My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[Robin]

Originally Posted by UndercoverElephant

Robin,

I'm not going to respond to the majority of your post about Neurath and the Vienna Circle because most people who will read this won't be able to understand the context of the discussion.

If you expected people to understand your original claim about the association between science and metaphysical assumptions, why do you think those same people would fail to understand the counter claim that scientists have for well over a century, carefully examined these assumptions and largely disavowed them?

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The same one that was raised by Kant. What is the relationship between the the world as it appears to us and the world as it is in itself, how can we know the answer to this question and what does it have to do with things like time and causality?

OK, so that's more than one problem, but it's all interlinked.

Kant did not raise that problem, he said that "the world as it is in itself" could only be meaningful in the negative sense as something that was unknowable.

Kant only raised the concept of the noumenon in order to all but dismiss it and Mach got rid of it altogether. It is an irrelevant meaningless concept.

Time and causality simple (metaphysically speaking) - we have mathematical models and we check them against observations. No need for the "thing in itself" whatever that means.

[Robin]

Originally Posted by UndercoverElephant

I know that the claim that consciousness is a product is itself incompatible with materialistic monism. It becomes dualistic epiphenomenalism.

Now your new claim is

X produces Y implies that X is a different substance from Y

Nonsense.

[edit] and your secondary assumption is that consciousness is a substance at all[/edit]

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I don't know what "observably complex process of consciousness" means. I know what complex neural activity is. I know how complex my own consciousness experiences are. But I don't know what your phrase means.

I don't get what you don't get.

You say your consciousness experiences are complex but you don't think your consciousness is complex.

What is the distinction you are making between your consciousness experiences and your consciousness?

Is there some consciousness you have that is not experience and is not complex? Tell me about it.

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It is the bridge between naive materialism and post-modernism. It's how you get from John Locke to Friederich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Locke was neither naive nor a materialist but maybe you weren't suggesting that. I don't know why you would even want to get to Nietzsche and the ability to get to post-modernism is hardly a recommendation.

But your claim seems to be that the thing metaphysics can do that science can't is to get from one philosopher to another.

I think science can operate quite effectively without having to do that.

[fuelair]

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

I think

Therefore you is!!!

[soylent]

Originally Posted by rocketdodger

Why is it not a physical concept?

It's not a physical concept because it is so much more useful to define it as a metaphysical property. That way you can continually claim that materialism is bankrupt because it can't even in principle explain conciousness; who cares whether consciousness as so defined even exists?

[Robin]

Originally Posted by robin

Originally Posted by UndercoverElephant

I know that the claim that consciousness is a product is itself incompatible with materialistic monism. It becomes dualistic epiphenomenalism.

Now your new claim is

X produces Y implies that X is a different substance from Y

Nonsense.

[edit] and your secondary assumption is that consciousness is a substance at all[/edit]

Oh and I just noticed your third assumption that:

X produces Y imples that Y can have no effect on X

[Robin]

Originally Posted by soylent

It's not a physical concept because it is so much more useful to define it as a metaphysical property. That way you can continually claim that materialism is bankrupt because it can't even in principle explain conciousness; who cares whether consciousness as so defined even exists?

Or that there is not any metaphysical position that is capable of explaining consciousness.

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by Dancing David

Um, so you can't answer the question?
Okay.


Then demonstrate how it influences science, you can ask any question you want, that is a given.

Some things are replicable, so what are they?

(And yes the questions you ask do determine the answers you find. So what question would you ask)

ETA: A metaphor does nothing to explain your phenomenology of metaphor, it does not demonstrate your basic premise, you state you think, but how can you know that you think?

The subjective phenomenology runs into the exact same issue as the objective stance.

We "understand" a work of art not because we know the mind of the artist, but because we know our own.

Originally Posted by Robin

You think, therefore consciousness creates itself.

Hmmm...

Perhaps you should be a little more explicit about this step.

