Prayer

[JetLeg]

I am not sure that I believe in intercessory prayer. The main reason is because some studies showed it not to work.


But the question is the following :

When a rational person says "I believe that prayer works", it also means that he is interested in checking whether prayer really does work, or it does not. And, such a person would be persuaded that prayer doesn't work, if it were demonstrated.

When a fundamentalist says "I believe that prayer works", in his case when presented with evidence for the contrary, he won't change his mind. Morever, he is not interested in checking the truth of his statement.

When a liberal religious person says "I believe that prayer works", he somehow thinks that studies of intercessory prayer do not disprove the validity of prayer, but for different reasons than the fundamentalist - spiritual ones. He thinks that "god is too big to be tested". And yet he prays all the time.


My actual question is this :

1) Do you think that the meaning of the proposition "I believe that prayer works" is different for each of them? Because the rational really thinks that this proposition describes reality, and is ready to check it, but the fundamentalist and the liberal somehow do not think it, each because of his reasons.

2) Because of that, should these propositions formalised (in logic) in a different way?

3) If not the meaning - what is about these propositions that is different from one person to another?

[Roboramma]

When a liberal religious person says "I believe that prayer works", he somehow thinks that studies of intercessory prayer do not disprove the validity of prayer, but for different reasons than the fundamentalist - spiritual ones. He thinks that "god is too big to be tested". And yet he prays all the time. I don't think this viewpoint is impossible - just ridiculous.

If there were a God, it would know when tests were being conducted on prayer. It could easily decide that at those times it would simply not listen.

Of course its a pretty cruel god that's so scared of being discovered it will punish the innocent (who may not have any idea about the study being conducted) and not answer their prayers simply to avoid being found out.

But it's not impossible, I guess.


My actual question is this :

1) Do you think that the meaning of the proposition "I believe that prayer works" is different for each of them? Because the rational really thinks that this proposition describes reality, and is ready to check it, but the fundamentalist and the liberal somehow do not think it, each because of his reasons. No, they all mean that if you pray you can expect to get a result. The liberal may disagree about the effectiveness of testing and the fundamentalist just shuts off his brain when the idea of testing comes up.
But the original proposition means the same thing to all of them, and you can tell this by their actions (ie. when the fundamentalist wants something in his life, he'll pray for it, because he expects to get a result).

[JetLeg]

But the original proposition means the same thing to all of them, and you can tell this by their actions (ie. when the fundamentalist wants something in his life, he'll pray for it, because he expects to get a result).

But if the proposition for one of them is such that one wants to check its truth, the other does not want to check its truth, and the third one retreats into moderate-religious-babble, when asked about the content of its truth, something must be very different about the way they think of this proposition to them. What, if not the meaning of it?

[Roboramma]

But if the proposition for one of them is such that one wants to check its truth, the other does not want to check its truth, and the third one retreats into moderate-religious-babble, when asked about the content of its truth, something must be very different about the way they think of this proposition to them. What, if not the meaning of it?
It may not be the proposition itself that differs but simply the way that the people view it. Not because there is something special about this particular proposition, but because these people's views of the world differ.

The problem is that sometimes some people's views of the world are simply wrong. Which leads two different people to make different conclusions about the same proposition. Not because they don't realise that they're discussing different propositions using the same words, though I'm sure that happens as well, but because one of them is simply wrong.

On the other hand, I think that you may have a point in here somewhere, but I need to think on it more.

[GeeMack]

When a rational person says "I believe that prayer works", it also means that he is interested in checking whether prayer really does work, or it does not.

[...]

Because the rational really thinks that this proposition describes reality, and is ready to check it, but the fundamentalist and the liberal somehow do not think it, each because of his reasons.But if the proposition for one of them is such that one wants to check its truth, the other does not want to check its truth, and the third one retreats into moderate-religious-babble, when asked about the content of its truth, something must be very different about the way they think of this proposition to them. What, if not the meaning of it?


The foundation of your concern is flawed. It doesn't necessarily follow that a generally rational person who claims to believe in an unevidenced phenomenon has any desire to test or check the validity of that claim.

[JetLeg]

The foundation of your concern is flawed. It doesn't necessarily follow that a generally rational person who claims to believe in an unevidenced phenomenon has any desire to test or check the validity of that claim.

It does, granted that this unevidenced phenomenon might have a strong effect on his life, and that he cares about his own life.

[tsg]

1) Do you think that the meaning of the proposition "I believe that prayer works" is different for each of them? Because the rational really thinks that this proposition describes reality, and is ready to check it, but the fundamentalist and the liberal somehow do not think it, each because of his reasons.

Not to any significant extent. They may quibble about what constitutes "prayer" and "works", but they all mean pretty much the same thing: wishing for something can make it happen.

3) If not the meaning - what is about these propositions that is different from one person to another?

How they arrived at the conclusion.

As for not being able to test god, you're coming at it from the wrong direction. If you can't check whether or not prayer works, where did they get the idea that it did?

The fact is that god is being tested all the time. The very first time someone got the idea in their head to pray for something and it happened, they said, "hey, this prayer thing works!" That's testing god. If it didn't happen and they noticed, they're testing god. Simply put, people are constantly examining cause and effect in their daily lives. Unless the people praying are forgetting all about what they asked for, god is being tested.

[JetLeg]

How they arrived at the conclusion.

I am slightly derailing my own post, but :

If a blind person and a non-blind person say

"There is a cat on the sofa".

The blind person says that there is because he felt the cat before. The non-blind because he saw the cat. Morever, the blind person never saw a single cat.

Wouldn't you say that the meaning of their proposition is different? The blind represents "cat" with touch, the non-blind with sights.

And if not the meaning, what is different in this case?

[tsg]

I am slightly derailing my own post, but :

If a blind person and a non-blind person say

"There is a cat on the sofa".

