Must all materialists subscribe to supervenience physicalism as a minimum?

[PixyMisa]

Quote:

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Eleatic has a point. Imagine a world in which you perceived everything more or less as it is now, except that the sex organs of the opposite gender were huge and had a neon sign pointing to them, and predators were also huge and had long, dripping fangs sticking out of their mouths. This might have selective advantage.

That's not unreliable observation, though, that's a targeting overlay.

[Eleatic Stranger]

Quote:

Unreliable observers don't notice or don't respond appropriately to the dire predator/poisonous alkaloids/yawning chasm/what have you. Crunch/urk/splat as appropriate.

Obviously.

No... not obviously. In fact you just switched from talking about accuracy to appropriately responding to various dangers - and that's a substantial shift. For instance, I might be a very reliable observer of large predators - but that doesn't mean I'd avoid them: for that I would need to also be a reliable runner-away-from-predators, and if I was this second one it wouldn't matter how reliable an observer of predators I was as long as I was good at running away from them. They could look like fluffy green bunny rabbits to me as long as I was appropriately afraid of them.

Look, natural selection does not select for truthfulness or accuracy - only those in as much as they might be instrumental in making smaller versions of myself. And there's no intrinsic or automatic connection between holding accurate beliefs about my enviroment and making lots of babies.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Quote:

Eleatic said:
They could look like fluffy green bunny rabbits to me as long as I was appropriately afraid of them.

But they better not look like nothing at all, or like a plant, or like a friendly animal. Then you wouldn't be appropriately afraid of them. And you better not spend your run-away-from-predators energy running away from things that won't hurt you, or you'll not have energy for the predators. And you better not be so skittish that you can't stop and eat.

Quote:

And there's no intrinsic or automatic connection between holding accurate beliefs about my enviroment and making lots of babies.

I think it is safe to say that the reason our observational skills seem to be "pretty reliable" is due to evolution.

~~ Paul

[Donks]

What definition of reliable are you using? I'd use "giving the same result on successive trials" (M-W). It doesn't matter if I perceive predators as fluffy green bunnie rabbits, as long as I always preceive them as such and can recognize them. If, on the other hand, my perception is unreliable, and sometimes I perceive predators as FGBRs, and sometimes as apple trees, or some random object, I'm going to get eaten.

[PixyMisa]

Paul and Donks have answered this adequately.

Unrealiable means, well, unreliable. If hungry tigers always look like fluffy green bunny rabbits to you - and nothing else does - then you can rely on that, so your senses aren't unreliable.

Just very, very strange.

[Eleatic Stranger]

Quote:

Originally posted by PixyMisa
Paul and Donks have answered this adequately.

Unrealiable means, well, unreliable. If hungry tigers always look like fluffy green bunny rabbits to you - and nothing else does - then you can rely on that, so your senses aren't unreliable.

Just very, very strange.

But even that is missing the major point in favor of commenting on the examples - suppose I had unreliable senses that were unreliable in a way that did increase my survival chances in a not insignificant number of cases and didn't particularly harm my overall chances. Unless you can demonstrate that that possibility is logically absurd the point again falls apart.

The point you made is that reliable construed not-epistemically may be selected for in many cases, but that (1) fails to demonstrate that reliability construed epistemically (reliably accurate) is equivalent to reliability construed non-epistemically (responds differentially to stimuli in a predictable fashion) and (2) fails to demonstrate the impossibility of some unreliable mechanism (construed non-epistemically) increasing one's chances of survival and reproduction.

In other words, your rephrasing of the term 'reliable' simply turns ones confusing puzzle into two confusing puzzles - it's not an answer.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Eleatic Stranger,

Quote:

But even that is missing the major point in favor of commenting on the examples - suppose I had unreliable senses that were unreliable in a way that did increase my survival chances in a not insignificant number of cases and didn't particularly harm my overall chances. Unless you can demonstrate that that possibility is logically absurd the point again falls apart.

Remember that we are talking about reliability of observations in the sense of being able to reliably predict future observations from information extracted from our past ones. There is no question that this ability provides a survival advantage. Your suggestion that it is possible that some sort of unreliable senses could result in an overall increase in survival chances, would in this context be the suggestion that making inaccurate predictions about future events in the world you are interacting with, could somehow be survival advantageous. This is nonsensical. Sure, you could imagine bizarre scenarios where this would be the case for some specific set of events, but it is clear that on average, being able to make accurate predictions is going to be advantageous.

I really don't see the relevance of this aspect of the discussion, though. The important point is that the scientific method is demonstrably reliable. It doesn't make any difference whether you accept the axioms of science or not, or whether you believe your observations are representative of reality or not, or anything else which you believe. As long as they are not suffering from neurological disorders which either interfere with their senses, or impair their reasoning ability, it is easily demonstrated to anybody that the scientific method provides accurate predictions of future observations. Even those who reject science and its conclusions, typically do so by disputing that our observations are representative of reality, not by claiming that science fails to accurately predict future observations.

