are these statements logically equivalent?

[bpesta22]

Can't figure this out:

1) I don't believe gods exist.
2) I believe that no gods exist.

Trying to figure out if these two are equivalent, or differ logically. For example, would it be wrong to characterize (1) as a form of agnosticism (or weak atheism) and (2) as a form of atheism / strong atheism.

Or, do the two statements say exactly the same thing, logically.

I'm struggling with the difference between belief (which classifies one as atheist or theist) and knowledge (which classifies one as gnostic or agnostic). I have problems with using K to label people, as I think K (justified true belief) is impossible, and I think it's redundant / not independent of B -- we couldn't possibly know something we don't believe in.

So, the standard 2 x 2 table that labels people:

believe that god exists but dont know it (agnostic theist)
believe that god exists and know it (gnostic theist)
Believe that no gods exist but dont know it (agnostic atheist)
believe that no gods exist and know it (gnostic atheist)

seems to be either a straw-man, or a mislabeling, or a confounding of 3 variables (belief, knowledge, belief in god versus believing gods don't exist) when only 2 are needed to label.

it seems like you don't need the K distinction, and that the proper labels should be:

..............Gods exist............No gods exist
yes........theist...................strong atheist
no.........weak atheist.........deist / watchmaker type

can't call it yes or no; agnostic.


The standard table:

http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.p...t_vs._Agnostic

(see bottom)

Just seems wrong to me.

It seems underspecified in that it should allow / draw out cells where belief, knowledge, and "god exists" / no gods exist are all crossed. When you do that, you get to some absurd cells, which suggests to me that the standard table is not specified correctly.

Of course, I could be wrong.

help?

[andyandy]

Quote:

1) I don't believe gods exist.
2) I believe that no gods exist.

1) can either be a negative rejection or a positive assertion dependent on context.

2) is a positive assertion

Therefore the two sentences can be viewed as functionally identical in some contexts, but functionally distinct in others.

[Mangafranga]

I don't really follow the rest of your post, but to just address this part (and to flesh out andyandys response)-

Originally Posted by bpesta22

1) I don't believe gods exist.

To me 1 reads as "I don't have the belief that "p"" (this is the negative rejection interpretation). This leaves open whether or not that person has the belief that "~p". The person could just lack a belief either way. For example if you were to ask me if I had the belief that you have a car, I would probably say I neither believe that you have a car, nor do I believe that you don't have a car. And it is also possible that they do have the belief that "~p".

On the other hand it is possible to interpret 1 as "I believe that "~p""(the positive interpretation), although that intrepretation isn't natural to me. In this case it would be logically equivalent to 2.

[quixotecoyote]

I struggled with that for a while too. What I ended up with is that they are equivalent. They mean the same thing in any context you will actually see used, that you don't think a god exists. The reason the odd formulation has so much popularity is that it's really easy to get some wiggle room if you aren't making a positive claim. For that reason many atheists will phrase it as 1 in order to maintain the semantic high ground.

Unless you've never given the matter any thought at all, you're likely to have a belief on whether or not god exists, even if you aren't sure. The only way 1 is different than 2 is if it's meant to express a lack of any belief, not merely a negative one. Unless you truly think that god's a 50/50 toss up, no data to suggest a likelihood, or the thought's never crossed your mind, I think it's a weaselly way to phrase it.

[arthwollipot]

Think about it this way:

1. I don't believe that there is a teapot orbiting Pluto.
2. I believe that there are no teapots orbiting Pluto.

When you divorce the question from its emotional content, everything seems much clearer. The first allows for the possibility that there is a teapot orbiting Pluto, the second one does not.

Hence, they are not logically equivalent statements. What's more, one is a negative statement and one is a positive statement.

[baron]

The statements are identical in meaning. The end result of a belief in nothing is the same as no belief in something, i.e. a lack of recognition of the subject in question.

[arthwollipot]

I disagree. The lack of belief in the presence of a teapot is not the same thing as a belief in the nonpresence of a teapot. Sure - both imply that there is no teapot, but the method of coming to that conclusion is completely different.

