Sentient machines

[Freakshow]

As you'll soon see, this does belong here as a philosophy discussion, and not in the computers and technology section.

Take the following two points as being given:

1. You have a test for evaluating sentience and conciousness. What this test is actually comprised of isn't really relevant to this discussion. The test is 100% flawless. It relies entirely on observation of and interaction with the subject being tested. (Not everyone knows what the Turing Test is, which is why I did not use that phrase.)
2. Someone has created a computer that passes this test.
3. The person who created the computer has died. We know little of how he was able to accomplish the creation of this computer.
4. It is not acceptable to tear the computer apart for the purposes of attempting to reverse-engineer it.
5. No, I am not getting this idea from that Star Trek Episode where they try to determine if Data is alive. I actually don't like Star Trek.

The question is...do you now conclude that this computer has attained consciosness and sentience? Or do you just conclude that it is an inanimate object that is pretending to be concious? If you make the conclusion that it is inanimate and is just pretending, then how do you do so, without circular reasoning?

Because if you make the conclusion that it is not alive, and is just pretending, how do you know that other humans are alive, and aren't just pretending? You can't inhabit other's minds. You can't live their experiences. All you can do is observe and evaluate. These observations and evaluations tell you that others are conscious. While telling you at the same time that someone in a vegetative state is not.

So what's the difference? You don't have some magical insight into other human's existence, and you don't have some magical insight into the computer's existence. Sure, you can say "Well, I know its electicity and silicon", but similar things can be said about the human brain. That is therefore not an acceptable reply.

So is it alive, or not? How do you know?

My own opinion: I'm not really sure. But if you put a gun to my head and forced me to choose one way or the other, I would consider it to be a new life.

[Melendwyr]

I agree with you.

As far as inquiring into why people might say otherwise: I think most people have simply learned to associate "personness" with things that look human. (There may also be inborn programming involved.) Put that machine in a human-looking body, let it walk and talk, and people would treat it like any other person if they didn't know about its insides.

[c4ts]

Phillip K. Dick much?

[Freakshow]

Originally Posted by c4ts

Phillip K. Dick much?

Actually, no. I know who he is, but have never read any of his works.

[c4ts]

"Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?" is a good place to start. You'd probably know it better as Blade Runner.

But anyway, the problem you describe is a p-zombie. It's something that looks sentient but is actually programmed to imitate sentient behavior. Either the imitation will eventually diverge and it's going to be really obvious, or you'd have to know everything about the universe in order to design a precise mimicry mechanism. Otherwise, if it's made to take in information and respond in ways that appear indistinguishable from self-awareness, it's going to become self-aware as a consequence.

The other option is solipsism, where everyone but you is a p-zombie.

[Roboramma]

Originally Posted by Freakshow

As you'll soon see, this does belong here as a philosophy discussion, and not in the computers and technology section.

Take the following two points as being given:

1. You have a test for evaluating sentience and conciousness. What this test is actually comprised of isn't really relevant to this discussion. The test is 100% flawless. It relies entirely on observation of and interaction with the subject being tested. (Not everyone knows what the Turing Test is, which is why I did not use that phrase.)
2. Someone has created a computer that passes this test.[/b]

1. So, in other words, assume that this computer is sentient andd concious.
   
   
   Quote:
2. No, I am not getting this idea from that Star Trek Episode where they try to determine if Data is alive. I actually don't like Star Trek.

[RandFan]

Originally Posted by Freakshow

The question is...do you now conclude that this computer has attained consciosness and sentience? Or do you just conclude that it is an inanimate object that is pretending to be concious? If you make the conclusion that it is inanimate and is just pretending, then how do you do so, without circular reasoning?

One of the truly great philosophical questions. The ghost in the machine. I've moved from a proponent to an agnostic on the subject of dualism but I'm still interested in the when and how sentience emerges and how would we know if another entity was possesed of it?