Think defined as "to have a conscious mind".
Conscious defined as "aware of ones thoughts"

Asking me, how do you know "you think" is not equivalent to me asking myself how do I know "I think".
In the first instance you are addressing an object not of your creation in the 2nd I am addressing an object I created. This is the unique quality of thinking. It is self-referential. In order to answer the first question I refer to the 2nd and I am stuck, as I cannot transcend my own thinking in order to observe it as an independent object not of my creation. All I can say about it is, I think I think. We can transfer thinking to the brain/matter/atoms and then claim the "I" is an illusion which prevents us from studying thinking as an independent objective entity and this may prove useful in conceptualization, but it is not justified as it still assumes thinking and only transfers thinking elsewhere. We might then be further inclined to deny thinking as well, which is also unjustified as we would use thinking to do this.

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by Robin

But if time is only an illusion then process would be an illusion and the word "thinking" implies process - so we cannot have any more metaphysical confidence in the concept of "thinking" than we can in any other.

So we quickly find that everything is torn asunder again.

Maybe we should just cheerfully admit that we may never have any perfect knowledge.

Yes, except that is it justified to use thinking to deny thinking.

[cyborg]

Originally Posted by UndercoverElephant

Who are you asking?

Anyone who would care to give a definition of consciousness that could facilitate a productive conversation rather than "my favourite semantics".

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by cyborg

Anyone who would care to give a definition of consciousness that could facilitate a productive conversation rather than "my favourite semantics".

Well before we can define something which stands up to the rigors of logic we need to experience it or alternatively not it.
I suggest starting here

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by Dancing David

Now the issue is that phenomenology is not sufficient in and of itself, but it is also subject to the scientific method. All things are.

here is the intro to cognitive behavior therapy, a good place to start on cognitive behaviorism. You will note it combines an objective phenomenology.

Thanks for the link

Another example of the use of phenomenology in science is cognitive archaelogy as used by Prof. Lewis-Williams archaelogy described in his books The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art and Inside the Neolithic Mind: Consciousness, Cosmos and the Realm of the Gods

[Aepervius]

Originally Posted by rocketdodger

But note also that every step after 2) is wrong as well -- and even first year philosophy students can see why. This is why nobody takes him seriously in this matter anymore.

I got a 2 out of 20 in first year of philo (extremly poor note), did not take a second year. I continued off to QM. So you can udnerstand that I only commented on the argument I could understand .

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by Dancing David

Now the issue is that phenomenology is not sufficient in and of itself, but it is also subject to the scientific method. All things are.

Yes I agree and would not say otherwise. For me the main purpose of the scientific method is to develop a language through which consistent and repeatable information can be shared. However we cannot avoid being ourselves and this implies self-examination if we are to understand ourselves, especially something such as consciousness. For this task I believe phenomenology is indispensable.

Perhaps a better way of understanding consciousness is indirectly by examining its effects on the objective world around us.

Have humans interacted with the world differently through history? I believe there is plenty of evidence to suggest so.

Does this imply we had a different awareness of ourselves in relationship to the world through history? I believe there is evidence to support this.

Is there reason to believe that currently humans from different backgrounds and upbringings interact with the world differently and therefore have different types/degrees of self-awareness? I believe there is evidence to support this.

Then perhaps consciousness cannot be defined as an atomic fact available for logical scrutiny and it is rather a complex term encompassing many types of self-awareness through time and space. The best we can do is find correlations between consciousness and its effects on the objective world.

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by cyborg

Anyone who would care to give a definition of consciousness that could facilitate a productive conversation rather than "my favourite semantics".

Self-referential information processing.

[quixotecoyote]

Originally Posted by PixyMisa

Self-referential information processing.

I seem to have heard that somewhere before...



And I remember what that thread was like.

[Robin]

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

Yes, except that is it justified to use thinking to deny thinking.

That is merely an assumption of your conclusion to say that I am using thinking to deny thinking.

