On Consciousness

[Clive]

Originally Posted by dlorde

Reflecting more soberly (), that's equivocating 'bald'. It's the negation in 'irrevocable' that makes it absolute; the analogous question would be "does a man with three hairs on his head have a hairless head?", to which the answer is obviously 'No'.

I appreciate that you may find their use of "irrevocable" as not being consistent with your own take on how that word should be used. However, it's not something that I feel concerned enough about to debate to the nth degree. The line about the bald man was something that I used mainly because it was "fresh" in my memory after hearing it for the first time very recently, I think in the video I linked to earlier (or perhaps the "Phantoms in the Brain" documentaries on youtube that I watched before that after someone else provided a link to those - very interesting and thought provoking also).

Bottom line for me is that I found Ramachandran and Hewitt's "Three Laws of Qualia" paper pretty coherent - but I'm sure that even they would be happy to concede it's not meant to be the final word, but rather an honest attempt to provide a possible explanation (and still incomplete) of what could be going on, whilst also being consistent with observations from people with various brain disorders and lesions, etc.

If you wanted to be consistent about attacking vague use of language (and it's pretty hard not to be vague because there really aren't many words in our language that don't have "shades of meaning") then I really think "Self Referential Information Processing" is so vague as to be almost meaningless. Of course, it may not seem that way inside Pixy's mind, but I note that 18 months ago Rocketdodger happily accepted that fragment of C++ code posted earlier as a working implementation of SRIP, while more recently Pixy said it didn't do anything and only had self reference, but then didn't answer my question about where the self reference was unambiguously evident once it was "compiled" into one possible "machine language".

What is "information"? How should it "reference itself"? How does the brain encode information? Etc., Etc.

I recall (vaguely, from an earlier thread where I think I asked you specifically) that you personally do not necessarily subscribe to the "SRIP hypothesis", at least not to the extent that Pixy appears willing to defend it, so I'm not try to suggest that you do. But an even handed approach might suggest you should dig further into what "SRIP" is really meant to represent if indeed you also want to argue about the particular use of "irrevocable" in that paper.

Mostly it does not seem to me that Pixy is truly interested in some kind of inclusive discussion about exactly what "SRIP" is meant to mean (in detail) but in fact is more interested in being provocative, and perhaps just winning points for debating style or whatever words best describe that aspect of some "discussions" on these forums.

Of course it's easy to get sucked into a rigid stance (me too) where we want to defend one position or another "to the death" rather than really try to be open to understanding other views, but when it boils down to it the aspect of "consciousness" that I am really puzzled by is the subjective, conscious awareness, feelings that I KNOW I personally experience, and why those kinds of experiences should happen for only some parts of what goes on in my head but not for all. "SRIP" hasn't helped me at all in that respect. Of course all the rest of what is going on is also very interesting (and probably also a key part of the puzzle) but that doesn't leave me scratching my head as much. I've written quite a lot of code in my life and also have some formal education in computing theory, and so don't have a problem with the basic idea that the brain has some (or even "many") processes that are essentially doing the same kind of thing as a conventional man made computing system can do. But none of that seems to provide any kind of real explanation (that I personally can "grok") for my own first person subjective experiences.

Perhaps it really is just some kind of "emergent property" but I find that explanation very unsatisfying - in fact not really an "explanation" at all, but more like a placeholder for "we'll figure this out later". I'd like to be able to understand it at a level where we could say (with precision and certainty) exactly what was needed to reproduce it in another system.

After watching the "Phantoms in the Brain" clips on youtube I did find myself idly speculating about the possibility that we all have a variety of less obvious brain damage/lesions or even just "differences" such that for some the idea of "qualia" simply makes no sense (or little sense) perhaps because they truly do not have the same kind of "experience" that I do. In other words, perhaps there really are degrees of zombieness. If true, we'll be arguing about this until hell freezes over and still not agreeing with each other!

[Mr. Scott]

Originally Posted by Jeff Corey

David, you are right. Covering the right eye does not eliminate visual signals to the left primary visual cortex, due to the hemidecussation at the optical chiasma.