Along with Blade Runner ("Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?") see:

Artificial Intelligence: AI
2001: A Space Odyssey
Bicentennial Man
I, Robot

Bicentennial Man is a bit preachy and I, Robot mostly just an action movie but worth seeing if your interested in the question. Of course there are many Sci Fi books dealing at least in part with the subject.

[Freakshow]

Originally Posted by RandFan

One of the truly great philosophical questions. The ghost in the machine. I've moved from a proponent to an agnostic on the subject of dualism but I'm still interested in the when and how sentience emerges and how would we know if another entity was possesed of it?

Along with Blade Runner ("Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?") see:

Artificial Intelligence: AI
2001: A Space Odyssey
Bicentennial Man
I, Robot

Bicentennial Man is a bit preachy and I, Robot mostly just an action movie but worth seeing if your interested in the question. Of course there are many Sci Fi books dealing at least in part with the subject.

I'm glad I'm not the only other person in the world that liked "I, Robot". I absolutely loved the movie. I don't think it gets enough credit.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Roboramma,

Quote:

Well, given that we've already assumed that the computer is sentient and concious, I don't see how I would come to any other conclusion...

But I would ask, how is it at all possible to design a test that is 100% flawless at determining if something is concious? I can imagine that such might be possible in the future when we have a better understanding of what conciousness is, physically speaking, but right now?

100% flawlessness isn't really necessary for Freakshow's argument to work. All that is needed is that the AI's behavior be indistinguishable from that of a sentient being.

Unless I am misunderstanding Freakshow, the argument can be rephrased something like this:

The only reasons any of us have for believing that anybody else possesses consciousness like we do, is by observing their behavior. So the question is, if some machine exhibited the same type of behavior as a human being, would there be any criteria by which we could determine that the human being is sentient, and the machine is not?

The answer is quite clearly "NO".

So we are left with either solipsism, or accepting that the machine is also sentient. Any belief that the human is sentient and the machine is not would have to be based on the preconceived belief that machines cannot be sentient. Hence the circularity part.


As far as I can see, the only real question which remains is whether or not, with respect to other people, it is actually rational to believe that they have consciousness or not.

I say that it is. My argument goes like this:

1) I know that what I think of as my "consciousness" affects my behavior, and does so in a very strong way.

2) There is extremely strong scientific evidence that human behavior is completely controlled by the brain, and that there is not any mysterious "stuff" interacting with the brain to influence human behavior.

3) My brain, and my behavior, are more or less the same as every other human being, indicating that it is extremely unlikely that, while other people's behavior is caused by their brains (as science indicates), my own is not.

4) I thus conclude that my own behavior is caused by my brain, which means that whatever it is which I think of as my "consciousness", must be something my brain is doing.

5) I thus conclude that other human beings are also conscious.

Note that if I could not conclude (4), it would not be rational for me to conclude that other people are also conscious at all. That is the thing that really boggles my mind about people who insist that there is more to consciousness than brain activity. If they really believe this, then they have absolutely no rational justification for believing that anybody other than themselves possesses this additional component!


That's how I see it, anyway.


Dr. Stupid

[Freakshow]

Originally Posted by Stimpson J. Cat

Roboramma,


100% flawlessness isn't really necessary for Freakshow's argument to work. All that is needed is that the AI's behavior be indistinguishable from that of a sentient being.

Unless I am misunderstanding Freakshow, the argument can be rephrased something like this:

The only reasons any of us have for believing that anybody else possesses consciousness like we do, is by observing their behavior. So the question is, if some machine exhibited the same type of behavior as a human being, would there be any criteria by which we could determine that the human being is sentient, and the machine is not?

The answer is quite clearly "NO".

So we are left with either solipsism, or accepting that the machine is also sentient. Any belief that the human is sentient and the machine is not would have to be based on the preconceived belief that machines cannot be sentient. Hence the circularity part.


As far as I can see, the only real question which remains is whether or not, with respect to other people, it is actually rational to believe that they have consciousness or not.