If there is no such thing as process or change I am not thinking at all and neither are you.

[Robin]

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

Think defined as "to have a conscious mind".
Conscious defined as "aware of ones thoughts"

Circular - if I substitute like terms you have defined conscious as aware of one's having a conscious mind and you have defined think as to have an awareness of one's thoughts

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Asking me, how do you know "you think" is not equivalent to me asking myself how do I know "I think".
In the first instance you are addressing an object not of your creation in the 2nd I am addressing an object I created. This is the unique quality of thinking. It is self-referential. In order to answer the first question I refer to the 2nd and I am stuck, as I cannot transcend my own thinking in order to observe it as an independent object not of my creation. All I can say about it is, I think I think. We can transfer thinking to the brain/matter/atoms and then claim the "I" is an illusion which prevents us from studying thinking as an independent objective entity and this may prove useful in conceptualization, but it is not justified as it still assumes thinking and only transfers thinking elsewhere. We might then be further inclined to deny thinking as well, which is also unjustified as we would use thinking to do this.

Again - circular. In any case I don't deny thinking - I just cannot prove the concept.

So "thinking" is no better a metaphysical starting point than "matter".

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by Robin

That is merely an assumption of your conclusion to say that I am using thinking to deny thinking.

If there is no such thing as process or change I am not thinking at all and neither are you.

And how would we decide whether there is process or change other than employing thinking?

Originally Posted by Robin

Circular - if I substitute like terms you have defined conscious as aware of one's having a conscious mind and you have defined think as to have an awareness of one's thoughts

Again - circular. In any case I don't deny thinking - I just cannot prove the concept.

Exactly, this is the unavoidable nature of thinking. It is self referential because I create it myself.

Originally Posted by Robin

So "thinking" is no better a metaphysical starting point than "matter".

Except it would be nonsensical to claim to create matter but not thoughts. However both depend on thinking before we can have knowledge of either. "Thinking" is not a metaphysical proposition as metaphysics pre-supposes thinking.

[Robin]

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

And how would we decide whether there is process or change other than employing thinking?

If there is no process and no change then we neither decide nor think - so the question is redundant.

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Exactly, this is the unavoidable nature of thinking. It is self referential because I create it myself.

This has precisely nothing to do with what I said. Providing a circular definition of "think" and "conscious" does not prove that consciousness creates itself.

It only proves your definition is meaningless. If someone provided a circular definition of "matter" would that prove that matter creates itself?

But if you create thinking please feel free to go ahead and explain how you create it.

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Except it would be nonsensical to claim to create matter but not thoughts.

Nobody has claimed this and so the point is meaningless

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However both depend on thinking before we can have knowledge of either.

Just so long as there is such a thing as thinking.

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"Thinking" is not a metaphysical proposition as metaphysics pre-supposes thinking.

So what? Did I suggest that thinking was a metaphysical proposition?

I can't even prove there is such a thing as thinking and neither, apparently, can you.

[Dancing David]

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

Thanks for the link

Another example of the use of phenomenology in science is cognitive archaelogy as used by Prof. Lewis-Williams archaelogy described in his books The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art and Inside the Neolithic Mind: Consciousness, Cosmos and the Realm of the Gods

Sorry that looks wildly speculative to me, I will take the time to read through it, but it goes against my childhood training at the feet of my father. (A famous mezo american archaeologist.) Structural analysis of living culture is very difficult to do, economic and game theory provides some metrics for theory, but speculation about un-measurable metrics is fraught with danger.

For example the common Victorian assertions about egyptian culture, which is not montheistic.

More later.

[Elaedith]

'My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple'

Don't understand the title. Has somebody claimed the study of consciousness is simple?

[Hux]

Exactly. It was and is never going to be simple. It might be one of those things we never qute get a handle on but Im not one of those who advocate there are some things beyond the realm of human understanding.

All I have seen above is a bunch of people trying to score points off one another, pedantic and unhelpful. This is probably why no one has got to the bottom of the question yet.

