Must all materialists subscribe to supervenience physicalism as a minimum?

[Z]

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As far as I can tell, epiphenomenalism holds that some class of conscious experiences is causally inefficacious. If that were true, we would not be able to think or talk of that class of experiences, and the concept of epiphenomenalism would never arise.

To dumb it down a bit: a physical event causes a mental event, but that mental event in no way affects anything physical? Well, if that's the case, I agree with Paul entirely. In which case, either a) some immaterial thing can somehow affect material things, or b) the supposed immaterial thing is, in fact, entirely material in nature.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

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Zaayrdragon said:
The key problem I have with a dualist standpoint - including my own - is how does something immaterial affect the material world? How does a 'soul', which has neither measurable mass nor energy, produces no detectable output, etc. in any way affect mass? I suspect, in my own form of dualism, that the soul is a probability-manipulating field which does not, so much, affect matter and energy in any direct sense, but rather the chance that a probability will become manifest... but I think such a position is probably too complex for science at the moment, and too complex for many to even contemplate in any meaningful sense. Certainly, I don't even understand what I'm trying to conceive of here...

This treats a probability as if it some extant thing to be manipulated. I think if you're going to change some probability, you have to do it by manipulating matter and energy.

~~ Paul

[Z]

Quote:

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
This treats a probability as if it some extant thing to be manipulated. I think if you're going to change some probability, you have to do it by manipulating matter and energy.

~~ Paul

See, this is where I tend to get into 'unreal things' vs. 'real things'. Surely, a Probability is merely a concept about the chance of a chaotic event occuring - an unreal thing which, defined in our language, is determined through observation and calculation.

But what if - BIG IF - there exists unreal 'spirits' (for lack of a better word) which cannot manipulate matter and energy, but which can (means unknown - we're discussing unreal things, remember, which means we cannot know in any normal way how they work) affect the chance that a chaotic event occurs. One part of me says that we'll one day understand absolutely everything physical, including such seemingly chaotic things as when a particle is going to decay or what quantum occurance is going to happen - but another part of me thinks that random, chaotic events - and I mean, the really chaotic stuff - is scientifically unknowable. But somehow tied into spirits and such.

Anyway, I realize that, to even contemplate such an idea, I have to toss out rationality and most forms of logic. I generally don't bring this up at all, since it is a matter of faith and intuition, rather than logic and reason. Further, like the issue of absolute free will versus practical free will, I don't think there's over much to be gained from looking for the soul in this manner. Essentially irrelevant, once again. Probably just another gap to hide God in.

But enough thread-hijacking - Apologies to the logical, rational folk of the JREF forum for this tripe.

And a thumb on the nose to the other six of you.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

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Zaayrdragon said:
But enough thread-hijacking - Apologies to the logical, rational folk of the JREF forum for this tripe.

I never have a problem discussing tripe with a reasonable person.

~~ Paul

[csense]

Quote:

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat



Well for one thing, it assumes that what you are calling the "conscious decision" (which is not a decision at all, but rather your feeling of having willfully made a decision), happens instantaneously at some point in time, and that there is nothing more to it than that feeling. Whereas the reality of the situation is that the feeling itself is the result of a complex set of brain processes which begin happening before that time as well. Your conscious feeling of having willfully made the decision is just one small part of a very complex set of brain processes.

Doesn't this beg the question though Stimpy.....

If all states of the mind are physical processes, then either the complex brain processes are acts of the will (conscious decisions, the feeling of) or they are a distinct subset.

If in fact this set of complex brain processes are themselves acts of the will, then in what meaningful way can you say that they are the result of the processes.

What difference does the temporal or spatial relationship of the parts, to each other, have on the concept of any given state of the mind, if that concept can not be further reduced from the set of physical processes that it is.

[69dodge]

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Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Of course a logical proof trumps scientific evidence. Are ya daft??

There couldn't possibly exist any scientific evidence that contradicts a correct logical proof. If it appears that scientific evidence exists which contradicts a logical proof, someone has made a mistake somewhere. It might be the experimentalist, but it might also be the philosopher. Philosophers are not immune to making mistakes, just because what they are attempting to construct are logical proofs rather than scientific theories.

I am reminded of a quote from the famous computer scientist Donald Knuth:<blockquote>Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved it correct, not tried it.</blockquote>Occasional reality checks are a good thing.

[69dodge]

Quote:

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
As far as I can tell, epiphenomenalism holds that some class of conscious experiences is causally inefficacious. If that were true, we would not be able to think or talk of that class of experiences, and the concept of epiphenomenalism would never arise.

I don't understand this argument.

A computer can say, "I have conscious experiences." It doesn't have them, of course, but it can still say it does. If it doesn't have conscious experiences at all, it certainly doesn't have causally efficacious ones.

I also say, "I have conscious experiences." How can you conclude from this that my conscious experiences are causally efficacious?

I'm not sure I even understand what "causally efficacious" means. All we see, really, is what happens. Who knows what causes what? What does "cause" mean? It's just shorthand for "is always followed by, in all situations we've ever looked at."

If a certain conscious experience is always correlated with a certain brain process, it doesn't really matter whether we say that subsequent events are caused by the conscious experience or by the brain process. Everything is the same either way, because the two always go together. I guess this is what Stimpy means when he says that the conscious experience is the brain process.

That seems to be stretching the meaning of the word "is" a bit, though. We'd like to be able to talk about experiences and also separately about brain processes (even if only to say things like "they're really the same"), because they are, at the very least, not obviously the same. (Ian would say, "obviously not the same." Which is not the same thing. )

So what's wrong with saying, there are brain process and there are conscious experiences and they always go together in certain ways? Subsequent brain processes can be thought of as being caused by previous brain processes, and the conscious experiences are just along for the ride, so to speak. Is this epiphenomenalism? What's incoherent about it?

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Eleatic Stranger,

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I am truly puzzled as how to you could ask this question, when I clearly answered it in the paragraph you quoted. What I mean by the scientific method working is that it consistently produces reliable predictions about future observations. Determining that your observations do or do not match what a scientific theory says they should be, does not require that you accept any of the assumptions of science as being true.
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Ok, and why is that what constitutes the scientific method working,

Impossible to determine for certain. It could be because the axioms of science are actually correct, and it could be because they are false, but whatever the truth is gives the same results anyway. The same goes for all scientific theories. One can always construct alternative possible explanations for why the theory works. That is why we talk about "scientific evidence" which "supports" a theory, rather than "scientific proof" which "proves" a theory.

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and what, exactly, constitutes a reliable prediction? Please answer in the form of a proposition testable by means of scientific experimentation.

Example: If I put x grams of NaOH into y grams of water, z calories of heat will be produced.

Frankly I am rather shocked that you would even require such an example.