I say that it is. My argument goes like this:

1) I know that what I think of as my "consciousness" affects my behavior, and does so in a very strong way.

2) There is extremely strong scientific evidence that human behavior is completely controlled by the brain, and that there is not any mysterious "stuff" interacting with the brain to influence human behavior.

3) My brain, and my behavior, are more or less the same as every other human being, indicating that it is extremely unlikely that, while other people's behavior is caused by their brains (as science indicates), my own is not.

4) I thus conclude that my own behavior is caused by my brain, which means that whatever it is which I think of as my "consciousness", must be something my brain is doing.

5) I thus conclude that other human beings are also conscious.

Note that if I could not conclude (4), it would not be rational for me to conclude that other people are also conscious at all. That is the thing that really boggles my mind about people who insist that there is more to consciousness than brain activity. If they really believe this, then they have absolutely no rational justification for believing that anybody other than themselves possesses this additional component!


That's how I see it, anyway.


Dr. Stupid

Great post! I agreed with almost all of it. I'm a little unsure of the last paragraph, but just need to read it some more tomorrow.

The only reason I specified "100% flawless" (you are right, it isn't absolutely required) is to help box the reader into a position where they are forced to focus on the philosophical matter at hand, instead of going into the issues of whether or not what is given is possible or reliable.

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Freakshow,

Quote:

Great post! I agreed with almost all of it. I'm a little unsure of the last paragraph, but just need to read it some more tomorrow.

Actually, looking back at what I said, my last paragraph doesn't come across quite as I intended. What I should have said is that it is step (4) which allows me to conclude that other people are also conscious. But really step (4) is a bit stronger than what is actually needed to reasonably draw this conclusion.

Even forgetting everything we know about how the brain works, and about the role it plays in things like thinking, remembering, perceiving, and so on. Even without any of that knowledge, we can look at other people, observe that they behave very similarly to the way we do, and observe that there are no apparent differences between us. Given such observations, the most reasonable conclusion is that they are exhibiting this behavior for the same reasons we are, and are therefor also conscious.

The scientific evidence concerning the brain just serves as supporting evidence for this hypothesis. It turns a reasonable theory into well-supported knowledge about how things work.

But again, if one presumes that there is some aspect of consciousness which is not reflected in our behavior, then there is no longer any basis for concluding that other people possess it.

So basically what the scientific evidence rules out is the notion of some sort of "ghost in the machine" which is conscious, and somehow interacts with our brains to produce our behavior.


Dr. Stupid

[rjh01]

Some things that we have that computers do not (what can be measured)
1. General knowledge (maybe).
2. Know lots of rubbish. Like what happened to us yesterday; what happens in a restaurant
3. The ability to evaluate this knowledge.
4. The ability to speak like a human.
5. The ability to see and analysis what you see.


All of the above are very difficult for a computer to have; yet, we all do easily.

The only bit I do not understand is what is ‘consciousness and sentience?” that is part of the original question. It is talked about a lot but never defined.

[drkitten]

Originally Posted by Freakshow

As you'll soon see, this does belong here as a philosophy discussion, and not in the computers and technology section.

Take the following two points as being given:[list=1][*]You have a test for evaluating sentience and conciousness. What this test is actually comprised of isn't really relevant to this discussion. The test is 100% flawless. It relies entirely on observation of and interaction with the subject being tested. (Not everyone knows what the Turing Test is, which is why I did not use that phrase.)[*]Someone has created a computer that passes this test.

As was pointed out, these two assumptions jointly are equivalent to the assumption that the computer is sentient and conscious.

Your question can therefore be rephrased as "Is a sentient and conscious computer sentient and conscious." To which the answer should be apparent upon a few hours contemplation.

[Beerina]

Originally Posted by rjh01

Some things that we have that computers do not (what can be measured)
1. General knowledge (maybe).
2. Know lots of rubbish. Like what happened to us yesterday; what happens in a restaurant
3. The ability to evaluate this knowledge.