[Dancing David]

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

We "understand" a work of art not because we know the mind of the artist, but because we know our own.

Yes, but you are still taking an experinece, which is 'thing in an of itself' and ascribing to it a value.

We may have experiences that we label as 'Ithink' but that is what they are , experiences, they are no more a valid reference point than any other.

To assert '*I think*' is as much of an assumption as '*matter exists*', it is a face value, an appearance. There is no more validity to *I think* than there is to *matter exists*, the error is the same either way, one can not assume either materialsim or idealism, one can only judge appearnces.

I am trying to get back to not 'what is thought' but the basis of the idea "I think", because that is what we ahce to start at before we can get into the other stuff.

Now it appeared to me that you stated

http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php...9&postcount=18

Quote:

Consciousness is self referential.
It creates itself.
It therefore can only be recognized by itself.
The question for me is not how does consciousness arise, which is answered above, but why does consciousness create itself?

Which is a huge assertion, that requires a discussion of the basis of many sperate parts.

In that you have not demonstrated premise 2 'It creates itself.' but merely asserted it.

these are really profound speculations to make, and I think we need to discuss them before going on to things such as

Quote:

Consciousness creation by matter assumes that matter is conscious.

And no way we can even resolve the tautology of

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To avoid this dualism I believe the why of consciousness can only be explained within its borders using its substance, thought.

it matters not, the tools we have are the same regardless.

This is not meant to be snarky or mean or judgmental, I apologise if my post appears that way.

[Robin]

Originally Posted by Hux

Exactly. It was and is never going to be simple. It might be one of those things we never qute get a handle on but Im not one of those who advocate there are some things beyond the realm of human understanding.

All I have seen above is a bunch of people trying to score points off one another, pedantic and unhelpful. This is probably why no one has got to the bottom of the question yet.

Sure, if we were less pedantic and more helpful we would have gotten to the bottom of the problem of consciousness by now.

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by Robin

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

And how would we decide whether there is process or change other than employing thinking?

If there is no process and no change then we neither decide nor think - so the question is redundant.

And you decided all of this without thinking I suppose

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Exactly, this is the unavoidable nature of thinking. It is self referential because I create it myself.

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This has precisely nothing to do with what I said. Providing a circular definition of "think" and "conscious" does not prove that consciousness creates itself.It only proves your definition is meaningless.

Not my definitions dictionary.com definitions and the point of the exercise was to demonstrate that these concepts are not atomic facts which can be scrutinized by logic. They 'are' self referential, no matter how much you want to analyze them further they won't give. Get over it or lets change the subject to bricks.

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If someone provided a circular definition of "matter" would that prove that matter creates itself?

Please try, it would be most interesting to see.

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But if you create thinking please feel free to go ahead and explain how you create it.

You obviously did not read this reply http://forums.randi.org/showthread.p...31#post5282531

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"Thinking" is not a metaphysical proposition as metaphysics pre-supposes thinking.

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So what? Did I suggest that thinking was a metaphysical proposition?

That is my reading of this

Originally Posted by Robin

So "thinking" is no better a metaphysical starting point than "matter".

Quote:

I can't even prove there is such a thing as thinking and neither, apparently, can you.

I never suggested that thinking required proof as I assume it. Feel free not to assume your own thinking. But then again feel free to reply with some further thoughts.

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by Dancing David

Yes, but you are still taking an experinece, which is 'thing in an of itself' and ascribing to it a value.

We may have experiences that we label as 'Ithink' but that is what they are , experiences, they are no more a valid reference point than any other.

To assert '*I think*' is as much of an assumption as '*matter exists*', it is a face value, an appearance. There is no more validity to *I think* than there is to *matter exists*, the error is the same either way, one can not assume either materialsim or idealism, one can only judge appearnces.

I am trying to get back to not 'what is thought' but the basis of the idea "I think", because that is what we ahce to start at before we can get into the other stuff.