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The scientific method is an epistemological method. Non-evidentiary grounds only come into play when you begin making metaphysical interpretations of scientific theories. Unfortunately, many people don't understand the difference between a scientific theory, and a metaphysical interpretation of a scientific theory.
Dr. Stupid
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And again I must refer you to the point I've made multiple times above - any epistemic theory involves a set of metaphysical assumptions. You can certainly argue that they're very obvious metaphysical assumptions that no one sensible would ever question, but that does not mean they aren't there. You could possibly even argue that the success of science provides a valid reason to believe those metaphysical assumptions (though doing so is a trifle risky, argumentatively speaking). Even a pure instrumentalist has to accept certain metaphysical assumptions in their epistemology - the virtue of instrumentalism is that those metaphysical assumptions turn out to be really, really minimal.

OK, so what are they? Or maybe you are just using the term "metaphysical" differently then I am here, namely in a way that overlaps "epistemological"?


Zaaydragon,

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I do have to agree with you on this point... Science is founded, in part, on the assumption that what is there is real, that what the senses tell us is reasonably representative of what is occuring, that things behave in predictable ways due to standardized influences, etc. Astronomy, for example, largely relies on assuming that the relationship between gravity and mass remains consistent; biology relies on the assumption that certain processes are vital for life function; chemistry on the certainty of certain actions, reactions, and mathematical relationships. Most of science relies on the language of mathematics remaining consistent. Now, demonstrably, these things remain largely true; and to attempt to conduct any kind of reasonable understanding of the world without relying on some assumed constants is nearly impossible; yet these are, at the core, metaphysical positions that are held in order for science to function properly.

Those are not all metaphysical assumptions, and I would never be so foolish as to suggest that the scientific method is not based on philosophical assumptions. But I see your point now. You are talking about something different than I am.

Natural philosophy (ie the philosophy of science), has historically involved all sorts of metaphysical assumptions. The philosophy of science includes both metaphysics and epistemology. But I am talking about the scientific method. The scientific method is en epistemological methodology for accumulating knowledge. It is derived from scientific epistemology, which is a part of natural philosophy. The other part of natural philosophy is the metaphysical interpretation part, which I referred to before. That is an aspect of the philosophy of science, but it is not a part of the scientific method. It is not necessary to derive the scientific method (only the epistemology part it), and it does not necessarily have to be a part of any specific philosophical worldview which includes scientific epistemology.


[b]Ian,[b]

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Sorry, but I'm afraid that's not good enough. I will not put up with a response simply saying that all my arguments are either fallacious or intuitive, and adding nothing to this. You need to actual address the points I make. If you think my points are based on intuition, you need to carefully spell this out, not simply content yourself by simply saying it. All it tells me is that you do not know how to address my arguments. This being so, please desist in your facile responses. Failure to comply will result in me putting you on ignore. Do I make myself clear?

I did address your arguments, in detail. And quite frankly, I do not think that I could possibly care less if you put me on ignore.

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Actually, I would be very surprised if you knew how to even begin to prove that 1 + 1 = 2.
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Then prepare to be surprised. 1 + 1 = 2 because it is defined to be so.

Wrong again, but thanks for playing.

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Not only does the above intrinsically assume that the brain activity and conscious awareness are completely distinct things,
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Get it through your head; in order to call 2 events one and the same event, they have to coincide in space and time. Not if one occurs 0.5 secs after the other (and indeed has nothing at all in commonality with the prior event to boot). We are talking about a causal relationship here; not one of identity or supervenience.

The awareness happens after the muscle movement is initiated. That does not mean that it is not part of the set of brain processes which initiated the muscle movement. It just means that the initiation of the muscle movement is not the last step in the process. Like I said before, your preconceptions about what is going on are completely biasing the way you think about the problem.

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but it assumes that your phenomenal experience of feeling like you have made a decision, is the actual decision making process, rather than a response to it.
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The phenomenal experience is the conscious apprehension of having made a decision. Apparently, according to the experiment, it is not the actual event which makes the decision - it only feels it is; indeed we experience it as being so.

Right. It is the feeling that we have made a decision, and not the actual making of the decision itself. Why should that be so hard to accept? Why should it be surprising that the feeling that we have made a decision does not come until after the decision was made? This is not at all surprising, since physical processes do not occur instantaneously.

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II
It demonstrates no such thing. I have provided a philosophical proof which dictates we cannot take this experimental result as a refutation of free will seriously.

Stimp
You have done no such thing, although I do not doubt that you think you have. The fact is that you would not recognize a formal logical proof if one was presented to you.
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It is a logical proof albeit not a formal one. Please explain any defects with my reasoning and cut out the insults.

I already did. Pointing out that your "proof" depends on assumptions which have not been justified, refutes your proof. Your response to this was to declare that those assumptions are obviosly true, and that anybody who disagrees with them is insane. You do not even recognize that those assumptions are based entirely on your intuitive preconceptions, because you don't understand the distinction between logical and intuitive reasoning.

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II
No, the decision is made by your thoughts. However according to the implications of the experiment, contrary to appearances this decision is actually wholly caused by a previous event in the brain.

Stimp
Again, you do not even seem to be aware of how utterly biased by your intuitive preconceptions this is. Your very argument presupposes that your thoughts are not brain events.
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But the experiment which we discussing necessitates they are not. The brain event occurs 0.5 secs before the mental event. Therefore they cannot be one and the same event! What don't you understand about this??

You just confirmed my point. Did it ever occur to you that what we are talking about are complex brain processes, not discrete events? And that both the decision making process, and the "mental event" that comes later, are different parts of the same complex brain process?

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If you had any conception of complex computational systems, and in particular feedback loops, this would not strike you as strange at all.
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Let's skip the unsubstantiated assertions huh? You honestly believe it doesn't seem strange that I make the decision to act after the brain events which decides(b) not to perform the action after all? Dear me! And yet, according to you, my decision to act is one and the same as the decison(b) prior to the decision(b) not to act after all!

You really need to get your arguments straight.

The point is that you do not make the decision after the brain processes which cause the action. Those brain processes are the decision, and what you are erroneously called the "mental decision" is simply your awareness of having made the decision, which is another brain process. Your intuitive preconception that your conscious feeling of making a decision is the decision making process itself, is preventing you from seeing this.

Under a physicalist model, where the conscious awareness itself is a brain process, it is trivial to see that the brain process which constitutes your awareness of making a decision, and the brain process which causes the muscular activity, are not going to be the same brain processes. And it is not at all surprising that the former would happen a short time after the latter.

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Well for one thing, it assumes that what you are calling the "conscious decision" (which is not a decision at all, but rather your feeling of having willfully made a decision), happens instantaneously at some point in time, and that there is nothing more to it than that feeling. Whereas the reality of the situation is that the feeling itself is the result of a complex set of brain processes which begin happening before that time as well. Your conscious feeling of having willfully made the decision is just one small part of a very complex set of brain processes.
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All of this is irrelevant.