And that's all that scientific epistemology claims, and all that the scientific method requires. When you get beyond that, into things like the ontological status of things, the "true" nature of reality, and so forth, you are no longer talking about scientific epistemology. You are talking about metaphysical interpretation of observations. That may be considered to be a part of the philosophy of science, but it is not epistemology anymore, and it is not necessary for the application or validation of the scientific method.


Dr. Stupid

[The idea]

Quote:

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[...] the suggestion that making inaccurate predictions about future events in the world you are interacting with, could somehow be survival advantageous [...] is nonsensical. Sure, you could imagine bizarre scenarios where this would be the case for some specific set of events [...]

Does "survival" mean "gene survival"? People who are trying to avoid producing any offspring might be more likely to pass on their genes if they make inaccurate predictions regarding the reliability of various methods of birth control.

(I had to say "might" because in some cases one could do more for one's genes by having no offspring and devoting resources to existing relatives than to having offspring and devoting resources to one's own offspring.)

Quote:

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
[...] but it is clear that on average, being able to make accurate predictions is going to be advantageous.

On average, yes.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

The Idea,

Quote:

Does "survival" mean "gene survival"? People who are trying to avoid producing any offspring might be more likely to pass on their genes if they make inaccurate predictions regarding the reliability of various methods of birth control.

Since we are talking about the evolutionary source of reliable senses, yes, I am talking about gene survival. And again, the example you state here is a very specific case where a very specific type of inaccuracy in predictions could lead to an evolutionary advantage, but this is irrelevant, because (1) it has no bearing on the argument that having reliable senses is an overall advantage evolutionary, and (2) it requires that the unreliable sense be unreliable in a very specific way, and only with respect to a very small set of things.

Quote:

[...] but it is clear that on average, being able to make accurate predictions is going to be advantageous.
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On average, yes.

That's the whole point.

Perhaps a further clarification is in order here. What does it mean to say that a person's senses are reliable? I would say that it means that the person can reliably predict future observations from past ones, as I have mentioned before. But what does that mean? It means that there are correlations in your sensory input which your brain is capable of adapting to. Since you sensory input is correlated with the other affects on your body, and therefore ultimately with what actions are needed to maximize your chances of survival, you have a better chance of surviving with than without them.

So, imagine no such correlations. Your sensory input is pure garbage, with no relationship to any of the factors that determine your survival. If this is the case, you are as good as dead.

The idea of unreliable senses somehow being more advantageous than reliable ones, is not even wrong. It is incoherent. If your senses were altered in such a way that your odds of survival were improved, that would imply that there is now more of a correlation between that sensory input, and the factors which determine your survival, then before. By definition, this would mean that your new senses are more reliable, not less. To say that they are less reliable is to say that there is less correlation between them and the influences which affect you. If this is the case, it is clear that your odds of survival are going to be reduced.

Remember that we are not talking about any sort of metaphysical reliability here. It does not make any difference how close to the "true nature" of reality your observations are. What matters is your ability to predict future observations from you current ones, and the correlation between those observations and the factors which directly affect you. For example, epistemologically speaking, the sense and observations of people in the matrix are every bit as reliable as those of people in the real world. Metaphysically, they are not, but so long as the matrix keeps functioning the way its supposed to, that doesn't matter. Likewise, it doesn't make any practical difference whether our senses are giving us an accurate representation of the "true" nature of reality or not, as long as we are able to use those senses to improve our ability to survive, and generally improve the subjective quality of our lives.

And that is the purpose of science. The correlations between the sensory input and the things which affect us, is only the first step. Our brains have to process that sensory information, extract the correlations, and decide what to do based on the results. Intuition is the label we attach to the way our brains do this. It is essentially a very sophisticated pattern matching process. It works very well, but we can do better. Having developed the ability to reason abstractly, and ultimately to teach our brains to perform formal logic, we can see that by applying a formal methodology to our observations, rather than simply acting intuitively, we can further increase our ability to extract useful and reliable information from our sensory input, and greatly increase our ability to use that information to accurately predict future events. That is what the scientific method is all about. You can add onto that all of the metaphysical interpretation you want, but in terms of the epistemological method, that's really all there is to it.


Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

Quote:

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

How on Earth would such a hallucination falsify the framework for anybody other than the person having the hallucinations?

In that case, its impossible to tell if the framework is falsified for other people. In other words, it is meaningless to talk about the framework being falsified for other people, since observations are only ever from a 1st person perspective.

Quote:

I already addressed that. Occasional mild hallucinations do not falsify it. Only in the case of severe persistent hallucinations, where you can no longer reliable determine what is hallucination and what is not, would the epistemology be falsified.

I'm finding it difficult to follow the logic behind this argument. Lets look at the falsification process for any one person again. This is what I've gathered so far.