Now it appeared to me that you stated

http://forums.randi.org/showpost.php...9&postcount=18



Which is a huge assertion, that requires a discussion of the basis of many sperate parts.

In that you have not demonstrated premise 2 'It creates itself.' but merely asserted it.

these are really profound speculations to make, and I think we need to discuss them before going on to things such as


And no way we can even resolve the tautology of


it matters not, the tools we have are the same regardless.

This is not meant to be snarky or mean or judgmental, I apologise if my post appears that way.

All good David, I am happy for post.

Just to be very clear. I am not referring to the finished product of thinking ideas, thoughts, concepts and assuming them. I am only assuming thinking. Also not your thinking or somebody else's thinking, but my thinking.

As far as "matter" is concerned I differentiate between matter and thinking in that matter is "given" and I play no role in its appearance, whereas thinking is what I must be active in for it to happen. Furthermore thinking cannot be grasped whilst it happens only thereafter. I can only reflect on my thinking. Whereas I can interact with matter as it appears before me.

I will try to address the rest of your concerns later.

[Robin]

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

And you decided all of this without thinking I suppose

If there is no such thing as thinking I didn't decide it.

Quote:

Not my definitions dictionary.com definitions and the point of the exercise was to demonstrate that these concepts are not atomic facts which can be scrutinized by logic. They 'are' self referential, no matter how much you want to analyze them further they won't give.

What - based on a couple of circular definitions from dictionary.com and your own unsupported assertions?

Quote:

Please try, it would be most interesting to see.

OK, from dictionary.com also:
Matter: the substance or substances of which any physical object consists or is composed
Physical: noting or pertaining to the properties of matter and energy

So there you are - a circular definition of matter. Therefore by your logic matter is self-referential and creates itself - right?

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You obviously did not read this reply http://forums.randi.org/showthread.p...31#post5282531

I did. It does not even remotely answer the question I asked.

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That is my reading of this

I said the very opposite. It is not a metaphysical starting point.

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I never suggested that thinking required proof as I assume it.

You seem to be very intent upon defending the concept

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Feel free not to assume your own thinking. But then again feel free to reply with some further thoughts.

Assuming of course that there were ever any in the first place.

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by Dancing David

Sorry that looks wildly speculative to me, I will take the time to read through it, but it goes against my childhood training at the feet of my father. (A famous mezo american archaeologist.) Structural analysis of living culture is very difficult to do, economic and game theory provides some metrics for theory, but speculation about un-measurable metrics is fraught with danger.

For example the common Victorian assertions about egyptian culture, which is not montheistic.

More later.

On first impressions I would tend to agree. However the unique documentation by the linguist Wilhelm Bleek and his assistant Lucy Lloyd in the 19th century of Bushman ethnology provides a hugely important resource for understanding ancient rock art directly from the creators thereof. In a way this documentation has allowed archaeologists to look back at the archaeological record of abstract representations using a "dictionary" to translate what they observe.

If you want to read some journal publications on the work of Lewis-Williams look here
http://web.wits.ac.za/Academic/Scien...ckArt/Home.htm

[Dancing David]

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

All good David, I am happy for post.

Just to be very clear. I am not referring to the finished product of thinking ideas, thoughts, concepts and assuming them. I am only assuming thinking. Also not your thinking or somebody else's thinking, but my thinking.

well, I take it all to a neutral stance
: The appearance of thinking, the appearance of matter

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.

As far as "matter" is concerned I differentiate between matter and thinking in that matter is "given" and I play no role in its appearance, whereas thinking is what I must be active in for it to happen.

then that discusses why one given and not the other.

Matter is a label for an experience, thinking is another. We have sensation and perceptions that lead to an appearance of matter, we have othere xperiences that lead to an appearnce of thought.
They are both appearances. (IMNSHO)

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Furthermore thinking cannot be grasped whilst it happens only thereafter.