It is not irrelevant, it is the entire point!

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The whole experiment is presupposing that the decision happens at a specific moment. The subjects' suddenly decide and make the appropriate movement.

Wrong. The experiment presupposes no such thing. You are presupposing this. Neuroscientists know perfectly well that these things don't happen instantaneously, and that the initiation of movement is the result of a complex sequence of interactions which begin some time before the movement begins, and end some time after the movement has been initiated.

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I acknowledge there is difficulty in this notion, and this constitutes another concern about the experiment.

It constitutes only evidence that you don't understand any of the science behind the experiment, which is no surprise.

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Moreover, the fact that the conscious decision might be caused by a prior event, does not in any shape or form make them both one and the same event! When I kick a football, does it mean that my leg and the football are one and the same object?? Hmmmm???

Now you are talking nonsense. A physical process causes the muscular activity. A physical process determines that the muscular activity will occur. What is the "decision" in this case, if not the activity which determines what will happen? You are just assigning the label "decision" to something which is not, in any meaningful sense, the decision at all. You might as well call your neighbor's cat the "decision".

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They don't. They could only be said to contradict Libertarian free-will, and that version of free-will is incoherent to begin with.
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How can it be incoherent?? If libertarian free will is incoherent, then compatibilist free will is incoherent as well. Unless you maintain that compatiblism simply means the observation that we are not imprisoned or tied up. But that's completely uninteresting and metaphysically vacuous.

We've been through all this before. The fact that you don't actually understand either the Libertarian Free-Will position, nor the Compatibilist position, is not my problem. Go read a book.

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It is. Try reading some of the scientific papers describing these experiments. I doubt you could even get through the abstracts without being completely overwhelmed.
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If there are further pertinent details, then you should have mentioned them. It makes no difference to my philosophical proof though.

I mentioned only that the results of the experiment contradict our intuitive preconceptions of the mind, which is true, and which requires no further details to establish. The nonsensical arguments about the experiements that you have brought up do not even address this issue. They are just attempts to further attack physicalism. If you want to use them to attack physicalism, I suggest you make some attempt to understand them first.

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It affects the brain process which follow it.
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But the experiment indicates this is not so. It indicates that it is merely the prior physical event to the conscious decision which effects brain processes.

No, it does not, in any way, indicate that.

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Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! You are making a completely unjustified leap here. Clearly decision X is not affected by our awareness of having made decision X, but that in no way implies that decision Y, made some time after the awareness of having made decision X, is not affected by our awareness of having made decision X.
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ROTFLMFAO!!!

Let's put this more clearly.

decision(b) = the "decision" made by brain - this is the true causally efficacious decision which brings about action X

decision(m) = the "decision" made by consciousness - this is wholly causally inefficacious in bringing about X, but nevertheless plays a role in bringing about the later action Y.

Thus your statement reads

"Clearly decision(b) to bring about action X is not affected by our decision(m) to do X, but that in no way implies that decision(b) Y, made some time after the awareness of having made decision X, is not affected by our decision(m) to bring about action X".

So my decison(m) to go to the library today is wholly inefficacious in me going to the library today - this was caused by decision(b). Nevertheless my decison(m) to go to the library today might have some causal efficacy in me going to Tesco's tomorrow!!!

ROTFLMFAO!!!

So, our consciousness does have an affect upon the world, but never in a way we intend it to! Ha Ha Ha Ha!!!! What a card you are Stimp!

You need to give your position some serious serious thought.

Dear me!

Again, this only sounds strange because you are presenting it from the context of your completely unjustified intuitive preconception that the awareness of having made a decision is actually your "mind" deciding to do something. It is not. And of course your presenting it as though I were claiming that the awareness of making one decision has a significant affect on the making of completely unrelated decisions at some much later time, is nothing more than a blatant strawman.

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On the contrary, the fact that you are able to say, after the fact, "I had a conscious experience of making the decision", proves that your conscious awareness had physical effects.
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But it doesn't have any physical effect in bringing about the appropriate action.

I know. So what?


csense,

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What these experiments indicate is that the conscious awareness of having made the decision is the last step of the decision making process. What it demonstrates is that our intuitive notions of how thought and decision making work, are seriously flawed.
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Maybe not

I'm not privy to all the research that you are currently involved with, nor could I say for that matter I would understand it as you do if it were to be presented, since I am not myself a Physicist, let alone hold a doctorate in such things.

It seems to me though that if we are talking about a sentient being engaged in pure reason, and setting aside motor control, which itself is a compelling argument..who sits there and thinks: "what is the meaning of life," You're going to have a hard time convincing me that science can not only distinguish the thought itself as a physical process distinct from any other process, but can also distinguish on a temporal line the precise point in time that I am distinctly aware, as it were, of my own intention to create it.

I do not know of any scientific theories of the mind or brain which would claim that it could do so. The thought process is not distinct from other brain processes, but instead extremely entangled with them, and it does not occur at a specific instant in time, it is a process which has a duration.

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If I'm thinking of a pink and purple polka dot unicorn, then unless any scientist can tell me, using any method available, what specific physical processes are correlated with it, and that these or those processes do indeed equal a pink and purple polka dot unicorn, without my actually telling them what I am thinking of to begin with...then I'll keep my intuitive notions, along with my logic and reason which tell me that I am immediately acquinted with my own awareness.

The fact that we lack the technology to do this now, in no way implies that it is impossible. Clinging to intuitive notions which you know are not logically justified, until such time as they are conclusively proven false, is rather dogmatic and irrational.

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When you, or any other scientist, come up with better evidence than poking around in someones head with a pointer and making their leg twitch, then you'll have my ear as far as cause and effect, and any ontological implications it may suggest.

How does this differ from the God of the Gaps argument?

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Well for one thing, it assumes that what you are calling the "conscious decision" (which is not a decision at all, but rather your feeling of having willfully made a decision), happens instantaneously at some point in time, and that there is nothing more to it than that feeling. Whereas the reality of the situation is that the feeling itself is the result of a complex set of brain processes which begin happening before that time as well. Your conscious feeling of having willfully made the decision is just one small part of a very complex set of brain processes.
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Doesn't this beg the question though Stimpy.....

If all states of the mind are physical processes, then either the complex brain processes are acts of the will (conscious decisions, the feeling of) or they are a distinct subset.

If in fact this set of complex brain processes are themselves acts of the will, then in what meaningful way can you say that they are the result of the processes.

What difference does the temporal or spatial relationship of the parts, to each other, have on the concept of any given state of the mind, if that concept can not be further reduced from the set of physical processes that it is.

I don't understand what you are asking here. It seems like you are presenting the question from the context of the will being something separate which causes brain processes to happen, rather than being a brain process itself.