Mild hallucinations do not falsify the framework even though we are not able to extract information about logcial relationships from these observations. They are deemed to be observational errors. My first question is:

on what logical basis are the mild hallucinations deemed to be observational errors?

My answer to that question would be because observations that are able to extract logical relationships still exist. It is only by virtue of these observations that we are able to infer that mild hallucinations are observational errors. If such observations that extract logical relationships did not exist then we would have the severe hallucination scenario.

So consider the severe hallucination scenario. These can falsify the axiomatic framework under the condition that observational errors cannot be controlled for. What does that mean in terms of the logical structure of the falsification process? I do not think it is enough to simply say that it is the conditions whereby you can no longer reliably determine what is hallucination and what is not. I mean, what would those observational conditions be? Would not the inclusion of a single observation that enables one to extract a logical relationship put an end to any falsification of the framework?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Davidsmith,

Quote:

How on Earth would such a hallucination falsify the framework for anybody other than the person having the hallucinations?
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In that case, its impossible to tell if the framework is falsified for other people. In other words, it is meaningless to talk about the framework being falsified for other people, since observations are only ever from a 1st person perspective.

First of all, this is not true. As long as the framework is not falsified for you, then you can, at least in principle, use the scientific method to determine whether or not it is working for somebody else. For example, we can use science to determine that somebody else is suffering from severe hallucinations which impair their ability to (among other things) apply the scientific method themselves.

What you can't do is use the scientific method to figure out whether or not it is falsified for somebody else, if it is falsified for you. This is trivial, because if it is falsified for you, you cannot use it to determine anything.

Quote:

I already addressed that. Occasional mild hallucinations do not falsify it. Only in the case of severe persistent hallucinations, where you can no longer reliable determine what is hallucination and what is not, would the epistemology be falsified.
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I'm finding it difficult to follow the logic behind this argument. Lets look at the falsification process for any one person again. This is what I've gathered so far.

Mild hallucinations do not falsify the framework even though we are not able to extract information about logcial relationships from these observations. They are deemed to be observational errors. My first question is:

on what logical basis are the mild hallucinations deemed to be observational errors?

My answer to that question would be because observations that are able to extract logical relationships still exist. It is only by virtue of these observations that we are able to infer that mild hallucinations are observational errors. If such observations that extract logical relationships did not exist then we would have the severe hallucination scenario.

You are leaving out a very important point which I already specifically mentioned. Those observations which are deemed to be observational errors are not simply discarded as errors. Their existence must also be explainable, using the scientific method, from the reliable information which we extract from those observations which are not in error. It is not enough to simply disregard observations which don't make sense as "hallucinations". We must also explain what hallucinations are, and why we have them.

Quote:

So consider the severe hallucination scenario. These can falsify the axiomatic framework under the condition that observational errors cannot be controlled for. What does that mean in terms of the logical structure of the falsification process? I do not think it is enough to simply say that it is the conditions whereby you can no longer reliably determine what is hallucination and what is not. I mean, what would those observational conditions be? Would not the inclusion of a single observation that enables one to extract a logical relationship put an end to any falsification of the framework?

No, for the reasons I just gave. The theory is that, at least in principle, all of our observations, even the ones which are in error, can be explained using the scientific method. We cannot simply disregard all observations which we deem to be in error simply because we cannot explain them.

After all, that type of an approach would not work anyway. How would we know whether the reason we can't explain a particular observation is because it was in error, or because we just haven't figured out the answer yet? That is not what scientific epistemology does. According to scientific epistemology, all of our observations, even the ones which we cannot use to extract reliable information about other things from, can be explained scientifically. Again, a case in point is hallucinations. We do not simply attach the label "hallucination" onto any observation which is unreliable, and forget about it. We scientifically study hallucinations themselves, to try to understand how they work and why we have them.


Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

Quote:

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Davidsmith,

First of all, this is not true. As long as the framework is not falsified for you, then you can, at least in principle, use the scientific method to determine whether or not it is working for somebody else. For example, we can use science to determine that somebody else is suffering from severe hallucinations which impair their ability to (among other things) apply the scientific method themselves.

If this is the case then you would be using two entirely different processes of falsification, depending on whether it is an inference about someone else's observations or your own observations that are being used to falsify the framework. It is clear that an inference about someone elses observations are in fact one's own observations. So in order to state that someone else's severe hallucinations falsify the framework, one would have to use observationally extracted logical relationships. This means that the framework can be falsified under two conditions that, to me, contradict one another. The first condition, whereby the framework is falsified for yourself, is where observational errors can no longer be controlled, meaning that observationally extracted logical relationships do not exist to control for error. The second condition, whereby you infer that the framework is falsified, is whereby observational errors are controlled and observationally extracted logical relationships do exist.