It's not the left or right eye. It's the left or right visual field -- if both foveas are fixated front and center, then aside from overlap, the left half of the visual field is only seen by the right brain, and the right half only by the left brain. Without the corpus callosum, the left and right brains are conscious of different, and possibly clashing, visual information.

[Mr. Scott]

I really think there's lots of evidence a split brain has two consciousnesses and little it maintains only one. I've found the left and right can be conscious of different smells from different nostrils. I'm still checking about left/right ear connections to right/left hemispheres.

[Clive]

Originally Posted by Mr. Scott

I really think there's lots of evidence a split brain has two consciousnesses and little it maintains only one. I've found the left and right can be conscious of different smells from different nostrils. I'm still checking about left/right ear connections to right/left hemispheres.

There are also the very interesting cases of conjoined twins, two heads/brains but some shared sensory input for other parts of the body, or as in another documentary I saw recently a case of two young girls joined at the head and with an apparent degree of connection between their two brains (or is it just one "shared brain" once there is at least one fibre linking the two).

From there we could start speculating about physically distinct brains (yours and mine say) which still communicate often enough and over a long enough period to allow some kind of "shared experience". In this case, we might argue that the communication is only at the higher levels and so there cannot really be a shared "consciousness" as such, but what if there's also a lot of physical "closeness", mutual touching (generating some degree of correlated sensory input), etc., and similar sensory input from essentially being in the same physical space/environment?

[Mr. Scott]

Originally Posted by Clive

There are also the very interesting cases of conjoined twins, two heads/brains but some shared sensory input for other parts of the body, or as in another documentary I saw recently a case of two young girls joined at the head and with an apparent degree of connection between their two brains (or is it just one "shared brain" once there is at least one fibre linking the two).

Yea, I was thinking about those cases in the context of split brains. Apparently, conjoined twins without neuronal connections can get feelings from each other. I know it's fiction, but in Todd Browning's FREAKS he shows one twin kissing while the other feels the pleasure. (oh look the scene is on youtube.)

Different hemispheres, lacking the high bandwidth synchronization of the corpus callosum, would have different flavors of consciousness because of lateralization, but I don't see any reason they'd retain the same unified consciousness of a normal brain. The right brain is mute, but still intelligent and independent in split brain patients, in spite of residual crosstalk.

Here's a bit about one case of shared-brain conjoined twins, apparently with separate consciousness but visual (and other) crosstalk:

YouTube Video This video is not hosted by the JREF. The JREF can not be held responsible for the suitability or legality of this material. By clicking the link below you agree to view content from an external website.

I AGREE

[Mr. Scott]

Originally Posted by Mr. Scott

I'm still checking about left/right ear connections to right/left hemispheres.

This is helpful:

Auditory Processing in Split Brain Patients

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the cochlear nerves intersect in a part of the brain stem called the inferior colliculus. This must be how the whole brain receives auditory signals from each ear. For example, the right hemisphere doesn’t receive information from only the right ear. From the inferior colliculus, the signal proceeds to the temporal lobes. It must be when the brain tries to recognize and identify the sound that the two temporal lobes try to message each other but are unable to because of the severed corpus callosum.

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by Clive

Mostly it does not seem to me that Pixy is truly interested in some kind of inclusive discussion about exactly what "SRIP" is meant to mean (in detail)

I've laid it out, in detail. I've pointed people to Godel, Escher, Bach, which lays it out in six hundred pages of detail. What exactly do you want?

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but in fact is more interested in being provocative, and perhaps just winning points for debating style or whatever words best describe that aspect of some "discussions" on these forums.

I'm trying to provoke people into providing coherent arguments instead of logical fallacies. Sometimes it works.

[Clive]

Originally Posted by Mr. Scott

Here's a bit about one case of shared-brain conjoined twins, apparently with separate consciousness but visual (and other) crosstalk:

YouTube Video This video is not hosted by the JREF. The JREF can not be held responsible for the suitability or legality of this material. By clicking the link below you agree to view content from an external website.

I AGREE

Yep - that's one of the cases I was referring to. The other case was an older set of female conjoined twins (in the USA, about 16 or 17 years of age in the documentary I saw) with essentially one torso, separate (unjoined) heads, and separate spines down to some point around mid torso (or perhaps a little lower) where they merged into one. Each of the girls controlled her side of the body but they could both detect a touch around the midline of the torso. They were quite mobile and were in the process of obtaining their driving license in the documentary, with each looking after roughly her half of the car controls...