Well that is an even more interesting question.

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I can only reflect on my thinking. Whereas I can interact with matter as it appears before me.

Are you sure?

That again is an appearance. It appears you can interacts with thoughts as well. generic you and generic thought. (Place holders for the moment.)

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I will try to address the rest of your concerns later.

These kinds of discussions take alot of time.

[Dancing David]

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

On first impressions I would tend to agree. However the unique documentation by the linguist Wilhelm Bleek and his assistant Lucy Lloyd in the 19th century of Bushman ethnology provides a hugely important resource for understanding ancient rock art directly from the creators thereof.

Well by training I am cautious. theer are the personal filters of the people involved and then the cultural filters of the people involved. And all the other confirmation bias, and sampling error.

So I would not draw general conclusions from a sample, perhaps speculative indicative factors.

But to translate from the !Kung or Khoi San experience to another would be fraught with peril.

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In a way this documentation has allowed archaeologists to look back at the archaeological record of abstract representations using a "dictionary" to translate what they observe.

A specific and limited dictionary filtered through two cultures.

Quote:

If you want to read some journal publications on the work of Lewis-Williams look here
http://web.wits.ac.za/Academic/Scien...ckArt/Home.htm

I am sure it is great stuff, I am just trained as I am trained (informally).

One of the huge problems is:

.... artifacts of preservation...

So the sudden appearance of 'art', 'technology' and similar signs of intelligence may just be an artifact of preservation. (Read Magdelian explosion)

The window of preservation is about 40,000 years for anything that is not a carved or chipped rock. This also is when the material tends to show up in the record.

So we can not say what neanderthal art, soft technology might have been. The instances of preservation would be too low to give a sample. It may be that they had a very advanced wood and fiber technology, but due to the artifacts of preservation, we would be very unlikely to find any traces of it.

So the only thing we have are stone tools and carving, not traditionally considered art.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by Ron_Tomkins

I've been investigating Roger Penrose and I found out that he wrote a book about consciousness entitled "The Emperor's New Mind". In it, he argues that classical mechanics are insufficient to study and understand the process of human consciousness, and that quantum mechanics is closer to becoming a tool to understanding it.

Since the issue of Artificial Intelligence has been argued here before, and dualists have argued that you can't explain the "magical" process of consciousness through science and math; it occurs to me that maybe we haven't been fair to the process and appeared too simplistic with our explanations, and we have not fully reviewed in what way is it that consciousness can be approached (And the way Penrose suggest is Quantum Mechanics).

(And considering that things behave very different at the Quantum Level, it looks like this could be a clue to the apparent "mystery" to the behavior and nature of consciousness)

This is why I invite anyone who can contribute their thoughts and knowledge about how consciousness can better be understood from the Quantum Mechanics point of view.

And that includes people who have read Penrose's book and can give their layman version of what's more or less addressed in such book (Trying not to spoil us the surprises too much )

Whether or not you want to read the book should not be determined by any of the summaries put forward so far in this thread. They've all been wildly inaccurate. One might assume that Penrose was some kind of new-Age mystic instead of on of the leading living Mathematical Physicists.

Penrose might well be wrong on some specific issues, but he has one thing going for him - he's the only Physicist who's addressed the issue of consciousness, AFAIAA. If you accept that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then you have to assume that it will be explained in physical terms, by physicists.

An advantage of the book is that because Penrose is a physicist, he feels the need to explain exactly what he means by just about everything. So there's some quite deep physics right from the start. It is possible to skip the very difficult maths if you want to.

If, when you've finished TENM, and Shadows Of The Mind, you might want to read some of the rebuttals, to be found on line. Also some of the rebuttals of the rebuttals.

[drkitten]

Originally Posted by westprog

Whether or not you want to read the book should not be determined by any of the summaries put forward so far in this thread. They've all been wildly inaccurate. One might assume that Penrose was some kind of new-Age mystic instead of on of the leading living Mathematical Physicists.