Ian,

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II
We have none for human beings either since they operate exclusively according to physical laws too.


Stimp
What does operating according to physical laws have to do with anything?
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Tell me how you justify that a rolling boulder is not conscious if not from its behaviour?

I don't. I justify it from the fact that the boulder has no brain.

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I have explained before why I conclude that other human beings, and many animals, have consciousness.
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I'm more interested in hearing your justification why you think that rocks and strawberries and trees are not conscious.

I have explained that before too, and quite frankly, I have no interest in engaging in such pseudo-philosophical nonsense.


Dr. Stupid

[davidsmith73]

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Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

That is not all of them.

What are the other axioms?

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But anyway, the basic falsifiable claim that scientific epistemology makes, is that the scientific method will actually work. That is, the axioms of science, when put together, directly imply that the scientific method should produce reliable predictions about future observations. If it did not work, that would falsify scientific epistemology.

But how could you tell if a failing in the scientific method, to whatever degree, is actually a failing in ones observations rather than an indication that the axioms are false?

If it is the case that all observations for all time must be in disagreement with the axiomatic framework for it to be falsified, then I think that is no more meaningful than the addition of incoherent metaphysical baggage that you mention before.

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But just as an example, imagine that tomorrow it stopped working. Everything gets all strange. Scientific predictions are no longer accurate, and in general scientific methodology just stops being useful. That would pretty clearly falsify the axioms of science.

I disagree. Thre is also the possibility that ones observations are at fault rather than the axioms. In fact, there is no way of knowing, epistemologically, which alternative is true.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

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69dodge said:
A computer can say, "I have conscious experiences." It doesn't have them, of course, but it can still say it does. If it doesn't have conscious experiences at all, it certainly doesn't have causally efficacious ones.

But it is programmed to say that.

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I also say, "I have conscious experiences." How can you conclude from this that my conscious experiences are causally efficacious?

Because if they are not, then we were preprogrammed to act as if they were. Why would evolution rig that up? I think it's much more likely that it would rig up consciousness to have a downstream effect on our behavior.

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So what's wrong with saying, there are brain process and there are conscious experiences and they always go together in certain ways? Subsequent brain processes can be thought of as being caused by previous brain processes, and the conscious experiences are just along for the ride, so to speak. Is this epiphenomenalism? What's incoherent about it?

I'm not sure if that's epiphenomenalism. Whatever class of our experiences is just along for the ride, having no effect on the brain whatsoever, must be experience that we cannot think or talk about. Otherwise it is having an effect. Therefore, what we do talk about as conscious experience must not be in that class. Thus, we are not talking about epiphenomena.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Quote:

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos


Because if they are not, then we were preprogrammed to act as if they were. Why would evolution rig that up? I think it's much more likely that it would rig up consciousness to have a downstream effect on our behavior.

[/b]

Huh? Downstream effect? How is this different from libertarian free will?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

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Stimpy said:
Impossible to determine for certain. It could be because the axioms of science are actually correct, and it could be because they are false, but whatever the truth is gives the same results anyway. The same goes for all scientific theories. One can always construct alternative possible explanations for why the theory works. That is why we talk about "scientific evidence" which "supports" a theory, rather than "scientific proof" which "proves" a theory.

I think Eleatic Stranger is asking a more metaphysical question, so to speak. I think he is asking why we are assuming that consistent reliable prediction is what we mean by the scientific method "working." Then he asks whether science can be used to verify the definition of reliable prediction. I guess he is trying to get at the idea that we are making more assumptions than we may realize.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

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Ian said:
Huh? Downstream effect? How is this different from libertarian free will?

Ignoring the fact that I can't make any sense of libertarian free will, I don't see what conscious experience affecting future behavior has to do with free will at all.

~~ Paul

[csense]

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Whereas the reality of the situation is that the feeling itself is the result of a complex set of brain processes which begin happening before that time as well. Your conscious feeling of having willfully made the decision is just one small part of a very complex set of brain processes.
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Doesn't this beg the question though Stimpy.....

If all states of the mind are physical processes, then either the complex brain processes are acts of the will (conscious decisions, the feeling of) or they are a distinct subset.

If in fact this set of complex brain processes are themselves acts of the will, then in what meaningful way can you say that they are the result of the processes.

What difference does the temporal or spatial relationship of the parts, to each other, have on the concept of any given state of the mind, if that concept can not be further reduced from the set of physical processes that it is.
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I don't understand what you are asking here. It seems like you are presenting the question from the context of the will being something separate which causes brain processes to happen, rather than being a brain process itself.

Well, for arguments sake, I'm agreeing with you that the will, or acts thereof, are processes which have duration. The question is, what is the significance of this duration.

Whether the feeling of having made a decision (being itself a set of processes which has duration) is a subset that is entangled in a larger set of processes, or actually is the larger set of processes....what is the significance of sequence of the individuals within a subset, or the sequence of the subset to the whole....ontologically speaking.

In other words, and as a metaphor, if I'm reading something and I happen upon the word box, I read it left to right: b--o--x. The individuals within the set have a temporal and spatial relationship, and when I sound the last letter, x, the concept of "box" emerges. What significance does the "b" have, being first in the chain of cause and effect, that the x doesn't have, being the last in the chain, to the relationship of the emergent concept of "box."

Put another way, what is the significance saying that a process, or set of processes, occur before the emergence of what we call "the feeling itself," if not ontological.

[csense]

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If I'm thinking of a pink and purple polka dot unicorn, then unless any scientist can tell me, using any method available, what specific physical processes are correlated with it, and that these or those processes do indeed equal a pink and purple polka dot unicorn, without my actually telling them what I am thinking of to begin with...then I'll keep my intuitive notions, along with my logic and reason which tell me that I am immediately acquinted with my own awareness.
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The fact that we lack the technology to do this now, in no way implies that it is impossible. Clinging to intuitive notions which you know are not logically justified, until such time as they are conclusively proven false, is rather dogmatic and irrational.

I agree, it does not imply that it is impossible, but if it is possible, then it does imply that specific mathematical models of any given state of the mind are identical between two different sentient beings...and if that is true, then the physical structure of all sentient beings are identical, and this to me seems illogical.

[csense]

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What these experiments indicate is that the conscious awareness of having made the decision is the last step of the decision making process. What it demonstrates is that our intuitive notions of how thought and decision making work, are seriously flawed.
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Maybe not

I'm not privy to all the research that you are currently involved with, nor could I say for that matter I would understand it as you do if it were to be presented, since I am not myself a Physicist, let alone hold a doctorate in such things.