The Cyk project (sp?) was based on the assumption that humans were little more than gigantic bags of learned knowledge, and the reason all AI attempts were miserable failures was because the machines lacked this knowledge.

So they'd type in knowledge in teams all day long, then let the machine "think" about it all night, and ask them questions the next morning.

It came up with some interesting observations, that are thinks you actually had to learn yourself, but now never think about, like "If I turn around, is the thing behind me still there?"

[Freakshow]

Originally Posted by drkitten

As was pointed out, these two assumptions jointly are equivalent to the assumption that the computer is sentient and conscious.

Your question can therefore be rephrased as "Is a sentient and conscious computer sentient and conscious." To which the answer should be apparent upon a few hours contemplation.

That actually wasn't what I meant to convey, but I realize now where the confusion comes from. I'll have to work on rewording it somewhat for future use. Thanks for filing the bug.

The point here isn't actually to talk about computers, but to talk about "what is consciousness"? I fall in the camp that thinks that we human beings are nothing more than organic computers. I don't believe in dualism, and have not been able to find any claim for it other than "Well, we humans are special somehow. We have SOULS!"

So, if people that believe that (humans have souls, and that is the explanation for our consciousness) are confronted with this situation...how do they react? Do they say "Someone just managed to come up with a computer that can flawlessly imitate a conscious being, and therefore pass this flawless test. It is a phenomenal trick, but still just a trick", or do they say "Hey, I was wrong. Machines CAN be concious. So maybe we don't have souls, after all. Maybe we humans are just sentient computers, too."

[hammegk]

Unfortunately, no 100% test can be derived to demonstrate any of us is conscious. If you accept that machines may indeed be sentient & conscious, presumably you also accept you can be exactly replaced by compute power and i/o sensors/servos. Identifying a programmer you would trust to do so might be a problem though.

As to solipsism, I've never heard a iron-clad argument disproving it; best I can do is by gentlemens' agreement state that we both should act as if neither of us is The Solipsist, should such exist; i.e. I don't "think" I'm The Solipsist. Thought Exists remains as the only tautology, otherwise we would not be doing what we are doing, or "think" we are doing.

I remain unconvinced that I am solely my behavior as perceived.

[drkitten]

Originally Posted by Freakshow

The point here isn't actually to talk about computers, but to talk about "what is consciousness"? I fall in the camp that thinks that we human beings are nothing more than organic computers. I don't believe in dualism, and have not been able to find any claim for it other than "Well, we humans are special somehow. We have SOULS!"

So, if people that believe that (humans have souls, and that is the explanation for our consciousness) are confronted with this situation...how do they react?

Well, if you accept as an assumption that only things with souls are conscious (and that only humans have souls), then it's not circular reasoning to reject the idea of a non-souled thing not being conscious. (You obviously do not accept that assumption, and in fact make the contrary assumption. This is good. Assumptions are good. I like assumptions -- but I also like to keep track of them, so that they can be rejected or amended as necessary.)

So we now have this hypothetical "test for consciousness." The obvious question is "Does it work?" If you also assume that the test is flawless (which I think is a much less valid assumption -- any behavioral test will have a chance of being passed "through sheer dumb luck."), then our second assumption is incompatible with our assumptions about souls. One of them has to go.

Which is more likely, that I'm wrong about souls, or that I'm wrong about the ability of humans to construct and administer a "flawless" test? I would argue in this circumstance that the second is much less likely -- humans have never been able to do anything "flawlessly," and the idea that this one test, one for which we have no possible way of cross-checking its results, happens to be the one thing we can do perfectly, defies credibility.

A more reasonable scenario is where this test is "highly accurate" (which you can formalize at any arbitrary level of accuracy if you need to). The question then becomes -- which is more likely, that the test missed on this one instance, or that the assumption about souls is incorrect. Again, I'd want to know how you demonstrated how accurate the test was -- and how you distinguished a test for "humanness" from a test for "consciousness." I don't think the epistemological machinery is there for you to be able to say, with conviction, that the test is "highly accurate."