The blind person says that there is because he felt the cat before. The non-blind because he saw the cat. Morever, the blind person never saw a single cat.

Wouldn't you say that the meaning of their proposition is different? The blind represents "cat" with touch, the non-blind with sights.

No. Both are indicating that there is an animal known as a "cat" on a piece of furniture known as a "sofa".

And if not the meaning, what is different in this case?

Again, how they arrived at the conclusion. They used different methods to determine there was a cat on the sofa, but both arrived at the same conclusion.

[Mashuna]

I am slightly derailing my own post, but :

If a blind person and a non-blind person say

"There is a cat on the sofa".

The blind person says that there is because he felt the cat before. The non-blind because he saw the cat. Morever, the blind person never saw a single cat.

Wouldn't you say that the meaning of their proposition is different? The blind represents "cat" with touch, the non-blind with sights.

And if not the meaning, what is different in this case?

Just because they have differing perceptions of the cat, the cat is still the same.

[JetLeg]

Just because they have differing perceptions of the cat, the cat is still the same.

The cat is the same, I agree.
But what about the meaning of their propositions?

Don't you think that part of the meaning of their propositions is their perceptions of the cat?

What would you say that is different between them?

[tsg]

The cat is the same, I agree.
But what about the meaning of their propositions?

Don't you think that part of the meaning of their propositions is their perceptions of the cat?

No.

[Mashuna]

The cat is the same, I agree.
But what about the meaning of their propositions?

Don't you think that part of the meaning of their propositions is their perceptions of the cat?

What would you say that is different between them?

That there is a missing, implicit part of their statement, which refers to their method of knowing. "I see a cat on the sofa" vs "I feel a cat on the sofa". Both lead to the same result, there is a cat on the sofa.

[JetLeg]

No.

So where is the difference?

The way their minds represents the propositions "there is a cat on the sofa" is very different.

[drkitten]

So where is the difference?

In the rest of the propositions that people believe.

Propositions are not typically believed in a vacuum. I might believe that a particular restaurant is good because I've eaten there and enjoyed it. You might believe that that same restaurant is good because you've read a good review of it. In either case, the proposition "that restaurant is good" is identical -- but other propositions are different.

Read Quine's response to the falsifiability question for more on this.

[tsg]

So where is the difference?

In how they arrived at the conclusion.

The way their minds represents the propositions "there is a cat on the sofa" is very different.

No, it isn't. Both know what a cat is. Both know what a sofa is. Both know what it means for a cat to be on a sofa. Both have determined that there is, in fact, a particular cat on a particular sofa. Both know if they pet the cat it will likely purr. Both know if they pick up the cat it will have weight. Both know if they move the cat it won't be on the sofa anymore. The only thing that is different is how they determined there was a cat on the sofa. The methods used to determine the reality don't change the reality.

[JetLeg]

Just because they have differing perceptions of the cat, the cat is still the same.

I agree the cat is the same. But the meaning of their proposition might be different, because the meaning should include their subjective perception of the words they use.

[JetLeg]

In how they arrived at the conclusion.



No, it isn't. Both know what a cat is. Both know what a sofa is. Both know what it means for a cat to be on a sofa. Both have determined that there is, in fact, a particular cat on a particular sofa. Both know if they pet the cat it will likely purr. Both know if they pick up the cat it will have weight. Both know if they move the cat it won't be on the sofa anymore. The only thing that is different is how they determined there was a cat on the sofa. The methods used to determine the reality don't change the reality.

I did not imply the last sentence.

But I disagree with the rest.

I will make the example more extreme. Take a person that is blind versus a person who is paralized and can only see. For the first, this cat is a fluffy, heavy thing, pleasant to touch, that can bite. For the second it is a black (assumed) thing that can move and jump very quickly, quiet pleasant to look at, with green eyes (this specific cat).

So

(1) "a cat" does mean something different to them.

(2) The way their minds represents the propositions "there is a cat on the sofa" is very different.

[JetLeg]

In either case, the proposition "that restaurant is good" is identical -- but other propositions are different.


Interesting. Which propositions in this specific example?

[Roboramma]

JetLeg, correct me if I'm wrong, but is the following what you're saying:

While two different people refer to the same real object, if they don't have a complete understanding of that object, they mean different things when they refer to it.
So, if I say, "the cat on the sofa" but I think that it has sharp claws, and my friend says, "yes, the cat on the sofa" but knows that she took it to be declawed last week, while we're both refering to same cat, in some way we're talking about two different things because by "the cat on the sofa" we mean different things.

Specifically, I mean a cat that has claws, and she doesn't.

Is that right?

So if I make a statement about the cat: "the cat on the sofa could scratch me if it wanted to", this is different from if she did?

Here's the problem, though - it's not. While our ideas of the cat may differ - I think it has claws, she doesn't - we both know about the object in the real, objective world that we're refering to.
If I go over and find out that the cat in fact can't scratch me because it doesn't have claws, I won't say, "that's not the cat on the sofa that I was referring to - it's by definition a different cat". I'll say, "Oh, I was wrong about the cat on the sofa, now that i know more, I realise that my conclusion was also wrong - it can scratch me.".

In other words, the idea is: that object in the real world + the things I think I know about it.

[drkitten]

Interesting. Which propositions in this specific example?

In the case of the restaurant I visited, propositions like "I have visited this restaurant," "I know what the food there tastes like." "The bechamel sauce is not too salty." "The waitress has red hair" and so forth. It's not so much that the propositions mean different things, but that they have different truth values for me (who has experienced them) than for you, who have only read a review.

In particular, I know that the statement "the bechamel sauce is not too salty" is true, because I experienced it. You don't know whether or not it's true unless the review specifically mentioned it, and even then, you only know from hearsay (the reviewer might have lied, or might have had different standards for "too salty.") So we both get to the same final conclusion, but based on different supporting propositions which we (independently) hold to be true.

