My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple - Page 4

!Kaggen · 6th November 2009, 12:27 PM

Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler

As I mentioned, the collection of mental processes that we call "consciousness" are emergent properties at least at the level of brain structure. You don't get consciousness in a single atom or subatomic particles. Even when physicists ask questions about how a particle "knows" about the spin of a linked particle, the scare quotes are used to recognize that they're using the pathetic fallacy.

How many brain cells do we need before consciousness emerges?

drkitten · 6th November 2009, 12:56 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

Are you prepared to concede that he is, in fact, a physicist? Indeed, a very eminent physicist?

Not in the slightest, no.

His work as an algebraist and geometer has been of tremendous use to physics, just as Kahneman's work (and Simon's) work in psychology has been of tremendous use to economists. This does not make Penrose a physicist any more than it makes Kahneman or Simon economists.

And I hold to this statement despite the fact that Kahneman and Simon have received Nobel prizes in economics. Because -- as they would be the first to admit -- their work is psychological, not economic.

Dancing David · 6th November 2009, 02:20 PM

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

who says some discovery's aren't

Now I did not mean that. I meant that translating the idiomatic meaning of pictorial art that is filetered through personal and cultural filters and then trying to interpret symbolms across time and culture is not wise.

You are safe in saying 'flying people can be interpreted as shamans','flying people can be interpreted as angels','flying people can be interpreted as being launched from a catapult' but you can only speculate as to the meaning of pictorial art unless you have a good contemporary understanding of the symbology. And even then it can be questionable.

Dancing David · 6th November 2009, 02:22 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

It's called that by people who disagree with it. People who are neutral call it the Lucas-Penrose thesis. There are of course a number of versions - inherent in the fact that it's Lucas-Penrose, not just Lucas.

Do you mean the impossible QM effects? I will check.

Nope something else

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The probably most prominent and most articulate argument why the whole field of AI would be doomed to failure is expressed in the so-called Lucas-Penrose argument, which can be summarized as follows: Since Gödel proved that in each sound formal system - which is strong enough to formulate arithmetic - there exists a formula which cannot be proved by the system (assumed the system is consistent), and since we (human beings) can see that such a formula must be true, human and machine reasoning must inevitably be different in nature, even in the restricted area of mathematical logic. This attributes to human mathematical reasoning a very particular role, which seems to go beyond rational thought. Note that it is not about general human behaviour, and not even about the process of how to find mathematical proofs (which is still only little understood), but just about the checking of (finite) mathematical arguments.

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmk/papers/05-KI.html

What if the brain is analog and fuzzy?

drkitten · 6th November 2009, 02:36 PM

Originally Posted by Dancing David

Do you mean the impossible QM effects? I will check.

Nope something else

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmk/papers/05-KI.html

What if the brain is analog and fuzzy?

Hell, what if the brain is "unsound"?

Who would think that humans were capable of making mistakes in reasoning? Certainly not Penrose, which is one reason that he is "simply" wrong.

westprog · 6th November 2009, 03:04 PM

Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler

Yup. I'd accept that we can get advances from fields like psychiatry, neuroscience, even psychology before I would expect any insight into consciousness coming from physics.

Of course. There's so little known about consciousness that there's nothing much for physicists to work with.

The fact remains - for something to be completely understood, there needs to be a physical explanation. Go deep enough and it's all physics.

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Somewhat of a derail. . .I understand the TV show NUMB3RS is pretty entertaining, but the first episode I watched turned me off completely because it made the same mistake people here are making. The hero was using some mathematical model of the criminal's behavior to predict what he would do next. At one point, the prediction was dead wrong. Aha! he says, I forgot to consider the observer effect. He then invokes the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and claims that any time you observe something you alter it. He then leaps to the conclusion that since the bad guy knows the cops are after him, he has to change the mathematical model to take that into account. . .

Bleah!

What applies to subatomic particles does not necessarily apply to human brains (at that level of organization). The characteristics that emerge from such higher levels of organization that give rise to consciousness are NOT the characteristics of subatomic particles--especially the "weirdness" which is pretty much defined as the characteristics of subatomic particles that are NOT observed in the macro world.

From a logic point of view, it is the composition fallacy to think that if an object is composed of smaller objects with a given property that the larger object must also have that property.

As I mentioned, the collection of mental processes that we call "consciousness" are emergent properties at least at the level of brain structure. You don't get consciousness in a single atom or subatomic particles. Even when physicists ask questions about how a particle "knows" about the spin of a linked particle, the scare quotes are used to recognize that they're using the pathetic fallacy.

Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales. If consciousness is something that emerges on a large scale, it emerges as a result of small scale processes combined in some way not yet known.

westprog · 6th November 2009, 03:05 PM

Originally Posted by Dancing David

What if the brain is analog and fuzzy?

Then strong AI is wrong, since it assumes that the brain is digital and precise.

drkitten · 6th November 2009, 03:07 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

Then strong AI is wrong, since it assumes that the brain is digital and precise.

No, it assumes that the necessary fuzzy aspects of the brain can be modelled by something digital and precise.

Since we've had precise formulations of fuzzy logic^WP for decades, that's not a particularly controversial assumption.

westprog · 6th November 2009, 03:22 PM

Originally Posted by drkitten

Not in the slightest, no.

His work as an algebraist and geometer has been of tremendous use to physics,

Has it? That's beside the point. Penrose has not been working as a mathemetician solely. There are plenty of pure and applied mathematicians whose work has been used by physicists. They don't win physics prizes.

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just as Kahneman's work (and Simon's) work in psychology has been of tremendous use to economists. This does not make Penrose a physicist any more than it makes Kahneman or Simon economists.

And I hold to this statement despite the fact that Kahneman and Simon have received Nobel prizes in economics. Because -- as they would be the first to admit -- their work is psychological, not economic.

Let's stick to science, shall we?

Originally Posted by Wikipaedia

In 1965 at Cambridge, Penrose proved that singularities (such as black holes) could be formed from the gravitational collapse of immense, dying stars

That sounds sort of physics-ish to me. Or how about

Originally Posted by Wikepaedia

In 1969 he conjectured the cosmic censorship hypothesis. This proposes (rather informally) that the universe protects us from the inherent unpredictability of singularities (such as the one in the centre of a black hole) by hiding them from our view behind an event horizon. This form is now known as the "weak censorship hypothesis"; in 1979, Penrose formulated a stronger version called the "strong censorship hypothesis". Together with the BKL conjecture and issues of nonlinear stability, settling the censorship conjectures is one of the most important outstanding problems in general relativity. Also from 1979 dates Penrose's influential Weyl curvature hypothesis on the initial conditions of the observable part of the Universe and the origin of the second law of thermodynamics.[7] Penrose wrote a paper on the Terrell rotation.

Sort of kind of like physics, isn't it?

And what about

Originally Posted by Wikipaedia

In 2004 Penrose released The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe, a 1,099-page book aimed at giving a comprehensive guide to the laws of physics. He has proposed a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics.[9] Penrose is the Francis and Helen Pentz Distinguished (visiting) Professor of Physics and Mathematics at Pennsylvania State University.

So, he's made discoveries in physics. He's got physical theories published in Physics journals. He's written a big book all about physics. (And it's a very big book, I can assure you, and it's not at all easy reading). And he's a professor of Physics. He is not a mathematician whose ideas have been seized on by physicists. He's a mathematician who's used his mathematical knowledge to do physics. Precisely what else could he possibly do to qualify as a physicist?

