Explain consciousness to the layman.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by Belz...

I'll join myself in pointing out that, if the thing you are emulating is computation, then in fact the emulation is the real thing.

Yes, clearly if consciousness is purely computational in nature, then one of its properties is that it can be emulated precisely. However, since the computational nature of consciousness is precisely what is in dispute, the claim has little weight.

[rocketdodger]

Originally Posted by westprog

If, however, we wish to model the operation of the computer in terms of its interactions in real time, the Turing model is not applicable, and we can't draw conclusions on the behaviour of the real time systems by using the Turing model. It is possible to model the behaviour of real time systems, using different models.

Nope.

All digital systems are dependent upon discrete clock events driving their computation. There is no such thing as "event based" digital calculation that only happens when some random thing happens in the external world. To the extent that "real time" events do anything, they simply set register values in various locations that the clock driven logic simply accesses on a clock cycle. That is how digital logic works. Plain and simple. No exceptions. The CPU in your computer doesn't magically just drop everything as soon as a sensor sends it a signal. It only happens on a clock cycle.

The implication of this is that since discrete events equally spaced in time *are* part of the Turing model -- in fact, the Turing machine is entirely based upon the notion that it reads and processes each tape segment as a discrete event -- all digital systems can be fully modeled by any other Turing equivalent process.

Note that this isn't even necessarily an issue because if certain physical postulates are correct the universe operates at a discrete timescale and spatial scale anyway, which would imply that all of known reality can be described using the "Turing" model of which you speak. But that doesn't have anything to do with the FACT that digital logic only takes place at discrete intervals.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by rocketdodger

Oh? I was not aware that *your* consciousness was connected with *my* neurons.

The fact that both of us can be conscious, yet we do not share neurons, immediately confirms that consciousness is independent of a specific physical substrate.

Both of us respire - yet we do not share lungs. However, respiration in both our cases is a well defined physical process. Respiration is dependent on a specific physical substrate- in this case, lungs. Any duplication of the physical process of respiration would have to involve a duplication of the essential elements of the lungs. It might use different means to achieve the same end, but would be restricted by the very nature of respiration.

The assertion about the nature of consciousness is that no physical restrictions apply. Any physical substrate is available, and any physical process can apply, with dimensions of space and time being entirely irrelevant.

[rocketdodger]

Originally Posted by westprog

No real time system performing monitoring and control can be modelled as a Turing machine. (That is not to say that it cannot be emulated as a computation - an entirely different matter). What is going on is not computation, and treating it as such is not useful or helpful. Many real time control systems have a negligible compuational element. Sometimes the response required is a simple as opening a valve when an indicator exceeds a particular value. Modelling such an interaction with a programming language - like PASCAL, say - which uses the Turing model is not possible. In order to perform such operations, languages need to add in features such as interrupts and pauses which are extraneous to that model. This also means - and this is the critical, essential element - that it is not possible to make assumptions about the behaviour of the realtime system based on reasoning using the Turing model.

You clearly haven't learned what actually happens in the microchips behind the systems you claim to have used.

Interrupts don't magically alter the timing of the digital system. Digital logic occurs in discrete vertical slices. That. Is. How. It. Works.

Even if an interrupt somehow drove a cascade of logic, maybe in an older system that wasn't synchronized to a central clock, it would still be a discrete event, the timing of which had no relevance to the timing of any other digital calculation. All that matters to the logic is the order of the cascades. Whether calculation B is halfway between A and C in time, or closer to A, or closer to C, is irrelevant. As long as it happens after A and before C the outcome is identical.

Kind of like ... the "Turing model."

[rocketdodger]

Originally Posted by westprog

Is this a joke? I hope so, because if it's a serious demand, that's just sad.

You see, if A is putting forward a specific claim, and B is saying that it's not well founded, then it's not - really, really not - an option for A to demand that B provide a scientific proof of an alternative to that specific claim. At the very least, the burden of scientific proof lies with the person putting forward a specific claim, not the person saying that a particular claim is unproven, and presenting alternatives as possibilities.

