Explain consciousness to the layman.

[Toontown]

Wow. After 122 pages, we have been imbued with the knowledge that conscousness (whatever it is) is computational in nature.

Well. At least consciousness isn't something that randomly stumbles about like a drunk, but behaves systematically.

But we already knew that.

Looks like the layman has demanded too much this time.

[Leumas]

Originally Posted by Toontown

Wow. After 122 pages, we have been imbued with the knowledge that conscousness (whatever it is) is computational in nature.

Well. At least consciousness isn't something that randomly stumbles about like a drunk, but behaves systematically.

But we already knew that.

Looks like the layman has demanded too much this time.

Which is as simplistic an explanation as saying life is carbon based.

Saying life is carbon based is as useless an assertion when it comes to explaining the cause for why things are alive as it is to say that consciousness is computation based to explain why things are conscious..

What is even more simplistic is to assert that the cause for consciousness is computation and consciousness is no more than some computation.....just like we would consider the assertion that the cause for life is carbon and carbon is life.

The operational definition that carbon is the basis of life and thus is the cause of life leads one to conclude that a lump of charcoal is alive.....that would be monumentally simplistic and useless.

Likewise the operational definition that computation is the basis of consciousness and thus is the cause of consciousness may lead one to conclude that a calculator is conscious.....that would be monumentally simplistic and useless.

[doronshadmi]

Here is a quote taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computation :

"Computation is any type of calculation[1] or the use of computer technology in Information processing.[2][3] Computation is a process following a well-defined model understood and expressed in an algorithm, protocol, network topology, etc. Computation is also a major subject matter of computer science: it investigates what can or cannot be done in a computational manner."

X = computational manner

Can X be used in order to well-define in details what is NOT-X?

Is there a model of computation which allows well-defined models to be changed during computation, and if not, can we conclude that any well-defined model is some kind of filter or restriction, which has direct or indirect influence on the predictable results?

[keyfeatures]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

X = computational manner

Can X be used in order to well-define in details what is NOT-X?

I'd say no. Can X even be defined without being able to define NOT-X? Such a contradiction appears at the heart of all distinction-making. How can you have a thing / not-thing when the relative complement is unknown (and therefore so is the initial set). Division becomes arbitrary. Logic circular.

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

rocketdodger and dlorde do you think that computational means that our brain is after all predictable?

If you mean the observable functioning of our brain, i.e. our behaviour, then no, being computational doesn't necessarily imply predictability; there is a complexity problem - we can't know the initial state and connectivity, nor map all the inputs precisely enough to predict what it will do. There is also the chaos problem - parts of the brain apparently function chaotically, and it is often said (I'm not sure how accurately) that the whole brain operates on the edge of chaos; if there is any chaotic function involved, there will be inherent unpredictability.

Having said that, for obvious reasons our gross behaviour is fairly predictable most of the time.

Quote:

Furthermore, do you think that our brain is a part of determinist reality, such that uncertainty, creativity, free will etc... are no more than illusions?

I think QM has quashed the idea of a fundamentally deterministic reality, but if we assume that this is statistically averaged out to deterministic equivalence at the macro levels of cells and above, then I think one could take a deterministic viewpoint. If not, then we need to make some allowance for stochastic 'interference'.

But whether reality is deterministic or stochastic, uncertainty, creativity, and free will are abstractions, human constructs. They exist as interpretations we make of what we perceive of reality. Asking if such an abstraction is an illusion opens a semantic can of worms. Before we can answer that, we need to agree on a clear definition of what we mean by it. Good luck with 'free will'

Quote:

For example, let's assume that activity or inactivity of a given neuron is insignificant, is there a clear way to predict when the given neuron will change its current state?

Neurons are complex and dynamic biological systems, so their responses are not entirely consistent, but if you know the initial state and environment well enough you can predict pretty well how and when it will respond to various stimuli, both in-vitro and in-vivo. A lot of work has been and is being done on this. Google is your friend here.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by dlorde

I see. So what is one to make of Honda's 'Asimo', or Boston Dynamics' 'Big Dog', or any of the hundreds of other robots controlled by computational processing?