But I'm not going to get all excited about it.

[quixotecoyote]

Originally Posted by arthwollipot

I disagree. The lack of belief in the presence of a teapot is not the same thing as a belief in the nonpresence of a teapot. Sure - both imply that there is no teapot, but the method of coming to that conclusion is completely different.

But I'm not going to get all excited about it.

Going with the teapot, would you really believe someone who said that he refused to think that there were no teapots around Pluto, but would not think that there were teapots. I'd think he was playing semantic games.

[blobru]

On knowledge vs. belief, I think:
belief is knowledge that such & such is more probable than not;
knowledge is belief in such & such for which one can conceive no meaningful alternative.
e.g., I know tomorrow will be Tuesday vs. I believe it will rain tomorrow.

So, "I believe God [doesn't] exist[s]" vs. "I know God [doesn't] exist[s]", seems the proper way to frame the combinations of [a]theists and [a]gnostics.

As for the two sentences:
1) I don't believe gods exist.
2) I believe that no gods exist.
... the only difference I can see is superficial -- 1) has asserted "gods exist" which I deny; 2) has asserted "no gods exist" which I accept. As a whole, the two statements appear logically equivalent (my belief in no gods, or non-belief in gods, makes either true). In parts, 2) is either doubly true (both assertion and belief) or doubly false; 1) is conflicted: either true and false, or false and true; however, the fact of gods existing or not still makes the beliefs identically true or false (which is the gist of either statement), so again they're logically equivalent.
There may be some peculiar sense of "belief" I'm overlooking... for now I'll say, logically at least, 1) = 2).

[volatile]

Originally Posted by quixotecoyote

Going with the teapot, would you really believe someone who said that he refused to think that there were no teapots around Pluto, but would not think that there were teapots. I'd think he was playing semantic games.

I think these kind of "semantic games" are actually quite important if precision is to be achieved in thought and in communication. You can see what a tangle BillieJoe got himself in over in the "Proof of God" thread for evidence of that.

It comes down to falsifiability again, which is important if we are to be able to justify atheism as a rigorously achieved opinion and not just something taken on faith. It's too easy to allow theists to view atheism as "just another religion" if we're not very clear about the logical thought process that led us there.

Arthwollipot is absolutely correct - "The lack of belief in the presence of a teapot is not the same thing as a belief in the nonpresence of a teapot. Sure - both imply that there is no teapot, but the method of coming to that conclusion is completely different."

[JoeEllison]

Originally Posted by arthwollipot

I disagree. The lack of belief in the presence of a teapot is not the same thing as a belief in the nonpresence of a teapot. Sure - both imply that there is no teapot, but the method of coming to that conclusion is completely different.

But I'm not going to get all excited about it.

I'd expand on this, by saying that #2 is a position of faith, while #1 is really a lack of faith. You can infer this from the fact that people use the word "belief" in very specific ways, especially when it comes to these subjects.

[Jekyll]

Originally Posted by bpesta22

Can't figure this out:

1) I don't believe gods exist.
2) I believe that no gods exist.
Or, do the two statements say exactly the same thing, logically.

Well if you wanted to express this in a logical predicate, the differences are between: ~B(G) and B(~G), where ~ means not, and B(...S...) expresses your belief in a statement S. Symbolically they're different, although you could still argue that they are equivalent in meaning.

However, I think there is a meaningful difference between the two as well. If you view the strength of a belief as some kind of probability, then `I have no belief(in X)' asserts a lack of bias while `I believe that not X is true' is a bias towards other explanations.

I'm not sure how meaningful this distinction is when talking about belief in God though. Many of the more sophisticated believers seem to only believe in God as some kind of philosophical prime mover and are as sure as atheists that god is not responsible for what other people would call divine intervention.

[drkitten]

Originally Posted by bpesta22

I'm struggling with the difference between belief (which classifies one as atheist or theist) and knowledge (which classifies one as gnostic or agnostic). I have problems with using K to label people, as I think K (justified true belief) is impossible, and I think it's redundant / not independent of B -- we couldn't possibly know something we don't believe in.