Not at all.

A scientific proof of your claim is as simple as showing in some way that is even remotely formal from a logical perspective that while neurons can support consciousness, for example, simulated neurons cannot.

I don't see the issue there, if you actually have reasons for your arguments it should be easy to just create a formal structure from them.

Originally Posted by westprog

I note, in passing, that there hasn't been the slightest indication of a scientific proof of the computational nature of consciousness.

Other than all the known research, yes, I agree. Not the slightest indication.

For example, the fact that every known internal function of the neuron can be emulated by computation is not the slightest indication.

Neither, for example, is the fact that every known interaction between multiple neurons can be emulated by computation.

[rocketdodger]

Originally Posted by westprog

The assertion about the nature of consciousness is that no physical restrictions apply.

That is simply a lie.

The assertion is that there are physical restrictions limiting the substrate to something that can support computation of a certain complexity.

That is a very well defined restriction, despite your absurd claim that a bowl of soup can compute just as well as IBM's Watson supercomputer. The fact that you are unable to understand this restriction doesn't imply the restriction is not valid, no more than my lack of precise knowledge regarding quantum physics would invalidate the physical restrictions that define what a superconductor is.

[Belz...]

Originally Posted by westprog

Yes, clearly if consciousness is purely computational in nature, then one of its properties is that it can be emulated precisely. However, since the computational nature of consciousness is precisely what is in dispute, the claim has little weight.

I don't see why it's in dispute, and you've done a pretty poor job of explaining it.

[Belz...]

Originally Posted by westprog

Both of us respire - yet we do not share lungs. However, respiration in both our cases is a well defined physical process. Respiration is dependent on a specific physical substrate- in this case, lungs. Any duplication of the physical process of respiration would have to involve a duplication of the essential elements of the lungs.

But not necessarily biological lungs, I'd add.

Quote:

The assertion about the nature of consciousness is that no physical restrictions apply. Any physical substrate is available, and any physical process can apply, with dimensions of space and time being entirely irrelevant.

I don't think anyone is saying that. The contention that a biological brain is required, however, has been uttered more than once.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by Belz...

I don't see why it's in dispute,

Because it's an unproven hypothesis. Some very clever, educated people think the hypothesis is true, and some other very clever, educated people think it's false or unproven.

Quote:

and you've done a pretty poor job of explaining it.

Maybe you've done a pretty poor job of understanding it.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by Belz...

But not necessarily biological lungs, I'd add.

One could produce an overly-restrictive definition of respiration that would require biological lungs, but that would lead to less rather than more understanding of the phenomenon.

Quote:

I don't think anyone is saying that. The contention that a biological brain is required, however, has been uttered more than once.

By whom? On this thread?

[Irony]

Originally Posted by westprog

The computational theories claim that consciousness is entirely independent of any possible physical substrate. Consciousness would be created by computation done with colliding asteroids or packs of cards in exactly the same way. There is nothing happening in the brain which creates consciousness which is inherent to it.

This is obviously entirely different to any other biological process, and is clearly not physical in the same sense as, say, respiration.

The alternative to this is to assume that consciousness is tied to some specific action of the brain, in the same way that respiration is tied to the passage of oxygen atoms through the lungs.

Good to see your knowledge of respiration is on par with your knowledge of computation.

Fish respirate. Insects respirate. Plants respirate. None of these have lungs.

[Wowbagger]

Originally Posted by AlBell

I'll join westprog in pointing out that emulation on a computer does not equal, or even imply, replication vis-a-vis consciousness or any IRL event.

Here is a thought experiment I once wrote up for another thread, that I think is relevant, here. ( http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=7639678 ) Unfortunately, it will take a few paragraphs to explain.

You can replace the word "sentience" with "consciousness" or "qualia" or whatever other term you need.