They aren't. Simple as that. They use a different model. So does all real-time processing - indeed, all computers, in practice. The Turing model is applicable to certain calculations performed on a computer.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

Hi rocketdodger,

I think that you have missed the idea of the paradigm-shift, in this case, which is:

Input is done during the "ongoing process", which is different than the attempt to include at once the entire environment as an input, before acting.

By this approach the considered system enables to change its decisions and activation according to real-time changes in the environment.

In other words, the system is opened to real-time changes, and enables to be effective, without waiting to infinite amount of input, before it starts to act.

This time please try to get the difference between interactive view of computation (which is the new paradigm) and a function-based transformation of an input to an output (which is the old paradigm):

"According to the interactive view of computation, interaction (com-
munication with the outside world) happens during the computation,
not before or after it. Hence, computation is an ongoing process rather
than a function-based transformation of an input to an output."

The important point is that while one can simulate controlling a robot using computation, it's not possible to actually control it without interactivity. The program used to control a robot is not the same as one that is not time dependent. The implication is that there is functionality in the control of the robot which would not be present in a computation that takes an unrestricted amount of time to complete.

Time-dependence is not the same thing as order dependence.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by dlorde

It's not a definition, it's a description, an explanation.

And it leaves out something about what happens in the neuron. It's an abstraction. The question is - does the abstraction leave out anything important? Does it leave out functionality that is actually part of being human? I think that the example of the robot shows that it does. A neuron doesn't just perform a logical step - it does so within a particular timeframe. A model which ignore this is not complete.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by Belz...

There you go again, labeling what you disagree with as a "faith". Typical.

This is quite amusing, given the cavalcade of accusations that anyone who doesn't follow the computational model is trying to smuggle God in.

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by westprog

Originally Posted by dlorde

... So what is one to make of ... robots controlled by computational processing?

They aren't. Simple as that. They use a different model. So does all real-time processing - indeed, all computers, in practice. The Turing model is applicable to certain calculations performed on a computer.

So all computers, in practice, are not computational?

Phew, well that was easy

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by westprog

And it leaves out something about what happens in the neuron. It's an abstraction. The question is - does the abstraction leave out anything important? Does it leave out functionality that is actually part of being human? I think that the example of the robot shows that it does. A neuron doesn't just perform a logical step - it does so within a particular timeframe. A model which ignore this is not complete.

You are familiar with real-time processing aren't you?

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by dlorde

If you mean the observable functioning of our brain, i.e. our behaviour, then no, being computational doesn't necessarily imply predictability; there is a complexity problem - we can't know the initial state and connectivity, nor map all the inputs precisely enough to predict what it will do. There is also the chaos problem - parts of the brain apparently function chaotically, and it is often said (I'm not sure how accurately) that the whole brain operates on the edge of chaos; if there is any chaotic function involved, there will be inherent unpredictability.

Having said that, for obvious reasons our gross behaviour is fairly predictable most of the time.

I think QM has quashed the idea of a fundamentally deterministic reality, but if we assume that this is statistically averaged out to deterministic equivalence at the macro levels of cells and above, then I think one could take a deterministic viewpoint. If not, then we need to make some allowance for stochastic 'interference'.

But whether reality is deterministic or stochastic, uncertainty, creativity, and free will are abstractions, human constructs. They exist as interpretations we make of what we perceive of reality. Asking if such an abstraction is an illusion opens a semantic can of worms. Before we can answer that, we need to agree on a clear definition of what we mean by it. Good luck with 'free will'


Neurons are complex and dynamic biological systems, so their responses are not entirely consistent, but if you know the initial state and environment well enough you can predict pretty well how and when it will respond to various stimuli, both in-vitro and in-vivo. A lot of work has been and is being done on this. Google is your friend here.

Can I understand from your reply that computation is not well-defined in terms of determinism?

Do you think that your reply is completely closed under computation?

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

Can I understand from your reply that computation is not well-defined in terms of determinism?

I suspect the answer is no you can't; but as I'm not certain what you mean, perhaps you could clarify?

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by keyfeatures

I'd say no. Can X even be defined without being able to define NOT-X? Such a contradiction appears at the heart of all distinction-making. How can you have a thing / not-thing when the relative complement is unknown (and therefore so is the initial set). Division becomes arbitrary. Logic circular.