Simple. Justified true belief is not impossible, by any means.

For example, Mr Randi holds up his left hand, displays a sponge ball, closes his hand, then asks me which hand it's in. I believe -- justificably so -- that it's in his left hand.

My slightly more sophisticated friend has more knowledge of magic than I and believes -- also justifiably so -- that it's in his right hand because he recognizes the possibility of a trick.

Mr Randi, who is doing the trick, believes (justifiably so) that neither hand holds a sponge ball, because he put the sponge ball in his trouser pocket.

We all have justified beliefs, but only one of them (probably Randi's) is actually true.

You're making the standard confusion between having knowledge of P and having knowledge that you have knowledge of P. Just because I have a justified belief doesn't make it true. But just because I can't prove my justified belief true doesn't make it false.

[drkitten]

Originally Posted by quixotecoyote

Going with the teapot, would you really believe someone who said that he refused to think that there were no teapots around Pluto, but would not think that there were teapots. I'd think he was playing semantic games.

Teapots on Pluto are of course an extreme example; no rational person even thinks that they might be there.

But there are lots of examples where people don't hold opinions. Do you believe that La Estrellita is the best Mexican restaurant in Boulder Colorado? Never been to Boulder?
Well, is there a difference between not believing that that some restaurant you've never heard of is the best (because, fundamentally, you neither know nor care), and actively believing that some restaurant you've heard of isn't the best?

[dvide]

A newly born baby lacks a belief in God, but it does not positively believe God does not exist. The baby is too young to have even considered it. In the case of most athiests they lack a belief in God simply because they see no logical reason to do so, but they haven't decided to believe God does not exist.

I have found that there are some agnostics, however, who think atheism is defined as the positive belief that God does not exist. They are uncomfortable with this, which is why they call prefer to call themselves agnostics. I think a lot of athiests and agnostics would actually completely agree with one another - they're just using two terms for the same thing.

[Bri]

I think the two statement are usually intended to show the difference between a weak atheist (agnostic atheist, sometimes just called an "agnostic") and a strong atheist ("gnostic" atheist, sometimes just called an "atheist").

The first doesn't make a positive claim, but is an admission that the person doesn't know whether or not there is a god (agnosticism is a statement about a lack of knowledge of gods, whereas atheism is a statement about a lack of belief of gods). The second sentence is a positive claim that no gods exist (it implies a certain amount of knowledge about a lack of gods, usually stated in the form "I think it is more likely that no gods exist").

That said, the two points of view probably represent a continuum because agnosticism and atheism both represent a continuum (how strong you think your knowledge against the existence of gods is and how strong your belief against the existence of gods is). So most atheists would lie somewhere between the two extremes of "I have no idea whatsoever whether or not there is a god" and "I know for a fact that there is no god."

Most weak atheists will say that it is more likely that there are no gods but admit that they don't know for sure whether there are gods or not. Most strong atheists say that they believe that there are no gods, but admit that it is possible that there is a god. Therefore, if you are somewhere in the middle of the continuum, it is possible to make either statement and mean the exactly same thing.

Some question whether any valid belief exists at either extreme. Few people have no opinion whatsoever about whether or not there is a god, which would imply that they're probably not at the far "weak atheist" end of the continuum (i.e. they believe that some evidence exists that would tip the probability one way or the other). At the same time, few believe that it's possible to know for certain that there are no gods (although I have heard a few strong atheists claim to believe that it is impossible that a god exists because they think that the existence of a god is logically impossible.)

The real question is how much and of what quality you think the evidence for or against the existence of gods is (i.e. how likely you think it is that a god exists or doesn't exist).

-Bri

[Bri]

Originally Posted by drkitten

Teapots on Pluto are of course an extreme example; no rational person even thinks that they might be there.

I believe they might be there. It is highly unlikely that they are there, but it is certainly possible.