Let us suppose that scientists actually discover what sentience actually is: The whole process by which it happens, etc. For this exercise, the exact details are not important, for us. But, we can feel free to speculate on a general approach: There might be a mechanism by which small amounts of chaos are introduced into a neural network, allowing for fleeting moments of independent action (seemingly random to outside parties). That, plus other well-studied ingredients might all be what is necessary for a complete working sentient entity. I will call it the MB-Trouble Algorithm, since it was inspired by the pop-up dice dome in that board game. It is important to emphasize that ALL of the details are known in the universe of this experiment, even if they are not all known to us readers.

In the same universe as this thought experiment, there are humans who (for whatever reason) volunteered to allow their brains to be manipulated, to test the MB-Trouble model. The exact physiological structures are discovered, and messed with in the lab. And, every time it happens: Sentience fails in that human in precisely the way the model would predict. Pulling on one thing causes them to act more like a chat bot, with no actual understanding of what is going on. Pushing on another causes them to behave more like a Chinese room: They might have in internal understanding of things, but much of their communication is clearly done without it. We can assume the experimental protocols are solid. So, they know it is a good model that applies to human sentience. (See my ideas for testing sentience in a prior post.)

Now comes the grand day, when they simulate this MB-Trouble Algorithm in a computer system. Remember that they are ONLY building a MODEL of MB-Trouble. They are not emulating every single molecule of every single cell of every single neural process, etc. They aim only to simulate its principal ingredients: an abstraction of the chaos-inducer, plus all the other necessary ingredients I could not actually name, yet.

And, in this universe, the Algorithm works as predicted: The simulation is able to pass any and all tests for sentience you could name: Turing tests, mirror-recognition tests, novel problem solving skills, random number choosing, etc. And, of course, when the simulation happens to be broken in one spot, it fails the same way humans did, when that part was broken in their brains.

In this thought experiment there is NO DOUBT we have simulated the VERY THING that makes "understanding", "meaning" , "semantics", "sentience", "qualia", "consciousness" and "strong intelligence" actually happen.

What, then, is the difference between this simulation of sentience, and that which is found in natural, organic humans?!

Originally Posted by AlBell

It's also getting laughable that the claim any Turing machine can do it, then admitting Turing machines do not and cannot exist; yes, universal computing machines are an IRL implementation of a theoretical Turing machine.

I know Universal Computing Machines are an implementation of Turing Machines. (To me, the words are practically synonymous.) But, since other people took issue with the word "Turing", and this thread isn't about "Turing", I decided to pick my battles and move on to other things to say about the topic of the opening post.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by rocketdodger

Note that this isn't even necessarily an issue because if certain physical postulates are correct the universe operates at a discrete timescale and spatial scale anyway, which would imply that all of known reality can be described using the "Turing" model of which you speak.

Originally Posted by rocketdodger

That is simply a lie.

The assertion is that there are physical restrictions limiting the substrate to something that can support computation of a certain complexity.

That is a very well defined restriction, despite your absurd claim that a bowl of soup can compute just as well as IBM's Watson supercomputer. The fact that you are unable to understand this restriction doesn't imply the restriction is not valid, no more than my lack of precise knowledge regarding quantum physics would invalidate the physical restrictions that define what a superconductor is.

Is it just me, or are there two contrary assertions here?

Yes, it would be possible to at least try to model a bowl of soup as a Turing machine, but it would be a pointless thing to do. The model is inappropriate and unhelpful. The fact that one can apply a model doesn't mean that we learn anything by doing so.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by Wowbagger

Here is a thought experiment I once wrote up for another thread, that I think is relevant, here. ( http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=7639678 ) Unfortunately, it will take a few paragraphs to explain.

You can replace the word "sentience" with "consciousness" or "qualia" or whatever other term you need.

