrian]

Maybe there is a big cavity in the middle of the earth (regardless how unlikely this may sound), so science shouldn't be that quick in claiming that the earth is solid?Earthquake studies have mapped the substance of (or, more specifically, the time and energy it takes waves to pass through) the earth's core well enough to rule out any cavities large enough to be considered worth calling the Earth non-solid. Just being obnoxious. ;)

[jan]

Originally posted by Pyrian
Earthquake studies have mapped the substance of (or, more specifically, the time and energy it takes waves to pass through) the earth's core well enough to rule out any cavities large enough to be considered worth calling the Earth non-solid. Just being obnoxious. ;)

I guess it should be clear that every claim can be defended an infinite amount of time as long as we allow infinite many ad-hoc hypotheses for every evidence against our claim. Just to be stern. :wink:

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Jan,

I guess it should be clear that every claim can be defended an infinite amount of time as long as we allow infinite many ad-hoc hypotheses for every evidence against our claim. Just to be stern.

That's why science does not allow such nonsense. Proper application of Occam's razor eliminates such ad-hoc hypotheses.


Dr. Stupid

[Suggestologist]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Jan,



That's why science does not allow such nonsense. Proper application of Occam's razor eliminates such ad-hoc hypotheses.


Dr. Stupid

Nonsense, Science thrives on ad hoc interpretations of results.

[jan]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Jan,

That's why science does not allow such nonsense. Proper application of Occam's razor eliminates such ad-hoc hypotheses.

Dr. Stupid

Yes, but what exactly are you trying to teach me? That there isn't a large cavity in the middle of the earth? That Darwinism is right? That there is no immortal soul? That there is nothing oh so special about consciousness? That's just what I tried to explain a few posts ago.

And to Suggestologist,

maybe you should buy some popular science paper like science or nature or scientific american and count how many articles contains sentences like "it was considered that it works like ..., but we now have shown it works like ... instead", and how many articles countains sentences like "it was considered that it works like ..., and that is still true, and any evidence against can be explained away by the following roundabout ad-hoc hypothesis".