It seems to me though that if we are talking about a sentient being engaged in pure reason, and setting aside motor control, which itself is a compelling argument..who sits there and thinks: "what is the meaning of life," You're going to have a hard time convincing me that science can not only distinguish the thought itself as a physical process distinct from any other process, but can also distinguish on a temporal line the precise point in time that I am distinctly aware, as it were, of my own intention to create it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

I do not know of any scientific theories of the mind or brain which would claim that it could do so. The thought process is not distinct from other brain processes, but instead extremely entangled with them, and it does not occur at a specific instant in time, it is a process which has a duration.

But in order to conclude that conscious awareness is the last step in a process, you must posit a subset of processes (of which awareness is) distinct from other processes. Otherwise, how do you not only identify individuals or sets of processes within the brain, but also their relationship.

Additionally, once you identify these individuals and sets, then you must also posit instantiations, insofar as instantiation itself is a unit of time which has duration, albeit extremely short in normal usage, but nevertheless and relatively speaking, is still distinct whatever duration of time we apply.

To say on the one hand that, yes, this or that happens first, and this or that happens later...and then on the other hand say that nothing is really distinct since there is complex entanglement, is a little obscure and ambiguous as far as I'm concerned.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Quote:

csense said:
Put another way, what is the significance saying that a process, or set of processes, occur before the emergence of what we call "the feeling itself," if not ontological.

Are you sure we have the same definition of ontological in mind?

The brain is a huge pile of processing modules. Some of those modules move muscles, some recognize words on the page, some deliver up the meaning of the recognized words, and some produce feelings of, say, willfulness. They all run in parallel, with massive amounts of feedback. Some mechanism---and I don't think we know how it works---moves the attention among the outputs of these modules. Whatever order the attention moves in is the order in which we apparently experience the output of the modules. There are various theories about how cohorts of neural signals ebb and flow in strength and drive our attention.

The "feeling" is just one of those processes.

~~ Paul

[csense]

Quote:

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Are you sure we have the same definition of ontological in mind?

The brain is a huge pile of processing modules. Some of those modules move muscles, some recognize words on the page, some deliver up the meaning of the recognized words, and some produce feelings of, say, willfulness. They all run in parallel, with massive amounts of feedback. Some mechanism---and I don't think we know how it works---moves the attention among the outputs of these modules. Whatever order the attention moves in is the order in which we apparently experience the output of the modules. There are various theories about how cohorts of neural signals ebb and flow in strength and drive our attention.

The "feeling" is just one of those processes.

~~ Paul

Well, I can't speak for Ian, but he clearly understands the significance of what is being talked about here, and if there are no implications to the nature of being and free will, then what is the significance of discussing this in a philosophy forum.

If it's just data, without any philosophical implications, spoken or otherwise....then what exactly is the point.

No offense to Stimpy of course.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm not sure what the point is, but we do seem to have this conversation over and over again, don't we? Well, we have to talk about something.

~~ Paul

[hammegk]

Quote:

Originally posted by zaayrdragon
In which case, either a) some immaterial thing can somehow affect material things, or b) the supposed immaterial thing is, in fact, entirely material in nature.

You forgot c) the supposed material thing is, in fact, entirely immaterial in nature.

Actually a) is 100% illogical, so you can choose monism b) or c) and actually defend your choice.

[hammegk]

Quote:

Originally posted by csense

Put another way, what is the significance saying that a process, or set of processes, occur before the emergence of what we call "the feeling itself," if not ontological.

I like that enough I wanted to see it in bold type.

Stimpy continues to miss the problem he has assuming ego-consciousness has some exalted position in "consciousness".

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

Quote:

That is not all of them.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What are the other axioms?

Well, without getting too formal, you also need an axiom stating that those consistent logical relationships can be inferred from our observations.

Quote:

But anyway, the basic falsifiable claim that scientific epistemology makes, is that the scientific method will actually work. That is, the axioms of science, when put together, directly imply that the scientific method should produce reliable predictions about future observations. If it did not work, that would falsify scientific epistemology.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

But how could you tell if a failing in the scientific method, to whatever degree, is actually a failing in ones observations rather than an indication that the axioms are false?

Because one of the predictions that the scientific method makes is that we should be able to control for observational errors. Obviously no single observation from a single person is going to be sufficient to falsify a theory, but when repeated experimentation consistently fails to match the theory's predictions, the theory is falsified.

Quote:

If it is the case that all observations for all time must be in disagreement with the axiomatic framework for it to be falsified, then I think that is no more meaningful than the addition of incoherent metaphysical baggage that you mention before.

I agree. Fortunately, that is not the case.

Quote:

But just as an example, imagine that tomorrow it stopped working. Everything gets all strange. Scientific predictions are no longer accurate, and in general scientific methodology just stops being useful. That would pretty clearly falsify the axioms of science.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I disagree. Thre is also the possibility that ones observations are at fault rather than the axioms. In fact, there is no way of knowing, epistemologically, which alternative is true.

It doesn't matter. That is why that extra axiom I listed above is necessary. It doesn't make any difference whether or not reality functions according to consistent logical rules. If our observations fail to allow us to reliably determine those rules (in other words, if the scientific method fails to provide us with accurate predictions of future observations), then scientific epistemology is falsified. Sure, we don't know which of the axioms are wrong. It could be any of them, or all of them. But if the scientific method fails to work, then scientific epistemology, as a whole, is falsified.


csense,

Quote:

I don't understand what you are asking here. It seems like you are presenting the question from the context of the will being something separate which causes brain processes to happen, rather than being a brain process itself.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well, for arguments sake, I'm agreeing with you that the will, or acts thereof, are processes which have duration. The question is, what is the significance of this duration.

Whether the feeling of having made a decision (being itself a set of processes which has duration) is a subset that is entangled in a larger set of processes, or actually is the larger set of processes....what is the significance of sequence of the individuals within a subset, or the sequence of the subset to the whole....ontologically speaking.

In other words, and as a metaphor, if I'm reading something and I happen upon the word box, I read it left to right: b--o--x. The individuals within the set have a temporal and spatial relationship, and when I sound the last letter, x, the concept of "box" emerges. What significance does the "b" have, being first in the chain of cause and effect, that the x doesn't have, being the last in the chain, to the relationship of the emergent concept of "box."

Put another way, what is the significance saying that a process, or set of processes, occur before the emergence of what we call "the feeling itself," if not ontological.

I'm sorry, I really don't understand what you are getting at here, or what you are trying to ask me. The way I see it, the feeling of having made a decision is a part of the process of thinking about what you are doing. Likewise, the decision to move a muscle is also part of the process of thinking about what you are doing. The evidence just indicates that the, for any given decision, the part of the process which is the feeling of having made a decision happens a short time after the part of the process which is the actual making of the decision. I don't see how ontology even enters into it.