Let us suppose that scientists actually discover what sentience actually is: The whole process by which it happens, etc. For this exercise, the exact details are not important, for us. But, we can feel free to speculate on a general approach: There might be a mechanism by which small amounts of chaos are introduced into a neural network, allowing for fleeting moments of independent action (seemingly random to outside parties). That, plus other well-studied ingredients might all be what is necessary for a complete working sentient entity. I will call it the MB-Trouble Algorithm, since it was inspired by the pop-up dice dome in that board game. It is important to emphasize that ALL of the details are known in the universe of this experiment, even if they are not all known to us readers.

In the same universe as this thought experiment, there are humans who (for whatever reason) volunteered to allow their brains to be manipulated, to test the MB-Trouble model. The exact physiological structures are discovered, and messed with in the lab. And, every time it happens: Sentience fails in that human in precisely the way the model would predict. Pulling on one thing causes them to act more like a chat bot, with no actual understanding of what is going on. Pushing on another causes them to behave more like a Chinese room: They might have in internal understanding of things, but much of their communication is clearly done without it. We can assume the experimental protocols are solid. So, they know it is a good model that applies to human sentience. (See my ideas for testing sentience in a prior post.)

Now comes the grand day, when they simulate this MB-Trouble Algorithm in a computer system. Remember that they are ONLY building a MODEL of MB-Trouble. They are not emulating every single molecule of every single cell of every single neural process, etc. They aim only to simulate its principal ingredients: an abstraction of the chaos-inducer, plus all the other necessary ingredients I could not actually name, yet.

And, in this universe, the Algorithm works as predicted: The simulation is able to pass any and all tests for sentience you could name: Turing tests, mirror-recognition tests, novel problem solving skills, random number choosing, etc. And, of course, when the simulation happens to be broken in one spot, it fails the same way humans did, when that part was broken in their brains.

In this thought experiment there is NO DOUBT we have simulated the VERY THING that makes "understanding", "meaning" , "semantics", "sentience", "qualia", "consciousness" and "strong intelligence" actually happen.

What, then, is the difference between this simulation of sentience, and that which is found in natural, organic humans?!

I know Universal Computing Machines are an implementation of Turing Machines. (To me, the words are practically synonymous.) But, since other people took issue with the word "Turing", and this thread isn't about "Turing", I decided to pick my battles and move on to other things to say about the topic of the opening post.

Whether or not such a system would have the same subjective experience as a human being is still open - but it would certainly be evidence in its favour. Would it also be evidence if such a project were undertaken, and despite huge resources being allocated, it failed to pass the assorted tests for sentience? Would such a result affect anyone's confidence that sentience was in fact computational?

[westprog]

Originally Posted by Irony

Good to see your knowledge of respiration is on par with your knowledge of computation.

Fish respirate. Insects respirate. Plants respirate. None of these have lungs.

Which of course in no way invalidates the analogy, but I'm sure it gives you a nice well-informed glow. "Hey, I made an irrelevant point on the Internet and threw in a gratuitous insult." "High five, dude!"

[rocketdodger]

Originally Posted by westprog

Is it just me, or are there two contrary assertions here?

A system modeled/described/emulated by computations is not a system that is itself performing computations.

No more than you are performing particle interactions because the particles that make you up are interacting.

Originally Posted by westprog

Yes, it would be possible to at least try to model a bowl of soup as a Turing machine, but it would be a pointless thing to do. The model is inappropriate and unhelpful. The fact that one can apply a model doesn't mean that we learn anything by doing so.

Except if the model itself has something to say about it. Which is rather the point in this context -- if a model of a consciousness is claiming it is conscious, what do you do?

[rocketdodger]

Originally Posted by westprog

Whether or not such a system would have the same subjective experience as a human being is still open - but it would certainly be evidence in its favour. Would it also be evidence if such a project were undertaken, and despite huge resources being allocated, it failed to pass the assorted tests for sentience? Would such a result affect anyone's confidence that sentience was in fact computational?

Of course.

But that hasn't happened yet.

You seem to think the rather pathetic attempts of the last 30 years constitute "huge resources."

Here is a hint: despite what people may tell the press, no computer science researcher has thus far seriously considered any of these attempts to be even remotely close to what is needed to actually do the job.