Quote:

You are leaving out a very important point which I already specifically mentioned. Those observations which are deemed to be observational errors are not simply discarded as errors. Their existence must also be explainable, using the scientific method, from the reliable information which we extract from those observations which are not in error. It is not enough to simply disregard observations which don't make sense as "hallucinations". We must also explain what hallucinations are, and why we have them.

With respect, I think that's irrelavent and not answering my question. I asked on what logical basis are the mild hallucinations deemed to be observational errors?

Again, from what you have said previously I think that it is only by virtue of observationally extracted logical relationships that we are able to infer that mild hallucinations are observational errors. It is only if such observations that extract logical relationships did not exist would we have the scenario in which observational errors cannot be controlled for.

Quote:

Would not the inclusion of a single observation that enables one to extract a logical relationship put an end to any falsification of the framework?
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No, for the reasons I just gave. The theory is that, at least in principle, all of our observations, even the ones which are in error, can be explained using the scientific method. We cannot simply disregard all observations which we deem to be in error simply because we cannot explain them.

Observations that are unable to extract logical relationships (mild hallucinations) are not used in any explanation because they cannot extract logical relationships!. They may well be refered to and be explainable but this is only be virtue of other observations that can extract logical relationships. In this sense they are discarded, which makes your point irrelavent.

It still seems like the inclusion of any single observation that is able to extract a logical relationship will put an end to any attempt at falsification of the framework. This is because such an inclusion would mean that observational errors can be controlled for, to whatever degree, and so the framework is not falsified.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

Quote:

First of all, this is not true. As long as the framework is not falsified for you, then you can, at least in principle, use the scientific method to determine whether or not it is working for somebody else. For example, we can use science to determine that somebody else is suffering from severe hallucinations which impair their ability to (among other things) apply the scientific method themselves.
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If this is the case then you would be using two entirely different processes of falsification, depending on whether it is an inference about someone else's observations or your own observations that are being used to falsify the framework.

I'm not sure what you are trying to say. These are not two different processes of falsification. One is a process of falsification, and the other is a conclusion about somebody else's ability to make use of scientific epistemology, based on a scientific evaluation of your observations of them.

Quote:

It is clear that an inference about someone elses observations are in fact one's own observations. So in order to state that someone else's severe hallucinations falsify the framework, one would have to use observationally extracted logical relationships.

You still seem to be confused about what is meant by saying that the framework is falsified. It is an epistemological framework, not a metaphysical one. It can be false for one person, and not for another. My observations that another person cannot apply the scientific method, due to hallucinations, does not falsify the epistemological framework for me. The other person's observation that the scientific method does not work, falsifies it for him.

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This means that the framework can be falsified under two conditions that, to me, contradict one another.

That is because you are operating under the false idea that if any person were to falsify the framework, then the framework is false for everybody. This is not the case.

Quote:

The first condition, whereby the framework is falsified for yourself, is where observational errors can no longer be controlled, meaning that observationally extracted logical relationships do not exist to control for error. The second condition, whereby you infer that the framework is falsified, is whereby observational errors are controlled and observationally extracted logical relationships do exist.

Wrong. In the second case you are not inferring that the framework is falsified. You are inferring that the other person would determine the framework to be falsified. For him, not all of the axioms are true. Since one of the axioms pertains specifically to his ability to reliably extract information from his senses, this does not imply that the axioms are not all true for you, or for anybody else.

This is the key point, which you seem to be completely missing. One of the axioms of scientific epistemology is an assumption about the individual person trying to apply the epistemology. That axiom can be true for some people, and false for others. That means that the epistemological framework can be valid for some people, and falsified for others.

Quote:

You are leaving out a very important point which I already specifically mentioned. Those observations which are deemed to be observational errors are not simply discarded as errors. Their existence must also be explainable, using the scientific method, from the reliable information which we extract from those observations which are not in error. It is not enough to simply disregard observations which don't make sense as "hallucinations". We must also explain what hallucinations are, and why we have them.
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With respect, I think that's irrelavent and not answering my question. I asked on what logical basis are the mild hallucinations deemed to be observational errors?

It is directly relevant, because it directly answers your question. Mild hallucinations can be deemed to be observational errors, because our other observations can be used to construct demonstrably reliable theories which account for the existence of the hallucinations. Put bluntly, even if you are suffering from occasional mild hallucinations, the scientific method still works, because you can control for those observational errors, and figure out where they come from.

Quote:

Again, from what you have said previously I think that it is only by virtue of observationally extracted logical relationships that we are able to infer that mild hallucinations are observational errors.

Of course. That is how we infer anything.

Quote:

It is only if such observations that extract logical relationships did not exist would we have the scenario in which observational errors cannot be controlled for.

Only if the specific logical relationships which we use to account for the existence of the hallucinations, did not exist. Simply having some logical relationships between some of our observations, is not sufficient to control for the observational errors. We need logical relationships which specifically account for those errors. This is why what I said above is not only relevant, but exactly the answer to your question. Simply discarding those observations which we cannot make sense of as "observational errors", does not constitute "controlling for observational errors". We must also be able to use the information we have extracted from our other observations to account for the existence and nature of those observational errors. This requires much more than simply having some logical relationships between some observations.