Here's a suggestion:

Stop digging.

westprog · 6th November 2009, 03:24 PM

Originally Posted by drkitten

No, it assumes that the necessary fuzzy aspects of the brain can be modelled by something digital and precise.

Any device that exists in the real world will necessarily be fuzzy and analogue, whether it's a brain, an abacus, or a digital computer. The Strong AI hypothesis assumes that the essential element is the emulation of digital processing.

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Since we've had precise formulations of fuzzy logic^WP for decades, that's not a particularly controversial assumption.

Dancing David · 6th November 2009, 04:04 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

Then strong AI is wrong, since it assumes that the brain is digital and precise.

Really, the fuzzy logic people would disagree.

Sounds like a true Scotsman argument to me, is there something that supports your position?
ETA
It may have been defined that way in the past, but that may not be true for all people into AI.

Dancing David · 6th November 2009, 04:06 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

Any device that exists in the real world will necessarily be fuzzy and analogue, whether it's a brain, an abacus, or a digital computer. The Strong AI hypothesis assumes that the essential element is the emulation of digital processing.

Um digital by defintition is not analog, you can emulate analog on digital.

What are you trying to say?

JoeTheJuggler · 6th November 2009, 04:13 PM

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

How many brain cells do we need before consciousness emerges?

I don't think any number of disorganized brain cells will result in consciousness emerging. (Nor will any number of aggregated atoms or molecules. Nor will a collection of amygdalas or a collection of nerve fibers.)

However, the question as to what specific structures give rise to what specific components of "consciousness" (again stuff like memory, proprioception, language, empathy, etc. are all components of consciousness) and how they do it are questions that I predict will be answered by neuroscience (or related fields) and not by physics.

JoeTheJuggler · 6th November 2009, 04:19 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales.

No. That's not true. That is the composition fallacy.

Consider a structure like a house. It has emergent properties, such as the ability to keep a person protected from the weather.

A brick, which is a component of that house, does NOT have that property. You can analyze a brick all you want, and it will not exhibit the properties that emerge at higher levels.

Similarly, you can analyze a hydrogen atom all you want and you will not find in it the properties of water.

It is as silly to consider the human brain to be a collection of atoms as it would be for your auto mechanic to try to diagnose a problem with your car's engine by considering it to be a collection of atoms.

QM will no more explain consciousness than it will explain why your car won't start (or, for that matter, why it does start when it's working). That's why a competent automotive mechanic doesn't have to learn QM.

JoeTheJuggler · 6th November 2009, 04:24 PM

I still see no answer to the question I asked at the end of post #118. I'll ask it again,
has trying to understand consciousness by invoking QM led to any practical applications (as examining it with neuroscience has)?

How's that "quantum anaesthesia" for surgery coming along? (Again, the sensation of pain is a part of consciousness.)

westprog · 6th November 2009, 04:44 PM

Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler

No. That's not true. That is the composition fallacy.

Consider a structure like a house. It has emergent properties, such as the ability to keep a person protected from the weather.

A brick, which is a component of that house, does NOT have that property. You can analyze a brick all you want, and it will not exhibit the properties that emerge at higher levels.

Similarly, you can analyze a hydrogen atom all you want and you will not find in it the properties of water.

It is as silly to consider the human brain to be a collection of atoms as it would be for your auto mechanic to try to diagnose a problem with your car's engine by considering it to be a collection of atoms.

QM will no more explain consciousness than it will explain why your car won't start (or, for that matter, why it does start when it's working). That's why a competent automotive mechanic doesn't have to learn QM.

Of course a mechanic doesn't need to know physics in order to understand how a car works up to a point. But if he wants to know how chemical energy is converted into motion, it is necessary to understand the workings of the car on an atomic level. And we do understand it on an atomic level. We can actually see how the chemical energy contained in the fuel and oxygen produce heat, which produces pressure, which involves molecules moving faster and striking the piston head, which produces force on the crankshaft which turns the wheel. If we don't know how all this happens on an atomic scale, we don't know how a car works. Saying that a car moves because it's an emergent property of fuel air and steel is just saying we don't actually know how the car works.

Until we can trace the effects of consciousness from the micro level, tracking the forces involved, then we don't have a physical process.

westprog · 6th November 2009, 04:54 PM

Originally Posted by Dancing David

Um digital by defintition is not analog, you can emulate analog on digital.

What are you trying to say?

I'm saying that all real world computing devices are in fact analogue in nature, and emulate an ideal digital computer. There is no such thing in reality as a digital computer, since nature at the level at which such devices operate is not digital in nature.

It might be possible, theoretically, to create a genuinely digital device, but it hasn't been done yet.

westprog · 6th November 2009, 05:01 PM

Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler

I still see no answer to the question I asked at the end of post #118. I'll ask it again,
has trying to understand consciousness by invoking QM led to any practical applications (as examining it with neuroscience has)?

How's that "quantum anaesthesia" for surgery coming along? (Again, the sensation of pain is a part of consciousness.)

It's not to be expected that theory would lead to more practical applications than experimental research. AFAIAA, no theory of consciousness has produced any practical applications so far.

There is no dichotomy between experimental research and forming theories. It's impossible to devise theories without data, but uninterpreted data is of no value.

RandFan · 6th November 2009, 05:13 PM

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

How many brain cells do we need before consciousness emerges?

How many atoms are needed in the wing of a plane before flight emerges?

RandFan · 6th November 2009, 05:21 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

I'm saying that all real world computing devices are in fact analogue in nature, and emulate an ideal digital computer. There is no such thing in reality as a digital computer, since nature at the level at which such devices operate is not digital in nature.

It might be possible, theoretically, to create a genuinely digital device, but it hasn't been done yet.

A semantical argument. Digital has a real and fundamental meaning when it comes to data transmission. That all underlying medium is analog does not obviate that meaning. Digital transmission has high fidelity (not perfect). Analog, by comparison, does not.

Robin · 6th November 2009, 05:45 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

I'm saying that all real world computing devices are in fact analogue in nature, and emulate an ideal digital computer. There is no such thing in reality as a digital computer, since nature at the level at which such devices operate is not digital in nature.

It might be possible, theoretically, to create a genuinely digital device, but it hasn't been done yet.

Assuming of course that nature is not in fact digital.

Feynman once conjectured that nature might be fundamentally discrete. If that was the case then digital devices would be an emulation of digital on an emulation of analog.

Robin · 6th November 2009, 05:48 PM

Originally Posted by RandFan

A semantical argument. Digital has a real and fundamental meaning when it comes to data transmission. That all underlying medium is analog does not obviate that meaning. Digital transmission has high fidelity (not perfect). Analog, by comparison, does not.

This is true too and more to the point. A digital system is no less a digital system because it is built on an analog system.

Dancing David · 6th November 2009, 08:12 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

I'm saying that all real world computing devices are in fact analogue in nature, and emulate an ideal digital computer. There is no such thing in reality as a digital computer, since nature at the level at which such devices operate is not digital in nature.

It might be possible, theoretically, to create a genuinely digital device, but it hasn't been done yet.

I don't think I understand enough to agree with you or disagree with you. The bytes in memory of the machine I am typing this on are stored eight bits, 01010101 being 85 if I remember correctly, I think the 1 bit is last.

So that is processed as 85₁₀ or 55₁₆ and it is not an analog value it is not gated at 'around 85', if the byte is a command in the processor, 55₁₆ it is going to be a separate function in the list of the processor than 56₁₆.

So I don't really understand your point, could you elaborate with examples. The amplification of radio waves in a non-digital system is a good example of analog.