ETA: Abby and Brittany Hensel

Would be interesting to know how their "body maps" in the brain differed, but I recall from the full documentary that the girls and/or their parents were not interested in allowing them to become lab rats.

[Belz...]

Originally Posted by Jeff Corey

David, you are right. Covering the right eye does not eliminate visual signals to the left primary visual cortex, due to the hemidecussation at the optical chiasma.

Ok then you explain that phenomenon.

[Jeff Corey]

Originally Posted by Belz...

Ok then you explain that phenomenon.

What phenomenon? Hemidecussation? That's not a phenomenon, that's an anatomical fact.

[Dancing David]

Originally Posted by Mr. Scott

It's not the left or right eye. It's the left or right visual field -- if both foveas are fixated front and center, then aside from overlap, the left half of the visual field is only seen by the right brain, and the right half only by the left brain. Without the corpus callosum, the left and right brains are conscious of different, and possibly clashing, visual information.

That is what I said, except for the second line.

The demonstration of the second line would take some exhaustive research, in term of establishing what information crosses over in the mid brain and brain stem.

Why are people ignoring that? The two hemispheres of the upper cortex are separated. The mid brain and lower are not, so the blatant assumption that all information is passed through the corpus callosum needs to be investigated, it may be reasonable as an idea, it may not.

[Dancing David]

Originally Posted by Belz...

Ok then you explain that phenomenon.

Which specific case and which specific phenomena?



My sole point is that there are some large unsupported assertions going on, if people were to use neutral language and show some caution, I would not have a point. There is also the need in the cases of split brain study to look at:

-the differential effects of verbal expression vs. associative thinking
-the specific of brain damage and trauma in each patient
-the specific definition of which behaviors of consciousness are effected

[Mr. Scott]

Originally Posted by Dancing David

That is what I said, except for the second line.

The demonstration of the second line would take some exhaustive research, in term of establishing what information crosses over in the mid brain and brain stem.

Why are people ignoring that? The two hemispheres of the upper cortex are separated. The mid brain and lower are not, so the blatant assumption that all information is passed through the corpus callosum needs to be investigated, it may be reasonable as an idea, it may not.

I'm fine with the idea that some information is transferred between the hemispheres in parts of the brain other than the corpus callosum, but it really looks like the preponderance of the evidence I've been aware of for many many years indicates there is a separate consciousness in each half, though they are pretty good at keeping in sync much of the time, mostly because the two visual fields and two ears usually pick up the same information, and they communicate with hand movements and speech.

It makes sense that there would be two separate consciousness (souls, if you will) in split brain patients, and there's lots of evidence for it.

Are you arguing that split brain patients retain a single unified consciousness? I'd really like to see evidence for it. Until I see some, I'll consider it an extraordinary claim.

[Belz...]

Originally Posted by Jeff Corey

What phenomenon? Hemidecussation? That's not a phenomenon, that's an anatomical fact.

Don't play coy. The phenomenon I described as a consequence of the operation.

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by Clive

I appreciate that you may find their use of "irrevocable" as not being consistent with your own take on how that word should be used.

My point is that it is simply incorrect. You can't have degrees of hairlessness, irrevocability, impossibility, or uniqueness (although the hyperbolic 'very unique' does seem to have caught on).

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However, it's not something that I feel concerned enough about to debate to the nth degree.

Likewise.

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The line about the bald man was something that I used mainly because it was "fresh" in my memory after hearing it for the first time very recently, I think in the video I linked to earlier (or perhaps the "Phantoms in the Brain" documentaries on youtube that I watched before that after someone else provided a link to those - very interesting and thought provoking also).

I expect you remember it because it is mentioned in the article we are discussing!

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Bottom line for me is that I found Ramachandran and Hewitt's "Three Laws of Qualia" paper pretty coherent - but I'm sure that even they would be happy to concede it's not meant to be the final word, but rather an honest attempt to provide a possible explanation (and still incomplete) of what could be going on, whilst also being consistent with observations from people with various brain disorders and lesions, etc.

I agree that they make some very good points, and it's a pity they were careless presenting them.