Quote:

If I'm thinking of a pink and purple polka dot unicorn, then unless any scientist can tell me, using any method available, what specific physical processes are correlated with it, and that these or those processes do indeed equal a pink and purple polka dot unicorn, without my actually telling them what I am thinking of to begin with...then I'll keep my intuitive notions, along with my logic and reason which tell me that I am immediately acquinted with my own awareness.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The fact that we lack the technology to do this now, in no way implies that it is impossible. Clinging to intuitive notions which you know are not logically justified, until such time as they are conclusively proven false, is rather dogmatic and irrational.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I agree, it does not imply that it is impossible, but if it is possible, then it does imply that specific mathematical models of any given state of the mind are identical between two different sentient beings...and if that is true, then the physical structure of all sentient beings are identical, and this to me seems illogical.

I do not see how you have reached this conclusion. In principle, if such technology were to be developed, it would have to work by looking at the structure of the particular brain being "read", and essentially decode the neural network. Each brain would be different, and as a result the mathematical model used to figure out what you are thinking would be specific to your brain.

Quote:

I do not know of any scientific theories of the mind or brain which would claim that it could do so. The thought process is not distinct from other brain processes, but instead extremely entangled with them, and it does not occur at a specific instant in time, it is a process which has a duration.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

But in order to conclude that conscious awareness is the last step in a process, you must posit a subset of processes (of which awareness is) distinct from other processes. Otherwise, how do you not only identify individuals or sets of processes within the brain, but also their relationship.

Why is that a problem? I would say that the intuitive preconception that the mind is somehow composed of a bunch of distinct processes, is both wrong, and a serious roadblock to understanding what is going on. I don't think that the awareness can be isolated as some distinct process. I think that it is only our intuitive notion that awareness is somehow distinct from our other mental processes, that inclines us to think that it should be.

Quote:

To say on the one hand that, yes, this or that happens first, and this or that happens later...and then on the other hand say that nothing is really distinct since there is complex entanglement, is a little obscure and ambiguous as far as I'm concerned.

Maybe so, but that is what the evidence suggests to be the case (and I'm not just talking about these specific experiments here, but neuroscience in general). You say that it makes things obscure and ambiguous. I say that it just makes our job of figuring out how the brain works very very complicated. But imagining it to work in some simpler, more intuitive way, when the evidence suggests that it does not, is not going to get us anywhere. The brain is a highly entangled set of extraordinarily complex neural networks. If we want to understand how it works, then that is something we just have to deal with.

Quote:

Well, I can't speak for Ian, but he clearly understands the significance of what is being talked about here, and if there are no implications to the nature of being and free will, then what is the significance of discussing this in a philosophy forum.

If it's just data, without any philosophical implications, spoken or otherwise....then what exactly is the point.

No offense to Stimpy of course.

There is a lot more to philosophy than just metaphysics. Saying that the mind is just a set of physical processes does not magically make all of the philosophical issues concerning the mind disappear. It just provides us with a starting point for figuring out which of those issues can be addressed meaningfully, and a method for trying to address them.


Hammegk,

Quote:

Put another way, what is the significance saying that a process, or set of processes, occur before the emergence of what we call "the feeling itself," if not ontological.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I like that enough I wanted to see it in bold type.

Stimpy continues to miss the problem he has assuming ego-consciousness has some exalted position in "consciousness".

I cannot even begin to imagine where you got the idea that I assume ego-consciousness has an exalted position in consciousness. I am not even sure what that is supposed to mean.


Dr. Stupid

[Interesting Ian]

Quote:

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
Ian said:
Huh? Downstream effect? How is this different from libertarian free will?


Ignoring the fact that I can't make any sense of libertarian free will, I don't see what conscious experience affecting future behavior has to do with free will at all.

~~ Paul [/b]

In which case could you please explain what on earth you mean by "Downstream effect"?

[Interesting Ian]

Quote:

II
Then prepare to be surprised. 1 + 1 = 2 because it is defined to be so.


Stimpy
Wrong again, but thanks for playing.

Oh right! Silly me. 1+1 = 2 not by virtue of definition, but because of some other reason.

OK Stimp. Shoot!

[Z]

Oh no - not a mathematical proof.

Ian, I ought to smack you for inviting him to post a proof of why 1+1=2 - those things always leave my head spinning.

Still - I'm a little curious too - I've always held the assumption that 1 + 1 = 2 because that's how we define it. So... post away.

[Interesting Ian]

Quote:

II
Get it through your head; in order to call 2 events one and the same event, they have to coincide in space and time. Not if one occurs 0.5 secs after the other (and indeed has nothing at all in commonality with the prior event to boot). We are talking about a causal relationship here; not one of identity or supervenience.

Stimp
The awareness happens after the muscle movement is initiated.

I wonder if people realize, like I do, that therefore this Libel experiment has no repercussions for free will whatsoever?

Imagine we are the subject. We are supposed to press the button when we will it. But in a real life situation we could not possibly say we make a (mental) decision, then immediately afterwards perform the action. No, as Stimp says, the feeling of having made the decision to move ones body, is concomitant with the movement of ones body!

Prior to this movement, we might be thinking 'yes I'm just about to move my body . .but hang on . .maybe not!'

This is consistent with the notion of the veto - you are "geared up" to move your arm, but at the last split second you decide not to. You cannot be in a state where you will definitely move your arm prior to the actual movement, because you always have that option to exercise the veto and not move your arm after all.

In practical terms it just means that you are there thinking, 'yes I will definitely move my arm in the next split second' - and the prior brain event will show up on the measuring instrument - but you always have the power to negate that prior event!

I think it's best understood by thinking about a situation where you will make a sudden movement. A small percentage of the time will be where you feel you will immediately make the appropriate movement, but as a matter of fact do not.

I admit I probably haven't expressed myself very well, but hopefully people will get the gist of what I'm saying.

Just think about the experiment. It's bound to be the case that you think you've made the decision simultaneously with the initial movement of your body, rather than just before it. This being so there is no implications for free will whatsoever!

Do you understand this Stimp?

[Z]

Amazingly, I think I get it as well - though I think the argument against free will comes in again as one considers that the 'decision' to move, etc. comes once again in the form of actual, physical brain processes, which are themselves subject to other signals, etc.

But I'm partially high tonight. Please forgive.

Anyway, in my opinion, the Libel experiments still do not have any effect on what I call practical free will; and I think there isn't going to be any means to deal with the issue of 'absolute free will' unless science finally disproves, once and for all, the divine. Of course, disproof is far more difficult than proof, especially of the divine. God will never be fully proven nor disproven, I think.

[davidsmith73]

Quote:

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

Well, without getting too formal, you also need an axiom stating that those consistent logical relationships can be inferred from our observations.

This means that there will be certain observations that infer logical relationships and certain ones that do not, based on this axiom.