Quote:

Would not the inclusion of a single observation that enables one to extract a logical relationship put an end to any falsification of the framework?
---------------------------------------------------------------

No, for the reasons I just gave. The theory is that, at least in principle, all of our observations, even the ones which are in error, can be explained using the scientific method. We cannot simply disregard all observations which we deem to be in error simply because we cannot explain them.
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Observations that are unable to extract logical relationships (mild hallucinations) are not used in any explanation because they cannot extract logical relationships!. They may well be refered to and be explainable but this is only be virtue of other observations that can extract logical relationships. In this sense they are discarded, which makes your point irrelavent.

No, it does not make my point irrelevant. The point I am making is exactly that they are not simply discarded. They are accounted for by the information extracted from your other observations. If this were not the case, then regardless of what other information you may be able to extract from your other observations, scientific epistemology would be falsified.

Quote:

It still seems like the inclusion of any single observation that is able to extract a logical relationship will put an end to any attempt at falsification of the framework. This is because such an inclusion would mean that observational errors can be controlled for, to whatever degree, and so the framework is not falsified.

This is simply nonsense. Extracting logical relationships from some of your observations which do not in any way have anything to do with the observation that was in error, cannot in any meaningful sense be considered to constitute "controlling for observational error". If you wish to argue that it does, you will need to explain how and why it does. There is a lot more to controlling for observational errors than simply being able to extract logical relationships from other observations. Those logical relationships must provide you with the information needed to figure out how and why the observational errors occurred. If not, then you have not controlled for them at all. You have simply ignored them.


Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

Quote:

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
davidsmith,

I'm not sure what you are trying to say. These are not two different processes of falsification. One is a process of falsification, and the other is a conclusion about somebody else's ability to make use of scientific epistemology, based on a scientific evaluation of your observations of them.

If the latter is a conclusion about someone else's ability to make use of scientific epistemology then its a conclusion about the falsification of scientific epistemology for that person. I can't see how it isn't since the axiomatic framework makes it clear that someone applying the scientific method should be able to make predictions about future observations. If one is able to infer that someone else can't do that then the framework has been falsified for that person. However, the fact that we have two methods for falsification that contradict each other in terms of the conditions under which the falsification takes place makes me ask these types of questions. If you are saying that one cannot claim that the framework is falsified for someone else then you must agree with my original statement that it is meaningless to talk about the framework being falsified for other people, since observations are only ever from a 1st person perspective.

Quote:

You still seem to be confused about what is meant by saying that the framework is falsified. It is an epistemological framework, not a metaphysical one. It can be false for one person, and not for another. My observations that another person cannot apply the scientific method, due to hallucinations, does not falsify the epistemological framework for me. The other person's observation that the scientific method does not work, falsifies it for him.

Which brings us back to my original point, that observations are only ever from a 1st person perspective. If you claim that it is only the other person's observations that can falsify the framework for him, then it's meaningless to talk about falsification for someone else because you cannot observe someone elses observations!

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That is because you are operating under the false idea that if any person were to falsify the framework, then the framework is false for everybody. This is not the case.

I don't think the contradictions have anything to do with some type of universal falsification. They occur because on the one hand you can falsify the framework for yourself by virtue of the fact that no observationally extracted logical relationships exist (ergo observational errors cannot be controlled for) and on the other hand you can know that its falsified for other people by virtue of the existence of observationally extracted logical relationships.

Quote:

In the second case you are not inferring that the framework is falsified. You are inferring that the other person would determine the framework to be falsified.

Logic doesn't depend on whether it's me or you performing the operations. It makes no difference to the argument. Either way the conclusion is that falsification has taken place. If you claim you cannot say that the framework has been falsified for someone else then its meaningless to make statements to that effect.

Quote:

For him, not all of the axioms are true. Since one of the axioms pertains specifically to his ability to reliably extract information from his senses, this does not imply that the axioms are not all true for you, or for anybody else.

I'm not saying that falsification for someone else would mean that the framework is falsified for me or anybody else. I'm saying that, from what you have said, there are two contradictory conditions in which we can say that falsification has taken place. One is where it is falsified for yourself by virtue of the non-existence of observationally extracted logical relationships (ergo observational errors cannot be controlled for) and the other is where you can know that its falsified for other people by virtue of the existence of observationally extracted logical relationships.

Quote:

It is directly relevant, because it directly answers your question. Mild hallucinations can be deemed to be observational errors, because our other observations can be used to construct demonstrably reliable theories which account for the existence of the hallucinations.

I disagree. Before we had theories that explain hallucinations, such hallucinatory observations were not used to extract logical relationships.