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If you wanted to be consistent about attacking vague use of language (and it's pretty hard not to be vague because there really aren't many words in our language that don't have "shades of meaning") then I really think "Self Referential Information Processing" is so vague as to be almost meaningless.

Pixy has explained what he means by it more than once, but if you missed it, I'm sure he'll give you a link. Personally, as a software developer, I feel quite comfortable with the meaning of 'information processing' and 'self-reference'.

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What is "information"? How should it "reference itself"?

Information. The self-referencing refers to the process, i.e. the process takes information about aspects of its own state and/or performance as input.

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But an even handed approach might suggest you should dig further into what "SRIP" is really meant to represent if indeed you also want to argue about the particular use of "irrevocable" in that paper.

I don't see the two having any particular relationship; I think I understand what SRIP means, and I don't think 'irrevocable' has degrees.

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Mostly it does not seem to me that Pixy is truly interested in some kind of inclusive discussion about exactly what "SRIP" is meant to mean (in detail) but in fact is more interested in being provocative, and perhaps just winning points for debating style or whatever words best describe that aspect of some "discussions" on these forums.

You'll have to ask Pixy. My view is that Pixy's use of SRIP as sufficient for consciousness is provocative, and necessarily so, given the absence of other coherent definitions, descriptions, or suggestions in the thread; it's a starting point, albeit low-level. I find it disappointing that the response has been so negative rather than attempting to progress the discussion.

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I am really puzzled by is the subjective, conscious awareness, feelings that I KNOW I personally experience, and why those kinds of experiences should happen for only some parts of what goes on in my head but not for all. "SRIP" hasn't helped me at all in that respect.

I see SRIP as a fundamental enabler of consciousness; it's not going to tell you anything specific about human personal subjective conscious experience, any more than the transition rules of Conway's Game of Life will tell you how a circuit made of glider logic gates will function.

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... But none of that seems to provide any kind of real explanation (that I personally can "grok") for my own first person subjective experiences.

Subjective experience is what it is like when you are what is doing the processing, and however much we elucidate the mechanisms and causality behind it, ISTM personal experience is not going to get any less subjective.

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I'd like to be able to understand it at a level where we could say (with precision and certainty) exactly what was needed to reproduce it in another system.

Hopefully the Blue Brain Project is taking us in that direction.

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I did find myself idly speculating about the possibility that we all have a variety of less obvious brain damage/lesions or even just "differences" such that for some the idea of "qualia" simply makes no sense (or little sense) perhaps because they truly do not have the same kind of "experience" that I do. In other words, perhaps there really are degrees of zombieness.

Apart from specific minor sensory deficits in the general population (e.g. colour blindness), I don't see any reason to suspect that.

[Dancing David]

Originally Posted by Mr. Scott

I'm fine with the idea that some information is transferred between the hemispheres in parts of the brain other than the corpus callosum, but it really looks like the preponderance of the evidence I've been aware of for many many years indicates there is a separate consciousness in each half, though they are pretty good at keeping in sync much of the time, mostly because the two visual fields and two ears usually pick up the same information, and they communicate with hand movements and speech.

It makes sense that there would be two separate consciousness (souls, if you will) in split brain patients, and there's lots of evidence for it.

Are you arguing that split brain patients retain a single unified consciousness? I'd really like to see evidence for it. Until I see some, I'll consider it an extraordinary claim.

And without a definition of the behaviors you are applying to consciousness and then rigorous study it would be hard to say under what definition you are saying that there are two consciousnesses.

Again I am urging neutral statements and avoiding generalization.



If you want to put words in my mouth that is your issue.

[Zeuzzz]

Consciousness produces the brain, the brain does not produce consciousness.

Disprove that statement someone, if you would be so kind.

[Mr. Scott]

Originally Posted by Zeuzzz

Consciousness produces the brain, the brain does not produce consciousness.

Disprove that statement someone, if you would be so kind.

Given what we know about the brain, that would seem to be an extraordinary claim with no evidence to support it, so the burden of proof is on you.

E.g., prove there's no invisible pink unicorn in my garage. You can't? I win!