Or, as tsg put it, "The only thing that is different is how they determined there was a cat on the sofa. The methods used to determine the reality don't change the reality."

[tsg]

I did not imply the last sentence.

But I disagree with the rest.

I will make the example more extreme. Take a person that is blind versus a person who is paralized and can only see. For the first, this cat is a fluffy, heavy thing, pleasant to touch, that can bite. For the second it is a black (assumed) thing that can move and jump very quickly, quiet pleasant to look at, with green eyes (this specific cat).

They both have the same concept of what a cat is even if their experiences of cats may differ. If one can tell the other "there is a cat on the sofa" and have the other understand what he means, the propositions are the same. That is, the sighted person will see the cat and say to the blind person "there is a cat on the sofa". The blind person will then understand that if the proposition is true and he walks over to the sofa he should be able to feel a cat there. In short "cat" embodies all the characteristics the two people know about cats even though they each can only experience different subsets of them. It doesn't change what they mean by "there is a cat on the sofa".

[grayman]

Even if two people understand the concept of whatever the topic at hand may be, whether it is a cat, a restaurant, or a red-headed waitress, the two people will still interpret each other's words to mean what it would have meant had the other person said it.

Example: The fundamentalist person says, "I believe that prayer works" to the liberal person, the liberal person takes that to mean what it would had it been the liberal person that said it.

If I said, "I don't believe that prayer will work", would you understand my meaning as, "I don't believe that prayer will work because there is no God to receive this prayer", or, "I don't believe that prayer will work in this situation"?

[JetLeg]

JetLeg, correct me if I'm wrong, but is the following what you're saying:

While two different people refer to the same real object, if they don't have a complete understanding of that object, they mean different things when they refer to it.
So, if I say, "the cat on the sofa" but I think that it has sharp claws, and my friend says, "yes, the cat on the sofa" but knows that she took it to be declawed last week, while we're both refering to same cat, in some way we're talking about two different things because by "the cat on the sofa" we mean different things.

Specifically, I mean a cat that has claws, and she doesn't.

Is that right?



Yes, thanks. In some way you were talking about two different things, though I am not sure what the way is exactly.



Here's the problem, though - it's not. While our ideas of the cat may differ - I think it has claws, she doesn't - we both know about the object in the real, objective world that we're refering to.

If I go over and find out that the cat in fact can't scratch me because it doesn't have claws, I won't say, "that's not the cat on the sofa that I was referring to - it's by definition a different cat". I'll say, "Oh, I was wrong about the cat on the sofa, now that i know more, I realise that my conclusion was also wrong - it can scratch me.".

In other words, the idea is: that object in the real world + the things I think I know about it.


I don't think that proliferating examples is neccessary, but I like this one by Pema Chodron (taken out of context)



He constructed a big hat divided right down the middle, the left side of which was brilliant blue and the right side flaming red. Then he went to a place where many people were working in the fields on the left side of a road and many other people were working in the fields on the right side of the road. There the god manifested in all his glory; no one could miss him. Big and radiant, wearing his hat, he walked straight down the road. All the people on the right side of the road dropped their hoes and looked up at this god; all the people on the left side of the road did the same. Everybody was amazed. Then he disappeared. Everyone shouted, "We saw God! We saw God!" They were all full of joy, until someone on the left said, "There he was in all his radiance and in his red hat!" And people on the right said, "No, he had on a blue hat.



If I understand you correctly, then you would say that the meaning of 'god' was the same for all of them, but their ideas about 'god' were different? Or do I miss something?

[Roboramma]

I don't think that proliferating examples is neccessary, but I like this one by Pema Chodron (taken out of context)



If I understand you correctly, then you would say that the meaning of 'god' was the same for all of them, but their ideas about 'god' were different? Or do I miss something?
Yeah, I agree with that. By "god" they're all refering to that thing that appeared in front of them.
There is one caveat, though - they might turn out to be wrong even that it is god.

To illustrate what I mean, back to the cat on the sofa. We both see a cat sleeping on a sofa. You say, "Let's go pet it", and I say, "I'm worried that it might scratch me."
So we walk over to it. When we get there, we find that it's just a stuffed animal.
My point being that even in this case we're still both talking about the same object when refering to the cat, it just turns out that we're wrong about what it is.

[tsg]

Yes, thanks. In some way you were talking about two different things, though I am not sure what the way is exactly.

Unless one person is of the opinion that a cat without claws is no longer a cat, they aren't really talking about different things. If they are, then it is the result of a disagreement about what characteristics constitute a cat. While these can be the result of their perceptions of a cat, it does not follow that people with different perceptions will necessarily disagree on the concept being discussed.

Back to your OP, if the three people involved all mean that making requests of an unseen entity makes it more likely to happen when they say "I believe prayer works", then there is no difference in their propositions. All three, when asked to pray for the miraculous recovery of a friend who has cancer, will go home and ask their god to heal this friend with the expectation that it will increase his chances. The means by which they came to that conclusion can be entirely different and they still are all saying the same thing when they say "I believe prayer works."

[JetLeg]

If I understand you correctly, then you would say that the meaning of 'god' was the same for all of them, but their ideas about 'god' were different? Or do I miss something?



Yeah, I agree with that.



I am not sure how can you draw this line of seperation.



To illustrate what I mean, back to the cat on the sofa. We both see a cat sleeping on a sofa. You say, "Let's go pet it", and I say, "I'm worried that it might scratch me."

So we walk over to it. When we get there, we find that it's just a stuffed animal.

My point being that even in this case we're still both talking about the same object when refering to the cat, it just turns out that we're wrong about what it is.

According to your own definitions, you should say that you were not talking of any object when you were refering to a cat. You thought you were talking about the same object, but you were not talking of an object at all.