Quote:

Put bluntly, even if you are suffering from occasional mild hallucinations, the scientific method still works, because you can control for those observational errors, and figure out where they come from.

Exactly. It is only by virtue of the existence of observations that are able to extract logical relationships that we are able to deem mild hallucinations as observational errors. Just trying to clarify important issues.

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It is only if such observations that extract logical relationships did not exist would we have the scenario in which observational errors cannot be controlled for.
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Only if the specific logical relationships which we use to account for the existence of the hallucinations, did not exist. Simply having some logical relationships between some of our observations, is not sufficient to control for the observational errors. We need logical relationships which specifically account for those errors. This is why what I said above is not only relevant, but exactly the answer to your question. Simply discarding those observations which we cannot make sense of as "observational errors", does not constitute "controlling for observational errors". We must also be able to use the information we have extracted from our other observations to account for the existence and nature of those observational errors. This requires much more than simply having some logical relationships between some observations.

That was not my point. My point was that the only situation whereby the axiomatic framework can be falsified is the situation where we have zero observations that extract logical relationships. I am not talking about any specific observations that cannot be controlled for, I am talking about all observations that cannot be controlled for.

Quote:

No, it does not make my point irrelevant. The point I am making is exactly that they are not simply discarded. They are accounted for by the information extracted from your other observations. If this were not the case, then regardless of what other information you may be able to extract from your other observations, scientific epistemology would be falsified.

we have clarified my original point regarding this (see above)

Quote:

It still seems like the inclusion of any single observation that is able to extract a logical relationship will put an end to any attempt at falsification of the framework. This is because such an inclusion would mean that observational errors can be controlled for, to whatever degree, and so the framework is not falsified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
This is simply nonsense. Extracting logical relationships from some of your observations which do not in any way have anything to do with the observation that was in error, cannot in any meaningful sense be considered to constitute "controlling for observational error". If you wish to argue that it does, you will need to explain how and why it does. There is a lot more to controlling for observational errors than simply being able to extract logical relationships from other observations. Those logical relationships must provide you with the information needed to figure out how and why the observational errors occurred. If not, then you have not controlled for them at all. You have simply ignored them.

I do not need to specify which observational errors my extracted logical relationship are to control for. The fact that the extracted logical relationships exist for me means that, in principle, some observations can be controlled for and makes falsification invalid since the framework is still operable, in principle. Since errors can be controlled for if extracted logical relationships exist for me, the framework is not falsified. Why must I specify which observations I am to control for?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

Quote:

If the latter is a conclusion about someone else's ability to make use of scientific epistemology then its a conclusion about the falsification of scientific epistemology for that person. I can't see how it isn't since the axiomatic framework makes it clear that someone applying the scientific method should be able to make predictions about future observations. If one is able to infer that someone else can't do that then the framework has been falsified for that person.

Yes, it means that person A has used scientific epistemology to infer that the axioms of scientific epistemology are not true for person B. Why should this pose any sort of problem?

Quote:

However, the fact that we have two methods for falsification that contradict each other in terms of the conditions under which the falsification takes place makes me ask these types of questions.

What do you mean "contradiction"? There is no contradiction. What we have are two completely different conclusions, with two completely different methodologies for reaching that conclusion. In one case we have a person concluding that the axioms of science are falsified for him, based on the fact that the scientific method does not work for him, and in the other case we have a person using scientific epistemology to conclude that the axioms of science are not true for somebody else. You can refer to these as different methods for falsification, but the fact remains that they are different methods for determining different things.

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If you are saying that one cannot claim that the framework is falsified for someone else then you must agree with my original statement that it is meaningless to talk about the framework being falsified for other people, since observations are only ever from a 1st person perspective.

But that is not what I am saying. As long as it is not falsified for you, you can use it to determine that it is falsified for somebody else. I honestly do not understand what you think the problem with that is.

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You still seem to be confused about what is meant by saying that the framework is falsified. It is an epistemological framework, not a metaphysical one. It can be false for one person, and not for another. My observations that another person cannot apply the scientific method, due to hallucinations, does not falsify the epistemological framework for me. The other person's observation that the scientific method does not work, falsifies it for him.
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Which brings us back to my original point, that observations are only ever from a 1st person perspective. If you claim that it is only the other person's observations that can falsify the framework for him, then it's meaningless to talk about falsification for someone else because you cannot observe someone elses observations!

Nonsense. We can, and do, observe other people's observations all the time. We don't sense their sensory input, but that is something else entirely. More specifically, making an observation is something you do, and we observe other people doing this. We can then use the scientific method to draw conclusions about what they have observed, based on our observations of them observing. Again, we do this all the time.

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I don't think the contradictions have anything to do with some type of universal falsification. They occur because on the one hand you can falsify the framework for yourself by virtue of the fact that no observationally extracted logical relationships exist (ergo observational errors cannot be controlled for) and on the other hand you can know that its falsified for other people by virtue of the existence of observationally extracted logical relationships.