[Mr. Scott]

Originally Posted by Dancing David

And without a definition of the behaviors you are applying to consciousness and then rigorous study it would be hard to say under what definition you are saying that there are two consciousnesses.

Again I am urging neutral statements and avoiding generalization.



If you want to put words in my mouth that is your issue.

I didn't mean to put words in your mouth. Since you seem to object to any suggestion that there are two consciousnesses in a split brain patient, I naturally infer you believe there's only one.

Did you really look at the aroma experiment graphic I posted? (below)

The right brain smells a rose through the right nostril and the left hand (controlled by the right brain) picks up a rose on the table. At the same time, the left brain does not smell the rose because the left nostril is blocked (unlike other senses, nasal signals do not cross on their way to the brain) and the left brain denies verbally that a rose was smelled.

So, if the right brain is conscious of the rose smell, and the left brain is unconscious of it, this manifests the separate consciousnesses of the split halves. IOW each side is unconscious of what the other is conscious of.

(results are similar with sight, hearing, and touch experiments)

By any definition I've ever heard, this indicates two separate consciousnesses.

By what definition of consciousness could one reach a different conclusion?

[Zeuzzz]

Originally Posted by Mr. Scott

Given what we know about the brain, that would seem to be an extraordinary claim with no evidence to support it, so the burden of proof is on you.

E.g., prove there's no invisible pink unicorn in my garage. You can't? I win!

Non sequitur.

Can you answer my question instead this time please?

[Beelzebuddy]

Originally Posted by Mr. Scott

By any definition I've ever heard, this indicates two separate consciousnesses.

By what definition of consciousness could one reach a different conclusion?

By Pixy's definition (SNIFL or whatever), they've always been two separate consciousnesseses, just kept in sync with a callosal bridge.

By my definition, "what the brain does," they're only mostly separate. Mostly separate is partly together. With all separate there's usually only one thing you can do:

Be your own best friend

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by Beelzebuddy

By Pixy's definition (SNIFL or whatever), they've always been two separate consciousnesseses, just kept in sync with a callosal bridge.

My interpretation of the implications of that definition is that there would be a number of consciousnesses of varying complexity (I would have called them 'sub-consciousnesses' but that might have been confusing ) coordinated in each hemisphere to produce two compound hemispherical(?) consciousnesses linked by a callosal bridge. Since they develop sharing much of the information and feedback, the two hemispheres work together in synchrony to form a greater single consciousness (much as do their component consciousnesses), and their separate potentialities only become obvious (apparent) on callosal separation. The individual component consciousnesses would be limited by the requirements of their areas of functional specialisation, and it would be tricky to devise ways to demonstrate such limited forms of conscious awareness in vivo (and presumably unethical in vitro )

I suppose this model could be seen as a 'hive mind'

[Dancing David]

Originally Posted by Mr. Scott

I didn't mean to put words in your mouth. Since you seem to object to any suggestion that there are two consciousnesses in a split brain patient, I naturally infer you believe there's only one.

Did you really look at the aroma experiment graphic I posted? (below)

The right brain smells a rose through the right nostril and the left hand (controlled by the right brain) picks up a rose on the table. At the same time, the left brain does not smell the rose because the left nostril is blocked (unlike other senses, nasal signals do not cross on their way to the brain) and the left brain denies verbally that a rose was smelled.

So, if the right brain is conscious of the rose smell, and the left brain is unconscious of it, this manifests the separate consciousnesses of the split halves. IOW each side is unconscious of what the other is conscious of.

(results are similar with sight, hearing, and touch experiments)

By any definition I've ever heard, this indicates two separate consciousnesses.

By what definition of consciousness could one reach a different conclusion?

http://forums.randi.org/imagehosting...729ae49b9e.gif

And again you over state what I did not say, in my statements. I did not object to two consciousnesses, I stated that we should be cautious without clearer definitions of which specific behaviors we are talking about and that there may be some more rigorous testing to rule out cross communication.

And again there may be ways of phrasing 'consciousness' that would make that case true. However, without specific testing to see what emotions and memories the individual may experience in response to the stimuli and other testing there could be communication.

Who was that patient and what were the specifics of the case?



And no, it does not meet the criteria of two separate 'consciousness' if we look at levels of arousal and then look at levels of awareness. Technically it would indicate that yes, the person was not aware of the olfactory stimulus, however, there is more to the definition of consciousness then that.