What do you have in mind?

Dancing David · 6th November 2009, 08:15 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

It's not to be expected that theory would lead to more practical applications than experimental research. AFAIAA, no theory of consciousness has produced any practical applications so far.

There is no dichotomy between experimental research and forming theories. It's impossible to devise theories without data, but uninterpreted data is of no value.

And again, you place this meta value on an undefined term that you wish to place at some arbitrary value.

Perception is part of consciousness, as is sensation, as is memory and while they are not all perfectly understood processes, they are processes that do have a strong data basis and theory to go with the data.

Dancing David · 6th November 2009, 08:17 PM

Originally Posted by RandFan

A semantical argument. Digital has a real and fundamental meaning when it comes to data transmission. That all underlying medium is analog does not obviate that meaning. Digital transmission has high fidelity (not perfect). Analog, by comparison, does not.

And i am fairly certain that the internal architechture of the processor is digital. I could be totaly wrong.

RandFan · 6th November 2009, 08:31 PM

Originally Posted by Dancing David

And i am fairly certain that the internal architechture of the processor is digital. I could be totaly wrong.

Transistors (digital switches) are mechanical devices composed of semiconducting material. IOW: They are an analog medium. There is no such thing as a metaphysical switch.

PixyMisa · 6th November 2009, 08:43 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

Penrose might well be wrong on some specific issues

He's wrong on all the specific issues.

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but he has one thing going for him - he's the only Physicist who's addressed the issue of consciousness, AFAIAA.

And that's why he's wrong. He knows nothhing about consciousness or neuroscience.

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If you accept that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then you have to assume that it will be explained in physical terms, by physicists.

No. Complete rubbish.

Rock formations are physical phenomena. They are studied by geologists.
Living creatures are physical phenomena. They are studied by biologists.
Chemical compounds are physical phenomena. They are studied by chemists.
Fossils are physical phenomena. They are studied by paleontologists.

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An advantage of the book is that because Penrose is a physicist, he feels the need to explain exactly what he means by just about everything. So there's some quite deep physics right from the start. It is possible to skip the very difficult maths if you want to.

There remains the problem that he's completely wrong.

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If, when you've finished TENM, and Shadows Of The Mind, you might want to read some of the rebuttals, to be found on line. Also some of the rebuttals of the rebuttals.

He's still completely wrong.

rocketdodger · 6th November 2009, 09:08 PM

Originally Posted by RandFan

Transistors (digital switches) are mechanical devices composed of semiconducting material. IOW: They are an analog medium. There is no such thing as a metaphysical switch.

Oh, God, please don't bring up switching...

rocketdodger · 6th November 2009, 09:19 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

Until we can trace the effects of consciousness from the micro level, tracking the forces involved, then we don't have a physical process.

I agree -- the fact that our brains are entirely physical doesn't imply anything about whether consciousness is a physical process.

RandFan · 6th November 2009, 09:36 PM

Originally Posted by rocketdodger

I agree -- the fact that our brains are entirely physical doesn't imply anything about whether consciousness is a physical process.

As a former and ardent duaalist I have to ask. Pray tell what process could it be then?

!Kaggen · 6th November 2009, 10:02 PM

Originally Posted by Robin

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

And you decided all of this without thinking I suppose

If there is no such thing as thinking I didn't decide it.

hmm.. I refer to you sig for clarification, please.

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Not my definitions dictionary.com definitions and the point of the exercise was to demonstrate that these concepts are not atomic facts which can be scrutinized by logic. They 'are' self referential, no matter how much you want to analyze them further they won't give.

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What - based on a couple of circular definitions from dictionary.com and your own unsupported assertions?

once again I refer you to your sig for clarification, please.

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Please try, it would be most interesting to see.

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OK, from dictionary.com also:
Matter: the substance or substances of which any physical object consists or is composed
Physical: noting or pertaining to the properties of matter and energy

So there you are - a circular definition of matter. Therefore by your logic matter is self-referential and creates itself - right?

I am not convinced of your proof. In any case I was not suggesting that matter or thinking would create themselves if they were defined self-referentially. You suggested this and I suggested you try prove it. What I did say was that what I myself create, is self-referential. I gave you a dictionary definition of think and conscious as a guide and proceeded to explain why you saying you think and me saying I think is not equivalent. The point being to show you how only I can create and address my consciousness.

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You obviously did not read this reply http://forums.randi.org/showthread.p...31#post5282531

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I did. It does not even remotely answer the question I asked.

I did not pretend to answer the question in the above post only point out that it is unjustified to transfer thinking outside of its activity so as to explain its creation.

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That is my reading of this

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I said the very opposite. It is not a metaphysical starting point.

Hmm.. not and no better are not equivalent. This is shifting the goalposts.

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I never suggested that thinking required proof as I assume it.

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You seem to be very intent upon defending the concept

Thinking is the only concept to defend. Failure thereof would make any other concept indefensible.

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Feel free not to assume your own thinking. But then again feel free to reply with some further thoughts.

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Assuming of course that there were ever any in the first place.

I would rather be polite at this stage.

!Kaggen · 6th November 2009, 10:17 PM

Originally Posted by Dancing David

well, I take it all to a neutral stance
: The appearance of thinking, the appearance of matter

If you like. The difference for me is that for thinking I cannot see how I can experience its appearance without producing it myself.

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then that discusses why one given and not the other.

Matter is a label for an experience, thinking is another. We have sensation and perceptions that lead to an appearance of matter, we have othere xperiences that lead to an appearnce of thought.
They are both appearances. (IMNSHO)

What are these other experiences, if I may ask?

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I can only reflect on my thinking. Whereas I can interact with matter as it appears before me.

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Are you sure?

No, but that's the only experience I have had (consistent and repeatable

)

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That again is an appearance. It appears you can interacts with thoughts as well. generic you and generic thought. (Place holders for the moment.)

Thoughts yes, not thinking.

!Kaggen · 6th November 2009, 10:36 PM

Originally Posted by Dancing David

Well by training I am cautious. theer are the personal filters of the people involved and then the cultural filters of the people involved. And all the other confirmation bias, and sampling error.

So I would not draw general conclusions from a sample, perhaps speculative indicative factors.

But to translate from the !Kung or Khoi San experience to another would be fraught with peril.

A specific and limited dictionary filtered through two cultures.

I am sure it is great stuff, I am just trained as I am trained (informally).

Originally Posted by Dancing David

Now I did not mean that. I meant that translating the idiomatic meaning of pictorial art that is filetered through personal and cultural filters and then trying to interpret symbolms across time and culture is not wise.

You are safe in saying 'flying people can be interpreted as shamans','flying people can be interpreted as angels','flying people can be interpreted as being launched from a catapult' but you can only speculate as to the meaning of pictorial art unless you have a good contemporary understanding of the symbology. And even then it can be questionable.

Of course you may be right David, then again you may be wrong.
Like our other discussion on thinking and consciousness, perhaps studying the evolution of consciousness starts with the self examination of our own thinking. It is after all the one artifact, the experience thereof, we share with our ancestor H. sapiens.

The other important thing I forgot to mention about the thesis of Lewis-Williams is the insight he has drawn from neuroscience and specifically the work on entoptic phenomena entoptic phenomena arising during ASC.

I would be most interest to know what you think after an in depth study of the work of Lewis-Williams and the Rock Art Institute as you seem to be knowledgeable in both archaeology, cognitive science and neuroscience. I realize this is asking a lot, but to be honest I have yet to find someone who understands the background and the thesis of Lewis-Williams well enough to have a serious discussion about it.