-Bri

[Roboramma]

Originally Posted by drkitten

But there are lots of examples where people don't hold opinions. Do you believe that La Estrellita is the best Mexican restaurant in Boulder Colorado? Never been to Boulder?
Well, is there a difference between not believing that that some restaurant you've never heard of is the best (because, fundamentally, you neither know nor care), and actively believing that some restaurant you've heard of isn't the best?

Exactly. I don't believe that bpesta ate eggs for breakfast today, but I also don't believe that he didn't eat eggs for breakfast. I simply don't know.

Of course, saying that i don't know doesn't mean I know nothing about it - I can say that it's more likely than that he ate spiders, for instance. And if I had access to some decent statistics for his part of the world, and knew what part of the world he lives in, I might be able to narrow down that likelihood even further. If I knew the person that cooked his breakfast and could ask him/her, I might narrow it down even further. And if I found enough evidence, I might go from saying "I don't believe you had eggs for breakfast" to saying "I believe you didn't have eggs for breakfast".

None of that last paragraph (or this one) was in response to you drkitten. I just think there's a parallel here with atheism. It's possible to say "I don't know if there's a god, but I don't believe that there is" without saying that you have no information one way or the other. But at the same time it is different from saying "I believe there is no god."

[IMST]

I would say that statement one applies to me, where statement two does not. I feel the concept of gods as usually stated is unfalsifiable, therefore it is equally meaningless to believe and believe not. There's just no way to have any evidence either way, so it's pointless.

[bpesta22]

Thanks for the replies so far-- !

Knowledge is justified true belief. I guess I'm hinging on TRUE. True with certainty, or to some degree of probability? I think it makes a difference, as in my experience, it seems like many agnostics feel that unless they can know for sure, they can't call it, and hence are agnostic versus atheist.

Plus, is knowing a feeling or does knowing imply that what is known is true (not just to the person, but true given the evidence)? Can you know something which in reality is false. I'd say yes, but the definition of K seems to say no. Also, if K is justified true belief, than both the atheist and the theist cannot K that there belief is true.

So, I still think there's a problem with that 2 x 2 box, but I haven't figured it out to my satisfaction.

Thanks again!

[arthwollipot]

Originally Posted by Jekyll

Well if you wanted to express this in a logical predicate, the differences are between: ~B(G) and B(~G), where ~ means not, and B(...S...) expresses your belief in a statement S. Symbolically they're different, although you could still argue that they are equivalent in meaning.

If you're going with formal logic, then you can do different things with the formula ~B(G) than you can with B(~G).

[rustytunes]

Perhaps you need to look at your definition of the word "belief". If belief is the conviction of the truth of a proposition without its verification, I would have phrased your problem:

1) I don't believe gods exist.
2) I think that no gods exist.

I don't really like using the word believe in this context.

[Mozybyte]

What is this word that "God" is?

[drkitten]

Originally Posted by bpesta22

Knowledge is justified true belief. I guess I'm hinging on TRUE. True with certainty, or to some degree of probability?

Neither -- both -- depending upon how you phrase it.

It is, for example, TRUE that a bachelor is unmarried. It is also TRUE that a fair die has a 1/6 chance of showing an ace when thrown. Both of those statements are true-with-certainty, despite the fact that the second is technically a statement about a probability distribution, not about any particular die being thrown.

Quote:

Both of those statements I think it makes a difference, as in my experience, it seems like many agnostics feel that unless they can know for sure, they can't call it, and hence are agnostic versus atheist.

Actually, the difference is not in TRUE, but in "justified." An atheist has a lower standard for what she considers a justified belief. At one extreme, a mathematical proof usually counts as justification by almost anyone's standards, but on the other hand, many people will consider a statement "justified" if a statement is merely so likely that to withhold assent would be perverse. For example, I consider it justified to state that my Honda is in the parking lot across the street, since I just parked it there. It could have been stolen in the past ten minutes, but I doubt it. It could have turned into a winged barracuda and flown away, but I doubt that. Under normal circumstances, "I parked it there, so that's where it is" is a legitimate justification, even if it's not 100% ironclad proof. If my car is in fact where I parked it, then I "know" where it is. If it's turned into a barracuda, then I will be both incorrect in my belief and very, very surprised.