Again it is important to look at which behavior under the rubric of consciousness you are using. Strangely I think I have presented something similar recently, there is no unified entity referred to as consciousness.

Most correctly the individual was unable to verbalize the nature of the olfactory stimulus presented, now did they ask them to draw a picture with the left hand or to express memories at the time? Perhaps picture matching as well? (These are the ways to see what other cross communication might be occurring)

So yes if you want to say that 'consciousness' is merely the ability to express verbally (for the left hemisphere), you have different forms of awareness and two separate areas that do not communicate sufficiently to express a verbal concept related to the olfactory stimulus presented to the other hemisphere.

So if you wish to define consciousness so narrowly, then you could say that the left hemisphere was unable to verbalize the awareness in the right hemisphere. But I am not sure that says there are two separate consciousnesses.

However, as stated there could be other ways to see if the midbrain is sending information from the right hemisphere to the left.

My main objection is that the term consciousness include many different behaviors and there one should be careful in describing which behaviors are being referred to.

My pedantic point is overdrawn.

[Jeff Corey]

No it ain't David. It be right on.
And by the whey, me car had a split brane moment when the ABS went all silly wid the GPS.

[Mr. Scott]

Quote:

Consciousness produces the brain, the brain does not produce consciousness.

Disprove that statement someone, if you would be so kind.

Originally Posted by Zeuzzz

Can you answer my question instead this time please?

That's not a question, it's an imperative statement. I can no more disprove that consciousness produces the brain than you can disprove there's a pink unicorn in my garage. Do you understand the analogy?

Is there any evidence that consciousness produces the brain? If not, then the suggestion that it does is worthless, and disproving worthless suggestions is pointless. Is that clear?

But, I'll play so I can give you a chance to make your point. I can't disprove consciousness produces the brain. I await your response.

[Zeuzzz]

Psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals infer that states of mind preclude the physical basis for brain.
Epigenetic inheritance infers that states of mind such as severe stress, diet and other things can alter gene methylation and also histone modifications (which are the primary components of chromatin responsible for forming DNA that makes up chromosomes) can change gene expression.
The effects of psychedelics produce a reality so different from what consciousness normally experiences you have to wonder if the brain of the person is in-fact merely the material mechanism through which they see the world. If the brain precludes consciousness then I find it very hard to see how anyone can remain lucid and return to normal brain function when reality has just dissolved in front of their eyes.

Ultimately, it's completely possible to keep studying the brain the same way it's been studied. The direction of causation of effects almost comes secondary in this; you either study the brain and say it produces these states of consciousness, or you study the brain and say this is the way consciousness manifests via the brain.

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by Zeuzzz

Consciousness produces the brain, the brain does not produce consciousness.

Disprove that statement someone, if you would be so kind.

If we remove your consciousness, the brain remains.

If we remove your brain, consciousness goes with it.

It's about as wrong as it's possible to be while still meaning something.

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by Zeuzzz

Psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals infer that states of mind preclude the physical basis for brain.

Sorry, but that's incoherent. I'm not sure what you're trying to say.

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The effects of psychedelics produce a reality so different from what consciousness normally experiences you have to wonder if the brain of the person is in-fact merely the material mechanism through which they see the world.

No.

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by Zeuzzz

Psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals infer that states of mind preclude the physical basis for brain.

This is a dualist misconception (assuming 'preclude' is a typo - if not, it's incoherent). Brain function is biochemical; synaptic transmission is biochemical (or bio-electrical); the 'psyche' that has somatic effects is a biological process involving synaptic transmission.

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Epigenetic inheritance infers that states of mind such as severe stress, diet and other things can alter gene methylation and also histone modifications (which are the primary components of chromatin responsible for forming DNA that makes up chromosomes) can change gene expression.

Diet isn't a state of mind.

Stress is a physiological condition that may involve brain mediated hormonal contributions. Brain function is biochemical, as above. States of mind are biochemical & bioelectrical patterns of brain activity. There is nothing mysterious or surprising about the brain influencing somatic biochemical homeostasis - that's part of its function.