[Wowbagger]

Originally Posted by westprog

Would it also be evidence if such a project were undertaken, and despite huge resources being allocated, it failed to pass the assorted tests for sentience? Would such a result affect anyone's confidence that sentience was in fact computational?

It would certainly cause everyone in that Universe to rethink the idea, at the very least.

The reasons for the failure would have to be ironed out. If it turns out that they discover some aspect of sentience that can never be computed (which seems absurd, but we can roll with it for the sake of argument), then they would have to announce, definitively, that sentience could not be computational.

But, unless such a thing were found, I imagine the people in that Universe would continue marching on, trying to figure out how to get the computations to work.

[AlBell]

Originally Posted by Leumas

Pebbles are not BIOLOGICAL things and thus they require a motivator. Biological things move and grow and are ACTIVE PROCESSES in and of themselves (due to active chemical and electrical engines).

A human brain is a HUMONGOUS biological PROCESS that acts and reacts on its intertwined parts with side-effects and due to muscles there are also side-effects on the environment outside the brain bundle which in turn cause environmental changes that cause effects and side-effects on the brain bundle.

These POSITIVE and NEGATIVE FEEDBACK effects can cause cascading and diverging as well as stable and unstable loops and sub-loops and the whole thing becomes a mess of DYNAMIC CONSTRAINTS.

Yup.

Quote:

So the human brain does NOT require a MOTIVATOR let alone one with a consciousness for us to inherit from.

I did not mention human brain; I did mention sentient entity. Please re-read what you responded to. I would appreciate an on-point answer as to where in the pebble scenario consciousness is found, since I'm confident we agree pebbles are neither sentient nor conscious and in fact will never become so.

[AlBell]

Originally Posted by PixyMisa

No, that's not correct, and this is a very important point:

http://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/a_bunch_of_rocks.png

(XKCD by Randal Schwartz. Sharing and hotlinking expressly permitted under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 License.)

Mmmkay. Now, how about an answer to my question?

[Irony]

Originally Posted by westprog

Which of course in no way invalidates the analogy, but I'm sure it gives you a nice well-informed glow. "Hey, I made an irrelevant point on the Internet and threw in a gratuitous insult." "High five, dude!"

Of course it doesn't invalidate the analogy. In fact, it improves it. Like you said, consciousness is tied to the brain like respiration is tied to lungs; they aren't necessary.

Cue you complaining about how I just said everything can respirate because you can't distinguish between "X is not necessary" and "no medium whatsoever is necessary".

[westprog]

Originally Posted by rocketdodger

You seem to think

What would make this trot along more smoothly is if we concentrated on what people say, not what they "seem to think".

WB gave a fairly clear hypothetical example, and as is usual in these discussions, proposed certain conclusions consequent on a particular outcome. I pointed out that if we are to consider one particular outcome, we should also consider the contrary. There was no implication that all the resources of the Artificial Intelligence community have been fruitlessly exhausted.

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by AlBell

I'll join westprog in pointing out that emulation on a computer does not equal, or even imply, replication vis-a-vis consciousness or any IRL event.

Originally Posted by westprog

How can something appear to be consciousness without being consciousness?

Quote:

It's also getting laughable that the claim any Turing machine can do it, then admitting Turing machines do not and cannot exist; yes, universal computing machines are an IRL implementation of a theoretical Turing machine.

You seem confused.

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by westprog

No real time system performing monitoring and control can be modelled as a Turing machine.

Mathematics for this theorem, please.

Now.

Quote:

(That is not to say that it cannot be emulated as a computation - an entirely different matter).

Mathematics for this theorem too, please.

Quote:

What is going on is not computation, and treating it as such is not useful or helpful.

And this one.

Quote:

Many real time control systems have a negligible compuational element. Sometimes the response required is a simple as opening a valve when an indicator exceeds a particular value. Modelling such an interaction with a programming language - like PASCAL, say - which uses the Turing model is not possible.

And this one.