!Kaggen · 6th November 2009, 10:45 PM

Originally Posted by Dancing David

One of the huge problems is:

.... artifacts of preservation...

So the sudden appearance of 'art', 'technology' and similar signs of intelligence may just be an artifact of preservation. (Read Magdelian explosion)

The window of preservation is about 40,000 years for anything that is not a carved or chipped rock. This also is when the material tends to show up in the record.

So we can not say what neanderthal art, soft technology might have been. The instances of preservation would be too low to give a sample. It may be that they had a very advanced wood and fiber technology, but due to the artifacts of preservation, we would be very unlikely to find any traces of it.

So the only thing we have are stone tools and carving, not traditionally considered art.

An important point. However you appear to have left out rock art from the Magdelian explosion? Do you think it justified that "intelligence" as a term used today should be applied to people 40 000 years ago or even 500 years ago for that matter?

JoeTheJuggler · 6th November 2009, 11:07 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

But if he wants to know how chemical energy is converted into motion, it is necessary to understand the workings of the car on an atomic level.

No. There is no such thing as the understanding of a car on an atomic level.

You can learn about atoms by studying things at the atomic level, but not cars.

The properties of a car (something you can sit in, the ability to transport you and other loads from place to place, etc.) do not emerge at the atomic level.

Again, this statement:

Originally Posted by westprog

Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales.

Is not true. In the car analogy, consciousness is a higher level emergent property (or rather a collection of properties) like the ability of a car to transport you from one place to another. You can't analyze either of these properties at the atomic level.

Originally Posted by westprog

If we don't know how all this happens on an atomic scale, we don't know how a car works.

That's not true. Again, most auto engineers, designers and mechanics do not know QM, and yet we do actually know how a car works. The properties that we're concerned with in higher levels are not the properties of subatomic particles.

Originally Posted by westprog

Saying that a car moves because it's an emergent property of fuel air and steel is just saying we don't actually know how the car works.

Not it's not. It's saying that we can understand these properties without worrying about individual atoms much less subatomic particles. In fact, it says that atomic theory and subatomic particles doesn't tell us anything about how cars work.
_________

Originally Posted by westprog

It's not to be expected that theory would lead to more practical applications than experimental research. AFAIAA, no theory of consciousness has produced any practical applications so far.

I've already given you several examples of this. In neuroscience, specific components of consciousness (memory, proprioception, systems of arousal, etc.) have been studied in some detail and have led to practical applications, especially in medicine.

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There is no dichotomy between experimental research and forming theories. It's impossible to devise theories without data, but uninterpreted data is of no value.

I'm not arguing about the difference between experimental vs theoretical work. I'm arguing that neuroscience (which is both theory and experiment) has led us to theories of consciousness that have led to very practical applications. QM (which is also theoretical and experimental) has not. Applying QM to consciousness has only resulted in the publication of New Agey books that compare subatomic particles to the mind.

JoeTheJuggler · 6th November 2009, 11:12 PM

Originally Posted by westprog

Of course. There's so little known about consciousness that there's nothing much for physicists to work with.

No. Again, we know quite a lot about consciousness (memory, arousal, proprioception, etc.) and it's all based on the neuroscience model. The field is advancing pretty quickly these days. . . in neuroscience, not in physics, and certainly not from QM.

I'm not dissing physics. It's just that the collection of properties or functions we call consciousness is not the subject of physics. (No more than auto repair and house construction are!)

!Kaggen · 6th November 2009, 11:41 PM

Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler

I don't think any number of disorganized brain cells will result in consciousness emerging. (Nor will any number of aggregated atoms or molecules. Nor will a collection of amygdalas or a collection of nerve fibers.)

However, the question as to what specific structures give rise to what specific components of "consciousness" (again stuff like memory, proprioception, language, empathy, etc. are all components of consciousness) and how they do it are questions that I predict will be answered by neuroscience (or related fields) and not by physics.

How many organized brain cells till consciousness emerges?

!Kaggen · 6th November 2009, 11:46 PM

Originally Posted by RandFan

How many atoms are needed in the wing of a plane before flight emerges?

flight will never "emerge" if it is a plastic model plane.
I do not see how flight will "emerge" on any wing regardless.
Why is a wing even necessary for flight?

!Kaggen · 6th November 2009, 11:49 PM

Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler

It's just that the collection of properties or functions we call consciousness is not the subject of physics. (No more than auto repair and house construction are!)

I see so if physics explains gravity we can safely ignore this and build houses as high as we want to?

RandFan · 7th November 2009, 12:09 AM

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

flight will never "emerge" if it is a plastic model plane.

That's not an answer to the question. It's a straw man for you to attack.

Quote:

I do not see how flight will "emerge" on any wing regardless.

What you "see" is neither here nor there. To achieve flight there needs be a number of variables. If and only if all of the variables are met can flight happen (aka emerge).

Quote:

Why is a wing even necessary for flight?

Another straw man.

You have left the question unanswered. I assume you are withdrawing your silly question about brain cells. Even if your semantical argument was valid it still wouldn't answer the question as to how many atoms are necassary for flight.

6th November 2009, 12:27 PM	#121
!Kaggen Muse Join Date: Jul 2009 Location: Home Posts: 890	Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler As I mentioned, the collection of mental processes that we call "consciousness" are emergent properties at least at the level of brain structure. You don't get consciousness in a single atom or subatomic particles. Even when physicists ask questions about how a particle "knows" about the spin of a linked particle, the scare quotes are used to recognize that they're using the pathetic fallacy. How many brain cells do we need before consciousness emerges?
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6th November 2009, 02:20 PM	#123
Dancing David Penultimate Amazing Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Central Illinois Posts: 17,332	Originally Posted by !Kaggen who says some discovery's aren't Now I did not mean that. I meant that translating the idiomatic meaning of pictorial art that is filetered through personal and cultural filters and then trying to interpret symbolms across time and culture is not wise. You are safe in saying 'flying people can be interpreted as shamans','flying people can be interpreted as angels','flying people can be interpreted as being launched from a catapult' but you can only speculate as to the meaning of pictorial art unless you have a good contemporary understanding of the symbology. And even then it can be questionable.
	__________________ I’m not ready to make nice, I’m not ready to back down, I’m still mad as hell and I don’t have time to go round and round and round, It’s too late to make it right I probably wouldn’t if I could, ‘Cause I’m mad as hell, Can’t bring myself to do what it is you think I should- Dixie Chicks

6th November 2009, 02:22 PM	#124
Dancing David Penultimate Amazing Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Central Illinois Posts: 17,332	Originally Posted by westprog It's called that by people who disagree with it. People who are neutral call it the Lucas-Penrose thesis. There are of course a number of versions - inherent in the fact that it's Lucas-Penrose, not just Lucas. Do you mean the impossible QM effects? I will check. Nope something else Quote: The probably most prominent and most articulate argument why the whole field of AI would be doomed to failure is expressed in the so-called Lucas-Penrose argument, which can be summarized as follows: Since Gödel proved that in each sound formal system - which is strong enough to formulate arithmetic - there exists a formula which cannot be proved by the system (assumed the system is consistent), and since we (human beings) can see that such a formula must be true, human and machine reasoning must inevitably be different in nature, even in the restricted area of mathematical logic. This attributes to human mathematical reasoning a very particular role, which seems to go beyond rational thought. Note that it is not about general human behaviour, and not even about the process of how to find mathematical proofs (which is still only little understood), but just about the checking of (finite) mathematical arguments. http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmk/papers/05-KI.html What if the brain is analog and fuzzy?
	__________________ I’m not ready to make nice, I’m not ready to back down, I’m still mad as hell and I don’t have time to go round and round and round, It’s too late to make it right I probably wouldn’t if I could, ‘Cause I’m mad as hell, Can’t bring myself to do what it is you think I should- Dixie Chicks Last edited by Dancing David; 6th November 2009 at 02:26 PM.