These things only become confusing or mysterious if you treat the mind as somehow separate from or independent if the biological brain; It isn't. The mind is the brain in operation.

[Belz...]

Originally Posted by Zeuzzz

Psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals infer that states of mind preclude the physical basis for brain.

That makes no sense. I assume you mean that these effects preclude a physical basis for consciousness. If so, it's funny that you don't realise that infers the exact opposite. If consciousness was not generated by the brain, drugs would have no effect on it.

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The effects of psychedelics produce a reality so different from what consciousness normally experiences you have to wonder if the brain of the person is in-fact merely the material mechanism through which they see the world.

Non sequitur. Also, your hypothesis is untestable and unfalsifiable, making it useless for several reasons, not the least of which is that it makes no difference.

[Zeuzzz]

Originally Posted by Belz...

That makes no sense. I assume you mean that these effects preclude a physical basis for consciousness.

Or they show the way that consciousness manifests?

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so, it's funny that you don't realise that infers the exact opposite. If consciousness was not generated by the brain, drugs would have no effect on it.

If the brain is the conduit through which consciousness gains its materialistic form, the lens through which it see's the physical world, drugs would severely alter the way in which the world is seen.

A previous thread I started might be relevant. (http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=127812)

this talk is on the exact subject of mirror neurons.

Joan Roughgarden - Neuroscience of creativity on the brain

[Belz...]

Originally Posted by Zeuzzz

Or they show the way that consciousness manifests?

Again, untestable and irrelevant. The more simple explanation is that the brain generates consciousness, given the impact of drugs and physical damage on consciousness.

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If the brain is the conduit through which consciousness gains its materialistic form, the lens through which it see's the physical world, drugs would severely alter the way in which the world is seen.

Again, untestable and irrelevant.

[calebprime]

Psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals infer that states of mind preclude the physical basis for brain.


[Evidence from our observations of] [the] psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals [of belief systems] infers implies that the physical brain cannot be the basis for mind.

[evidence ensues]

[Jeff Corey]

So called psychosomatic effects involve respondent and operant conditioning procedures, which are clearly based in this material world, so you are wrong.

[Clive]

Originally Posted by PixyMisa

I've laid it out, in detail. I've pointed people to Godel, Escher, Bach, which lays it out in six hundred pages of detail. What exactly do you want?

Running a few searches shows that you may have posted about 6000 times to threads related to consciousness. How about pointing out a handful of those (or single one if that exists) which best summarise the details of your hypothesis? Others have asked you to do something similar previously but I recall that your response was along the lines that it wasn't your job to do that for them. However I don't think it's reasonable to expect someone to trawl through thousands of posts trying to find the definitive few (if they exist at all) that might be what you refer to when you say "I've laid it out, in detail".

With respect, is there anything significant in the "SRIP hypothesis" that is uniquely yours, or are you just using "Consciousness is SRIP" as a kind of shorthand for what Douglas Hofstadter has said in GEB? I have my own (first edition) copy of GEB, showing its age npw, but still open on the coffee table about a meter from where I sit. That edition has well over 700 pages, and I'm pretty sure I've read more or less all of them, most in an initial attempt to read the whole from from start to finish when I first bought it, and then in many partial re-reads subsequently.

Finally, although my own searching (both within JREF and elsewhere) didn't turn up the kind of detailed all-in-one-place description of the "Consciousness is SRIP hypothesis" that I was trying to find, I did find one article that appears to possibly be the source of some of your ideas:

Gaia Gains Consciousness ABS

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by Clive

Running a few searches shows that you may have posted about 6000 times to threads related to consciousness. How about pointing a handful of those (or single one if that exists) which best summarise the details of your hypothesis? Others have asked you to do something similar previously but I recall that your response was along the lines that it wasn't your job to do that for them.

Those responses are to people who are asking for explanations already provided repeatedly in that very thread.

Quote:

With respect, is there anything significant in the "SRIP hypothesis" that is uniquely yours

No; I've pointed that out repeatedly as well. This is not my idea, only my phrasing. If you've read GEB, you should have most of it. Dennett and I Am a Strange Loop will fill in most of the rest.