[JetLeg]

Back to your OP, if the three people involved all mean that making requests of an unseen entity makes it more likely to happen when they say "I believe prayer works", then there is no difference in their propositions. All three, when asked to pray for the miraculous recovery of a friend who has cancer, will go home and ask their god to heal this friend with the expectation that it will increase his chances. The means by which they came to that conclusion can be entirely different and they still are all saying the same thing when they say "I believe prayer works."

Take a moslim who says that the Quran is true. I think that if moslims really thought that the Quran is true they would welcome attempts by historians to find out whether this proposition is true or not. The fact they do not shows that they mean something else.

[Roboramma]

I am not sure how can you draw this line of seperation. Simple - "that thing that I saw that appeared in front of me is what I'm talking about"
"You mean the thing that just appeared over there?"
"Yeah"
Okay, so we now know we're both talking about the same thing. Whether it was wearing a blue hat or a red hat is a different question.


According to your own definitions, you should say that you were not talking of any object when you were refering to a cat. You thought you were talking about the same object, but you were not talking of an object at all.
Sure I was - I was talking about that black thing on the sofa. That it turned out not to be a cat doesn't change that.

[JetLeg]

Sure I was - I was talking about that black thing on the sofa. That it turned out not to be a cat doesn't change that.

If you see a mirage of a cat (somehow), and call the mirage Kitty. Does kitty stand for something in the real world? You would never call a mirage a kitty. You would only call a cat - Kitty.

[tsg]

Take a moslim who says that the Quran is true. I think that if moslims really thought that the Quran is true they would welcome attempts by historians to find out whether this proposition is true or not. The fact they do not shows that they mean something else.

I don't see how this follows. Maybe they don't care whether historians think it's true.

[tsg]

If you see a mirage of a cat (somehow), and call the mirage Kitty. Does kitty stand for something in the real world? You would never call a mirage a kitty. You would only call a cat - Kitty.

You're equivocating. He's not naming the mirage "Kitty", he's saying he saw and object that he thought was a cat.

[GeeMack]

The foundation of your concern is flawed. It doesn't necessarily follow that a generally rational person who claims to believe in an unevidenced phenomenon has any desire to test or check the validity of that claim.

It does, granted that this unevidenced phenomenon might have a strong effect on his life, and that he cares about his own life.


Nah, I don't think so. But since you're the one making a claim here, that people who believe prayer works, but are otherwise rational, are actually interested in checking whether or not it indeed does work, go ahead and post your best evidence to support your claim.

[JetLeg]

Yeah, I agree with that. By "god" they're all refering to that thing that appeared in front of them.


How would you define the 'meaning' of a word? (In general)

I would say that the meaning of a word, however to define it is inseperable from the way the person actually thinks this word. When one person from the example thinks "god", inseperably he thinks of something red. And the other inseperably thinks of something blue. And both are part of the words' meaning.

[JetLeg]

Nah, I don't think so. But since you're the one making a claim here, that people who believe prayer works, but are otherwise rational, are actually interested in checking whether or not it indeed does work, go ahead and post your best evidence to support your claim.

It follows from the assumptions that

1) People are interested in their own well-being
and
2) People want to find out what effects their well-being and what does not.

Therefore, people who believe prayer works, but are rational will be interested to find out whether prayer does effect their well-being, or not.

[Loss Leader]

Haven`'t read the whole thread. Sorry if this is a restate:


1) Do you think that the meaning of the proposition "I believe that prayer works" is different for each of them? Because the rational really thinks that this proposition describes reality, and is ready to check it, but the fundamentalist and the liberal somehow do not think it, each because of his reasons.


Your entire question rests upon the logical error of equivocation. Equivocation is when a single word is given different meanings in the same logical argument.

In this case, each of the participants (rationalist, theist) is using the word "believe" differently. When each defines what they mean rather than all sharing the same word, your question disappears.

[JetLeg]

Haven`'t read the whole thread. Sorry if this is a restate:





Your entire question rests upon the logical error of equivocation. Equivocation is when a single word is given different meanings in the same logical argument.

In this case, each of the participants (rationalist, theist) is using the word "believe" differently. When each defines what they mean rather than all sharing the same word, your question disappears.


Well, imagine that there were some study that proved that prayer worked. A skeptic would look at the results of the study, come to the conclusion that prayer works, and say "prayer works". A believer would be happy that the the study confirms his belief and say "prayer works".
There is no equivocation here.
However, if flaws were found in the study, then their reaction would be very different.Therefore, something must be different about their statements. I suggested that the actual meaning of the statement is different.

[tsg]

Well, imagine that there were some study that proved that prayer worked. A skeptic would look at the results of the study, come to the conclusion that prayer works, and say "prayer works". A believer would be happy that the the study confirms his belief and say "prayer works".
There is no equivocation here.
However, if flaws were found in the study, then their reaction would be very different.Therefore, something must be different about their statements. I suggested that the actual meaning of the statement is different.

No, it isn't.

You're confusing two very different things here. "I believe prayer works" is the assertion. What they consider proof of the assertion is where they differ. Providing all three people mean the same thing by that statement (and you haven't stipulated otherwise) ie. asking an unseen entity to grant desires can bring them about, then all three mean the same thing by the statement. What is different is their requirements for evidence to consider that statement true. Whether the statement is true does not change what the speaker means by it.

[Bri]

When a rational person says "I believe that prayer works", it also means that he is interested in checking whether prayer really does work, or it does not. And, such a person would be persuaded that prayer doesn't work, if it were demonstrated.

I assume by "prayer works" you mean that whatever is being prayed for comes true a greater percentage of the time than we would expect it to by chance (without being prayed for).

That seems to be unfalsifiable to me since as others have pointed out, it is possible that prayer only works when it's not being studied.