How is this a contradiction? I see nothing contradictory here at all.

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In the second case you are not inferring that the framework is falsified. You are inferring that the other person would determine the framework to be falsified.
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Logic doesn't depend on whether it's me or you performing the operations. It makes no difference to the argument. Either way the conclusion is that falsification has taken place.

Wrong. They are two completely different conclusions. The conclusion that the axioms of science are false for you is not identical to the conclusion that the axioms of science are false for somebody else. It does make a difference whether it is me or you performing the operation, because that determines who the axioms are false for.

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If you claim you cannot say that the framework has been falsified for someone else then its meaningless to make statements to that effect.

I don't know why you would think that I am claiming that, when I specifically said that I am not.

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For him, not all of the axioms are true. Since one of the axioms pertains specifically to his ability to reliably extract information from his senses, this does not imply that the axioms are not all true for you, or for anybody else.
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I'm not saying that falsification for someone else would mean that the framework is falsified for me or anybody else. I'm saying that, from what you have said, there are two contradictory conditions in which we can say that falsification has taken place. One is where it is falsified for yourself by virtue of the non-existence of observationally extracted logical relationships (ergo observational errors cannot be controlled for) and the other is where you can know that its falsified for other people by virtue of the existence of observationally extracted logical relationships.

Again, there is absolutely nothing contradictory about this. They are different conclusions, so why shouldn't they be arrived at in different ways?

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It is directly relevant, because it directly answers your question. Mild hallucinations can be deemed to be observational errors, because our other observations can be used to construct demonstrably reliable theories which account for the existence of the hallucinations.
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I disagree. Before we had theories that explain hallucinations, such hallucinatory observations were not used to extract logical relationships.

I am not saying that they are used to extract logical relationships. I am saying that they are events which can be explained in terms of logical relationships between the other observations. The fact that at some time we did not have the explanation, is irrelevant. The same goes for every observed phenomena.

Look at it this way. The scientific epistemology does not require that all of our observations are going to be reliable, but it does say that we should be able to construct accurate theories to describe those which are. Now, call set A the set of observations which are reliable, and set B the set of observations which are in error. The observation that set B exists, is a reliable observation! Therefore scientific epistemology requires that we be able to construct accurate theories to explain their existence. The scenario you suggest, in which our observations are so unreliable that the scientific method does not work, but in which there are still a few logical relationships which can be extracted from them, clearly does not meet this requirement. The axioms of science would still be false in such a scenario, and the scientific epistemology would still be falsified.

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It is only if such observations that extract logical relationships did not exist would we have the scenario in which observational errors cannot be controlled for.
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Only if the specific logical relationships which we use to account for the existence of the hallucinations, did not exist. Simply having some logical relationships between some of our observations, is not sufficient to control for the observational errors. We need logical relationships which specifically account for those errors. This is why what I said above is not only relevant, but exactly the answer to your question. Simply discarding those observations which we cannot make sense of as "observational errors", does not constitute "controlling for observational errors". We must also be able to use the information we have extracted from our other observations to account for the existence and nature of those observational errors. This requires much more than simply having some logical relationships between some observations.
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That was not my point. My point was that the only situation whereby the axiomatic framework can be falsified is the situation where we have zero observations that extract logical relationships. I am not talking about any specific observations that cannot be controlled for, I am talking about all observations that cannot be controlled for.

And what I just said above absolutely refutes your point. I can only assume that you completely misinterpreted my above post, because I just got through explaining exactly why it is not necessary that we be completely unable to extract any information at all from any of our observations, in order to falsify the axioms of science. You need to present some argument for why you think this is the case, and you need to address my argument for why it is not the case.

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No, it does not make my point irrelevant. The point I am making is exactly that they are not simply discarded. They are accounted for by the information extracted from your other observations. If this were not the case, then regardless of what other information you may be able to extract from your other observations, scientific epistemology would be falsified.
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we have clarified my original point regarding this (see above)

I see no clarification of your point, only a repetition of your assertion that we could only falsify the axioms of science if there was zero information extractable from our observations. You have not provided any explanation that I can see for why you think this is the case.

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It still seems like the inclusion of any single observation that is able to extract a logical relationship will put an end to any attempt at falsification of the framework. This is because such an inclusion would mean that observational errors can be controlled for, to whatever degree, and so the framework is not falsified.
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This is simply nonsense. Extracting logical relationships from some of your observations which do not in any way have anything to do with the observation that was in error, cannot in any meaningful sense be considered to constitute "controlling for observational error". If you wish to argue that it does, you will need to explain how and why it does. There is a lot more to controlling for observational errors than simply being able to extract logical relationships from other observations. Those logical relationships must provide you with the information needed to figure out how and why the observational errors occurred. If not, then you have not controlled for them at all. You have simply ignored them.
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I do not need to specify which observational errors my extracted logical relationship are to control for. The fact that the extracted logical relationships exist for me means that, in principle, some observations can be controlled for and makes falsification invalid since the framework is still operable, in principle.