Quote:

Plus, is knowing a feeling or does knowing imply that what is known is true (not just to the person, but true given the evidence)?

Knowing, by definition, implies something is true. (That's the "true" part of JTB.)

Quote:

Can you know something which in reality is false. I'd say yes, but the definition of K seems to say no.

Of course you can't, by the definition. What you can have is a justified belief in which you are highly highly confident, but it happens not to be untrue.

Quote:

Also, if K is justified true belief, than both the atheist and the theist cannot K that there belief is true.

Yup. Under the JTB framework, you can never -- or only in exceedingly rare circumstances, like in a math class -- know that one of your beliefs is genuine knowledge.

[Bri]

Originally Posted by bpesta22

Knowledge is justified true belief. I guess I'm hinging on TRUE. True with certainty, or to some degree of probability?

There isn't very much that we know for certain, therefore I think it is always going to be varying degrees of probability. The question is whether you think there is enough evidence against the existence of gods to hold a positive belief that there are none. Some agnostics would hold that if there isn't enough evidence, holding a positive belief that there are no gods would be a faith-based belief.

Quote:

I think it makes a difference, as in my experience, it seems like many agnostics feel that unless they can know for sure, they can't call it, and hence are agnostic versus atheist.

I think it's more subtle than that, and agnosticism and atheism are not really opposites, but two dimensions of a related set of beliefs. Nearly all atheists are agnostic to some degree (i.e. they admit that it is currently impossible to know for certain whether gods exist). The question is whether they feel that there is enough evidence to hold a positive belief that there are no gods.

Quote:

So, I still think there's a problem with that 2 x 2 box, but I haven't figured it out to my satisfaction.

There was a rather lengthy thread on this a while ago, and I came up with two charts that seem to work fairly well. The first one is the full grid with "gnosticism/agnosticism" along the left and "theism/atheism" along the top.



As you can see, this table leads to 6 cells. However, the "gnostic weak atheist" seems to be a fairly indefensible position, and therefore I doubt anyone believes it. So, removing that one yields the following easier to read chart:



Maybe that will help. It should be pointed out that there are no clear boundaries between the cells of these tables, so there is no clear boundary between an agnostic weak atheist and an agnostic strong atheist. Which you call yourself would depend on how much evidence you feel there is to justify a positive belief that there are no gods.

-Bri

[drkitten]

Originally Posted by Bri

There isn't very much that we know for certain, therefore I think it is always going to be varying degrees of probability. The question is whether you think there is enough evidence against the existence of gods to hold a positive belief that there are none. Some agnostics would hold that if there isn't enough evidence, holding a positive belief that there are no gods would be a faith-based belief.

But that's not an issue of "truth," that's an issue of "justification."

If you do not feel that any belief can be "justified" by only partial evidence, then of course you will not claim to "know" that there are no gods. You'll also never recommend a dish in a restaurant -- just because the linguini has been good the past thirty times you've eaten it is not sufficient justification to believe that it will be good this time. You probably also bet on tape-delayed sports events, too. After all, just because the Chargers lost live doesn't mean that they will lose on the tape, too....

Fortunately, very few people are this extreme.

[Mangafranga]

Originally Posted by bpesta22

Knowledge is justified true belief. I guess I'm hinging on TRUE. True with certainty, or to some degree of probability?

This seems to me to look at the TJB analysis from the wrong angle. The "true" aspect is not something that resides within the belief, as it were. It is just a constraint. That is, if the justified belief is not true, it is not knowledge.

[Bri]

Originally Posted by drkitten

But that's not an issue of "truth," that's an issue of "justification."

Yes, I entirely agree. Truth is truth, the question is whether or not you feel there is enough evidence to justify a belief that X is the truth.

Quote:

If you do not feel that any belief can be "justified" by only partial evidence, then of course you will not claim to "know" that there are no gods.