Do you think that your reply is completely closed under X?

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by dlorde

I suspect the answer is no you can't; but as I'm not certain what you mean, perhaps you could clarify?

I'll try.

Do you think that computation is completely deterministic? ( in this case you disagree with http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-det...Turing_machine )

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by dlorde

both in-vitro and in-vivo.

Do you think that there can be a complete theory of consciousness in terms of in-vivo, or any theory is actually in-vitro since it is based on well-defined rules that are used as filters, which restrict in-vivo into in-vitro, in order to get understandable results?

[keyfeatures]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

Do you think that your reply is completely closed under X?

Well no. NOT X is not X...I think?

So can X be used to determine what is NOT X?

[keyfeatures]

Are human responses to the Wason selection task computational? They certainly aren't logical.

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

Do you think that computation is completely deterministic?

Not necessarily (NDTM). However, it is not clear that an NDTM implementation is feasible, although you could simulate one. So for practical purposes, lets assume it is deterministic. What now?

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

Do you think that there can be a complete theory of consciousness in terms of in-vivo, or any theory is actually in-vitro since it is based on well-defined rules that are used as filters, which restrict in-vivo into in-vitro, in order to get understandable results?

Can there be a complete theory of consciousness? hard to say without a complete definition of consciousness. I can't make sense of the rest of your question.

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by dlorde

Can there be a complete theory of consciousness? hard to say without a complete definition of consciousness. I can't make sense of the rest of your question.

In my question, the term in-vitro is used to describe isolated things, where the term in-vivo is used to describe non-isolated things.

In that case do you think that any given definition actually isolates the researched subject (in that case any attempt to define consciousness restricts the research into in-vitro).

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by dlorde

Not necessarily (NDTM). However, it is not clear that an NDTM implementation is feasible, although you could simulate one. So for practical purposes, lets assume it is deterministic. What now?

Do you think that practical things must be deterministic?

[keyfeatures]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

Do you think that practical things must be deterministic?

I think all things must be deterministic. Even quantum events.

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by keyfeatures

I think all things must be deterministic. Even quantum events.

Why?

[keyfeatures]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

Why?

This for starters.

[Mr. Scott]

Originally Posted by dlorde

Can there be a complete theory of consciousness? hard to say without a complete definition of consciousness. I can't make sense of the rest of your question.

One problem is I don't think there is a single type of consciousness. We can start with rat consciousness, because ours is built on it. I even think different people have different flavors of consciousness, and even the same person goes through different phases of consciousness throughout the day.

Which one do we pick? I don't think they all use the same magic bean.

Chopra says the whole universe is conscious and we all partake in that great universal consciousness. He's so cute.

We need more progress in the biology of how memories are accessed and stored.

But I really think Dennett is closest:

Consciousness Explained
The Magic of Consciousness

[westprog]

Originally Posted by dlorde

So all computers, in practice, are not computational?

If you think about it, obviously they cannot be.

Quote:

Phew, well that was easy

I'm using the definition of "computational" - referring to a Turing machine - that has been used by the computationalists to "prove" that consciousness must be computational in nature. I don't mind a different definition of computation being used, but I object to the definition being deliberately switched around to confuse the argument.

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

.. do you think that any given definition actually isolates the researched subject (in that case any attempt to define consciousness restricts the research into in-vitro).

Sorry, still can't make out what you're asking - perhaps someone else can make it coherent for me?

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

Do you think that practical things must be deterministic?

No.

What is your point with all this?

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by westprog

I'm using the definition of "computational" - referring to a Turing machine - that has been used by the computationalists to "prove" that consciousness must be computational in nature. I don't mind a different definition of computation being used, but I object to the definition being deliberately switched around to confuse the argument.

OK; I don't recall you mentioning this 'computers aren't Turing machines' (or Turing machine equivalent - they obviously can't actually be Turing machines) argument earlier, when we were discussing Turing machines; however, I don't want to go round the Turing machine capability vortex again, so perhaps we should focus on real-world computation, the kind of thing done by the microprocessors we have been talking about for so long.