Basically, this works to an epistemological question. Yes, there is possibly evidence that could falsify the assumption that humans and only humans are conscious. But I can't see how that evidence could itself be acquired, or the validity of the evidence established. It's a bootstrapping problem. I can't develop a unicorn detector without a theory of unicorns, and I can't establish a theory of unicorns without the ability to detect at least one unicorn to give me some data.

[Starthinker]

Originally Posted by rjh01

Some things that we have that computers do not (what can be measured)
1. General knowledge (maybe).
2. Know lots of rubbish. Like what happened to us yesterday; what happens in a restaurant
3. The ability to evaluate this knowledge.
4. The ability to speak like a human.
5. The ability to see and analysis what you see.


All of the above are very difficult for a computer to have; yet, we all do easily.

The only bit I do not understand is what is ‘consciousness and sentience?” that is part of the original question. It is talked about a lot but never defined.

I think to this list you can add something about being aware of self, fearing death, and the ability to imagine other realities.

[Roboramma]

I guess when it comes down to this I think we really need to understand conciousness, and understand the brain before we can create a workable test to see if something is concious.
What is conciousness, really?
What good is it for a brain? Is it something that comes about because of the other functions of the brain, or is it something that is there specifically for a purpose?
Ie. Does being intelligent produce conciousness or is conciousness necessary for intelligence?

Or is that a poorly framed question?

One reason for this, and one problem that I see with the Turing Test, but also with any test of conciousness, is that there are always multiple solutions to problems. Just because someone can program a computer to recognise a letter doesn't mean the computer is recognising it the same way that a human is.
On the other hand, I think that a computer that had to work within the limits of the human brain's information processing power that could still do all the things that we humans do would probably have to be concious.

But that's just a guess.

[Leif Roar]

There's actually two different questions here that are getting confused.

The first question is "Is the computer conscious and sentient?" and the answer to that question is (with our current understanding of consciousness and sentience) a resounding "We don't know."

The other question is "Should we consider the computer as conscious and sentient?" and the answer to that question is "Yes, as it appears to be, and we don't know differently."

[Taffer]

Originally Posted by Freakshow

So is it alive, or not? How do you know?

Being alive and being conscious are two different things. The problem comes from the definition of life; it's either falls too short or goes too far. On the one had, it doesn't include viruses and some forms of intracellular parasites, and on the other, it includes things like fire, and self replicating RNA. I'd say, no, a computer isn't 'alive' in the sense we use it. It doesn't replicate, it doesn't undergo any cell processes, it doesn't undergo respiration, etc.

It is, however, conscious.

[Q-Source]

Originally Posted by Freakshow

So is it alive, or not? How do you know?

My own opinion: I'm not really sure. But if you put a gun to my head and forced me to choose one way or the other, I would consider it to be a new life.

Freakshow,

The question should not be whether or not a machine is conscious. There is a simple NO or YES answer for that depending on what you believe.

The important question, that has been around for thousand of years, is: what is consciousness?, does it exist in the first place?.

How on Earth are scientists going to create a machine that is conscious if they deny that consciousness exist???

If I remember well, in order to have a machine that is indistinguishable from a human being, this machine would have to behave and think in such a way that it is possible to reduce those subjective experiences to objective processes, am I wrong??.

Well, I don't question whether or not scientists can create this machine. Of course they can. The thing is, they still don't have a way to obtain a complete objective description of the subjective. They can't.

[Taffer]

Q-Source, you obviously do not understand the materialist stance on consciousness if you claim that they "deny that consciousness exists".

[Q-Source]

Originally Posted by Stimpson J. Cat

Even forgetting everything we know about how the brain works, and about the role it plays in things like thinking, remembering, perceiving, and so on. Even without any of that knowledge, we can look at other people, observe that they behave very similarly to the way we do, and observe that there are no apparent differences between us. Given such observations, the most reasonable conclusion is that they are exhibiting this behavior for the same reasons we are, and are therefor also conscious.