Quote:

In order to perform such operations, languages need to add in features such as interrupts and pauses which are extraneous to that model.

And this one.

Quote:

This also means - and this is the critical, essential element - that it is not possible to make assumptions about the behaviour of the realtime system based on reasoning using the Turing model.

And this one.

Westprog, please refrain from making any further bizarre claims until you have established or retracted your existing list of bizarre claims.

[Minoosh]

Well, gosh, another long consciousness thread and since it's current here I am proposing a theory about theories of consciousness.

I'm equally dubious about the AI/"emergent"/complexity model and the vague notion that quantum, non-algorithmic processes are somehow involved, so I'm fairly neutral.

OK, now my theory-of-theory, or at least something I wondered about, based on things like Schrodinger's cat ... we tend to go deep talking about human consciousness, and maybe engage in some species-centric solipsism by supposing a soon-to-be-poisoned cat is not itself conscious. It made me wonder ... is anybody looking at animal consciousness? Doggy qualia? You live with an intelligent animal, you observe it, and it seems obvious that such an animal has subjective interior experiences and perhaps a degree of self-awareness. Yet those conjuring up Platonic realms seem to be talking strictly about humans. My theory is that theorists in the quantum models dismiss animal consciousness, that it "doesn't count." This in turn may lend credence to the AI-type theories. Like I said I'm not sold on either, but I think if the cat is poisoned, it's either dead or alive before a human observer collapses the quantum wavefunction.

[PixyMisa]

There's a lot of research going on in animal neuroscience - partly because cutting people's heads open and sticking electrodes in them is frowned upon these days. (And even so, it's important to always mount a scratch monkey.)

The quantum consciousness guys don't really do research, they just write books.

[Minoosh]

Originally Posted by PixyMisa

(And even so, it's important to always mount a scratch monkey.)

That sounds vaguely obscene.

Originally Posted by PixyMisa

The quantum consciousness guys don't really do research, they just write books.

And cynically I'd say, isn't it convenient that the theories don't currently lend themselves to research. I still think there's room for speculative thinking within the framework of an informed view of quantum mechanics. And the latter is where many/most of the theorists are out of their depth.

Yet still, I think our minds may really be the result of something other than classical computing. I can't really explain why. It could be I have a desire to not be a machine. On the other hand being a machine could be a nice life - if something goes flooey, IT can fix it.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by Irony

Of course it doesn't invalidate the analogy. In fact, it improves it. Like you said, consciousness is tied to the brain like respiration is tied to lungs; they aren't necessary.

Cue you complaining about how I just said everything can respirate because you can't distinguish between "X is not necessary" and "no medium whatsoever is necessary".

The essential point - which I have reiterated, and will state again - is that respiration, whether using gills, lungs or whatever - is a physically well defined process. We can't do respiration by using silicon instead of oxygen, or by interpretive dance.

There are no* physical restrictions on computation. I suspect that the Chinese Room was an effort to find the most ludicrous method of producing consciousness, but there is apparently no limit to what can be considered a computation. Elements that have no physical connection can be considered a computation. If a pattern can be deduced (or could theoretically be deduced by some possible encoding scheme) then the subjective experience of consciousness will be produced. There doesn't seem to be any location where this happens, or time when it takes place, in any clearly defined way. We could do a computation with interpretive dance.


*Beyond the simple requirement of enough complexity in the system to reflect the computation. (It seems to be State The Obvious Day every day).

[tsig]

Originally Posted by westprog

All the biological processes in the body are connected with specific physical processes.

Of course computation has to be done with some kind of physical activity. However, it is not linked with any specific physical process. If the generation of consciousness is indeed a matter of computation, then it is unique as a biological function in that it is not tied to anything specific. In particular, it is entirely unfocused in time and space. There is no location for the computation. There is no physical definition of what, precisely, is going on. There is no practical way to determine what in fact constitutes a computation, and physically, either computations are happening all the time, everywhere, or they aren't happening at all.