So it seems that for anyone to want to find out if prayer really works, they must also believe that prayer must work even when it's being studied. Therefore, there might be several differences between people who believe that prayer works:


some don't care about studies of prayer because they don't believe that prayer must work when being studied.
some care about studies of prayer because they believe that prayer must work when being studied and wish to prove or disprove their belief in prayer.
some don't care about studies of prayer because they simply don't wish to prove or disprove their belief in prayer.


-Bri

[Loss Leader]

However, if flaws were found in the study, then their reaction would be very different.Therefore, something must be different about their statements. I suggested that the actual meaning of the statement is different.
No, it isn't.

You're confusing two very different things here. "I believe prayer works" is the assertion. What they consider proof of the assertion is where they differ.


Yes it is, TSG, and for exactly the same reason you stated. As I said, each person is using the word "believe" differently. That means that each person's statement has a different meaning.

How does their use of the word "believe" differ? It differs in the level of proof each requires for belief. The rationalist uses the word "believe" to mean "think after reviewing the best evidence available at the time" while the fundamentalist means "have faith regardless of the existence of evidence to the contrary."

I don't understand what we're discussing, here. Once each actor is clear about what he means by "believe," the apparant problem disappears.


General: I ask you, have you ever known what it is to be an orphan?

King: Often!

General: Yes, orphan. Have you ever known what it is to be one?

King. I say, often.

Pirates. (disgusted) Often, often, often. (Turning away)

General. I don’t think we quite understand one another. I ask you, have you ever known what it is to be an orphan, and you say “orphan”. As I understand you, you are merely repeating the word “orphan” to show that you understand me.

King. I didn’t repeat the word often.

General. Pardon me, you did indeed.

King. I only repeated it once.

General. True, but you repeated it.

King. But not often.

General. Stop! I think I see where we are getting confused. When you said “orphan”, did you mean “orphan” – a person who has lost his parents, or “often”, frequently?

King. Ah! I beg pardon – I see what you mean – frequently.

General. Ah! you said "often", frequently.

King. No, only once.

General. (irritated) Exactly – you said “often”, frequently, only once.

[Bri]

How does their use of the word "believe" differ? It differs in the level of proof each requires for belief. The rationalist uses the word "believe" to mean "think after reviewing the best evidence available at the time" while the fundamentalist means "have faith regardless of the existence of evidence to the contrary."

Their use of the word "believe" is the same. Their reasons (the level of evidence required) for belief are different. In other words, as drkitten said earlier in the thread, there is other information that is not present in the statement "I believe that prayer works." However, they all share a common belief that prayer works, and they all mean pretty much the same thing by it.

-Bri

[Loss Leader]

Their use of the word "believe" is the same. Their reasons (the level of evidence required) for belief are different. In other words, as drkitten said earlier in the thread, there is other information that is not present in the statement "I believe that prayer works." However, they all share a common belief that prayer works, and they all mean pretty much the same thing by it.


I'm sorry. If you were right, I'd agree with you.

[Roboramma]

How would you define the 'meaning' of a word? (In general)

I would say that the meaning of a word, however to define it is inseperable from the way the person actually thinks this word. When one person from the example thinks "god", inseperably he thinks of something red. And the other inseperably thinks of something blue. And both are part of the words' meaning.

The problem here is that two people's ideas about a word will never (or at least seldom) be identical in the way that you require. However, they have a common reference - the real world - and that's what allows us to use them to communicate with each other.
So when you say, "I have a cat at home" I have some idea of what you mean because I've seen actual cats before, met other people who've interacted with them, and talked to those people about them, seen them in photos and videos, etc.
Our ideas of what the word "cat" means may not be perfectly identical, but that's not necessary for communication. They just need to be close enough, and when they disagree, we can examine the real world to reasses our understandings of the concept "cat".

[tsg]

Yes it is, TSG, and for exactly the same reason you stated. As I said, each person is using the word "believe" differently. That means that each person's statement has a different meaning.

How does their use of the word "believe" differ? It differs in the level of proof each requires for belief. The rationalist uses the word "believe" to mean "think after reviewing the best evidence available at the time" while the fundamentalist means "have faith regardless of the existence of evidence to the contrary."

I disagree. "Believe" indicates that a person thinks a thing to be true. How they came to that belief is a different matter and not included in the statement. There is no confusion about what they think is true. The only difference is how they came to that belief. A quick scan through the dictionary definitions (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/believe) confirms this. If people are using the word "believe" to indicate how they came to that belief, it has escaped the notice of several publishers who compile the common usages of words.

The fact that a good deal of the conversation on this forum is about whether a particular belief is justified is evidence of that. Very often you will see arguments about the validity of the evidence presented. How often do you see people claiming "you don't believe that because your reasoning is faulty"?

[Bri]

I'm sorry. If you were right, I'd agree with you.

Can't argue with that!

Of course, you agree with me for different reasons than I do even though we are using the same definition of "agree." You agree with me because I'm right, but oddly you are sorry that I'm right. I agree with me because I'm me, and I'm not sorry that I'm right.

-Bri

[Belz...]

I am not sure that I believe in intercessory prayer.

Well, I'm sure I don't.

But then, what's the point ? You believe reality is relative to the observer. No answer could possibly help you.

[JetLeg]

The problem here is that two people's ideas about a word will never (or at least seldom) be identical in the way that you require. However, they have a common reference - the real world - and that's what allows us to use them to communicate with each other.

I agree with that.

But when you speak of the 'meaning' of the world, do you think it is the common reference in the real world only?

How would you call the subjective part when?

When I think

"The forum of Jref", I think it using my subjective experience of it.

[tsg]

Are you going to start inventing worlds and claim that it has anything to do with this one again?

[JetLeg]

Are you going to start inventing worlds and claim that it has anything to do with this one again?

This is not the point. The point is that when I think

"The forums of JREF", the content which passes through my head is very different from the content which is in the head of you when you think of "the forums of jref". Because we have experienced them differently.

So, if you don't classify that as part of the meaning of the word, what do you classify this as a part of?