How can you be sure that the rest is conscious?, what if we all are p-zombies?. According to your reasoning, we all must be p-zombies instead.

I don't understand your language, why is "consciousness" still in your vocabulary?. If you think that subjective=objective processes, then at least, you should be consistent like Daniel Dennett and eliminate the word consciousness for once and all.

[Q-Source]

Originally Posted by Taffer

Q-Source, you obviously do not understand the materialist stance on consciousness if you claim that they "deny that consciousness exists".

As I said to Stimpson, if you are a materialist or reductionist, at least you MUST be consistent with your arguments.

Otherwise, tell me which is the materialistic definition of consciousness.

[69dodge]

Originally Posted by Q-Source

If I remember well, in order to have a machine that is indistinguishable from a human being, this machine would have to behave and think in such a way that it is possible to reduce those subjective experiences to objective processes, am I wrong??.

Well, I don't question whether or not scientists can create this machine. Of course they can. The thing is, they still don't have a way to obtain a complete objective description of the subjective. They can't.

I probably don't understand what you're trying to say, because it seems to me that you're obviously contradicting yourself.

If a machine could be created which acts like a person, then either it is not necessary to "reduce [...] subjective experiences to objective processes" in order to build such a machine, or else, if it is necessary it is also possible.

[Ryokan]

I'm a sentient machine, and proud of it

[jay gw]

Since consciousness and sentience are not exclusive to humans there should be no reason to deny that the computer is conscious.

[Taffer]

Originally Posted by Q-Source

As I said to Stimpson, if you are a materialist or reductionist, at least you MUST be consistent with your arguments.

Otherwise, tell me which is the materialistic definition of consciousness.

As I said, you do not understand that which you are arguing against. Materialists do not hold that consciousness does not exist, but rather that consciousness as a seperate entity from the brain does not exist. Consciousness is the brain.

[Starthinker]

What if you give the machine the definitions of consciousness, life, etc, then ask it if it's sentient or not. Do you think it'd blow a fuse?

[Taffer]

No, I think it'd respond "yes".

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally Posted by Freakshow

I'm glad I'm not the only other person in the world that liked "I, Robot". I absolutely loved the movie. I don't think it gets enough credit.

huh, a guy who loves I Robot and doesnt like Star Trek... scary. I Robot, while still have some of what Asimove tried to say, its nothing but an american action movie, exaggerated ad nauseam. Star Trek, on the other side, its a fairly good series (both the shows and the pictures) about genuine science fiction. Anyway, continue with the topic please.

[Taffer]

Originally Posted by Bodhi Dharma Zen

Star Trek, on the other side, its a fairly good series (both the shows and the pictures) about genuine science fiction.

Well, genuine Space Opera, at least.

[toddjh]

I don't believe it's possible to simulate consciousness at all. Sure, it may one day be possible to write a deterministic computer program which can act superficially like a human (make convincing small talk, respond to queries from a store of general knowledge using natural-sounding language, and so on). Such simulations might even fool a lot of people under controlled conditions (even Eliza and friends fool some people, somehow) but this imitation can only go so far.

In order to mimic the full complexity of human behavior, there will be a limit to the amount the machine can "cheat." For example, take creativity and intuition. How could you program a machine to reproduce these? It's absurd to think there could be something as simple as a "creativity constant" in the source code you could go in and tweak to turn your AI into a genius. The only way things like that will exist is if they are emergent properties of the system, the same way they arise in us. In order for that to happen, the machine must be on the same order of complexity as humans themselves. I would argue that, by that point, you are no longer simulating consciousness, but reproducing it.

As for I, Robot, I thought it was halfway decent too. I think a lot of SF fans disliked it more than they should've because they were hoping for something close to the book (which is not filmable, in my opinion) and were let down by the fact that it was a conventional sci-fi action movie that had almost nothing to do with Asimov's stories.