That's why "for certain" is in parentheses in the tables, because most don't believe that it's necessary to know for certain (nor that we can know anything for certain), but only to have enough evidence to justify belief.

-Bri

[drkitten]

Originally Posted by Mangafranga

This seems to me to look at the TJB analysis from the wrong angle. The "true" aspect is not something that resides within the belief, as it were. It is just a constraint. That is, if the justified belief is not true, it is not knowledge.

Brilliantly put.

[Beerina]

Originally Posted by In My Spare Time

I would say that statement one applies to me, where statement two does not. I feel the concept of gods as usually stated is unfalsifiable, therefore it is equally meaningless to believe and believe not. There's just no way to have any evidence either way, so it's pointless.

Yes, but at this point, I point out that the modern concept of God is really a corner into which He's been shoved by logic (and a healthy dose of my-god-is-tougher-than-your-god one-upsmanship over the millenia).

Modern God has the curious property of infinite power, and hence could hide infinitely well from modern, finite mortals. And he has the even more curious property of wanting to do this.

Many propose He values, for some strange reason, belief in Him without proof. As if this has some supreme metaphysical importance.

As if doing something for a reward, or to avoid punishment, or both, is acceptable only if you do it without proof it's going to actually happen. Is this a true value, or just an ad-hoc rationalization of the fact this "behavior" is really just a stretch trying to explain it, piling an ever-more-thinly-stretching reason on hypothisized God-behavior, when in fact, He just isn't there? And it's finally reached the level where the behavior matches simply not existing with complete mathematical precision. Curious that, and evidence of absence if you ask me.

I should point out, though, that this type of behavior (doing it because of a promise of reward, or avoiding punishment) really isn't very high on most ethicists' scales of ethical behavior rationales. It's considered better to do good things when people, including a hypothesized god, are not watching. It's better to do them because helping others helps you. Some, which I do not agree with, add in full-blown altruism, where you do it without any desire for a kickback benefit, although that does seem to be almost a meme-like reproduction taking precidence over a selfish gene.

Ahh, too much thinking. Where's the chocolate hot fudge and strawberry ice cream?

[blobru]

Originally Posted by Bri

As you can see, this table leads to 6 cells. However, the "gnostic weak atheist" seems to be a fairly indefensible position, and therefore I doubt anyone believes it.

Very handy table, Bri; but I'm not sure you should toss out "Gnostic weak atheist" just yet.
What if you reword it: "The [non]existence of a god is known; I currently lack a belief in the existence of gods however."
This then is someone who believes the info is available, but until she has enough she'll reserve judgement...
Such a one might be called a 'seeker', no?

[Bri]

I think you're indicating a statement of ignorance, unless I misunderstand. Something along the lines of "I know there is evidence that there are no gods, but I don't know what the evidence is so I will reserve judgement one way or the other until I do more research."

The problem with that reasoning is that if you know the evidence exists (even if you don't know what it is) then that seems to imply a positive belief that there are no gods, which would indicate a gnostic strong atheist. There is no need to reserve judgment unless you aren't claiming to know whether or not the evidence exists.

-Bri

[Bri]

In thinking about this further, I can imagine a situation where person A has good evidence that person B has proof of either the existence or nonexistence of deities, but doesn't know which it is (perhaps person B hasn't disclosed to person A whether deities exist or not). In that case, I suppose one could argue that person A is a gnostic weak atheist until such time as person B discloses the verdict.

Of course, I'm not sure what evidence person A might have of person B's knowledge without also knowing the verdict, nor am I sure how defensible such a position would be to anyone else. So, I will concede that perhaps it is possible for someone to have evidence that the existence or nonexistence of deities is known, but not have a positive belief in the existence or nonexistence of deities.

From a practical standpoint, I would be willing to venture that there are few if any gnostic weak atheists out there.

-Bri

[triadboy]

Originally Posted by bpesta22

Can't figure this out:

1) I don't believe gods exist.
2) I believe that no gods exist.