If we are dealing with a well-defined, well-understood phenomenon like respiration, we know where it happens, how it happens, and we can duplicate all the processes artificially. There is a physical theory of what happens.

To claim that because something is associated with a set of events that happen somewhere in the universe, that it constitutes a physical theory seems to me to stretch the concept beyond the point of usefulness.

Computations are happening everywhere, all the time?

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by westprog

There are no* physical restrictions on computation.

*Beyond the simple requirement of enough complexity in the system to reflect the computation. (It seems to be State The Obvious Day every day).

And the organisation of the system. And quantum mechanics, and thermodynamics.

So when you say "There are no physical restrictions on computation.", you mean "There are physical restrictions on computation."

Which is, I'm sure you'll agree, a different statement.

Quote:

I suspect that the Chinese Room was an effort to find the most ludicrous method of producing consciousness

It was a reductio ad absurdum argument. One that failed - because such an argument requires you to establish a contradiction, not merely reach a conclusion you dislike.

Quote:

but there is apparently no limit to what can be considered a computation.

Because computation is defined functionally.

Quote:

We could do a computation with interpretive dance.

So?

[tsig]

Originally Posted by Wowbagger

Here is a thought experiment I once wrote up for another thread, that I think is relevant, here. ( http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=7639678 ) Unfortunately, it will take a few paragraphs to explain.

You can replace the word "sentience" with "consciousness" or "qualia" or whatever other term you need.

Let us suppose that scientists actually discover what sentience actually is: The whole process by which it happens, etc. For this exercise, the exact details are not important, for us. But, we can feel free to speculate on a general approach: There might be a mechanism by which small amounts of chaos are introduced into a neural network, allowing for fleeting moments of independent action (seemingly random to outside parties). That, plus other well-studied ingredients might all be what is necessary for a complete working sentient entity. I will call it the MB-Trouble Algorithm, since it was inspired by the pop-up dice dome in that board game. It is important to emphasize that ALL of the details are known in the universe of this experiment, even if they are not all known to us readers.

In the same universe as this thought experiment, there are humans who (for whatever reason) volunteered to allow their brains to be manipulated, to test the MB-Trouble model. The exact physiological structures are discovered, and messed with in the lab. And, every time it happens: Sentience fails in that human in precisely the way the model would predict. Pulling on one thing causes them to act more like a chat bot, with no actual understanding of what is going on. Pushing on another causes them to behave more like a Chinese room: They might have in internal understanding of things, but much of their communication is clearly done without it. We can assume the experimental protocols are solid. So, they know it is a good model that applies to human sentience. (See my ideas for testing sentience in a prior post.)

Now comes the grand day, when they simulate this MB-Trouble Algorithm in a computer system. Remember that they are ONLY building a MODEL of MB-Trouble. They are not emulating every single molecule of every single cell of every single neural process, etc. They aim only to simulate its principal ingredients: an abstraction of the chaos-inducer, plus all the other necessary ingredients I could not actually name, yet.

And, in this universe, the Algorithm works as predicted: The simulation is able to pass any and all tests for sentience you could name: Turing tests, mirror-recognition tests, novel problem solving skills, random number choosing, etc. And, of course, when the simulation happens to be broken in one spot, it fails the same way humans did, when that part was broken in their brains.

In this thought experiment there is NO DOUBT we have simulated the VERY THING that makes "understanding", "meaning" , "semantics", "sentience", "qualia", "consciousness" and "strong intelligence" actually happen.

What, then, is the difference between this simulation of sentience, and that which is found in natural, organic humans?!

I know Universal Computing Machines are an implementation of Turing Machines. (To me, the words are practically synonymous.) But, since other people took issue with the word "Turing", and this thread isn't about "Turing", I decided to pick my battles and move on to other things to say about the topic of the opening post.

It's a simulation.

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by Minoosh

That sounds vaguely obscene.

The story behind it is actually rather tragic: http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/S/scratch-monkey.html

[westprog]

Originally Posted by tsig

Computations are happening everywhere, all the time?