6th November 2009, 03:04 PM	#126
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler Yup. I'd accept that we can get advances from fields like psychiatry, neuroscience, even psychology before I would expect any insight into consciousness coming from physics. Of course. There's so little known about consciousness that there's nothing much for physicists to work with. The fact remains - for something to be completely understood, there needs to be a physical explanation. Go deep enough and it's all physics. Quote: Somewhat of a derail. . .I understand the TV show NUMB3RS is pretty entertaining, but the first episode I watched turned me off completely because it made the same mistake people here are making. The hero was using some mathematical model of the criminal's behavior to predict what he would do next. At one point, the prediction was dead wrong. Aha! he says, I forgot to consider the observer effect. He then invokes the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and claims that any time you observe something you alter it. He then leaps to the conclusion that since the bad guy knows the cops are after him, he has to change the mathematical model to take that into account. . . Bleah! What applies to subatomic particles does not necessarily apply to human brains (at that level of organization). The characteristics that emerge from such higher levels of organization that give rise to consciousness are NOT the characteristics of subatomic particles--especially the "weirdness" which is pretty much defined as the characteristics of subatomic particles that are NOT observed in the macro world. From a logic point of view, it is the composition fallacy to think that if an object is composed of smaller objects with a given property that the larger object must also have that property. As I mentioned, the collection of mental processes that we call "consciousness" are emergent properties at least at the level of brain structure. You don't get consciousness in a single atom or subatomic particles. Even when physicists ask questions about how a particle "knows" about the spin of a linked particle, the scare quotes are used to recognize that they're using the pathetic fallacy. Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales. If consciousness is something that emerges on a large scale, it emerges as a result of small scale processes combined in some way not yet known.
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6th November 2009, 03:05 PM	#127
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	Originally Posted by Dancing David What if the brain is analog and fuzzy? Then strong AI is wrong, since it assumes that the brain is digital and precise.
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	__________________ "The use of anthropomorphic terms when dealing with computer systems is a sign of professional immaturity" -Edsger Dijkstra

6th November 2009, 12:56 PM	#122
drkitten Penultimate Amazing Join Date: Mar 2004 Location: Wits' End Posts: 16,294	Originally Posted by westprog Are you prepared to concede that he is, in fact, a physicist? Indeed, a very eminent physicist? Not in the slightest, no. His work as an algebraist and geometer has been of tremendous use to physics, just as Kahneman's work (and Simon's) work in psychology has been of tremendous use to economists. This does not make Penrose a physicist any more than it makes Kahneman or Simon economists. And I hold to this statement despite the fact that Kahneman and Simon have received Nobel prizes in economics. Because -- as they would be the first to admit -- their work is psychological, not economic.

6th November 2009, 02:36 PM	#125
drkitten Penultimate Amazing Join Date: Mar 2004 Location: Wits' End Posts: 16,294	Originally Posted by Dancing David Do you mean the impossible QM effects? I will check. Nope something else http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmk/papers/05-KI.html What if the brain is analog and fuzzy? Hell, what if the brain is "unsound"? Who would think that humans were capable of making mistakes in reasoning? Certainly not Penrose, which is one reason that he is "simply" wrong.

6th November 2009, 03:07 PM	#128
drkitten Penultimate Amazing Join Date: Mar 2004 Location: Wits' End Posts: 16,294	Originally Posted by westprog Then strong AI is wrong, since it assumes that the brain is digital and precise. No, it assumes that the necessary fuzzy aspects of the brain can be modelled by something digital and precise. Since we've had precise formulations of fuzzy logic^WP for decades, that's not a particularly controversial assumption.

6th November 2009, 03:22 PM	#129
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	Originally Posted by drkitten Not in the slightest, no. His work as an algebraist and geometer has been of tremendous use to physics, Has it? That's beside the point. Penrose has not been working as a mathemetician solely. There are plenty of pure and applied mathematicians whose work has been used by physicists. They don't win physics prizes. Quote: just as Kahneman's work (and Simon's) work in psychology has been of tremendous use to economists. This does not make Penrose a physicist any more than it makes Kahneman or Simon economists. And I hold to this statement despite the fact that Kahneman and Simon have received Nobel prizes in economics. Because -- as they would be the first to admit -- their work is psychological, not economic. Let's stick to science, shall we? Originally Posted by Wikipaedia In 1965 at Cambridge, Penrose proved that singularities (such as black holes) could be formed from the gravitational collapse of immense, dying stars That sounds sort of physics-ish to me. Or how about Originally Posted by Wikepaedia In 1969 he conjectured the cosmic censorship hypothesis. This proposes (rather informally) that the universe protects us from the inherent unpredictability of singularities (such as the one in the centre of a black hole) by hiding them from our view behind an event horizon. This form is now known as the "weak censorship hypothesis"; in 1979, Penrose formulated a stronger version called the "strong censorship hypothesis". Together with the BKL conjecture and issues of nonlinear stability, settling the censorship conjectures is one of the most important outstanding problems in general relativity. Also from 1979 dates Penrose's influential Weyl curvature hypothesis on the initial conditions of the observable part of the Universe and the origin of the second law of thermodynamics.[7] Penrose wrote a paper on the Terrell rotation. Sort of kind of like physics, isn't it? And what about Originally Posted by Wikipaedia In 2004 Penrose released The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe, a 1,099-page book aimed at giving a comprehensive guide to the laws of physics. He has proposed a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics.[9] Penrose is the Francis and Helen Pentz Distinguished (visiting) Professor of Physics and Mathematics at Pennsylvania State University. So, he's made discoveries in physics. He's got physical theories published in Physics journals. He's written a big book all about physics. (And it's a very big book, I can assure you, and it's not at all easy reading). And he's a professor of Physics. He is not a mathematician whose ideas have been seized on by physicists. He's a mathematician who's used his mathematical knowledge to do physics. Precisely what else could he possibly do to qualify as a physicist? Here's a suggestion: Stop digging.
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	__________________ "The use of anthropomorphic terms when dealing with computer systems is a sign of professional immaturity" -Edsger Dijkstra

6th November 2009, 03:24 PM	#130
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	Originally Posted by drkitten No, it assumes that the necessary fuzzy aspects of the brain can be modelled by something digital and precise. Any device that exists in the real world will necessarily be fuzzy and analogue, whether it's a brain, an abacus, or a digital computer. The Strong AI hypothesis assumes that the essential element is the emulation of digital processing. Quote: Since we've had precise formulations of fuzzy logic^WP for decades, that's not a particularly controversial assumption.
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	__________________ "The use of anthropomorphic terms when dealing with computer systems is a sign of professional immaturity" -Edsger Dijkstra

6th November 2009, 04:04 PM	#131
Dancing David Penultimate Amazing Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Central Illinois Posts: 17,332	Originally Posted by westprog Then strong AI is wrong, since it assumes that the brain is digital and precise. Really, the fuzzy logic people would disagree. Sounds like a true Scotsman argument to me, is there something that supports your position? ETA It may have been defined that way in the past, but that may not be true for all people into AI.
	__________________ I’m not ready to make nice, I’m not ready to back down, I’m still mad as hell and I don’t have time to go round and round and round, It’s too late to make it right I probably wouldn’t if I could, ‘Cause I’m mad as hell, Can’t bring myself to do what it is you think I should- Dixie Chicks