Quote:

how could you tell if a failing in the scientific method, to whatever degree, is actually a failing in ones observations rather than an indication that the axioms are false?
----------------------------------------------------
Because one of the predictions that the scientific method makes is that we should be able to control for observational errors. Obviously no single observation from a single person is going to be sufficient to falsify a theory, but when repeated experimentation consistently fails to match the theory's predictions, the theory is falsified.

With regards to falsifying the axiomatic framework, consider the situation whereby tomorrow the scientific method stopped working. Scientific predictions are no longer accurate, and in general scientific methodology just stops being useful. Would that would falsify the axiomatic framework of science? I think not. This is because an example of such a situation happens all the time and we call it hallucination. So in fact, the situation whereby the scientific method fails to provide us with accurate predictions of future observations is not going to falsify the axiomatic framework simply because such a situation could be down to observational error.

Quote:

It doesn't matter. That is why that extra axiom I listed above is necessary. It doesn't make any difference whether or not reality functions according to consistent logical rules. If our observations fail to allow us to reliably determine those rules (in other words, if the scientific method fails to provide us with accurate predictions of future observations), then scientific epistemology is falsified. Sure, we don't know which of the axioms are wrong. It could be any of them, or all of them. But if the scientific method fails to work, then scientific epistemology, as a whole, is falsified.

But such a situation is not possible, even in principle. It is not possible to determine if such a situation is down to observational error (for example hallucination) or a failing in any of the axioms, therefore the framework is not falsifiable.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Quote:

Ian said:
In which case could you please explain what on earth you mean by "Downstream effect"?

It means a future effect. In other words, it is entirely redundant with the term "effect."

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Quote:

Ian said:
Oh right! Silly me. 1+1 = 2 not by virtue of definition, but because of some other reason.

OK Stimp. Shoot!

Here you go:

http://mathforum.org/library/drmath/view/51551.html

~~ Paul

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Quote:

II
Then prepare to be surprised. 1 + 1 = 2 because it is defined to be so.


Stimpy
Wrong again, but thanks for playing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Oh right! Silly me. 1+1 = 2 not by virtue of definition, but because of some other reason.

OK Stimp. Shoot!

Live and learn. http://mathforum.org/library/drmath/view/51551.html

Quote:

Stimp
The awareness happens after the muscle movement is initiated.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I wonder if people realize, like I do, that therefore this Libel experiment has no repercussions for free will whatsoever?

Well, certainly not for any coherently defined version of free-will that I have ever heard of. It does have repercussions for many people's intuitive conceptions of free-will.

Quote:

Imagine we are the subject. We are supposed to press the button when we will it. But in a real life situation we could not possibly say we make a (mental) decision, then immediately afterwards perform the action. No, as Stimp says, the feeling of having made the decision to move ones body, is concomitant with the movement of ones body!

Prior to this movement, we might be thinking 'yes I'm just about to move my body . .but hang on . .maybe not!'

This is consistent with the notion of the veto - you are "geared up" to move your arm, but at the last split second you decide not to. You cannot be in a state where you will definitely move your arm prior to the actual movement, because you always have that option to exercise the veto and not move your arm after all.

In practical terms it just means that you are there thinking, 'yes I will definitely move my arm in the next split second' - and the prior brain event will show up on the measuring instrument - but you always have the power to negate that prior event!

I think it's best understood by thinking about a situation where you will make a sudden movement. A small percentage of the time will be where you feel you will immediately make the appropriate movement, but as a matter of fact do not.

I admit I probably haven't expressed myself very well, but hopefully people will get the gist of what I'm saying.

Just think about the experiment. It's bound to be the case that you think you've made the decision simultaneously with the initial movement of your body, rather than just before it. This being so there is no implications for free will whatsoever!

Do you understand this Stimp?

Sounds ok to me. I'm not the one who said it has implications for free-will. I just said that the results of the experiment are very counter-intuitive to a lot of people.


davidsmith,

Quote:

Well, without getting too formal, you also need an axiom stating that those consistent logical relationships can be inferred from our observations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This means that there will be certain observations that infer logical relationships and certain ones that do not, based on this axiom.

Not at all. What it means is that it must be possible to extract information about those relationships from our observations. This does not imply that there are any "perfect" observations. On the contrary, the whole point is that the epistemological system provides a method for extracting that information, and a major part of that methodology is the process of controlling for observational errors.

Quote:

how could you tell if a failing in the scientific method, to whatever degree, is actually a failing in ones observations rather than an indication that the axioms are false?
----------------------------------------------------
Because one of the predictions that the scientific method makes is that we should be able to control for observational errors. Obviously no single observation from a single person is going to be sufficient to falsify a theory, but when repeated experimentation consistently fails to match the theory's predictions, the theory is falsified.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

With regards to falsifying the axiomatic framework, consider the situation whereby tomorrow the scientific method stopped working. Scientific predictions are no longer accurate, and in general scientific methodology just stops being useful. Would that would falsify the axiomatic framework of science?

Absolutely.

Quote:

I think not. This is because an example of such a situation happens all the time and we call it hallucination.

In general, this does not qualify as such an example. I have suffered from hallucinations myself a few times, due to things like high fever and medication. But ultimately I was able to sort things out.

Of course, in the extreme case of somebody suffering from persistent, extreme hallucinations (or any number of other neurological diseases which interfere with the processing of sensory input and/or reasoning), the axioms of science are not valid, at least not for that person. Since one of the axioms is a statement about the person applying the scientific epistemology, clearly it is possible for the axioms to be true for one person, and not for another.

What this means is that the poor guy who is suffering from these problems has no way of determining why the scientific method is not working for him. As far as he knows, it could be because the world really doesn't operate according to consistent logical rules. Or it could just be because something is wrong which is preventing his brain from being able to extract reliable information about those rules from his observations.

Likewise this means that while scientific epistemology has been falsified for the person suffering from the neurological disorder, that does not imply that it is falsified for everybody else. This is a common feature to many epistemological frameworks. Since epistemology is concerned with what is knowable, and how we come to know it, unless an epistemological framework makes the assumption that all people have the same relevant capabilities, the system may be valid for one person and not for another.

As a more clear example, imagine the old brain in a jar idea. Unless the sensory input being fed into the brain is designed in such a way as to allow the brain to make reliable predictions about future observations, the scientific epistemology is, for that brain, false. That does not imply anything about whether or not scientific epistemology is valid for anybody else.


Dr. Stupid

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Quote:

Davidsmith said:
With regards to falsifying the axiomatic framework, consider the situation whereby tomorrow the scientific method stopped working. Scientific predictions are no longer accurate, and in general scientific methodology just stops being useful. Would that would falsify the axiomatic framework of science? I think not. This is because an example of such a situation happens all the time and we call it hallucination. So in fact, the situation whereby the scientific method fails to provide us with accurate predictions of future observations is not going to falsify the axiomatic framework simply because such a situation could be down to observational error.