Well, if computations can be done by means of a Chinese room, or a row of pebbles - then they exist in all possible patterns, everywhere.

There is a tendency to describe a computation as something done wittingly by a conscious mind. That's how I would prefer to describe it, but clearly you can't have consciousness creating computation and computations creating consciousness.

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by westprog

Well, if computations can be done by means of a Chinese room, or a row of pebbles - then they exist in all possible patterns, everywhere.

Please show the mathematics for this theorem.

Quote:

There is a tendency to describe a computation as something done wittingly by a conscious mind. That's how I would prefer to describe it

Why?

Quote:

but clearly you can't have consciousness creating computation and computations creating consciousness.

Why not?

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by westprog

Well, if computations can be done by means of a Chinese room, or a row of pebbles

And also: The computations aren't done by the room, or the pebbles. Computations are done using the room, or the peoples.

The room and the pebbles are datastores without a processor.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by rocketdodger

Except if the model itself has something to say about it. Which is rather the point in this context -- if a model of a consciousness is claiming it is conscious, what do you do?

If, if, if. What if it insists that it isn't conscious? I'm inclined to make my judgement when it happens, not based on made up cases.

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by westprog

If, if, if. What if it insists that it isn't conscious?

Then it's conscious.

[!Kaggen]

bump

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

Originally Posted by PixyMisa

Any system that can perform calculations and select what calculations to perform.

That does not seem a very useful definition since to calculate and to compute are pretty much synonymous. Saying a computer is something that computes is pretty redundant although I can see how it would be a useful definition for your purposes

[PixyMisa]

Originally Posted by !Kaggen

That does not seem a very useful definition since to calculate and to compute are pretty much synonymous.

No. Wrong.

Any system that can perform calculations and select what calculations to perform.

Quote:

Saying a computer is something that computes is pretty redundant although I can see how it would be a useful definition for your purposes

No. Wrong.

[!Kaggen]

Originally Posted by PixyMisa

No. Wrong.

Any system that can perform calculations and select what calculations to perform.


No. Wrong.

Wait a bit.

Before we get onto the self-referencing you want to add to the definition of a computer lets agree that the terms compute and calculate are synonymous.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/compute

Quote:

com·pute
   [kuhm-pyoot] Show IPA verb, -put·ed, -put·ing, noun
verb (used with object)
1.
to determine by calculation; reckon; calculate: to compute the period of Jupiter's revolution.
2.
to determine by using a computer or calculator.
verb (used without object)
3.
to reckon; calculate.
4.
to use a computer or calculator.
5.
Informal . to make sense; add up: His reasons for doing that just don't compute.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/calculate

Quote:

cal·cu·late
   [kal-kyuh-leyt] Show IPA verb, -lat·ed, -lat·ing.
verb (used with object)
1.
to determine or ascertain by mathematical methods; compute: to calculate the velocity of light.
2.
to determine by reasoning, common sense, or practical experience; estimate; evaluate; gauge.
3.
to make suitable or fit for a purpose; adapt (usually used passively and with an infinitive): His remarks were calculated to inspire our confidence.
4.
Chiefly Northern U.S.
a.
to think; guess.
b.
to intend; plan.

and more

http://thesaurus.com/browse/compute

now

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/computer

Quote:

com·put·er
   [kuhm-pyoo-ter] Show IPA
noun
1.
Also called processor. an electronic device designed to accept data, perform prescribed mathematical and logical operations at high speed, and display the results of these operations. Compare analog computer, digital computer.
2.
a person who computes; computist.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer

Quote:

A computer is a programmable machine designed to automatically carry out a sequence of arithmetic or logical operations

I don't see any reference to self-referencing or your new terminology and select what calculations to perform in these definitions of computers. Is the emphasis supposed to make it more applicable?


Oh wait...I see what your trying to do

You want to define a computer as a self-referential information processor so that if you define a brain as a self-referential information processor then it follows that the brain is a computer.

Neat