6th November 2009, 04:06 PM	#132
Dancing David Penultimate Amazing Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Central Illinois Posts: 17,332	Originally Posted by westprog Any device that exists in the real world will necessarily be fuzzy and analogue, whether it's a brain, an abacus, or a digital computer. The Strong AI hypothesis assumes that the essential element is the emulation of digital processing. Um digital by defintition is not analog, you can emulate analog on digital. What are you trying to say?
	__________________ I’m not ready to make nice, I’m not ready to back down, I’m still mad as hell and I don’t have time to go round and round and round, It’s too late to make it right I probably wouldn’t if I could, ‘Cause I’m mad as hell, Can’t bring myself to do what it is you think I should- Dixie Chicks

6th November 2009, 04:13 PM	#133
JoeTheJuggler Philosopher Join Date: Jun 2006 Location: St. Louis Posts: 9,526	Originally Posted by !Kaggen How many brain cells do we need before consciousness emerges? I don't think any number of disorganized brain cells will result in consciousness emerging. (Nor will any number of aggregated atoms or molecules. Nor will a collection of amygdalas or a collection of nerve fibers.) However, the question as to what specific structures give rise to what specific components of "consciousness" (again stuff like memory, proprioception, language, empathy, etc. are all components of consciousness) and how they do it are questions that I predict will be answered by neuroscience (or related fields) and not by physics.
	__________________ "That is a very graphic analogy which aids understanding wonderfully while being, strictly speaking, wrong in every possible way." —Ponder Stibbons

6th November 2009, 04:19 PM	#134
JoeTheJuggler Philosopher Join Date: Jun 2006 Location: St. Louis Posts: 9,526	Originally Posted by westprog Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales. No. That's not true. That is the composition fallacy. Consider a structure like a house. It has emergent properties, such as the ability to keep a person protected from the weather. A brick, which is a component of that house, does NOT have that property. You can analyze a brick all you want, and it will not exhibit the properties that emerge at higher levels. Similarly, you can analyze a hydrogen atom all you want and you will not find in it the properties of water. It is as silly to consider the human brain to be a collection of atoms as it would be for your auto mechanic to try to diagnose a problem with your car's engine by considering it to be a collection of atoms. QM will no more explain consciousness than it will explain why your car won't start (or, for that matter, why it does start when it's working). That's why a competent automotive mechanic doesn't have to learn QM.
	__________________ "That is a very graphic analogy which aids understanding wonderfully while being, strictly speaking, wrong in every possible way." —Ponder Stibbons

6th November 2009, 04:24 PM	#135
JoeTheJuggler Philosopher Join Date: Jun 2006 Location: St. Louis Posts: 9,526	I still see no answer to the question I asked at the end of post #118. I'll ask it again, has trying to understand consciousness by invoking QM led to any practical applications (as examining it with neuroscience has)? How's that "quantum anaesthesia" for surgery coming along? (Again, the sensation of pain is a part of consciousness.)
	__________________ "That is a very graphic analogy which aids understanding wonderfully while being, strictly speaking, wrong in every possible way." —Ponder Stibbons

6th November 2009, 04:44 PM	#136
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler No. That's not true. That is the composition fallacy. Consider a structure like a house. It has emergent properties, such as the ability to keep a person protected from the weather. A brick, which is a component of that house, does NOT have that property. You can analyze a brick all you want, and it will not exhibit the properties that emerge at higher levels. Similarly, you can analyze a hydrogen atom all you want and you will not find in it the properties of water. It is as silly to consider the human brain to be a collection of atoms as it would be for your auto mechanic to try to diagnose a problem with your car's engine by considering it to be a collection of atoms. QM will no more explain consciousness than it will explain why your car won't start (or, for that matter, why it does start when it's working). That's why a competent automotive mechanic doesn't have to learn QM. Of course a mechanic doesn't need to know physics in order to understand how a car works up to a point. But if he wants to know how chemical energy is converted into motion, it is necessary to understand the workings of the car on an atomic level. And we do understand it on an atomic level. We can actually see how the chemical energy contained in the fuel and oxygen produce heat, which produces pressure, which involves molecules moving faster and striking the piston head, which produces force on the crankshaft which turns the wheel. If we don't know how all this happens on an atomic scale, we don't know how a car works. Saying that a car moves because it's an emergent property of fuel air and steel is just saying we don't actually know how the car works. Until we can trace the effects of consciousness from the micro level, tracking the forces involved, then we don't have a physical process.
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	__________________ "The use of anthropomorphic terms when dealing with computer systems is a sign of professional immaturity" -Edsger Dijkstra

6th November 2009, 04:54 PM	#137
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	Originally Posted by Dancing David Um digital by defintition is not analog, you can emulate analog on digital. What are you trying to say? I'm saying that all real world computing devices are in fact analogue in nature, and emulate an ideal digital computer. There is no such thing in reality as a digital computer, since nature at the level at which such devices operate is not digital in nature. It might be possible, theoretically, to create a genuinely digital device, but it hasn't been done yet.
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	__________________ "The use of anthropomorphic terms when dealing with computer systems is a sign of professional immaturity" -Edsger Dijkstra

6th November 2009, 05:01 PM	#138
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	Originally Posted by JoeTheJuggler I still see no answer to the question I asked at the end of post #118. I'll ask it again, has trying to understand consciousness by invoking QM led to any practical applications (as examining it with neuroscience has)? How's that "quantum anaesthesia" for surgery coming along? (Again, the sensation of pain is a part of consciousness.) It's not to be expected that theory would lead to more practical applications than experimental research. AFAIAA, no theory of consciousness has produced any practical applications so far. There is no dichotomy between experimental research and forming theories. It's impossible to devise theories without data, but uninterpreted data is of no value.
westprog Illuminator Join Date: Dec 2006 Posts: 3,421	__________________ "The use of anthropomorphic terms when dealing with computer systems is a sign of professional immaturity" -Edsger Dijkstra

6th November 2009, 05:13 PM	#139
RandFan Mormon Atheist Join Date: Dec 2001 Location: Southern California Posts: 31,091	Originally Posted by !Kaggen How many brain cells do we need before consciousness emerges? How many atoms are needed in the wing of a plane before flight emerges?
	__________________ www.StopSylvia.com. Nothing wrong with God removing people from this world and bringing them to the next. --hamelekim

6th November 2009, 05:21 PM	#140
RandFan Mormon Atheist Join Date: Dec 2001 Location: Southern California Posts: 31,091	Originally Posted by westprog I'm saying that all real world computing devices are in fact analogue in nature, and emulate an ideal digital computer. There is no such thing in reality as a digital computer, since nature at the level at which such devices operate is not digital in nature. It might be possible, theoretically, to create a genuinely digital device, but it hasn't been done yet. A semantical argument. Digital has a real and fundamental meaning when it comes to data transmission. That all underlying medium is analog does not obviate that meaning. Digital transmission has high fidelity (not perfect). Analog, by comparison, does not.
	__________________ www.StopSylvia.com. Nothing wrong with God removing people from this world and bringing them to the next. --hamelekim Last edited by RandFan; 6th November 2009 at 05:22 PM.