[JetLeg]

The problem here is that two people's ideas about a word will never (or at least seldom) be identical in the way that you require. However, they have a common reference - the real world - and that's what allows us to use them to communicate with each other.

I agree with that.

But when you speak of the 'meaning' of the world, do you think it is the common reference in the real world only?

How would you call the subjective part when?

When I think

"The forum of Jref", I think it using my subjective experience of it.

[Hardenbergh]

An article titled "The Return of Prayer" was written by Larry Dossey, M.D.

The Return of Prayer

by Larry Dossey, MD

Reprinted from Alternative Therapies in Health and Medicine
November 1997; 3(6):10-17, 113-120

Margaret Mead, the noted anthropologist, once said, "Prayer does not use any artificial energy, it doesn't burn up any fossil fuel, it doesn't pollute." It has another attribute Mead didn't mention, which should be of interest to all healthcare professionals: It apparently works. An impressive body of evidence suggests that prayer and religious devotion are associated with positive health outcomes.

As this information has become increasingly known, prayer is returning to medicine after sitting on the sidelines for most of this century. This has evoked a variety of responses, ranging from elation, to confusion, to horror.

"PRAYER ACTUALLY WORKS ?"

I bumped into the latter of these responses in 1996 when I was invited to lecture and consult at a large hospital in New York City. The day began with an address to the house staff, in which I discussed the emerging scientific evidence for the effectiveness of intercessory prayer. I reviewed several of the salient experiments that had captured the attention of the medical profession, and I summarized some of the studies that were currently in progress. Later in the day I met with the staff of the hospice department in a follow-up meeting. Before our discussion could begin, I was approached by a clergyman who was obviously quite disturbed. He worked full-time in the hospice area and devoted his life to offering spiritual guidance and prayer for dying patients and to providing psychological and spiritual support for the hospice staff. He said, "Look. I need to get something straight. I heard your lecture this morning -- and if I understand you correctly, you're claiming that intercessory prayer actually works?"

For a moment I was speechless and did not know how to respond. Although this man's life was immersed in prayer, he obviously harbored deep doubts about whether his prayers had any effect whatever. When confronted with evidence that intercessory prayer might actually be effective, he was astonished and confused. We chatted privately for a few moments, and I affirmed my earlier comments. I admired his honesty; most of us aren't as courageous as he was in expressing our doubts about prayer.

This experience confirmed my belief that even "true believers" often doubt, at some level of the mind, the effectiveness of prayer; and that even religious professionals can be shocked to discover that science has something positive to say about prayer. The reasons are no doubt complex, but are related to the stormy relations that have existed between science and religion for the past two centuries, particularly since Darwin. When battles between these two camps have arisen, religion usually has not fared well. As a result, most religious believers are understandably leery of "what science says" about their faith.

Another reason many religious folk object to the entry of science onto their turf is the stereotypical attitude toward science which most of us have developed during the process of becoming educated and socialized in twentieth-century America. The message that has been driven home to almost all of us in our colleges and universities is, "There are two ways to live your life. You can choose to be intellectual, rational, analytical, logical, and scientific; or, on the other hand, you can choose to be intuitive, spiritual, and religious. These two vectors of the psyche are incompatible and cannot be brought together; you cannot have it both ways." Most of us choose one path or the other, and suffer the rest of our life as a result of this artificial, schizophrenic split. The recent developments in prayer research show, however, that these choices are not incompatible. Science and spirituality can come together; we can have it both ways.

WHAT IS PRAYER?

I have discussed with thousands of Americans what they believe prayer is. I have concluded that the most common image of prayer in our culture is something like this: "Prayer is talking aloud or to yourself, to a white, male, cosmic parent figure, who prefers to be addressed in English."

This is, of course, an extremely limited and culturally conditioned view of prayer. It disenfranchises large proportions of the world's population, and that of our own society, who do not share this perspective. For example, many people believe that prayer can go beyond words to involve silence. For some, prayer is more a matter of being than doing -- such as Thomas Merton, who once remarked that he prayed by breathing. Moreover, most people who pray worldwide are not white and they don't speak English (nor did Jesus or any of the founders of the world's major religions). Also, many people who pray are not fond of the idea of a male god or a personal god of any kind. Consider Buddhism, one of the world's great faiths. Buddhism is not a theistic religion, yet prayer is central to the Buddhist tradition. Buddhists offer their prayers to the universe, not to a personal god. Buddhism, therefore, violates most of the cultural assumptions we make about the nature of prayer. Shall we inform Buddhists and others who differ from our cultural norm that they aren't really praying?

In the following discussion I want to employ a deliberately broad and ambiguous definition of prayer: "Prayer is communication with the Absolute." This definition is inclusive, not exclusive; it affirms religious tolerance; and it invites people to define for themselves what "communication" is, and who or what "the Absolute" may be. This definition is broad enough to include people of the various faiths who have participated as subjects in prayer research.

What is intercessory prayer? "Intercessory" comes from the Latin inter, "between," and cedere, "to go." Intercessory prayer is, therefore, a go-between -- an effort to mediate on behalf of, or plead the case of, someone else. Intercessory prayer is often called "distant" prayer, because the individual being prayed for is often remote from the person who is praying.

http://www.gratefulness.org/readings/Dossey_Prayer.htm (16 pages)

Here's a brief biography on Larry Dossey:

http://www.dosseydossey.com/larry/default.html
http://www.dosseydossey.com/larry/appear.html

[tsg]

This is not the point. The point is that when I think

"The forums of JREF", the content which passes through my head is very different from the content which is in the head of you when you think of "the forums of jref". Because we have experienced them differently.

If we are both reading and posting to the same place, we are both talking about the same place when we say "the JREF Forums". That your subjective experiences differ from mine when you think of "the JREF Forums" does not mean we are talking about different things.