Short summary of the facts, yet again:

1. The brain is a computer. (Empirically.)
2. Consciousness is informational. (By definition / usage.)
3. Consciousness is an ongoing process, not a state (and certainly not an object). (By definition / usage.)
4. Consciousness is a function of the brain. (Empirically.)
5. When we speak of consciousness, we are speaking of something self-referential. See Descartes' cogito: I think is self-referential.
6. The Universe is quantised. (At least effectively, see Planck's constant.)
7. There is no model of computation more powerful than the Universal Turing Machine that does not rely on performing infinite amounts of work in finite time. (Church-Turing Thesis, hypercomputation.)
8. It is physically impossible to perform infinite amounts of work in finite time. (Thermodynamics.)

Short summary of the conclusions we can draw from these facts:

1. Consciousness is self-referential information processing.
2. The brain cannot possibly be more powerful than a Universal Turing Machine.
3. Consciousness can be implemented on any Turing-equivalent computer, and human consciousness can be implemented on any sufficiently large Turing-equivalent computer, given appropriate data.

Quote:

Finally, although my own searching (both within JREF and elsewhere) didn't turn up the kind of detailed all-in-one-place description of the "Consciousness is SRIP hypothesis" that I was trying to find, I did find one article that appears to possibly be the source of some of your ideas:

No.

[Mr. Scott]

I'm starting to think the Blue Brain Project is for wimps. Simulating the brain at a molecular level? Has it been shown that there's computation at that level? That would be like simulating a computer but simulating each transistor at a molecular level. There isn't any computation going on at that level. Why would we think there is in the brain? I'd think that a functional simulation of neurons would be sufficient.

[Fudbucker]

Originally Posted by PixyMisa

Those responses are to people who are asking for explanations already provided repeatedly in that very thread.


No; I've pointed that out repeatedly as well. This is not my idea, only my phrasing. If you've read GEB, you should have most of it. Dennett and I Am a Strange Loop will fill in most of the rest.

Short summary of the facts, yet again:

1. The brain is a computer. (Empirically.)
2. Consciousness is informational. (By definition / usage.)
3. Consciousness is an ongoing process, not a state (and certainly not an object). (By definition / usage.)
4. Consciousness is a function of the brain. (Empirically.)
5. When we speak of consciousness, we are speaking of something self-referential. See Descartes' cogito: I think is self-referential.
6. The Universe is quantised. (At least effectively, see Planck's constant.)
7. There is no model of computation more powerful than the Universal Turing Machine that does not rely on performing infinite amounts of work in finite time. (Church-Turing Thesis, hypercomputation.)
8. It is physically impossible to perform infinite amounts of work in finite time. (Thermodynamics.)

Short summary of the conclusions we can draw from these facts:

1. Consciousness is self-referential information processing.
2. The brain cannot possibly be more powerful than a Universal Turing Machine.
3. Consciousness can be implemented on any Turing-equivalent computer, and human consciousness can be implemented on any sufficiently large Turing-equivalent computer, given appropriate data.


No.

I don't see how conclusion (1) follows. At best you've listed necessary conditions for consciousness. It's like saying if you've got flour, yeast, and water, you've got bread.

If consciousness is SRIP (and vice-versa), then all instances of SRIP should be instances of consciousness. They aren't, so it isn't.

[Beelzebuddy]

Originally Posted by Mr. Scott

I'm starting to think the Blue Brain Project is for wimps. Simulating the brain at a molecular level? Has it been shown that there's computation at that level? That would be like simulating a computer but simulating each transistor at a molecular level. There isn't any computation going on at that level. Why would we think there is in the brain? I'd think that a functional simulation of neurons would be sufficient.

The Blue Brain isn't at the molecular level, it's at the compartment level. It's a fairly significant abstraction which encompasses the minimum detail needed to capture all the observed brain function we know to be important. Any less and you're deliberately introducing dysfunction for simplicity and efficiency's sake.

Originally Posted by Fudbucker

If consciousness is SRIP (and vice-versa), then all instances of SRIP should be instances of consciousness. They aren't, so it isn't.

Are too, by Pixy's definition.

[Roboramma]

Originally Posted by Fudbucker

If consciousness is SRIP (and vice-versa), then all instances of SRIP should be instances of consciousness. They aren't, so it isn't.

Evidence for the highlighted part?