Are you saying that you believe that a Turing machine equivalent can't support consciousness, but since you also believe that real computers are not Turing machine equivalent, you're open to the possibility that a real computer could support consciousness?

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by dlorde

No.

What is your point with all this?

You wrote: "So for practical purposes, lets assume it is deterministic."

Why should we assume it is deterministic in order to deal with it?

[Belz...]

Originally Posted by Leumas

Which is as simplistic an explanation as saying life is carbon based.

So you agree that consciousness is at least in part computation ?

Quote:

Saying life is carbon based is as useless an assertion when it comes to explaining the cause for why things are alive as it is to say that consciousness is computation based to explain why things are conscious..

Can you propose an alternative explanation that fits the facts ?

[Belz...]

Originally Posted by westprog

This is quite amusing, given the cavalcade of accusations that anyone who doesn't follow the computational model is trying to smuggle God in.

Your tu quoque does not change the fact that you specifically called the opposing viewpoint a faith.

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by keyfeatures

This for starters.

Page 2, right side a the end:

Quote:

"This argument shows that no physical state ג of the
system can be compatible with both of the quantum
states |0> and |+>. If the same can be shown for any
pair of quantum states |Ф₀> and |Ф₁>, then the quantum
state can be inferred uniquely from ג. In this case, the
quantum state is a physical property of the system, and
the statistical view is false."

The current mathematical tools that are used in this article do not express uncertainty in terms of superposition of identities, which is simply a symmetric view of a given system. By this article a physical property of the system is simply the lack of symmetry, which is resulted by certain identities. It does not mean that the symmetric state of superposition of identities is not a physical property of the system.


Page 2, right side a the top:

Quote:

FIG. 1. Two systems are prepared independently. The quantum
state of each, determined by the preparation method, is
either |0> or |+>. The two systems are brought together and
measured. The outcome of the measurement can only depend
on the physical properties of the two systems at the time of
measurement.

There is no clear evidence that two systems of a given realm are completely independent. On the contrary, the ability to know that there are two systems, is possible exactly because they share the same realm, or in other words, they are not completely independent of each other. Once again it is shown how a group of researchers simply exclude themselves as factors of the results.

[keyfeatures]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

Page 2, right side a the end:

The current mathematical tools that are used in this article do not express uncertainty in terms of superposition of identities, which is simply a symmetric view of a given system. By this article a physical property of the system is simply the lack of symmetry, which is resulted by certain identities. It does not mean that the symmetric state of superposition of identities is not a physical property of the system.


Page 2, right side a the top:

There is no clear evidence that two systems of a given realm are completely independent. On the contrary, the ability to know that there are two systems, is possible exactly because they share the same realm, or in other words, they are not completely independent of each other. Once again it is shown how a group of researchers simply exclude themselves as factors of the results.

I don't think they are necessarily excluding themselves as factors of the results. Neither are they ignoring the symmetric state of superposition. Rather it's like a coin toss. The coin has two (likely) states it can land. This is the coin's 'superposition'. Prior to observing the outcome of a toss the coin can be considered to have landed heads/tails with a 50/50 equally smeared probability. However, the action (preparation) of the toss determines which one it's going to be. If the toss was repeated in exactly the same way, the outcome would be exactly the same. Of course there aren't two systems (heads or tails), but there are variations in system that lead to outcome of one of two states. (I'm ignoring the fact that the coin could turn into an elephant or land on its side as either so impossible or improbably as to be insignificant).

Anyway, you didn't answer my question. Can X be used to determine what is NOT X?

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by keyfeatures

I don't think they are necessarily excluding themselves as factors of the results. Neither are they ignoring the symmetric state of superposition.

They exclude their abilities to know that the considered systems actually share the same realm (actually without this sharing no measured results are comparable, in the first place).

The current definition of the term Superposition is not what I define as Superposition of identities. At superposition of identities all identities simultaneously have probability 1, where clear identity is simply the case of simultaneity of a single identity with probability 1.

For example, the expression "AB" means that A and B are not clearly known because both identities simultaneously have probability 1 (notated as 2/1).