So, if you don't classify that as part of the meaning of the word, what do you classify this as a part of?

Your experiences with and opinions of the JREF Forums.

ETA: I'm going to attempt to make this clearer. If I say to you "Gravy totally shredded a CT'er on JREF the other day," would you understand what I meant? Even if you don't know who Gravy is, you still understand where this supposed shredding took place, right? If that is the case, then we aren't talking about different things despite that our experiences with JREF differ by quite a bit. When you say "the JREF Forums" I know immediately what you are talking about.

[Loss Leader]

Can't argue with that!

Of course, you agree with me for different reasons than I do even though we are using the same definition of "agree." You agree with me because I'm right, but oddly you are sorry that I'm right. I agree with me because I'm me, and I'm not sorry that I'm right.




Ah, I see the source of the confusion here and I am sorry if my imprecision caused you to misapprehend the situation. Let me clarify: I don't agree with you because you are wrong. Had you been right, which you were not, I would have been happy to agree with you. In fact, if you in the future change from the wrong opinion that you now hold to the right one (as I described it), I would be happy to agree with you at that time.

My point is that I am not a disagreeable sort who goes on to take the automatic gainsay of whatever position you espouse. I am an agreeable sort whose only requirement is that you be right which, unfortunately, you have not been.

[Bri]

Ah, I see the source of the confusion here and I am sorry if my imprecision caused you to misapprehend the situation. Let me clarify: I don't agree with you because you are wrong. Had you been right, which you were not, I would have been happy to agree with you. In fact, if you in the future change from the wrong opinion that you now hold to the right one (as I described it), I would be happy to agree with you at that time.

My point is that I am not a disagreeable sort who goes on to take the automatic gainsay of whatever position you espouse. I am an agreeable sort whose only requirement is that you be right which, unfortunately, you have not been.

Perhaps you are just using a different definition of the word "agree" than I am.

Or could it be that you are using the same definition, but in fact have different criteria for agreeing with me? Nah, that couldn't be it.

-Bri

[Skibum]

Perhaps you are just using a different definition of the word "agree" than I am.

Or could it be that you are using the same definition, but in fact have different criteria for agreeing with me? Nah, that couldn't be it.

-Bri


JetLeg?

[Bri]

JetLeg?

In case you missed it, I was poking fun at Loss Leader's contention that people have different definitions of the word "believe" and that a person's reason for belief is somehow included in their definition of the word.

Apparently, Webster has a special volume dedicated specifically to the thousands of pages of definitions of that one word.

-Bri

[GeeMack]

It follows from the assumptions that

1) People are interested in their own well-being
and
2) People want to find out what effects their well-being and what does not.

Therefore, people who believe prayer works, but are rational will be interested to find out whether prayer does effect their well-being, or not.


Those who believe that prayer works, rational or not, already accept that it affects one's well-being. That's what it means to believe it works. Your comment above is nonsensical.

Again, it doesn't necessarily follow that a generally rational person who believes in an unevidenced phenomenon has any desire to test the legitimacy of the phenomenon. Remember, the people you are talking about already believe prayer works. You've made an apparently unsupportable claim, JetLeg, but if you can provide evidence to support it, I'm all ears.

Then again, maybe tsg is onto something. Maybe you're creating one of your fantasy worlds again, you know, where everything you say is right simply because you want it to be. Reality must be a very uncomfortable place for you, JetLeg. Bummer.

[Mashuna]

This is not the point. The point is that when I think

"The forums of JREF", the content which passes through my head is very different from the content which is in the head of you when you think of "the forums of jref". Because we have experienced them differently.

So, if you don't classify that as part of the meaning of the word, what do you classify this as a part of?

Context.

[volatile]

Do we really need a whole new threat where JetLeg can solipsistically masturbate again? We already have a perfectly good one...

[Loss Leader]

Apparently, Webster has a special volume dedicated specifically to the thousands of pages of definitions of that one word.



Must Websters actually dedicate a volume to the simple fact that connotative meaning is imbued by personality, community and culture and that no amount of denotative definitions will capture that fact?

[Bri]

Must Websters actually dedicate a volume to the simple fact that connotative meaning is imbued by personality, community and culture and that no amount of denotative definitions will capture that fact?

If there were thousands of definitions of the word, then yes it would probably require a dedicated volume for just that word. However, as another poster already pointed out, the thousands of possible reasons for belief do not indicate that there must be corresponding definitions of the word "belief" for each one, just as the multitude of possible reasons for disagreement with my post does not imply that there must be a corresponding definition of "disagreement" for each one.

-Bri

[tsg]

Do we really need a whole new threat where JetLeg can solipsistically masturbate again? We already have a perfectly good one...

Several, if I remember correctly.

Maybe Darat can work on a plugin for JetLeg's account that links the "New Thread" button to one of his previous threads.

[volatile]

Several, if I remember correctly.

Maybe Darat can work on a plugin for JetLeg's account that links the "New Thread" button to one of his previous threads.

As long as that plugin exists for him, but doesn't exist for everyone else, then I'm all for it... :rolleyes:

[JetLeg]

It follows from the assumptions that

1) People are interested in their own well-being
and
2) People want to find out what effects their well-being and what does not.

Therefore, people who believe prayer works, but are rational will be interested to find out whether prayer does effect their well-being, or not.


Those who believe that prayer works, rational or not, already accept that it affects one's well-being. That's what it means to believe it works. Your comment above is nonsensical.

Again, it doesn't necessarily follow that a generally rational person who believes in an unevidenced phenomenon has any desire to test the legitimacy of the phenomenon.

Yes, you are right. I should have changed "will be interested to find out" to "will be interested to check".

It follows from the assumptions that

1) People are interested in their own well-being
and
2) People want to find out what effects their well-being and what does not.

Therefore, people who believe prayer works, but are rational will be interested to check the truth of their belief, since they are interested in their well-being.