No, he's not a new-Age mystic. He's simply wrong.

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Penrose might well be wrong on some specific issues, but he has one thing going for him - he's the only Physicist who's addressed the issue of consciousness, AFAIAA.

Big deal. My cat may well be the only Cat who's addressed the issue of consciousness. That doesn't mean that "Meow" is a useful or correct contribution.

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If you accept that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then you have to assume that it will be explained in physical terms, by physicists.

Not at all. Broken bones are physical phenomena, but they're explained and addressed by physicians, not by physicists.

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An advantage of the book is that because Penrose is a physicist, he feels the need to explain exactly what he means by just about everything.

Yes, but that's overridden by the disadvantage that it's wrong beyond repair from day one. He gets the physics wrong, he gets the cognitive science wrong, he gets the neuroanatomy wrong, and he even gets the math (Goedel's theorem) wrong.

(And, no, Penrose is NOT a physicist. He's a mathematician. Emeritus Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics at the Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford, with a Ph.D. in mathematics (algebra, specifically) from Cambridge. One of the top mathematicians in the world, but NOT a physicist.)

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So there's some quite deep physics right from the start.

And it's all incorrect.

Which makes "deep" rather less than useful.

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by Dancing David

fraught with peril.

who says some discovery's aren't

[westprog]

Originally Posted by drkitten

No, he's not a new-Age mystic. He's simply wrong.

He might be wrong, but he's certainly not simply wrong, as any perusal of the discussions will show.

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Big deal. My cat may well be the only Cat who's addressed the issue of consciousness. That doesn't mean that "Meow" is a useful or correct contribution.

However, cats have not made any noteworthy contributions to understanding physical phenomena.

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Not at all. Broken bones are physical phenomena, but they're explained and addressed by physicians, not by physicists.



Yes, but that's overridden by the disadvantage that it's wrong beyond repair from day one. He gets the physics wrong, he gets the cognitive science wrong, he gets the neuroanatomy wrong, and he even gets the math (Goedel's theorem) wrong.

(And, no, Penrose is NOT a physicist. He's a mathematician. Emeritus Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics at the Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford, with a Ph.D. in mathematics (algebra, specifically) from Cambridge. One of the top mathematicians in the world, but NOT a physicist.)

Well, that's simply wrong. He might be a mathematician, but he's undoubtedly a physicist as well, as a brief read of The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe will show. He's made major contributions to mathematics and physics. He's won major physics prizes. I gave the link to the Wiki page, so really there's no excuse for that one.

Originally Posted by Wikipaedia

Along with Stephen Hawking, he was awarded the prestigious Wolf Foundation Prize for Physics in 1988. In 1989 he was awarded the Dirac Medal and Prize of the British Institute of Physics. In 1990 Penrose was awarded the Albert Einstein Medal for outstanding work related to the work of Albert Einstein by the Albert Einstein Society. ... From 1992 to 1995 he served as President of the International Society on General Relativity and Gravitation

You see, in order to carry out certain types of physics, it's actually helpful to start out as a mathematician. Would the fact that someone was Lucasian professor of Mathematics at Cambridge mean that they could not be considered as an expert on physics?

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And it's all incorrect.

Which makes "deep" rather less than useful.

I'll leave it to the OP to judge whether "Penrose is not a physicist" has any implications as to the truth of the statement "Penrose gets the physics wrong".

[drkitten]

Originally Posted by westprog

He might be wrong, but he's certainly not simply wrong, as any perusal of the discussions will show.

No, he's simply wrong.

There's a reason it's called the Lucas-Penrose fallacy.

Quote:

I'll leave it to the OP to judge whether "Penrose is not a physicist" has any implications as to the truth of the statement "Penrose gets the physics wrong".

It does not, since the fact that he gets the physics wrong (Tegmark's 17 orders of magnitude) is independently documented.