On the contrary "A,B" are already two distinguished identities ("A" has 1/1 identity and "B" has 1/1 identity), and by using this fact the standard meaning of superposition is used to determine that each already distinguished 1/1 identity has probability 1/2 to become a given 1/1 result.

Originally Posted by keyfeatures

Anyway, you didn't answer my question. Can X be used to determine what is NOT X?

I thought it was a rhetoric question. X can't be used in order to determine what is NOT-X in details, because by doing that NOT-X is actually X (NOT-X does not exist, in the first place).

[westprog]

Originally Posted by dlorde

OK; I don't recall you mentioning this 'computers aren't Turing machines' (or Turing machine equivalent - they obviously can't actually be Turing machines) argument earlier, when we were discussing Turing machines; however, I don't want to go round the Turing machine capability vortex again, so perhaps we should focus on real-world computation, the kind of thing done by the microprocessors we have been talking about for so long.

Are you saying that you believe that a Turing machine equivalent can't support consciousness, but since you also believe that real computers are not Turing machine equivalent, you're open to the possibility that a real computer could support consciousness?

It's been repeatedly insisted that an actual Turing machine can't be built, and this somehow makes the discussion moot. What we are talking about is a program written according to the Turing model. Plenty of programs are written like this - to perform computations - and they are perfectly useful. Other programs have interactive capabilities - most modern programs, for instance - but their essential function, or at least significant functionality, is in the computation. Other programs, such as those used to control robots, are inherently interactive. What they are doing is different in kind to computation.

If you accept that artificial intelligence/consciousness will necessarily be using programming of the second kind, then it isn't possible to apply reasoning - such as the Church-Turing thesis - that applies only to the second kind.

[westprog]

Originally Posted by Belz...

Your tu quoque does not change the fact that you specifically called the opposing viewpoint a faith.

No, I called your willingness to accept the verdict of people you consider to be experts acting on faith. What would you call it?

[keyfeatures]

Originally Posted by doronshadmi

I thought it was a rhetoric question. X can't be used in order to determine what is NOT-X in details, because by doing that NOT-X is actually X (NOT-X does not exist, in the first place).

I'm not disagreeing with you but it seems that distinctions are usually made that assume their own negation. This is the basis of logical reasoning, no? Without a negation you don't have a distinction.

I'm interested as to why you add "in details". What do you mean by 'details'?

Regarding the NDTM - it still seems pretty deterministic. You still have logical operations - just paraconsistent ones. How could you get a single processor to come up with an outcome (choice) from this? What sort of architecture could make this work in practice? Perhaps it would have to be a little like a beehive where each bee acts as an individual processor and the most persistent overall message wins - with another processor filtering a variety of outputs. Do human brains operate along such lines? Too much paraconsistency (half the 'hive' says this, the other half that) and you get excessive procrastination. There are cases of brain damage, for example, where people have become so 'reasoned' they are unable to make snap decisions because they endlessly weigh up the pros and cons of every action.

[doronshadmi]

Originally Posted by keyfeatures

I'm not disagreeing with you but it seems that distinctions are usually made that assume their own negation. This is the basis of logical reasoning, no? Without a negation you don't have a distinction.

I'm interested as to why you add "in details". What do you mean by 'details'?

Regarding the NDTM - it still seems pretty deterministic. You still have logical operations - just paraconsistent ones. How could you get a single processor to come up with an outcome (choice) from this? What sort of architecture could make this work in practice? Perhaps it would have to be a little like a beehive where each bee acts as an individual processor and the most persistent overall message wins - with another processor filtering a variety of outputs. Do human brains operate along such lines? Too much paraconsistency (half the 'hive' says this, the other half that) and you get excessive procrastination. There are cases of brain damage, for example, where people have become so 'reasoned' they are unable to make snap decisions because they endlessly weigh up the pros and cons of every action.

In my opinion healthy brain is not limited to any particular of case of pros and cons, which enables it still act at any degree of uncertainty and redundancy, as long as it is still "in one piece".

Furthermore, in my opinion, consciousness' development is measured by its ability be an unbroken linkage among simplicity and complexity, under situations (abstract of physical) that are characterized by uncertainty and redundancy.