It's a lot easier to like when you know it was intended to be a completely original story called Hardwired until the studio got the rights to the book and insisted the filmmakers change the title and throw in some of Asimov's character names and plot points. It's still a conventional sci-fi action movie, of course, but it's more thoughtful than most.

Jeremy

[Taffer]

I believe that is what we are talking about, toddjh: A machine as complex as a human brain. If you do not think that this would be conscious, I'd like to hear where you think consciousness comes from.

[toddjh]

Originally Posted by Taffer

I believe that is what we are talking about, toddjh: A machine as complex as a human brain. If you do not think that this would be conscious, I'd like to hear where you think consciousness comes from.

I think you misunderstood. What I am saying is that I think the original question is moot because it would be impossible to merely simulate a human-like level of consciousness. The only way we could succeed in making such a machine is to actually make it conscious, so the question of whether or not it's sentient is answered right from the start.

Jeremy

[Taffer]

I believe he is asking if consciousness can be in something that isn't human.

Also, think of it another way: Could me make a program that was conscious?

ETA: Although I agree with you on your point.

[toddjh]

Originally Posted by Taffer

I believe he is asking if consciousness can be in something that isn't human.

Well, I think the answer to that is trivially yes. There are other species that are obviously conscious to a certain degree.

Quote:

Also, think of it another way: Could me make a program that was conscious?

I don't think you could make a program that could mimic consciousness perfectly, but I think you could make one that creates it. I can't think of a reason why a complete software simulation of a human brain shouldn't result in the same emergent properties that a real brain does.

It wouldn't be a fancy version of Eliza, though. I think a lot of the current attempts at AI are doomed to failure for that reason: they attempt to cheat and recreate the high-level effects of consciousness without reproducing the underlying causes. They'll all hit a brick wall sooner or later and get stuck.

Jeremy

[Skeptical Greg]

Originally Posted by toddjh

...... The only way we could succeed in making such a machine is to actually make it conscious, so the question of whether or not it's sentient is answered right from the start.

Jeremy

Exactly.. Once you have simulated conciousness, it is no longer a simulation..



As a side to this.. There seems to be this inferrence, that once we have succeeded in creating intelligience, there is a question of how will we treat ( act toward ) it; or that it might be entitled to rights or some such.
Why should we treat it any better ( or worse ) than any other sentient beings ( including ourselves ) that we are already aware of?

Why should we think twice about flipping a switch on a machine, any more than we think about dropping a bomb or pulling a trigger?

[toddjh]

Originally Posted by Diogenes

As a side to this.. There seems to be this inferrence, that once we have succeeded in creating intelligience, there is a question of how will we treat ( act toward ) it; or that it might be entitled to rights or some such.
Why should we treat it any better ( or worse ) than any other sentient beings ( including ourselves ) that we are already aware of?

There's been a thread or two about this before. I think it will be a complete non-issue.

First, nobody is going to be making AIs just for the hell of it (except for maybe some prototypes to show it can be done). We're going to make them to do specific tasks. Given that, I fully expect they will be "programmed" (or conditioned/evolved/whatever term you want to use) to want to do what we tell them to do -- there's no better motivation than desire.

They're sentient and many people (myself included) will think that means they are entitled to the same legal rights as humans wherever practical. However, I think their "programming" will make this a moot point. They won't care about their rights. All they'll care about is doing their job, and they'll be perfectly content with that arrangement. They'll be obsessive workaholics.

In fact, if we ever get to the point where there are "free the AIs" rallies and the like, I fully expect it's the AIs themselves who will laugh at them and tell them to mind their own damn business.

Someone (I forget who, sorry!) thought that it would be a very similar situation to the house elves in the Harry Potter books, who sneer at anyone trying to "free" them, and whose worst fear in the world is losing their jobs.

Jeremy