[JoeTheJuggler]

Let's take one concrete example. Part of the collection of mental processes that fall under the label "consciousness" is proprioception. Neuroscience has localized proprioception functions to the basal ganglia, and can make successful predictions based on the knowledge gained from this study. They can stimulate specific brain regions to induce OBEs.

People who invoke QM for the study of something like proprioception makes claims that the consciousness can leave the body (astral projection or OBE). Of course, their "work" hasn't led to any better understanding of the phenomenon, and they can't even reproduce the phenomenon under controlled conditions.

Again, neuroscience has done a great deal to explain consciousness. I expect it will be the field that gives us more insight into the phenomenon in the future. Invoking QM has not led to any greater understanding, and I doubt very much it ever will.

[drkitten]

Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler

Let's take one concrete example. Part of the collection of mental processes that fall under the label "consciousness" is proprioception. Neuroscience has localized proprioception functions to the basal ganglia, and can make successful predictions based on the knowledge gained from this study. They can stimulate specific brain regions to induce OBEs.

.... And, contra westprog, these neuroscientists are by and large not physicists. Suggesting that the idea that the best people to work on explanations of consciousness are not physicists.

[JoeTheJuggler]

An even better example is how we explain the conscious perception of pain. The neuroscience model tells us that some mechanical force is translated via a nociceptor into an action potential that travels along afferent nerves to the CNS. Connections that go to the primary sensory cortex for that area of the body seem to correlate highly with the subjective experience of the pain.

Using that model we can predict that it should be possible to block that afferent nerve at any number of places, or just sedate the cortex entirely. We can do all those things with great precision. (Ask a woman who's had an epidural during labor. From what I'm told, the subjective experience of pain goes away like magic.)

Has invoking QM led to any such practical applications?

[westprog]

Originally Posted by drkitten

No, he's simply wrong.

There's a reason it's called the Lucas-Penrose fallacy.

It's called that by people who disagree with it. People who are neutral call it the Lucas-Penrose thesis. There are of course a number of versions - inherent in the fact that it's Lucas-Penrose, not just Lucas.

I suggest a reading of the actual discussions which are far more subtle than is likely to be found here.

Quote:

It does not, since the fact that he gets the physics wrong (Tegmark's 17 orders of magnitude) is independently documented.

Are you prepared to concede that he is, in fact, a physicist? Indeed, a very eminent physicist?

[JoeTheJuggler]

Originally Posted by drkitten

.... And, contra westprog, these neuroscientists are by and large not physicists. Suggesting that the idea that the best people to work on explanations of consciousness are not physicists.

Yup. I'd accept that we can get advances from fields like psychiatry, neuroscience, even psychology before I would expect any insight into consciousness coming from physics.

Somewhat of a derail. . .I understand the TV show NUMB3RS is pretty entertaining, but the first episode I watched turned me off completely because it made the same mistake people here are making. The hero was using some mathematical model of the criminal's behavior to predict what he would do next. At one point, the prediction was dead wrong. Aha! he says, I forgot to consider the observer effect. He then invokes the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and claims that any time you observe something you alter it. He then leaps to the conclusion that since the bad guy knows the cops are after him, he has to change the mathematical model to take that into account. . .

Bleah!

What applies to subatomic particles does not necessarily apply to human brains (at that level of organization). The characteristics that emerge from such higher levels of organization that give rise to consciousness are NOT the characteristics of subatomic particles--especially the "weirdness" which is pretty much defined as the characteristics of subatomic particles that are NOT observed in the macro world.

From a logic point of view, it is the composition fallacy to think that if an object is composed of smaller objects with a given property that the larger object must also have that property.

As I mentioned, the collection of mental processes that we call "consciousness" are emergent properties at least at the level of brain structure. You don't get consciousness in a single atom or subatomic particles. Even when physicists ask questions about how a particle "knows" about the spin of a linked particle, the scare quotes are used to recognize that they're using the pathetic fallacy.