No, it doesn't. It would if the axioms of science only said that you could extract some reliable information from some of your observations some of the time, and nothing more, but that is not what they say. The axioms of science require much more than this, as I have repeatedly explained. If the axioms of science are true, then in principle it must be possible to control for all observational errors, not just some of them. And it must be possible to construct scientific theories which account for all of your observations, including the erroneous ones.

You are arguing against the falsifiability of a watered-down version of the scientific method, which is not falsifiable.

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Since errors can be controlled for if extracted logical relationships exist for me, the framework is not falsified. Why must I specify which observations I am to control for?

You don't have to specify which observations you are going to control for. You must control for all of them.


Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

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Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
davidsmith,

Yes, it means that person A has used scientific epistemology to infer that the axioms of scientific epistemology are not true for person B. Why should this pose any sort of problem?


What do you mean "contradiction"? There is no contradiction. What we have are two completely different conclusions, with two completely different methodologies for reaching that conclusion. In one case we have a person concluding that the axioms of science are falsified for him, based on the fact that the scientific method does not work for him, and in the other case we have a person using scientific epistemology to conclude that the axioms of science are not true for somebody else. You can refer to these as different methods for falsification, but the fact remains that they are different methods for determining different things.

If person A infers that the framework is falsified for person B and person B also concludes that the framework is falsified for themself then they clearly have different methods of making their conclusions (as I pointed out), but both conclude that the framework is falsified for person B. In both cases, each individual is making the same conclusion about person B using their own observations.

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Nonsense. We can, and do, observe other people's observations all the time. We don't sense their sensory input, but that is something else entirely.

Yes, the latter is what I meant. Any attempt to conclude that the framework is falsified for someone else must be based on one's own observations only. This is because ones own observations about someone else's infered observations can be in error.

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Wrong. They are two completely different conclusions. The conclusion that the axioms of science are false for you is not identical to the conclusion that the axioms of science are false for somebody else. It does make a difference whether it is me or you performing the operation, because that determines who the axioms are false for.

The way I see it, the conclusions are thus:

a) I conclude that the axioms are false for me.

b) I conclude that person B concludes that their axioms are false for person B.

If you are concluding b), that someone else has falsified the framework for themselves then you are concluding that the same falsification process has happened in both situations. You are therefore concluding that the same thing has happened, but using different methods.

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Mild hallucinations can be deemed to be observational errors, because our other observations can be used to construct demonstrably reliable theories which account for the existence of the hallucinations.
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Before we had theories that explain hallucinations, such hallucinatory observations were not used to extract logical relationships
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I am not saying that they are used to extract logical relationships. I am saying that they are events which can be explained in terms of logical relationships between the other observations. The fact that at some time we did not have the explanation, is irrelevant. The same goes for every observed phenomena.

The fact that the framework requires that we should be able to control for all observational errors does not address the issue about why mild hallucinations are deemed to be observational errors in the first instance. That's why it is incorrect to say that mild hallucinations are deemed observational errors because theories are in principle able to account for their existence. For a theory to account for their existence, the observational errors must be identified in the first place, and this does not depend on a theory that explains them.

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The scientific epistemology does not require that all of our observations are going to be reliable, but it does say that we should be able to construct accurate theories to describe those which are. Now, call set A the set of observations which are reliable, and set B the set of observations which are in error. The observation that set B exists, is a reliable observation! Therefore scientific epistemology requires that we be able to construct accurate theories to explain their existence. The scenario you suggest, in which our observations are so unreliable that the scientific method does not work, but in which there are still a few logical relationships which can be extracted from them, clearly does not meet this requirement. The axioms of science would still be false in such a scenario, and the scientific epistemology would still be falsified.

So, we have established that you say the framework is falsifiable when:

a) observational error exists

b) one is able to extract logical relationships from ones observations

c) all observational errors cannot be controlled for

On the issue of c) you said this:
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Simply having some logical relationships between some of our observations, is not sufficient to control for the observational errors. We need logical relationships which specifically account for those errors
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So we can say that your claim now is that the framework is falsifiable when:

a) observational error exists

b) one is able to extract logical relationships from ones observations

c) all observational errors cannot be accounted for

If it is the case that c) refers to all observational errors then my question now would be - how is one able to tell that all observational errors cannot be accounted for?

I find that question particularly difficult to answer if one agrees with a) and b) since it seems impossible to tell that a failing in ones ability to account for a particular set of observational errors is merely a failing in which particular extracted logical relationships have been applied to those erroneous observations or whether all observational errors cannot be controlled for. This is why I claim that the inclusion of any single extracted logical relationship is enough to put an end to falsification of the framework because you do not know if such extracted logical relationships could in principle account for observational errors. And if they could in principle account for observational errors then c) is false.