6th November 2009, 05:45 PM	#141
Robin Illuminator Join Date: Apr 2004 Posts: 4,897	Originally Posted by westprog I'm saying that all real world computing devices are in fact analogue in nature, and emulate an ideal digital computer. There is no such thing in reality as a digital computer, since nature at the level at which such devices operate is not digital in nature. It might be possible, theoretically, to create a genuinely digital device, but it hasn't been done yet. Assuming of course that nature is not in fact digital. Feynman once conjectured that nature might be fundamentally discrete. If that was the case then digital devices would be an emulation of digital on an emulation of analog.
Robin Illuminator Join Date: Apr 2004 Posts: 4,897	__________________ If any one alters the definitions, I cannot pretend to argue with him, until I know the meaning he assigns to these terms. - David Hume 1711-1776

6th November 2009, 05:48 PM	#142
Robin Illuminator Join Date: Apr 2004 Posts: 4,897	Originally Posted by RandFan A semantical argument. Digital has a real and fundamental meaning when it comes to data transmission. That all underlying medium is analog does not obviate that meaning. Digital transmission has high fidelity (not perfect). Analog, by comparison, does not. This is true too and more to the point. A digital system is no less a digital system because it is built on an analog system.
Robin Illuminator Join Date: Apr 2004 Posts: 4,897	__________________ If any one alters the definitions, I cannot pretend to argue with him, until I know the meaning he assigns to these terms. - David Hume 1711-1776

6th November 2009, 08:12 PM	#143
Dancing David Penultimate Amazing Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Central Illinois Posts: 17,332	Originally Posted by westprog I'm saying that all real world computing devices are in fact analogue in nature, and emulate an ideal digital computer. There is no such thing in reality as a digital computer, since nature at the level at which such devices operate is not digital in nature. It might be possible, theoretically, to create a genuinely digital device, but it hasn't been done yet. I don't think I understand enough to agree with you or disagree with you. The bytes in memory of the machine I am typing this on are stored eight bits, 01010101 being 85 if I remember correctly, I think the 1 bit is last. So that is processed as 85₁₀ or 55₁₆ and it is not an analog value it is not gated at 'around 85', if the byte is a command in the processor, 55₁₆ it is going to be a separate function in the list of the processor than 56₁₆. So I don't really understand your point, could you elaborate with examples. The amplification of radio waves in a non-digital system is a good example of analog. What do you have in mind?
	__________________ I’m not ready to make nice, I’m not ready to back down, I’m still mad as hell and I don’t have time to go round and round and round, It’s too late to make it right I probably wouldn’t if I could, ‘Cause I’m mad as hell, Can’t bring myself to do what it is you think I should- Dixie Chicks

6th November 2009, 08:15 PM	#144
Dancing David Penultimate Amazing Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Central Illinois Posts: 17,332	Originally Posted by westprog It's not to be expected that theory would lead to more practical applications than experimental research. AFAIAA, no theory of consciousness has produced any practical applications so far. There is no dichotomy between experimental research and forming theories. It's impossible to devise theories without data, but uninterpreted data is of no value. And again, you place this meta value on an undefined term that you wish to place at some arbitrary value. Perception is part of consciousness, as is sensation, as is memory and while they are not all perfectly understood processes, they are processes that do have a strong data basis and theory to go with the data.
	__________________ I’m not ready to make nice, I’m not ready to back down, I’m still mad as hell and I don’t have time to go round and round and round, It’s too late to make it right I probably wouldn’t if I could, ‘Cause I’m mad as hell, Can’t bring myself to do what it is you think I should- Dixie Chicks

6th November 2009, 08:17 PM	#145
Dancing David Penultimate Amazing Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Central Illinois Posts: 17,332	Originally Posted by RandFan A semantical argument. Digital has a real and fundamental meaning when it comes to data transmission. That all underlying medium is analog does not obviate that meaning. Digital transmission has high fidelity (not perfect). Analog, by comparison, does not. And i am fairly certain that the internal architechture of the processor is digital. I could be totaly wrong.
	__________________ I’m not ready to make nice, I’m not ready to back down, I’m still mad as hell and I don’t have time to go round and round and round, It’s too late to make it right I probably wouldn’t if I could, ‘Cause I’m mad as hell, Can’t bring myself to do what it is you think I should- Dixie Chicks

6th November 2009, 08:31 PM	#146
RandFan Mormon Atheist Join Date: Dec 2001 Location: Southern California Posts: 31,091	Originally Posted by Dancing David And i am fairly certain that the internal architechture of the processor is digital. I could be totaly wrong. Transistors (digital switches) are mechanical devices composed of semiconducting material. IOW: They are an analog medium. There is no such thing as a metaphysical switch.
	__________________ www.StopSylvia.com. Nothing wrong with God removing people from this world and bringing them to the next. --hamelekim

6th November 2009, 08:43 PM	#147
PixyMisa Persnickety Insect Join Date: Dec 2002 Posts: 7,206	Originally Posted by westprog Penrose might well be wrong on some specific issues He's wrong on all the specific issues. Quote: but he has one thing going for him - he's the only Physicist who's addressed the issue of consciousness, AFAIAA. And that's why he's wrong. He knows nothhing about consciousness or neuroscience. Quote: If you accept that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then you have to assume that it will be explained in physical terms, by physicists. No. Complete rubbish. Rock formations are physical phenomena. They are studied by geologists. Living creatures are physical phenomena. They are studied by biologists. Chemical compounds are physical phenomena. They are studied by chemists. Fossils are physical phenomena. They are studied by paleontologists. Quote: An advantage of the book is that because Penrose is a physicist, he feels the need to explain exactly what he means by just about everything. So there's some quite deep physics right from the start. It is possible to skip the very difficult maths if you want to. There remains the problem that he's completely wrong. Quote: If, when you've finished TENM, and Shadows Of The Mind, you might want to read some of the rebuttals, to be found on line. Also some of the rebuttals of the rebuttals. He's still completely wrong.
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6th November 2009, 09:08 PM	#148
rocketdodger Illuminator Join Date: Jun 2005 Location: Hyperion Posts: 4,213	Originally Posted by RandFan Transistors (digital switches) are mechanical devices composed of semiconducting material. IOW: They are an analog medium. There is no such thing as a metaphysical switch. Oh, God, please don't bring up switching...

6th November 2009, 09:19 PM	#149
rocketdodger Illuminator Join Date: Jun 2005 Location: Hyperion Posts: 4,213	Originally Posted by westprog Until we can trace the effects of consciousness from the micro level, tracking the forces involved, then we don't have a physical process. I agree -- the fact that our brains are entirely physical doesn't imply anything about whether consciousness is a physical process.