I'd like to know how many languages would translate both those thoughts the same. Maybe it's just something goofy you can do with the English language.

[joobz]

Originally Posted by triadboy

I'd like to know how many languages would translate both those thoughts the same. Maybe it's just something goofy you can do with the English language.

I'm certain that nuance exists in all languages (except perhaps pidgin forms)

the important point is if translations are always being true to the multiple layered meanings that can be encoded in the original. makes you wonder how any fundie can think they know what the bible is really saying.

[jsfisher]

Originally Posted by bpesta22

Can't figure this out:

1) I don't believe gods exist.
2) I believe that no gods exist.

Trying to figure out if these two are equivalent, or differ logically.

There are (1) things I believe are true, (2) there are things I believe are false, and (3) there are things that fall somewhere in between.

English is often ambiguous. The statement, "I don't believe gods exist", could be a statement of the second type or the negation of a statement of the first type.

So, "I don't believe gods exist" could mean either "I believe no gods exist" or "I don't know what to believe". At least that's the way I see it....

[arthwollipot]

Originally Posted by triadboy

I'd like to know how many languages would translate both those thoughts the same. Maybe it's just something goofy you can do with the English language.

We have some polyglots on the forum - I'm sure some of them can help.

[blobru]

Originally Posted by Bri

I think you're indicating a statement of ignorance, unless I misunderstand. Something along the lines of "I know there is evidence that there are no gods, but I don't know what the evidence is so I will reserve judgement one way or the other until I do more research."...

Originally Posted by Bri

In thinking about this further, I can imagine a situation where person A has good evidence that person B has proof of either the existence or nonexistence of deities, but doesn't know which it is (perhaps person B hasn't disclosed to person A whether deities exist or not). In that case, I suppose one could argue that person A is a gnostic weak atheist until such time as person B discloses the verdict. ...

I see gnostic weak atheism as a confession of current ignorance, but a surety that researching "God" will prove whether It exists or not.
I don't think it means A believes B has proof; more likely, A believes with enough information she [A] will resolve the question herself (perhaps with a God-[dis]proof no one's thought of yet).
This differs from agnostic weak atheism in that: the a-w-a believes it is in principle impossible to know one way or another -- absent some future science which rules God out or an appearance by God; the g-w-a believes it is possible to know now based on current data, she just has to 'figure it out'.
(Note: gender aside, this describes my own position at times.)

[schlitt]

the first statement could be taken as "i dont beleive gods (plural) exist, i only beleive in one god"

Whereas the second statement does not leave room for any god(s), multiple or singular.

[Bri]

Originally Posted by blobru

I see gnostic weak atheism as a confession of current ignorance, but a surety that researching "God" will prove whether It exists or not.
I don't think it means A believes B has proof; more likely, A believes with enough information she [A] will resolve the question herself (perhaps with a God-[dis]proof no one's thought of yet).
This differs from agnostic weak atheism in that: the a-w-a believes it is in principle impossible to know one way or another -- absent some future science which rules God out or an appearance by God; the g-w-a believes it is possible to know now based on current data, she just has to 'figure it out'.
(Note: gender aside, this describes my own position at times.)

The agnostic weak atheist believes that it is unknown whether gods exist, not necessarily that it is unknowable. The latter view is a subset of agnosticism (sometimes called "strong agnosticism") but it is difficult to defend since there is the possibility of the appearance of a god. Logically, such a view is problematic because to claim that gods are unknowable is itself a statement of knowledge about gods.

What you describe seems to be an agnostic weak atheist, not a gnostic weak atheist. A gnostic position is that the existence or nonexistence of gods is known. What you describe certainly acknowledges that the existence of gods is currently unknown.

In addition, there are some problems with the view you described that could make it a difficult one to defend. She claims to know that there is enough information of sufficient quality available to resolve the question, but doesn't know what that information is. So the question must be asked: how does she know that there is enough information of sufficient quality available, and what justifies the belief that she will come up with an answer when nobody else has in thousands of years?

-Bri