[JetLeg]

In other words, the idea is: that object in the real world + the things I think I know about it.

So, by the 'meaning' of a word, you mean only the objective thing that is denotated by this word, and non of your subjective ideas and experiences about it, right?

According to this usage of the term 'meaning', Peter Pan has no 'meaning', there is no real thing that stands for Peter Pan. And Winnie the Pooh lacks 'meaning', because there is no objective object you can call him this. Agree?

[Loss Leader]

According to this usage of the term 'meaning', Peter Pan has no 'meaning', there is no real thing that stands for Peter Pan.


You realize that Peter Pan exists in the real world, right? The fact that he is an entirely intangible, man-made creation doesn't mean he doesn't exist. It just means that you cannot touch him and that everything about him was invented by JM Barry, Walt Disney and Sandy Duncan (and others).

Also, if you don't believe Peter Pan exists, Tinkerbell will die.

[JetLeg]

You realize that Peter Pan exists in the real world, right? The fact that he is an entirely intangible, man-made creation doesn't mean he doesn't exist. It just means that you cannot touch him and that everything about him was invented by JM Barry, Walt Disney and Sandy Duncan (and others).

Also, if you don't believe Peter Pan exists, Tinkerbell will die.


I could also say that according to your views, the word god has no 'meaning', and in case that jesus never existed jesus has no 'meaning'. (When meaning is defined as the external object in the world that corresponds to the word).

This is somewhat strange somehow. When we are arguing whether jesus existed or not, are we arguing whether 'jesus' has 'meaning'?

[Belz...]

When we are arguing whether jesus existed or not, are we arguing whether 'jesus' has 'meaning'?

What in the blue hell are you talking aboot ?

[JetLeg]

What in the blue hell are you talking aboot ?

I asked when two people the red-blue god named Paul (read above) from different sides, (one from the red side and on from the blue side) the term 'Paul' has different meanings from them.

Roboramma said that the meaning is the same, but the the ideas about Paul are different.

So, I pointed out that according to this, terms like 'Peter pan' and 'Tinkerbel' have no 'meaning' at all, and one can say that when we are arguing whether jesus exists we argue whether 'jesus' has meaning - whether the term 'jesus' has something which it stands for in reality, and asked if Roboramma agrees.

[Loss Leader]

I could also say that according to your views, the word god has no 'meaning', and in case that jesus never existed jesus has no 'meaning'. (When meaning is defined as the external object in the world that corresponds to the word).

This is somewhat strange somehow. When we are arguing whether jesus existed or not, are we arguing whether 'jesus' has 'meaning'?


<deep sigh>

[JetLeg]

<deep sigh>

??

[Roboramma]

I could also say that according to your views, the word god has no 'meaning', and in case that jesus never existed jesus has no 'meaning'. (When meaning is defined as the external object in the world that corresponds to the word).

This is somewhat strange somehow. When we are arguing whether jesus existed or not, are we arguing whether 'jesus' has 'meaning'?

Two things - one, a concept is different than an object. Sometimes concepts are made of the common properties of objects. So, "that cat" is an object that we can both look at, whereas, "cats" is a concept about all cats in the world.

Once we've got concepts we can use them to create more concepts, even counterfactual ones. They no longer have to point to things in the real world, because they're build of things that can be pointed to.

So, even though neither of us has ever seen a green cat, we've both seen the colour green and cats, and thus we both know what a green cat would be.
For instance, maybe you've seen black cats before and I've seen white cats. I take the whiteness of the cat and substitute green. You take the blackness of your cat and substitute green. We end up with a concept that has the same meaning - green cats.

Fictional characters like peter pan and jesus are similar.

[Loss Leader]

Fictional characters like peter pan and jesus are similar.


Peter Pan and Jesus are similar in no way. First of all, Peter Pan was a boy, Jesus was 33. Peter Pan battled pirates, Jesus battled the Roman Empire. Peter Pan had a thing for young girls, Jesus ...


Never mind.

[JetLeg]

Two things - one, a concept is different than an object. Sometimes concepts are made of the common properties of objects. So, "that cat" is an object that we can both look at, whereas, "cats" is a concept about all cats in the world.

Once we've got concepts we can use them to create more concepts, even counterfactual ones. They no longer have to point to things in the real world, because they're build of things that can be pointed to.

So, even though neither of us has ever seen a green cat, we've both seen the colour green and cats, and thus we both know what a green cat would be.
For instance, maybe you've seen black cats before and I've seen white cats. I take the whiteness of the cat and substitute green. You take the blackness of your cat and substitute green. We end up with a concept that has the same meaning - green cats.

Fictional characters like peter pan and jesus are similar.


Yes, but you strictly defined 'meaning' as the external object which corresponds to the word.

Therefore, 'peter pan' and 'green cats' have no meaning.


I agree with your description of the way that we come to these terms in the first place, but that is irrelevant.

[Belz...]

Yes, but you strictly defined 'meaning' as the external object which corresponds to the word.

Therefore, 'peter pan' and 'green cats' have no meaning.

You're going crazy, Jet. You should take a week off, or two.

[Belz...]

I asked when two people the red-blue god named Paul (read above) from different sides, (one from the red side and on from the blue side) the term 'Paul' has different meanings from them.

Roboramma said that the meaning is the same, but the the ideas about Paul are different.

So, I pointed out that according to this, terms like 'Peter pan' and 'Tinkerbel' have no 'meaning' at all, and one can say that when we are arguing whether jesus exists we argue whether 'jesus' has meaning - whether the term 'jesus' has something which it stands for in reality, and asked if Roboramma agrees.

Again, what in the blue hell are you talking about ?

[Cosmo]

Jet, you really ought to read more (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism) about the implications of your logic.

[volatile]

Jet, you really ought to read more (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism) about the implications of your logic.

I've already given him that link - he's refused to read it thus far...