You're thinking of scientific predictions failing in a localized area, for a small group of people, for a short time. Now think of them as failing universally, for everyone, forever. What would happen? It wouldn't simply falsify the assumptions of science, it would probably mean the end of the universe as we know it, including us.

Quote:

But such a situation is not possible, even in principle. It is not possible to determine if such a situation is down to observational error (for example hallucination) or a failing in any of the axioms, therefore the framework is not falsifiable.

You are right that some natural event could suddenly render the entire human race incapable of making conventional observations. A total mass hallucination of some sort. However, I think the point is moot, because if the natural world suddenly did become arbitrarily chaotic, our inability to make rational observations would be the least of our problems.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I hereby swear that Stimpy and I did not collaborate on our choice of proofs.

~~ Paul

[PixyMisa]

Quote:

Originally posted by davidsmith73
With regards to falsifying the axiomatic framework, consider the situation whereby tomorrow the scientific method stopped working. Scientific predictions are no longer accurate, and in general scientific methodology just stops being useful. Would that would falsify the axiomatic framework of science? I think not. This is because an example of such a situation happens all the time and we call it hallucination.

Eh?

That's not a failure of the scientific method, that's a failure of the observer. The same thing applies to people who are insane. If you can't make consistent connections from your sensory data in the present, you're not going to get anywhere trying to do scientific research. Indeed, you'll probably soon be dead.

And you can control for hallucinations, precisely because they do not affect the different senses consistently and the real world does. If your senses are playing up but your mind is not likewise inhibited, you can tell.

(Hi Stimpy, Paul, Ian, everyone! Looks like nothing's changed while I've been gone. )

[davidsmith73]

Quote:

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

Not at all. What it means is that it must be possible to extract information about those relationships from our observations. This does not imply that there are any "perfect" observations. On the contrary, the whole point is that the epistemological system provides a method for extracting that information, and a major part of that methodology is the process of controlling for observational errors.

I didn't mean to imply that there are any "perfect" observations. I simply mean that the axiom would necessarily mean that we are able to extract information about the logcial relationships from certain observations but not others. The ones that we are not able to extract information about the relationships are the ones that are observational errors, an example of which would be hallucination.

Quote:

Of course, in the extreme case of somebody suffering from persistent, extreme hallucinations (or any number of other neurological diseases which interfere with the processing of sensory input and/or reasoning), the axioms of science are not valid, at least not for that person.

There is no way of knowing this. If you or I are hallucinating then there is no way of distinguishing between the possibility that it is the axioms that are at fault or if our observations are in error.

Can you explain how you or I could tell the difference?

Quote:

Since one of the axioms is a statement about the person applying the scientific epistemology, clearly it is possible for the axioms to be true for one person, and not for another.

but since observations are always made from a first person perspective, there is no way of knowing if this is true.

Quote:

What this means is that the poor guy who is suffering from these problems has no way of determining why the scientific method is not working for him. As far as he knows, it could be because the world really doesn't operate according to consistent logical rules. Or it could just be because something is wrong which is preventing his brain from being able to extract reliable information about those rules from his observations.

Precisely. Observations are always from the 1st person and that goes for observations concerning other peoples communication about their observations.

Quote:

Likewise this means that while scientific epistemology has been falsified for the person suffering from the neurological disorder,

It hasn't been falsified for the hallucinating person. There is no way to tell if the lack of future predictions using the scientific method is a failing in the axiomatic framework or if ones observations are in error.

Can you explain how to distinguish between these two alternatives?

Quote:

that does not imply that it is falsified for everybody else. This is a common feature to many epistemological frameworks. Since epistemology is concerned with what is knowable, and how we come to know it, unless an epistemological framework makes the assumption that all people have the same relevant capabilities, the system may be valid for one person and not for another.

But the same argument applies. Observations are only possible from a 1st person perspective. One is only able to gain knowledge about other peoples observations from ones own. Since this is the case, hallucinations apply to observations about other peoples observations, there is no way to tell if other peoples lack of future predictions using the scientific method is a failing in their axiomatic framework or if ones own observations about them are in error. The same problem arises.

Quote:

As a more clear example, imagine the old brain in a jar idea. Unless the sensory input being fed into the brain is designed in such a way as to allow the brain to make reliable predictions about future observations, the scientific epistemology is, for that brain, false. That does not imply anything about whether or not scientific epistemology is valid for anybody else.
Dr. Stupid

But since epistemology is about what is knowable then any knowledge about the brain's predictions about future observations has to be made through ones own observations. So again, there is no way of telling if the brains lack of future observations is a failing in the axiomatic framework for that brain or an error in ones own observations.

[davidsmith73]

Quote:

Originally posted by PixyMisa
Eh?

That's not a failure of the scientific method, that's a failure of the observer.

Most people would agree. My point is that the axiomatic framework of science cannot be falsified by obsevations that consistently did not produce predictions about future events, since this could equally well be a case of hallucination. There is no way to distinguish between the two scenarios.

Quote:

And you can control for hallucinations, precisely because they do not affect the different senses consistently and the real world does.

For the purposes of this example, observations about the "real world" only applies to someone in an observational state that is not classed as hallcinatory, and that would invalidate the entire argument.

[davidsmith73]

Quote:

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
You're thinking of scientific predictions failing in a localized area, for a small group of people, for a short time. Now think of them as failing universally, for everyone, forever. What would happen? It wouldn't simply falsify the assumptions of science, it would probably mean the end of the universe as we know it, including us.

See also my reply to Stimpy here. Knowledge about the lack of future predictions from other peoples observations, at any time, has to be gained through one's own observations. Therefore the same argument applies as to whether this is indeed a failing in the axiomatic framework or an error in ones own observations concerning other people's observations.

Quote:

You are right that some natural event could suddenly render the entire human race incapable of making conventional observations. A total mass hallucination of some sort. However, I think the point is moot, because if the natural world suddenly did become arbitrarily chaotic, our inability to make rational observations would be the least of our problems.

I don't see how that's relevent to the argument.

[Darat]

Quote:

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
I hereby swear that Stimpy and I did not collaborate on our choice of proofs.

~~ Paul

Just proves* that you are both figments of the same rather poor imagination...

(*using proved in its new meaning of "I know it's true.")

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Pixy! Good to see you.

~~ Paul

[PixyMisa]

Quote:

Originally posted by davidsmith73
For the purposes of this example, observations about the "real world" only applies to someone in an observational state that is not classed as hallcinatory, and that would invalidate the entire argument.

Not at all.

Simply act on your sensory data. If it's reasonably accurate, you'll live long and prosper. If you're hallucinating, you'll get run over by a bus while you're chatting with the seven-legged pygmy elephants.

Those who survive get to make more observations.