6th November 2009, 09:36 PM	#150
RandFan Mormon Atheist Join Date: Dec 2001 Location: Southern California Posts: 31,091	Originally Posted by rocketdodger I agree -- the fact that our brains are entirely physical doesn't imply anything about whether consciousness is a physical process. As a former and ardent duaalist I have to ask. Pray tell what process could it be then?
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6th November 2009, 10:02 PM	#151
!Kaggen Muse Join Date: Jul 2009 Location: Home Posts: 890	Originally Posted by Robin Originally Posted by !Kaggen And you decided all of this without thinking I suppose If there is no such thing as thinking I didn't decide it. hmm.. I refer to you sig for clarification, please. Quote: Not my definitions dictionary.com definitions and the point of the exercise was to demonstrate that these concepts are not atomic facts which can be scrutinized by logic. They 'are' self referential, no matter how much you want to analyze them further they won't give. Quote: What - based on a couple of circular definitions from dictionary.com and your own unsupported assertions? once again I refer you to your sig for clarification, please. Quote: Please try, it would be most interesting to see. Quote: OK, from dictionary.com also: Matter: the substance or substances of which any physical object consists or is composed Physical: noting or pertaining to the properties of matter and energy So there you are - a circular definition of matter. Therefore by your logic matter is self-referential and creates itself - right? I am not convinced of your proof. In any case I was not suggesting that matter or thinking would create themselves if they were defined self-referentially. You suggested this and I suggested you try prove it. What I did say was that what I myself create, is self-referential. I gave you a dictionary definition of think and conscious as a guide and proceeded to explain why you saying you think and me saying I think is not equivalent. The point being to show you how only I can create and address my consciousness. Quote: You obviously did not read this reply http://forums.randi.org/showthread.p...31#post5282531 Quote: I did. It does not even remotely answer the question I asked. I did not pretend to answer the question in the above post only point out that it is unjustified to transfer thinking outside of its activity so as to explain its creation. Quote: That is my reading of this Quote: I said the very opposite. It is not a metaphysical starting point. Hmm.. not and no better are not equivalent. This is shifting the goalposts. Quote: I never suggested that thinking required proof as I assume it. Quote: You seem to be very intent upon defending the concept Thinking is the only concept to defend. Failure thereof would make any other concept indefensible. Quote: Feel free not to assume your own thinking. But then again feel free to reply with some further thoughts. Quote: Assuming of course that there were ever any in the first place. I would rather be polite at this stage.
	__________________ the source Last edited by !Kaggen; 6th November 2009 at 10:06 PM.

6th November 2009, 10:17 PM	#152
!Kaggen Muse Join Date: Jul 2009 Location: Home Posts: 890	Originally Posted by Dancing David well, I take it all to a neutral stance : The appearance of thinking, the appearance of matter If you like. The difference for me is that for thinking I cannot see how I can experience its appearance without producing it myself. Quote: then that discusses why one given and not the other. Matter is a label for an experience, thinking is another. We have sensation and perceptions that lead to an appearance of matter, we have othere xperiences that lead to an appearnce of thought. They are both appearances. (IMNSHO) What are these other experiences, if I may ask? Quote: I can only reflect on my thinking. Whereas I can interact with matter as it appears before me. Quote: Are you sure? No, but that's the only experience I have had (consistent and repeatable ) Quote: That again is an appearance. It appears you can interacts with thoughts as well. generic you and generic thought. (Place holders for the moment.) Thoughts yes, not thinking.
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6th November 2009, 10:36 PM	#153
!Kaggen Muse Join Date: Jul 2009 Location: Home Posts: 890	Originally Posted by Dancing David Well by training I am cautious. theer are the personal filters of the people involved and then the cultural filters of the people involved. And all the other confirmation bias, and sampling error. So I would not draw general conclusions from a sample, perhaps speculative indicative factors. But to translate from the !Kung or Khoi San experience to another would be fraught with peril. A specific and limited dictionary filtered through two cultures. I am sure it is great stuff, I am just trained as I am trained (informally). Originally Posted by Dancing David Now I did not mean that. I meant that translating the idiomatic meaning of pictorial art that is filetered through personal and cultural filters and then trying to interpret symbolms across time and culture is not wise. You are safe in saying 'flying people can be interpreted as shamans','flying people can be interpreted as angels','flying people can be interpreted as being launched from a catapult' but you can only speculate as to the meaning of pictorial art unless you have a good contemporary understanding of the symbology. And even then it can be questionable. Of course you may be right David, then again you may be wrong. Like our other discussion on thinking and consciousness, perhaps studying the evolution of consciousness starts with the self examination of our own thinking. It is after all the one artifact, the experience thereof, we share with our ancestor H. sapiens. The other important thing I forgot to mention about the thesis of Lewis-Williams is the insight he has drawn from neuroscience and specifically the work on entoptic phenomena entoptic phenomena arising during ASC. I would be most interest to know what you think after an in depth study of the work of Lewis-Williams and the Rock Art Institute as you seem to be knowledgeable in both archaeology, cognitive science and neuroscience. I realize this is asking a lot, but to be honest I have yet to find someone who understands the background and the thesis of Lewis-Williams well enough to have a serious discussion about it.
	__________________ the source Last edited by !Kaggen; 6th November 2009 at 10:39 PM.

6th November 2009, 10:45 PM	#154
!Kaggen Muse Join Date: Jul 2009 Location: Home Posts: 890	Originally Posted by Dancing David One of the huge problems is: .... artifacts of preservation... So the sudden appearance of 'art', 'technology' and similar signs of intelligence may just be an artifact of preservation. (Read Magdelian explosion) The window of preservation is about 40,000 years for anything that is not a carved or chipped rock. This also is when the material tends to show up in the record. So we can not say what neanderthal art, soft technology might have been. The instances of preservation would be too low to give a sample. It may be that they had a very advanced wood and fiber technology, but due to the artifacts of preservation, we would be very unlikely to find any traces of it. So the only thing we have are stone tools and carving, not traditionally considered art. An important point. However you appear to have left out rock art from the Magdelian explosion? Do you think it justified that "intelligence" as a term used today should be applied to people 40 000 years ago or even 500 years ago for that matter?
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6th November 2009, 11:07 PM	#155
JoeTheJuggler Philosopher Join Date: Jun 2006 Location: St. Louis Posts: 9,526	Originally Posted by westprog But if he wants to know how chemical energy is converted into motion, it is necessary to understand the workings of the car on an atomic level. No. There is no such thing as the understanding of a car on an atomic level. You can learn about atoms by studying things at the atomic level, but not cars. The properties of a car (something you can sit in, the ability to transport you and other loads from place to place, etc.) do not emerge at the atomic level. Again, this statement: Originally Posted by westprog Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales. Is not true. In the car analogy, consciousness is a higher level emergent property (or rather a collection of properties) like the ability of a car to transport you from one place to another. You can't analyze either of these properties at the atomic level. Originally Posted by westprog If we don't know how all this happens on an atomic scale, we don't know how a car works. That's not true. Again, most auto engineers, designers and mechanics do not know QM, and yet we do actually know how a car works. The properties that we're concerned with in higher levels are not the properties of subatomic particles. Originally Posted by westprog Saying that a car moves because it's an emergent property of fuel air and steel is just saying we don't actually know how the car works. Not it's not. It's saying that we can understand these properties without worrying about individual atoms much less subatomic particles. In fact, it says that atomic theory and subatomic particles doesn't tell us anything about how cars work. _________ Originally Posted by westprog It's not to be expected that theory would lead to more practical applications than experimental research. AFAIAA, no theory of consciousness has produced any practical applications so far. I've already given you several examples of this. In neuroscience, specific components of consciousness (memory, proprioception, systems of arousal, etc.) have been studied in some detail and have led to practical applications, especially in medicine. Quote: There is no dichotomy between experimental research and forming theories. It's impossible to devise theories without data, but uninterpreted data is of no value. I'm not arguing about the difference between experimental vs theoretical work. I'm arguing that neuroscience (which is both theory and experiment) has led us to theories of consciousness that have led to very practical applications. QM (which is also theoretical and experimental) has not. Applying QM to consciousness has only resulted in the publication of New Agey books that compare subatomic particles to the mind.
	__________________ "That is a very graphic analogy which aids understanding wonderfully while being, strictly speaking, wrong in every possible way." —Ponder Stibbons